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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate: 

December 2005: 

Homeland Security: 

DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management Controls for the Science 
and Technology Directorate: 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-206]: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-206, a report to the Ranking Minority Member, 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,: 
United States Senate: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Science and Technology 
(S&T) Directorate was established to focus on areas such as addressing 
countermeasures for biological threats. To do this, it hired experts 
from the national laboratories under the authority of the 
Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA). The Directorate is organized 
into portfolios, led by portfolio managers. Questions have been raised 
about potential conflicts of interest for these individuals, since a 
portion of the Directorate’s research funds have gone to the national 
laboratories. GAO was asked to examine (1) the management controls 
established within the Directorate to help guard against conflicts of 
interest for IPA portfolio managers; and (2) the role of the IPA 
portfolio managers, particularly those from national laboratories, in 
determining where research and development projects were directed. 

What GAO Found: 

DHS’s S&T Directorate is working to improve its management controls to 
help guard against conflicts of interest for its IPA portfolio 
managers, but it can do more. In the first few years of DHS’s 
existence, the S&T Directorate focused on the urgency of organizing 
itself to meet the nation’s homeland security research and development 
requirements, and had few resources devoted to developing its 
management infrastructure, including the management controls to guard 
against conflicts of interest. In the past year, steps have been taken 
to improve these controls. For example, in June 2005, DHS implemented a 
new process for hiring IPA employees. Although the S&T Directorate is 
taking steps to improve its ethics-related management controls, several 
conditions still need to be addressed to better ensure that its IPA 
portfolio managers comply with the conflict of interest laws. First, 
the process for determining where research and development projects and 
funds are directed, including the role of the IPA portfolio managers, 
has never been finalized. Second, the S&T Directorate does not require 
documentation of how determinations are made about where research and 
development projects and funds are directed. Third, S&T Directorate 
officials are only now seeking waivers, where appropriate, and 
considering whether to take other actions that would allow IPA 
portfolio managers to participate in certain matters. Finally, DHS 
officials told us that S&T Directorate employees, including those hired 
under the IPA, are offered the same new employee and annual ethics 
training as are all DHS employees. However, employees hired under the 
IPA do not receive regular training that addresses their unique 
situation; namely that they have an agreement for future employment 
with an entity that may benefit from the S&T Directorate’s funding. 

The role of the IPA portfolio managers, five of whom came from the 
national laboratories, in determining where research and development 
projects and associated funds were directed was unclear. This was due 
to several factors. First, as previously discussed, the S&T Directorate 
has never finalized a standard process for determining where research 
and development projects and funds are directed, or the decision-making 
role of the IPA portfolio managers within such a process. Second, the 
extent of the IPA portfolio managers’ participation in making these 
determinations was unclear because there was no documentary evidence of 
how these determinations were actually made. Third, the testimonial 
evidence on the extent of the IPA portfolio managers’ involvement was 
inconsistent and, at times, vague. Because we could not determine 
whether or not the IPA portfolio managers participated “personally and 
substantially” in the decision-making process, which is precluded by 18 
U.S.C. § 208, GAO contacted the Acting Director of the Office of 
Government Ethics (OGE) in September 2005. GAO suggested that OGE 
review this matter further in conjunction with its planned ethics 
program review of DHS. In December 2005, OGE officials told us that 
they plan to examine, among other matters, the transparency and 
accountability issues in DHS’s ethics program raised by our findings. 

What GAO Recommends: 

To improve the S&T Directorate’s ethics-related management controls, 
GAO recommends that DHS take several related actions to help ensure 
that IPA portfolio managers comply with conflicts of interest laws. DHS 
concurred with our recommendations, and noted several actions they plan 
to take. If implemented effectively, these actions would be responsive 
to some of our recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-206. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact George H. Stalcup at 
(202) 512-6806 or stalcupg@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DHS's S&T Directorate Can Do More to Improve Its Management Controls 
Related to Conflicts of Interest for Its IPA Portfolio Managers: 

IPA Portfolio Managers' Role in Determining Where R&D Projects and 
Funds Were Directed Was Unclear: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: DHS Research and Development Funding Distribution in Fiscal 
Year 2004: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: The S&T Directorate's Offices and Overview of Their 
Functions: 

Figure 2: The S&T Directorate's R&D Funding Obligations in Fiscal Year 
2004: 

Abbreviations: 

BTS: Border and Transportation Security: 

DAEO: Designated Agency Ethics Officer: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

ERB: Executive Review Board: 

FFRDC: Federally Funded Research and Development Center: 

HSARPA: Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency: 

IPT: Integrated Project Team: 

IPA: Intergovernmental Personnel Act: 

OGC: Office of General Counsel: 

OGE: Office of Government Ethics: 

OPM: Office of Personnel Management: 

ORD: Office of Research and Development: 

PPB: Office of Programs, Plans, and Budgets: 

R&D: Research and Development: 

SED: Systems Engineering and Development: 

S&T: Science and Technology: 

Letter December 22, 2005: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

Dear Senator Lieberman: 

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and Technology 
(S&T) Directorate was established by the Homeland Security Act of 
2002[Footnote 1] to coordinate the federal government's civilian 
efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats 
on our nation. This activity was not the previous responsibility of any 
one agency. The Office of Programs, Plans, and Budget (PPB) was created 
within the S&T Directorate to establish and oversee the priorities of 
DHS's research and development activities. At the beginning of our 
review, PPB was organized into 18 portfolios, each focused on a 
particular discipline, such as addressing countermeasures for 
biological threats and border and transportation security.[Footnote 2] 
Each portfolio was headed by a portfolio manager who, according to DHS, 
helped to establish the research and development needs and priorities 
of their portfolios. 

When the S&T Directorate began operating in March 2003, it hired 
scientists, engineers, and experts in needed disciplines from federal 
laboratories, universities, and elsewhere in the federal government 
under authority provided by the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) 
of 1970.[Footnote 3] Portfolio managers hired under the IPA were 
brought to DHS from these employers because of their expertise in the 
areas of greatest risk to the nation's security. These managers were 
hired for a specified limited period with the understanding that they 
would subsequently return to their "home" institution. Seven of the 16 
portfolio managers for the 18 portfolios were employed by DHS under the 
IPA. Five of these 7 employees came from the national laboratories, 
which are owned by the Department of Energy (DOE) and operated by 
private contractors, and the two others came from a nonprofit 
organization and a federally funded research and development center 
(FFRDC).[Footnote 4] You have raised questions about potential 
conflicts of interest for these individuals, since a portion of the 
Directorate's research funds have gone to these laboratories. In fiscal 
year 2004, 23 percent of the S&T Directorate's $761 million in research 
and development project funding obligations went to the national 
laboratories. (Appendix I provides more detailed budgetary data). 

IPA employees are generally subject to the same conflict of interest 
laws and regulations as all other federal employees. One of these laws, 
Section 208 of Title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. § 208), 
generally precludes federal employees from personally and substantially 
participating in decisions in which they have a financial interest, 
including participating in decisions that affect an entity, such as the 
national laboratories, with which they have an agreement for future 
employment. However, the agency official responsible for hiring the 
employee can grant a waiver of this law's application if the official 
determines that the conflicting interest is not so substantial as to be 
deemed likely to affect the integrity of the services the government 
may expect. Further, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires 
agencies to establish a set of management controls.[Footnote 5] GAO 
issues standards for internal control in the federal 
government,[Footnote 6] as required by the Federal Managers' Financial 
Integrity Act of 1982,[Footnote 7] which provide the overall framework 
for establishing and maintaining internal control and for identifying 
and addressing major performance challenges and areas at greatest risk 
for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. 

As agreed with your office, we examined (1) the management controls 
that have been established within DHS's S&T Directorate to help guard 
against conflicts of interest for portfolio managers hired under the 
IPA, and (2) the role of the IPA portfolio managers (particularly those 
from the national laboratories) in determining where research and 
development (R&D) projects and associated funds are directed. 

To address our objectives, we reviewed DHS documentation of management 
controls related to conflicts of interest and other relevant documents, 
as well as its Web-based research and development process currently 
under development. In addition, we reviewed ethics laws and 
regulations, guidance on internal controls, and prior GAO and DHS 
Inspector General work pertaining to DHS's S&T Directorate and ethics 
issues. We also interviewed senior DHS officials, including the 
Assistant Secretary for Programs, Plans, and Budgets for the S&T 
Directorate and DHS's Designated Agency Ethics Officer (DAEO), as well 
as other officials in the S&T Directorate, including the IPA portfolio 
managers. In addition, we judgmentally selected two portfolios within 
the S&T Directorate, and interviewed members of these portfolio teams, 
to examine in more detail the existence of their process and management 
controls and compare any differences in the application of such 
processes and controls. These portfolios were: (1) the Biological 
Countermeasures portfolio, which is the largest portfolio in the S&T 
Directorate and led by an IPA; and (2) the Border and Transportation 
Security portfolio, a smaller portfolio led by a career federal 
employee. We also met with the Acting Director of the Office of 
Government Ethics (OGE) and her staff. OGE is the federal agency 
responsible for overseeing the executive branch's ethics programs. 
Appendix II contains more detailed information on our scope and 
methodology. 

We performed our work from September 2004 through December 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

DHS's S&T Directorate is working to improve its management controls to 
help guard against conflicts of interest for employees hired under the 
IPA, but it can do more. In the first few years of DHS's existence, the 
S&T Directorate focused on the urgency of organizing itself to meet the 
nation's homeland security research and development requirements, and 
had few resources devoted to developing its management infrastructure, 
including the management controls to guard against conflicts of 
interest. However, in the past year, steps have been taken to improve 
these controls. For example, in June 2005, DHS implemented a new 
process for hiring IPA employees. Although DHS is taking steps to 
improve its management controls, there is more the Directorate can do 
to better ensure that its IPA portfolio managers comply with the 
conflict of interest laws. First, the process for determining where R&D 
projects and funds are directed, including the role of the IPA 
portfolio managers, has never been finalized. Second, the S&T 
Directorate does not require documentation of how determinations are 
made about where R&D projects and funds are directed. Third, S&T 
Directorate officials are only now seeking waivers, where appropriate, 
and considering whether to take other actions that would allow IPA 
portfolio managers to participate in certain matters. Finally, DHS 
officials told us that S&T Directorate employees, including those hired 
under the IPA, are offered the same new employee and annual ethics 
training as are all DHS employees. However, employees hired under the 
IPA do not receive regular training that addresses their unique 
situation; namely that they have an agreement for future employment 
with an entity that may benefit from the S&T Directorate's funding. 

The role of the IPA portfolio managers, five of whom were hired from 
the national laboratories, in determining where research and 
development projects and associated funds are directed was unclear. 
This was due to several factors. First, as previously discussed, the 
S&T Directorate has never finalized a standard process for determining 
where R&D projects and funds are directed, or for the decision-making 
role of the IPA portfolio managers within such a process. Second, the 
extent of the IPA portfolio managers' participation in making the 
determinations was unclear because there was no documentary evidence of 
how those determinations were actually made. Finally, the testimony 
regarding the extent of the IPA portfolio managers' involvement in the 
decision-making process was inconsistent and, at times, vague. For 
example, one IPA portfolio manager told us that he/she recused 
him/herself from any decision that may have involved his/her national 
laboratory, although this portfolio manager noted that he/she was 
present and "facilitated" the meetings when such decisions were made. 
Other IPA portfolio managers told us that they participated to varying 
degrees. However, because there was no documentation of the decision- 
making process, we could not determine the extent of the IPA portfolio 
managers' actual involvement on any particular funding matter, or 
whether their involvement affected their national laboratory. Because 
we could not determine whether or not the IPA portfolio managers 
participated "personally and substantially" in the decision-making 
process, we contacted the Acting Director of OGE in September 2005, and 
suggested that OGE review this matter further in conjunction with its 
planned ethics program review of DHS. In December 2005, OGE officials 
told us that they plan to examine, among other matters, the 
transparency and accountability issues in DHS's ethics program raised 
by our findings. 

To help IPA portfolio managers comply with conflict of interest laws, 
we are making recommendations that the Secretary of DHS direct the 
Undersecretary for Science and Technology to work with DHS's DAEO and 
OGE to establish additional ethics-related management controls for the 
S&T Directorate by: 

* finalizing the R&D process; 

* developing a system to document how decisions are made within the R&D 
portfolio teams; 

* determining whether waivers of 18 U.S.C. § 208 are appropriate or 
other actions are needed; 

* providing regular ethics training for IPA portfolio managers; and: 

* establishing a monitoring and oversight program of ethics-related 
management controls. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security. DHS concurred with our recommendations and noted several 
actions that they plan to take. If implemented effectively, these 
actions would be responsive to some of our recommendations. For 
example, the S&T Directorate plans to (1) coordinate with the DAEO and 
OGE in seeking waivers under 18 U.S.C. § 208 for some of the IPAs in 
the S&T Directorate; (2) enhance its ethics-related training for IPAs; 
and (3) strengthen its monitoring and oversight programs for ethics- 
related management controls. 

Although DHS agreed with all of our recommendations, it believed that 
we misstated the facts in asserting that IPA employees do not routinely 
receive specific training regarding conflicts of interest. We revised 
the report to indicate that the ethics training we believe is still 
needed should focus on the application of the ethics statutes and 
regulations to the unique financial relationship between the IPA 
portfolio managers and their "home" institutions. Second, we are 
encouraged that the S&T Directorate is seeking waivers under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 208 for some IPAs. However, IPA portfolio managers continue to be 
vulnerable to violating the conflict of interest laws because the S&T 
Directorate has not finalized the process for determining where 
research and development projects and funds are directed. DHS's 
comments are provided in appendix III. In addition, we received 
technical comments from DHS, which we incorporated as appropriate. We 
also provided a draft to OGE. On December 8, 2005, we met with OGE 
officials, including the Deputy Director of the Office of Agency 
Programs, who provided us with technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. 

Background: 

The S&T Directorate consists of four offices responsible for managing 
and executing DHS's R&D programs: (1) the Office of Programs, Plans and 
Budgets (PPB); (2) Office of Research and Development (ORD); (3) 
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA); and (4) 
Systems Engineering and Development (SED), as seen in figure 1 below. 

Figure 1: The S&T Directorate's Offices and Overview of Their 
Functions: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] On June 29, 2005, a Chief Financial Officer position was created 
for the S&T Directorate to consolidate and execute budgetary planning. 
Because the budgetary responsibility for the S&T Directorate was moved 
out of the Office of Programs, Plans, and Budgets, its name was changed 
to the Office of Programs, Plans and Requirements (PPR). This new 
position and name change are not reflected in this figure. 

[End of figure] 

In the first few years of DHS's existence, the S&T Directorate focused 
on the urgency of organizing itself to meet the nation's homeland 
security research and development requirements, and had few resources 
devoted to developing its management infrastructure, including the 
management controls to guard against conflicts of interest. In our 2004 
report on DHS's potential use of the national laboratories, we noted 
that when the S&T Directorate began operating in March 2003, they 
sought and hired scientists, engineers, and experts in needed 
disciplines from federal laboratories, universities, and elsewhere in 
the federal government.[Footnote 8] These individuals were brought into 
the S&T Directorate to use their knowledge in ways that would help the 
Directorate achieve its mission quickly and effectively. DHS officials 
told us that these individuals came to DHS out of a sense of urgency 
and motivated by a strong sense of patriotism. Some of these scientists 
were hired from the national laboratories, and they came with the 
understanding that they would return to their laboratories following 
their time at DHS. 

As part of their responsibilities, portfolio managers led and 
facilitated Integrated Project Teams (IPT), which included 
representatives from ORD, HSARPA, and SED.[Footnote 9] In addition to 
identifying R&D projects and budgets, IPTs were responsible for 
determining which office (ORD, HSARPA, or SED) within the S&T 
Directorate would be responsible for them. These determinations were 
important because it influenced whether the project and associated 
funds went to the public or private sector. According to a March 2004 
Office of Inspector General report,[Footnote 10] ORD generally executes 
programs that involve the national laboratories and which the private 
sector should not, could not, or would not perform. HSARPA generally 
executes programs for which technology development involves the private 
sector. SED generally executes programs employing proven technologies 
and resulting in transition to operational systems. 

As previously discussed, IPA employees are generally subject to the 
same laws and regulations that govern the ethical conduct of other 
federal employees. Section 208 of Title 18 of the United States Code, a 
criminal statute, generally precludes federal employees from personally 
and substantially participating in any particular matter that would 
have a direct and predictable effect on their financial interests, or 
the financial interest of any organization attributable to them. An 
employee's participation is "substantial" if their participation is 
meaningful to the matter. An employee can be personally and 
substantially involved in a variety of ways, including making a 
recommendation, rendering advice, or making a decision on a particular 
matter. The law can be waived if the employee first makes a full 
disclosure of the conflict of interest to the official responsible for 
his or her appointment, "and receives in advance a written 
determination made (i.e., waiver) by such official that the interest is 
not so substantial as to be deemed likely to affect the integrity of 
the services which the government may expect."[Footnote 11] Executive 
departments and agencies are required to forward documentation of such 
waivers to OGE.[Footnote 12] Waivers cannot be granted to cover past 
activities. In addition to avoiding conflicts of interest, executive 
branch employees must avoid even the appearance of a conflict of 
interest. However, when there is potential for such an appearance of a 
conflict, an employee can be granted an "authorization" to work on a 
matter even in situations where a reasonable person with knowledge of 
the relevant facts can question the employee's impartiality in a 
matter.[Footnote 13] 

As mentioned earlier, OMB requires agencies to establish a set of 
management controls and GAO issues standards for internal control in 
the federal government.[Footnote 14] In addition, GAO developed the 
Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool[Footnote 15] to help 
managers and evaluators determine how well an agency's internal control 
is designed and functioning and help determine what, where, and how 
improvements, when needed, may be implemented. The five standards for 
internal control are: control environment, risk assessment, control 
activities, information and communications, and monitoring. Two of 
these standards, control environment and control activities, include 
key factors related to conflicts of interest. If effectively 
implemented, these internal controls can help to guard against 
employees participating in actions that present a personal conflict of 
interest. Examples of relevant key factors that address the 
establishment and maintenance of an effective control environment of an 
agency are: 

* establishment and use of a formal code of conduct and other policies 
communicating appropriate ethical and moral behavioral standards and 
addressing acceptable operational practices and conflicts of interest; 

* establishment of an ethical tone at the top of the organization and 
communicated throughout the agency; and: 

* implementation of policies and procedures for hiring employees. 

Internal control activities are the policies, procedures, techniques, 
and mechanisms that help ensure that management's directives to 
mitigate identified risks are carried out. Examples of relevant key 
factors that address internal control activities are: 

* existence of appropriate policies, procedures, techniques, and 
mechanisms with respect to each of the agency's activities; 

* providing appropriate training and other control activities to give 
employees the tools they need to perform their duties and 
responsibilities to meet the demands of changing organizational needs; 
and: 

* documentation of transactions and other significant events is 
complete and accurate and facilitates tracing the transaction or event 
and related information from authorization and initiation, through its 
processing, to after it is completed. 

DHS's S&T Directorate Can Do More to Improve Its Management Controls 
Related to Conflicts of Interest for Its IPA Portfolio Managers: 

DHS's S&T Directorate has implemented several management controls to 
help its IPA portfolio managers comply with conflict of interest laws 
and regulations. Most of these were implemented during the course of 
our review. Since the S&T Directorate was created in 2003, individuals 
employed in the S&T Directorate under the IPA have completed an 
"assignment agreement", as required by OPM. Having procedures in place 
for hiring employees and implementing them is one aspect of an 
effective management control environment. The assignment agreements 
include a section on conflicts of interest and employee conduct. As 
part of the assignment agreement, each applicant must acknowledge that: 

* "applicable Federal, State or local conflict-of-interest laws have 
been reviewed with the employee to assure that conflict-of-interest 
situations do not inadvertently arise during this assignment"; and: 

* "the employee has been notified of laws, rules and regulations, and 
policies on employee conduct which apply to him/her while on this 
assignment." 

We reviewed the IPA assignment agreements for all of the IPA portfolio 
managers and found that the IPA portfolio managers acknowledged these 
provisions. 

The S&T Directorate's leadership took steps to establish an ethical 
tone and communicate it through a March 15, 2004, memorandum from DHS's 
Undersecretary for S&T to all S&T Directorate employees emphasizing 
that they should strictly adhere to all applicable ethics laws. The 
memo summarized ethics laws, called attention to the consequences of 
noncompliance, provided points of contact for those with questions, and 
explained that S&T employees "have the responsibility to be scrupulous 
in complying with all applicable ethics laws." Further, the memo 
specifically mentioned that employees hired under the IPA may not 
participate in matters involving their "home" institution (which, in 
the S&T Directorate, has often been a DOE national laboratory). The 
memo explained provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 208, stating that an employee 
may not participate "personally and substantially" in a particular 
matter that may affect an entity in which he has a financial interest 
and that "personal and substantial participation can occur if the 
employee participates in a decision, approval, disapproval, 
recommendation, investigation, or the rendering of advice on the 
matter." 

According to DHS's DAEO, the IPAs in the S&T Directorate were employed 
before a process was in place to screen them for personal conflict of 
interest issues. On June 30, 2005, the S&T Directorate issued new, 
internal procedures for hiring employees under the IPA. These new 
procedures outline the responsibilities of the parties involved in the 
hiring process and detail the steps necessary to hire an IPA. These 
steps include a preliminary review of financial disclosure forms by 
DHS's Office of General Counsel (OGC) to determine whether conflicts of 
interest exist based on the roles and responsibilities of the proposed 
position. 

Along with these new hiring procedures, the S&T Directorate began 
requiring applicants being considered under the IPA to complete written 
disqualification statements meant to bar their involvement in any 
matter that could reasonably be perceived to affect the interests of 
their national laboratory or other employer. In addition, once hired, 
IPAs can complete a memorandum that provides their supervisor with a 
written recusal from "certain Government matters" that affect the 
institution to which they will return after their employment at DHS, 
and allows them "to describe the screening arrangement" they are 
implementing to ensure that they comply with their "obligation to 
recuse." In this memorandum, the employee then lists each asset, 
entity, or other interest that gives rise to a disqualifying interest 
under 18 U.S.C. § 208. 

DHS officials told us that S&T Directorate employees, including those 
hired under the IPA, are offered the same new employee and annual 
ethics training as are all new DHS employees. Having training and 
orientation programs for new employees, with ongoing training for all 
employees, are key activities for establishing effective 
controls.[Footnote 16] On January 7, 2005, the Assistant Secretary of 
PPB also held a mandatory meeting for all IPAs in the S&T Directorate. 
S&T Directorate officials told us that this meeting was called to 
discuss the ethics issues that apply specifically to employees hired 
under the IPA, including the conflict of interest statutes. 

Other important management controls that could help ensure portfolio 
managers comply with conflict of interest laws are not yet in place in 
the S&T Directorate. Importantly, the process for determining where R&D 
projects and funds are directed, including the role of the IPA 
portfolio managers, has never been finalized. Establishment of a 
process for each agency activity is one of the key factors for meeting 
internal control standards. Though IPTs were created to help make this 
determination, as previously discussed, we were told that each IPT 
worked differently and there were no requirements to operate in the 
same way. In addition, neither the S&T Directorate nor its draft 
process requires documentation of how determinations are made about 
where R&D projects and funds are directed. 

Further, the S&T Directorate is only now seeking waivers, where 
appropriate, and considering whether to grant authorizations or take 
other actions for their portfolio managers hired under the IPA. As we 
discussed, under 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1), the official responsible for an 
employee's appointment may grant a waiver in advance allowing 
participation in certain matters if he or she makes a written 
determination that the affected financial interest "is not so 
substantial as to be deemed likely to affect the integrity" of the 
employee's services. In May 2005, an S&T Directorate official stated to 
us that they first needed to "scrutinize all of their positions to 
determine whether an actual or apparent conflict requires such action." 
In August 2005, senior S&T officials told us that, in conjunction with 
DHS's DAEO and OGE, they had begun the process of determining whether 
to issue waivers to IPA portfolio managers. During our exit briefing 
with DHS in September 2005, DHS officials indicated that one option 
might be to not hire anyone for which a waiver may be needed. In DHS's 
December 2005 letter to us commenting on our report, it noted that the 
S&T Directorate is now seeking waivers for at least 6 of its IPAs. 

Finally, IPA portfolio managers in the S&T Directorate are not 
routinely offered specific training that focuses on the application of 
the ethics statutes and regulations to the unique financial 
relationship between the IPA portfolio managers and their "home" 
institution. The January 2005 meeting held with all IPAs in the S&T 
Directorate to discuss the specific ethics issues related to their 
circumstances is not scheduled to be repeated. Ensuring that management 
conveys the message on a periodic basis that integrity and ethical 
values must not be compromised is part of maintaining an effective 
control environment. Because of IPA portfolio managers' ties to their 
"home" institution, and that their responsibilities at DHS may involve 
issues that affect their "home" institution, ensuring that these 
managers receive regular training that targets the application of 
conflict of interest laws to IPAs may keep them alert to those actions 
that could constitute a violation of such laws. 

IPA Portfolio Managers' Role in Determining Where R&D Projects and 
Funds Were Directed Was Unclear: 

The recent changes and further improvements to the S&T Directorate's 
ethics-related management controls are critical because we found that 
the role of the IPA portfolio managers in determining where R&D 
projects and associated funds were directed was unclear. This was due 
to several factors, as discussed in more detail below. 

First, the process that was to be followed by IPA portfolio managers 
when determining where R&D projects and funds are directed, and the 
decision-making role of the IPA portfolio managers within such a 
process, has never been finalized. DHS provided us with a draft version 
of this process as part of a Web-based tool. However, IPTs were not 
required to follow this draft process and team members from the two 
IPTs that we examined said that they were becoming familiar with the 
process. In this draft, DHS stated that IPTs, facilitated by portfolio 
managers, were to "decide" which office within the S&T Directorate 
would execute a project, (i.e., ORD, HSARPA, or SED). The draft stated 
that if the members of the IPT could not reach agreement, the project 
would be reviewed by the Executive Review Board (ERB), which consisted 
of the Assistant Secretary, Programs, Plans, and Budgets, and the 
Directors of SED, ORD, and HSARPA. However, in September 2005, senior 
S&T Directorate officials told us that the information regarding the 
decision-making role of the IPT in the draft Web-based tool was 
inaccurate, indicating that IPTs can only make recommendations to the 
ERB, but not a final decision. However, as we noted, 18 U.S.C. § 208 
guards against "personal and substantial participation" through various 
actions which include "decision" and "recommendation." 

Second, DHS officials, portfolio managers, and IPT members were unable 
to provide us with any documentation, such as meeting minutes, to 
indicate the actual role that the five IPA portfolio managers from the 
national laboratories played in the decision-making process within the 
IPTs. Third, the testimony regarding the extent of the IPA portfolio 
managers' involvement in the decision-making process was inconsistent 
and, at times, vague. For example, one IPA portfolio manager told us 
that he/she recused himself/herself from any decision that may have 
involved his/her national laboratory, although this manager noted that 
he/she was present and "facilitated" the IPT meetings when such 
decisions were made. Other IPA portfolio managers told us that they 
participated to varying degrees. For example, one told us that he/she 
was involved in the IPT decisions regarding which S&T Directorate 
office would execute a project only when the other IPT members could 
not reach agreement. Another told us that he/she participated in all 
IPT discussions that helped make this determination. However, because 
there was no documentation of the decision-making process, we could not 
determine the extent of the IPA portfolio managers' actual involvement 
on any particular funding matter, or whether their involvement affected 
their "home" institution, such as a national laboratory. 

In March 2005, we discussed our review with OGE to obtain their views 
on the ethics issues, both in general and as they may specifically 
apply to the S&T Directorate. During these discussions, OGE officials 
told us that they planned to begin their first audit of DHS's ethics 
program in late 2005. Because we could not determine whether or not the 
IPA portfolio managers participated "personally and substantially" in 
the decision-making process, however, we contacted the Acting Director 
of OGE in September 2005 and suggested that OGE review this matter 
further in conjunction with its planned ethics program review of DHS. 
In December 2005, OGE officials told us that they plan to examine, 
among other matters, the transparency and accountability issues in 
DHS's ethics program raised by our findings. 

Conclusions: 

In the first few years of its existence, the S&T Directorate focused on 
rapidly organizing itself to meet the nation's homeland security R&D 
requirements. During this time, DHS had few resources devoted to 
developing the S&T Directorate's management infrastructure, including 
management controls to guard employees against conflicts of interest. 
Although the S&T Directorate has recently implemented management 
controls to help protect against conflicts of interest, and is 
currently considering others, more needs to be done. In the absence of 
a process for deciding what entities will implement R&D projects, the 
role that IPA portfolio managers played has been inconsistent and the 
potential exists that they may have unknowingly violated conflict of 
interest laws. By developing and carrying out a process to decide which 
office will execute a project, and clearly defining the roles and 
responsibilities of those involved in the process, the S&T Directorate 
may help its IPA portfolio managers avoid such situations in the 
future. In addition, documenting how the decisions are made while 
implementing this process may help protect both DHS and its employees 
if questions are raised. 

Ensuring that the S&T Directorate continues to have access to the best 
personnel with needed expertise is important to the success of DHS's 
mission. The IPA provides the S&T Directorate with a mechanism to hire 
some of these people. However, because IPA portfolio managers have an 
arrangement for future employment with an entity that could benefit 
from the S&T Directorate's work, determining whether (1) waivers of the 
conflict of interest laws are appropriate, (2) IPA portfolio managers 
should be authorized to work on these issues regardless of any 
appearance of a conflict, or (3) DHS should take other steps to 
facilitate the use of their expertise to achieve the S&T Directorate's 
mission, could help ensure that these valuable employees are protected 
against violating conflict of interest laws. 

Further, once hired, IPA employees must understand how the ethics laws 
address their unique situations; namely, that they have an agreement 
for future employment with an entity that stands to benefit from the 
S&T Directorate's funding. Regular training for IPA portfolio managers 
that targets the conflict of interest laws could help them understand 
what actions are not permitted. 

Finally, to help ensure that DHS's ethics-related management controls 
are implemented and working in a satisfactory manner, it is critical 
that DHS establish a monitoring and oversight program. Such a 
monitoring mechanism will allow the S&T Directorate to assess its 
ethics-related management controls in order to facilitate awareness and 
mitigation of risk in DHS, while providing a greater degree of 
impartiality and integrity. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help IPA portfolio managers comply with the conflict of interest 
law, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct 
the Undersecretary of the S&T Directorate to improve the S&T 
Directorate's management controls related to potential conflicts of 
interest by: 

* finalizing the S&T Directorate's R&D process and defining and 
standardizing the role of the IPA portfolio managers in this process; 

* developing a system to document how decisions are made within the 
IPTs; 

* determining, in consultation with DHS's DAEO and OGE, whether waivers 
of 18 U.S.C. § 208 or authorizations related to the appearance of a 
conflict of interest are appropriate, or other actions are needed; 

* providing regular ethics training for IPA portfolio managers that 
focuses on the application of the ethics statutes and regulations to 
their unique financial situation; and: 

* establishing a monitoring and oversight program of ethics-related 
management controls. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security. DHS concurred with our recommendations and noted some actions 
that they plan to take. If implemented effectively, these actions would 
be responsive to some of our recommendations. For example, the S&T 
Directorate plans to (1) coordinate with the DAEO and OGE in seeking 
waivers under 18 U.S.C. § 208 for some of the IPAs in the S&T 
Directorate; (2) enhance its ethics-related training for IPAs; and (3) 
strengthen its monitoring and oversight programs for ethics-related 
management controls. 

Although DHS agreed with all of our recommendations, it believed that 
we misstated the facts in asserting that IPA employees do not routinely 
receive specific training regarding conflicts of interest. We revised 
the report to indicate that the ethics training we believe is still 
needed should focus on the application of the ethics statutes and 
regulations to the unique financial relationship between the IPA 
portfolio managers and their "home" institutions. Second, we are 
encouraged that the S&T Directorate has reviewed the individual 
circumstances of all of the IPAs in the S&T Directorate and is seeking 
waivers under 18 U.S.C. § 208 for at least six of these individuals. 
However, as stated in our report, the S&T Directorate has not finalized 
the process for determining where research and development projects and 
associated funds are directed, nor has it defined and standardized the 
role of the IPA portfolio managers in this process. Further, the 
ability of IPA portfolio managers themselves to influence or control 
where projects and funds are directed has been inconsistent and, at 
times, vague within the S&T Directorate. Thus, IPA portfolio managers 
continue to be vulnerable to violating the conflict of interest laws. 
DHS's comments are provided in appendix III. In addition, we received 
technical comments from DHS, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

We also provided a draft to OGE. On December 8, 2005, we met with OGE 
officials, including the Deputy Director of the Office of Agency 
Programs, who provided us with technical comments, which we made as 
appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and other interested parties. In addition, this report is 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any further questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-6806 or [Hyperlink, stalcupg@gao.gov]. 
Major contributors to this report included Ben Crawford, Terry Draver, 
John Krump, James Lager, Andrea Levine, Sarah Veale, and Michael Volpe. 

Sincerely yours, 

George H. Stalcup: 
Director, Strategic Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: DHS Research and Development Funding Distribution in Fiscal 
Year 2004: 

In fiscal year 2004, the most recent year in which the Science and 
Technology (S&T) Directorate could provide us with detailed breakdowns 
of its obligated funds, about 41 percent of the $761 million obligated 
for its research and development (R&D) funding was distributed to 
Department of Energy and federal laboratories (mostly the Office of 
Research and Development's programs) and about 40 percent to the 
private sector (mostly the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects 
Agency's programs), as seen in figure 2 below. 

Figure 2: The S&T Directorate's R&D Funding Obligations in Fiscal Year 
2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: This chart is presented for background purposes only; therefore 
we did not assess the reliability of the data. 

[A] Includes Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, 
nonprofits, etc. 

[B] Includes DHS-funded laboratories. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

The objectives of our review were to examine (1) the management 
controls that have been established within the Department of Homeland 
Security's (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to help guard 
against conflicts of interest for portfolio managers hired under the 
Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), and (2) the role of the IPA 
portfolio managers (particularly those from the national laboratories) 
in determining where research and development (R&D) projects and 
associated funds are directed. 

To address our objectives, we analyzed DHS documentation of management 
controls related to conflicts of interest and other relevant documents. 
These documents included such materials as agency directives, official 
memos, human capital procedures, fiscal years 2007-2011 Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting Cycle guidance, DHS reports and testimony to 
Congress, and IPA agreement forms for the Directorate's employees hired 
under the IPA. In addition, we reviewed the most current, but 
incomplete, draft of an electronic version of the Research, 
Development, Testing and Evaluation process to be used by the S&T 
Directorate. We reviewed relevant laws and regulations, including the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Title 18 U.S.C. Section 208(a); (b); and 
5 C.F.R. pt. 2635. In addition, we used GAO's Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government and Internal Control Management and 
Evaluation Tool. We also reviewed prior work from DHS's Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) and GAO on the DHS S&T Directorate and ethics- 
related issues. 

We interviewed officials in the S&T Directorate, including the Deputy 
Secretary for S&T and head of Programs, Plans, and Budgets (PPB); 
Director of the Office of Research and Development (ORD); Acting 
Director of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(HSARPA); S&T portfolio managers, five of whom were employed by DHS on 
IPA agreements from the national laboratories; and the human capital 
director for S&T. We did not interview the Director of Systems, 
Engineering, and Development (SED) because SED works with mature 
technologies at or near the deployment stage, rather than technologies 
needing R&D by an entity like the national laboratories. More 
specifically, we examined the role of the IPA portfolio managers from 
the national laboratories in determining where R&D projects and 
associated funds were directed during the period from December 2004 
through May 2005. In addition, we interviewed DHS's Designated Agency 
Ethics Officer, attorneys in DHS's General Counsel's Office, and DHS's 
OIG. 

We judgmentally selected two portfolios within the S&T Directorate to 
examine in more detail the existence of their process and management 
controls and compare any differences in the application of such 
processes and controls. These portfolios were: (1) the Biological 
Countermeasures portfolio, which is the largest portfolio in the S&T 
Directorate and is run by an IPA; and (2) the Border and Transportation 
Security (BTS) portfolio, a smaller portfolio managed by a career 
federal employee. We interviewed the members of these Integrated 
Project Teams, which included representatives of PPB, HSARPA, ORD and 
SED. In addition, we reviewed the fiscal years 2004 and 2005 Execution 
Plans for the Biological Countermeasures portfolio, the fiscal year 
2004 Execution Plan for the BTS portfolio, and the fiscal year 2004 BTS 
portfolio funding allocations by type of entity. (e.g., national 
laboratory, university, private industry, etc.) 

We also met with the Acting Director of the Office of Government Ethics 
(OGE) and her staff to discuss the ethics issues we were reviewing at 
DHS. OGE exercises leadership in the executive branch to prevent 
conflicts of interest on the part of government employees and to 
resolve those conflicts of interest that do occur. The responsibilities 
of the Director of OGE include, among other things, consulting with 
agency ethics counselors and other responsible officials regarding the 
resolution of conflict of interest problems in individual cases, and 
ordering corrective action on the part of agencies and employees which 
the Director deems necessary. 

Written comments from DHS are included in appendix III. We performed 
our work from September 2004 through December 2005 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

December 7, 2005: 

Mr. George H. Stalcup: 
Director, Strategic Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Stalcup: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on draft report GAO-
06-206, HOMELAND SECURITY. DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related 
Management Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate. 
Technical comments have been provided under separate cover. 

With respect to the assertion that Intergovernmental Personnel Act 
(IPA) portfolio managers within the Science and Technology (S&T) 
Directorate do not routinely receive specific training regarding 
conflicts of interest, we believe this misstates the facts. While it is 
clear that the identification and administration of detailees under the 
IPA in S&T has been problematic, there is no question that once an IPA 
is identified to the Department's Legal Advisor for Ethics (the 
Department's Designated Agency Ethics Officer or DAEO), that individual 
is required to complete new employee and annual ethics training, as 
appropriate. As discussed in your report, the January 2005 meeting with 
all IPAs in S&T that was held to discuss ethics issues was a direct 
result of discussions with IPAs at the annual ethics training session 
held in December 2004 for S&T personnel. 

A review of the ethics training records for Calendar Year (CY) 04 and 
05 shows that in CY 04, the Ethics Office provided 7 one-hour face-to- 
face annual ethics training sessions for S&T staff who filed financial 
disclosures, to include the IPA employees. In CY 05, the number of 
these face-to-face sessions increased to 12. For CY 05, while 
developing the S&T focused annual training, the ethics instructors 
identified ethics issues unique to S&T personnel after consultation 
with S&T officials, reviewed requests for ethics advisory opinions 
submitted by S&T personnel throughout the past year, and considered 
ethical concerns raised by S&T staff in discussion with the ethics 
staff. As a result, the training sessions to S&T personnel integrated 
discussion of ethical problems, such as conflicts of interest likely to 
arise in S&T due to the component's unique mission and component 
specific programs. As the S&T IPAs have become known to the Ethics 
Office and added to those notified about annual ethics training, the 
number of IPAs attending appropriate ethics training has steadily 
increased. 

Overall, the Department concurs with the recommendations contained in 
the report. However, we would like to call your attention to some 
corrective actions already underway with respect to three of the 
Recommendations for Executive Action and ask that these efforts be 
acknowledged in the final report. 

* Determining, in consultation with DHS's DAEO and OGE, whether waivers 
of 18 U.S.C § 208, authorizations related to the appearance of a 
conflict of interest, or other actions are needed: 

In November 2005, officials from the Science and Technology's Offices 
of General Counsel and Human Capital thoroughly reviewed the records, 
and assignments, of all IPA employees that are assigned to S&T. This 
review was conducted under the premise that we would seek a waiver 
under 18 U.S.C. 208(b) if the duties of the incumbent IPA could 
potentially affect the financial interests of a family member or their 
sending institution. This review standard was intended to be stricter 
than that in 18 U.S.C. 208 - -personal and substantial participation of 
employee in a matter in which he/she has a financial interest. 

Given the recent allegations that IPAs at S&T were in positions to 
direct work to their sending institutions, we were especially focused 
on both the raw ability of an IPA to direct work to any particular 
institution (including the national labs) as well as their ability to 
shape requirements which could be the subject of future work which 
their institution might seek to perform. As a result of this zero-based 
review, we identified 7 IPAs in S&T that are candidates for 18 U.S.C. 
208 waivers. This is in addition to the disqualification statements 
that all IPAs in S&T have signed admonishing them of their obligations 
under 18 U.S.C. 208 and requiring them to involve their named 
supervisor in any official matter in which their sending institution, 
or a corporate affiliate, may become involved. 

One individual is at the end of her IPA term so, depending on timing, a 
waiver may not be sought in her case by S&T. In no case did S&T find an 
instance where an IPA - regardless of assignment - is specifically 
directing work to his/her sending institution or, to the best of our 
knowledge, helping shape requirements which could benefit his/her 
sending institution. S&T is now preparing waiver packages - using 
templates provided by Office of Government Ethics (OGE) - for the 
appropriate individuals. Those packages will be coordinated with the 
DAEO and the OGE. As new IPAs join S&T, each case will be analyzed 
prior to that person's assignment to determine whether the new hire IPA 
presents 18 U.S.C. 208 challenges that would need to be addressed in 
some manner. 

* Providing regular ethics training for IPA portfolio managers that 
focuses on the application of the ethics statutes and regulations to 
their unique financial situation. 

Officials from the Department's Office of General Counsel (OGC) and 
S&T's Offices of General Counsel and Human Capital determined that the 
appropriate course of action for long-term ethics training would be to 
enhance the new ethics website called Ethicsburg to include new 
training web pages devoted strictly to IPAs. 

If approved by Ethicsburg management, this web-based approach would 
allow the IPA job candidate to complete his/her ethics training before 
joining the Directorate. Upon completion of the required training, 
Ethicsburg automatically generates a completion certificate, which is 
routed to the Department's OGC. The Directorate is in the process of 
submitting recommendations for the long-term Ethicsburg initiative to 
add IPA training to Ethicsburg management. 

In the interim, pending approval of the long-term Ethicsburg 
initiative, the short-term training solution is the creation of a MS 
PowerPoint © presentation devoted to the IPA's unique ethics training 
requirements. Section one of this presentation would be devoted to 
training ethics-related laws and statutes, while section two would be a 
multiple choice test that each IPA would need to complete with a 
passing score. The Directorate is in the process of developing this 
presentation which will be distributed to all current S&T IPAs for 
completion no later than January 31, 2006. 

Additionally, all IPAs are required to fulfill their annual ethics 
training requirement unless they are new hires or have completed the 
ethics training during the current calendar year. S&T's annual ethics 
training is conducted in two settings: several classroom sessions with 
an OGC instructor, or electronically through Ethicsburg. Instructions 
were sent to all IPAs regarding filing the Confidential Disclosure 
Report (OGE-450) and the Public Financial Disclosure Report (SF-278). 
Instructions were also sent to IPAs on how to access Ethicsburg. 

* Establishing a monitoring and oversight program of ethics-related 
management controls. 

In those situations where Ethicsburg is determined to be an appropriate 
means for providing ethics training, it affords a simple mechanism for 
notifying the Ethics Office and the supervisor of the employee involved 
that the employee has completed certain required modules of ethics 
education. Ethicsburg will, at the request of the employee who has 
completed a training module, send an electronic notification to a data 
file maintained by the Ethics Office and to the employee's supervisor 
that the employee has successfully completed the training. 

Meanwhile, during CY05, the Directorate created numerous ethics related 
guidance documents regarding ethics non-disclosure report filing 
requirements. Within these documents were instructions to reference the 
OGC website to access required ethics laws and past legal actions for 
training purposes. Distribution lists were created for OGE-450 and SF- 
278 filers for the purpose of disseminating ethics related 
announcements regarding training and the filing of non-disclosure 
reports. 

By early 2006, S&T will launch a new Staffing Management System (SMS) 
database which will contain the names of all current S&T employees to 
include IPAs. Included within the SMS system, we will track and monitor 
completion of ethics training requirements; submission of new financial 
disclose forms; disqualification statements; and Section 208 waivers 
for all IPAs. Until the SMS system is launched, current management 
controls include audit mechanisms now in place to ensure each item is 
addressed. In addition, S&T receives reports from the OGC office on 
financial reports by calendar year. 

With regard to the two other Recommendations for Executive Action, in 
general we concur. The Directorate has taken action to strengthen 
existing processes. It should be noted that the S&T/Office of the Chief 
Financial Officer, the Requirements Office, and the program execution 
officers have instituted internal controls which require that before 
any requirements are validated or funds allocated to an executing 
organization (Office of Research and Development, Systems Engineering 
and Development, or Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects) that 
there is significant oversight by S&T's senior management. 

We thank you again for the opportunity to provide comments on this 
draft report and look forward to working with you on future homeland 
security issues. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Steven J. Pecinovsky: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

(450346): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 301, 116 Stat. 2135, 2163 (2002). 

[2] As of September 2005, there were 13 portfolios. 

[3] 5 U.S.C. §§ 3371-76. The IPA facilitates the temporary hiring of 
skilled personnel or specialists to and from other federal entities, 
state and local governments, colleges and universities, and Indian 
tribal governments. Such assignments may be used to achieve objectives 
such as assisting the transfer and use of new technologies. DHS hires 
IPAs under a 2-year agreement that can be renewed one time for 2 
additional years, consistent with Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
regulations. 

[4] FFRDCs are nonprofit organizations that are generally financed on a 
sole-source basis by federal agencies. 

[5] OMB Circular No. A-123 (June 1995). 

[6] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[7] 31 U.S.C. § 3512(c). 

[8] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's 
Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 
Detection and Response Technologies, GAO-04-653 (Washington, D.C.: May 
24, 2004). 

[9] For more information on the use of IPTs, see GAO, Best Practices: 
DOD Teaming Practices Not Achieving Potential Results, GAO-01-510 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2001). 

[10] Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 
Survey of the Science and Technology Directorate, OIG-04-24 
(Washington, D.C.: March 2004). 

[11] 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1). 

[12] 5 C.F.R. § 2640.303. 

[13] 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502. Authorizations are based upon a determination 
"that the interest of the Government in the employee's participation 
outweighs the concern that a reasonable person may question the 
integrity of the agency's programs and operations." 

[14] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

[15] GAO, Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G 
(Washington, D.C.: August 2001). 

[16] For more on DHS's training program, see GAO, Department of 
Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training Important for 
Successful Transformation, GAO-05-888 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 
2005). 

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