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entitled 'Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard 
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force 
Transformation Initiatives' which was released on October 20, 2005. 

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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and Chairman, 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 
Relations, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

October 2005: 

Reserve Forces: 

Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and 
Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives: 

GAO-06-111: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-111, a report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Government Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats and International Relations, House of Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Recent military operations have required that the Army rely extensively 
on Army National Guard forces, which currently comprise over 30 percent 
of the ground forces in Iraq. Heavy deployments of Army National Guard 
forces and their equipment, much of which has been left overseas for 
follow-on forces, have raised questions about whether the Army National 
Guard has the types and quantities of equipment it will need to 
continue supporting ongoing operations and future missions. 

GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) the Army National Guard 
has the equipment needed to support ongoing operations and (2) the Army 
can account for Army National Guard equipment left overseas. GAO also 
assessed the Army’s plans, cost estimates, and funding strategy for 
equipping Guard units under its modular and rotational force 
initiatives. 

What GAO Found: 

While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting 
the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the 
equipment inventory of the Guard’s nondeployed units and threatens the 
Guard’s ability to prepare forces for future missions at home and 
overseas. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment 
shortfalls because (1) they have been equipped at less than war-time 
levels with the assumption that they could obtain additional resources 
prior to deployment and (2) current operations have created an 
unanticipated high demand for certain items, such as armored vehicles. 
To fully equip its deploying units, as of July 2005, the Army National 
Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from its 
nondeployed units. As of May 2005, such transfers had exhausted the 
Guard’s inventory of more than 220 high demand equipment items, such as 
night vision equipment, trucks, and radios. Further, as equipment 
requirements for overseas operations continue to evolve, the Army has 
been unable to identify and communicate what items deploying units need 
until close to their scheduled deployments, which challenges the Guard 
to transfer needed equipment quickly. 

To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for continuing 
operations, the Army has required Army National Guard units to leave 
behind many items for use by follow-on forces, but the Army can account 
for only about 45 percent of these items and has not developed a plan 
to replace them, as DOD policy requires. DOD has directed the Army to 
track equipment Guard units left overseas and develop replacement 
plans, but they have not yet been completed. The Army Guard estimates 
that since 2003 it has left more than 64,000 items, valued at more than 
$1.2 billion, overseas to support operations. Without a completed and 
implemented plan to replace all Guard equipment left overseas, Army 
Guard units will likely face growing equipment shortages and challenges 
in regaining readiness for future missions. Thus, DOD and Congress will 
not have assurance that the Army has an effective strategy for 
addressing the Guard’s equipping needs. 

Although Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new 
designs within the Army’s modular force by 2008, they are not expected 
to be equipped for these designs until at least 2011. The Army has not 
developed detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard’s equipment 
requirements to transform to a modular force while supporting ongoing 
operations. As of June 2005, the Army estimated that it would cost 
about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard’s units, but this 
estimate did not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to 
provide detailed information to support the estimate. In the short 
term, units nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for 
equipment, which may affect the availability of equipment needed for 
modular conversions. Until the Army fully identifies the Guard’s 
equipment requirements and costs for both the near and long term, DOD 
and Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh the affordability 
and effectiveness of the Army’s plans. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary 
of the Army to develop and submit to Congress plans and funding 
strategies to address the Army National Guard’s equipment shortfalls, 
accurately track and replace equipment its forces left overseas, and 
complete planning to integrate the Army National Guard into its modular 
and rotational force initiatives. DOD agreed with the recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-111. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent, 202-
512-4402, stlaurentj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Overall Equipment 
Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units: 

Army's Lack of Accountability and Plans to Replace All Army National 
Guard Equipment Retained in Theater Hinder the Guard's Ability to 
Prepare and Train Units: 

Army National Guard Units Are Changing to New Designs, but Will 
Continue to Lack Equipment Comparable to Active Forces: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Examples of Current Mobilization Equipment Shortages among 
Nondeployed Army National Guard Units: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Post-September 11, 2001 Army National Guard Activity under 
Federal Command and Control: 

Figure 2: Percentage of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units Meeting 
Minimum Equipment Criteria to Deploy: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

October 4, 2005: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Government Reform: 

The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 
Relations: 
Committee on Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 
subsequent launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army National 
Guard has been called upon to play a significant role in supporting 
active Army forces overseas while, at the same time, taking on new 
homeland defense missions, such as protecting critical infrastructure-
-all of which require that the Army National Guard have sufficient 
quantities and types of equipment items. In addition, the Army National 
Guard must use its allotted equipment to perform other domestic 
responsibilities, including responding to natural emergencies or 
incidents of civil unrest. Historically, the Army National Guard has 
been structured as a follow-on force that supports the active Army in 
overseas conflicts, and as such, Guard units have not been resourced 
with all of the equipment and personnel they require for their 
missions. Instead, it was assumed that there would be sufficient time 
for units to obtain the remainder of their resources prior to 
deployment. However, Army National Guard members now comprise 31 
percent of the ground forces in Iraq. While Army officials anticipate 
Guard involvement to decline somewhat in 2006, the tempo of operations 
over the long term remains uncertain. The post-September 11 increase in 
the Army National Guard's responsibilities, particularly its increased 
involvement in overseas operations, raises concerns about whether the 
Army National Guard has the equipment it needs to continue to support 
operations in the future. 

The Army recognizes that it needs to transform its forces, including 
the National Guard, to better meet the emerging threats of the 21st 
century and is undertaking two initiatives designed to enhance the 
capability of active and reserve forces. One of the Army's key 
initiatives--called the modular force initiative--is a multibillion 
dollar effort to restructure the entire Army. It involves increasing 
the flexibility and responsiveness of the force by converting from a 
division-based structure to smaller brigade combat teams and increasing 
the pool of units available for deployment. In addition, the Army is in 
the process of developing a rotational force model in which active and 
reserve forces would progress through a cycle of increasing readiness, 
culminating in the availability of a specified number of units for 
deployment if needed. The Army also hopes the model will increase 
deployment predictability for Army National Guard soldiers, who have 
been heavily involved in recent operations and must balance their 
military duties with civilian careers. 

The challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in managing its 
reserve forces and allocating its resources across services and 
programs are some of the many issues that we have highlighted to 
Congress as the nation entered the 21st century.[Footnote 1] We have 
previously reported on how the Army National Guard and Army Reserve 
have been used in recent operations.[Footnote 2] In 2004, we reported 
on the effect of the continuing high use of National Guard forces and 
challenges to prepare the Guard for future overseas and domestic 
missions.[Footnote 3] In addition, we recently testified on the Army's 
plans to convert to a modular force.[Footnote 4] And, in August 2003 
and September 2004, we reported on several reserve mobilization issues, 
including the limited use of the individual ready reserve and long-term 
availability issues.[Footnote 5] 

In response to your request that we examine Army National Guard 
equipment issues, the objectives of this report are to assess the 
extent to which (1) the Army National Guard has the types and 
quantities of equipment needed to support the Global War on Terrorism 
and (2) the Army can account for Army National Guard equipment that has 
been transferred to the active component in theater and its plans for 
replacing this equipment. We also examined the Army's plans for 
converting the Army National Guard to a modular force and implementing 
a rotational force model to determine how Army National Guard units 
will be equipped for future missions and the estimated costs of the 
conversion. 

To address these objectives, we analyzed data on the types and 
quantities of Army National Guard equipment that have been used in 
support of the Global War on Terrorism and the equipment status of 
nondeployed units; the extent to which Army National Guard equipment 
has been retained overseas in the theater of operations; and the Army's 
plans to create a modular force and its new rotational force model. We 
interviewed officials in the DOD, the Department of the Army, and the 
National Guard Bureau to obtain information on how equipment needs have 
evolved, the extent to which equipment has been transferred to the 
active component and the Army's plans for replacing it, and the Army's 
plans to include the Army National Guard in the modular force 
initiative and the rotational force model. We supplemented this 
information with visits to Army commands and conducted a case study of 
unit equipment experiences by visiting two units, the 30th Brigade 
Combat Team in North Carolina, which deployed in February 2004, and the 
48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, which deployed in May 2005. We 
selected these units because they allowed us to evaluate how the 
process used to prepare units has changed with subsequent rotations to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. We conducted our review in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards between December 2004 
and August 2005 and determined that the data used were sufficiently 
reliable for our objectives. The scope and methodology used in our 
review are described in further detail in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

While Army National Guard units have deployed overseas with most of the 
equipment they have needed to support current operations, the Guard is 
experiencing growing equipment shortages which are decreasing the 
ability of its nondeployed forces to be ready for future operations at 
home and overseas. Equipment shortages have developed for two primary 
reasons. First, the Army National Guard has been equipped at less than 
war-time readiness levels under the assumption that there would be 
sufficient time for its forces to obtain additional equipment prior to 
deployment; in peacetime, units generally had only about 65 to 75 
percent of the equipment they needed for their wartime missions. For 
recent operations, theater commanders have generally required Army 
National Guard units to deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the equipment 
that is needed for their missions and, in some cases, to obtain 
different equipment, such as more modern communications systems, than 
Army National Guard units are authorized in peacetime. Thus, to fully 
equip its deploying units, as of July 2005 the Army National Guard had 
transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from nondeployed 
units to prepare deploying units; an increase of 189 percent from the 
35,000 equipment items that were transferred as of June 2004.[Footnote 
6] Providing this equipment has depleted its inventories of more than 
220 critical items and reduced inventories of other mission-essential 
items[Footnote 7] to only 61 percent of requirements by May 2005. 
Second, demand for some types of equipment, such as armored humvees and 
night vision equipment, has increased across the Army, and equipment 
requirements continue to evolve. This has made it very difficult for 
the Army to communicate to deploying units what equipment is needed in 
theater and further challenges the Army National Guard to identify and 
transfer the right equipment. The continuing strategy of transferring 
equipment to deploying forces hampers the ability of nondeployed forces 
to train for future missions. The Army has developed processes to 
ensure that deploying active and reserve forces are provided the 
equipment they need for their deployments through transferring 
equipment between units and concentrating high-demand equipment in 
theater. However, growing equipment shortages resulting from these 
processes among the Army National Guard nondeployed force make it 
unclear whether the Guard will be able to maintain acceptable levels of 
equipment readiness for missions overseas or at home. 

Compounding the problem of equipment transfers within the Guard, Army 
National Guard units that have returned from overseas deployments have 
left behind many equipment items for use by follow-on forces by 
transferring equipment to active Army units. However, the Army does not 
have a complete accounting of these items or a plan to replace the 
equipment, as DOD policy requires. DOD Directive 1225.6, which 
implements this policy, requires the services to develop a replacement 
plan for equipment transferred from the reserve component to the active 
component for more than 90 days. The Army National Guard estimates that 
since 2003, it has transferred more than 64,000 pieces of equipment, 
valued at more than $1.2 billion, to the Army to support Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. However, the Army is only centrally tracking the portion 
of the Guard's equipment that it expects will remain in the theater for 
the duration of current operations such as those items purchased 
specifically for units deploying to the theater or certain high-demand 
items in short supply. Items that units transfer to other units may 
also remain in theater for up to 3 years, but the Army does not have a 
complete accounting of these items because they are not tracked 
centrally. The Army expects that the items transferred from unit to 
unit will eventually be returned to the Guard, although the Guard does 
not know whether or when the items will be returned. Army officials 
told us they did not track and develop plans to replace Guard equipment 
because there were many other priorities in the early phases of the 
war, and the strategy of having units leave some equipment was expected 
to be a short-term measure. Yet, as operations continue, the amount of 
Guard equipment overseas has increased and, without a centralized 
process to account for all items that have been retained in theater, it 
is not clear how the Army will be able to develop the replacement plans 
required by the DOD directive. In May 2005, DOD expressed its concerns 
about the magnitude of equipment Guard units have left overseas and 
directed the Army to submit replacement plans for Guard equipment. 
Until these plans are completed and replacement equipment provided, 
Army National Guard units will face continuing equipment shortages 
while challenged to train and prepare for future missions. 

Although Army National Guard units are converting to new designs within 
the Army's modular force by 2008 and entering the Army's new rotational 
cycle, some units are not expected to be equipped for the new designs 
until 2011. Further, the Army has not developed detailed equipping 
plans that specify the Guard's equipment requirements for each phase of 
the rotational cycle. One of the Army's chief goals of its modular 
force initiative is to create standardized unit designs in the active 
and reserve forces with similar structures and equipment that are as 
effective as current brigades. Under this initiative, the Army National 
Guard's new units will need different types and quantities of equipment 
for wartime missions and training. However, the Army is modifying the 
preferred designs to include the equipment it can reasonably expect to 
have based on current funding plans. As a result, Army National Guard 
units will continue to lack equipment items and have to use less modern 
equipment to fill gaps until at least 2011, and not be comparably 
equipped with their active duty counterparts. Our analysis of other DOD 
initiatives has shown that detailed plans which outline the major 
implementation tasks and identify realistic funding requirements are 
needed to facilitate success and avoid unintended consequences, such as 
differing assumptions among key leaders in DOD and Congress about 
priorities or program performance. The Army has not completed detailed 
plans or cost estimates for these initiatives because it is moving 
quickly to implement them to better support continuing operations. 
Until the Army fully identifies the requirements and associated costs 
of these two initiatives and makes key implementation decisions, DOD 
and Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh their 
affordability and effectiveness, and the Army National Guard will face 
uncertainty as it prepares to implement the restructuring efforts. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary 
of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding 
strategy that addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard 
and a plan for the effective integration of the Army National Guard 
into its rotational force model and modular force initiatives. DOD 
agreed with our recommendations and cited actions the Army is taking to 
posture the Army National Guard for prolonged operations by building a 
rotational force and developing a resource priority plan for all Army 
units. DOD stated that the details raised in our recommendations need 
to be addressed in the Army's strategy for equipping Army National 
Guard units to prepare for future state emergency response, homeland 
defense, and federal missions. DOD also stated that the Army is taking 
steps to implement stricter accountability over Guard equipment 
currently left in theater and is working to develop replacement plans 
for these items. 

Background: 

The Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard 
of the United States are two components of the armed forces Selected 
Reserve.[Footnote 8] The National Guard Bureau is the federal entity 
responsible for the administration of both the Army National Guard and 
the Air National Guard. The Army National Guard, which is authorized 
350,000 soldiers, makes up more than one-half of the Army's ground 
combat forces and one-third of its support forces (e.g., military 
police, transportation units). Army National Guard units are located at 
more than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50 states and 4 U.S. 
territories. Traditionally, the majority of Guard members are employed 
on a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend per month and 2 
weeks per year. However, after September 11, 2001, the President 
authorized reservists to be activated for up to 2 years. As of July 
2005, more than 70,000 Army National Guard personnel were activated 
under this authority to support ongoing operations. The Guard also 
employs some full-time personnel who assist unit commanders in 
administrative, training, and maintenance tasks. 

Army National Guard personnel may be ordered to perform duty under 
three general statutory frameworks: Title 10 or 32 of the United States 
Code or pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. In a Title 
10 status, Army National Guard personnel are federally funded and under 
federal command and control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by 
being ordered to active duty, either voluntarily or under appropriate 
circumstances involuntarily (i.e., mobilization). Personnel in Title 32 
status are federally funded but under state control. Title 32 is the 
status in which National Guard personnel typically perform training for 
their federal mission. Personnel performing state active duty are state-
funded and under state command and control. Under state law, the 
governor may order National Guard personnel to perform state active 
duty to respond to emergencies, civil disturbances, and for other 
reasons authorized by state law. 

While the Army National Guard performs both federal and state missions, 
the Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions, 
and these take priority over state missions. The Global War on 
Terrorism, a federal mission, is a comprehensive effort to defeat 
terrorism and protect and defend the homeland and includes military 
operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. As we reported in our November 2004 report on 
the National Guard, the Army National Guard's involvement in federal 
operations has increased substantially since the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, and Army National Guard members have participated in overseas 
warfighting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, peacekeeping operations 
in Bosnia and Kosovo, and homeland missions, such as guarding Air Force 
bases. Figure 1 shows that while the number of activated Army National 
Guard personnel has declined since its peak in December 2004 and 
January 2005, it continues to provide a substantial number of personnel 
to support current operations. As of July 2005, about 35,500 of the 
113,000 soldiers, or nearly one-third of the soldiers serving in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, were Army National Guard members. In a June 
30, 2005, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee the 
Army's Chief of Staff said that the Army National Guard's participation 
in overseas operations is expected to decrease somewhat in the near 
future. Although the Army National Guard is expected to continue its 
participation in ongoing operations, decisions as to the level of 
participation have not been made. 

Figure 1: Post-September 11, 2001 Army National Guard Activity under 
Federal Command and Control: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The Department of the Army is responsible for equipping the Army 
National Guard. DOD policy requires that equipment be provided to units 
according to their planned wartime mission, regardless of their 
component. However, based on the Army's funding priorities, the most 
modern equipment is usually provided to units that would deploy first. 
Later deploying units, such as most Army National Guard units, are 
equipped with older items from the Army's inventory as active forces 
receive newer and more modern equipment. Army National Guard units are 
responsible for conducting some maintenance of their equipment. 

Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Overall Equipment 
Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units: 

While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting 
the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the 
equipment inventory of the Guard's nondeployed units and equipment 
shortages threaten the Guard's ability to prepare forces for future 
deployments. Among nondeployed National Guard units, the amount of 
essential warfighting equipment on hand has continued to decrease since 
we last reported on the Army National Guard in 2004. Equipment 
shortages have developed because most Army National Guard units are 
still structured with lesser amounts of equipment than they need to 
deploy. To ready deploying units for overseas missions, the Guard has 
had to transfer large numbers of equipment items from nondeployed 
units--a practice that has left nondeployed units with increasing 
shortages of equipment and made it difficult to prepare units for 
future missions and maintain readiness for any unplanned contingencies. 
Moreover, the equipment requirements for deploying Army National Guard 
units have evolved as the nature of current operations has changed. 
This has meant that in some cases, the Army National Guard has had 
little time to identify sources of equipment and transfer needed items 
to deploying units. The Army is adapting some of its processes to help 
units address the evolving equipment requirements. 

The Army National Guard's Initial Equipment Shortages and the 
Continuing Need for Fully Equipped Forces for Current Operations Have 
Resulted in Critical Equipment Shortages: 

Most Army National Guard units mobilized[Footnote 9] for recent 
overseas operations had equipment shortages that had to be filled so 
that the unit could meet the combatant commander's equipment 
requirements for their mission. These shortages exist because the Army, 
following DOD planning guidance, has historically equipped all Army 
units, including the Army National Guard, according to a tiered 
resourcing strategy. Under tiered resourcing, those units expected to 
deploy overseas early in a conflict receive first priority for 
equipment, and most Army National Guard units were expected to deploy 
after the active component units to serve as follow-on forces. The Army 
therefore accepted some operational risks by providing lower priority 
Army National Guard units with less equipment than they would need for 
their mission under the assumption that there would be time to provide 
additional equipment to these units before they would be deployed. For 
example, Army National Guard enhanced separate brigades[Footnote 10] 
are generally supplied with about 75 percent of the equipment they 
require for their warfighting missions and divisional units, which 
comprise the majority of the Guard's combat forces, are supplied with 
about 65 percent. In addition to being given less equipment, most Army 
National Guard units did not have priority for the newest, most modern 
equipment, so much of the Guard's equipment is older and less modern 
than that of the active Army and is not always compatible with more 
modern items. 

However, for recent operations, combatant commanders have required Army 
National Guard units to deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the equipment 
they are expected to need and with equipment that is compatible with 
active Army units. As an increasing number of Army National Guard 
forces have been needed to support current operations, the Army 
National Guard has supplied the equipment its deploying units need to 
meet combatant commander requirements by transferring equipment from 
within the Army National Guard. The Army National Guard first tries to 
identify the needed equipment within the same state as the deploying 
unit. If the equipment cannot be found within the state, the National 
Guard Bureau requests the equipment from Army National Guard units 
across the United States. If the equipment is not available in the Army 
National Guard, the Army National Guard notifies the Army that the 
equipment is not available, and the Army takes over the task of 
providing the equipment to the mobilized unit. 

For example, although the 30th Brigade Combat Team needed about 8,810 
night vision goggles to deploy, it only had about 40 percent of its 
requirement on hand when it was alerted to prepare to deploy, so the 
Army National Guard had to identify and transfer about 5,272 pairs of 
goggles to fully equip the unit. In another case, the Army tasked the 
National Guard to convert 40 nonmilitary police units, including field 
artillery companies, to security units capable of performing selected 
military police missions in Iraq during 2004 and 2005. While a military 
police company typically has 47 humvees in its inventory, field 
artillery companies have only about 3 humvees that are suitable for 
this new mission. Therefore, the converted units had to obtain armored 
humvees from other units already in Iraq because the Army National 
Guard had depleted its inventory of armored humvees. 

As current operations have continued, the pool of equipment from which 
the Army National Guard can draw has been reduced because so many items 
have been transferred to deploying units or left overseas. Shortages of 
some equipment items have forced the Army National Guard to take 
measures that have further exacerbated existing shortages in 
nondeployed units to provide training equipment for deploying units. 
For example, because the Army National Guard's supply of armored 
humvees was depleted, the Army directed the Army National Guard to 
transfer more than 500 humvees from nondeployed Guard units to create 
training sets for units to use when preparing for deployment. 

Significant numbers of equipment transfers have persisted as operations 
overseas have continued. We previously reported that as of June 2004 
the Army National Guard had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of 
equipment to ready units for recent operations.[Footnote 11] By July 
2005, the number of equipment items transferred among Army National 
Guard units had grown to more than 101,000. As a result of these 
transfers, the equipment readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard 
units has declined. As figure 2 shows, the percentage of nondeployed 
units that reported having the minimum amount of equipment they would 
need to deploy[Footnote 12] dropped from 87 percent in October 2002 to 
59 percent in May 2005. However, this estimate includes units that have 
older, less modern equipment referred to as substitute equipment. While 
these substitute items are useful for training purposes, commanders may 
not allow these items in the theater of operations because they may not 
be compatible with the equipment other units are using and cannot be 
sustained logistically in theater. In addition, this estimate includes 
units that have equipment that is undergoing maintenance after 
returning from deployment or was left overseas, so these items are not 
readily available for deployment. The National Guard Bureau estimates 
that when substitute items, equipment undergoing maintenance, and 
equipment left overseas for follow-on forces are subtracted, its 
nondeployed units had available only about 34 percent of essential 
warfighting equipment as of July 2005. 

Figure 2: Percentage of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units Meeting 
Minimum Equipment Criteria to Deploy: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Units must have at least 80 percent of their mission-essential 
equipment to meet minimum deployment criteria. Because data were not 
available for all months between October 2002 and July 2004, some chart 
points in this period were estimated based on trends. 

[End of figure] 

With respect to some equipment items, transfers of equipment to 
deploying units have depleted the inventories of many key items in 
nondeployed units. Table 1 shows selected items needed for current 
mobilization for which inventory levels in nondeployed Guard units have 
fallen below 20 percent of authorized levels. 

Table 1: Examples of Current Mobilization Equipment Shortages among 
Nondeployed Army National Guard Units: 

Equipment for handling truck containers; 
Number of items authorized: 25; 
Number of items on hand: 4; 
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 16. 

Machine guns; 
Number of items authorized: 1,088; 
Number of items on hand: 150; 
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 14. 

Chemical decontamination equipment; 
Number of items authorized: 514; 
Number of items on hand: 73; 
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 14. 

Armament carrier humvees; 
Number of items authorized: 2,240; 
Number of items on hand: 220; 
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 10. 

Truck flatbed semitrailers; 
Number of items authorized: 2,287; 
Number of items on hand: 180; 
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 8. 

Lightweight rifles; 
Number of items authorized: 16,839; 
Number of items on hand: 788; 
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 5. 

Individual night vision goggles; 
Number of items authorized: 127,000; 
Number of items on hand: 1,000; 
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 1. 

Weapon night vision sights; 
Number of items authorized: 11,400; 
Number of items on hand: 0; 
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 0. 

Up-armored scout humvees; 
Number of items authorized: 3,922; 
Number of items on hand: 0; 
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 0. 

Chemical agent monitoring equipment; 
Number of items authorized: 7,200; 
Number of items on hand: 0; 
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data as of May 2005. 

[End of table] 

As of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that equipment 
transfers had reduced its inventory of more than 220 items to less than 
5 percent of the required amount or a quantity of fewer than 5 items. 
Among these 220 high-demand items are generators, trucks, and radios. 

While the Army can supply deploying forces with additional equipment 
after they are mobilized, nondeployed units will be challenged to 
maintain readiness for future missions because they do not have the 
equipment to train with or to use for other contingencies. The effect 
of equipment shortages on nondeployed units' ability to perform 
homeland defense missions is not known because, as we reported in 2004, 
DOD has not developed requirements or preparedness standards and 
measures for the homeland missions in which the Army National Guard is 
expected to participate. However, as previously reported, some of these 
items such as humvees, night vision goggles, and chemical protective 
suits are useful for the Guard's domestic missions, such as responding 
to potential terrorist threats. 

Evolving Equipment Requirements Challenge Efforts to Equip Units for 
the Global War on Terrorism: 

As current military operations have evolved, equipment requirements for 
the Global War on Terrorism have continued to change. This has 
challenged Guard units preparing to deploy because equipment 
requirements are not defined and communicated to them until close to 
their deployment dates. Equipment that was not considered essential for 
some units' expected missions has become important for ongoing 
operations, and units have been required to have equipment that is 
newer than or different from that on which they have been trained. For 
example, the 30th Brigade Combat Team from North Carolina, which 
deployed in the spring of 2004, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team from 
Georgia, which deployed in 2005, were directed to deploy as motorized 
brigade combat teams with humvees instead of the heavy-tracked 
equipment, such as Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks, with which they 
had trained for their expected missions. Overall, the combatant 
commander required that the 30th Brigade deploy to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom with more than 35 types of items that were previously not 
authorized for the unit, including different radios and weapons. 

Due to changing conditions in theater and a desire to tailor a unit's 
equipment as closely as possible to its expected mission, the Army has 
continued to modify equipment requirements after units are alerted. 
These changes have resulted in requirements not being communicated to 
some Army National Guard units in a timely manner so that the units 
could be equipped as efficiently as possible for current operations or 
be provided ample time for training. In some instances, Army National 
Guard units have not known exactly what equipment they would require to 
deploy and what they could expect to receive in theater until close to 
their deployment dates, which has made it more difficult for Army 
National Guard officials to gather the equipment deploying units need 
to fill equipment shortages. For example, the 48th Brigade Combat Team, 
which was preparing for deployment in May 2005, had still not received 
a complete list of all of the equipment it would need at the time of 
our visit in April 2005. Because officials did not know exactly what 
they would need to take with them overseas, the brigade packed and 
transported 180 different vehicles to be shipped to theater. When 
officials learned that this equipment was already available in theater, 
these vehicles had to be shipped back to the brigade's mobilization 
station at Fort Stewart, Georgia. 

In some cases, delays caused by the changing equipment requirements 
reduced the amount of time units had to train with their new equipment. 
For example, the 30th Brigade did not have a chemical agent 
identification set to train with until its final exercise before 
deploying, and it did not have access to a Blue Force Tracker, a 
digital communications system that allows commanders to track friendly 
forces across the battlefield in real time, for training until the unit 
was in theater. In some cases, the 30th Brigade did not receive some 
items until they could be transferred from nondeployed units or they 
were provided in theater. For example, the unit received the 4,000 
ceramic body armor inserts needed to protect soldiers from small arms 
fire upon arrival in Kuwait. According to Army officials, in such 
instances units may undergo training upon arrival in the theater of 
operations to acquaint them with new equipment. However, we did not 
evaluate the adequacy of the training units received in the theater of 
operations. 

Army Has Adapted Its Equipping Process to Better Address Critical 
Equipment Shortages and Evolving Equipment Requirements for Ongoing 
Operations: 

To address critical equipment shortages and the evolving equipment 
requirements for current operations, the Army has adapted its equipping 
process in two ways. First, rather than having units bring all their 
equipment to the theater of operations and take it back to their home 
stations when they return home, the Army now requires units, in both 
the active and reserve components, to leave certain essential equipment 
that is in short supply in theater for follow-on units to use.[Footnote 
13] This is intended to reduce the amount of equipment that has to be 
transported from the United States to theater, to better enable units 
to meet their deployment dates, and to maintain stocks of essential 
equipment in theater where it is most needed. While this equipping 
approach has helped meet current operational needs, it has continued 
the cycle of reducing the pool of equipment available to nondeployed 
forces for unplanned contingencies and for training. 

Second, the Army has instituted a process, known as a predeployment 
site survey, to allow large[Footnote 14] units preparing to deploy to 
send a team to the mission area to determine equipment needs. The team 
generates a list of equipment, known as an operational needs statement, 
which the unit will need in theater but was not previously authorized 
and will need to obtain before deployment. Once the Army has approved 
the items, the unit can obtain them through transfers from other units 
or procurement. Over the course of current operations, the Army has 
improved the operational needs statement process by pre-approving 
packages of equipment that are in high-demand for current operations so 
that deploying units do not have to request these items separately. For 
example, more than 160 items, such as interceptor body armor; Javelin, 
a medium antitank weapon system; kits to add armor to humvees; and 
night vision goggles, among other items, are pre-approved. For example, 
in 2003, the 30th Brigade Combat Team prepared about 35 lists of 
additional equipment it would need to deploy in January 2004. By the 
time the 48th Brigade was preparing for deployment in 2005, changes to 
the process resulted in the unit preparing only one operational needs 
statement. 

In addition, an existing Army program, the Rapid Fielding Initiative, 
has provided individual equipment to soldiers, including those in the 
Army National Guard, more quickly than the standard acquisition process 
by fielding commercial-off-the-shelf technology. The Army provides 49 
items such as body armor, helmets, hydration systems, goggles, 
kneepads, and elbow pads through this initiative to units preparing to 
deploy at their home stations and in theater. 

Filling shortages in deploying units has left nondeployed forces with 
worsening equipment shortages and hampers their ability to train for 
future missions. Growing shortages make it unclear whether the Guard 
will be able to maintain acceptable levels of equipment readiness for 
missions overseas or at home. 

Army's Lack of Accountability and Plans to Replace All Army National 
Guard Equipment Retained in Theater Hinder the Guard's Ability to 
Prepare and Train Units: 

The Army National Guard estimates that, since 2003, it has left more 
than 64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas to 
support continuing operations. But, the Army lacks a full accounting of 
this equipment and has not prepared plans to replace it as required 
under DOD policy. As a result, the Guard is challenged in its ability 
to prepare and train for future missions. The policy reflected in DOD 
Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, April 7, 2005, requires 
a replacement plan for reserve component equipment transferred to the 
active component for more than 90 days.[Footnote 15] According to Army 
officials, the Army did not initially track the Guard's equipment or 
prepare replacement plans in the early phases of the war because the 
practice was intended to be a short-term measure and there were other 
priorities. In addition, the Army did not have a centralized process to 
develop plans to replace the equipment Army National Guard units left 
overseas and transfers of equipment between units were only documented 
at the unit level in unit property records. 

However, as operations have continued, the amount of Guard equipment 
retained in theater has increased, which has further exacerbated the 
shortages in nondeployed Army National Guard units. For example, when 
the North Carolina 30th Brigade Combat Team returned from its 
deployment to Iraq in 2005, it left 229 humvees, about 73 percent of 
its pre-deployment inventory of those vehicles, for other units to use. 
Similarly, according to Army National Guard officials, three Illinois 
Army National Guard units were required to leave almost all of their 
humvees, about 130, in Iraq when they returned from deployment. As a 
result, the units could not conduct training to maintain the 
proficiency they acquired while overseas or train new recruits. In all, 
the National Guard reports that 14 military police companies left over 
600 humvees and other armored trucks which are expected to remain in 
theater for the duration of operations. While the Army has now 
instituted processes to account for certain high-demand equipment items 
that are being left in theater for the duration of the conflict and 
expects replacement plans for this equipment to be developed by August 
2005, it does not appear that these replacement plans will account for 
all items transferred to the active component because the Army has not 
been tracking all Guard equipment left in theater in a centralized 
manner. 

In June 2004, six months after the first Army National Guard units left 
equipment overseas when they returned from deployment, the Army tasked 
the Army Materiel Command with overseeing equipment retained in 
theater. However, according to Army and National Guard officials, the 
Army Materiel Command developed plans to track only certain high-demand 
equipment items that are in short supply, such as armored humvees and 
other items designated to remain in theater for the duration of the 
conflict. However, Guard units have also left behind equipment that was 
not designated to stay for the duration of the conflict, but which may 
remain in theater for up to three years, such as cargo trucks, rough 
terrain fork lifts, and palletized load trucks, which the Army Materiel 
Command does not plan to track. Of the over 64,000 equipment items the 
Army National Guard estimates Guard units have left behind, the 
National Guard Bureau estimates that as of July 2005, the Army Material 
Command was only tracking about 45 percent of those items. Given the 
lack of tracking of all Guard equipment left in theater, it is not 
clear how the Army will develop replacement plans for these items as 
required by DOD policy. 

In May 2005 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 
requested that the Army submit a replacement plan for all Army National 
Guard equipment retained in theater by June 17, 2005. The Assistant 
Secretary noted that while the exact amount of equipment transferred 
between the reserve and active components is unknown, overall the 
magnitude of these transfers has been significant and was an area of 
concern. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 
subsequently extended the date replacement plans were due to August 15, 
2005. According to Army officials, the equipment tracked by individual 
units may eventually be returned to the Guard. However, Army and Army 
National Guard officials said that even if it is eventually returned, 
equipment condition is likely to be poor given its heavy use during 
current operations and some of it will likely need to be replaced. The 
National Guard estimates it will cost at least $1.2 billion to replace 
the equipment it has left in Iraq, if it is not returned or is not 
useable. Until the Army develops plans to replace the equipment, 
including identifying timetables and funding sources, the National 
Guard will continue to face critical equipment shortages which reduce 
readiness for future missions. 

Army National Guard Units Are Changing to New Designs, but Will 
Continue to Lack Equipment Comparable to Active Forces: 

Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs 
within the Army's modular force by 2008, but they are expected to 
convert with the equipment they have on hand and will lack some 
equipment for these designs until at least 2011. However, the Army is 
modifying the designs it tested and found to be as effective as current 
brigades to include the equipment it can reasonably expect to have 
based on current funding plans. As a result, Army National Guard units 
will continue to lack equipment items and have to use less modern 
equipment to fill gaps until at least 2011 and will not be comparably 
equipped with their active duty counterparts. While the Army estimated 
in June 2005 that it would cost about $15.6 billion to convert most of 
the Guard's units, this estimate did not include all expected costs and 
the Army was unable to provide detailed information to support the 
estimate. Further, it has not developed detailed equipping plans that 
specify the Guard's equipment requirements as it progresses through the 
new rotation cycle used to provide ready forces for ongoing operations. 
The Army is quickly implementing its initiatives to transform its 
forces into modular units and a rotational cycle of deployment without 
detailed plans and cost estimates because it views these initiatives as 
critical to sustaining current operations. In the short term, units 
nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for equipment, 
which may delay when units will receive the equipment needed for 
modular conversions. In 2004 and 2005, the Army published and 
subsequently updated the Army Campaign Plan,[Footnote 16] to establish 
the broad goals, assumptions, and time frames for converting to the 
modular force and implementing the rotational force model. However, the 
plan does not include detailed equipping plans, cost estimates, or 
resources needed for implementing the modular and rotational deployment 
initiatives. Our analysis of best practices in strategic planning has 
shown that detailed plans, which describe how the objectives will be 
achieved and identify resources, facilitate success and avoid 
unintended consequences, such as differing assumptions among key 
leaders in DOD and Congress about priorities or program performance. 
Until equipping requirements for implementing the modular designs and 
the rotational model are specified, costs are better defined, and 
funding is identified, the Guard faces risks as it prepares to 
implement the Army's restructuring while supporting the high pace of 
operations at home and overseas. 

Army National Guard Units Will Continue to Face Equipment Shortfalls 
That May Delay Transformation to Modular Designs and Hinder 
Comparability with Active Forces: 

The Army has recognized that it needs to become more flexible and 
capable of achieving a wide range of missions. To this end, in 2004, 
the Army began to reorganize its forces from a structure organized 
around divisions to one based on standardized, modular brigades that 
can be tailored to meet the specific needs of the combatant commander. 
The Army is in the process of developing and approving detailed 
designs,[Footnote 17] including equipment requirements, for 
active[Footnote 18] and reserve combat units, support units, and 
warfighting headquarters so that the first Guard units can begin their 
scheduled conversions in September 2005. Among the goals of the new 
structure are to maximize the flexibility and responsiveness of the 
force by standardizing designs and equipment requirements for both 
active and reserve units and maintaining reserve units at a higher 
level of readiness than in the past. However, under current plans, 
Guard units will continue to be equipped with items that may be older 
than their active counterparts and less capable than the new modular 
unit designs require. The Army's initial estimate for converting Guard 
units to modular designs is about $15.6 billion through 2011, but this 
estimate is incomplete because it does not include the costs for 
converting all units to the new structure or the full costs of 
equipping them for the design the Army tested and determined was as 
effective as current brigades. Moreover, the Army has not developed 
plans to equip Guard units to the tested modular unit design and 
instead plans to equip them for a less modern design. Without a 
detailed equipping plan that identifies funding priorities over time, 
the Army National Guard is likely to continue to face challenges in its 
ability to train and maintain ready forces in the future. 

The Army expects that the new modular brigades, which will include 
about 3,000 to 4,000 personnel,[Footnote 19] will be as capable as the 
current brigades of between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel through the use 
of enhanced military intelligence capability, introduction of key 
technology enablers, such as weapons and communications systems, and by 
having support capabilities contained in the brigade itself instead of 
at a higher echelon of command. The Army tested the new modular brigade 
designs and found that they were as effective as current brigades. 
However, the Army has modified the tested designs based on the 
equipment it can reasonably expect to provide to units undergoing 
conversion based on its current inventory of equipment, planned 
procurement pipelines, and other factors, such as expected funding. At 
the time of this report, the Army had not tested the modified designs 
to determine whether they are as capable as the current brigades or the 
tested design. The Army plans to equip modular Guard units for the 
modified design by 2011. In the meantime, modular Guard units are 
expected to continue the practice of using approved substitute 
equipment and will initially lack some of the key enablers, such as 
communications systems, which are the basis for the improved 
effectiveness of modular units. 

As of June 2005, the Army had approved modified designs for the 25 Army 
National Guard brigade combat teams and 25 support brigades scheduled 
to convert to the modular structure between 2005 and 2007, and all 
eight warfighting headquarters converting between 2005 and 2008. Under 
current plans, all the Army National Guard units will be converted to 
the modular organizational structure by 2008 with the exception of 3 
support brigades which will be converted in 2011. The Army expects to 
complete modular designs for the remaining 9 brigade combat teams and 
15 support brigades by September 2005. The Army had originally planned 
to convert Guard units on a slower schedule by 2010, but at the request 
of the Army National Guard, accelerated the plan so that Guard units 
would share the new standardized organizational designs with the active 
component at least two years earlier, avoid training soldiers for the 
previous skill mix, and better facilitate recruiting and retention 
efforts. 

However, our work indicates that accelerated modular conversions will 
exacerbate near-term equipment shortfalls. There are significant 
shortfalls in the Army's ability to equip Guard units for the modified 
design in the short term for three key reasons. First, according to 
current plans, the units are expected to convert to their new designs 
with the equipment they have on hand. However, because of existing 
shortages and the large number of equipment items that deployed units 
left in Iraq or that need repair or replacement due to heavy use, units 
will not have the equipment needed to reach even the modified design. 
For example, converted Guard units expect initially to be without some 
equipment items, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, single channel 
ground and airborne radio systems, and Javelin antitank missiles that 
provide the basis for the improved capability of the new brigades. 
Second, the Army has not planned funding to provide equipment to the 
additional Guard units converting to the modular structure on the 
accelerated schedule. Although most Guard units are scheduled to be 
reorganized by 2008, they are expected to receive equipment for their 
new designs on a slower schedule, and in some cases are not expected to 
receive their equipment until 2 to 3 years after they reorganize. The 
lack of detailed plans for equipping Army National Guard units makes it 
difficult to determine how the Army intends to transition Guard units 
from the old to the new organizational structure effectively. 

Finally, the Army's cost estimates for converting Guard units to the 
modular structure are incomplete and likely to grow. The Army's current 
cost estimate for converting all its active and reserve units to the 
modular force is $48 billion, a 71 percent increase from its initial 
rough order of magnitude estimate of $28 billion made in 2004. Of the 
$48 billion, the Army estimated in June 2005 that Army National Guard 
modular conversions would cost about $15.6 billion. This estimate 
included costs to convert all eight of the Guard's warfighting 
headquarters and 33 of the Guard's 34 combat units between 2005 and 
2011. It also includes procurement of some high-demand equipment such 
as tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, humvees, and antitank guided- 
missile systems. During our work, we obtained summary information on 
the types of cost and key assumptions reflected in the Army's 
estimates; however, we were unable to fully evaluate the estimate 
because the Army did not have detailed supporting information. 

Our work highlighted several limitations to the Army's cost estimate 
for Army National Guard modular force conversions. First, the estimate 
was based on a less modern design than both the modified design that 
the Army plans to use in the near term and the tested design it intends 
to evolve to over time. The estimate assumes that Guard units will 
continue to use substitute equipment items that may be older and less 
capable than that of active units and does not include costs for all 
the technology enablers that are expected to provide additional 
capability for modular units. As a result, the estimate does not 
include costs for all the equipment Guard units would require to reach 
the capabilities of the tested modular brigade design. Second, the 
estimate does not include costs for 10 of the Guard's support units, 
nor does it include military construction costs associated with the 
Guard's 40 support units. According to the Army National Guard, 
military construction costs for converted support units are expected to 
near the $1.4 billion in military construction costs already included 
for the Guard's warfighting headquarters and combat units. Furthermore, 
current cost estimates assume that Guard equipment inventories will be 
at prewar levels and available for modular conversions. However, this 
may not be a reasonable assumption because, as discussed previously, 
Army National Guard units have left large amounts of equipment overseas 
- some of which will be retained indefinitely and the Army has not 
provided plans for its replacement. 

Further, the Army has currently identified funding sources for only 
about 25 percent ($3.9 billion) of the current estimate--$3.1 billion 
programmed in the fiscal year 2006-2011 future years defense program 
and $.8 billion expected from fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding. 
Approval for funding the remaining $11.7 billion is pending within DOD. 
However, equipping priorities and the amount designated for equipment 
have not been decided. 

In the long term, according to the Army, the intent is to equip all 
active and reserve component units to the tested design over time. 
However, it will take until at least 2011 under current plans for the 
Army National Guard units to receive the equipment they will need for 
the modified designs which are still less modern than the one the Army 
tested and found as effective as current brigades, and the pace of 
operations may further delay equipping Guard units. Moreover, the Army 
does not have detailed plans or cost estimates that identify the 
funding required for equipping Guard units for the tested design. 
Without detailed plans for when Guard units will get the equipment they 
need for the tested design, it is unclear when the Army National Guard 
will achieve the enhanced capabilities the Army needs to support 
ongoing operations. Further, without more complete equipment 
requirements and cost estimates, the DOD and Congress will not have all 
the information they need to evaluate funding requests for the Army 
National Guard's transition to the modular force. 

Army Plans for Equipping Army National Guard Units Under Its Rotational 
Force Model Are Not Complete: 

The Army's initiative to transform into a rotational force, which is 
intended to provide units with a predictable cycle of increasing 
readiness for potential mobilization once every 6 years, involves a 
major change in the way the Army planned to use its reserve forces and 
has implications for the amount and types of equipment that Army 
National Guard units will need over time. Historically, Army National 
Guard units have been provided only a portion of the equipment they 
needed to train for their wartime missions because they were generally 
expected to deploy after active units. However, current military 
operations have called for the Army National Guard to supply forces to 
meet a continuing demand for fully equipped units, a demand the Army 
National Guard met through transfers of equipment to deploying units 
and which undermined the readiness of nondeployed units. Under the 
rotational force concept, the Army would provide increasing amounts of 
equipment to units as they move through training phases and near 
readiness for potential deployment so they would be ready to respond 
quickly with fully equipped forces if needed. However, the Army has not 
yet finalized equipping requirements for Army National Guard units as 
they progress through the rotational cycle. In addition, it is not 
clear how the equipment needed to support units in the new rotational 
cycle will affect the types and quantities of items available for 
modular conversions and affect the pace of the Army National Guard's 
transformation. Without firm decisions as to requirements for both the 
new modular structure and rotational force model and a plan that 
integrates requirements, the Army and Army National Guard are not in 
the best position to develop complete cost estimates or to determine 
whether the modular and rotational initiatives are working together to 
reach the goal of improving Army National Guard readiness. 

While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip units 
according to the readiness requirements of each phase of the rotational 
force model, it has not yet detailed the types and quantities of items 
required in each phase. Under this proposal the Army National Guard 
will have three types of equipment sets: a baseline set, a training 
set, and a deployment set. The baseline set would vary by unit type and 
assigned mission and the equipment it includes could be significantly 
reduced from the amount called for in the unit design, but plans call 
for it to provide at least the equipment Guard units need for domestic 
missions. Training sets would include more of the equipment units will 
need to be ready for deployment, but units would share the equipment 
that would be located at training sites throughout the country, so the 
equipment would not be readily available for units' state or homeland 
missions. The deployment set would include all equipment needed for 
deployment including theater specific equipment, items provided through 
operational needs statements, and equipment from Army prepositioned 
stock. At the time of this report, the Army was still developing the 
proposals for what would be included in the three equipment sets and 
planned to publish the final requirements in December 2005. 

Army resourcing policy gives higher priority to units engaged in 
operations or preparing to deploy than those undergoing modular 
conversions. As a result, the requirements of ongoing operations will 
continue to drain the Army National Guard's equipment resources and 
affect the pace at which equipment will be available for nondeployed 
units to transform to their new design. At the present time, it is not 
clear how the equipment requirements associated with supporting 
deployment under the new rotational readiness cycle will affect the 
types and quantities of equipment available to convert the Army 
National Guard to a modular force. Until the near-term requirements for 
the rotational force and long-term requirements for a modular force are 
fully defined, the Army and Army National Guard will not be in a 
position to prioritize funding to achieve readiness goals in the near 
and long term. Further, although Army leaders have made it a priority 
to ensure that Army National Guard units have the equipment they need 
to continue to perform their domestic missions, it is not possible to 
assess whether units will have the equipment they need until unit 
designs and training set configurations are finalized and homeland 
defense equipment requirements are known. 

Conclusions: 

Evolving equipment requirements for the Global War on Terrorism have 
challenged the Army National Guard in equipping its units for 
deployment while trying to maintain the readiness of its nondeployed 
force for training and future missions. While strategies such as 
transferring needed equipment from nondeploying units to ready 
deploying units, completing operational needs statements, and leaving 
equipment overseas when Guard units return home have helped to equip 
deploying units, these strategies may not be sustainable in the long 
term, especially as the Guard's equipment inventories continue to 
diminish. In the meantime, as the Army National Guard's equipment 
stocks are depleted, risks to its ability to perform future overseas 
and domestic missions increase. 

The Army's lack of accountability over the Guard's equipment stocks 
retained in theater has created a situation in which deploying Guard 
units face considerable uncertainty about what equipment they need to 
bring overseas and what equipment they will have for training when they 
return from deployment. DOD Directive 1225.6 requires a plan to replace 
reserve component equipment that is transferred to the active 
component, but the Army has not prepared these plans. Without a 
replacement plan, the Army National Guard faces depleted stocks of some 
key equipment items needed to maintain readiness and is unable to plan 
for how it will equip the force for future missions. 

Supporting ongoing operations will continue to strain Army National 
Guard equipment inventories, which will likely delay the pace of its 
transformation to a modular force. Further, current modular plans for 
the Guard's conversion will not provide for equipping Guard units to 
the less modern modified design and there are no plans to equip the 
Guard for the design the Army found as capable as current brigades. As 
a result, Guard units will continue to face equipment shortages and 
have to use older equipment than their active counterparts. If units 
are not comparable, the Army National Guard will have to continue its 
current practice of transferring equipment to fill the shortfalls in 
deploying units, thereby undermining the readiness of nondeployed 
forces. With lower readiness of Guard forces, the nation faces 
increased risk to future overseas operations, unplanned contingencies, 
and the homeland missions the Guard may be called upon to support. 

Recommendations: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 
Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy that 
addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard for the Global 
War on Terrorism and addresses how the Army will transition from short- 
term equipping measures to long-term equipping solutions. This plan 
should address the measures the Army will take to ensure it complies 
with existing DOD directives to safeguard reserve component equipment 
readiness and provide a plan to replace depleted stocks resulting from 
equipment transferred to the active Army, so that the Guard can plan 
for equipping the force for future missions. 

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary 
of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan for the effective 
integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational force model 
and modular force initiatives. This plan should include: 

* the specific equipment requirements, costs, timelines, and funding 
strategy for converting Army National Guard units to the modular force 
and the extent to which Guard units will have comparable types of 
equipment and equipment levels as the active modular units, 

* an analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard's units will 
need for their missions in each phase of the rotation cycle, and: 

* how the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if 
full funding is not provided on the expected timeline. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written 
comments on a draft of this report. The department agreed with our 
recommendations and cited actions it is taking to implement them. DOD's 
comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also 
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop and submit a plan and 
funding strategy to Congress that addresses the equipment needs of the 
Army National Guard for the Global War on Terrorism, specifically 
addressing how the Army will transition from its short-term equipping 
measures to long-term equipping solutions. In its comments, DOD said 
that the Army needs to determine how Army National Guard forces will be 
equipped to meet state disaster response and potential homeland defense 
requirements as well as federal missions and include these requirements 
in its resource priorities. DOD also said that the Army is working to 
implement stricter accountability over equipment currently left in 
theater and to comply with DOD guidelines which require replacement 
plans for these items. 

DOD also agreed with our recommendation to develop and submit a plan to 
Congress that details the effective integration of the Army National 
Guard into the Army's rotational force model and modular force 
initiatives. DOD said that the Army plans to develop resourcing 
alternatives to mitigate potential risks should full funding for 
transformation initiatives not be realized. DOD also agreed that 
readiness goals for the Army National Guard in the 6-year rotational 
model need to be established and that the Army's equipping strategy for 
the Army National Guard must include the resources required to be 
prepared to carry out both their federal and state missions. 

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the 
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it 
until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to 
the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Chief, 
National Guard Bureau; and the Director, Office of Management and 
Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO web 
site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 
512-4402. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed 
documentation and interviewed officials from the Army National Guard, 
the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, and the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. We 
supplemented this information with visits to the United States Army 
Forces Command, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command, and the 
First Army of the United States. We also developed case studies of two 
units: the 30th Brigade Combat Team located in North Carolina and the 
48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia. These states were chosen to 
provide representative examples of how Army National Guard units were 
prepared for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom in support of the 
Global War on Terrorism. The 30th Brigade Combat Team was one of the 
first National Guard units to deploy for Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
had just returned from deployment when we visited in March 2005. The 
48th Brigade Combat Team was preparing for deployment to Operation 
Iraqi Freedom at the time of our visit in April 2005. In both states we 
met with unit logistics staff who had visibility over how the unit 
prepared for deployment. 

To examine the extent to which Army National Guard units have the 
equipment needed for the Global War on Terrorism, we obtained and 
analyzed data on critical shortages and the types and quantities of 
equipment transferred from nondeployed units to deploying units from 
the National Guard Bureau and our two case study states. Additionally, 
we supplemented these data with interviews, briefings, and 
documentation from officials at the National Guard Bureau, the 
Department of the Army, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Reserve Affairs, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the 
Coalition Forces Land Component Command, and the First Army of the 
United States. We did not examine whether shortages of particular items 
were the result of industrial base issues. To understand the processes 
the Army adapted to equip units as equipment requirements evolved for 
the Global War on Terrorism, we interviewed officials from and analyzed 
data provided by the 30th Brigade Combat Team in North Carolina, the 
48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, the National Guard Bureau, the 
Department of the Army, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the Coalition 
Forces Land Component Command, and the First Army of the United States. 

To assess the Army National Guard equipment retained in theater, we 
analyzed Army National Guard data and the Guard's estimate of the cost 
to replace the equipment if it is not returned. Additionally, we 
interviewed officials and reviewed documentation and data from the Army 
National Guard, Department of the Army, the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, U.S. Army Forces Command, and 
the Coalition Forces Land Component Command about the lack of reliable 
data and whether any plans exist to replace the Guard's equipment. We 
supplemented data on how much of the Army National Guard's equipment 
has been left in theater with briefings and reviewed internal Army 
messages regarding the accountability and visibility of this equipment. 

To evaluate how the Army National Guard has been integrated into the 
Army's plans for a modular structure and force generation model, we 
interviewed officials at the Army National Guard, the Department of the 
Army, and U.S. Army Forces Command. We reviewed documents such as the 
Army Campaign Plan, the Army Transformation Roadmap, the Army's force 
generation model, and numerous briefings on the Army's plans for a 
modular force and the new force generation model. Additionally, we 
interviewed Guard officials from both of our case study states about 
the units' plans to convert to modular force given Army time frames and 
cost estimates. 

To assess the reliability of data used during the course of this 
engagement, we interviewed data sources about how they ensured the 
accuracy of their data and reviewed their data collection methods, 
standard operating procedures, and other internal control measures. In 
addition, we reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and, when 
applicable, performed computer testing to assess data reliability. We 
determined that the data were sufficient to answer each of our 
objectives. 

We conducted our review between December 2004 and August 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Agency comments were made on GAO-05-954. This report number was 
subsequently changed to GAO-06-111. 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 
RESERVE AFFAIRS: 
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1800: 

SEP 15 2005: 

Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. St. Laurent: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, "RESERVE FORCES: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard 
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force 
Transformation Initiatives," dated August 18, 2005 (Code 350607/GAO-05- 
954). 

The Army Campaign Plan includes the Army Force Generation Model that is 
designed to posture the Army National Guard for prolonged operations by 
building a rotational force. The Army has also developed the Army 
Resource Priority List that identifies the priority for providing 
resources to all units in all components of the Army. As the Army moves 
forward in the implementation of these initiatives, the details raised 
in your recommendations need to be addressed in order to determine the 
appropriate readiness levels for Army National Guard units at each 
phase of the rotational model. The equipping strategy for the Guard 
must include the resources required to be prepared to carry out their 
state emergency response requirements, Homeland Defense missions, and 
to be trained and equipped to mobilize under Title 10, U.S.C. In 
today's environment where support to our deployed forces is paramount, 
it is equally important that we do not lose sight of the readiness of 
our Army National Guard forces at home. 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. I concur 
with the recommendations as stated, and will work to resolve the issues 
addressed in this report. Detailed comments on the GAO recommendations 
and report are enclosed. The point of contact for this office is 
Captain Scott Walton, OASD/RA (M&F), at 703-693-7485. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Thomas F. Hall: 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED AUGUST 18, 2005: 
GAO CODE 350607/GAO-05-954: 

"RESERVE FORCES: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment 
Readiness and Better Integrate Guard Into Army Force Transformation 
Initiatives" 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS: 

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a 
plan and funding strategy that addresses the equipment needs of the 
Army National Guard for the Global War on Terrorism and addresses how 
the Army will transition from the short-term equipping measures to long-
term equipping solutions. This plan should address the measures the 
Army will take to ensure it complies with existing DoD directives to 
safeguard reserve component equipment readiness and provide a plan to 
replace depleted stocks resulting from equipment transferred to the 
active Army, so that the Guard can plan for equipping the force for 
future missions. (page 26/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Army has developed the Army Resource Priority 
List that identifies the priority for providing resources to all units 
in all components of the Army. The Army must now determine how Army 
National Guard forces will be equipped to meet state disaster response 
and potential DoD Homeland Defense requirements and include them in 
their resource priority list. In today's environment where support to 
our deployed forces is paramount, it is equally important that we do 
not lose sight of the readiness of our Army National Guard forces to 
meet their traditional state emergency response requirements here at 
home. 

The Army has begun to implement stricter accountability of their assets 
and is in the process of identifying Army Reserve and Army National 
Guard equipment currently left in theater. As the report states, this 
is a significant amount of equipment. The Army is working to comply 
with the guidelines in DoD Directive 1225.6 to request future transfers 
of equipment from the Reserve to the Active component and provide the 
Secretary of Defense replacement plans prior to this equipment 
transfer. 

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a 
plan for the effective integration of the Army National Guard into its 
rotational force model and modular force initiatives. This plan should 
include: 

* The specific equipment requirements, costs, timelines, and funding 
strategy for converting Army National Guard units to the modular force 
and the extent to which Guard units will have comparable types of 
equipment and equipment levels as the active modular units; 

* An analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard's units will 
need for their missions in each phase of the rotation cycle; and: 

* How the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if 
full funding is not provided on the expected timeline. (page 26/GAO 
Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Army Campaign Plan (ACP) includes the Army 
Force Generation Model that is designed to posture the Army National 
Guard for prolonged operations by building a rotational force. The 
budget process has many entities competing for scarce resources and for 
that reason, the Army must prepare a plan to manage implementation 
risks if full funding is not realized in the expected timeline to meet 
the requirements of the ACP. The cyclical construct of the Army Force 
Generation Model was developed to ensure the reserve component units of 
the Army returning from operations outside the Continental United 
States reset and reorganize into modular formations and are placed on a 
ramp to combat readiness over a six-year period. As the Army moves 
forward in the implementation of these initiatives, the details 
addressed in recommendation 2 need to be answered in order to determine 
the appropriate readiness level for Army National Guard units at each 
phase of the six year rotational model. The equipping strategy for the 
Guard must include the resources required to be prepared to carry out 
their state emergency response requirements, Homeland Defense missions, 
and to be trained and equipped to mobilize under Title 10, U.S.C. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant 
Director; Frank Cristinzio; Alissa Czyz; Curtis Groves; Nicole Harms; 
Tina Morgan Kirschbaum; Kim Mayo; Kenneth Patton; Jay Smale; and 
Suzanne Wren also made major contributions to this report. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal 
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005). 

[2] GAO, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army 
Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages, GAO-05-660 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 12, 2005). 

[3] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National 
Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004). 

[4] GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to 
Implement and Fund Modular Forces, GAO-05-443T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 
16, 2005). 

[5] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the 
Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington, 
D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003) and Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long- 
term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and 
Demobilization Issues, GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004). 

[6] GAO-05-21. 

[7] Mission-essential items are those items that are critical for 
accomplishing missions, including principal weapon/mission systems and 
equipment and critical mission support items. 

[8] The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army 
National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval 
Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United 
States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The 
Selected Reserve consists of military members assigned to organized 
reserve units and reservists who participate in at least 48 scheduled 
drills or training periods each year and serve on active duty for 
training of not less than 14 days during each year. 

[9] Mobilization involves assembling and organizing personnel, 
supplies, and materiel for active military service. Deployment is 
defined as the relocation of forces, personnel or equipment from home 
station to meet operational requirements. 

[10] Enhanced separate brigades have between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers 
and are the Army National Guard's highest priority combat units. These 
15 brigades received specialized training and higher priority than 
other National Guard units for personnel and resources during 
peacetime. Once called to active duty, they are expected to be ready to 
deploy overseas within 90 days. In October 2004, the Army stopped using 
the enhanced separate brigade designation and now refers to these units 
as brigade combat teams. 

[11] GAO-05-21. 

[12] To meet minimum deployment criteria, a unit must generally have at 
least 80 percent of its mission-essential equipment items on hand. 

[13] The Army has directed that equipment purchased specifically for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, or other key 
items currently in short supply such as armored vehicles, improvised 
explosive device jammers, long-range surveillance systems, and 
generator sets, remain in theater for the duration of operations. 

[14] Units that are smaller than a brigade complete a virtual pre- 
deployment site survey by communicating with units already in theater 
to determine the equipment they need to request. 

[15] Replacement plans for removed equipment and supplies are not 
required for transfers in support of force restructuring adopted as 
result of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process 
decisions approved by the Secretary of Defense. 

[16] The Army updated the plan in October 2004 and June 2005. 

[17] Unit designs prescribe the unit's wartime mission, capabilities, 
organizational structure, and mission-essential personnel and equipment 
requirements. 

[18] The Army plans to reorganize its 10 active divisions by the end of 
fiscal year 2006, expanding from the current 33 to 43 modular, 
standardized brigade combat teams and creating new types of command 
headquarters. 

[19] The Army's plan calls for three variants of the modularized 
brigade combat team. The infantry variant will have about 3,300 
personnel, the armored variant 3,700 personnel, and the Stryker variant 
4,000 personnel. 

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