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Report to Congressional Committees: 

June 2005: 

Cooperative Threat Reduction: 

DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal Controls, but Challenges 
Remain: 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-329] 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-329, a report to congressional committees: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Section 3611 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2004 mandates that GAO assess the Department of Defenseís (DOD) 
internal controls for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program 
and their effect on the programís execution. In addressing the mandate, 
we assessed DODís management and internal controls over implementing 
CTR projects since 2003 by using the control standards for the federal 
government as criteria. In response to the mandate, we focused on those 
management and internal control areas considered most relevant to CTR 
project implementation: (1) building a management structure, (2) risk 
assessments, (3) performance measures, (4) program reviews, (5) 
communications, and (6) project monitoring. The Congress also mandated 
that GAO describe the status of DODís implementation of legislative 
mandates covering the CTR program.

What GAO Found: 

Through the CTR program, DOD provides assistance to help the former 
states of the Soviet Union secure and eliminate their weapons of mass 
destruction. Since 2003, DOD has improved its management and internal 
controls over the CTR program. Prior to 2003, DOD had problems managing 
the program and ensuring that the program was meeting its objectives. 
These inadequacies became apparent in 2003 following two project 
failures in Russia that cost the CTR program almost $200 million, 
including the never used liquid rocket fuel disposition facility. 
Following these incidents, DOD implemented a more structured approach 
to managing the CTR program. In July 2003, DOD filled vacancies in the 
office responsible for managing the program, providing a level of 
leadership and oversight that did not previously exist. Once in place 
the new leadership made important improvements to the programís 
internal controls in the areas of organizational structure, risk 
assessments, performance measures, program reviews, and communication. 
For example, DOD now assesses and balances risks with project 
requirements and measures project performance at each phase. DOD also 
conducts semi-annual meetings to review commitments and 
responsibilities of CTR-recipient governments and to minimize risk. 
Although enhancing its internal controls helps mitigate the risks that 
stem from having to rely on the cooperation of CTR-recipient 
governments, DOD can never fully eliminate the project risks associated 
with recipient governmentsí cooperation. Furthermore, while DODís 
enhancements are an improvement over previous internal controls, 
current mechanisms do not include a separate review of CTR projects 
upon their completion. As such, DOD lacks a system for evaluating 
projects upon their completion and applying lessons learned to future 
projects.

Facility to Destroy Liquid Rocket Fuel Cost $95 Million but Was Never 
Used: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense conduct performance 
reviews of CTR projects upon their completion. Such reviews would 
provide a mechanism to document lessons learned and apply them to 
future project planning and implementation. DOD concurred with our 
recommendation.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-329.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Joseph Christoff at (202) 
512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal Controls over the CTR 
Program: 

Conclusion: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Two Project Failures Cost the CTR Program Nearly $200 
Million: 

Appendix II: Legislative Mandates Covering the CTR Program: 

Appendix III: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix IV: Current CTR Program Areas: 

Appendix V: DOD's Current Management and Internal Controls for the CTR 
Program Compared with Internal Control Standards: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Internal Control Standards and Factors Compared with DOD 
Internal Controls: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: DOD Management Structure for the CTR Program: 

Figure 2: Russian SS-24 Missile Engine Undergoing Dismantlement: 

Figure 3: CTR Program Legislative Mandates (Fiscal Years 1992-2004): 

Figure 4: CTR Program Area Descriptions and Obligations as of April 
2005: 

Abbreviations: 

AT&L: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics: 

CT: Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate: 

CTR: Cooperative Threat Reduction program: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DTRA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency: 

GAO: Government Accountability Office: 

IG: Inspector General: 

JRIP: Joint Requirements and Implementation Plans: 

MDA: Milestone Decision Authority: 

TRSC: Threat Reduction Support Center: 

Letter June 30, 2005: 

The Honorable John Warner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Since 1992, Congress has authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to 
provide more than $5 billion for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
program to help the former states of the Soviet Union[Footnote 1] 
secure and eliminate their weapons of mass destruction and prevent 
their proliferation. Through the CTR program, the United States has 
supported activities such as eliminating nuclear missiles, building 
storage facilities for nuclear materials, eliminating chemical weapons, 
securing biological pathogens, and employing former weapons scientists. 
Recent project failures in Russia, however, have raised congressional 
concerns about the program's management. Specifically, from 1993 
through 2003, DOD spent nearly $200 million to construct a liquid 
rocket fuel disposition facility that was never used and to design a 
solid rocket motor elimination facility that was never constructed. In 
2003, as a result of these incidents, DOD began to revise its 
management and internal controls over the CTR program. (For more 
detailed information on these CTR project failures, see app. I.)

The Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical 
Demilitarization and Threat Reduction within the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(AT&L)[Footnote 2] is responsible for developing CTR implementation 
plans and making sure that CTR contractual obligations are met. 
Concurrently, the CTR Policy Office, within the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, is responsible for developing and 
coordinating CTR policy guidance and defining CTR program objectives. 
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) reports to the Deputy 
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical Demilitarization and 
Threat Reduction and oversees the execution of CTR projects on a daily 
basis. 

Section 3611 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2004 mandates that GAO assess DOD internal controls for the CTR program 
and their effect on the program's execution.[Footnote 3] The mandate 
specifies that our analysis focus on controls intended to ensure that 
projects are being executed consistent with the program's objectives. 
In addressing the mandate, we evaluated DOD's management and internal 
controls for implementing CTR projects since 2003 by using the 
applicable control standards for the federal government.[Footnote 4] To 
respond to the mandate, we identified those management and internal 
control areas most relevant to CTR project implementation: (1) program 
management, (2) risk assessments, (3) performance measurement, (4) 
program reviews, (5) communications, and (6) project monitoring. 
Congress also mandated that we describe the status of DOD's 
implementation of legislative mandates covering the CTR program. (See 
app. II for information on CTR legislative mandates.)

In reviewing DOD's management and internal controls for implementing 
the CTR program, we collected and analyzed DOD documents and developed 
a semi-structured interview guide and questioned 30 DOD officials 
responsible for managing and implementing the CTR program. We met with 
other DOD officials, reviewed DOD documents including DOD acquisition 
management guidance, and analyzed legislation. In addition, we traveled 
to Russia and Kazakhstan to observe CTR project implementation and to 
obtain information from American, Russian, and Kazakhstani government 
officials and contractor personnel. To determine the reliability of the 
data we used in this report, we reviewed relevant agency documents and 
obtained information from agency officials to ensure that the data used 
are sufficiently reliable for our work. We performed our work from 
April 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. (See app. III for more details on our 
scope and methodology.)

Results in Brief: 

Since 2003, DOD has improved its management and internal controls over 
the CTR program. Previously, DOD had problems managing the CTR program 
and ensuring that CTR program objectives were being met. Following two 
project failures in Russia, DOD implemented a series of new measures in 
2003 that provided a more structured approach to managing the CTR 
program. DOD's goal is to mitigate risks to an appropriate level. 
Despite the introduction of new and revised management approaches and 
controls, DOD cannot fully mitigate the risks involved in cooperating 
with CTR recipient governments. In addition, DOD's current procedures 
and controls do not include final reviews of CTR projects upon their 
completion. Therefore, DOD has no systematic or formal mechanism to 
document and apply the lessons learned from such evaluations to new and 
ongoing projects. 

To improve management of the CTR program, DOD has addressed five key 
areas. 

* Program management. DOD's original management plan for the CTR 
program called for AT&L to oversee planning, issue written guidance on 
how projects should be implemented, and develop processes to ensure 
that projects were meeting objectives. However, DOD did not have 
officials in key positions in this office from 1998 through 2003. CTR 
policy and DTRA officials attempted to fill this void but lacked 
expertise and training in acquisition and project management. In July 
2003, following the heptyl and Votkinsk project failures, DOD filled 
these vacancies within AT&L. AT&L officials now actively participate in 
program risk assessments, performance measurement, ongoing program 
reviews, and regular communication regarding details on project status. 

* Risk assessments. DOD uses several new methods to assess and mitigate 
the risks associated with CTR projects. DOD designates one official 
with overall management responsibility to balance the requirements of 
each project with potential risks. DOD divides CTR projects into three 
phases and requires management approval that the project is on track to 
meet its objectives before the project enters its next phase and 
additional funds are obligated. DOD also instituted periodic meetings 
with stakeholders[Footnote 5] to evaluate and minimize risk associated 
with CTR projects. With these new methods in place, all stakeholders 
are now cognizant of CTR project risks and managers are required to 
develop concrete strategies for addressing identified risks. 

* Performance measurement. DOD devised and implemented new written 
guidelines on developing and reporting CTR project objectives, 
schedules, and cost estimates. In a new training course required for 
all CTR program and project managers, managers are instructed on 
developing measures for how, when, in what sequence, and at what cost, 
specific project tasks will be completed. According to CTR project 
managers, the current guidance on performance measurement is clearer 
and more consistent than in the past and helps with the review of 
ongoing projects. 

* Ongoing program reviews. DOD introduced a new process to more 
systematically and consistently review CTR projects. In quarterly and 
other meetings, a designated manager, in consultation with all 
stakeholders, oversees the project's performance measures including 
cost, schedule, and performance objectives, and determines whether the 
project proceeds to its next phase or whether corrective actions need 
to be taken. According to CTR managers, the new program review system 
has resulted in more consistently conducted program evaluations that 
provide management with significant project details not previously 
included in program reviews. 

* Communication. Communication among the DOD offices involved in the 
CTR program is more structured. All stakeholders communicate project 
issues and problems through daily email, weekly reports, and quarterly 
meetings. Through ongoing program reviews and new reporting 
requirements stakeholders and managers now have regular opportunities 
to learn about project developments and provide input on project 
implementation. DOD has also improved its external communications with 
CTR-recipient countries by more clearly defining the responsibilities 
and expectations of all parties, including the recipient countries 
involved in each project. These controls provide assurance that each 
party is held accountable for its responsibilities. 

Despite the introduction of new and revised internal controls, DOD 
continues to face the challenge of gaining the cooperation of CTR- 
recipient governments to jointly implement projects and ensure that 
assistance is used to meet program objectives. Successful projects 
require signed agreements between DOD and CTR recipient countries, as 
well as U.S. access to sites to ensure that program goals are being 
achieved. However, reaching agreement on project issues and obtaining 
necessary access can involve lengthy negotiations. For example, after 
more than 10 years of discussion, Russia and DOD have yet to negotiate 
an agreement that would allow U.S. personnel access to monitor the 
loading of the CTR-funded fissile material storage facility at Mayak. 
Such an agreement would assure DOD that the facility is being used as 
intended. 

DOD also lacks internal controls that would provide a system for 
monitoring projects upon their completion and applying lessons learned 
to future projects. According to internal control standards, monitoring 
includes assessing both ongoing activities and separate evaluations of 
completed activities and should assess the quality of performance over 
time. By conducting final reviews of completed CTR projects and 
addressing the findings of such reviews, DOD can further improve its 
current and future management of the program. 

To further improve DOD internal controls for the CTR program, we are 
recommending that the Secretary of Defense conduct final reviews of CTR 
projects at their completion to evaluate whether projects were 
conducted in an efficient manner or were effectively meeting the 
objectives of the program. Such reviews would provide a mechanism for 
documenting lessons learned and applying them to future project 
planning and implementation. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to conduct evaluations of CTR 
projects upon their completion. DOD also provided technical comments 
that we incorporated as appropriate. 

Background: 

Congress created the CTR program in 1991 to help the states of the 
former Soviet Union secure and eliminate their weapons of mass 
destruction and prevent their proliferation. Through the CTR program, 
the United States has supported activities to eliminate nuclear 
missiles, build a storage facility for nuclear materials, eliminate 
chemical weapons, secure biological pathogens, and employ former 
weapons scientists. As of January 2005, the CTR program has assisted in 
the elimination of about 570 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 
nearly 30 nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. In 2004, 
Congress authorized DOD to expand the scope of the CTR program to 
countries outside the former Soviet Union. For example, beginning in 
2005, CTR assistance will help Albania destroy its chemical weapons 
stockpile. 

Figure 1 shows the DOD management structure for the CTR program. Within 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the CTR Policy 
Office is responsible for developing and coordinating policy guidance, 
defining program objectives for the CTR program, and negotiating 
agreements with CTR recipients. The CTR Policy Office works with the 
office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics through the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
for Chemical Demilitarization and Threat Reduction. DTRA reports to the 
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and 
Biological Defense Programs. The Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense for Chemical Demilitarization and Threat Reduction provides 
strategic implementation guidance on and oversight of CTR projects, and 
interacts daily with DTRA on CTR matters. Within DTRA, the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CT) directorate manages the program's daily 
operations. The directorate is organized into five program areas: 
Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention, Chemical Weapons 
Elimination, Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security, Strategic Offensive 
Arms Elimination, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation 
Prevention.[Footnote 6] (For a more detailed description of these 
program areas, see app. IV.) The directorate is located at Ft. Belvoir, 
Virginia, and several DTRA offices throughout the former Soviet 
Unionprovide in-country support for CTR program 
implementation.[Footnote 7]

Figure 1: DOD Management Structure for the CTR Program: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

At the beginning of the program in 1992, DOD primarily purchased and 
provided equipment such as cranes, cutting tools, and vehicles to 
recipient countries. As the program matured, CTR assistance provided 
more services, such as hiring U.S. contractors who helped recipient 
countries dismantle nuclear delivery systems and missiles. Currently, 
CTR provides most assistance to recipient countries through contracts 
with American firms. DOD executes, manages, and reviews the contracts 
according to DOD and federal acquisition requirements. Specifically, in 
2001, the CTR program began using special contracts with prime 
contractors who, with their teams of supporting subcontractors, 
implement the majority of CTR projects in the recipient countries. 
These five contractors are known as CTR Integrating 
Contractors.[Footnote 8] DTRA has also contracted with the Science 
Applications International Corporation's Threat Reduction Support 
Center (TRSC). TRSC staff provide support to CTR program and project 
managers in the areas of operations, logistics, engineering, financial, 
and program management. 

DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal Controls over the CTR 
Program: 

Since 2003, DOD has improved its management and internal controls over 
the CTR program. Prior to 2003, DOD's internal controls over the 
program were limited and did not ensure that CTR program objectives 
were being met. Following two project failures in Russia, DOD 
implemented a series of new measures in 2003 that provided a more 
structured approach to managing the CTR program. Most importantly, in 
July 2003, DOD filled vacancies within AT&L, the office responsible for 
ensuring that DTRA's implementation of CTR projects was meeting cost, 
schedule, and performance goals. After DOD filled these positions, the 
new leadership worked closely with DTRA officials to introduce 
important enhancements to the program's internal controls. For example, 
DOD adopted several new methods to assess and mitigate the risks 
involved in cooperating with CTR-recipient governments. Although these 
methods attempt to reduce risk to an acceptable level, DOD cannot fully 
mitigate the risks involved in working jointly with CTR-recipient 
governments. While DOD's enhancements are an improvement over the 
previous management and internal controls for the program, CTR 
procedures do not include final reviews of CTR projects upon their 
completion. As such, DOD has no mechanism for assessing the success of 
completed projects and applying lessons learned to future projects. 

Improved Program Management and Internal Controls Allow for Improved 
Implementation of CTR Program: 

Beginning in 2003, DOD implemented several new and enhanced management 
processes to allow program managers to better assess the progress of 
CTR projects and address program implementation weaknesses to reduce 
the risk of program failures. For example, DOD filled vacant AT&L 
positions; developed specific guidance for project managers on 
reporting objectives, schedules, and cost estimates; and improved 
communication within the program and with recipient countries. (For a 
comparison of DOD's CTR internal controls with selected control 
standards for the federal government, see app. V.) DOD developed a 
training course that all CTR project and program managers are required 
to complete, which provides detailed instruction on incorporating the 
new requirements of the internal control framework into all CTR 
projects. According to 24 of the 30 CTR program, policy, and 
acquisition officials responding to our structured interview, the new 
framework has helped improve CTR project implementation. For example, 
CTR officials stated that now the program management review system is 
more rigorous and project managers know what is expected of them in 
reporting on the cost, schedule, and performance of their projects. 

Key Leadership and Oversight Vacancies Filled for CTR Program: 

In July 2003, DOD filled AT&L vacancies, closing a critical gap in the 
department's ability to ensure that the CTR program was meeting cost, 
schedule, and performance goals. Previously, DOD had not been carrying 
out its own management plans for ensuring that CTR projects were 
meeting stated goals. Specifically, in May 1994, the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense approved a plan to strengthen the implementation of CTR 
projects. Under this plan, the CTR policy office was responsible for 
negotiating agreements with recipient countries, establishing policy 
guidance, working on the CTR budget, and notifying Congress of 
developments in the program. After CTR policy approved a project and 
signed an agreement to begin work, AT&L was responsible for developing 
detailed implementation plans, monitoring ongoing work, and ensuring 
that work was meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals. However, 
DOD left several AT&L positions vacant until 2003, leaving a critical 
gap in oversight over the CTR program. The CTR policy office began 
managing daily CTR project activities to fill this leadership gap. 
However, according to the director of the policy office, staff in that 
office were not qualified to manage the activities of the program 
because they were not familiar with DOD acquisition guidelines nor did 
they have the technical expertise necessary to manage CTR programs. 
According to a 2004 DOD Inspector General (IG) report on the management 
of the CTR program, if the AT&L positions had been filled, those 
officials might have identified some of the risks involved in the two 
failed CTR projects that cost DOD nearly $200 million. 

Since the AT&L positions were filled in July 2003, the office now 
participates in CTR program planning and review, overseeing program 
review meetings, and providing guidance on issues such as performance 
measurement and reporting requirements. The Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Chemical Demilitarization and Threat Reduction attends 
informal monthly meetings with CTR program managers to be updated on 
the status of projects and other management issues. He also serves as 
the program reviewer for several CTR projects, making him responsible 
for overseeing the cost, schedule, and performance of each of those 
projects and approving them at the end of each project phase. For 
example, in July 2004, he approved a biological weapons proliferation 
prevention project's acquisition program baseline and authorized the 
program manager to move the project into the demonstration phase. CTR 
officials stated that it is now clear who they need to report to and 
when. 

DOD Uses Several New Methods to Assess CTR Project Risk: 

DOD uses several new methods to assess and mitigate risks associated 
with CTR projects. DOD identifies a senior official responsible for 
ensuring the potential risks to meeting objectives are evaluated for 
each project, requires stakeholders on each project to meet regularly 
to conduct specific risk management activities, and implements each 
project in three phases. According to DOD's risk management guide, risk 
is defined as a measure of the potential inability of a program to 
achieve its overall program objectives within defined cost, schedule, 
and technical constraints.[Footnote 9]

DOD's approach to assessing program risks was limited prior to 2003. In 
September 1996, we reported that the CTR multiyear plan did not 
indicate whether program officials had omitted risk and contingencies 
from project cost estimates.[Footnote 10] In addition, a 2003 DOD IG 
report found that DOD did not identify risks or have adequate controls 
in place to mitigate risk when managing projects.[Footnote 11] 
According to a CTR official, CTR program and project managers 
periodically included risk assessments in planning their projects, but 
did not include actions to control the risks identified if problems 
occurred. The DOD IG reported that the CTR program management's failure 
to fully assess project risks contributed to DOD spending nearly $200 
million on projects in Russia to construct a liquid rocket fuel 
disposition facility that was never utilized and to design a solid 
rocket motor elimination facility that was never constructed. 

In an effort to improve assessments of the risks associated with CTR 
projects, DOD began designating an official, known as the Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA), to be responsible for ensuring that project 
managers, with assistance from project stakeholders, assess the risks 
to meeting project objectives and formulate plans to mitigate these 
risks. MDAs are assigned to projects based on several factors, 
including the project's risk and expected cost. According to an AT&L 
official, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical 
Demilitarization and Threat Reduction is usually assigned as the MDA 
for high-cost or high-risk projects. For projects with less risk or 
expense, the MDA is usually the director of the DTRA/CT directorate. 
MDAs review the risks identified by the project managers and evaluate 
the plans they have developed to mitigate these risks. 

In addition, DOD instituted periodic stakeholders meetings to assess 
and minimize risks associated with CTR projects and to discuss major 
project issues and milestones. In these meetings, project managers 
present assessments of potential risks that could impact their ability 
to meet project objectives. For example, a risk identified for the 
Russian SS-24 missile elimination project was that political or 
economic developments in Russia might unexpectedly affect the project's 
costs. After the project managers present their assessments, the 
stakeholders provide input to address these risks and consider 
additional problems that may arise during project implementation. 
According to CTR management officials, this team approach to risk 
assessment ensures consensus early in each phase of the project. It has 
resulted in more informed decision making because stakeholders meet 
regularly to receive updates on project status and make decisions on 
the next phase of project implementation based on the facts presented 
during those meetings. Of the 30 DOD and CTR officials we interviewed 
using our structured interview guide, 9 said that this new process of 
stakeholder involvement was one of the most important new internal 
controls for the CTR program.[Footnote 12]

Furthermore, DOD now uses a new phased-contract approach that divides 
each CTR project into three phases. These phases can vary according to 
project, but usually include phases covering project development, 
project execution, and project maintenance, according to a CTR 
official. This approach helps to minimize risk by allowing managers to 
make the appropriate changes, delay, or stop a project if a problem 
occurs. For example, in 2003, in the development phase of a Ukrainian 
SS-24 missile elimination project, DOD decided not to proceed with the 
project because the risks associated with the missile destruction 
method that the Ukrainians wanted to use were too high. Project 
managers are required to develop exit criteria for each project phase 
that clearly state under what conditions the project will be permitted 
to move into the next phase and under what conditions DOD will stop the 
project. For example, for a CTR project tasked with eliminating 
Russia's SS-25 missiles, one of the exit criteria for moving into the 
project's maintenance phase is that DOD complete negotiations on the 
contract to maintain the missile elimination facility that is being 
constructed. 

DOD Has New Guidelines for Reporting Project Performance: 

In 2003, DOD devised and implemented new guidelines that provide CTR 
project managers with written instructions on developing and reporting 
project objectives, schedules, and cost estimates. According to the 
internal control guidelines for the federal government, it is important 
for an organization to establish measures to gauge its performance on 
critical activities and determine if the organization is meeting its 
objectives. CTR program area and project managers we interviewed stated 
that prior to 2003 there were no established procedures for developing 
performance measures, evaluating project performance, or reporting 
(either orally or in writing) on project implementation to management. 
In addition, project plans were not comprehensive and lacked 
established baselines against which to measure performance. 

According to CTR project managers, the current guidance on performance 
measurement is clearer and more consistent than in the past. For 
example, in a training course required for all CTR program and project 
managers, project managers are instructed on developing measures for 
how, when, in what sequence, and at what cost specific project tasks 
will be completed. Our fieldwork included a site visit to a CTR project 
in Russia that had developed such measures. One measure used to gauge 
performance on that project is whether the elimination of Russian SS-24 
missiles complies with arms control treaty requirements. For each 
measure, project managers develop objectives - the indicator's desired 
outcome - and thresholds - the minimum acceptable performance for that 
measure. For example, one objective for the SS-24 missile elimination 
project is to eliminate Russia's SS-24 missiles by March 2008. However, 
if the missiles cannot be eliminated by then, they must be eliminated 
by the threshold date of August 2008. (Figure 2 shows the elimination 
of an SS-24 engine.)

Figure 2: Russian SS-24 Missile Engine Undergoing Dismantlement: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

If the threshold is not met at the end of a particular project phase, 
the project manager and DOD management officials may consider stopping 
the project. When an indicator is in danger of not being met, the 
project manager is required to submit a warning report to the project's 
MDA to ensure that management is aware of potential delays and that the 
project manager is addressing the problem. If the indicator is not met, 
DOD management officials may stop the project until a plan is in place 
to bring the indicator up to the threshold level. 

DOD Has More Systematic and Consistent Tools to Review Programs: 

In 2003, DOD introduced a new process to review projects and programs 
to provide a more systematic and consistent structure to management's 
review of CTR projects. According to the internal control guidelines 
for the federal government, program reviews are important for program 
management because they provide comparisons of actual performance to 
planned or expected results and help management assess its programs. 
Program reviews lacked the detail that allowed senior management to 
evaluate projects and risks consistently. However, according to CTR 
program managers we interviewed, before 2003 there was no standardized 
guidance to assist program managers on developing program reviews or 
implementing their programs. For example, CTR program area and project 
managers did not receive any guidance on how to report on the daily 
management of program operations or on the type of information that 
status reports should include. 

Under the new program review system, the designated MDA conducts 
reviews of a project's cost, schedule, and performance objectives. 
During program reviews, which take place periodically throughout the 
course of a project, project managers report to their MDAs on the 
status of their projects and whether the objectives are being met. In 
addition, these review meetings are more detailed than they were before 
the new system was in place. For example, a project review in 2004 for 
a CTR project tasked with installing nuclear detection devices in 
Uzbekistan included details on the project's schedule over the next 3 
years, with specific dates for completion of certain milestones. It 
also included a detailed breakdown of funding for the project over the 
next 3 years and a thorough discussion of project risks. The 
information was not included in the project's 2003 review. According to 
several CTR project managers, the new program review system has 
resulted in more consistently conducted project evaluations. Of the 30 
DOD officials we interviewed, 19 said the program review process, 
conducted by the MDA, was one of the most important new internal 
controls for the CTR program.[Footnote 13] They reported that, with the 
introduction of the MDA, program reviews are occurring at the same 
intervals for each project and that project managers report cost, 
schedule, and performance data in the same format to their MDAs during 
the reviews. Through the course of work we reviewed copies of various 
MDA project review documents. 

Communication Is More Structured: 

According to DOD officials, communication within the CT directorate and 
among the DOD offices involved in the CTR program, has improved with 
the introduction of new internal controls. DOD also has improved its 
external communications with CTR-recipient countries. Internal control 
guidelines for the federal government state that communication 
mechanisms should exist within an organization to allow the easy flow 
of information down, across, and up the organization. However, before 
2003, internal communications within the CTR program office were not 
clear, according to DOD officials. For example, all CTR stakeholders 
were not present during project development meetings nor were they 
involved in early decision making about project risks. Communications 
between DOD and CTR recipient governments also were not clear. DOD 
assumed, without getting written documentation that CTR recipient 
countries would carry out the responsibilities and commitments to which 
they agreed. 

Since 2003, communication among the DOD offices working on the CTR 
program has improved. Stakeholders on specific projects meet more 
frequently now than in the past to discuss project issues and problems. 
Project managers involve stakeholders in the earliest stages of project 
development on through to the final phase of project completion to 
assure that stakeholders and managers have regular opportunities to 
learn about project developments and provide input on project 
implementation. This system has now been institutionalized and all CTR 
project managers are instructed in a new training course to convene 
meetings with stakeholders throughout the life of their projects. In 
addition, new reporting requirements help ensure that all stakeholders 
are informed of project developments. All of the 30 DOD officials we 
interviewed said that they are required to report on the cost, 
schedule, and performance of their programs and projects periodically, 
including daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly. For example, DOD now 
requires program managers to submit monthly project status reports to 
ensure that potential problems are documented and stakeholders are 
informed of them. In addition, 28 of the 30 DOD officials in our 
structured interview reported that the amount of communication within 
the CT directorate allows them to effectively implement their projects. 
Project managers are in frequent contact with contractors implementing 
projects in recipient countries. We observed a meeting in Russia 
between a CTR project manager and the Russian contractors implementing 
the project he manages. During the meeting, they negotiated revisions 
to a new contract and discussed the project's status. The project 
manager makes similar trips at least once a month to the project site 
to oversee progress and meet with the contractors. Other project 
managers we interviewed in Russia and in the U.S. stated that they hold 
weekly phone conferences with contractors, exchange emails, and make 
regular visits to project sites. 

Contracting officials in Russia stated that they hold weekly telephone 
conferences with their CTR project managers and contact them regularly 
when project implementation issues arise. We observed such a weekly 
telephone communication during our visit to the International Science 
and Technology Center in Moscow. Contractors also submit monthly 
written reports. Project managers also are in daily contact with their 
program managers and CT directorate management. According to a CTR 
official, at quarterly program review meetings, program and project 
managers present detailed information, both orally and in writing, on 
the status of their projects to all involved stakeholders. 

DOD has also improved its external communications with CTR-recipient 
countries. DOD and recipient government officials now consistently 
share more detailed information on project developments and issues of 
concern. CTR management officials and program and project managers are 
in frequent contact with their recipient government counterparts 
throughout project implementation. In 2004 CTR teams made 165 trips, 
compared with 70 trips in fiscal year 2001, to meet recipient 
government officials and improve their monitoring of CTR projects. 
Russian government officials working on CTR projects stated that they 
communicate with CTR officials continually and meet regularly with the 
director of the CT directorate. They also hold weekly teleconferences 
with project managers, and project managers visit project sites 
regularly. While traveling with CTR project managers in Russia and 
Kazakhstan, we observed extensive discussions of important issues 
during site visits and meetings with contractors and recipient 
government officials. 

Furthermore, DOD has introduced and updated its controls to ensure that 
commitments made by the CTR program and recipient governments are 
regularly documented and discussed. These controls also are a means to 
ensure that each party is held accountable for its responsibilities. In 
2003, DOD began using Joint Requirements and Implementation Plans 
(JRIP) to document the commitments and responsibilities agreed to by 
each party involved in project implementation. For example, a 
requirements plan for a CTR project tasked with eliminating a specific 
type of Russian nuclear missile states that one of DOD's 
responsibilities in implementing the project is to design and construct 
storage facilities for the missiles to be eliminated. One of the 
Russian government's responsibilities on the same project is to provide 
DOD with a schedule for the delivery of the missiles to the proper 
facility for elimination. If either party fails to meet its obligations 
as articulated in the document, the other party can stop progress on 
the project. For example, DOD officials halted new construction from 
March to June 2004 at the CTR-funded chemical weapons destruction 
facility at Shchuch'ye until the Russian government stopped insisting 
on unnecessary design changes for the construction of a boiler house on 
the site. To further enhance communication between CTR program 
officials and CTR recipient countries, DOD also holds biannual meetings 
where officials from both sides meet to review and discuss project 
implementation and revise plans when necessary. According to CTR 
management officials and JRIP documents we reviewed, these meetings 
provide a regular forum for discussion that was not previously 
available and have improved communication between DOD officials and CTR-
recipient governments. 

Inherent Risks Remain in Working with Recipient Governments: 

DOD faces significant challenges in collaborating with CTR-recipient 
governments to jointly implement projects and ensure that assistance is 
used to meet program objectives. Successful implementation of CTR 
projects requires the cooperation of recipient governments, but DOD 
cannot fully mitigate the risks involved in working jointly with these 
governments. First, working with CTR-recipient governments often 
involves lengthy negotiations to reach agreements on various issues 
throughout a project's implementation. This can delay U.S. funded 
efforts to help secure or dismantle weapons of mass destruction by 
months or years. Second, risks to the project can increase when 
implementation begins before the necessary agreements are in place. 
Third, after agreements are reached and implementation is under way, 
additional risk is introduced by the control environment[Footnote 14] 
within the recipient governments. For instance, if a recipient 
government has a poor control environment risk increases that the 
agreed to objectives and conditions will not be met. 

In cooperating with CTR-recipient governments, DOD must negotiate a 
variety of agreements that can require lengthy negotiations. The 
highest level of agreements, called umbrella agreements, provide an 
overall legal framework for U.S. and CTR-recipient countries' 
cooperation in implementing projects.[Footnote 15] Implementing 
agreements outline the types and amounts of assistance to be provided 
for specific CTR projects. For instance, projects to eliminate 
strategic nuclear arms, including strategic bombers, missiles, and 
related equipment are conducted under the Strategic Nuclear Arms 
Elimination Implementing Agreement signed by DOD and the Ukrainian 
Ministry of Defense in December 1993.[Footnote 16] Agreement amendments 
update the annual amount of funding that CTR will provide for a 
specific project within a recipient country. For example, the December 
2004 agreement amendment for biological weapons proliferation projects 
with the government of Kazakhstan provides for $30 million in CTR 
funding during fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The recipient governments 
must sign agreements or agreement amendments before projects can begin 
and funding can be provided or increased, but this may take time and 
delay projects, according to CTR officials. According to a CTR program 
area manager, the Russian government took more than 18 months to sign 
an implementing agreement for nuclear weapons transportation and 
security projects because it did not want to reveal the location of 
nuclear weapons storage sites that the government planned to close. In 
2004, the government of Kazakhstan took more than 6 months to sign the 
annual agreement amendment for biological weapons proliferation 
projects. According to CTR contractors and officials at Kazakhstani 
biological research facilities, the government's delay slowed efforts 
to improve the security and safety of biological pathogens at their 
institutes. For CTR biological weapons proliferation prevention 
projects in Russia, however, DOD has no implementing agreement. These 
projects are implemented through the International Science and 
Technology Center in Moscow.[Footnote 17] Until it can conclude a 
biological threat reduction implementing agreement with the Russian 
government, DOD has limited the types of projects it initiates in 
Russia. 

Risks to CTR projects can increase when DOD begins implementation 
before the necessary agreements are in place with CTR recipient 
governments. After more than 10 years, Russia and DOD have yet to 
negotiate a transparency agreement that would allow U.S. personnel 
access to the CTR-funded fissile material storage facility at Mayak to 
ensure that it is being used as intended. DOD designed and built the 
facility to provide centralized, safe, secure, and ecologically sound 
storage for weapons-grade fissile material from dismantled Russian 
nuclear warheads. In December 2003, DOD completed the CTR-funded Mayak 
facility at a cost of about $335 million,[Footnote 18] and the Russian 
government assumed full responsibility for its operation and 
maintenance. Although the Russian government has pledged its commitment 
to transparency, it has not signed an agreement with DOD. Therefore, 
the United States has no reasonable assurance that Russia will only use 
the facility to store materials from dismantled nuclear weapons and not 
reuse the materials. According to CTR program officials, the Russian 
government may soon begin storing nuclear materials at the Mayak 
facility without an agreement in place. We first raised concerns about 
the lack of a transparency agreement for the Mayak facility in 
1994.[Footnote 19] Later, in April 1999, we voiced concerns that the 
United States still lacked clear assurances that Russia would use the 
Mayak facility in a manner consistent with all U.S. national security 
objectives for the project.[Footnote 20]

Furthermore, two CTR project failures in Russia illustrate the 
consequences of DOD not having the necessary agreements in place (see 
app. I for additional information). In the early 1990s, DOD agreed to 
assist Russia in constructing a facility to dispose of liquid missile 
propellant, known as heptyl, which had been drained from 
intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. DOD spent 
nearly $95 million over 10 years to build a facility to destroy the 
heptyl, only to learn in January 2002 that Russia had diverted the 
heptyl to its commercial space program, rather than storing it for 
eventual destruction. As a result, the facility was never used. The DOD 
IG reported in 2002 that CTR program officials negotiated a weak 
implementing agreement with the Russian government. Specifically, the 
agreement did not require the Russian government to provide the heptyl 
or provide access for CTR program officials to inspect the heptyl 
storage facilities and verify the quantities present.[Footnote 21]

Similarly, DOD had agreed in the early 1990s to build a facility in 
Russia to dispose of solid rocket motors from dismantled missiles. DOD 
spent almost $100 million over nearly 10 years to design the facility, 
despite the concerns of local residents about the possible 
environmental impact. In January 2003, Russian officials notified DOD 
that the regional government had denied the land allocation permit 
necessary to begin construction due to the opposition from local 
residents. As a result, DOD never began construction on the facility. 
The DOD IG found that the implementing agreement for the design of the 
solid rocket motor elimination facility at Votkinsk failed to specify 
Russian responsibilities for the project. Primarily, the Russian 
government was to obtain the necessary land allocation permits. CTR 
officials accepted in good faith that Russia would help implement 
program objectives and therefore assumed that they did not need to 
document the Russian government's responsibilities. In addition, 
despite local protests against construction of the facility from the 
beginning of the project, DOD project managers did not identify land 
allocation as a potential risk until April 2002.[Footnote 22]

Even after DOD concludes appropriate agreements, however, risks still 
may exist due to the control environment of the recipient governments. 
For instance, if a recipient government has a poor control environment 
risk increases that the agreed to objectives and conditions will not be 
met. A good control environment requires that an organization's 
structure clearly defines key areas of authority and responsibility. 
When the Russian government reorganized in early 2004, it was uncertain 
which agencies and officials were in charge of working with DOD. While 
the names of some of the agencies had merely changed, other agencies 
were subsumed into larger organizations or completely dissolved. 
According to CTR program officials, the reorganization had a 
significant impact on program implementation. For example, the CTR 
Policy Office is renegotiating its implementing agreements to reflect 
the new Russian government entities. CTR projects also experienced 
delays when the Russian government reorganized the committee that 
granted tax exemptions and resolved customs issues for all CTR 
assistance entering Russia. Work on the CTR-funded chemical weapons 
destruction facility in Russia was delayed until needed equipment was 
cleared through customs. Furthermore, CTR recipient governments may not 
provide adequate access to project sites or may pursue priorities that 
compete with CTR program objectives. DOD's inability to gain access to 
all sites where CTR assistance is provided has been an issue since the 
CTR program began in 1992. The U.S. government has been concerned with 
its ability to examine the use of its CTR-provided assistance, while 
CTR-recipient countries have security concerns regarding U.S. access to 
sensitive sites.[Footnote 23] For example, as we reported in March 
2003, DOD had made only limited progress installing security upgrades 
at Russian nuclear weapons storage sites and former biological weapons 
facilities because Russia would not provide DOD access to several 
sites.[Footnote 24] Since March 2003, Russia has granted DOD access to 
some nuclear weapon storage sites, and continues to restrict access to 
some former biological weapons facilities. 

DOD Does Not Have a Mechanism to Review CTR Projects Once They Are 
Completed: 

While CTR program officials monitor the progress of ongoing projects, 
DOD has no mechanism to monitor and evaluate the results of completed 
projects in relation to their meeting program objectives. According to 
internal control standards, monitoring should assess the quality of 
project performance over time. Conducting program evaluations, such as 
reviewing completed CTR projects, may be warranted after major changes 
in management plans. DOD does not conduct final evaluations of 
completed CTR projects and currently has no mechanism to document 
lessons learned and apply them to future project planning and 
implementation. At its inception, the CTR program primarily provided 
equipment to recipient countries, but now the vast majority of 
assistance is provided through contracted services. Although the 
program has shifted to funding costly, complex, and sometimes high-risk 
projects that can last for many years, DOD has not expanded the scope 
of its project monitoring process to include evaluations of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of CTR projects upon their completion. 

In June 2001, we recommended that DOD conduct such evaluations to 
improve DOD's overall program oversight. In response, DOD agreed to 
periodically assess the efficiency and effectiveness of CTR assistance, 
including contracted services. However, DOD lacks a final review 
process to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of completed CTR 
projects. As of June 2005, DOD had completed 77 projects, but program 
officials did not evaluate and record what went well during a project's 
implementation and what could have been improved to better meet program 
objectives. While CTR officials discuss ongoing individual projects 
performance through the MDA process, senior CTR management officials 
acknowledged that projects are not evaluated upon their completion and 
such information is not shared program wide in a systematic manner. As 
such, it is difficult to apply lessons learned to future CTR projects 
as they are being planned and implemented and avoid past mistakes. 
Officials stated that conducting final evaluations could further 
improve their management of the CTR program,especially as the program 
expands into countries outside the former Soviet Union. Since DOD does 
not assess the efficiency and effectiveness of projects as they are 
completed, it cannot apply the lessons learned from such evaluations to 
new and ongoing projects in a systematic way. 

Conclusion: 

Since 1992, CTR assistance has helped the states of the former Soviet 
Union eliminate and protect their weapons of mass destruction. Although 
the CTR program has helped reduce the threat that these weapons could 
be stolen or misused, incidents such as the heptyl disposition and 
solid rocket motor elimination projects demonstrated significant 
problems with DOD's program management. In the aftermath of these 
incidents, DOD has worked to revamp its CTR program management to 
achieve greater assurance that projects are implemented according to 
program objectives. By standardizing its management approach and 
applying it consistently across all CTR program areas, DOD is improving 
its management of the CTR program. DOD has greater assurance that all 
stakeholders, including recipient governments, are involved in project 
implementation. CTR program and project managers have clearer guidance 
on how to conduct their work and report on it. Furthermore, DOD has 
made progress in more clearly articulating and documenting its 
cooperative arrangements with CTR recipient countries, as well as 
holding recipient governments more accountable for implementing the CTR 
projects in their respective countries. 

These improved controls cannot eliminate the risks inherent in the 
program, but the goal is to mitigate risk to an appropriate level given 
the circumstances. Most significantly, the success of the CTR program 
requires the cooperation of recipient governments. Good internal 
controls help mitigate the risks from having to rely on recipient 
governments to sign agreements, provide access, and support project 
implementation. Still, governments can change their project goals, deny 
access to U.S. contractors and officials, or withhold permits to allow 
work to proceed. DOD's more robust internal controls have helped 
minimize the impact of these actions, but they cannot guarantee a 
project's success. The U.S. government remains concerned about its 
ability to determine how CTR-provided assistance is being used, while 
CTR recipient countries continue to have security concerns regarding 
U.S. access to their sensitive facilities and sites. 

In addition, while DOD has made progress over the past 2 years in 
improving its management of the CTR program, it still does not review 
the overall performance of projects upon their completion. As projects 
are completed, assessing and documenting lessons learned will allow DOD 
to further improve CTR project implementation. As the CTR program 
completes more projects and the program begins to expand beyond the 
former Soviet Union, such a mechanism will become more important to 
overall program management. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense conduct performance reviews 
upon the completion of CTR projects. Such reviews would provide a 
mechanism for documenting lessons learned and applying them to future 
project planning and implementation. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD provided comments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced 
in appendix VI. DOD concurred with our recommendation that reviews of 
completed CTR projects should be conducted to document and apply 
lessons learned. DOD also provided technical comments, which we have 
incorporated where appropriate. 

We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and 
other interested congressional committees. We will also make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be 
available on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8979 or [Hyperlink, christoffj@gao.gov]. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Joseph A. Christoff, Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Two Project Failures Cost the CTR Program Nearly $200 
Million: 

By 2003, two CTR program project failures caused DOD to reassess its 
management of the program. In the early 1990s, DOD agreed to assist 
Russia in constructing a facility to dispose of liquid missile 
propellant, known as heptyl, and build a solid rocket motor disposition 
facility. However, DOD terminated these projects after spending nearly 
$200 million over almost a decade. 

In the case of the heptyl disposition facility, DOD spent more than $95 
million over 10 years on the facility at Krasnoyarsk, Russia, that was 
never used. In 1993, the Russian government asked for CTR assistance to 
dispose of heptyl from intercontinental and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles that were being destroyed in compliance with arms 
control agreements.[Footnote 25] At the time, Russian government 
officials claimed that existing heptyl storage facilities were full and 
that they needed a way to dispose of the propellant, according to DOD 
officials. DOD officials also stated that Russian officials had told 
them that the heptyl could not be used for the Russian commercial space 
program. However, when CTR officials were ready to test the almost 
completed facility in January 2002, officials from the Russian Aviation 
and Space Agency revealed that nearly all of the heptyl had been 
diverted to the commercial space program. In February 2003, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense approved the dismantlement and salvage of the no- 
longer needed heptyl disposition facility. 

According to the DOD IG, a variety of inadequate management controls 
contributed to the heptyl project failure.[Footnote 26] The IG reported 
that AT&L was not assuming its role in managing the CTR program by 
providing input and direction for projects. Rather, the CTR Policy 
Office, which had little experience in following DOD acquisition 
guidelines, establishing milestones, and identifying risks, was 
managing daily CTR project activities. Because AT&L was not performing 
adequate oversight of the program, CTR program officials negotiated an 
implementing agreement[Footnote 27] without specific programmatic 
commitments from the Russian government and did not thoroughly identify 
the risks associated with eliminating the heptyl. Specifically, the 
agreement did not require the Russian government to provide the heptyl 
or provide access for CTR program officials to inspect the heptyl 
storage facilities and verify the quantities present. CTR officials 
accepted in good faith that Russia would provide the heptyl and 
therefore assumed that they did not need to document or oversee the 
Russian government's responsibilities. In assessing the risks of the 
heptyl project, CTR project officials failed to identify the 
possibility that the Russian government would use the heptyl for other 
purposes and therefore developed no mitigation plan. 

A second project failed in January 2003. After spending almost 10 years 
to design the facility at Votkinsk to destroy solid rocket motors, CTR 
program officials ended the project at a cost of almost $100 million. 
In the early 1990s, Russia had requested CTR assistance to destroy 
motors from dismantled missiles in compliance with an arms control 
agreement. Originally, the facility was to be located at Perm, but 
pending construction of the facility generated environmental opposition 
from local residents. The facility was thus moved to Votkinsk in 
February 1998, where local residents concerned with the environmental 
impact of the facility also began protests. Still, CTR program 
officials continued with the design of the facility, remaining 
optimistic that the regional government would issue the required 
permits regardless of opposition. Officials from the Russian Aviation 
and Space Agency told CTR program officials in July 2002 that land for 
the facility would be allocated no later than September 2002. In a 
January 2003 letter, however, Russian officials notified DOD that the 
regional government had denied the land allocation permit due to the 
opposition from local residents. 

Inadequate management practices also contributed to the failure of the 
solid rocket motor disposition project at Votkinsk. As with the failed 
heptyl project, the DOD IG reported that AT&L did not assume its 
management role in overseeing the CTR program.[Footnote 28] The CTR 
Policy Office was managing daily CTR project activities. The 
implementing agreement for the Votkinsk project failed to specify 
Russian responsibilities, such as obtaining the necessary land 
allocation permits. In addition, despite the local environmental 
protests against construction of the facility from the beginning, 
project managers did not identify land allocation as a risk until April 
2002. Furthermore, the contracting processes that were in place 
contained no mechanism to terminate the project when costs increased 
and the schedule was delayed. DTRA awarded the project contract for the 
complete design and construction of the facility rather than 
contracting in phases so that possible CTR program losses could be 
minimized. 

[End of section]

Appendix II: Legislative Mandates Covering the CTR Program: 

As required by section 3611 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2004, we reviewed the status of DOD's implementation of 
legislative mandates covering the CTR program. Since 1992, Congress has 
passed 25 pieces of legislation that guide CTR project activities. 
Specifically, Congress has established a series of (1) requirements 
that must be met before DOD can fund CTR projects, (2) conditions on 
CTR expenditures, and (3) reporting requirements on the CTR program and 
project implementation. Figure 3 illustrates the types of congressional 
legislation covering the CTR program from fiscal year 1992 to 2004 and 
includes those legislative requirements that have lapsed. Over the 
years, DOD has mostly complied with these requirements, except for 
several occasions when it was late in providing required reports to 
Congress. Legislation has recently been proposed that would repeal some 
DOD requirements. 

Congress has established a variety of requirements that must be met 
before DOD can fund CTR projects. For example, in establishing the CTR 
program in 1991, Congress required that CTR assistance provided to the 
countries of the former Soviet Union could not be expended until the 
President certified to Congress that the recipient governments were 
committed to reducing their weapons arsenals.[Footnote 29] According to 
CTR officials, verifying CTR program compliance with legislation can be 
a time-consuming process and may delay the implementation of projects, 
but they cannot spend CTR funds unless all legislative conditions are 
met. DOD officials involved with managing the CTR program recognize 
that Congress is exercising its oversight responsibilities over the CTR 
program. 

Congress has also placed limits or conditions on how DOD can spend CTR 
money. For instance, in Congress placed conditions on CTR money to 
prohibit spending in certain areas, such as conventional weapons 
destruction[Footnote 30] and housing for retired or current members of 
CTR-recipient countries' military forces.[Footnote 31] Also in 2000, 
Congress halted CTR funding for construction of the Russian chemical 
weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye[Footnote 32] until fiscal 
year 2004 when it granted a waiver.[Footnote 33]

Congress also requires DOD to submit reports on overall program 
implementation, as well as specific projects. Since the beginning of 
the CTR program, DOD has mostly complied with its congressional 
reporting requirements. However, as we previously reported, from 1994 
through 1999 DOD was late in providing its annual report, which 
accounts for CTR assistance.[Footnote 34] Specifically, DOD was 16 
months late in submitting its report for 1997 and more than 10 months 
late in submitting its report for 1998. Beginning in fiscal year 2001, 
the reporting requirement to account for CTR assistance became part of 
the annual CTR report.[Footnote 35] For fiscal years 2002 through 2004, 
DOD provided its annual CTR report to Congress late.[Footnote 36] 
However, DOD provided its annual report to Congress for fiscal years 
2005 and 2006 mostly on time. 

Recently, some members of Congress have introduced bills that may 
lesson the legislative burden on the CTR program. In February 2005, 
Senator Lugar introduced the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Act of 2005.[Footnote 37] The bill, among other actions, would repeal 
some of the restrictions that Congress had previously placed on the CTR 
program. If enacted the bill would remove (1) a Presidential 
certification[Footnote 38] requirement for all CTR recipient countries 
to receive CTR assistance and (2) the funding constraints placed on the 
construction of the CTR- funded chemical weapons destruction facility 
in Russia. In February 2005, members of the House of Representative 
introduced the Omnibus Nonproliferation and Anti-nuclear Terrorism Act 
of 2005.[Footnote 39] This bill also includes a provision for the 
repeal of the same restrictions outlined in the bill introduced by 
Senator Lugar. 

Figure 3: CTR Program Legislative Mandates (Fiscal Years 1992-2004): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

[End of section]

Appendix III: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess DOD's management and internal controls over the CTR program, 
we collected and analyzed DOD documents, including CTR project plans, 
briefings, annual reports, and milestone decision authority 
memorandums. We also obtained and analyzed all legislation passed since 
1992 that covers the CTR program. We applied the internal standards as 
described in GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government.[Footnote 40] We focused on those controls most relevant to 
the CTR program, including organizational structure, risk assessments, 
performance measures, program reviews, communications, and monitoring 
of projects. We also reviewed DOD acquisition management guidance as 
contained in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Instruction 5000.01 
for our assessment of CTR management controls.[Footnote 41] Using the 
federal government standards and DOD's guidance, we developed and 
tested a semi-structured interview guide that included questions 
regarding DOD's internal controls for the CTR program. We included 
steps in the development and administration of the semi-structured 
interview guide to minimize errors resulting from the respondents' 
interpretation of the questions or from differences in information 
available to respondents answering the questions. We pretested the 
instrument with three DOD officials. In addition, an internal survey 
specialist reviewed our semi-structured interview guide. We modified 
the interview guide to reflect the questions and comments from the 
pretests and internal review. We used the semi-structured interview 
guide to interview 30 DOD officials responsible for managing and 
implementing the CTR program. We also held meetings with 17 other 
officials. Specifically, we met with officials from the CTR Policy 
Office, AT&L, and DTRA's Business and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CT) 
directorates. Within CT, we obtained information from the director, 
deputy director, program and project managers from all five program 
areas,[Footnote 42] and officials from the Program Integration office. 
In addition, we met with officials from DTRA offices in Moscow and 
Almaty and the Threat Reduction Support Center in Springfield, 
Virginia. We traveled to the Russian Federation to observe CTR projects 
involving strategic offensive arms elimination and biological weapons 
proliferation prevention. We met with Russian officials at the Federal 
Space Agency, the Federal Agency for Industry, and the Federal Atomic 
Energy Agency. We also visited the Republic of Kazakhstan to observe 
CTR-funded projects involving biological weapons proliferation 
prevention. While in Russia and Kazakhstan, we met with representatives 
from all five CTR Integrating Contractors[Footnote 43] to obtain 
information on their roles in implementing CTR projects. We also 
reviewed our prior work on the CTR program. 

Although information about funding for the CTR program and the 
program's accomplishments is used for background purposes only, we 
assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing relevant agency 
documents and obtaining information from agency officials. We 
determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of this report. 

We performed our work from April 2004 through May 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Current CTR Program Areas: 

Since 1992, Congress has authorized DOD to provide more than $5 billion 
for the CTR program to help the former states of the Soviet Union, 
including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova, and Georgia, secure and eliminate their weapons of mass 
destruction and prevent their proliferation. As of April 2005, DOD has 
obligated about $4.5 billion in support of the CTR program. Of this 
obligated amount, about $2.7 billion funds projects are being 
implemented under CTR's five program areas of biological weapons 
proliferation prevention, chemical weapons elimination, nuclear weapons 
safety and security, strategic offensive arms elimination, and weapon 
of mass destruction proliferation prevention initiative, as shown in 
figure 4. The remaining obligations cover completed CTR projects or 
other program support areas.[Footnote 44]

Figure 4: CTR Program Area Descriptions and Obligations as of April 
2005: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] Ukraine may also receive CTR assistance under the BWPP program. 

[B] The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and other government agencies are 
involved with the construction of the chemical weapons destruction 
facility at Shchucy'ye. 

[C] NWSS includes Nuclear Weapons Storage Security projects and Nuclear 
Weapons Transportation Security projects in Russia. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section]

Appendix V: DOD's Current Management and Internal Controls for the CTR 
Program Compared with Internal Control Standards: 

In managing the CTR program, standards for internal controls in the 
federal government provide an overall framework for DOD to establish 
and maintain management controls and identify and address major 
performance challenges and areas at risk for mismanagement. The five 
overall standards for internal control are control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, information and communications, and 
monitoring. Each standard contains numerous factors that an 
organization's management can use to evaluate its internal controls. 
For example, under the control environment standard, there are about 30 
factors listed such as whether an agency's organizational structure has 
appropriate and clear internal reporting requirements. For this report, 
we focused on those factors most relevant to CTR program 
implementation. The scope of our work thus covered factors such as 
organizational structure, risk assessments, performance measures, 
program reviews, communications, and monitoring of projects. Table 1 
describes the factors selected in reviewing DOD's current internal 
controls for the CTR program. 

Table 1: Internal Control Standards and Factors Compared with DOD 
Internal controls: 

Standards: Control environment: Establish and maintain an environment 
throughout the organization that sets a positive and supportive 
attitude toward internal control and conscientious management; 
Factors: Organizational structure: Key areas of authority and 
responsibility are defined and communicated throughout the 
organization; Appropriate and clear internal reporting relationships 
have been established; 
Current DOD internal controls: DOD filled vacancies in the office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and 
Logistics (AT&L) to provide oversight of the program. Specifically, 
within AT&L, the office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense for Chemical Demilitarization and Threat Reduction participates 
in CTR program planning, including overseeing program review meetings 
and providing guidance to program and project managers. This office 
also interacts with the CTR Policy Office and conveys policy guidance 
to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate; DOD uses designated 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) to perform oversight of all CTR 
program areas. The MDA chairs program reviews and approves project 
acquisition and implementation strategies. The MDA has the authority to 
approve all project phases or to withhold approval subject to revised 
planning; CTR project managers regularly report to their MDAs to 
provide updates on project status and to report on cost, schedule, and 
performance. With the introduction of the MDA process, program reviews 
occur at the same intervals for each project and project managers are 
reporting similar types of information to their MDAs; DTRA Implementing 
Instructions for Major Program Guidance (DTRA 5000.01) now defines the 
roles and responsibilities for management and oversight of DTRA major 
programs, including CTR projects. 

Standards: Risk assessment: Provide for an assessment of the risks the 
agency faces from both external and internal sources; 
Factors: Risk identification, risk analysis, and managing risk during 
change: Management comprehensively identifies risk using various 
methodologies as appropriate; Management has developed an approach for 
risk management and control based on how much risk can be prudently 
accepted. For example, specific control activities are identified to 
manage or mitigate specific risks at each activity level; The agency 
has mechanisms in place to anticipate, identify, and react to risks 
presented by changes in governmental, economic, industry, regulatory, 
operating, or other conditions that can affect the achievement of 
entity-wide or activity-level goals and objectives; Adequate mechanisms 
exist to identify risks to the agency arising from external factors; 
Current DOD internal controls: Since the two CTR project failures in 
2003, DOD now uses several methods to assess and mitigate risks 
associated with CTR projects; An MDA is designated for each CTR project 
based on several factors, including the project's risk and expected 
cost; CTR program officials now use a phased-contract approach in 
managing project implementation. Under this approach, projects are 
evaluated in three phases to minimize project risk; DOD has instituted 
periodic meetings of stakeholders to assess and minimize risks 
associated with CTR projects; The CTR program uses amendments to 
implementing agreements to convert recipient government assumptions or 
responsibilities into firm commitments. Implementing agreements have 
been used to limit CTR program risks; CTR's new and revised internal 
controls provide a mechanism for addressing and mitigating the specific 
risks associated with each project, but the CTR program must still rely 
on the good will of recipient governments to help implement projects. 
DOD cannot fully mitigate the risks of cooperating with these 
governments. 

Standards: Control activities: Help ensure that management's directives 
are carried out effectively and efficiently in accomplishing the 
agency's objectives; Agency managers review actual performance against 
targets; 
Factors: Top-level and management reviews at the functional or activity 
level: Top-level management regularly reviews actual performance 
against budgets, forecasts, and prior results; 
Current DOD internal controls: The MDA for CTR projects is responsible 
for balancing requirements with risks, approving and overseeing cost, 
schedule, and performance baselines; DOD has introduced a new process 
to review CTR projects whereby the designated MDA conducts periodic 
reviews of a project's cost, schedule, and performance objectives; 
Monthly review meetings of CTR projects include more detailed 
discussions of project plans that now include objectives, exit 
strategies, and project status. Project plans are submitted to CTR 
management for review regularly. 

Factors: Performance measures and indicators: The agency has 
established and monitors performance measures and indicators; 
Current DOD internal controls: CTR project baselines now include the 
thresholds and objectives for key parameters such as cost, schedule, 
and performance; DTRA had developed and implemented guidelines that 
provide CTR project managers with written instructions on developing 
and reporting project objects, schedules, and cost estimates. 

Standards: Information and communications: Should be recorded and 
communicated to management and others who need it; 
Factors: Communications: Mechanisms should exist to allow the easy flow 
of information down, across, and up the organization, and easy 
communications exist between functional activities, such as between 
procurement and production activities; 
Current DOD internal controls: DTRA Implementing Instructions for Major 
Program Guidance (DTRA 5000.01) documents the roles and 
responsibilities for management and oversight of DTRA major programs, 
including CTR projects; All CTR stakeholders are provided with 
consistent information on a regular basis through emails, weekly 
reports, and periodic meetings; CTR project managers hold weekly phone 
conferences with contractors implementing projects in recipient 
countries to ensure proper program implementation. Contractors are 
required to submit monthly written reports to CTR officials; DOD has 
improved its external communications with CTR-recipient countries. To 
more clearly define the project commitments of CTR-recipient 
governments and minimize risk at the outset of each project and 
throughout its life cycle, DOD has introduced and updated controls to 
ensure that commitments made by the CTR program and governments 
receiving CTR assistance are clearly defined and documented. 

Standards: Monitoring: Should assess the quality of performance over 
time and ensure that the findings of audits and other reviews are 
promptly resolved; 
Factors: Ongoing monitoring: Management has a strategy to ensure that 
ongoing monitoring is effective and will trigger separate evaluations 
where problems are identified; Separate evaluations are often prompted 
by events such as major changes in management plans or strategies; 
Current DOD internal controls: CTR program officials now monitor the 
performance of ongoing projects through a variety of controls, but they 
do not assess the performance of CTR projects upon their completion; 
DTRA has developed and implemented guidance that provides CTR project 
managers with written instructions on how to measure performance for 
meeting project objectives, schedules, and cost estimates. The metrics 
described in this guidance are intended to establish meaningful goals 
and track milestones for each project; During periodic program reviews, 
CTR project managers report to their MDAs on the status of their 
projects, primarily whether objectives are being met; CTR project 
managers interact regularly with contractors and recipient government 
officials through emails, phone conferences, and project visits. In 
fiscal year 2003, CTR teams made 165 project trips compared with 70 
trips in 2001. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 
POLICY: 
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON: 
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000: 

09 JUN 2005: 

Mr. Joseph A. Christoff: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. General Accounting Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Christoff: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, "COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION: DOD Has Improved its Management 
and Internal Controls but Challenges Remain," dated May 27, 2005 (GAO 
Code 320264/GAO-05-329). 

My office has received the draft GAO report and concurs with the 
recommendation that the Secretary of Defense conduct performance 
reviews of CTR projects upon their completion to document lessons 
learned and apply them to future project planning and implementation. 

My point of contact for this report is James H. Reid at (703) 696-7737, 
james.reid@osd.mil. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Lisa Bronson: 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Technology Security Policy and 
Counterproliferation: 

cc: 

ATSD (NCB); 
DATSD (CD&TR); 
Director, DTRA: 

[End of section]

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff (202) 512-8979: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Dave Maurer, Beth Hoffman Leůn, 
Josie Sigl, Stephanie Robinson, Nima Patel Edwards, Stacy Edwards, Lynn 
Cothern, Judy Pagano, and Mark Dowling contributed to this report. 
Etana Finkler also provided assistance. 

(320264): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] CTR recipient states of the former Soviet Union include Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and 
Georgia. 

[2] For the purposes of this report, we are using the acronym AT&L to 
refer to the office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
for Chemical Demilitarization and Threat Reduction within the Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics. 

[3] Public Law 108-136 also requires GAO to assess the management and 
coordination activities of the threat reduction and nonproliferation 
programs of the Departments of Defense and Energy. See GAO, Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration, 
GAO-05-157 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2005). GAO is also assessing the 
Department of Energy's management of its nonproliferation programs. 

[4] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/ 
AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999); and Internal Control 
Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 
2001). 

[5] Stakeholders include all CTR management, acquisition, and policy 
decision makers as well as other government agency officials who are 
involved with implementing a particular CTR project. 

[6] The CT directorate also has a program integration component and an 
executive language service to support program implementation. 

[7] Currently, the CTR program has offices in Moscow, Russia; and Kiev, 
Ukraine; and has plans to establish permanent offices in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan; Almaty, Kazakhstan; Baku, Azerbaijan; and Tbilisi, Georgia. 

[8] The five CTRIC contractors are Parsons Delaware, Inc; Bechtel 
National, Inc; Raytheon Technical Services Company; Kellogg, Brown, & 
Root; and Washington Group International, Inc. 

[9] DOD, Risk Management Guidebook for DOD Acquisition, Fifth Edition, 
June 2003. 

[10] GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Status of the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program, GAO/NSIAD-96-222 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 1996). 

[11] DOD, Office of the Inspector General, Cooperative Threat 
Reduction: Solid Rocket Motor Disposition Facility (D-2003-131), Sept. 
11, 2003. 

[12] Using our structured interview guide, we asked DOD officials what 
they believed the most important new internal controls for the CTR 
program are. This was an open-ended question and each official could 
provide multiple answers. We obtained the following responses from the 
30 officials we interviewed as to which new internal controls are the 
most important: 19 said the MDA review process, 9 said periodic 
meetings with stakeholders, 9 said the involvement of the AT&L office 
in the program, 8 said new reporting requirements, 7 said the new 
methods for communicating with and documenting the responsibilities of 
recipient government officials, and 7 said the program's new focus on 
the acquisition process. 

[13] See footnote 12 for a full list of responses. 

[14] The governments maintain and establish an environment throughout 
their bureaucracies that sets a positive and supportive attitude toward 
internal control and management. It provides discipline and structure 
as well as the climate, which influences the quality of internal 
control. 

[15] Umbrella agreements contain a comprehensive set of rights, 
exemptions, and protections for U.S. personnel and CTR program 
activities. Currently, DOD has umbrella agreements with the governments 
of Albania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, 
and Uzbekistan. 

[16] Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States 
of America and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Concerning the 
Provision of Material, Services, and Related Training to Ukraine in 
Connection with the Elimination of Strategic Nuclear Arms, dated 
December 5, 1993, and as amended. 

[17] The International Science and Technology Center was established by 
the United States, the European Union, Russia, and Japan in November 
1992 to provide peaceful research opportunities to former Soviet 
weapons scientists and redirect their skills away from producing 
weapons of mass destruction. 

[18] As of April 2005, DOD had spent $14.9 million on the design of the 
facility and $319.6 on the facility's construction. The amount does not 
include $69.3 million spent on fissile material containers for the 
facility. 

[19] GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the 
Former Soviet Union, GAO/NSIAD-95-7 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6, 1994). 

[20] GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian 
Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, GAO/NSIAD-99-76 
(Washington, D.C: Apr. 13, 1999.)

[21] DOD Office of the Inspector General, Cooperative Threat Reduction: 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Liquid Propellant Disposition 
Project, D-2002-154 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2002). 

[22] DOD Office of the Inspector General, Cooperative Threat Reduction: 
Solid Rocket Motor Disposition Facility Project, D-2003-131 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2003). 

[23] GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight but 
Procedural Limitations Remain, GAO-01-694 (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 
2001). 

[24] GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation 
Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, 
GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2003). 

[25] The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I, signed July 31, 
1991, by the United States and the Soviet Union, limited the number of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles, and heavy bombers each side could have as well as the number 
of warheads the missiles could carry. START II, signed in 1993 by the 
United States and the Russian Federation, was to eliminate multiple 
warheads on all intercontinental ballistic missiles except for 
submarine-launched missiles. 

[26] DOD Office of the Inspector General, Cooperative Threat Reduction: 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Liquid Propellant Disposition 
Project, D-2002-154 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2002). 

[27] Implementing agreements, signed by DOD and the executive agents of 
CTR recipient countries, outline the types and amounts of assistance to 
be provided for specific projects. 

[28] DOD Office of the Inspector General, Cooperative Threat Reduction: 
Management Structure of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, D- 
2004-050 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2004). 

[29] Public Law 102-228, Section 211. 

[30] Public Law 106-65, Section 1303. 

[31] Public Law 106-79, Section 8078. 

[32] Public Law 106-65, Section 1305. 

[33] Public Law 106-65, Section 1305 and Public Law 108-136, Section 
1306. 

[34] GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD's 1997-1998 Reports on 
Accounting for Assistance Were Late and Incomplete, GAO/NSIAD-00-40 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2000). GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction: 
DOD Has Adequate Oversight of Assistance, but Procedural Limitations 
Remain, GAO-01-694 (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2001). 

[35] Public Law 106-398, Section 1308(a). The annual report describes 
CTR activities and assistance provided during the preceding fiscal 
year. Subsequent legislation has added required information to this 
report. See Public Law 107-107, Section 1309; Public Law 107-314, 
Section 1304. 

[36] GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report, GAO-03- 
341R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2, 2002). GAO, FY 2003 Annual Report on 
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, GAO-03-627R (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 8, 2003). GAO, FY 2004 Annual Report on the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program, GAO-03-1008R (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 
2003). 

[37] S. 313. 

[38] Public Law 102-228, Section 211, as amended, specifies that the 
President must state in writing that CTR recipient countries are 
committed to (1) making substantial investment of their own resources 
to dismantle or destroy weapons, (2) forgoing a military modernization 
program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements, (3) forgoing any 
use of components of destroyed nuclear weapons in new weapons, (4) 
facilitating U.S. verification of weapons destruction, (5) complying 
with all relevant arms control agreements, and (6) observing internally 
recognized human rights. 

[39] H.R. 665 was introduced by Representatives Schiff, Shays, 
Butterfield, Chandler, Davis, Edwards, Grijalva, Holt, Israel, Maloney, 
Scott, Sherman, and Watson. 

[40] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999). We also referred 
to GAO's publication, Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, 
GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2001). 

[41] DTRA Instruction 5000.01: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 
Major Programs (Ft. Belvoir, VA: Nov. 15, 2004). 

[42] The five program areas are Biological Weapons Proliferation 
Prevention, Chemical Weapons Elimination, Nuclear Weapons Safety and 
Security, Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination, and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Proliferation Prevention. 

[43] The five contractors are Parsons; Bechtel International Systems, 
Inc; Raytheon Technical Services Company; Kellogg, Brown, and Root; and 
Washington Group International. 

[44] Other program support areas include Defense and Military Contacts, 
Arctic Nuclear Waste, and administrative costs. 

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