GAO-05-518, National Mall: Steps Identified by Stakeholders Facilitate Design and Approval of Security Enhancements


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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of 
Representatives: 

June 2005: 

National Mall: 

Steps Identified by Stakeholders Facilitate Design and Approval of 
Security Enhancements: 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-518]: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-518, a report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Government Reform, House of Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The National Mall in Washington, D.C., encompasses some of our 
country’s most treasured icons and serves as a public gathering place 
for millions of visitors each year. The National Air and Space Museum, 
for example, was the most visited museum worldwide in 2003, hosting 9.4 
million visitors. Federal agencies with facilities on the National Mall 
have begun implementing physical security enhancements to protect their 
facilities and the visiting public. 

This report responds to your interest in the efforts and expenditures 
pertaining to these security enhancements and discusses (1) the 
physical security enhancements that have been implemented on the 
National Mall since September 11, 2001, the additional enhancements 
planned, and the costs of these enhancements; (2) the considerations 
given to incorporating access and aesthetics into the design and 
approval of these security enhancements, and how issues of access and 
aesthetics are perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements; 
and (3) examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to 
implement the enhancements, and any challenges the agencies are 
experiencing in using these key practices. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Smithsonian Institution, 
Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, and National 
Gallery of Art provided clarifying and technical comments, which were 
incorporated into this report where appropriate. 

What GAO Found: 

Since September 11, 2001, federal agencies on the National Mall have 
obligated about $132 million for physical security enhancements, with 
the National Park Service and the Smithsonian accounting for about 75 
percent of the total obligations. Security enhancements include 
additional security personnel, facility upgrades, and equipment and 
technology. Planned enhancements include the installation of permanent 
security barriers to protect against vehicle bombs. 

Public access and aesthetic considerations are integral to the design 
and approval of security enhancements on the National Mall. Federal 
agencies must coordinate with reviewing organizations, such as the 
National Capital Planning Commission, and consider aesthetics, historic 
preservation, urban design, urban planning, and environmental effects 
when implementing security enhancements. Although federal agencies 
reported that the review process can be time-consuming, review 
organizations noted that early and frequent consultation with them 
helps to ensure a smoother, more efficient, and expeditious review 
process. GAO’s survey of about 300 visitors to the National Mall, and 
reports from federal agencies, indicate that visitors value access to 
and the appearance of the National Mall and generally find the current 
level of security enhancements acceptable. GAO’s survey results also 
suggest that visitors regard access and aesthetics as important 
priorities when adding security enhancements to the National Mall. 

Federal agencies on the National Mall reported using five of the six 
key practices identified by GAO—allocating resources using risk 
management, leveraging technology, information-sharing and 
coordination, performance management and testing, and strategic 
management of human capital—in implementing physical security 
enhancements. However, none of the federal agencies on the National 
Mall reported using the key practice of aligning assets to mission in 
implementing security measures because they believe they do not have 
excess or underutilized facilities or consider the practice applicable 
to property under their jurisdiction. Agencies identified balancing 
ongoing mission priorities with the need for security as a common 
challenge in using key practices to implement physical security 
enhancements. 

Current and Proposed Security Enhancements at the National Museum of 
Natural History: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-518. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Mark L. Goldstein at 
(202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Federal Agencies Have Obligated about $132 Million for Physical 
Security Enhancements on the National Mall since September 11, and 
Additional Measures Are Planned: 

Security Enhancements Have Incorporated Considerations of Public Access 
and Aesthetics and Have Been Generally Accepted by Visitors: 

Federal Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices, but Balancing Mission 
Priorities with the Need for Physical Security Enhancements Poses 
Common Challenge: 

Concluding Observations: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Results of National Mall Visitor Survey: 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Bibliography: 

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation: 

Department of the Interior: 

National Capital Planning Commission: 

National Coalition to Save Our Mall: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Total Obligations for Physical Security Enhancements on the 
National Mall, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: The National Mall in Washington, D.C.: 

Figure 2: Key Practices in Facility Protection: 

Figure 3: Phased Implementation of USDA Physical Security Enhancements: 

Figure 4: Incorporation of Physical Security Enhancements in the 
National Museum of the American Indian: 

Figure 5: Modifications to Physical Security Enhancements of the 
Washington Monument: 

Figure 6: Current and Proposed Security Enhancements at the National 
Museum of Natural History: 

Figure 7: Visitor Survey Results on Access to and Appearance of the 
National Mall: 

Abbreviations: 

ACHP: Advisory Council on Historic Preservation: 

CFA: U.S. Commission of Fine Arts: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

EOC: Emergency Operations Center: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

HVAC: heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning: 

NCPC: National Capital Planning Commission: 

NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act: 

NHPA: National Historic Preservation Act: 

NM&I: National Monuments and Icons Assessment Methodology: 

SHPO: State Historic Preservation Officer: 

USBG: U.S. Botanic Garden: 

USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

Letter June 14, 2005: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increased attention 
has been given to protecting our nation's key assets, whose destruction 
could result not only in the loss of life, but in the loss of 
irreplaceable items from American history and of structures that have 
come to symbolize America worldwide. The National Mall in Washington, 
D.C., encompasses some of our country's most treasured icons and serves 
as a public gathering place for millions of visitors each year. The 
National Air and Space Museum, for example, was the world's most 
frequently visited museum in 2003, with 9.4 million visitors. As such, 
federal agencies and entities[Footnote 1] with facilities on the 
National Mall[Footnote 2]--the National Park Service, Smithsonian 
Institution, National Gallery of Art, Department of Agriculture, and 
U.S. Botanic Garden--have implemented and are continuing to implement 
physical security enhancements to protect their facilities, employees, 
and the visiting public. To assist in financing the anticipated costs 
of designing and implementing new security enhancements, Congress 
provided supplemental appropriations to most of these federal agencies 
in fiscal year 2002.[Footnote 3] In addition, the agencies have funded 
security enhancements from their annual appropriations acts. 

We have issued several reports on the physical security of federal 
facilities. For example, in November 2004, we identified a set of key 
practices that can provide a framework for guiding federal agencies' 
facility protection efforts.[Footnote 4] To assist the Committee in its 
oversight role, this report discusses (1) the physical security 
enhancements that have been implemented on the National Mall since 
September 11, the additional enhancements planned, and the costs of 
these enhancements; (2) the considerations given to incorporating 
access and aesthetics in designing and approving physical security 
enhancements on the National Mall, and how issues of access and 
aesthetics are perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements; 
and (3) examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to 
implement physical security enhancements on the National Mall, and any 
challenges the agencies are experiencing in using these key practices. 

To accomplish all of these objectives, we reviewed historical plans for 
the design, expansion, and maintenance of the National Mall; 
appropriations acts and accompanying legislative material; statutory 
and regulatory provisions related to security enhancements of the 
National Mall grounds; and federal agency proposals for implementing 
physical security enhancements on the National Mall. We also received 
information about obligations and costs associated with physical 
security enhancements on the National Mall since the terrorist attacks 
of September 11. We interviewed officials of the National Park Service, 
U.S. Park Police, Smithsonian Institution, National Gallery of Art, 
Department of Agriculture, U.S. Botanic Garden, U.S. Capitol Police, 
National Capital Planning Commission, U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, 
Advisory Council for Historic Preservation, District of Columbia's 
Historic Preservation Office, Department of Homeland Security, and 
National Coalition to Save Our Mall. Furthermore, we surveyed about 300 
visitors to the National Mall on 5 days in October and November 2004 to 
obtain reactions about security enhancements. We performed our work 
from August 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. (See app. I for a more detailed 
discussion of the report's scope and methodology; also see app. II for 
the results of our National Mall Visitor Survey.)

Results in Brief: 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, federal agencies on the 
National Mall have obligated about $132 million for physical security 
enhancements, with two agencies accounting for about three-quarters of 
the obligations incurred. Specifically, the National Park Service 
accounted for about $57 million, or 43 percent of the total 
obligations, and the Smithsonian Institution accounted for an 
additional 32 percent of the total obligations. Security enhancements 
implemented by these federal agencies include additional security 
personnel, facility upgrades, and equipment and technology. Additional 
security enhancements planned by these federal agencies include the 
installation of permanent perimeter security barriers to protect 
against vehicle bombs and of technological upgrades to improve 
surveillance and monitor access into facilities. However, the 
implementation of physical security enhancements on the National Mall 
is shaped, in part, by the availability of funds and the costs of 
enhancements. Federal agencies typically adjust their security plans on 
the basis of available funding. 

Public access and aesthetic considerations are integral to the design 
and approval of security enhancements on the National Mall. Federal 
agencies are required to coordinate with review organizations, such as 
the National Capital Planning Commission, and consider aesthetics, 
historic preservation, urban design, urban planning, and environmental 
impacts when implementing physical security enhancements. Although 
federal agencies told us the review process can be time-consuming, 
review organizations noted that early and frequent consultation with 
review organizations helps to ensure a smoother, more efficient, and 
expeditious review process. These officials also noted that informal 
consultations should occur during the project's preliminary design 
phase and continue throughout the design of the security project. For 
example, the Smithsonian Institution consulted with all of the review 
organizations before developing a concept design for its perimeter 
security projects and, as a result, received favorable reviews from all 
stakeholders on its preliminary design. Finally, our survey results and 
reports from federal agencies indicate that visitors value access to 
and the appearance of the National Mall, and that they generally find 
the current level of security enhancements acceptable. Our survey 
results further suggest that visitors regard access and aesthetics as 
important priorities when adding security enhancements to the National 
Mall. 

In past work, we identified six key practices that have emerged from 
the increased attention to facilities protection that, collectively, 
could provide a framework for guiding federal agencies' ongoing 
facility protection efforts. These key practices are allocating 
resources using risk management, leveraging security technology, 
information-sharing and coordination, performance management and 
testing, strategic management of human capital, and aligning assets to 
mission. Federal agencies on the National Mall reported using five of 
these six key practices in implementing physical security enhancements. 
For example, agencies told us they use risk assessments to efficiently 
allocate resources to mitigate areas of greatest risk first. In 
addition, agencies reported integrating new technologies to extend the 
capabilities of security staff and to improve their facilities' overall 
operating efficiencies. Agencies also reported sharing information 
through periodic meetings, including performance measures in their 
strategic plans, and providing new training programs for security 
personnel. However, none of the federal agencies on the National Mall 
reported using the key practice of aligning assets to mission, which 
involves the reduction of underutilized or excess facilities in order 
to reduce vulnerabilities, in implementing security measures on the 
National Mall. Agencies reported that they do not believe that they 
have any excess or underutilized facilities on the National Mall or 
elsewhere or do not consider this practice applicable to property under 
their jurisdiction. For example, one agency reported that all of its 
facilities are needed to execute its mission of increasing and 
diffusing knowledge, and that the closure of any of its facilities 
would therefore be inconsistent with its mission. Federal agencies 
identified balancing ongoing mission priorities with security needs as 
a common challenge in using key practices to implement physical 
security enhancements. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Smithsonian Institution, 
Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, and National 
Gallery of Art provided clarifying and technical comments, which we 
incorporated into this report where appropriate. 

Background: 

The National Mall in Washington, D.C., traces its history in part to 
plans developed by Pierre Charles L'Enfant and the U.S. Senate's Park 
Commission of the District of Columbia--commonly known as the McMillan 
Commission. The L'Enfant Plan of 1791 envisioned the National Mall as a 
grand avenue beginning at the U.S. Capitol and extending west to the 
current site of the Washington Monument. The McMillan Commission Plan 
of 1901-1902 extended the National Mall further west and south to the 
future sites of the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. Multiple 
geographic definitions of the National Mall exist. For example, the 
narrowest definition of the National Mall encompasses the area between 
1ST and 14TH Streets and Constitution and Independence Avenues. Broader 
definitions of the National Mall extend its boundaries to include the 
grounds of the Washington Monument and the grounds of the Lincoln and 
Jefferson Memorials, while other definitions also include the U.S. 
Capitol, the White House, the Ellipse, and West Potomac Park. For the 
purposes of our report, we defined the National Mall as the area 
extending from the foot of the U.S. Capitol grounds west to the 
Washington Monument and proceeding further west and southeast to 
include the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. It also includes the area 
between Constitution and Independence Avenues between 1ST and 14TH 
Streets (see fig. 1).[Footnote 5]

Figure 1: The National Mall in Washington, D.C. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The open spaces of the National Mall, along with the Washington 
Monument, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, and other 
memorials,[Footnote 6] are (1) administered and maintained by the 
National Capital Parks unit of the National Park Service (Park 
Service), which is within the Department of the Interior (Interior), 
and (2) patrolled by the U.S. Park Police. In addition, other federal 
agencies control and maintain various facilities located on the 
National Mall, as described below: 

* Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian): Created as a trust 
instrumentality of the United States by an act of Congress in 
1846,[Footnote 7] the Smithsonian is considered the world's largest 
museum and research complex, featuring 11 facilities on the National 
Mall--that is, the Smithsonian Castle, Arts and Industries Building, 
Freer Gallery of Art, Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden, National 
Air and Space Museum, National Museum of African Art, National Museum 
of American History, National Museum of the American Indian, National 
Museum of Natural History, Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, and S. Dillon 
Ripley Center. 

* National Gallery of Art (National Gallery): With the gift of Andrew 
W. Mellon's collection of paintings and works of sculptures, the 
National Gallery was created by a joint resolution of Congress in 1937. 
Located at the northeast corner of the National Mall, the National 
Gallery today maintains two buildings--the West and East Buildings, 
opened in 1941 and 1978, respectively--and an outdoor Sculpture Garden, 
opened to the public in 1999. 

* Department of Agriculture (USDA): The only cabinet-level agency 
building located on the National Mall is the USDA's Whitten 
Building.[Footnote 8] In 1995, this building was named for former U.S. 
Representative Jamie L. Whitten. 

* U.S. Botanic Garden (USBG): Tracing its origins as far back as 1816, 
USBG is managed under the direction of the Joint Committee on the 
Library, with the Architect of the Capitol responsible for the garden's 
operations and maintenance. USBG's Conservatory and the adjacent 
outdoor National Garden (currently under construction) are situated on 
the southeast corner of the National Mall. Security for USBG is 
provided by the U.S. Capitol Police. 

Along with the federal agencies that manage facilities on the National 
Mall, several governmental and other entities have an oversight, 
advisory, or advocacy role related to the construction, renovation, or 
modification of facilities, including the implementation of security 
enhancements, on the National Mall and throughout Washington, D.C. 
These entities include the following: 

* National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC): NCPC, which is the 
federal government's central planning agency for the National Capital 
Region, provides planning guidance for the development of federal land 
and buildings in the city. NCPC and federal agencies must comply with 
both the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National 
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). These laws require that federal 
agencies consider the effects of their undertakings on environmental 
quality and historic properties, respectively, and allow for public 
participation and comment. NCPC's policies and procedures are meant to 
ensure compliance with these laws during its review process. NCPC also 
reviews the design of federal construction projects, oversees long- 
range planning for development, and monitors capital investment by 
federal agencies. 

* Commission of Fine Arts (CFA): CFA provides advice to federal and 
D.C. government agencies on matters of art and architecture that affect 
the appearance of the capital city. 

* D.C. State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) and Advisory Council 
on Historic Preservation (ACHP): Federal agencies that undertake the 
construction or renovation of properties in Washington, D.C., are 
required by law to assess whether there may be effects to designated 
historic properties, engage in consultation with the SHPO[Footnote 9] 
on effects to historic properties, and provide ACHP with an opportunity 
to comment. ACHP promotes the preservation, enhancement, and productive 
use of the nation's historic resources and reviews federal programs and 
policies to promote effectiveness, coordination, and consistency with 
national preservation policies. 

* National Coalition to Save Our Mall: Founded in 2000, the coalition 
is made up of professional and civic organizations and concerned 
artists, historians, and citizens to provide a national constituency 
dedicated to the protection and preservation of the National Mall in 
Washington, D.C. The coalition's mission is to "defend our national 
gathering place and symbol of Constitutional principles against threats 
posed by recent and ongoing proposals--for new memorials, security 
barriers, service buildings and roads--that would encroach on the 
Mall's historical and cultural integrity, its open spaces and sweeping 
vistas, and its significance in American public life."

The physical security of federal facilities, including those on the 
National Mall, has been a more urgent governmentwide concern since the 
1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma. The vulnerability of our nation's infrastructure was further 
highlighted after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Since the 
September 11 attacks, actions have been taken to better protect our 
critical infrastructure and key assets from future attacks of 
terrorism. In 2002, the Administration's Office of Homeland Security 
issued The National Strategy for Homeland Security, which recognized 
the potential for attacks on national monuments and icons and 
identified Interior as the lead federal agency with jurisdiction over 
these key assets.[Footnote 10] The Administration outlined actions that 
Interior should take to protect national icons and monuments in The 
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets in 2003.[Footnote 11] Furthermore, the 
Administration issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 in 
December 2003, establishing a national policy for federal agencies to 
identify and prioritize U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources 
and to protect them from terrorist attacks.[Footnote 12]

In response to the effects of what were viewed as makeshift security 
measures that affected the historic design and streetscape of 
Washington, D.C., NCPC's Interagency Task Force issued a report in 
October 2001--Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital-- 
identifying design strategies to improve mobility and aesthetic 
conditions throughout Washington, D.C.[Footnote 13] The following year, 
NCPC released a design framework and implementation strategy for 
Washington's "monumental core" and downtown area, National Capital 
Urban Design and Security Plan, which provided a summary of building 
perimeter security considerations; streetscape design concepts that 
incorporate security components; and an implementation strategy for the 
design, construction, funding, maintenance, and operations of security 
installations in Washington, D.C.[Footnote 14] (See the bibliography 
for additional reports related to this topic.)

Likewise, improving the physical security of federal facilities has 
been the subject of several GAO reports, including our November 2004 
report.[Footnote 15] In that report, we assessed the actions of the 
federal government's Interagency Security Committee in coordinating 
federal facility protection efforts and delineated a set of six key 
practices emerging from the collective practices of federal agencies to 
provide a framework for guiding agencies' facility protection efforts 
(see fig. 2). As previously mentioned, these key practices are 
allocating resources using risk management, leveraging technology, 
information-sharing and coordination, performance measurement and 
testing, aligning assets to mission, and strategic management of human 
capital. 

Figure 2: Key Practices in Facility Protection: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Federal Agencies Have Obligated about $132 Million for Physical 
Security Enhancements on the National Mall since September 11, and 
Additional Measures Are Planned: 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, about $132 million has 
been obligated for physical security enhancements by federal agencies 
for facilities on the National Mall. Overall, the Park Service and the 
Smithsonian have incurred higher levels of obligations for physical 
security enhancements than other agencies because they manage most of 
the facilities on the National Mall (see table 1). Federal agencies 
obligated funds for physical security enhancements from funds made 
available through annual and supplemental appropriations. 

Table 1: Total Obligations for Physical Security Enhancements on the 
National Mall, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004: 

Dollars in millions: 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Park Service: $19.0; 
Smithsonian: $17.1[A]; 
National Gallery: $1.4; 
USDA: $8.5; 
USBG: $0. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Park Service: $14.4; 
Smithsonian: $17.3; 
National Gallery: $2.1; 
USDA: $9.5; 
USBG: $0.6. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Park Service: $24.0; 
Smithsonian: $7.2; 
National Gallery: $3.7; 
USDA: $7.1; 
USBG: $0. 

Fiscal year: Total; 
Park Service: $57.4[B]; 
Smithsonian: $41.6[C]; 
National Gallery: $7.2[D]; 
USDA: $25.1[E]; 
USBG: $0.6[F]. 

Sources: Department of the Interior's National Park Service, 
Smithsonian Institution, National Gallery of Art, Department of 
Agriculture, and U.S. Botanic Garden. 

[A] Obligation includes $2.25 million for temporary security barriers. 

[B] Park Service obligations include $24.5 million for Park Police 
security personnel, including some overtime, and equipment. 

[C] Security personnel costs are included in the obligation totals for 
each fiscal year. 

[D] Obligations for security personnel are not included because no 
additional security personnel were hired after September 11. 

[E] Some obligations made for the entire headquarters complex of USDA 
are included. 

[F] Obligations at USBG have been made by the U.S. Capitol Police since 
2003. The U.S. Capitol Police did not incur any obligations for 
physical security enhancements at USBG in fiscal year 2004. No 
obligations were incurred in fiscal year 2002. 

[End of table]

The implementation of physical security enhancements on the National 
Mall is shaped, in part, by the availability of funds and the costs of 
enhancements. Federal agencies often adjust their security plans on the 
basis of available funding. The remaining text in this section 
describes the physical security enhancements for which these agencies 
told us they have obligated funds, as well as some of the costs 
associated with implementing these enhancements. Additional planned 
physical security enhancements for each of the agencies are also 
discussed. 

National Park Service and U.S. Park Police: 

The Park Service and the Park Police told us they obligated over $57 
million for physical security enhancements, including security 
personnel, on the National Mall during fiscal years 2002 through 2004, 
primarily at the Washington Monument and the Lincoln and Jefferson 
Memorials.[Footnote 16] For each of these monuments and memorials, the 
Park Service incurred such obligations to conduct site surveys; develop 
security proposals; comply with environmental, historical, and design 
guidelines; hire construction managers; and replace temporary security 
measures with permanent security enhancements. Perimeter security 
construction was under way at both the Washington Monument and the 
Lincoln Memorial during our review, while designs for perimeter 
security at the Jefferson Memorial have not been finalized. The 
following text provides some examples of perimeter security 
enhancements implemented and planned at each of these national icons. 

* The Washington Monument: After September 11, the Park Service 
installed closed-circuit television cameras, in addition to temporary 
security measures, such as a ring of jersey barriers and a visitor 
screening facility at the Washington Monument. During our review, the 
Monument was closed to the public because of construction to replace 
these temporary security features with permanent security enhancements. 
The Monument reopened in April 2005, and the grounds are expected to 
reopen in early summer. The grounds will be regraded, and 30-inch 
retaining walls, serving as both vehicle barriers and visitor seating, 
will surround the Monument. In addition, pedestrian pathways, upgraded 
lighting, and seating benches are expected to be installed on the 
Monument grounds. The total cost of constructing these permanent 
physical security enhancements is estimated at $12.2 million. The Park 
Service also told us it is considering the installation of a remote 
visitor screening facility; however, implementation of this security 
enhancement had not been approved or scheduled.[Footnote 17]

* The Lincoln Memorial: After September 11, concrete jersey barriers 
and planters were installed around the Lincoln Memorial ring and the 
circular drive east of the memorial was closed to all traffic. 
Construction is expected to be completed in spring 2006, at which time 
a 35-inch retaining wall will serve as a perimeter vehicle barrier 
around the north, west, and south sides of the memorial.[Footnote 18] 
In addition, bollards (short posts) will be installed on the east side 
of the circle to complete the vehicle barrier system. Construction 
costs for the vehicle barrier system are estimated at $5.1 million. 

* The Jefferson Memorial: Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
temporary concrete jersey barriers have been in place around the 
Jefferson Memorial, and the U-shaped drive on the south side of the 
memorial has been closed to traffic. In addition, the parking lot 
adjacent to the memorial has been closed to the public. The 
construction of a permanent vehicle barrier system, still in the design 
stage, is expected to begin in the winter of 2005 and to be completed 
in the winter of 2006 at an estimated cost of $4.1 million. 

In addition to funds specifically obligated at these national icons, 
the Park Service obligated funds in fiscal year 2002 for closed-circuit 
television cameras at various memorials located within the National 
Mall. Furthermore, the Park Police obligated funds during this time for 
security personnel and equipment support, such as X-ray machines, body 
armor, and vehicles. The Park Service told us the completion of 
permanent vehicle barriers and the installation of equipment and 
technology upgrades, such as permanent security cameras at each 
monument and memorial, were the only additional physical security 
enhancements planned on the National Mall at the time of our review. 

Smithsonian Institution: 

In fiscal years 2002 through 2004, the Smithsonian obligated 
approximately $42 million for numerous physical security enhancements, 
such as additional security personnel, periodic risk assessments, 
perimeter vehicle barriers, blast mitigation film, closed-circuit 
television cameras, emergency voice systems, and electronic screening 
of the public and mail at its National Mall facilities. Some of these 
security enhancements were already completed at the time of our review. 
In other cases, enhancements already existed in a facility or are 
planned to be implemented during future renovations. Smithsonian 
officials noted that they have established priorities for the 
implementation of physical security enhancements, identifying as their 
top priorities the installation of perimeter security barriers and of 
blast protection film on their facilities' windows. The Smithsonian 
plans to obligate an additional $72 million to implement these and 
other security enhancements between fiscal years 2006 through 
2012.[Footnote 19]

* Perimeter vehicle barriers: Permanent barriers around the exterior of 
each of the Smithsonian's National Mall facilities will replace 
existing temporary barriers to provide protection from vehicle bombs. 
According to the Smithsonian, this security measure, which is to be 
implemented in three phases, is one of its highest priorities. The 
first phase, the construction of a perimeter barrier around the 
National Air and Space Museum, has already begun and is expected to be 
completed in February 2006.[Footnote 20] The second phase, the 
construction of perimeter barriers around the Smithsonian's National 
Museum of American History and National Museum of Natural History is 
expected to begin in July 2006 and to be completed in June 2008. The 
final phase, addressing perimeter security for the remaining 
Smithsonian facilities on the National Mall, will be implemented 
between April 2008 and April 2010. Smithsonian officials told us that 
$11 million was obligated for this project in fiscal years 2002 and 
2003, and that an additional $24.7 million is planned for obligation 
through fiscal year 2008. 

* Blast-resistant window system enhancement: For this enhancement, 
which is designed to prevent or reduce the number of deaths or injuries 
from flying glass, the Smithsonian obligated a total of $1.8 million in 
fiscal years 2003 and 2004 and plans to obligate an additional $44.9 
million through fiscal year 2012 to implement this measure. 

* Perimeter closed-circuit television cameras: Providing surveillance 
of the grounds adjacent to the Smithsonian's National Mall facilities 
to detect suspicious activities, this enhancement has been implemented 
by the Smithsonian at 3 of its facilities on the National 
Mall,[Footnote 21] resulting in obligations totaling $660,000 in fiscal 
year 2002. The Smithsonian canceled the implementation of this security 
enhancement at some of its other National Mall facilities but plans to 
implement the measure during future security upgrades or capital 
renovation projects. 

* Emergency voice systems: This enhancement, intended to enable 
emergency response staff to broadcast disaster-or emergency-related 
information to affected Smithsonian staff and visitors, was in place at 
three museums on the National Mall prior to September 11. To implement 
this enhancement at the remainder of its facilities, the Smithsonian 
obligated $2.9 million in fiscal year 2002. 

* Electronic screening of the public and mail: According to the 
Smithsonian, this enhancement is designed to prevent a terrorist from 
carrying an explosive device or firearm into a Smithsonian facility, or 
to mitigate the effects of such a weapon's use. The enhancement also is 
designed to detect explosives or biological agents delivered through 
the mail system. Although lack of space for screening equipment will 
limit the use of this security enhancement at its National Mall 
facilities, the Smithsonian does plan to implement this measure at some 
of its facilities. However, in some cases, renovations are required to 
install an adequate number of screening stations. The Smithsonian has 
deferred renovations to fully implement this measure until it can 
address higher priority security enhancements. In the meantime, several 
facilities have received full magnetometer screening and bag searches 
to limit the potential for explosive devices or firearms to enter a 
Smithsonian facility. The Smithsonian obligated $2.2 million in fiscal 
year 2002 for this enhancement. 

Besides funding the enhancements previously identified, the Smithsonian 
obligated about $20 million for additional security personnel and $1 
million for risk assessments for its facilities during fiscal years 
2002 through 2004. Furthermore, the Smithsonian has requested $700,000 
for electronic access control measures and $2 million to deter, detect, 
or prevent the introduction of chemical, biological, or radiological 
agents into air intakes at its National Mall facilities. 

National Gallery of Art: 

Officials from the National Gallery told us it has obligated over $7 
million to implement physical security enhancements at its East and 
West Buildings and Sculpture Garden since September 11. Funds have been 
obligated at both the East and West Buildings and for equipment and 
technology, such as magnetometers, X-ray machines, closed-circuit 
television cameras, and body armor. In addition, the National Gallery 
installed streetscape and landscape barriers, such as trees and 
boulders, along the exterior of the East Building; constructed a 
security guardhouse and modified the service entrance at the West 
Building; and deployed temporary barricades to be used during 
heightened security alerts. Finally, the National Gallery has obligated 
funds for an Integrated Security Management System, the review of its 
disaster management plan, and the review of vulnerability assessments 
for security against explosive devices. Although implementation of 
future security enhancements is subject to available funding, the 
following text describes some examples of security enhancements planned 
by the National Gallery: 

* The National Gallery plans to conduct additional studies to evaluate 
its camera system and the need for an Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC). By determining the number and location of cameras currently in 
use throughout the National Gallery, this study will provide the 
gallery with the most comprehensive surveillance system possible. The 
EOC study will determine the National Gallery's need for an off-site 
space to conduct security operations in the event of a large-scale 
emergency affecting the National Mall. The estimated cost of the 
studies is $350,000. 

* The National Gallery plans to upgrade perimeter security through 
additional protections against explosions and hazardous agents. These 
measures include erecting bollards and retractable steel plates around 
the perimeter of the East and West Buildings and Sculpture Garden to 
protect against unauthorized vehicles, adding window film to windows in 
the entire East Building and part of the West Building, and installing 
air intake protection sensors in the West Building to protect against 
biological agents or other materials. The estimated cost of 
implementing these enhancements is $1.4 million. 

* The National Gallery plans to install additional equipment and 
technology, such as improved access controls and biometrics, perimeter 
cameras, and screening devices. For example, new employee 
identification badges (smart cards) will be authenticated and 
electronically tracked through the National Gallery's Integrated 
Security Management System to protect against fraud. In addition, the 
National Gallery intends to improve security and access controls 
through the use of biometric systems. Additional external cameras will 
improve surveillance of the East and West Buildings and Sculpture 
Garden. Finally, X-ray machines and magnetometers that are already in 
use at some public entrances will be added at closed entrances at the 
West Building to improve visitor access during heightened security. The 
estimated cost of implementing these enhancements is $580,000. 

Department of Agriculture: 

USDA has obligated about $25 million for physical security enhancements 
for its facilities on or adjacent to the National Mall since September 
11.[Footnote 22] USDA conducted blast assessment studies, hired 
additional security personnel, and began installing window protection 
measures and a public address system at each of its Washington, D.C., 
facilities, in addition to developing a perimeter streetscape security 
master plan for the four-building headquarters complex. USDA also 
obligated funds for a situation room and a heating, ventilating, and 
air-conditioning (HVAC) air intake study at the Whitten Building 
located on the National Mall. 

USDA plans to continue installing blast resistant windows for the South 
Building under its overall modernization project and safety drapes in 
additional locations in the four-building headquarters complex; it also 
plans to undertake major HVAC improvements against bioterrorism. 
However, the implementation of these measures is dependent on available 
funding and the priority given to these measures by USDA. In some 
cases, the security enhancements will be coordinated with major 
renovations of its facilities. Beginning in fiscal year 2006, USDA also 
plans to improve security around its facilities by implementing 
perimeter security barriers that it developed for the Whitten Building 
and adjacent facilities. USDA plans to implement this project in four 
phases based on funding availability and USDA's assessment of each 
building's location, vulnerability, and other factors (see fig. 3). 
Each phase can be subdivided and adjusted according to funding 
availability. The proposed security elements include a combination of 
bollards, fences, planters, tree well enclosures, and retaining and 
freestanding walls located primarily at the buildings' roadways, curbs, 
and driveways. Specifically, at the Whitten Building facing the 
National Mall, USDA plans to install a combination of bollards and 
planters to create a 50-foot stand-off distance from the facility. The 
overall estimated cost of implementing these perimeter security 
enhancements is between $13 million and $14 million. 

Figure 3: Phased Implementation of USDA Physical Security Enhancements: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

U.S. Botanic Garden: 

The U.S. Capitol Police is responsible for security at USBG. The 
physical security enhancements implemented at USBG include a visitor 
screening facility at the entrance of the Conservatory to detect 
weapons and explosives, security cameras, card readers throughout the 
Conservatory, an alarm system, and the addition of four security 
officers when the Conservatory is open to the public. The U.S. Capitol 
Police obligated $600,000 in fiscal year 2003 to implement these 
enhancements. U.S. Capitol Police officials told us they do not 
anticipate a need for additional funding for security enhancements at 
USBG. 

Security Enhancements Have Incorporated Considerations of Public Access 
and Aesthetics and Have Been Generally Accepted by Visitors: 

Public access and aesthetics are vital to the design and approval of 
physical security enhancements to sites on the National Mall. Agencies 
are required to coordinate with reviewing organizations and consider 
aesthetics, historic preservation, urban design, urban planning, and 
environmental impacts when implementing physical security enhancements. 
Reports from federal agencies, along with responses to our own survey 
of National Mall visitors, indicate that visitors have found the 
current level of public access and the aesthetics of temporary and 
permanent physical security enhancements acceptable. The majority of 
survey respondents also indicated that aesthetics and public access 
should be given high priorities when adding security enhancements to 
the National Mall. 

Access and Aesthetics Are Critical to the Design and Approval of 
Physical Security Enhancements on the National Mall: 

Agency officials told us that they consider public access and 
aesthetics in developing and designing physical security enhancements 
for their facilities on the National Mall. These officials noted that 
maintaining the cultural and historic character of their facilities is 
important, and that providing visitors with access to their facilities 
is fundamental to their educational and commemorative missions. For 
example, officials of the Smithsonian and National Gallery stated the 
importance of ensuring the public's access to their collections and 
exhibits when implementing security enhancements. Park Service 
officials noted that they want visitors to be able to access the 
monuments and memorials as they did before security enhancements were 
implemented. Similarly, in terms of aesthetics, officials of the 
Smithsonian and National Gallery told us that in designing smaller 
security projects, they use exhibit and design specialists to ensure 
that the security projects are implemented according to consistent 
standards throughout their facilities. For larger security projects, 
they also work with security consultants, design specialists, and 
architecture and engineering firms to ensure that aesthetics are 
incorporated into their security designs. USBG works with the U.S. 
Capitol Police to incorporate aesthetics into security 
enhancements.[Footnote 23] For example, additional surveillance cameras 
were reinstalled in less visible sites, while maintaining their overall 
security function. 

In the case of a facility that is under construction, such as the 
Smithsonian's National Museum of the American Indian,[Footnote 24] 
security features can be integrated directly into the design of the 
structure without the need for the subsequent installation of 
potentially more conspicuous and obtrusive features (see fig. 4). After 
September 11, the Smithsonian altered the landscaping plan for the 
National Museum of the American Indian to integrate additional security 
enhancements into the design of the facility. Specifically, four 
substantial "grandfather rocks"[Footnote 25] were repositioned to 
locations where they could serve as a vehicle barrier, while 
maintaining the cultural and aesthetic significance of these objects. 

Figure 4: Incorporation of Physical Security Enhancements in the 
National Museum of the American Indian: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In most cases, however, agencies have had to develop and design 
physical security enhancements for facilities already in place on the 
National Mall. Still, officials of these agencies told us that public 
access and aesthetics are critical elements in the design of security 
enhancements. For example, officials of the Smithsonian noted that the 
perimeter vehicle barriers that will be constructed around each of its 
museums on the National Mall have been designed with an eye toward 
integrating the architectural design and characteristics of the museums 
into the barriers. In addition, they noted that the height of the 
barriers will be adjusted in certain locations to achieve a better 
appearance and scale, improve pedestrian movement and accessibility, 
and provide space for visitors to sit on the barriers themselves. 
Similarly, the physical security enhancements to the Washington 
Monument that were under construction during our review were designed 
to ensure consistency in the historical landscaping of the grounds and 
in the spaces for visitors' recreation. Although the Park Service 
developed alternative design proposals, including the one depicted in 
the figure below (right), the selected design includes a regrading of 
the Monument grounds and the construction of retaining walls that are 
intended to disappear into the landscape (see fig. 5). 

Figure 5: Modifications to Physical Security Enhancements of the 
Washington Monument: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Multiple Organizations Work with National Mall Agencies to Design and 
Review Security Enhancements: 

Several organizations work with the agencies that have facilities on 
the National Mall to ensure that security enhancements reflect access 
and aesthetic concerns. Specifically, the SHPO and ACHP, as well as 
NCPC and CFA, coordinate with the agencies that have facilities on the 
National Mall. Such coordination is designed to ensure that 
architecture, urban design, urban planning, aesthetics, historic 
preservation, and environmental impacts are considered when 
implementing physical security enhancements. 

For example, federal agencies[Footnote 26] must prepare an 
environmental assessment to determine the effects of proposed security 
enhancements on the human environment as part of the NEPA 
process.[Footnote 27] In addition, because security enhancements may 
affect the historic character of properties on the National Mall, 
federal agencies are required to follow the NHPA's Section 106 review 
process. This process has federal agencies consider the effects of 
their actions on historic property and address "adverse effects" that 
could diminish the integrity of the property. Federal agencies are 
responsible for initiating the review process and for consulting with 
the SHPO on measures to deal with any adverse effects. In addition, 
ACHP is given a reasonable opportunity to comment as part of the NHPA 
process. Federal agencies are also required to solicit public input as 
part of both the NEPA and NHPA review processes. 

Finally, agencies must submit those designs that fall under the NCPC 
and CFA statutory authorities to these review organizations before 
security enhancements can be implemented. NCPC officials told us that 
they examine security projects comprehensively from a broad design and 
urban planning perspective to ensure the project's consistency with the 
commission's comprehensive urban design and planning documents, such as 
the Comprehensive Plan for the National Capital and the Urban Design 
and Security Plan. NCPC must give approval before a security 
enhancement project can be implemented. CFA officials told us they 
focus on visual appearance and on how security enhancements can be 
physically integrated into the urban environment. Although agencies 
must submit security designs to CFA, the commission plays an advisory 
role in reviewing security projects and cannot enforce agencies to 
implement its recommendations. Projects are generally submitted to NCPC 
and CFA after the completion of most, if not all, of the NEPA and NHPA 
processes. These processes must be completed before NCPC approves the 
final design. 

National Mall Agencies and Review Organizations Identified Challenges 
in Designing and Approving Security Enhancements: 

Although aesthetic and public access considerations are seen as 
critical elements in the design and approval of physical security 
enhancements to facilities on the National Mall, agency officials also 
told us that the process applicable to all construction and renovation 
projects in Washington, D.C.--requiring consultation, review, and 
approval with multiple review organizations--adds to project costs and 
can be both time-consuming and inefficient. Of particular concern, 
officials of these agencies noted the seeming overlap in consultations 
and reviews of projects required among the review organizations. For 
example, Park Service officials told us that in submitting a security 
proposal, one review organization might request a particular change to 
the design, and another organization might request an entirely 
different change. Sometimes, consensus on the design of a security 
project had been reached at the staff level within a review 
organization, but the commissioners within that organization then had 
different ideas about the project's design. For example, designs for 
security enhancements for the eastern portion of the Lincoln Memorial 
have gone before the CFA's commissioners several times for their 
review.[Footnote 28] Furthermore, some agency officials noted that the 
commissioners from CFA and NCPC might disagree on a particular security 
design. According to officials from the Park Service, there is 
currently no guidance available to assist agencies in moving forward on 
proposals that receive contradictory direction. These officials 
suggested that in such cases, commissioners, rather than staff, from 
both review organizations should consult with one another to resolve 
their differences and provide guidance to the agency on moving forward. 
While CFA officials acknowledged that there is no formal process for 
resolving disagreements between commissions, they noted several options 
for reconciling such differences. For example, in some cases, agencies 
may be able to circulate revised drawings to the commissions in between 
formal meetings, or the commissions might delegate approval authority 
to the staff level, pending modifications. Finally, the public can 
comment on security proposals affecting the National Mall. As a result 
of competing stakeholder interests, it can take months or even years to 
go through the review process. 

The perimeter security designs for the Washington Monument illustrate 
the effects multiple stakeholders can have on a proposed security 
project's design and schedule. Officials from the Park Service told us 
that a preliminary design for the Washington Monument was selected in 
December 2001. The design consisted primarily of landscape barriers 
that would provide perimeter security and an underground visitor 
screening facility. The Park Service submitted its design to CFA at 
this time, and, according to both parties, CFA approved the vehicular 
barrier portion of the design with only minor changes.[Footnote 29] In 
addition, Park Service officials told us that they submitted the 
security design to NCPC in January 2002 and received final approval for 
the perimeter security portion of the design in June 2003. Park Service 
officials noted the approval process for the Washington Monument design 
was relatively quick. However, the design for the underground screening 
facility did not receive final approval from CFA and received only 
preliminary approval from NCPC before the underground screening 
facility project was canceled. According to CFA officials, the 
screening facility as planned would have drastically changed how 
visitors accessed the Monument, and it was not an effective security 
proposal. CFA officials told us they proposed a number of alternatives 
for this portion of the project, but the Park Service rejected them. 
According to CFA officials, they have not recently discussed this 
project with the Park Service. Park Service officials told us that the 
concept for the underground screening facility was abandoned because of 
significant resistance from a number of stakeholders and because 
Congress never approved funding for the measure. Park Service officials 
told us the temporary screening facility that was in place before the 
Washington Monument was under construction will be put back until a 
permanent screening facility is designed. 

Review organizations also identified challenges in the review process 
for implementing security enhancements on the National Mall. Review 
organizations said they have concerns about their budgets and staff 
resources. Officials from these organizations told us that the number 
of security projects submitted for their review has greatly increased 
since the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, officials noted that 
they have not received additional funding or staff to respond to the 
increase in proposals. In addition, officials from CFA and NCPC noted 
that some agencies do not always justify the need for a particular 
security enhancement or identify the threat that the agency is trying 
to protect against. Officials from CFA noted that this type of 
information is helpful in developing a design that meets the needs of 
both the agency and the review organization. Furthermore, officials 
from CFA also noted that when applicants come to them after a project 
already has been designed, the applicant is often reluctant to make any 
changes or consider alternative approaches because of the time and 
money already invested. Finally, both federal agencies and the review 
organizations noted that the limited number of security designs 
available to secure facilities in an urban environment presents a 
challenge in implementing security enhancements. Park Service officials 
noted that the technology available for perimeter security consists 
primarily of vehicle barrier systems (e.g., bollards, walls, and 
strengthened street furniture). However, these officials noted that the 
review organizations often do not approve security designs that 
exclusively consist of bollards. 

National Mall Agencies and Review Organizations Identified Steps That 
Can Make the Review Process More Efficient: 

Several agency officials, along with the review organizations, stated 
that early and frequent consultation helps to ensure a smoother, more 
efficient review process. Both the agencies and the review 
organizations noted that informal consultations between all parties 
should continue throughout the design of the security project. Informal 
consultations can begin before "putting pen to paper" and should occur 
during the project's preliminary design phase. According to these 
officials, security proposals, in particular, benefit from these early 
consultations because of their importance and sensitivity. Both the 
review organizations and the federal agencies identified the following 
additional actions that could lead to a more efficient review process: 

* Consult early and frequently with all relevant stakeholders: 
Consulting with all of the review organizations that play a role in the 
design and approval of security enhancements at the same time not only 
facilitates a more efficient review process, but doing so can also 
improve relations between agencies and review organizations over time. 
In addition, consulting with all stakeholders allows for the expression 
of everyone's views and concerns up front. Moreover, consultation with 
the staff and, in some cases with the commissioners of the review 
organizations, allows them to react informally to a proposed design, 
thereby giving agencies the opportunity to incorporate their opinions 
into the proposal. Officials from NCPC told us that their commissioners 
and CFA's commissioners might disagree on a design proposal because 
they are providing a first reaction to a design that was not previously 
discussed during informal consultations. In such cases, agencies may 
have to go back through the review process to meet everyone's needs, 
which can take several additional months or even years, in addition to 
costing the agency financial and staff resources. However, officials 
from the review organizations noted that disagreements between the two 
commissions occur infrequently, perhaps once a year. According to the 
Park Service, disagreements between the two commissions seem to occur 
more often with security projects that include some of our nation's 
memorials. For example, Park Service officials noted that they have 
received different direction from the two commissions on the Washington 
Monument, Lincoln Memorial, and Jefferson Memorial security projects. 

In considering a design for its perimeter security projects, the 
Smithsonian consulted with all of the review organizations before 
developing a concept design. The parties discussed different design 
options, and the Smithsonian was able to incorporate the review 
organizations' comments and suggestions into its proposal. According to 
CFA, the Smithsonian also selected a designer that considered the needs 
of the agency and the balance between security and access and urban 
design. Smithsonian officials believe that the success of their efforts 
hinged on bringing to the table experts from their offices of 
Protection Services; Historic Preservation; and Engineering, Design, 
and Construction who were willing to engage in dialogue and answer 
questions from the review organizations. As a result, the Smithsonian 
received favorable reviews of their preliminary design for security 
enhancements from all of the stakeholders. According to Smithsonian 
officials, the Smithsonian continues to consult with the SHPO, NCPC, 
and CFA during the ongoing development of its final perimeter security 
designs. 

* Be flexible and open to the review process and possible changes: 
Officials from some of the agencies and the review organizations 
discussed the importance of being open and flexible to alternatives 
throughout the design process for security enhancements. In particular, 
some officials stressed the importance of taking time to develop a 
security solution built on the opinions and consensus of all 
stakeholders. According to these officials, this approach will 
ultimately result in stronger working relationships and a design 
solution that takes both security and urban design issues into 
consideration. 

Officials from CFA told us that the Departments of Energy and Education 
developed successful security designs because they consulted early and 
were open to considering alternative proposals. For example, according 
to CFA, Energy's ideas for security designs at one of its Washington, 
D.C., facilities were not appropriate for an urban environment. 
However, through consultations with the review organizations, Energy 
was able to design a better security project that will be less costly 
than the one it originally designed. Similarly, Education developed a 
proposal for renovating its plaza but did not incorporate any security 
enhancements into the design. However, because Education consulted with 
the review organizations before going too far in the design process, it 
was able to incorporate security features into the design. As a result, 
Education avoided later costly revisions to the project. 

* Consult urban planning documents such as NCPC's submission guidelines 
and Urban Design and Security Plan: Agencies submitting project 
proposals to NCPC for review and approval are required to follow NCPC's 
submission guidelines. The guidelines include NCPC's requirements for 
various phases of project proposals as well as NCPC's environmental and 
historic preservation procedures. The submission guidelines also 
outline suggestions for coordinating stages of the review process. For 
example, agencies can initiate the NEPA and NHPA review processes 
simultaneously and plan their public participation, analysis, and 
review so as to meet the purposes and requirements of both statutes in 
a timely and efficient manner. The Security Plan provides a framework 
for planning, designing, and implementing security enhancements and 
focuses exclusively on incorporating perimeter security measures into 
existing streetscape or landscape features. The Security Plan also 
identifies security design solutions that are appropriate to the 
character of areas within the Monumental Core,[Footnote 30] including 
the National Mall and the Washington Monument and Lincoln and Jefferson 
Memorials. 

Several of the agencies on the National Mall told us they actively 
participated in the development of the Security Plan, and they are 
using the plan to help them balance perimeter security issues with 
considerations of aesthetics and access to the National Mall. For 
example, Park Service officials told us they used the plan to develop 
concept designs for the Washington Monument as well as the Lincoln and 
Jefferson Memorials.[Footnote 31] Similarly, the Smithsonian developed 
plans to replace planter pots, industrial-looking vehicle barriers, and 
other temporary security measures with custom-designed elements, 
including benches, light poles, urns, and bollards, that complement the 
historic surroundings of the National Mall (see fig. 6). Smithsonian 
officials noted that the Security Plan provides constructive ideas for 
what NCPC does and does not look for in designs for security 
enhancements. As a result, NCPC has praised the Smithsonian on its 
efforts to balance necessary security enhancements with public access 
and aesthetics. 

Figure 6: Current and Proposed Security Enhancements at the National 
Museum of Natural History: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Furthermore, according to USDA, its proposed security project was 
designed to address both minimum USDA perimeter security requirements 
and the goals of the NCPC plan. Proposed security enhancements for the 
Whitten Building include landscape bollards that sit well within the 
generous "front lawn" of the building, and that are designed to respect 
the significant and historic open character of the National Mall. 

Effects of Enhancements on Access and Appearance Are Generally 
Acceptable to Visitors: 

Visitors value access to and the appearance of the National Mall and 
generally find security enhancements acceptable. A number of agencies 
on the National Mall told us that they have received very few 
complaints about difficulty in accessing sites on the National Mall. 
Officials from the Smithsonian further told us that a survey they 
conducted of visitors to their museums in fiscal year 2002 suggests 
that visitors do not consider the time standing in line to pass 
security checkpoints at museum entrances problematic, provided the wait 
is less than 15 minutes. Moreover, some agencies we interviewed also 
reported very few complaints about the appearance of sites that are 
being or have been modified to accommodate physical security 
enhancements. 

Our survey of about 300 visitors to the National Mall found that these 
visitors did not view the security enhancements on the National Mall, 
which included both temporary and permanent enhancements, as having 
unacceptable effects on access or appearance.[Footnote 32] Seventy- 
eight percent of respondents indicated that security enhancements had 
no effect on public access to sites on the National Mall, or made 
access easier. In addition, 64 percent of those surveyed said the 
security enhancements had no effect or a positive effect on the 
appearance of the National Mall (see fig. 7). 

Figure 7: Visitor Survey Results on Access to and Appearance of the 
National Mall: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The majority of survey respondents also said the security enhancements 
they encountered would have no effect on whether they will return for a 
visit. However, results differed between residents of the Washington, 
D.C., metropolitan area and those who reside in other areas. 
Washington, D.C., metropolitan-area residents were almost twice as 
likely as U.S. residents from outside the Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan area to report that security measures have had a negative 
effect on access to and appearance of sites on the National Mall. 
Furthermore, although visitors reported that current levels of public 
access and appearance are satisfactory, the survey results also suggest 
that visitors regard access and aesthetics as important priorities when 
adding security measures to the National Mall. The majority of 
respondents (85 percent) said both access and aesthetics should be 
considered a medium to high priority when implementing additional 
security enhancements. Overall, these results suggest that in terms of 
public access and aesthetics, visitors to the National Mall find the 
existing temporary and permanent security enhancements acceptable. 

Federal Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices, but Balancing Mission 
Priorities with the Need for Physical Security Enhancements Poses 
Common Challenge: 

Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices to Implement Physical Security 
Enhancements: 

In our November 2004 report,[Footnote 33] we identified six key 
practices that have emerged from the increased attention to facilities 
protection given by federal agencies in recent years. We noted that, 
collectively, these key practices could provide a framework for guiding 
federal agencies' ongoing facility protection efforts. These practices 
are allocating resources using risk management; leveraging security 
technology; sharing information and coordinating protection efforts 
with other stakeholders; measuring program performance and testing 
security initiatives; implementing strategic human capital management 
to ensure that agencies are well-equipped to recruit and retain high- 
performing security professionals; and aligning assets to mission, 
thereby reducing vulnerabilities. 

Throughout our review, agencies with facilities on the National Mall 
reported using all but one of these key practices when implementing 
security enhancements. For example, the Smithsonian told us it 
leverages technology by using closed-circuit television cameras to 
extend the capabilities of its security staff. Closed-circuit 
television cameras enable security staff to quickly identify and 
respond to a security incident for investigative purposes. In addition, 
the Smithsonian told us it conducts periodic risk assessments of all 
its properties to determine how to allocate resources to mitigate the 
greatest risks first. The Park Service told us that it is including 
performance measures in its draft strategic plan, and that it conducts 
regular security inspections of national icons. The Park Service also 
told us that it is providing new training programs for security 
personnel, including in-service training for officers of the Park 
Police. To attract a more qualified pool of applicants for security 
positions, the National Gallery reported strengthening its recruitment 
process and reported a new emphasis on antiterrorism training for its 
security personnel. The National Gallery also told us it has 
implemented, or plans to implement, a number of advanced security 
technologies to provide a more comprehensive security assessment of its 
facilities. Finally, federal agencies also reported meeting 
periodically to discuss upcoming events, intelligence information, and 
criminal activities. However, none of the federal agencies reported 
using one key practice--aligning assets to mission--to implement 
physical security enhancements because they do not believe that they 
have excess or underutilized facilities on the National Mall or 
elsewhere or consider the practice applicable to properties under their 
jurisdiction.[Footnote 34]

Allocating Resources Using Risk Management: 

Allocating resources using risk management entails the systematic and 
analytical process of considering the likelihood that a threat will 
endanger an asset--that is, a structure, individual, or function--and 
identifying actions that can reduce the risk and mitigate the 
consequences. As part of its Disaster Management Program, the 
Smithsonian performs risk assessments of all its properties every 3 to 
5 years to determine the need for security enhancements. Smithsonian 
officials told us that their last risk assessment was performed in 
fiscal year 2002, but another multihazard risk assessment--addressing 
both man-made and natural disasters--was occurring during our review. 
According to Smithsonian officials, the current effort will update the 
last risk assessment and provide a ranked listing of risks, with 
proposed mitigation actions and costs, across the entire portfolio of 
the Smithsonian's facilities. In accordance with the intent of this key 
practice, Smithsonian officials said the updated risk assessment will 
allow the institution to use resources more efficiently to mitigate the 
greatest risks first. 

Park Service officials also told us that risk management is a key 
practice used to determine the need for physical security enhancements 
to their facilities on the National Mall. They noted that risk 
assessments were completed in the late 1990s by three outside entities, 
and internal reviews were performed by Park Police and Park Service 
officials. After September 11, the Park Service worked with a private 
security firm to assess the risk of terrorist attacks at monuments on 
the National Mall. This assessment examined potential threats-- 
including the distance from which explosives could potentially destroy 
any of the National Mall's structures--and alternative methods of both 
prevention and protection. Additionally, the Park Service identified 
specific protection criteria and designated key areas with the highest 
vulnerability as priorities, including areas of the National Mall. The 
Park Service told us it has used the security firm's report findings to 
determine where to allocate appropriated funds and implement security 
upgrades for high-risk structures. Park Service officials also told us 
that they rely on risk assessments as well as intelligence assessments, 
reviews of latest terror trends, visitor needs, and reviews of criminal 
and service incidents to allocate resources to respond to identified 
risks. 

Since June 2004, Interior has applied its National Monuments and Icons 
Assessment Methodology (NM&I Methodology) to assets that fall under the 
purview of the Park Service. The NM&I Methodology provides a uniform 
risk assessment and ranking methodology and was developed in response 
to the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7's requirement that 
Interior formulate a plan for identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and 
developing protective programs for critical assets within the national 
icons and monuments sector. According to information from Interior, the 
NM&I Methodology is specifically designed to quantify risk, identify 
needed security enhancements, and measure risk-reduction benefits at 
icon and monument assets.[Footnote 35]

National Gallery officials told us that it assesses potential risks to 
the physical security of its facilities through the use of technical 
consultants with specialized experience in security areas, such as 
blast analysis. The National Gallery uses the results of such studies 
to form a basis for developing specific projects or operational 
policies to mitigate the identified risks. For example, National 
Gallery officials told us that targeted risk assessments, such as the 
blast analysis on the exterior wall of the East Building, identified 
the need for window security film and various types of physical 
barriers. 

Leveraging Security Technology: 

By efficiently using technology to supplement and reinforce other 
security measures, agencies can more effectively apply the appropriate 
countermeasures to vulnerabilities identified through the risk 
management process. Our previous work reported that prior to a 
significant investment in a project, a detailed analysis should be 
conducted to determine whether the benefits of a technology outweigh 
its costs. In addition, we reported that agencies should decide how a 
technology will be used and whether to use a technology at all to 
address vulnerabilities before implementation. The implementation costs 
of technologies in facilities protection can be high, particularly if 
infrastructure modifications are necessary. Therefore, in some cases, a 
lesser technological solution may be more effective and less costly 
than more advanced technologies. 

Several of the agency officials we spoke with identified steps they 
have taken to make efficient use of technology to supplement and 
reinforce other security enhancements. For example, the Smithsonian 
uses closed-circuit television cameras in several of its museums on the 
National Mall. These cameras are low-cost security technologies that 
extend the capabilities of the Smithsonian's security staff by 
providing an immediate assessment of information for investigative 
purposes. The Smithsonian also identified the need for electronic 
screening facilities at some of its facilities on the National Mall. 
However, because the museums would need to undergo costly renovations 
to make enough space for the screening equipment, these museums are 
using magnetometer screening and bag searches until other, higher 
priority security enhancements have been implemented. 

The National Gallery has also implemented, and plans to implement, a 
number of security technologies at its facilities on the National Mall. 
Currently, the National Gallery uses magnetometers, X-ray machines, and 
closed-circuit television cameras to improve its perimeter protection. 
The National Gallery plans to undertake a risk analysis of its security 
camera configuration to determine whether the number of cameras 
currently in use provides the most comprehensive surveillance system 
possible. In addition, the National Gallery plans to improve its access 
control through new employee identification badges that can be rapidly 
authenticated and tracked electronically through an Integrated Security 
Management System. According to the National Gallery, comprehensively 
integrating a number of new technologies provides more complete 
security for its facilities and improves its operating efficiencies. 

Finally, Park Service officials stated that closed-circuit television 
cameras are in extensive use at the national icons on the National Mall 
and are a critical component to the security of the area. Park Service 
officials also noted that they are constantly reviewing developing 
security technologies to determine the most cost-effective methods for 
upgrades. 

Information-Sharing and Coordination: 

All agencies said they obtain and share information on potential 
threats to facilities to better understand risks and more effectively 
determine preventive measures. Among the agencies with facilities on 
the National Mall, meetings are held quarterly to discuss upcoming 
events, intelligence information, and criminal activities. Numerous 
other forums of information-sharing and coordination also occur: 

* Park Service officials told us that Park Police officers are assigned 
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Joint Task Force and 
participate in meetings with the U.S. Attorneys, the D.C. Metropolitan 
Police Department, and their own intelligence unit. In addition, we 
were told that the Park Service relies on information gathered from 
officers and rangers assigned to the National Mall area, who relay such 
information to other entities as appropriate; and that coordination 
routinely occurs between the Park Police and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). 

* Smithsonian officials said that they meet with the Park Police twice 
per month to discuss security issues, and again monthly to receive 
crime and terrorism intelligence from the Park Police, and on a daily 
basis to coordinate police activities on the National Mall. In 
addition, Smithsonian security officials meet and coordinate with the 
FBI and receive daily general information on terrorist and other 
disaster-related activity from DHS. 

* According to officials of the National Gallery, they attend meetings 
and briefings with the FBI, the Mayor's Special Events Task Group, and 
the U.S. Park Police. Further, National Gallery officials said they 
coordinate regularly with these entities, as well as the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), D.C. Metropolitan Police 
Department, DHS, U.S. Attorneys Office, U.S. Secret Service, 
Smithsonian, Library of Congress, National Archives, Federal Trade 
Commission, Federal Protective Service, and the John F. Kennedy Center 
for the Performing Arts. 

* USDA officials noted they share information and coordinate with the 
Smithsonian, their immediate neighbor on the National Mall. USDA 
officials also told us they coordinate with the Federal Protective 
Service and the Park Police for general physical security and law 
enforcement activities. In addition, USDA officials noted they 
coordinate matters pertaining to national security, threats and 
emergency response directly with DHS, FEMA, the FBI, and the U.S. 
Secret Service, as applicable. Dignitary protection and the security of 
high-risk personnel are coordinated with the U.S. Secret Service and 
the Department of State. Finally, USDA officials told us they 
participate on the Southeast Area Security Chiefs Council and other 
forums to exchange and develop information pertaining to security and 
law enforcement. 

As previously noted, another source of coordination on physical 
security enhancements occurred through the NCPC Interagency Security 
Task Force. Made up of representatives of 75 stakeholder agencies, the 
task force's efforts resulted in two reports that have guided agencies 
throughout the city in devising and implementing physical security 
enhancements. Both the Smithsonian and USDA's perimeter security 
projects relied heavily on the task force's National Capital Urban 
Design and Security Plan. 

Performance Measurement and Testing: 

This key practice encompasses two components to ensure the 
effectiveness of physical security enhancements implemented by 
agencies: linking security goals to broader agency mission goals, and 
inspecting and assessing physical security enhancements. Park Service 
officials indicated that they use both parts of this key practice 
because they (1) include performance measures in the U.S. Park Police's 
draft strategic plan and (2) conduct regular and frequent inspections 
of the national icons by the Park Police and routinely update and 
discuss security issues with Park Police officials. Smithsonian 
officials also told us they use both parts of this key practice in 
performing risk assessments of their facilities; implementing risk 
assessment recommendations for facility upgrades, adding staff, adding 
equipment, and using operational procedures as performance metrics; and 
including physical security measures in the Smithsonian's broader 
performance measurements. USDA also said it uses both parts of this key 
practice by linking security goals to the broader agency goal of 
providing a safe and functional workplace to support staff in carrying 
out their public service missions and through an established program to 
inspect and periodically reassess the physical security stature of all 
USDA properties, including the properties near the National Mall, and 
to effect corrective actions as appropriate. 

Strategic Human Capital Management: 

Strategic management of human capital involves implementing strategies 
to help individuals maximize their full potential, having the 
capability to recruit and retain high-performing security and law 
enforcement professionals, and ensuring that personnel are well 
exercised and exhibit good judgment in following security procedures. 
We found that most of the agencies on the National Mall are 
implementing this key practice primarily by offering new training 
programs for security personnel. Specifically, Park Service officials 
told us that they have sponsored training for employees of all affected 
parks as well as in-service training for officers of the Park Police. 
Similarly, the Smithsonian has instituted training courses on terrorism 
awareness, emergency procedure, and shelter-in-place procedures, among 
others, for its security staff. The National Gallery has also focused 
its efforts on training, with particular emphasis on antiterrorism 
training, such as shelter-in-place and evacuation drills. In addition, 
to attract a more qualified pool of applicants for security positions, 
the National Gallery reported strengthening its recruitment process. 
USDA constructed an emergency operations center, which is staffed 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week, to monitor and respond to emergencies. 

Aligning Assets to Mission: 

Aligning assets to mission involves the reduction of underutilized or 
excess property at federal agencies in order to better reflect 
agencies' missions and reduce vulnerabilities by decreasing the number 
of assets that need to be protected. Our previous work reported that to 
the extent that agencies are expending resources to maintain and 
protect facilities that are not needed, funds available to protect 
critical assets may be lessened. In addition, we noted that funds no 
longer spent securing and maintaining excess property could be put to 
other uses, such as enhancing protection at critical assets that are 
tied to agencies' missions. For example, we reported in January 2003 
that the Department of Defense estimates it is spending $3 billion to 
$4 billion each year maintaining facilities that are not needed. In 
another example, costs associated with excess Energy facilities, 
primarily for security and maintenance, were estimated by Energy's 
Office of the Inspector General in April 2002 to exceed $70 million 
annually.[Footnote 36] One building that illustrates this problem is 
the former Chicago main post office. In October 2003, we testified that 
this building, a massive 2.5 million square foot structure located near 
the Sears Tower, is vacant and costing USPS $2 million annually in 
holding costs.[Footnote 37] It is likely that agencies that continue to 
hold excess or underutilized property are also incurring significant 
holdings costs for services, including security and maintenance. 
Finally, we recently recommended that the Chair of the Interagency 
Security Committee consider our work as a starting point for 
establishing a framework of key practices that could guide agencies' 
efforts in the facility protection area.[Footnote 38]

None of the federal agencies reported using this key practice to 
implement physical security enhancements on the National Mall because 
they do not believe that they have excess or underutilized facilities 
or consider this practice applicable to property under their 
jurisdiction. For example, Smithsonian officials told us that they do 
not have any excess property on the National Mall or elsewhere. 
Officials stated that all of the Smithsonian's facilities, including 
its gardens, are needed for research, education, and exhibition 
purposes to execute its mission of increasing and diffusing knowledge. 
The Smithsonian believes that any closures of its facilities would 
therefore be inconsistent with its mission. Similarly, according to the 
Park Service, land reserved or dedicated for national park purposes, 
including land under its jurisdiction, by law is not considered excess 
or underutilized property.[Footnote 39]

Balancing Mission Priorities with the Need for Physical Security 
Enhancements Poses Common Challenge: 

Although we found that agencies on the National Mall are using most of 
the key practices we identified for the protection of facilities, 
officials from most of these agencies identified a common challenge in 
using these practices and, in fact, in implementing all types of 
physical security enhancements. That common challenge is balancing 
their ongoing mission priorities with the emergent need to implement 
physical security enhancements. Some officials described the challenge 
as inadequate funding for security enhancements, or as competition for 
limited resources between any new requirements for security 
enhancements and more traditional functions and operations. Officials 
described the challenge as a more subtle need to ensure that physical 
security enhancements are not inconsistent with the agencies' mission. 
For example, one official told us that planning for security 
enhancements necessitates the involvement of key facilities personnel 
to ensure that part of the agency's mission--public access--is 
maintained. Another official we spoke with noted that careful planning 
and coordination for implementing physical security enhancements is 
essential to avoid compromising both programs and public access. 
Similarly, some officials suggested that the multiple levels of 
consultation and review required for projects that involve construction 
or renovation on federal property could be an obstacle to the use of 
key practices. Finally, officials from one agency noted that a lack of 
reliable, quantitative risk assessment data and little consistency in 
interpreting information and intelligence obtained from various sources 
create a challenge in using key practices to implement security 
measures. 

Concluding Observations: 

The security of our nation's critical infrastructure remains a 
heightened concern in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks. On the National Mall, federal agencies are in the early stages 
of designing and implementing permanent perimeter security barriers to 
protect their facilities and the visiting public. In doing so, agencies 
have coordinated with a number of review organizations that consider 
the impact of proposed security designs on the urban environment and 
the symbolic nature of the National Mall, its icons, and its museums. 
Multiple stakeholder viewpoints on the design of security enhancements 
present a challenge for an efficient review process. In some cases, 
agencies involved stakeholders after investing time and resources in a 
particular security design. As a result, these agencies sometimes had 
to go through multiple iterations of the review process, which can 
strain the already limited financial and staff resources of all 
stakeholders. 

As agencies continue developing security proposals for their facilities 
on the National Mall, several steps, such as early and frequent 
consultation with all stakeholders, can result in a more efficient 
review process. Specifically, consultation in the preliminary design 
phase allows for the consideration of multiple viewpoints and 
alternative design solutions, thereby mitigating the potential for 
later costly and time-consuming revisions. Such early consultation 
could also expedite the implementation of security enhancements to 
protect facilities and visitors on the National Mall. 

Key practices, such as allocating resources using risk management, 
coordinating protection efforts with other stakeholders, and aligning 
assets to mission, have clear implications for the facility protection 
area. As we have recently recommended, it is important that agencies 
give attention to these practices and consider them collectively as a 
framework for guiding their ongoing efforts in implementing security 
measures on the National Mall and in their overall facility protection 
areas. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided draft copies of this report to the Smithsonian, Interior, 
USDA, and National Gallery for their review and comment. USDA officials 
generally agreed with the report's findings and concluding observations 
and provided clarifying comments. Officials from the other agencies 
also provided clarifying and technical comments, which we incorporated 
into this report where appropriate. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to other interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of 
Agriculture, the Interior, and Smithsonian; and the Director of the 
National Gallery. We will also make copies available to others upon 
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me on 
(202) 512-2834 or at [Hyperlink, goldsteinm@gao.gov] or Susan Fleming, 
Assistant Director, on (202) 512-4431 or at [Hyperlink, 
flemings@gao.gov]. 

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

Mark L. Goldstein: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to assess (1) physical security enhancements that 
have been implemented on the National Mall since September 11, 2001, 
the additional enhancements planned, and the costs of these 
enhancements; (2) the considerations given to incorporating access and 
aesthetics in designing and approving physical security enhancements on 
the National Mall, and how issues of access and aesthetics are 
perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements; and (3) 
examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to implement 
physical security enhancements on the National Mall, and any challenges 
the agencies are experiencing in using these key practices. 

For all of these objectives, we researched historical plans for the 
design, expansion, and maintenance of the National Mall; appropriations 
acts and accompanying legislative material; statutory and regulatory 
provisions related to security enhancements of the National Mall 
grounds; and proposals for implementing physical security enhancements 
on the National Mall. We also interviewed officials of the National 
Park Service (Park Service), U.S. Park Police, Smithsonian Institution 
(Smithsonian), National Gallery of Art (National Gallery), Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), U.S. Botanic Garden (USBG), U.S. Capitol Police, 
National Capital Planning Commission, U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, 
Advisory Council for Historic Preservation, District of Columbia's 
Historic Preservation Office, Department of Homeland Security, and 
National Coalition to Save Our Mall. 

While multiple geographic definitions of the National Mall exist, we 
defined the area of the National Mall, for purposes of our report, as 
extending from the foot of the U.S. Capitol grounds west to the 
Washington Monument and proceeding farther west and southeast to 
include the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. It also includes the area 
between Constitution and Independence Avenues between 1ST and 14TH 
Streets. We did not include the White House or the U.S. Capitol 
Building because security enhancements for these buildings fall under 
the jurisdiction of the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Capitol 
Police, respectively. 

In addition, for our first objective, we reviewed federal 
appropriations law and accompanying legislative materials, budget 
reports, and federal agencies' and entities' budget submissions related 
to physical security enhancements on the National Mall; we also 
received information about obligations and costs associated with 
physical security enhancements on the National Mall since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11. Agencies on the National Mall provided us with 
obligation data only for their facilities located on the National Mall, 
where possible. In some cases, obligations incurred for facilities on 
the National Mall could not be separated from obligations incurred for 
an agency's facilities located adjacent to the National Mall. To assess 
the reliability of the obligation and cost data received by these 
agencies, we developed a template for agencies on the National Mall to 
obtain consistency in the data provided by each of the agencies; 
interviewed knowledgeable agency officials to clarify any questions; 
provided the agencies with a spreadsheet we developed that organized 
obligations for security enhancements by fiscal year to make sure that 
we accurately used the data provided and asked agencies to identify the 
source of the obligations incurred; and further clarified any 
discrepancies in these data. From this assessment, we determined that 
these data are sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report. 

For our second objective, we also reviewed the law, planning and review 
criteria, reports, and documentation related to specific proposals for 
physical security enhancements on the National Mall. In addition, we 
conducted a 3-minute intercept survey of visitors to the National Mall 
to determine (1) the extent to which visitors to the National Mall feel 
that security measures on the National Mall affect access to sites on 
the National Mall and the appearance of the National Mall; (2) the 
extent to which visitors to the National Mall feel that additional 
security measures are needed; (3) the priority that National Mall 
visitors would assign access to the National Mall and the appearance of 
the National Mall, in the event that additional security measures are 
added; and (4) whether security measures affect the likelihood that 
National Mall visitors will return. 

To develop the questions for the 3-minute survey, we identified the key 
information necessary to gain a general understanding of (1) how 
visitors to the National Mall assess the effects of security measures 
on access to and the appearance of the National Mall and (2) the 
priority that visitors assign to the National Mall's accessibility and 
appearance. After initially developing, reviewing, and modifying the 
survey questions, we conducted a total of nine pretests--four cognitive 
pretests with GAO employees who were not associated with this review 
and five with visitors to the National Mall. 

We provided GAO employee pretest participants (internal participants) 
with an overview of the engagement and the intercept survey methodology 
to be utilized. Subsequently, we showed internal participants the map 
of the National Mall and then asked them to respond to the survey 
questions. Upon completion of the survey, we asked for specific 
comments on each question and encouraged participants to share their 
thoughts and ideas regarding the structure of the survey and the extent 
to which the questions seemed clear and easy to answer. 

The five external pretests were conducted by GAO team members on the 
National Mall, near the Smithsonian Metro Station. Following the 
intercept survey protocol, our interviewers approached respondents 
asking if they would like to answer a short survey on physical security 
measures on the National Mall area. Five out of 15 potential 
respondents approached participated in the survey. Nonrespondents 
consisted of those unwilling to participate, those who had not yet seen 
anything on the National Mall because they had just arrived, and those 
unable to speak the English language. Respondents were first shown the 
map of the National Mall and then were asked to respond to the survey 
questions. Interviewers noted questions, comments, and any lack of 
clarity to the questions on the part of external pretest respondents. 
The final changes to the survey were made on the basis of the combined 
observations from the pretests with GAO employees and pretests with 
visitors to the National Mall. 

The population for the survey was National Mall visitors. We chose 
survey sites to cover the geographic range of the National Mall and 
conducted interviews between 1:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on Monday, October 
18; Monday, October 25; Tuesday, October 26; Friday, November 5; and 
Sunday, November 7, 2004. We chose to interview National Mall visitors 
during these hours for two reasons: (1) to make it more likely that 
visitors stopped for the survey had been on the National Mall long 
enough to visit one or more sites on the National Mall and (2) to 
reduce the chances of surveying government employees on the National 
Mall during their lunch break. 

We identified 300 as the target size for our sample, on the basis of 
balancing the advantages and costs associated with a larger sample 
size, considering that a sample of this size allows for some analysis 
of subgroups but is small enough to limit survey costs. We stratified 
the sample by choosing survey sites to cover the geographic range of 
the National Mall. To avoid any bias by gender, ethnicity, or other 
individual differences, we systematically approached the fifth person 
who passed by a particular landmark (e.g., a park bench, tree, or light 
pole); first, from the time interviewing commenced and, thereafter, 
immediately following the completion of an interview. 

In counting potential respondents, we excluded several types of 
individuals as out of scope. Specifically, we excluded persons who did 
not speak English, who appeared to be younger than 18 years old, who 
were exercising on the National Mall, who were talking on a cell phone, 
who were leading a group of people on the National Mall, or who had 
just arrived on the National Mall and had not yet visited any sites. Of 
667 National Mall visitors approached and asked to complete the survey, 
537 were found to be in scope. Of these 537 visitors, 229 declined to 
complete the survey, yielding a 57 percent response rate. 

Although we took measures to avoid sample bias, our survey sample is a 
nonprobability sample. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be 
used to make inferences about a population because in a nonprobability 
sample, some elements of the population being studied have no chance or 
an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample. 

GAO employees conducted the interviews. A GAO employee showed 
respondents a map of the National Mall, asked the survey questions, and 
marked responses on the survey. The survey first asked respondents to 
specify which sites and what types of security measures they had seen 
in their visit to the National Mall. To help with site identification, 
the map that the respondents received clearly labeled the museums and 
monuments. The survey then posed a series of questions about the 
effects of the security measures on access to National Mall sites and 
the appearance of the National Mall, the extent to which additional 
security is needed on the National Mall, and the priority respondents 
would assign to the accessibility and appearance of National Mall 
sites, in the event that further security measures are added. The 
survey concluded by asking whether the security measures affect 
respondents' likelihood of returning to visit the National Mall. 

For our third objective, we also reviewed and analyzed GAO and other 
governmental reports on the protection of federal facilities and 
homeland security. We also developed a structured interview guide with 
questions about the key practices for implementing security 
enhancements and sent the guide to the Smithsonian, Park Service, USDA, 
and National Gallery. We then incorporated their responses into the 
report without independent verification. 

We conducted our review from August 2004 through May 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Federal agency 
officials provided much of the data and other information used in this 
report. Overall, we found no discrepancies with these data and, 
therefore, determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purpose of this report. We requested official comments on this report 
from the Smithsonian, the Department of the Interior, USDA, and the 
National Gallery. 

[End of section]

Appendix II: Results of National Mall Visitor Survey: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

[End of section]

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Mark L. Goldstein, (202) 512-2834; 
Susan A. Fleming, (202) 512-4431: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to those named above, Dennis J. Amari, Virginia Chanley, 
Sandra J. DePaulis, Robert V. Dolson, Colin Fallon, Denise M. Fantone, 
H. Brandon Haller, Anne Izod, Jason Kelly, Nancy J. Lueke, David 
Sausville, and Susan Michal-Smith made key contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section]

Bibliography: 

[End of section]

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation: 

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. Protecting Historic 
Properties: A Citizen's Guide to Section 106 Review. Washington, D.C.: 
2002. 

Department of the Interior: 

Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Homeland 
Security: Protection of Critical Infrastructure Systems - Assessment 2: 
Critical Infrastructure Systems (2002-I-0053). Washington, D.C.: 
September 2002. 

Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Homeland 
Security: Protection of Critical Infrastructure Facilities and National 
Icons--Assessment 1: Supplemental Funding - Plans and Progress (2002-I- 
0039). Washington, D.C.: June 2002. 

Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Progress 
Report: Secretary's Directives for Implementing Law Enforcement Reform 
in Department of the Interior (2003-I-0062). Washington, D.C.: August 
28, 2003. 

Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Review of 
National Icon Park Security (2003-I-0063). Washington, D.C.: August 
2003. 

National Capital Planning Commission: 

National Capital Planning Commission. Comprehensive Plan for the 
National Capital: Federal Elements. Washington, D.C.: August 2004. 

Interagency Task Force of the National Capital Planning Commission. 
Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital. Washington, D.C.: 
October 2001. 

National Capital Planning Commission. National Capital Urban Design and 
Security Plan. Washington, D.C.: July 2002. 

National Capital Planning Commission. Memorials and Museums Master 
Plan. Washington, D.C.: September 2001. 

National Coalition to Save Our Mall: 

National Coalition to Save Our Mall. First Annual State of the Mall 
Report: The Current Condition of the National Mall. Rockville, MD: 
October 2002. 

(543107): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] For the purposes of this report, we are using the term "agency" to 
refer to all five federal entities noted. 

[2] For the purposes of this report, the National Mall has been 
designated as the area extending from the foot of the U.S. Capitol 
grounds west to the Washington Monument, proceeding west to the Lincoln 
Memorial, and continuing southeast to the Jefferson Memorial. It also 
includes the area between Constitution and Independence Avenues between 
1ST and 14TH Streets. 

[3] P.L. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002). 

[4] GAO, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate 
Federal Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key 
Practices, GAO-05-49 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2004). 

[5] We did not include the White House or U.S. Capitol Building because 
security enhancements for these buildings fall under the jurisdiction 
of the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Capitol Police, respectively. 

[6] The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial, Korean War Veterans 
Memorial, Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and World War II Memorial are also 
located on the National Mall. 

[7] The Smithsonian Institution was created in accordance with the 
terms of a bequest made by James Smithson of England to form "an 
establishment for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men." 
In total, the Smithsonian consists of 18 museums and galleries, the 
National Zoological Park, and 10 science centers. 

[8] The headquarters complex of the Department of Agriculture also 
includes the South and Yates Buildings and the Cotton Annex; however, 
these buildings are not located directly on the National Mall. 

[9] The State Historic Preservation Officer is appointed by the Mayor 
of Washington, D.C. 

[10] Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, July 2002. 

[11] Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for the 
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, 
February 2003. The National Strategy directs Interior to take the lead 
on the following initiatives to protect national icons and monuments: 
define critical criteria for national monuments, icons, and symbols; 
conduct threat and vulnerability assessments; retain a quality security 
force; conduct security-focused public outreach and awareness programs; 
collaborate with state and local governments and private foundations to 
ensure the protection of symbols and icons outside the federal domain; 
evaluate innovative technologies; and make provisions for extra 
security during high-profile events. 

[12] Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 7, Critical 
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, December 
17, 2003. 

[13] NCPC, Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital, October 
2001. The Interagency Task Force included representatives from the 
Departments of the Interior, State, the Treasury, Defense, and Justice; 
the General Services Administration, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Secret Service, National Park 
Service, Federal Highway Administration, Architect of the Capitol, and 
U.S. Capitol Police; the House Committee on Government Reform and 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; various D.C. government 
agencies; and other interested parties. 

[14] NCPC, National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan, October 
2002. 

[15] GAO-05-49. 

[16] The Park Service has not obligated funds at any of its other 
memorials on the National Mall, such as the World War II Memorial, for 
vehicle barrier systems. Funds have been obligated for closed-circuit 
television systems at various locations on the National Mall. 

[17] The Park Service initially had plans for an underground visitor 
screening facility. 

[18] The Park Service has not yet completed security designs for the 
east side of the Lincoln Memorial. 

[19] The Smithsonian's planned obligations do not include security 
personnel. 

[20] Due to delays in obtaining the required stone, this project has 
been delayed from its original completion date of October 2005. 

[21] The Smithsonian installed closed-circuit television cameras at the 
National Museum of American History, National Museum of Natural 
History, and National Air and Space Museum. 

[22] USDA's Whitten Building is located on the National Mall, whereas 
the South and Yates Buildings and the Cotton Annex are located adjacent 
to the National Mall. 

[23] The U.S. Capitol Police coordinates with the Architect of the 
Capitol on the design and implementation of security enhancements for 
the Capitol Complex. 

[24] The National Museum of the American Indian was under construction 
during our review and opened to the public in September 2004. 

[25] The "grandfather rocks" serve as reminders of the longevity of 
Native peoples' relationships to the environment and carry the message 
and cultural memory of past generations to future generations. 

[26] For purposes of certain laws, such as NEPA and NHPA, the 
Smithsonian is treated as a federal agency. 

[27] 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 

[28] According to Park Service officials, they are continuing to work 
with both NCPC and CFA to develop a solution for the eastern portion of 
the Lincoln Memorial. 

[29] In a letter dated March 5, 2002, CFA stated "the Commission…have 
concluded with their unanimous approval, that Mr. Olin's preliminary 
scheme, as presented, is an appropriate design solution to improve the 
Monument's physical perimeter security."

[30] The Monumental Core includes the Capitol Grounds, the Mall and 
Mall Complex, the Southwest Federal Center, the Federal Triangle, the 
White House and President's Park, the Northwest Rectangle, Arlington 
Cemetery, the Pentagon, Fort Meyer, and Henderson Hall. 

[31] According to Park Service officials, following the Security Plan 
can sometimes lead to delay in the approval process for security 
projects. Park Service officials stated that their submission for a 
security project for the Lincoln Memorial, which followed the Security 
Plan recommendation, was rejected by NCPC in favor of an alternative 
plan that was designed by NCPC staff. 

[32] A total of 308 surveys were conducted on 5 days in late October 
and early November 2004 at various locations on the National Mall. 
Although we took measures to avoid sample bias, our survey sample is a 
nonprobability sample. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be 
used to make inferences about a population because in a nonprobability 
sample, some elements of the population being studied have no chance or 
an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample. 

[33] GAO-05-49. 

[34] The key practice of aligning assets to mission encourages agencies 
to release excess or underutilized property, so that they no longer 
incur costs to maintain and secure such property. 

[35] The NM&I Methodology has two phases, a consequence assessment 
phase and a risk assessment phase. During the consequence phase, each 
asset's iconic significance is subjectively determined and specific 
attack scenarios are used to evaluate security at each asset. The risk 
assessment phase is used to determine the effectiveness of existing 
security systems for preventing or mitigating the specified attack 
scenarios. 

[36] Department of Energy, Office of the Inspector General, Disposition 
of the Department's Excess Facilities, DOE/IG-0550 (Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 3, 2002). 

[37] GAO, Federal Real Property: Actions Needed to Address Long- 
standing and Complex Problems, GAO-04-119T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 
2003). 

[38] GAO-05-49. 

[39] The general practice of disposing of "excess or underutilized 
property" does not apply to Park Service property that is reserved or 
dedicated for national park purposes because the Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, specifically excludes 
this. 40 U.S.C. § 102(9)(A)(ii). 

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