This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-92 
entitled 'ATF: Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government 
Storage Facilities Are Few but May Be Underreported' which was released 
on November 1, 2005. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

October 2005: 

ATF: 

Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government Storage Facilities 
Are Few but May Be Underreported: 

GAO-06-92: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-92, a report to congressional requesters: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the 
United States by private sector companies and government entities. The 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has authority 
to regulate explosives and to license privately owned explosives 
storage facilities. After the July 2004 theft of several hundred pounds 
of explosives from a state and local government storage facility, 
concerns arose about vulnerability to theft. 

GAO analyzed (1) the extent of explosives thefts from state and local 
government facilities, (2) ATF’s authority to regulate and oversee 
state and local government explosives storage facilities, (3) the 
information ATF collects about state and local government storage 
facilities, and (4) security oversight measures in place at selected 
state and local government storage facilities. 

What GAO Found: 

Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of 
explosives from state and local government storage facilities. From 
January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received only 9 reports of thefts or 
missing explosives from state and local facilities, compared with a 
total of 205 explosives thefts reported nationwide during this same 
period. During the course of our audit, we found evidence of 5 thefts 
from state and local government facilities, 1 of which did not appear 
in ATF’s national database on thefts and missing explosives. Thus, the 
actual number of thefts occurring at state and local storage facilities 
could be higher than that identified by ATF data. 

ATF has no authority to oversee or inspect all state and local 
government explosives storage facilities. State and local government 
agencies are not required to obtain a license from ATF to use and store 
explosives, and only licensees—such as private sector explosives 
storage facilities—are subject to mandatory oversight. As a result, ATF 
has no means to ensure that state and local government facilities are 
in compliance with federal regulations. 

While ATF does not collect nationwide information about state and local 
government explosives storage facilities, information about some of 
these facilities is collected—for example, when facility operators 
voluntarily request an ATF inspection. Since January 2002, ATF has 
conducted 77 voluntary inspections at state and local storage 
facilities and found no systemic violations. By comparison, all 
licensed private sector facilities must submit a variety of information 
about their facility—including location and security measures in place— 
to ATF during the licensing process. ATF also collects information 
about these facilities during mandatory inspections. 

At the 18 state and local government storage facilities we visited, a 
variety of security measures were in place, including locked gates, 
fencing, patrols, and in some cases, electronic surveillance. All the 
facilities’ officials told GAO that they conducted routine inventories. 
But most were not required to be licensed or inspected by state or 
local regulatory agencies. We identified several instances of possible 
noncompliance with federal regulations, related primarily to storage 
safety issues rather than security. 

Explosives Storage Facility in Pennsylvania: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Attorney General direct the ATF Director to 
clarify explosives incident reporting regulations to ensure that all 
entities storing explosives, including state and local government 
agencies, understand their obligation to report all thefts or missing 
explosives. The Department of Justice agreed with GAO’s recommendation 
and indicated it would take steps to implement it. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-92. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Laurie Ekstrand at (202) 
512-8777 or ekstrandl@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Limited Data Indicate That Few Thefts May Have Occurred at State and 
Local Government Storage Facilities, but the Exact Number Is Uncertain: 

ATF Authority to Oversee State and Local Government Explosives Storage 
Facilities Is Limited, as Is ATF's Capacity to Absorb Additional 
Oversight Responsibilities: 

ATF Does Not Collect Nationwide Information about State and Local 
Government Storage Facilities, but Does So for Licensed Private Sector 
Facilities: 

Security Measures Varied at State and Local Explosives Storage 
Facilities We Visited: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Overview of the State and Local Entities We Visited: 

Table 2: Types of Physical Security in Place at the 18 Explosives 
Storage Facilities We Visited: 

Table 3: Inventory and Oversight Activities at the 14 State and Local 
Entities Visited: 

Table 4: State and Local Entities Visited: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Type 1 (Permanent Structure) Explosives Storage Magazines in 
Texas and Colorado: 

Figure 2: Type 2 (Mobile) Explosives Storage Magazines in Pennsylvania 
and Tennessee: 

Figure 3: Type 3 (Portable Day-Box) Explosives Storage Magazine in 
Pennsylvania: 

Figure 4: Pennsylvania Storage Facility with Interior Barrier 
Surrounding Type 2 Storage Magazines: 

Abbreviations: 

ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

OIG: Office of the Inspector General: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

October 3, 2005: 

The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 
International Relations: 
Committee on Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Lantos: 
House of Representatives: 

More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the 
United States. These explosives are used by both public sector entities 
(such as state and local government agencies) and private sector 
companies for a variety of purposes--including mining, construction, 
avalanche control, and law enforcement.[Footnote 1] Under current 
federal explosives laws and regulations, the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is responsible for licensing and 
regulating explosives manufacturers, importers, dealers, and users. 
ATF's authority to regulate explosives stems originally from the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and was expanded further by 
enactment of the Safe Explosives Act in 2002.[Footnote 2] It is 
primarily through its licensing authority that ATF oversees and 
inspects privately owned explosives facilities to ensure they comply 
with explosives storage laws and regulations. With regard to government-
owned explosives storage facilities, state and local agencies are also 
subject to federal explosives storage laws and regulations, but exempt 
from the ATF licensing requirements.[Footnote 3] 

In July 2004, several hundred pounds of explosives were stolen from law 
enforcement storage magazines at a city/county storage facility in 
California. The thieves were subsequently arrested and the explosives 
were recovered. Out of concern that state and local government 
explosives storage facilities could be vulnerable to theft, you asked 
us to provide information regarding the security oversight of these 
facilities. For this report, we focused on the following questions: 

What is the extent of explosives thefts from state and local government 
facilities and how does this compare with the total number of 
explosives thefts reported nationwide? 

What authority does ATF have to regulate and oversee state and local 
government explosives storage facilities and how does this compare with 
its authority over private sector storage facilities? 

What information does ATF collect regarding the locations and types and 
amounts of explosives stored at state and local government explosives 
storage facilities and how does this compare with information collected 
about private sector storage facilities? 

What security oversight measures are in place at selected state and 
local government storage facilities to ensure the safe and secure 
storage of explosives? 

To address these questions, we obtained information from U.S. 
government agencies, law enforcement associations, industry groups, and 
other experts on explosives. More specifically, to obtain the 
perspectives of U.S. government agencies on their efforts to regulate 
and oversee state and local government explosives storage facilities, 
and to obtain information on the numbers of explosives thefts and law 
enforcement bomb squads, we contacted officials from the Department of 
Justice (DOJ), ATF, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). To 
obtain other public sector and private sector perspectives on the 
security oversight of explosives storage facilities, we contacted 
associations representing state and local law enforcement agencies and 
the explosives industry. To determine what selected states and 
localities are doing to provide oversight of explosives storage in 
state and local government sector facilities, we met with officials at 
14 state and local government entities (13 law enforcement bomb squads 
and one public university) in four states--Colorado, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, and Texas--and observed their explosives storage facilities. 
We selected these four states to obtain a geographic spread (west, 
northeast, southeast, and southwest) across the country, based on (1) 
the number of explosives licensees and reported explosives thefts, (2) 
the number of law enforcement bomb squads, and (3) the location of 
universities with mining programs.[Footnote 4] Our criteria for 
identifying the type of security oversight measures in place included 
existing federal explosives storage laws and regulations and security 
guidelines issued by the explosives industry. Because we selected and 
visited a limited nonprobability sample of 14 state and local entities 
in the four states, the information discussed in this report cannot be 
generalized to all state and local government agencies that store 
explosives. Additional detail on our scope and methodology is provided 
in appendix I. 

We conducted our work from February through August 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of 
explosives from state and local government storage facilities. However, 
reports of thefts could be understated by an unknown amount. During the 
3-year period from January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received only 9 
reports of thefts or missing explosives from state and local government 
storage facilities. By comparison, during this same time period there 
were a total of 205 explosives thefts reported from all sources 
nationwide. There are two federal reporting requirements relating to 
the theft of explosives--one is specific to explosives licensees (and 
permittees) and the other generally applies to "any person who has 
knowledge of the theft or loss of any explosive materials from his 
stock." While ATF has interpreted this second reporting requirement as 
applying to nonlicensed state and local government explosives storage 
facilities, ATF officials acknowledged that state and local government 
entities may be unclear as to whether they are covered under this 
requirement. Indeed, this lack of clarity issue may have contributed to 
our findings: During our audit, we found evidence of five thefts from 
state and local government facilities, one of which did not appear in 
ATF's national database on thefts and missing explosives. Because of 
this, the total number of thefts occurring at state and local 
government storage facilities could actually be more than the number 
identified by ATF data. 

Although federal storage requirements are applicable to state and local 
government explosives storage facilities, ATF does not have oversight 
authority with respect to these facilities. With respect to private 
sector facilities, ATF oversight--including the ability to conduct 
regulatory inspections--is linked to the licensing of facilities. 
Private sector businesses and organizations that import, manufacture, 
or deal in explosives are required to obtain a federal license. As a 
requirement of the licensing process, private sector licensees are 
generally subject to mandatory ATF oversight inspections of their 
explosives storage facilities. State and local government agencies that 
use and store explosives are not required under federal explosives law 
to obtain a license from ATF. In addition, ATF does not have specific 
statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections at state and 
local explosives storage facilities. State and local government storage 
facilities are generally not inspected by ATF, unless the facility 
operator voluntarily requests such an inspection or shares its storage 
magazine with ATF. As a result, ATF has no means to ensure that all 
state and local government facilities nationwide are in compliance with 
federal storage regulations. 

ATF does not collect nationwide information on the number and location 
of state and local government storage facilities or the types and 
amounts of explosives that are being stored in these facilities. State 
and local government agencies are exempt from obtaining a federal 
explosives license, and they are not subject to ATF oversight 
authority. As a result, ATF has no real way of knowing the precise 
number of these facilities or the extent to which their explosives 
storage facilities are secure from theft. For a limited number of state 
and local government facilities--those that request a voluntary 
inspection or where ATF shares a state and local magazine--ATF conducts 
inspections that allow it to collect information about such things as 
the location and characteristics of these storage facilities. However, 
because ATF does not have authority to conduct mandatory inspections of 
all state and local government entities, ATF has no means to collect 
this type of information nationwide. Although ATF cannot gather 
information about state and local government entities, it is able to 
collect a variety of information about private sector explosives 
licensees, who operate roughly 7,500 storage facilities and nearly 
23,000 permanent or mobile storage magazines in the United States. 
Information about these storage facilities and the explosives being 
stored is required to be submitted to ATF during the licensing 
application process. Additional information is collected during the 
course of mandatory ATF inspections of licensees. During our audit, we 
identified various types of state and local government agencies that 
use and store explosives--including law enforcement bomb squads, public 
universities, and departments of transportation. However, we did not 
gather sufficient information about these entities to reliably estimate 
the total number of state and local government storage facilities and 
magazines nationwide. 

At the 14 state and local entities we visited, we observed a variety of 
security measures in place at their 18 storage facilities. Regarding 
physical security, most storage facilities had some kind of locked gate 
to prevent vehicle access, and several had fencing surrounding their 
storage facilities or storage magazines. At each of these facilities, 
officials told us they visually inspected or patrolled the facility on 
a regular basis. Four storage facilities also had electronic security 
systems in place--either monitored alarms or video surveillance-- 
although one of these was out of service at the time of our visit. 
Officials at several other entities said they were actively planning to 
implement some form of electronic security or were in the process of 
installing a security system in the near future at their storage 
facilities. These types of security measures--fences, vehicle barriers 
and electronic monitoring devices--all exceed the requirements of 
federal explosives regulations. Regarding oversight activities, 
officials at all the entities we visited told us they conducted routine 
inventories of their storage facilities. Most facilities were not 
required to be licensed or inspected by state or local regulatory 
agencies, although several officials said they had previously had their 
storage facilities inspected by ATF. Two of the 14 entities we visited 
had previously reported a loss or experienced a theft of explosives, 
but only one of these incidents appeared in ATF's nationwide theft 
database. 

To allow ATF to better monitor and respond to incidents of missing or 
stolen explosives, we are recommending that the Attorney General direct 
the ATF Director to clarify the explosives incident reporting 
regulations to ensure that all persons and entities who store 
explosives, including state and local government agencies, understand 
their obligation to report all thefts or missing explosives to ATF 
within 24 hours of an occurrence. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ for its review and comment. 
DOJ agreed with our recommendation and also provided technical 
comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. 

Background: 

ATF is the chief enforcer of explosives laws and regulations in the 
United States and is responsible for licensing and regulating 
explosives manufacturers, importers, dealers, and users.[Footnote 5] 
ATF is also responsible for regulating most, but not all, explosives 
storage facilities. ATF's regulatory authority over explosives stems 
from the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.[Footnote 6] This statute 
imposed controls over the importation, manufacture, distribution, and 
storage of explosives, and was the basis for giving ATF enforcement 
responsibilities for these controls.[Footnote 7] The Safe Explosives 
Act expanded ATF's authority to generally require licenses for persons 
who purchase or receive explosives and background checks on licensees 
and their employees who handle explosives.[Footnote 8] 

Under federal explosives regulations, a license is required for persons 
who manufacture, import, or deal in explosives and, with some 
exceptions, for persons who intend to acquire explosives for use. No 
license is required solely to operate an explosives storage facility. 
However, all persons who store explosive materials (including state and 
local agencies) must conform with applicable ATF storage regulations, 
irrespective of whether they are required to obtain an explosives 
license for other purposes. State and local agencies are not required 
to obtain an explosives license to use and store explosives. Similarly, 
federal government agencies, the U.S. military, and other federally 
owned or operated establishments are exempt from compliance with both 
the licensing and the storage regulations. According to ATF data, as of 
February 2005 there were 12,028 federal explosives licensees in the 
United States.[Footnote 9] Roughly 7,500 of these had some kind of 
explosives storage facility, consisting of 22,791 permanent or mobile 
storage magazines. 

ATF storage regulations include requirements relating to the safety and 
security of explosives storage magazines--that is, any building or 
structure (other than an explosives manufacturing building) used for 
storage of explosive materials. Regarding safety, the storage 
regulations include requirements related to location, construction, 
capacity, housekeeping, interior lighting, and magazine repairs, as 
well as a requirement that the local fire safety authority be notified 
of the location of each storage magazine. Regarding security, the ATF 
storage regulations include the following requirements: 

* Explosives handling. All explosive materials[Footnote 10] must be 
kept in locked magazines unless they are in the process of manufacture, 
being physically handled in the operating process of a licensee or 
user, being used, or being transported to a place of storage or use. 
Explosives are not to be left unattended when in portable storage 
magazines. 

* Magazine construction. Storage magazines must be theft-resistant and 
must meet specific requirements dealing with such things as mobility, 
exterior construction, door hinges and hasps, and locks. 

* Magazine inspection. Storage magazines must be inspected at least 
every 7 days. This inspection need not be an inventory, but it must be 
sufficient to determine if there has been an unauthorized entry or 
attempted entry into the magazines, or unauthorized removal of the 
magazine contents. 

* Magazine inventory. Within the magazine, containers of explosive 
materials are to be stored so that marks are visible. Stocks of 
explosive materials are to be stored so they can be easily counted and 
checked. 

Notwithstanding the security requirements described above, ATF storage 
regulations do not require explosives storage facilities to have any of 
the following physical security features--fences, restricted property 
access, exterior lighting, alarm systems, or electronic surveillance. 
Also, while ATF licensing regulations require explosives licensees to 
conduct a physical inventory at least annually, there is no similar 
inventory requirement in the storage regulations applicable to other 
persons who store explosives. 

Limited Data Indicate That Few Thefts May Have Occurred at State and 
Local Government Storage Facilities, but the Exact Number Is Uncertain: 

According to ATF data, the number of reported state and local 
government thefts is relatively small when compared with the total 
number of thefts that have occurred nationwide. For example, during a 
recent 3-year period (January 2002--February 2005), 9 thefts involving 
state and local government storage facilities were reported. Of these, 
5 involved state and local law enforcement agencies (1 was later 
determined to be the possible result of training explosives that had 
been mistakenly discarded), 3 others involved state government entities 
(all universities), and the remaining incident took place at a county 
highway department. Two of the 9 incidents occurred in California 
(including last year's theft that was mentioned previously), and no 
other state reported more than one incident. By comparison, during this 
same period, ATF received reports of 205 explosives thefts nationwide 
from all sources. Three states--California, Texas, and Pennsylvania-- 
accounted for about one-quarter (53) of the total reported thefts 
nationwide. According to ATF officials, this may be due to the larger 
numbers of explosives licensees and storage magazines located in these 
three states. 

The amounts of explosives reported stolen or missing from state and 
local government facilities in each reported incident of theft are also 
relatively small when compared with the total amounts of stolen and 
missing explosives nationwide. For example, during a recent 10-month 
period for which data were available (March 2003 through December 
2003), there were a total of 76 theft incidents nationwide reported to 
ATF, amounting to a loss of about 3,600 pounds of high explosives, 
3,100 pounds of blasting agents, 1,400 detonators, and 2,400 feet of 
detonating cord and safety fuse. By comparison, over an entire 10-year 
period (January 1995--December 2004), ATF received only 14 reports of 
theft from state and local law enforcement storage magazines. In 10 of 
these incidents, less than 50 pounds of explosives was reported stolen 
or missing; while in 3 of the incidents, more than 50 pounds was stolen 
or missing.[Footnote 11] In 6 of these 14 cases, ATF data indicate that 
most or all of the explosives were recovered; in the other 8 cases, 
none of the explosives have been recovered. 

While the ATF theft data indicate that thefts from state and local 
facilities make up only a small part of the overall thefts nationwide, 
these reports may be understated by an unknown amount. There are two 
federal reporting requirements relating to the theft of explosives. One 
is specific to all federal explosives licensees (and permittees) and 
requires any licensee to report any theft or loss of explosives to ATF 
within 24 hours of discovery. The second reporting requirement 
generally requires any other "person" who has knowledge of the theft or 
loss of any explosive materials from his stock to report to ATF within 
24 hours. Although the term "person" as defined in law and regulation 
does not specifically include state and local government 
agencies,[Footnote 12] ATF has historically interpreted this 
requirement as applying to nonlicensed state and local government 
explosives storage facilities. With respect to the second reporting 
requirement, according to ATF, the legislative history of the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970 indicates that Congress believed visibility 
over all incidents [emphasis added] of stolen explosives was necessary 
to effectively enforce any federal explosives regulatory statute-- 
primarily because of the special problems presented by stolen explosive 
materials and the persons possessing them. 

While ATF has interpreted the theft reporting requirement as applying 
to state and local government explosives storage facilities, ATF 
officials acknowledged that state and local government entities could 
be unsure as to their coverage under the theft reporting requirements. 
As a result, some state and local government entities may not know they 
are required to report such incidents to ATF, and this lack of 
information could impair ATF's ability to monitor these incidents and 
take appropriate investigative action. Indeed, during our site visits 
and other state and local contacts, we identified five state and local 
government entities that had previously experienced an incident of 
theft or reported missing explosives--two involving local law 
enforcement agencies, two involving state universities, and one 
involving a state department of transportation.[Footnote 13] However, 
one of these five incidents did not appear in ATF's nationwide database 
of reported thefts and missing explosives. Based on these findings, the 
actual number of thefts occurring at state and local government storage 
facilities nationwide could be more than the number identified by ATF 
data. 

ATF Authority to Oversee State and Local Government Explosives Storage 
Facilities Is Limited, as Is ATF's Capacity to Absorb Additional 
Oversight Responsibilities: 

With certain exceptions (such as for federal agencies), federal 
explosives law requires all persons who store explosives to conform to 
applicable regulations. However, there is no ATF oversight mechanism in 
place to ensure that state and local government facilities have 
complied with the regulations. With respect to private sector entities, 
ATF's authority to oversee explosives storage facilities is primarily a 
function of its licensing process. However, the licensing requirements 
described in the law and regulations above do not apply to the 
transportation, shipment, receipt, or importation of explosive 
materials to any state or its political subdivision (such as a city or 
county). That is, government entities, such as state and local law 
enforcement agencies, are not required to obtain a federal license to 
use and store explosives. In addition, ATF does not have specific 
statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections at state and 
local explosives storage facilities. As a result, these facilities are 
not subject to mandatory oversight under ATF's licensing authority or 
any ATF regulatory inspection authority apart from the licensing 
process. 

ATF may inspect state and local government storage facilities under 
certain circumstances--for example, if the operator of the facility 
voluntarily requests ATF to conduct an inspection. Since January 2002, 
ATF has conducted 77 voluntary inspections at state and local storage 
facilities--34 inspections at facilities that ATF shares with state and 
local agencies and 43 inspections at other state and local 
facilities.[Footnote 14] These inspections basically involve checking 
for compliance with federal storage regulations, including verifying 
proper construction of the storage magazine and verifying that the 
amount of explosives stored is consistent with the approved table of 
distances.[Footnote 15] In addition to conducting voluntary 
inspections, ATF also conducts inspections of state and local 
explosives storage magazines that are shared by ATF and a state or 
local agency. ATF currently shares space in 52 storage magazines, 
including 33 that are owned or leased by state and local agencies. 
Shared magazines are subject to mandatory inspections by ATF, and the 
inspection procedures are basically the same as those described above 
for voluntary inspections. According to ATF officials, no significant 
or systemic safety or security problems have been found during 
inspections of state and local storage magazines. However, regarding 
those state and local government facilities that ATF does not inspect, 
ATF officials acknowledged they had no way of knowing the extent to 
which these facilities are complying with federal storage regulations. 

By comparison with state and local government entities, private sector 
licensees are subject to mandatory ATF oversight and inspection. Under 
provisions of the Safe Explosives Act, ATF is generally required to 
physically inspect a license applicant's storage facility prior to 
issuing a federal explosives license--which effectively means at least 
one inspection every 3 years. This inspection is intended to verify 
that the applicant's storage facility complies with federal regulations 
regarding safety and security, and the inspection requirement applies 
to original license applications, as well as renewals (with certain 
exceptions).[Footnote 16] In addition, the regulations allow ATF to 
inspect licensees at any time during business hours, for the purpose of 
inspecting or examining any records or documents required to be 
maintained and any explosive materials kept or stored at the premises. 

ATF officials stated that if the agency were to be required to conduct 
mandatory inspections of state and local government storage facilities, 
they would likely need additional resources to conduct these 
inspections because they are already challenged to keep up with 
inspections that are mandated as part of the explosives licensing 
requirements. One factor that affects ATF's ability to meet inspection 
goals is that inspectors have to conduct inspections of licensed 
firearms dealers, manufacturers, and importers, as well as explosives 
licensees. As noted above, ATF must physically inspect explosives 
licensees at least once every 3 years--or about one-third (4,000) of 
the roughly 12,000 licensees each year. According to ATF officials, 
because license applications and renewals are not evenly distributed 
over this 3-year cycle, some years there may actually be more or less 
than 4,000 inspections per year. ATF currently has 723 field 
inspectors, 620 of whom regularly conduct explosives and firearms 
inspections (the others are in supervisory or administrative 
positions). About 20 percent of the inspection time is spent on 
explosives inspections; the remainder is spent on firearms. 

In July 2004, DOJ's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported that 
ATF's inspections program was being affected by staffing shortages. The 
OIG noted that in response to passage of the Safe Explosives Act, ATF 
had to divert resources from firearms inspections to conduct explosives 
inspections required under the act. The OIG report further stated that 
ATF had calculated (and reported to Congress) that it needed almost 
1,800 inspectors--including 540 just for explosives inspections--to 
manage its existing inspection workload at that time.[Footnote 17] To 
help ATF carry out its explosives responsibilities, the conferees on 
the DOJ appropriations act for fiscal year 2005 directed funding 
increases in fiscal year 2005 for the hiring of an additional 31 
explosives inspectors, for purposes of explosives investigations and 
regulatory compliance.[Footnote 18] In addition, the House Committee on 
Appropriations has recommended additional funding in ATF's fiscal year 
2006 appropriation, for the hiring of another 50 explosives 
inspectors.[Footnote 19] Despite these increases, giving ATF additional 
responsibility to oversee state and local government storage facilities 
could further tax the agency's inspection resources. According to ATF 
officials, because of the legislative mandate to physically inspect 
explosives licensees, the effect of additional state and local 
government explosives responsibilities (without similar increases in 
inspector resources) could be to reduce the number of firearms 
inspections that ATF could conduct. 

ATF Does Not Collect Nationwide Information about State and Local 
Government Storage Facilities, but Does So for Licensed Private Sector 
Facilities: 

According to ATF officials, ATF does not collect nationwide information 
on the number and location of state and local government explosives 
storage facilities, nor does the agency know the types and amounts of 
explosives being stored in these facilities. With respect to private 
sector licensees, ATF collects descriptive information concerning 
explosive storage facilities as part of the licensing process. However, 
state and local government explosive storage facilities are not 
required to obtain a license from ATF, and ATF does not have specific 
statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections of such 
facilities. As a result, no systematic information about these 
facilities is collected. For those state and local government 
facilities that ATF does inspect--either voluntary inspections of state 
and local magazines or mandatory inspections of shared magazines--some 
information is collected by ATF. During these inspections, ATF collects 
information about the location of the storage magazines, the types and 
amounts of explosives stored, and whether the magazines are in 
compliance with federal storage regulations. According to ATF 
officials, the information obtained from these inspections--along with 
the results from inspections of licensees--are maintained in ATF's N- 
Spect nationwide inspection database. While mandatory annual 
inspections are required by ATF at each of the 33 state and local 
magazines where ATF shares storage space, there have been only 77 
voluntary inspections of state and local storage magazines since 
January 2002. ATF also has some ability to monitor state and local 
storage facilities at locations where ATF maintains its own storage 
magazine. ATF headquarters and field offices currently have 118 storage 
magazines colocated at facilities with state and local storage 
magazines. For these facilities, ATF collects information about the 
location of the facility and the inspection status of any state and 
local magazines on site.[Footnote 20] Of the 77 voluntary inspections 
discussed above, 34 were at these colocated facilities. 

By comparison, ATF collects a variety of information about private 
sector explosives storage facilities, primarily under its authority to 
issue explosives licenses. For example, ATF license application forms 
require applicants for an explosives license to submit information 
about their storage capabilities. Specific information applicants are 
required to submit to ATF includes the type of storage magazine, the 
location of the magazine, the type of security in place, the capacity 
of the magazine, and the class of explosives that will be stored. ATF 
also collects information about private sector storage facilities 
during mandatory licensee inspections. As noted previously, prior to 
issuing or renewing an explosives license, ATF must generally verify by 
on-site inspection that the applicant has a storage facility that meets 
the standards of public safety and security against theft as prescribed 
in the regulations. Thereafter, ATF may also inspect a licensee at any 
time during business hours--including inspection of storage magazines, 
examination of explosives inventory and sales records, and verification 
of compliance with ATF administrative rules. Because state and local 
government storage facilities are exempt from the licensing process 
described above, they are not required to submit licensing-related 
information about their storage facility to ATF and they are not 
subject to licensing-related mandatory ATF inspections. In addition, 
ATF does not have specific statutory authority to perform regulatory 
oversight inspections of such facilities apart from the licensing 
process. As a result, ATF is unable to collect complete nationwide 
information about where these facilities are or the types and amount of 
explosives they store. 

During the course of our audit work, we compiled data on state and 
local law enforcement bomb squads that would be likely to use and store 
explosives. At the 13 state and local law enforcement bomb squads we 
visited, we identified 16 storage facilities and 30 storage magazines. 
At these locations, the number of storage facilities ranged from 1 to 
2, and the number of storage magazines ranged from 1 to 4. According to 
FBI data, there are currently 452 state and local law enforcement bomb 
squads nationwide. The total number of state and local government 
storage facilities and magazines nationwide, however, encompasses other 
entities in addition to law enforcement bomb squads--including other 
law enforcement agencies, public universities, and departments of 
transportation. The precise number of storage facilities and magazines 
at these locations is currently unknown. And because of the limited 
nature of our fieldwork, we cannot generalize about the extent of 
security and oversight these entities may have at their own explosives 
storage facilities. 

Security Measures Varied at State and Local Explosives Storage 
Facilities We Visited: 

We found that security oversight measures varied at the 14 selected 
state and local government entities we visited. These 14 entities 
maintained a total of 18 storage facilities. With regard to physical 
security, 13 of the 18 storage facilities restricted vehicle access to 
the storage area. Six of the 18 storage facilities also had a barrier 
immediately surrounding the storage containers preventing human access. 
Official personnel at all 18 facilities said they patrolled or 
inspected the storage facility on a regular basis. Regarding electronic 
security, 4 of the 18 facilities had either an alarm or video 
monitoring system in place. Inventory and other oversight activities at 
all 14 of the state and local entities included regular, periodic 
inventories of the contents of their explosives storage facilities. In 
addition, a federal, state, or local government authority had performed 
inspections for 9 of the 14 entities. State government agencies in 
Colorado and Pennsylvania required 5 state and local entities we 
visited in these states to obtain licenses to operate their explosives 
storage facilities. However, 2 of these 5 entities did not have the 
required licenses in place at the time of our visit. Two of the 14 
entities had experienced prior thefts or losses from their storage 
facilities, and we observed storage practices at four facilities that 
may not be in compliance with federal regulations. 

The following sections describe our observations of the explosives 
storage magazines and types of security measures in place at the 18 
state and local storage facilities we visited. Our criteria for 
identifying the type of security measures in place included existing 
federal explosives storage laws and regulations (27 C.F.R., Part 555, 
Subpart K) and security guidelines issued by the explosives industry 
(the Institute of Makers of Explosives). Most of these security 
measures are not currently required under federal storage regulations 
(perimeter fencing, for example). However, we are presenting this 
information in order to demonstrate the wide range of security measures 
actually in place at the time of our visits. 

Explosives Storage Facilities Varied with Regard to Users and Size: 

As shown in table 1, the 14 state and local government entities we 
visited included 11 city or county bomb squads (including police 
departments and sheriffs' offices), 2 state bomb squads, and one public 
university. Four of the 14 state and local entities had two separate 
storage areas encompassing a total of 18 explosives storage facilities 
among the 14 entities. As further shown in table 1, 17 of these 
explosives storage facilities were located on state, city, county, or 
police property. These included 3 that were located on state property 
(such as state law enforcement or state university), 7 that were 
located at police training facilities, and 7 that were located on city 
or county government-owned property (such as correctional or water 
facilities). For example, one local entity we visited in Texas had a 
storage facility located on the grounds of a city-owned nature 
preserve. 

Table 1: Overview of the State and Local Entities We Visited: 

State and local entities; 
Number: 14. 

Agency type: 

* State bomb squad; 
Number: 2; 
Examples: State police and highway patrol. 

* City/county bomb squad; 
Number: 11; 
Examples: Police departments and sheriffs' offices. 

* Public university; 
Number: 1; 
Examples: School with mining engineering curriculum. 

Storage facility locations; 
Number: 18. 

Property type: 

* Police training; 
Number: 7; 
Examples: Academy or other training facility. 

* State; 
Number: 3; 
Examples: University, state law enforcement. 

* City/county; 
Number: 7; 
Examples: Correctional facility, water treatment, nature park. 

* Airport; 
Number: 1; 
Examples: Airport grounds. 

Storage magazines; 
Number: 34. 

Magazine types: 

* Type 1 (permanent); 
Number: 10; 
Examples: 7 aboveground, 3 underground. 

* Type 2 (mobile); 
Number: 22; 
Examples: 19 box-type, 3 trailer-type. 

* Type 3 (temporary); 
Number: 2; 
Examples: 2 day-boxes used for permanent storage. 

Source: GAO observation, comments by state and local government 
officials, and ATF regulations. 

[End of table] 

Also, 11 of the 18 explosives storage facilities we visited contained 
multiple magazines for the storage of explosives. As a result, the 18 
facilities housed a total of 34 magazines divided into various types as 
shown in table 1.[Footnote 21] A Pennsylvania storage facility had 4 
magazines, which was the largest number among the facilities we 
visited. Figures 1 through 3 depict different types of explosives 
storage magazines. 

Figure 1: Type 1 (Permanent Structure) Explosives Storage Magazines in 
Texas and Colorado: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Figure 2: Type 2 (Mobile) Explosives Storage Magazines in Pennsylvania 
and Tennessee: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Figure 3: Type 3 (Portable Day-Box) Explosives Storage Magazine in 
Pennsylvania: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

All of the 18 facilities contained a variety of high explosives, 
including C-4 plastic explosive, TNT, binary explosives, and 
detonators. Officials from 13 of the state and local entities provided 
us with estimates of the quantities of explosives they were storing, 
and they reported amounts ranging from 10 to 1,000 pounds, with the 
majority of the entities (9) indicating they had 200 pounds or less. 

Different Types of Physical Security Measures at Explosives Storage 
Facilities: 

At the 18 storage facilities we visited, we looked for the presence of 
exterior and interior fencing, other barriers to restrict vehicle or 
pedestrian access, and security personnel. Federal explosives storage 
regulations do not require any of these physical security attributes; 
rather, the regulations generally require theft-resistant magazine 
construction (including locks) and weekly inspections of magazines. As 
shown in table 2, 13 of the 18 storage facilities restricted vehicle 
access to the facility grounds by way of a locked security gate or by 
virtue of being an indoor facility. Five of the 13 facilities 
restricted vehicle access after normal working hours (nights or nights 
and weekends). Officials at 7 other facilities said that vehicle access 
to the facilities was restricted at all times, including the indoor 
facility in Pennsylvania that was located in the basement of a 
municipal building.[Footnote 22] While these outdoor facilities had 
barriers to vehicle access via roadway, not all of the facilities were 
completely surrounded by fencing or some other perimeter barrier, nor 
do federal storage regulations require them to have such a barrier or 
fencing. 

Table 2: Types of Physical Security in Place at the 18 Explosives 
Storage Facilities We Visited: 

Exterior barrier around storage facility: 

Type of physical security: 
* Vehicle access restricted; 
Number of storage facilities: 12; 
Examples of physical security: Fence gates with electronic or manual 
locks. 

Type of physical security: 
* All access restricted; 
Number of storage facilities: 1; 
Examples of physical security: Interior storage in basement of 
municipal building. 

Type of physical security: 
* No exterior barrier; 
Number of storage facilities: 5. 

Extent of access control: 

Type of physical security: 
* Constant; 
Number of storage facilities: 7; 
Examples of physical security: 24 hours, 7 days a week. 

Type of physical security: 
* Certain periods only; 
Number of storage facilities: 5; 
Examples of physical security: Nights and weekends, or nights only. 

Type of physical security: 
* No access control; 
Number of storage facilities: 5; 
Examples of physical security: Accessible at all times by vehicle. 

Type of physical security: 
* Extent could not be verified; 
Number of storage facilities: 1[A]. 

Interior barrier around storage magazine: 

Type of physical security: 
* Pedestrian access restricted; 
Number of storage facilities: 6; 
Examples of physical security: Chain- link fences with locked gates. 

Type of physical security: 
* All access restricted; 
Number of storage facilities: 1; 
Examples of physical security: Multiple interior door locks. 

Type of physical security: 
* No interior barrier; 
Number of storage facilities: 11. 

Extent of personnel presence: 

Type of physical security: 
* Regular patrols or inspections; 
Number of storage facilities: 18; 
Examples of physical security: Bomb squad officers and police officers. 

Type of physical security: 
* 24-hour on-site; 
Number of storage facilities: 9[A]; 
Examples of physical security: City or county employees. 

Source: GAO observation and comments of state and local government 
officials. 

[A] At 1 facility, we were unable to determine the extent of access 
control or whether a 24-hour personnel presence existed. 

[End of table] 

Also, as shown in table 2, 6 of 18 storage facilities had an interior 
barrier immediately surrounding their storage magazines to prevent 
direct access by persons on foot. At each of these 6 facilities, the 
barriers consisted of a chain-link fence with a locked gate barring 
entry by unauthorized personnel (figure 4 reflects one of these 
facilities). At 1 other facility (the indoor facility in Pennsylvania), 
the storage magazines were in the basement of the municipal building, 
and multiple locked doors were used to prevent access by unauthorized 
personnel. Conversely, at 1 facility in Texas, the storage magazine 
could be reached on foot or by vehicle at any time because it did not 
have fencing or vehicle barriers to deter unauthorized access. 

Figure 4: Pennsylvania Storage Facility with Interior Barrier 
Surrounding Type 2 Storage Magazines: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Officials at all of the 18 storage facilities detailed in table 2 told 
us that official personnel patrolled or inspected the storage facility 
on a regular basis. For example, bomb squad officers said they 
regularly visited the facilities to check on their condition, in 
addition to visiting the facilities to retrieve or place explosive 
materials in them. In addition to bomb squad personnel, officials at 14 
of the 18 facilities said that police officers from local police 
departments patrolled the facilities to check for any obvious signs of 
problems such as forced entry. However, these police patrols typically 
did not include actual entry into the storage magazines to inspect the 
explosives themselves. 

As further shown in table 2, officials at 9 of the 18 storage 
facilities we visited said that state or local government employees 
maintained a 24-hour presence at the facilities. Four of these storage 
facilities were located on the grounds of police training centers, 
where either trainees or facility personnel were present at all times. 
Two storage facilities-one each in Tennessee and Texas--were on the 
grounds of jail facilities where local correctional personnel worked 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week. Two other storage facilities were located 
on the grounds of city/county water or sewage treatment plants, and 1 
storage facility was located in the basement of a municipal building. 
One additional facility in Pennsylvania was located on the grounds of 
the police academy, but we were unable to determine whether there was 
24-hour, on-site presence at that facility. 

Some Explosives Storage Facilities Had Electronic Security Measures: 

At the 18 storage facilities we visited, we looked for the presence of 
a monitored alarm or video surveillance system. Although no electronic 
security is required under federal regulations, 4 of the 18 explosives 
storage facilities had either an alarm or a video monitoring system in 
place. Specifically, one entity in Texas had 2 facilities with 
monitored alarm systems in place, and two entities in Pennsylvania and 
Tennessee had video monitoring of their explosives storage facilities. 
The Texas entity had alarm systems in place at 2 of its storage 
facilities. At 1 facility, two small detonator magazines--while not 
alarmed themselves--were located inside a building protected by an 
alarm system. At a second facility, the door to an underground storage 
magazine was alarmed. Regarding the 2 facilities with video monitoring, 
the Tennessee facility--which was located on the grounds of a local 
correctional facility--took advantage of a video surveillance system 
already in place to monitor prisoners. The Pennsylvania facility with 
video monitoring was located inside a municipal building and was part 
of that building's overall video security system. 

The remaining 14 of the 18 storage facilities did not have video or 
alarm systems in place at the time of our visit. Officials at 4 
facilities told us they had alarm systems planned (funding not yet 
approved), and officials at 3 facilities said they had alarm systems 
pending (funding approved and awaiting installation). Officials at 2 
facilities also told us they planned to install video monitoring. For 
example, 1 facility in Pennsylvania had its video monitoring system 
destroyed by lightning and was planning to replace it. However, the 
local government authority had yet to approve funding for the 
replacement. 

Several officials commented on the feasibility of installing alarm or 
video monitoring systems at explosives storage facilities. At 4 of the 
state and local entities we visited, officials noted that these storage 
facilities are often located in remote areas without easy access to 
sources of electricity. The officials added that this lack of necessary 
electrical infrastructure could be a cost-prohibitive barrier if they 
were required to install some form of electronic monitoring at 
explosives storage facilities. Regarding the possibility of new storage 
regulations that would require an electronic security system at 
explosives storage magazines, officials at 9 state and local entities 
told us they would not object to such a requirement as long as it did 
not create an undue financial burden. 

Inventory and Other Oversight Activities Varied at Explosives Storage 
Facilities: 

At the 14 state and local entities we visited, we looked for the 
presence of internal inventory procedures, internal or external 
inspections, and licensing of the storage facility by state or local 
government agencies . Under federal regulations, only explosives 
licensees are required to perform periodic inventories and are subject 
to periodic ATF regulatory inspections of their storage facilities; 
other persons who store explosives are not. As shown in table 3, 
officials at all 14 of the entities we visited told us they performed 
periodic inventories of the contents of their explosives storage 
facilities. Typically, during these inventories, officials said they 
count all the explosives in the storage facility and reconcile them 
with inventory records maintained either manually or in a computerized 
database. 

Table 3: Inventory and Oversight Activities at the 14 State and Local 
Entities Visited: 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: Internal inventory: 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: 
* Annual; 
Number of state/local entities: 7. 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: 
* More frequent; 
Number of state/local entities: 7; 
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: Conducted monthly, 
bimonthly, or quarterly. 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: External inspections. 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: 
* ATF only; 
Number of state/local entities: 6; 
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: All but one conducted 
voluntarily. 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: 
* State or local authority only; 
Number of state/local entities: 1; 
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: Conducted by state 
regulatory authority. 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: 
* Both ATF and state/local authority; 
Number of state/local entities: 2; 
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: Periodic by ATF, plus 
state/local inspection. 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: 
* No external inspections; 
Number of state/local entities: 5. 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: License/permit. 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: 
* Required and in place; 
Number of state/local entities: 3; 
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: All issued by state 
regulatory authority. 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: 
* Required and not in place; 
Number of state/local entities: 2; 
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: Required by state 
regulatory authority. 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: 
* Not required and in place; 
Number of state/local entities: 1; 
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: Voluntarily obtained by 
local police. 

Type of inventory and oversight activity: 
* Not required and not in place; 
Number of state/local entities: 8. 

Source: GAO observations and comments of state and local government 
officials. 

[End of table] 

In addition, 9 of the 14 state and local entities said they had 
received inspections of their storage facilities, and ATF had conducted 
the inspections in all but 1 of these 9 cases. Regarding this 1 case in 
Pennsylvania, officials said a state government authority regularly 
performed these inspections. With regard to the ATF inspections, state 
or local operators of the selected facilities voluntarily requested 
these inspections in all but 1 case (as discussed further below). 

Of the 9 selected state and local entities that received inspections by 
a regulatory authority, 6 entities told us they received them on a 
periodic basis, with another 3 entities having received a onetime 
inspection (all by ATF). A Pennsylvania entity that said it received 
annual inspections from ATF was unique among those we visited because 
it had also received a onetime inspection from a local government 
authority. This entity was the only one we visited to have any type of 
inspection, either onetime or periodic, from a local government 
authority. Last, a Colorado entity, another of the 5 receiving periodic 
inspections, said it was being inspected on a recurring basis by both 
ATF and a state government authority--it was the only entity we visited 
that fell into this category. 

Also as shown in table 3, 5 of the 14 state and local entities we 
visited told us they were required to obtain a license from state 
regulatory authorities to operate their explosives storage facilities. 
One entity in Colorado had a license to store explosives issued by the 
state, and this entity had also obtained a federal explosives license 
issued by ATF. Officials at this location told us that the state 
required them to obtain the federal license before applying for its 
mandatory state license. Indeed, according to ATF officials, state or 
local government facilities may apply for a federal explosives license 
if it is required by their state regulatory agency. However, once such 
a license is issued, these state and local government facilities must 
then comply with all the same explosives laws and regulations that are 
applicable to licensed private sector facilities. 

Officials at the 14 state and local entities we visited commented on 
the feasibility of mandatory ATF oversight of their explosives storage 
facility. Officials at 13 state and local entities said they did not 
object to the possibility of federal licensing or inspection of their 
explosives storage facilities. Six state and local entities also said 
that they already have close contacts with ATF and would not be 
concerned about additional ATF oversight of their storage facilities. 
Officials at 3 state and local entities noted that additional federal 
oversight was not a concern, as long as they were not held to a higher 
standard of security and safety than ATF requires of private industry. 

Some Entities Had Experienced Explosives Thefts or Reported Losses: 

Two of the 14 state and local entities we visited had previously had a 
theft or loss of explosives from one of their storage facilities. At a 
storage facility in Texas, officials told us that criminals had once 
used a cutting torch to illegally gain entry to an explosives storage 
magazine. Some explosives were stolen, but the suspected thieves were 
later apprehended and the materials were recovered. At another storage 
facility in Colorado, officials said that an unauthorized individual 
had obtained keys to an explosives storage magazine and taken some of 
the material. As with the previous case, several individuals were 
apprehended and the materials were recovered. One of these incidents 
(the theft of explosives in Texas) did not appear in ATF's nationwide 
database of reported thefts and missing explosives.[Footnote 23] 

The law enforcement community has recently taken action to address the 
issue of thefts and security at law enforcement explosives storage 
facilities. In April 2005, the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory 
Board--which represents more than 450 accredited law enforcement bomb 
squads nationwide--initiated a program to increase security awareness 
at its members' explosives storage facilities. In a letter to its 
membership, the advisory board encouraged all bomb squad commanders to 
increase diligence regarding explosives storage security. The advisory 
board also recommended that all bomb squads request a voluntary ATF 
inspection, ensure they maintain an accurate explosives inventory, and 
assess the adequacy of security measures in place at their respective 
explosive storage facilities to determine whether additional measures 
might be required--such as video monitoring, fencing, and alarms. This 
is a voluntary program, and it is too soon to tell what effect, if any, 
it will have towards enhancing the security at state and local law 
enforcement storage facilities and reducing the potential for thefts. 

Possible Noncompliance With Regulations at Some Storage Facilities: 

At 4 of the 14 state and local entities we visited, we observed various 
storage practices that may not be in compliance with federal explosives 
regulations. These circumstances appeared to be related to storage 
safety issues, rather than storage security. For example, one 
explosives storage facility was located in the basement of a municipal 
building and utilized small type 3 temporary magazines (known as day- 
boxes) for permanent storage of high explosives and detonators. ATF 
regulations state that these magazines should be used only for 
temporary storage of explosives and may not be left unattended. At 
another storage facility, a high explosives storage magazine housed a 
small detonator (or "cap") magazine in its interior, although ATF 
regulations generally require detonators to be kept separate from other 
explosive materials. Another storage facility contained several boxes 
of unmarked, 1970s-era plastic explosives (specifically C-4), 
possession of which is generally restricted under federal explosives 
law when the material in question does not contain a detection agent. 
Finally, an official at one storage facility acknowledged that because 
of the weight of explosives currently being stored, their storage 
magazine was in violation of ATF regulations concerning allowable 
distances from other inhabited structures. 

Conclusions: 

The overall number of state and local government explosives storage 
facilities, the types of explosives being stored, and the number of 
storage magazines associated with these facilities are currently 
unknown. Further, because ATF does not oversee state and local 
government storage facilities as part of the federal licensing process 
and ATF does not have any other statutory authority to conduct 
regulatory inspections of these facilities, ATF's ability to monitor 
the potential vulnerability of these facilities to theft or assess the 
extent to which these facilities are in compliance with federal 
explosives storage regulations is limited. Nevertheless, current 
federal explosives law as enacted by Congress does not provide ATF with 
specific authority to conduct regulatory oversight with respect to 
public sector facilities. And although we did observe possible 
noncompliance with the storage regulations at some of the state and 
local entities we visited, none of these circumstances appeared to make 
the facilities more vulnerable to theft. 

According to ATF's interpretation of federal explosives laws and 
regulations, state and local government agencies--including law 
enforcement bomb squads and public universities--are required to report 
incidents of theft or missing explosives to ATF within 24 hours of an 
occurrence. However, during the course of our audit work, we identified 
five incidents involving theft or missing explosives at state and local 
government facilities, one of which had not been reported to ATF. 
Because this reporting requirement applies to any "person" who has 
knowledge of a theft from his stock and the definition of "person" does 
not specifically include state and local government agencies, ATF 
officials acknowledged that these entities may be unsure as to whether 
they are required to report under this requirement. On the basis of our 
limited site visit observations and discussions with state, local, and 
ATF officials, we did not identify a specific threat or vulnerability 
to theft among state and local government explosive storage facilities. 
However, if state and local government entities are unsure about 
whether they are required to report thefts and missing explosives, 
ATF's ability to monitor these incidents and take appropriate 
investigative action may be compromised by a potential lack of 
information. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To allow ATF to better monitor and respond to incidents of missing or 
stolen explosives, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the 
ATF Director to clarify the explosives incident reporting regulations 
to ensure that all persons and entities who store explosives, including 
state and local government agencies, understand their obligation to 
report all thefts or missing explosives to ATF within 24 hours of an 
occurrence. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

On September 9, 2005, we provided a draft of this report to the 
Attorney General for review and comment. 

On September 26, 2005, DOJ advised us that the department had no formal 
agency comments and further advised us that DOJ agreed with our 
recommendation and would take steps to implement it. ATF provided 
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as 
appropriate. 

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further 
distribution of this report until 30 days after the date of the report. 
At that time, we will send copies of this report to the House Committee 
on Government Reform; House Committee on the Judiciary; House Committee 
on Homeland Security; Senate Committee on the Judiciary; Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; the Attorney 
General; the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives; appropriate state and local government officials; and other 
interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon 
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or EkstrandL@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were 
William Crocker, Assistant Director; David Alexander; Amy Bernstein; 
Philip Caramia; Geoffrey Hamilton; and Michael Harmond. 

Signed by: 

Laurie E. Ekstrand: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

In reviewing the security of state and local government explosives 
storage facilities, we focused on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) role in overseeing and regulating these 
facilities, including the extent to which ATF's licensing operations 
address state and local government facilities and what authority ATF 
has to enforce federal explosives law and regulations at state and 
local government facilities. In addition, we reviewed the extent to 
which ATF collects information about state and local government 
facilities, including locations and types and amount of explosives 
stored. To determine what states and localities are doing to ensure the 
safe and secure storage of explosives, we visited state and local 
explosives storage facilities. We also contacted other state and local 
government and explosives industry officials. 

Interviews and Other Contacts: 

To obtain the perspectives of U.S. government agencies on their efforts 
to regulate and oversee state and local government explosives storage 
facilities, we met with ATF headquarters officials--specifically 
individuals from ATF's Office of Enforcement Programs and Services, 
Office of Field Operations, Office of Strategic Intelligence and 
Information, and Office of the Chief Counsel. We also met with or 
obtained information from officials with the Department of Justice's 
(DOJ) Office of the Inspector General, as well as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's (FBI) Bomb Data Center. 

To determine what selected states and localities were doing to ensure 
the safe and secure storage of explosives in state and local government 
facilities, we met with state and local officials in Colorado, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas--specifically 13 state and local 
bomb squads and 1 public university. In these four states, we also 
contacted other state government agencies, including transportation and 
environmental protection agencies and fire marshals. We also contacted 
other public university officials in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah. 

To obtain additional perspectives of law enforcement and explosives 
industry experts on the safety and security of explosives storage 
facilities, we contacted representatives from the National Bomb Squad 
Commanders Advisory Board, the International Association of Bomb 
Technicians and Investigators, the Institute of Makers of Explosives, 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the National 
Sheriffs' Association. 

State and Local Site Visits: 

To find out what selected states and localities are doing to ensure the 
safe and secure storage of explosives in state and local government 
facilities, we visited 14 state and local government entities that 
stored explosives, as shown in table 4 below. During these site visits, 
we met with state and local officials and physically observed their 
explosives storage facilities and storage magazines. 

Table 4: State and Local Entities Visited: 

State: Colorado; 
State level: Public university: 1; 
City level: Police department: 1. 

State: Pennsylvania; 
State level: Law enforcement: 1; 
City level: Police department: 3. 

State: Tennessee; 
State level: Law enforcement: 1; 
County level: Sheriff's office: 1; 
City level: Police department: 2. 

State: Texas; 
City level: Police department: 3; 
City level: Fire department: 1. 

State: Total; 
State level: Law enforcement: 2; 
State level: Public university: 1; 
County level: Sheriff's office: 1; 
City level: Police department: 9; 
City level: Fire department: 1. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

We chose law enforcement bomb squads as the primary focus of our site 
visits because (1) we concluded that state and local bomb squads would 
be the most likely state and local government agencies to have a need 
for explosives storage facilities and (2) there was no other source of 
nationwide information on the number and location of state and local 
government explosives storage facilities. We selected our state and 
local site visits based on the following criteria: 

* In selecting which states to visit, we chose those states most likely 
to have significant state and local government and private sector 
explosives activities. The state selection criteria included (1) the 
number of federally licensed private sector explosives companies, (2) 
the number of reported explosives thefts,[Footnote 24] and (3) the 
number of law enforcement bomb squads.[Footnote 25] Using these 
criteria, we then selected a geographic mix of states--specifically one 
state in the northeast United States, one in the southeast, one in the 
southwest, and one in the west. 

* Within each state, we selected state and local bomb squads for our 
site visits. These were chosen to represent a mix based on the type of 
agency, size of jurisdiction, and geographic location. We selected two 
state law enforcement agencies, one county sheriff, nine city police 
departments, and one city fire department. These included three 
jurisdictions with populations over 1 million, five with populations 
between 100,000 and 1 million, three with populations below 100,000, 
and two with statewide jurisdictions. 

* We also selected one non-law enforcement explosives storage facility 
operated by a state university. This facility was selected as typical 
of the various state universities with mining-engineering programs and 
because it had a significant amount of explosives (over 100 pounds) in 
its storage facility. 

During our site visits, we used a semistructured interview guide to 
conduct interviews with state and local officials and determine the 
level of security at their explosives storage facilities. Our criteria 
for identifying the types of security measures in place included 
existing federal storage laws and regulations (27 C.F.R., Part 555, 
Subpart K) and security guidelines issued in 2005 by the explosives 
industry (the Institute of Makers of Explosives). Not all of the 
security criteria we used are currently requirements under federal 
storage regulations (perimeter fencing, for example). We used these 
additional criteria to demonstrate the wide range of security measures 
actually in place at the time of our visits to these facilities. Also, 
while we were not conducting a compliance audit, during our site visits 
we observed each storage magazine and noted any instances where 
explosives appeared not to be stored in compliance with federal 
regulations. 

We are not disclosing the names or other identifying information 
relating to the individual state and local entities we visited to 
ensure that security-related information is not unintentionally 
disclosed. Because our review was limited to a nonprobability sample of 
14 state and local entities in the four states, the information 
discussed in this report is illustrative and cannot be generalized to 
all state and local government entities nationwide that store 
explosives. 

ATF and FBI Data: 

ATF provided data related to explosives licensing and inspections, as 
well as relevant law, regulations, and procedures dealing with the 
storage of explosives. We also obtained data from ATF's Arson and 
Explosives National Repository related to incidents of theft and 
missing explosives reported to ATF. FBI provided us with a nationwide 
list of accredited bomb squads--including number, location, and name of 
agency. In addition, FBI provided policies and guidance related to the 
bomb squad training and accreditation process. 

The information we obtained from ATF (data on explosives licensees, 
explosives inspections, and explosives thefts) and FBI (data on the 
number and location of bomb squads) was used to provide background 
context on the number of private sector and state and local government 
explosives storage facilities and to assist us in selecting locations 
for our site visits. We interviewed agency officials knowledgeable 
about the data, and as a result, we determined that the data were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We also obtained 
data from ATF on incidents of explosive thefts and missing explosives 
at state and local government storage facilities. On the basis of our 
site visits and other audit work, we determined that these incidents 
may be underreported, as discussed earlier in this report. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Law enforcement bomb squads, for example, may store explosives for 
a number of uses--including destroying recovered explosives, 
dismantling explosive devices, and holding explosive materials for 
evidence. 

[2] Specifically, Title XI of Public Law 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 952 
(1970); and Subtitle C of Title XI of Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 
2135, 2280 (2002), respectively. 

[3] An approved storage facility is defined as a place where explosive 
materials are stored, consisting of one or more approved storage 
magazines. A storage magazine is defined as any building or structure, 
other than an explosives manufacturing building, used for storage of 
explosive materials. 

[4] We are not disclosing the names or other identifying information 
relating to the individual state and local entities we visited to 
ensure that security-related information is not unintentionally 
disclosed. 

[5] Licenses are issued to persons who manufacture, import, or sell 
explosives, while permits are issued to persons who intend to acquire 
and use explosives. Throughout the remainder of this report, references 
to explosives licenses, licensees, or ATF's licensing authority refer 
to both explosives licenses and permits. 

[6] Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title XI, 84 Stat. 922, 952 (1970). The 
explosives regulatory functions of ATF are found at 27 C.F.R. Part 555. 

[7] Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, 
116 Stat. 2135, 2280), ATF's existing enforcement responsibilities, 
including its authority over explosives, were transferred from the 
Treasury Department to the new Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives, within the Justice Department. All ATF regulations issued 
prior to that time remained in effect. 

[8] Subtitle C of Title XI of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

[9] Including licensees in the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, 
and the Virgin Islands. 

[10] As defined in the federal explosives law and regulations at 18 
U.S.C. § 841 and 27 C.F.R. § 555.11. 

[11] For the remaining incident, no details were available on the 
quantity of explosives involved. 

[12] The term "person" is defined in statute and regulation as "any 
individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, 
society, or joint stock company" (see 18 U.S.C. § 841(a); and 27 C.F.R. 
§ 555.11). 

[13] Two of these five incidents occurred at locations we visited; 
three occurred at other locations we identified during the course of 
our audit work. 

[14] As discussed later in this report, the total number of state and 
local government storage facilities nationwide is currently unknown. 

[15] As published in the federal storage regulations, the table of 
distances lists the minimum acceptable distances separating explosives 
magazines from inhabited buildings, passenger railroads, public 
highways, and other explosives magazines. 

[16] An exception is made for "limited" licenses which are good for 1 
year and allow a limited number of explosives purchases. For new 
applicants (and up to two renewals), ATF may verify the safety and 
security of the applicant's storage facility by means other than an 
inspection. 

[17] The OIG disputed these figures, but still estimated ATF needed 
about 800 inspectors just for firearms inspections. This is more than 
the total number of firearms and explosives inspectors that are 
currently on board. 

[18] H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-792, at 733 (2004). 

[19] H. R. Rep. No. 109-118, at 34 (2005). 

[20] Such as whether the state and local magazines have been 
voluntarily inspected by ATF. 

[21] Title 27, section 555.203, of the Code of Federal Regulations 
defines magazine types. 

[22] At 1 other storage facility in Pennsylvania, we also observed a 
vehicle barrier in place. However, local officials at this facility did 
not provide information about whether or not the barrier was in place 
at all times. 

[23] In addition to the two incidents described above, we also 
identified three other thefts at state and local entities during the 
course of our audit work. These other three incidents were all reported 
to ATF. 

[24] Based on explosives licensing data compiled by ATF and explosives 
theft incidents reported to ATF, both as of February 2005. 

[25] Based on data about state and local law enforcement bomb squads 
reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in November 2000. 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of 
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to 
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 
integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 
graphics. 

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its 
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order 
GAO Products" heading. 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: 

Voice: (202) 512-6000: 

TDD: (202) 512-2537: 

Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov 

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Public Affairs: 

Jeff Nelligan, managing director, 

NelliganJ@gao.gov 

(202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 

441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548: