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Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, 
House of Representatives: 

May 2005: 

Defense Infrastructure: 

Management Issues Requiring Attention in Utility Privatization: 

GAO-05-433: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-433, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Department of Defense (DOD) installations have about 2,600 electric, 
water, wastewater, and natural gas utility systems valued at about $50 
billion. In 1997, DOD decided that utility privatization was the 
preferred method for improving utility systems and services and the 
Congress approved legislative authority for privatizing utility systems 
at military installations with Public Law No. 105-85. 

Because of the costs and long-term implications of DOD’s utility 
privatization program, GAO reviewed the program to determine (1) the 
program’s status, (2) whether the services’ estimates of long-term 
savings from utility privatization projects are reliable, (3) how DOD 
implements the fair market value requirement for conveyed utility 
systems, and (4) whether other issues impact the effectiveness of DOD’s 
execution of the program. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD’s progress in implementing the utility privatization program has 
been slower than expected, largely because of the complexities of the 
solicitation and contracting processes. In 1997, DOD initially expected 
that the services would privatize or exempt all utility systems by 
January 2000. Yet, after spending about $248 million on program 
implementation, the services had privatized only 94 systems and 
exempted 311 systems of the 1,499 utility systems determined to be 
available for privatization as of December 31, 2004. Although DOD reset 
implementation target dates and established September 2005 as the 
current goal for the services to make decisions to privatize or exempt 
all systems, DOD officials stated that it was unlikely that the 
services would meet the revised goal. 

Utility privatization can provide for quicker system improvements than 
otherwise might be available; however, there are questions about 
program savings. Although the services’ economic analyses estimate that 
utility systems privatized to date will reduce the government’s costs 
for utility services, GAO questions the estimates because they give an 
unrealistic sense of savings to a program that increases ongoing 
government utility costs in order to pay contractors for enhanced 
utility services and capital improvements. Other base support services 
could suffer unless budgets are adjusted to reflect these increased 
costs. Moreover, GAO found that long-term cost comparisons did not 
depict actual expected costs of continued government ownership in the 
event that systems were not privatized and DOD had not taken steps to 
ensure that the estimates were otherwise reliable. As a result, GAO 
found in the seven cases it reviewed that the services’ analyses 
included inaccuracies that tended to favor the privatization option 
over continued government ownership. 

Although the services are permitted latitude in ensuring that the 
government receives fair market value for systems conveyed to 
privatization contractors, in some cases implementation has resulted in 
higher contract costs for utility services. Contractors normally 
include the full amounts they paid for conveyances in the associated 
utility services contracts and, therefore, the government will pay back 
the amounts received over time. In some cases, contractors also include 
additional amounts in the contracts to cover costs associated with the 
fair market value payment. Thus, implementing the fair market value 
requirement in such cases results in higher contract costs because the 
government will pay back more than it will receive for conveying the 
systems. 

Two additional issues of concern identified by GAO related to limited 
oversight of privatization contracts and DOD’s preferred practice of 
permanently conveying utility systems to contractors rather than using 
more limited arrangements which, according to DOD consultant reports, 
is a more prevalent private sector practice and one which may offer 
greater safeguards to the government. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD take several actions designed to help ensure 
the reliability of the economic analyses for proposed utility 
privatization projects and improve the guidance and procedures used to 
implement and oversee the utility privatization program. DOD did not 
agree with the recommendations. GAO believes its recommendations 
continue to have merit. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-433. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Barry W. Holman at (202) 
512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov. 

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Utility Privatization Implementation Has Been Slower Than Expected: 

The Services' Savings Estimates from Utility Privatization Are 
Questionable: 

Implementation of the Fair Market Value Requirement Can Result in 
Higher Contract Costs: 

DOD's Execution of the Utility Privatization Program Raises Other 
Concerns: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Results of GAO's Review of the Services' Economic Analyses 
Supporting Seven Utility Privatization Projects: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Status of the Utility Privatization Program as of December 31, 
2004: 

Table 2: Percentage of Systems with Privatization or Exemption 
Decision: 

Table 3: Implementation Costs for the Utility Privatization Program: 

Table 4: Selected Information from Economic Analyses Supporting Utility 
Privatization Projects: 

Table 5: Amounts to Be Received for Utility System Conveyances for 
Projects Reviewed: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

GSA: General Services Administration: 

Letter May 12, 2005: 

The Honorable Joel Hefley: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Readiness: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Department of Defense (DOD) installations have about 2,600 electric, 
water, wastewater, and natural gas utility systems valued at about $50 
billion. These systems consist of the equipment, fixtures, pipes, 
wires, and other structures used in the distribution of electric power 
and natural gas, the treatment and distribution of water, and the 
collection and treatment of wastewater. According to DOD officials, 
many of these systems have become unreliable and in need of major 
improvements due to inadequate funding caused by the competition for 
funds and DOD's risk management and budget allocation decisions. To 
address this issue, DOD decided in 1997 that utility privatization was 
the preferred method for improving utility systems and services because 
privatization would allow installations to benefit from private sector 
financing and efficiencies. With private sector financing, 
installations could immediately obtain major upgrades to their utility 
systems and pay for these improvements over time. Thus, utility 
improvements could be achieved without going through the traditional 
military construction budget justification and funding process. Under 
DOD's program, utility privatization normally involves two transactions 
with the successful contractor--the conveyance of the utility system 
infrastructure and the acquisition of utility services for upgrades, 
operations, and maintenance under a long-term contract of up to 50 
years. DOD estimates that some privatization contracts will cost more 
than a hundred million dollars over the contract time frames. 

To institute the program at DOD's request, the Congress approved 
legislative authority in 1997 for privatizing utility systems at 
military installations.[Footnote 1] The authority requires that the 
military services meet a number of conditions to privatize a system 
including, in part, the following two conditions. First, the services 
must demonstrate through an economic analysis that privatization of a 
system would reduce the government's long-term costs for utility 
services. Second, the services must receive as consideration for 
conveying a system an amount equal to the system's fair market 
value.[Footnote 2] DOD's program guidance permits the services to 
exempt systems from privatization when long-term costs will not be 
reduced or for unique security reasons. 

In view of these requirements and because of the program's costs and 
long-term implications, this report, undertaken pursuant to the 
Comptroller General's legislative authorities, determines (1) the 
program's status, (2) whether the services' estimates of savings from 
utility privatization projects are reliable, (3) how DOD implements the 
fair market value requirement for conveyed utility systems, and (4) 
whether other issues impact the effectiveness of DOD's execution of the 
program. As discussed with your offices, we are addressing the report 
to you because of your expressed interest related to your committee's 
oversight responsibilities. 

To address these questions, we summarized program implementation status 
and costs, compared the status to DOD's goals and milestones, and 
discussed issues affecting program implementation, such as accounting 
for contract termination liabilities. We relied on program status data 
provided by the services, confirmed the status data for seven projects, 
but did not otherwise test the reliability of the data. We examined 
DOD's guidance and methods for performing and reviewing the economic 
analyses used to determine whether privatization will reduce the 
government's long-term costs and for determining the fair market value 
of the systems to be conveyed. We reviewed the economic analyses for 
seven projects regarded by DOD as privatization successes to examine 
the basis for the estimates and the assumptions used, evaluate 
consistency and reliability, and assess the amounts received as 
consideration for the conveyances. Finally, we reviewed DOD and service 
guidance for utility privatization contract administration, discussed 
contract oversight with officials at five installations, and reviewed 
information from DOD officials and consultant reports on how DOD's 
approach to utility privatization compares with private sector 
practices. We conducted our work from July 2004 through March 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A 
more detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in 
appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

Although initial goals were aggressive, DOD's actual progress in 
implementing the utility privatization program has been slower than 
expected. In 1997, DOD initially expected that the services would 
privatize or exempt all utility systems by January 2000. Yet, after 
spending about $248 million on program implementation, the services had 
privatized only 94 systems and exempted 311 systems of the 1,499 
utility systems determined to be available for privatization as of 
December 31, 2004. Although DOD reset implementation target dates and 
established September 2005 as the current goal for the services to make 
decisions to privatize or exempt all systems, DOD officials stated that 
it was unlikely that the services would meet the revised goal. 
According to DOD and service program officials, program implementation 
has been slower than expected primarily because the privatization 
evaluation, solicitation, and contracting processes were more complex 
and time consuming than originally anticipated. Moreover, an issue 
surfaced in October 2004 that further slowed the program by placing 
pending contract awards on hold for several months while the matter was 
evaluated. This issue concerned whether the services were required at 
the time of contract signing to obligate sufficient funds to pay a 
privatization contractor for costs that had not been recovered under a 
contract to date in the event of a future contract termination. 
According to service officials, if required, the amounts needed could 
be large enough to make many proposed utility privatization projects 
financially unfeasible. The DOD Office of General Counsel evaluated the 
issue and concluded in February 2005 that the services were not 
required to obligate sufficient funds to cover contract termination 
liability under the utility privatization program. We agree that 
defense services are not required to record obligations for potential 
termination liabilities under that authority, unless and until they 
decide to terminate. 

Although the services' economic analyses estimate that utility systems 
privatized to date will reduce the government's costs for utility 
services, we found that the estimates give an unrealistic sense of 
savings to a program that generally increases government utility costs 
in order to pay contractors for enhanced utility services and capital 
improvements. DOD's funding obligations will likely increase faster 
than they would under continued government ownership as it pays over 
time for utility system improvements obtained from private sector 
financing. Air Force officials estimated that the Air Force's costs 
alone could increase between $100 million and $200 million annually for 
the first 5 to 10 years of privatization. Various service officials 
expressed concern that unless funding for operation and maintenance 
accounts are adjusted to reflect this increase, other support functions 
on military bases could suffer as funds are shifted to cover "must pay" 
privatized utility costs. Moreover, we found that the services' long-
term savings estimates, required to be developed to support 
privatization decisions, were questionable because the estimates did 
not depict actual expected costs of continued government ownership in 
the event that systems were not privatized and DOD had not taken steps 
to ensure that the estimates were otherwise reliable. First, to 
determine whether a proposed privatization contract would meet the 
statutory requirement for reduced long-term costs, each service 
followed DOD guidance and compared the long-term estimated costs of the 
contract with the estimated long-term "should costs" of continued 
government ownership assuming that the service would upgrade, operate, 
and maintain the system in accordance with accepted industry standards 
as called for in the proposed contract. This estimating method would be 
appropriate if, in the event the system is not privatized, the service 
proceeded to upgrade, operate, and maintain the system as called for in 
the estimate. However, this generally is not the case. According to DOD 
and service officials, if a system is not privatized, then the 
anticipated system improvements would probably be delayed because of 
DOD's budget allocation decisions, which have limited funds for utility 
improvements. Because of the time value of money, a future expense of a 
given amount is equivalent to a smaller amount in today's dollars. As a 
result, delaying system improvements to future years would reduce the 
estimated cost of the government ownership option in today's dollars 
and, therefore, affect the results of the economic analyses. At the 
same time, it must be recognized that delays in system improvements 
could increase government costs due to increased maintenance and 
possible changes in system reliability in the long term. Thus, if 
reduced costs to the government are expected to be a key factor in 
utility privatization decision making, then it would appear more 
appropriate for the services to compare the cost of a proposed 
privatization contract with the cost of continued government ownership 
on the basis of the actual planned expenditures and timing of these 
expenditures, with appropriate consideration to the impact of delayed 
improvements. Second, largely because DOD does not require that the 
services' economic analyses be subjected to an independent review for 
accuracy and compliance with guidance, we found in the seven cases we 
reviewed that the services' analyses included inaccuracies which tended 
to favor the privatization option over continued government ownership. 

Although the services are permitted latitude in ensuring that the 
government receives fair market value for systems conveyed to 
privatization contractors, in some cases implementation has resulted in 
higher contract costs for utility services. Guidance and practices for 
determining fair market value varied among the services, with Army 
guidance stating that fair market value for system conveyances could 
range from zero to full replacement cost of the system. For example, 
the Army privatized one installation's water distribution system, 
consisting of a reservoir, four water towers, and pipelines, and 
according to the economic analysis received no consideration from the 
contractor for the conveyance. Army officials stated that determining 
fair market value was subjective and determined in part by the amounts 
contractors were willing to pay. In some cases, the officials stated 
that the most beneficial business case was to convey systems at less 
than estimated fair market value. Also, although it is a reasonable 
concept that the government should receive consideration if an asset is 
conveyed to a contractor, the receipt of consideration for conveyances 
in the utility privatization program does not typically result in a net 
financial payment to the government. To recover their costs, 
privatization contractors normally include the full amounts they paid 
for conveyances in the associated utility services contracts and, 
therefore, the government will pay back the amounts received for the 
conveyances in the utility services bills over time. Beyond that, in 
some cases, contractors include additional amounts in the utility 
services bills to cover the contractors' costs associated with the fair 
market value payments. Implementing the fair market value requirement 
in such cases will result in increased costs because the government 
will pay back more than it will receive for the conveyances. For 
example, the economic analysis for the electric distribution system 
privatization at Dobbins Air Reserve Base showed that the contractor 
will pay $741,000 as the fair market value for the conveyance. The 
analysis also showed that the contractor will recover this cost, plus 
other associated costs, by charging the Air Force $1,322,000 in the 
utilities services bills over time. Thus, implementing the fair market 
value requirement in this case will result in the Air Force paying 
about $581,000, or 78 percent, more than it will receive for the 
conveyance. 

In examining DOD's execution of the utility privatization program, we 
identified two other areas of concern that could affect program 
effectiveness. First, the adequacy of privatization contract oversight 
was a concern. Although they intend to do so, the services have not 
issued specific contract administration guidance for the program since 
it began over 7 years ago. Officials at one installation we visited 
stated that they were performing limited oversight because they lacked 
sufficient guidance and had not been funded for people to oversee 
contractor performance. Also, in its reviews of four utility 
privatization contracts, the Army Audit Agency reported that contractor 
performance was not adequately monitored and, as a result, there was 
little assurance that the installations would receive quality products 
and services. Second, according to DOD consultant reports, DOD's 
approach to utility privatization differs from typical private sector 
practices in that private sector companies may outsource system 
operations and maintenance but normally retain system ownership. As a 
result, the consultant reports note that DOD's preferred approach of 
permanently conveying utility system ownership to contractors may give 
the contractor an advantage when negotiating service contract changes 
or renewals. This occurs because DOD must deal with the contractor or 
pay significant amounts to construct a new utility distribution system 
to replace the one conveyed to the contractor, attempt to purchase the 
system back from the contractor, or institute legal action to reacquire 
the system through condemnation proceedings. 

We are making recommendations to help ensure the reliability of the 
economic analyses for proposed utility privatization projects and to 
improve the guidance and procedures used to implement and oversee the 
utility privatization program. In commenting on a draft of this report, 
DOD disagreed with our recommendations, characterized our findings as 
being outdated and not well founded, and suggested that our report 
represented an unwarranted characterization of issues we identified as 
being systemic to the program. We believe that our review of the 
utility privatization program was objective, balanced, and represented 
program conditions existing at the time we completed our review in 
March 2005. We disagree with DOD's contention that our findings were 
outdated. Of the seven utility privatization projects we reviewed in 
detail, the associated contracts for four projects were awarded in 
2004, and the contracts for two projects were awarded in 2003. 
Additionally, the issues we identified and recommendations we made are 
current regardless of the case studies. We remain confident that both 
our conclusions and recommendations are soundly based upon the findings 
discussed in this report. We address DOD's comments in detail later in 
the report. Because of DOD's response to the report, we have added a 
matter for congressional consideration. 

Background: 

At DOD's request, the Congress approved legislative authority in 1997 
for privatizing utility systems at military installations.[Footnote 3] 
In defining a utility system, the authority included systems for the 
generation and supply of electric power; the treatment or supply of 
water; the collection or treatment of wastewater; the generation or 
supply of steam, hot water, and chilled water; the supply of natural 
gas; and the transmission of telecommunications. Included in a utility 
system are the associated equipment, fixtures, structures, and other 
improvements as well as real property, easements, and rights-of-way. 
The authority stated that the Secretary of a military department may 
convey a utility system to a municipal, private, regional, district, or 
cooperative utility company or other entity and the conveyance may 
consist of all right, title, and interest of the United States in the 
utility system or such lesser estate as the Secretary considers 
appropriate to serve the interests of the United States. 

Among other things, the current authority also includes two 
requirements for utility privatization. First, the Secretary shall 
submit reports to the congressional defense committees on the 
conveyances made under the authority each quarter. Previously, the 
statute required DOD to submit the report and wait 21 days before 
allowing a conveyance.[Footnote 4] For each such conveyance, the report 
is to include an economic analysis, based on acceptable life-cycle 
costing procedures, demonstrating that (1) the long-term economic 
benefit of the conveyance to the United States exceeds the long-term 
economic cost of the conveyance to the United States, and (2) the 
conveyance will reduce the long-term costs of the United States for 
utility services provided by the utility system concerned. Second, the 
Secretary shall require as consideration for a conveyance an amount 
equal to the fair market value, as determined by the Secretary, of the 
right, title, or interest of the United States conveyed. The 
consideration may take the form of a lump sum payment or a reduction in 
charges for utility services. 

Before and after approval of the specific authority for privatizing 
utilities, the services have used other authorities for utility 
privatization. For example, the Army had privatized some systems after 
obtaining congressional authority on each specific case. Also, the 
services have privatized systems by modifications to natural gas 
services agreements administered by the General Services Administration 
and by conveyances of some systems on the basis of authorities related 
to base realignment and closure and the military housing privatization 
program. 

DOD Made Utility Privatization a DOD Policy: 

In December 1997, DOD issued Defense Reform Initiative Directive Number 
9, which made utility system privatization a DOD policy.[Footnote 5] 
The directive instructed the military departments to develop a plan 
that would result in privatizing all installation electric, natural 
gas, water, and wastewater utility systems by January 1, 2000, unless 
exempted for unique security reasons or if privatization would be 
uneconomical. Under the program, privatization normally involves two 
transactions with the successful contractor--the conveyance of the 
utility system infrastructure and the acquisition of utility services 
for upgrades, operations, and maintenance under a long-term contract of 
up to 50 years. Normally, the conveyances do not include title to the 
land underlying the utility system infrastructures. 

A year later, in December 1998, DOD issued another directive to 
establish program management and oversight responsibilities and provide 
guidance for performing economic analyses for proposed projects, 
exempting systems from the program, and using competitive procedures to 
conduct the program.[Footnote 6] The directive also stated that the 
objective was for DOD to get out of the business of owning, managing, 
and operating utility systems by privatizing them and that exemptions 
from privatization should be rare. The directive reset the 
privatization implementation goal to September 30, 2003. 

Implementation Goals Reset and Program Guidance Revised: 

In October 2002, DOD issued revised program guidance and again reset 
implementation goals.[Footnote 7] The guidance noted DOD's contention 
that many installation utility systems had become unreliable and in 
need of major improvements because the installations historically had 
been unable to upgrade and maintain reliable utility systems due to 
inadequate funding caused by the competition for funds and DOD's budget 
allocation decisions. DOD officials stated that owning, operating, and 
maintaining utility systems was not a core DOD function and the 
guidance stated that privatization was the preferred method for 
improving utility systems and services by allowing military 
installations to benefit from private sector financing and 
efficiencies. The revised implementation goals directed the military 
departments to reach a privatization or exemption decision on at least 
65 percent of the systems available for privatization by September 30, 
2004, and on all systems by September 30, 2005. 

The October 2002 guidance also reemphasized that utility privatization 
was contingent upon meeting two requirements contained in the 
legislative authority for the program--that the services demonstrate 
through an economic analysis that privatization will reduce the long-
term costs to the government for utility services and that the services 
receive fair market value for system conveyances. The guidance included 
details for conducting the economic analyses stating that the services' 
analyses should compare the long-term estimated costs of proposed 
privatization contracts with the estimated long-term costs of continued 
government ownership assuming that the systems would be upgraded, 
operated, and maintained at accepted industry standards, as would be 
required under privatization. 

Utility Privatization Program Management: 

DOD's Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations 
and Environment provides overall policy and management oversight for 
the utility privatization program. However, primary management and 
implementation responsibility for the program is delegated to the 
individual services, their major commands, and individual 
installations. 

Prior GAO Reports on Utility Privatization and Related Subjects: 

Although this is our first detailed report on DOD's utility 
privatization program, we have issued four previous reports that 
commented on the program. These reports primarily focused on DOD's 
progress in implementing DOD's Defense Reform Initiative, which began 
in 1997. The initiative represented an important set of actions aimed 
at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD's business 
operations. One of those actions was the utilities privatization 
program. Concerning the utilities privatization program, we reported in 
April 1999 and August 1999 that the program was complex, time 
consuming, and expensive and that the services would not meet initial 
implementation goals.[Footnote 8] In July 2000, we reported that in 
December 1998, DOD had issued a program budget decision directing the 
services to set aside $243.6 million to complete privatizations between 
fiscal years 1999 and 2004.[Footnote 9] The program budget decision 
estimated that utility system privatization might begin to provide 
about $327 million in annual savings after privatizations were 
completed in 2003. However, we also reported that these early budget 
estimates of the costs and savings were unrealistic and that in 
addition to paying for privatization studies, military service 
officials were also concerned that utility bills would increase without 
a corresponding increase in operations and maintenance funds. In 
December 2002, we again reported that the utility privatization program 
was more complex and time consuming than anticipated and DOD planned to 
reset the program's completion goal.[Footnote 10]

We have also issued three reports on DOD's program management and 
oversight of another privatization program--the military housing 
privatization program.[Footnote 11] As noted elsewhere in this report, 
information from those reports provides a useful contrast in approach 
when compared to the utility privatization program. Finally, we have 
issued other reports that identified examples where the services moved 
operations and maintenance funds intended to support one functional 
area to another functional area and discussed associated 
impacts.[Footnote 12]

Utility Privatization Implementation Has Been Slower Than Expected: 

The utility privatization program provides DOD with a method to improve 
installation utility systems by using private sector financing as an 
alternative to traditional military construction funding. Although 
DOD's initial goals were aggressive in order to use privatization to 
quickly obtain improvements and get the services out of the business of 
owning and operating utility systems, actual program implementation has 
been slower than expected. In 1997, DOD expected that the services 
would privatize or exempt all utility systems by January 2000 and DOD's 
current goal is for the services to make decisions to privatize or 
exempt all systems by September 2005. Yet, the services had awarded or 
exempted only a fraction of the 1,499 systems available for 
privatization as of December 31, 2004. Program implementation slowed 
further in late 2004 and pending contract awards for all services were 
put on hold for several months over an issue related to contract 
termination liability. Implementation costs for the program will total 
about $296 million for fiscal years 1998 through 2005, according to DOD 
and service officials. 

Privatization Offers a Method for Obtaining Utility System Improvements 
Without Full Up-front Appropriations: 

Utility privatization has helped installations achieve major system 
improvements which, according to cognizant DOD and service officials, 
would not have been otherwise possible due to inadequate funding caused 
by the competition for funds and budget allocation decisions. They 
report the systems vary among the military services in the extent to 
which they have been adequately maintained and upgraded over time. With 
private sector financing as an alternative to traditional military 
construction funding, installations have obtained system upgrades and 
improved operations and maintenance and will pay for the improvements 
over time, rather than through full up-front appropriations.[Footnote 
13] According to these officials, the improvements have resulted in 
increased utility system reliability and efficiencies while reducing 
safety and environmental risks. Also, these officials noted that, with 
privatization, installations can focus more on their core defense 
missions rather than tending to problems caused by outdated utility 
systems. These officials further noted that without the privatization 
program these benefits would not have been obtained in the short term 
but would have been delayed, perhaps for many years. 

The Services Have Awarded Contracts for Only a Fraction of the Total 
Systems Available for Privatization: 

After spending about $248 million on program implementation costs, the 
services had awarded contracts for only a fraction of the 1,499 utility 
systems available for privatization as of December 31, 2004. Of the 94 
total contract awards, the services awarded 68 under the legislative 
authorities specifically provided for the program and 26 as part of 
other programs, such as DOD's military housing privatization program. 
As shown in table 1, the services also had exempted 311 systems for 
security or economic reasons and had 979 systems in various stages of 
the privatization contract solicitation process. 

Table 1: Status of the Utility Privatization Program as of December 31, 
2004: 

Component: Army; 
Systems available for privatization: 320; 
Systems pending solicitation or on hold: 67; 
Systems in solicitation: 144; 
Systems exempted: 40; 
Contracts awarded[A]: 69. 

Component: Navy; 
Systems available for privatization: 645; 
Systems pending solicitation or on hold: 23; 
Systems in solicitation: 534; 
Systems exempted: 73; 
Contracts awarded[A]: 15. 

Component: Air Force; 
Systems available for privatization: 505; 
Systems pending solicitation or on hold: 17; 
Systems in solicitation: 280; 
Systems exempted: 198; 
Contracts awarded[A]: 10. 

Component: Defense Logistics Agency; 
Systems available for privatization: 29; 
Systems pending solicitation or on hold: 8; 
Systems in solicitation: 21; 
Systems exempted: 0; 
Contracts awarded[A]: 0. 

Total; 
Systems available for privatization: 1,499; 
Systems pending solicitation or on hold: 115; 
Systems in solicitation: 979; 
Systems exempted: 311; 
Contracts awarded[A]: 94. 

Source: DOD. 

[A] According to service officials, of the 94 contract awards, 68 were 
awarded using 10 U.S.C. 2688 authorities and 26 were awarded using 
other authorities. Of the Army's 69 contract awards, 4 were awarded 
under the General Services Administration's areawide gas service 
agreements and 4 were awarded under authorities related to base 
realignment and closure. Of the Navy's 15 contract awards, 14 were 
awarded as part of the Navy's military housing privatization program or 
other transactions. Of the Air Force's 10 contract awards, 4 were 
awarded under the General Services Administration's areawide gas 
service agreements. 

[End of table]

In comparison to DOD's current implementation goals, only the Air Force 
met the September 30, 2004, goal by making a privatization or exemption 
decision on at least 65 percent of its utility systems available for 
privatization. As shown in table 2, as of September 30, 2004, the Air 
Force had made decisions on 70 percent of its systems while the Army, 
the Navy, and the Defense Logistics Agency had made decisions on 51 
percent, 47 percent, and 55 percent, respectively, of their utility 
systems. DOD officials stated that it was unlikely that the services 
will meet DOD's September 30, 2005, goal of making a privatization or 
exemption decision on every system available for privatization. 

Table 2: Percentage of Systems with Privatization or Exemption 
Decision: 

Component: Army; 
Goal for Sept. 30, 2004 (percent): 65%; 
Actual as of Sept. 30, 2004 (percent): 51%; 
Sept. 30, 2004 goal met? No; 
Goal for Sept. 30, 2005 (percent): 100%; 
Actual as of Dec. 31, 2004 (percent): 52%. 

Component: Navy; 
Goal for Sept. 30, 2004 (percent): 65%; 
Actual as of Sept. 30, 2004 (percent): 47%; 
Sept. 30, 2004 goal met? No; 
Goal for Sept. 30, 2005 (percent): 100%; 
Actual as of Dec. 31, 2004 (percent): 49%. 

Component: Air Force; 
Goal for Sept. 30, 2004 (percent): 65; 
Actual as of Sept. 30, 2004 (percent): 70; 
Sept. 30, 2004 goal met? Yes; 
Goal for Sept. 30, 2005 (percent): 100; 
Actual as of Dec. 31, 2004 (percent): 71. 

Component: Defense Logistics Agency; 
Goal for Sept. 30, 2004 (percent): 65%; 
Actual as of Sept. 30, 2004 (percent): 55%; 
Sept. 30, 2004 goal met? No; 
Goal for Sept. 30, 2005 (percent): 100%; 
Actual as of Dec. 31, 2004 (percent): 55%. 

Component: Total; 
Goal for Sept. 30, 2004 (percent): 65%; 
Actual as of Sept. 30, 2004 (percent): 56%; 
Sept. 30, 2004 goal met? No; 
Goal for Sept. 30, 2005 (percent): 100%; 
Actual as of Dec. 31, 2004 (percent): 57%. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of table]

According to DOD and service officials, implementation was slower than 
expected primarily because the program proved to be more complex and 
time consuming than initially expected. The program represented a new 
way of doing business for both the military and the private sector and 
it took time to develop guidance for determining fair market values for 
system conveyances and for comparing the long-term costs of a proposed 
privatization project with the long-term costs of continued government 
ownership. Initially, DOD also had to evaluate and make decisions in 
many areas such as the role of state laws and regulations on utility 
systems located on military installations but with ownership conveyed 
to private contractors. Further, to address some private utility 
company concerns, DOD made or sought and obtained waivers from some 
contracting regulations, but the process to do so was time consuming. 
For example, early in the program DOD learned that some private utility 
companies were reluctant to submit offers on privatization contracts 
because of regulations requiring that contractors follow accounting 
standards set by the Cost Accounting Standards Board. The concern was 
that the utility industry already had a set of established accounting 
practices used by regulatory agencies to set utility rates and to adopt 
an additional set of accounting standards would be too costly. DOD 
requested the Cost Accounting Standards Board to grant a waiver from 
use of the standards in utility privatization contracts under certain 
circumstances. Although the matter remained a point of contention for 
several years, the waiver was not obtained until September 2004 and DOD 
guidance on the matter was not issued until October 2004. 

Contract Termination Liability Questions Slowed Implementation Further: 

Program implementation slowed further in late 2004 and pending contract 
awards for all services were held up over an issue concerning contract 
termination liability. In October 2004, the Navy raised a question with 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense concerning whether it was 
required to obligate funds to cover potential contract termination 
expenses should the Navy terminate a utility services contract prior to 
the contractor recovering its acquisition and system improvement costs. 
Navy officials stated that, if required, the amounts needed could be 
very large, making many proposed utility privatization projects 
financially unfeasible. 

Not all the services shared the Navy's concern regarding termination 
liability. The Army, for example, reportedly has entered into a number 
of utility privatization agreements without recording an obligation to 
cover potential termination liability. The Army's position apparently 
was that 10 U.S.C. § 2688 provides the necessary authority to enter 
into utility privatization agreements without recording an obligation 
for termination liability. 

To resolve the differences between the services, the DOD Office of 
General Counsel considered the Navy and Army positions and issued 
guidance in February 2005 indicating that the services were not 
required to obligate funds to cover contract termination liability 
under the utility privatization program. In part, the DOD Office of 
General Counsel relied on a 1983 GAO decision[Footnote 14] which 
addressed the acquisition by the General Services Administration (GSA) 
of telephone equipment and related services under 40 U.S.C. § 
501(b)(3). That statutory provision, similar to section 2688, 
authorizes contracts for public utility services for multiple years (up 
to 10 years) without mentioning termination liability. The DOD Office 
of General Counsel noted that our 1983 decision stated that under 
section 501, GSA did not need to have available budget authority to 
obligate the total estimated cost of a contract, "but only sufficient 
budget authority to obligate its annual costs under the agreement." 
Although the 1983 decision did not directly address termination 
liability, the DOD Office of General Counsel maintains that a 
requirement to obligate termination costs for such contracts would 
directly contradict the conclusion that GSA need only obligate its 
"annual costs." According to the DOD Office of General Counsel, the 
same result is appropriate under section 2688. 

We examined the guidelines issued by the DOD Office of General Counsel 
and the authorities they relied on. Given the nature of the section 
2688 multiyear authority and the nature of the utility privatization 
program, we agree that defense services are not required to record 
obligations for potential termination liabilities under that authority, 
unless and until they decide to terminate. 

During our review of seven privatized DOD systems, we determined that 
the services generally are agreeing to reimburse contractors for the 
acquisition and system improvement costs of the facilities. To the 
extent a particular contract is terminated prior to the contractor 
recouping its acquisition and system improvement costs, DOD has agreed 
to repay those costs. In the context of the multiyear utility program, 
the services have generally entered into contracts with terms of 50 
years. During the terms of those contracts, DOD is either going to pay 
the annual costs of performance, which includes materials, labor, 
overhead, and other costs of the acquisition and system improvements, 
or it will pay termination costs, which will cover the contractor's 
unreimbursed costs for the acquisition and completed system 
improvements. 

As DOD's Office of General Counsel notes, our 1983 decision concluded 
that GSA may obligate the costs for its utility service contracts on an 
annual basis rather than obligating the entire amount of contract costs 
for future years in the first year of the contract. Section 2688, the 
authority underlying DOD's utility services contracts, is not unlike 
GSA's section 501 authority. They both permit contracting for utilities 
services for a multiyear period. Just as in 1983, when we viewed 
section 501 as a remedial provision to afford GSA flexibility in 
contracting, we view section 2688 to similarly afford DOD flexibility. 
In our 1983 decision, we noted that the purpose of section 501's 
multiyear contracting authority was to "take advantage of discounts 
offered under long term contracts" and "to effect economy and improve 
services," and, thus, broadly construed the authority conferred to 
facilitate achieving these objectives.[Footnote 15] For the same 
reasons, we read section 2688 broadly, and agree with DOD's 
interpretation of it. To read the statute to require obligating 
potential termination costs prior to a decision to terminate could 
undermine the economies and improvements in services that the statute 
envisions. 

The decision to terminate the contracts is DOD's, not the 
contractors'.[Footnote 16] If DOD decides to terminate a contract, 
those contracts appear to do nothing more than bind DOD to repay 
amounts that DOD would otherwise have paid if performance had 
continued, rather than additional penalties or charges DOD would not 
have paid absent the termination. If DOD decides to terminate, DOD must 
either have or obtain sufficient budget authority for the year DOD 
becomes liable for termination costs. Because DOD controls whether, and 
when, to terminate its contracts (and presumably would not terminate 
without sufficient budget authority to cover termination liability), 
should DOD in the future decide to terminate, such action does not 
expose the government to a financial risk. 

Utility Privatization Program Implementation Costs: 

For fiscal years 1998 through 2004, DOD and the services estimated that 
about $248 million had been spent to implement the utility 
privatization program (see table 3). For fiscal year 2005, 
implementation costs were expected to be about $48 million, bringing 
the total to about $296 million. According to DOD officials, the funds 
used to implement the program primarily paid for consultants hired to 
help implement the program by assisting the services in inventorying 
their utility systems, assessing the systems' condition, preparing 
economic analyses, and soliciting and contracting for proposed 
projects. Program implementation costs did not include funds used to 
pay the costs of awarded privatization contracts. 

Table 3: Implementation Costs for the Utility Privatization Program: 

Dollars in millions. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense; 
Fiscal years 1998 through 2004: $3.3; 
Fiscal year 2005: $0.0[A]; 
Total through fiscal year 2005: $3.3. 

Army; 
Fiscal years 1998 through 2004: $62.5; 
Fiscal year 2005: $15.0; 
Total through fiscal year 2005: $77.5. 

Navy; 
Fiscal years 1998 through 2004: $103.3; 
Fiscal year 2005: $27.6; 
Total through fiscal year 2005: $130.9. 

Air Force; 
Fiscal years 1998 through 2004: $78.6; 
Fiscal year 2005: $5.4; 
Total through fiscal year 2005: $84.0. 

Total; 
Fiscal years 1998 through 2004: $247.7; 
Fiscal year 2005: $48.0; 
Total through fiscal year 2005: $295.7. 

Source: DOD. 

[A] At the time of our review in February 2005, Office of the Secretary 
of Defense officials stated that they had not yet estimated their 
program implementation costs for fiscal year 2005. 

[End of table]

According to DOD officials, program implementation costs are expected 
to decline rapidly as the services complete their evaluations to 
privatize or exempt their utility systems. 

The Services' Savings Estimates from Utility Privatization Are 
Questionable: 

The services' economic analyses supporting utility systems privatized 
or near contract award for privatization estimate that the government's 
costs for equivalent utility services will be less with privatization. 
The amount of the savings is calculated based on the difference between 
the estimated costs of two options for improving the utility systems--
privatization and continued government ownership. However, because of 
the method used to estimate the costs of continued government 
ownership, we found that these estimates give an unrealistic impression 
of reduced costs in that the government's costs under privatization 
typically increase to pay contractors for enhanced utility services and 
capital improvements. Moreover, based on the economic analyses 
examined, we question the reliability of the projected differences in 
long-term costs between the privatization and government ownership 
options. In seven analyses we reviewed, we found inaccuracies and 
unsupported cost estimates that tended to favor the privatization 
option over continued government ownership. The Army Audit Agency has 
reported similar concerns with the reliability of analyses supporting 
Army utility privatization projects. 

Installation Utility Costs Increase with Privatization: 

Installation utility costs under privatization typically increase 
significantly above historical levels because the systems are being 
upgraded and the contractors recoup their investment costs through the 
utility services contracts.[Footnote 17] Essentially, under the 
privatization program, the services leverage private sector capital to 
achieve utility system improvements that otherwise would not be 
feasible in the short term because of limited funding caused by the 
competition for funds and budget allocation decisions. The services pay 
for the improvements over time through the utility services contracts. 
Army officials estimated that the average annual cost increase for each 
privatized Army system was $1.3 million. According to the economic 
analysis for the electric system privatization at Dobbins Air Reserve 
Base, the annual operations and maintenance costs for the system after 
privatization were expected to increase by over 500 percent compared to 
historical costs. 

Air Force headquarters officials stated concerns with the increased 
costs from historical levels with utility privatization. The officials 
estimated that based on the Air Force systems already privatized and 
those systems with the potential to be privatized, the Air Force's 
costs could increase between $100 million and $200 million annually for 
the first 5 to 10 years of privatization. The officials also stated 
their concern that privatized systems present the Air Force with a bill 
that must be paid, whereas the Air Force would have more flexibility in 
programming and executing improvements for government-owned utility 
systems. According to the officials, this flexibility allows the Air 
Force to better balance the spending of available funds on utility 
improvements and other mission requirements to ensure the best use of 
resources. 

Officials at each of the five installations we visited also expressed 
concern about increased utility costs from privatization. In 
particular, installation officials were concerned that other 
installation functions might suffer if funding provided for operating 
and maintaining their installations were not sufficiently increased to 
cover the higher utility costs. They noted that, under privatization, 
costs for upgrading, operating, and maintaining the systems are 
contract costs that must be paid. As a result, if an installation's 
funds were not increased sufficiently, then funds provided for other 
installation functions where there was more discretion in spending 
might be used to pay the higher utility bills. This, in turn, could 
negatively impact those other functions, such as the maintenance of 
installation facilities. 

The economic analysis for the Fort Campbell water and wastewater 
systems privatization illustrates the funding concern expressed by 
installation officials. The analysis stated that privatization will 
increase installation utility services costs well above levels 
previously budgeted for this purpose. The analysis further stated the 
concern that "the installation's budget may not be increased to the 
level necessary to fund the increase requiring sacrifice of other 
installation functions."

Privatization funding was a particular concern at Fort Irwin. Fort 
Irwin privatized its electrical system in 2003 and Army headquarters 
began providing funds to the installation to pay the monthly utility 
services bill. However, when we visited the installation in January 
2005, Fort Irwin officials stated that Army headquarters had provided 
no funds for the privatization contract from October 2004 through 
January 2005 and, as a result, the monthly utility services bills had 
not been paid. In March 2005, the officials stated that headquarters 
had provided some funding for the project, but the amount provided was 
only 34 percent of the amount needed. Fort Irwin officials said that 
headquarters officials stated that they would try to provide more 
funds; however, if the additional funds are not provided, then the 
installation will have to use funds intended for other installation 
functions to pay the utility services bills. 

Services' Economic Analyses Do Not Depict Actual Expected Costs of 
Continued Government Ownership: 

We found that the services' savings estimates for utility privatization 
projects were questionable because of the assumptions made about 
government "should costs" in the economic analyses that compare 
predicted costs under the privatization and government ownership 
options. DOD guidance directs the military services to compare 
estimated privatization costs based on the proposed contract with the 
estimated government ownership costs based on what it "should cost" the 
government to upgrade, operate, and maintain the system in accordance 
with accepted industry standards as called for in the proposed 
contract. This estimating method would be appropriate if, in the event 
the system is not privatized, the service would proceed to upgrade, 
operate, and maintain the system as called for in the government 
estimate. However, this generally is not expected to be the case. 
According to DOD and service officials, if a system is not privatized, 
then the anticipated system improvements would likely be delayed 
several years because of DOD's budget allocation decisions, which have 
limited the funds available for utility improvements and which caused 
DOD to look to privatization as an option in the first place. 

Because of the time value of money, a future expense of a given amount 
is equivalent to a smaller amount in today's dollars. Thus, delaying 
system improvements to future years would reduce the estimated cost of 
the government ownership option in today's dollars and, therefore, 
affect the results of a proposed project's economic analysis. At the 
same time, it must be recognized that delays in system improvements 
could increase government costs in the long term. Thus, if savings are 
expected to be a key factor in utility privatization decision making, 
then it would appear more appropriate for the services to compare the 
cost of a proposed privatization contract with the cost of continued 
government ownership on the basis of the actual planned expenditures 
and timing of these expenditures, with appropriate consideration to the 
impact of delayed improvements. 

The economic analysis supporting the June 2003 privatization of Fort 
Campbell's water and wastewater utility systems illustrates the impact 
of using DOD's method for estimating and comparing the long-term costs 
of the privatization and government ownership options.[Footnote 18] 
Following DOD's guidance, the Fort Campbell economic analysis estimated 
the long-term costs of government ownership by assuming that the 
installation would upgrade, operate, and maintain the systems in 
accordance with industry standards as the contractor proposed to do. 
The analysis estimated that over a 50-year period the total cost of 
government ownership of the systems would exceed the total cost of 
privatization by about $4.3 million in today's dollars. However, Fort 
Campbell officials stated that if the contract had not been awarded and 
the government continued to own the systems, then the improvements 
planned for the systems would not have occurred as indicated in the 
economic analysis. The officials stated that the improvements most 
likely would have been delayed for several years until the Army 
approved funding for the improvements. Based on information in the 
economic analysis, we estimated that if the start of improvements to 
upgrade the systems planned during the first 10 years under the 
government ownership option were delayed by 5 years, which installation 
officials stated was a reasonable assumption, then the estimated cost 
of the government ownership option would decrease by about $6.5 million 
in today's dollars because of the time value of money.[Footnote 19] 
Thus, in this case, consideration of the expected costs of continued 
government ownership based on a more realistic estimate of the timing 
of improvement expenditures could have changed the result of the 
analysis and showed that government ownership of the systems would be 
less costly than privatization over the long term. 

DOD Does Not Require an Independent Review of the Services' Economic 
Analyses: 

DOD does not require that the services' economic analyses be subjected 
to an independent review for accuracy and compliance with guidance, as 
a step to help ensure reliability. Normally, the services hire 
consultants to prepare the analyses and service officials stated that 
completed analyses are reviewed by the service's headquarters office 
responsible for the program. However, the reliability of the analyses 
is not reviewed by DOD headquarters officials or by an independent 
party, such as the services' audit agencies. Further, at the five 
installations we visited, installation officials stated that they had 
not reviewed the details in the economic analyses supporting their 
privatization projects and did not know the basis for some of the 
estimates used in the analyses. 

In contrast, DOD provides a more rigorous review of the analyses 
supporting privatization projects under DOD's military housing 
privatization program. Under this program, the service that proposes a 
project must provide the responsible DOD headquarters officials with a 
detailed briefing that describes the project, its justification, and 
whether it meets specific financial criteria. These officials stated 
that they review each project's supporting analysis and evaluate the 
estimates, assumptions, and methodology used in the analysis for 
reasonableness and compliance with guidance. If concerns are 
identified, the officials ask the service for additional information 
before the project is approved. These top-level review steps provide 
additional assurances that supporting analyses are reliable and that 
each project is adequately justified before approval. 

We reviewed seven utility privatization project analyses and identified 
inaccuracies, unsupported cost estimates, and noncompliance with 
guidance for performing the analyses. The cost estimates in the 
analyses we reviewed generally favored the privatization option by 
understating long-term privatization costs or overstating long-term 
government ownership costs. In five of the seven analyses, making 
adjustments to correct problems we identified would change the outcomes 
to show that government ownership, rather than privatization, would be 
less costly in the long term. In the remaining two cases, the analyses 
were not reliable because they did not reflect the actual utility 
system improvements to be performed by the contractor. 

The economic analysis for privatizing Fort Lee's water distribution 
system illustrates problems we identified. The Fort Lee analysis did 
not consider the system's value at the end of the analysis period--the 
residual value--under the government ownership option, as required by 
DOD guidance.[Footnote 20] Consideration of residual value recognizes 
that, under the government ownership option, the government would own 
the system and that the system would have some value at the end of the 
analysis period. In contrast, under the privatization option, the 
contractor, not the government, would own the system at the end of the 
analysis period. Not including the residual value in the analysis 
resulted in favoring the privatization option by overstating government 
ownership costs. We recomputed costs by including a residual value for 
the system at the end of the 50-year contract. The result was to change 
the outcome of the analysis from estimating that privatization would be 
less costly over the long term to estimating that government ownership 
would be less costly over the long term. 

Table 4 includes selected information on each project we reviewed, 
including the savings estimates from the services' analyses and a 
summary of the concerns we identified. Also, appendix II contains a 
detailed description of our review of each of the seven project 
economic analyses. 

Table 4: Selected Information from Economic Analyses Supporting Utility 
Privatization Projects: 

Dollars in millions. 

Water system, Fort Lee, Virginia; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
government ownership option in today's dollars: $10.3; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
privatization option in today's dollars: $8.8; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated savings or cost 
avoidance with privatization option: $1.5; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Were government 
ownership costs based on actual expected costs? No; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
cover the same time period as the privatization contract? No; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
consider residual value under the government ownership option? No; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
include errors in estimating costs? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Would correcting 
the issues identified change the outcome to favor government ownership? 
Yes. 

Electric system, Fort Lee, Virginia; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
government ownership option in today's dollars: $31.7; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
privatization option in today's dollars: $26.9; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated savings or cost 
avoidance with privatization option: $4.8; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Were government 
ownership costs based on actual expected costs? No; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
cover the same time period as the privatization contract? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
consider residual value under the government ownership option? No; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
include errors in estimating costs? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Would correcting 
the issues identified change the outcome to favor government ownership? 
Yes[A]. 

Water and wastewater systems, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
government ownership option in today's dollars: $196.6; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
privatization option in today's dollars: $192.3; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated savings or cost 
avoidance with privatization option: $4.3; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Were government 
ownership costs based on actual expected costs? No; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
cover the same time period as the privatization contract? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
consider residual value under the government ownership option? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
include errors in estimating costs? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Would correcting 
the issues identified change the outcome to favor government ownership? 
Yes. 

Electric system, Fort Irwin, California; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
government ownership option in today's dollars: $32.1; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
privatization option in today's dollars: $29.7; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated savings or cost 
avoidance with privatization option: $2.4; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Were government 
ownership costs based on actual expected costs? No; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
cover the same time period as the privatization contract? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
consider residual value under the government ownership option? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
include errors in estimating costs? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Would correcting 
the issues identified change the outcome to favor government ownership? 
Yes. 

Electric system, Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Georgia; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
government ownership option in today's dollars: $5.6; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
privatization option in today's dollars: $3.8; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated savings or cost 
avoidance with privatization option: $1.8; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Were government 
ownership costs based on actual expected costs? No; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
cover the same time period as the privatization contract? No; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
consider residual value under the government ownership option? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
include errors in estimating costs? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Would correcting 
the issues identified change the outcome to favor government ownership? 
Yes. 

Water system, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
government ownership option in today's dollars: $10.9; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
privatization option in today's dollars: $6.5; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated savings or cost 
avoidance with privatization option: $4.4; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Were government 
ownership costs based on actual expected costs? No; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
cover the same time period as the privatization contract? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
consider residual value under the government ownership option? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
include errors in estimating costs? Unknown[B]; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Would correcting 
the issues identified change the outcome to favor government ownership? 
Unknown[B]. 

Wastewater system, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
government ownership option in today's dollars: $7.2; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated total costs of 
privatization option in today's dollars: $5.7; 
Results from services' economic analyses: Estimated savings or cost 
avoidance with privatization option: $1.5; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Were government 
ownership costs based on actual expected costs? No; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
cover the same time period as the privatization contract? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
consider residual value under the government ownership option? Yes; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Did the analysis 
include errors in estimating costs? Unknown[B]; 
Results from GAO's review of the economic analyses: Would correcting 
the issues identified change the outcome to favor government ownership? 
Unknown[B]. 

Source: DOD information with GAO analysis. 

[A] The outcome of the economic analysis changes if the system's 
residual value is assumed to be equal to the system's current 
replacement value. Army officials stated that the system's residual 
value should equal the system's replacement value less depreciation 
and, if this value were used, the outcome of the economic analysis 
would not change. However, under privatization, the system is to be 
upgraded, operated, and maintained in accordance with industry 
standards, which will result in increasing the system's residual value. 

[B] We question the reliability of the economic analyses for Bolling 
Air Force Base because they did not reflect the actual system 
improvements to be performed by the contractor. We did not have 
sufficient information to recalculate estimates in the analyses. 
However, installation officials stated that they believed that 
continued government ownership of the systems would have been less 
costly than privatization over the long term. 

[End of table]

The Army Audit Agency Identified Concerns about the Reliability of 
Economic Analyses: 

The Army Audit Agency has issued reports that identified concerns about 
the reliability of the economic analyses supporting utility 
privatization contracts at four Army installations. These concerns are 
similar to the ones we identified in our review. For example, in July 
1999, the Army awarded a contract to privatize Aberdeen Proving 
Ground's water and wastewater utility system. The Army Audit Agency 
reviewed the project and the supporting economic analysis and reported 
in April 2004 that the analysis did not include realistic cost 
estimates for system improvements to be performed by the privatization 
contractor.[Footnote 21] For example, the report stated that the 
analysis understated the cost of system improvements by $18.5 million 
over the life of the contract. As a result, the audit agency concluded 
that there was not a reliable framework for preparing the analysis and 
the decision to privatize Aberdeen's water and wastewater system might 
result in higher costs to the government in the long term. 

Implementation of the Fair Market Value Requirement Can Result in 
Higher Contract Costs: 

Although DOD is permitted latitude in ensuring that the government 
receives fair market value for systems conveyed to privatization 
contractors, in some cases implementation has resulted in higher 
contract costs for utility services. Guidance and practices for 
determining fair market value varied among the services, with Army 
guidance stating that fair market value for system conveyances could 
range from zero to full replacement cost of the system. Also, although 
it is a reasonable concept that the government should receive 
consideration if an asset is conveyed to a contractor, the receipt of 
consideration for conveyances in the utility privatization program does 
not typically result in a net financial payment to the government. To 
recover their costs, privatization contractors normally include the 
full amounts they paid for conveyances in the associated utility 
services contracts and, therefore, the government will pay back the 
amounts received for the conveyances through utility services bills 
over time. In some cases, the contractors also include additional 
amounts in the utility services contracts to cover the contractors' 
costs associated with the fair market value payments. Consequently, 
implementing the fair market value requirement in such cases will 
result in the government paying back more than it will receive for the 
conveyances. 

Guidance and Practices for Determining Fair Market Value Vary: 

The legislative authority for the utility privatization program states 
that the Secretary of a military department shall require as 
consideration for a conveyance an amount equal to the fair market 
value, as determined by the Secretary, of the right, title, or interest 
of the United States conveyed. DOD provided general guidance on 
implementing this requirement in October 2002. As part of the 
negotiation strategy for utility system conveyances, the guidance 
directed the services to develop a range of fair market values, taking 
into account the business and strategic values of the utility system. 
The guidance stated that the services could choose to determine fair 
market value through an actual appraisal, a modified cost and income 
analysis, or a replacement or original-cost-less-depreciation analysis. 
Subsequently, in response to questions at an industry forum in 
September 2004, DOD officials stated that the fair market value should 
be established through open negotiations, the contractor would recover 
the fair market value paid for a conveyance through the service 
contract, and the contractor would earn a reasonable return on 
investment. 

Although service officials stated that they have generally followed 
this guidance, the Army issued additional guidance on determining fair 
market value in April 2002.[Footnote 22] This guidance basically stated 
that a range of values could be considered as fair market value for 
utility system conveyances. Specifically, the guidance stated that the 
Army had concluded that the fair market value "could be any number of 
values such as zero, nominal, appraised, full replacement cost of the 
system, or any negotiated amount, but that the [fair market value] 
should be determined by an economic analysis applied in planning the 
sale of each utility system." Army officials stated that determining 
fair market value is subjective and determined in part by the amounts 
contractors are willing to pay. In some cases, the officials stated 
that the most beneficial business case is to convey systems at less 
than their apparent fair market values. 

On the basis of information in the services' economic analyses we 
reviewed, table 5 shows the amounts that the government will receive 
from privatization contractors for utility system conveyances compared 
to one measure of fair market value--the system's replacement cost less 
depreciation. Whether the amounts received should be considered 
sufficient is difficult to gauge because DOD has not adopted objective 
standards for determining whether the amounts received meet the fair 
market value requirement. 

Table 5: Amounts to Be Received for Utility System Conveyances for 
Projects Reviewed: 

Dollars in millions. 

Fort Campbell water and wastewater systems; 
System replacement cost less depreciation[A]: $20.0; 
Amount to be received for the conveyance[B]: $4.5; 
Amount to be received as a percentage of system replacement cost less 
depreciation (percent): 23%. 

Fort Irwin electric system; 
System replacement cost less depreciation[A]: $10.0; 
Amount to be received for the conveyance[B]: $8.5; 
Amount to be received as a percentage of system replacement cost less 
depreciation (percent): 85%. 

Fort Lee electric system; 
System replacement cost less depreciation[A]: $16.5; 
Amount to be received for the conveyance[B]: $9.7; 
Amount to be received as a percentage of system replacement cost less 
depreciation (percent): 59%. 

Fort Lee water system; 
System replacement cost less depreciation[A]: Unknown[C]; 
Amount to be received for the conveyance[B]: $0.0; 
Amount to be received as a percentage of system replacement cost less 
depreciation (percent): 0%. 

Dobbins Air Reserve Base electric system; 
System replacement cost less depreciation[A]: $0.9; 
Amount to be received for the conveyance[B]: $0.7; 
Amount to be received as a percentage of system replacement cost less 
depreciation (percent): 78%. 

Bolling Air Force Base water system; 
System replacement cost less depreciation[A]: $3.1; 
Amount to be received for the conveyance[B]: $1.2; 
Amount to be received as a percentage of system replacement cost less 
depreciation (percent): 39%. 

Bolling Air Force Base wastewater system; 
System replacement cost less depreciation[A]: $2.9; 
Amount to be received for the conveyance[B]: $5.0; 
Amount to be received as a percentage of system replacement cost less 
depreciation (percent): 172%. 

Source: DOD with GAO analysis. 

[A] These values are normally determined by an analysis of each 
system's replacement cost less depreciation based on an evaluation of 
the system's physical condition. 

[B] According to the services' economic analyses, the amounts that the 
contractors will pay for the conveyances normally will be paid through 
credits applied over time to the government's utility services bill. 

[C] This project's economic analysis did not include information on the 
system's replacement cost. However, an Army analysis of the system, 
which included a reservoir, four water towers, and pipelines, performed 
about 10 years prior to privatization, stated that the system's 
replacement cost was about $11.8 million, and Fort Lee officials stated 
that the system was in good condition and was not in need of any 
immediate upgrades or improvements at the time of its conveyance to the 
contractor. 

[End of table]

The Army Audit Agency reported in October 2001 that the Army used 
varying methods to handle the fair market value requirement.[Footnote 
23] The audit agency reported that in four electric system 
privatizations the Army had used an independent contractor to estimate 
the fair market values of the systems. However, the fair market value 
estimates were not the final negotiated fair market values agreed to by 
the parties. For example, in one case the independent fair market value 
estimate for the system was $2.2 million and the system was conveyed 
for $0.1 million. In another case, the independent fair market value 
estimate for the system was $19.5 million and the system was conveyed 
for zero dollars. 

Implementation of the Fair Market Value Requirement Increased 
Privatization Contract Costs in Some Cases: 

The services' implementation of the requirement that the government 
receive fair market value when conveying utility systems resulted in 
increased costs to the government in some cases. The services normally 
negotiated with proposed privatization contractors for the fair market 
amount that the contractors will pay for system conveyances. However, 
to recover their costs, privatization contractors normally factor into 
the utility services contracts the full amount paid as fair market 
value for the systems. Thus, the government pays back the amounts 
received as consideration for the conveyances. However, in some cases, 
the contractors also include additional amounts in the utility services 
contracts to cover the contractors' costs associated with the fair 
market value payments, which increased contract costs. 

For example, according to the economic analysis for privatizing Dobbins 
Air Reserve Base's electric system, the contractor will pay about 
$741,000 as the fair market value for the system conveyance in today's 
dollars. However, the analysis stated that the contractor will recover 
this cost, plus other associated costs, by charging the Air Force about 
$1,322,000 in today's dollars in the utility services bills over time. 
Consequently, implementing the fair market value requirement in this 
case will result in the Air Force paying about $581,000, or 78 percent, 
more than it received for the conveyance. 

A similar situation occurred at another installation we visited. 
According to the economic analysis for privatizing Fort Lee's electric 
distribution system, the contractor will pay about $6.6 million for the 
conveyance with a cash down payment and with the remaining balance 
financed over 27 years and paid in the form of monthly credits to the 
installation's utility services bill. This arrangement will be 
equivalent to the contractor paying about $9.7 million for the 
conveyance in today's dollars. However, the analysis also stated that 
the contractor will recover its costs for purchasing the system, 
including added amounts for taxes and other associated costs, through 
annual charges added to the installation's utility services bill over 
the first 28 years of the contract. Based on the amounts to be charged, 
this arrangement will be equivalent to charging the Army about $16.7 
million in today's dollars. Consequently, implementing the fair market 
requirement in this case will result in the Army paying about $7.0 
million, or 72 percent, more than it received for the conveyance. 

In a review of the electric distribution system privatization at Fort 
Benning, the Army Audit Agency also found that receipt of fair market 
value for the conveyance will result in the government paying more 
under the contract than if no consideration had been received. The 
audit agency's report noted that the contractor agreed to pay $4.8 
million for the system and the Army agreed to pay the contractor for 
this cost plus additional amounts for profit. The result was that over 
the life of the contract the Army will pay about $748,000 more than it 
received for the conveyance.[Footnote 24]

DOD's Execution of the Utility Privatization Program Raises Other 
Concerns: 

In examining DOD's execution of the utility privatization program, we 
identified two additional areas of concern that could impact the 
overall effectiveness of the program. First, the services have not 
issued specific contract administration guidance for the program and, 
as a result, the adequacy of privatization contract oversight is a 
concern. Second, according to DOD consultant reports, DOD's approach to 
privatizing utilities differs from typical private sector practices 
and, as a result, privatization contractors may have an advantage when 
the time comes to negotiate utility service contract changes and 
renewals. Management attention in these areas could help ensure that 
best practices are used and the government's interests are adequately 
protected. 

Adequacy of Privatization Contract Oversight Is a Concern: 

The adequacy of privatization contract oversight is a concern. The 
services' oversight of utility privatization contracts appeared to be 
limited in some cases because of limited guidance and inadequate 
provisions for staff to monitor contracts. Inadequate oversight could 
result in the services paying contractors for work not performed or for 
work performed in an unsatisfactory manner. 

The services have not issued specific guidance on utility privatization 
contract administration even though the program began 7 years ago and 
94 contracts have been awarded. Service officials stated that such 
guidance was in preparation and should be issued before the end of 
2005. However, the lack of specific guidance for awarded contracts was 
a matter of concern at Fort Lee, one of the five installations we 
visited. Fort Lee officials stated that they had little guidance from 
headquarters on what they should be doing to oversee their water and 
electric privatization contracts, other than to pay the bills. The 
officials also stated that they did not have sufficient personnel to 
perform detailed monitoring of contractor performance because no 
additional resources were provided for this purpose after the contracts 
were signed. The officials believed that the contractors were 
performing adequately but had little documentation to support their 
opinions. 

The Army Audit Agency also has reported concerns with the adequacy of 
privatization contract oversight. As illustrated below, in its reviews 
of four Army utility privatization contracts at the Aberdeen Proving 
Ground and Forts Hamilton, Benning, and Pickett, the audit agency found 
that contractor performance was not adequately monitored, and as a 
result, there was little assurance that the installations would receive 
quality products and services under privatization. 

* In its review of utility privatization at the Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, the audit agency found that the Army paid about $3.3 million 
during fiscal year 2001 for operating expenses the contractor did not 
incur, system improvements the contractor did not perform, and 
purchases the contractor did not make.[Footnote 25] These conditions 
occurred because the Aberdeen Proving Ground did not develop a 
performance monitoring plan, monitor completion of system improvements, 
or require detailed expense reporting by the contractor. In response, 
the responsible Army officials agreed to develop a contract-monitoring 
plan to help track system improvements and require the contractor to 
report additional data on expenses. 

* In its review of utility privatization at Fort Hamilton, the audit 
agency found that the Army's guidance to the installation did not 
specify what aspects of the contract required monitoring, the 
installation did not have a plan to monitor contractor performance, and 
the contractor did not provide the Army with plans and reports as 
required by the contract to assist in contract oversight.[Footnote 26] 
The audit agency concluded that the Army needed to improve the contract 
administration procedures to ensure that the Army would receive quality 
products and services. In response, the responsible Army officials 
agreed to put procedures in place to address the findings. 

* In its review of utility privatization at Fort Benning, the audit 
agency found that Fort Benning did not have procedures in place to 
effectively monitor the contractor's performance because the contractor 
was not required to provide any performance data to the government and 
the installation did not have a contract-monitoring plan as required by 
guidance.[Footnote 27] In response, Fort Benning officials agreed to 
develop a contractor-monitoring plan that included inspection, 
verification, and reporting to establish better contract oversight. 

* In its review of utility privatization at Fort Pickett, the audit 
agency found that Fort Pickett had no contract monitoring plan, the 
installation official responsible for the contract did not know that 
the contractor had delayed about 50 percent of the improvements planned 
in the first year, and tenant organizations at the installation were 
not properly charged for reimbursable costs associated with the 
privatized electrical system.[Footnote 28] In response, the responsible 
Army officials agreed to develop a contract-monitoring plan to help 
track system improvements and to ensure accurate charges for tenants. 

DOD's Approach to Utility Privatization Appears to Differ from Typical 
Private Sector Practices: 

DOD has no studies or other documentation showing that its approach to 
utility privatization is based on private sector best practices. A 
senior DOD official characterized the utility privatization program as 
the result of a decision by the Office of the Secretary of Defense that 
operating and maintaining utilities was not a core function and that 
installation utilities should be privatized. Nevertheless, according to 
two reports prepared by Navy and Air Force consultants, DOD's approach 
actually differs from typical private sector practices in that private 
companies may outsource system operations and maintenance but normally 
opt for shorter than 50-year utility service contracts and typically do 
not permanently convey ownership of their utility systems. The first 
report, prepared by CNA at the request of the Navy and issued in March 
2001, noted that while most private sector contracts for utility 
services last from 7 to 10 years, most DOD utility services contracts 
under privatization are for 50 years.[Footnote 29] The report's concern 
was that a contract written today could not adequately anticipate all 
possible contingencies over the next 50 years because technologies and 
requirements can change in unforeseen ways. CNA also reported that, in 
contrast to DOD's preferred approach that utility system ownership be 
permanently conveyed to contractors, private sector firms typically 
retain ownership of their systems. The report's concern here was that 
DOD's preferred approach of permanently conveying ownership may give 
the contractor an advantage when negotiating service contract changes 
or renewals. For example, generally entering into a long-term services 
contract creates a bilateral monopoly where the military must purchase 
utility services from one company and that company must sell these 
services to the military. The report concluded that such an arrangement 
could pose special problems because DOD must deal with the contractor 
or face high costs. For example, if DOD and the contractor reached an 
impasse over some issue, then DOD might have to pay significant amounts 
to construct a new utility distribution system to replace the one that 
had been conveyed to the contractor, attempt to purchase the system 
back from the contractor, or institute legal action to reacquire the 
system through condemnation proceedings. 

The second report was prepared by Malcolm Pirnie, Incorporated, at the 
request of the Air Force and issued in March 2002.[Footnote 30] This 
report included the results of a survey of utility practices at 
entities similar to military installations, such as selected industrial 
complexes, airport authorities, and universities responsible for 
supplying utility services to their complexes. The survey found that in 
most cases, these entities owned and operated their utility systems. 
The report also noted that under DOD's approach, renegotiating terms 
after a contract's 50-year term ends could be a concern because in 
instances where alternatives for service were not available, DOD's 
negotiating position would be negatively impacted. 

Officials at several of the installations we visited also expressed 
concerns about the government's negotiating position under 
privatization after permanent conveyance of system ownership to a 
contractor. For example, Bolling Air Force Base officials stated that 
they were concerned that the contractor might obtain larger-than-
expected price increases in future price renegotiations because the 
contractor had a monopoly position over the government. As a result, 
they believed that a privatization contract could ultimately cost 
considerably more than expected. Similarly, the Fort Campbell economic 
analysis supporting privatization of the installation's water and 
wastewater systems stated that privatization "will give the new owner a 
monopoly for the utility service that will require close regulation by 
the Army. Staffing of this regulation function will be essential to 
insuring that a reasonable price is paid for the service rendered."

A recent situation at Fort Leonard Wood appears to illustrate the 
potential problems facing DOD under its approach to privatization when 
utility services contracts come up for renewal. About 15 years ago, the 
Army awarded a contract to a company to build a natural gas pipeline to 
the installation and in 1992 entered into a 10-year utility services 
contract with the company. This contract expired in October 2002. From 
that time through December 2004, the Army was unable to reach agreement 
with the company for a new 10-year contract. According to Army 
officials, the impasse was over higher service prices and other 
conditions imposed by the company as a condition for renewal. To 
continue service, the Army and the company had agreed to short-term 90-
day contracts in which the Army agreed to pay the company higher prices 
for utility services. After 26 months, in January 2005, the Army and 
the contractor agreed to new terms and entered into a new 10-year 
services contract. However, according to Army Audit Agency officials 
who were conducting a review of natural gas service contracts at 
several installations including Fort Leonard Wood, if negotiations for 
renewing the contract at Fort Leonard Wood had not been successful, 
then the Army possibly would have started legal efforts to condemn the 
system in order to gain ownership. 

Of the seven utility privatization projects that we reviewed, all but 
one followed DOD's preferred approach and permanently conveyed system 
ownership to the contractor. The exception was the privatization of 
Fort Campbell's water and wastewater systems. In this case, the 
installation conveyed the systems to the contractor, but the contract 
provided for reversion of ownership to the government at the end of the 
50-year services contract. During the privatization evaluation process, 
Fort Campbell officials had noted concerns over the permanent 
conveyance of the systems. Specifically, according to the Fort Campbell 
economic analysis for the systems, the government will pay the 
contractor to upgrade and maintain the systems in good condition over 
the 50-year contract term. As a result, by regaining ownership at the 
end of the contract, the Army would take ownership of systems worth a 
considerable sum of money and would have additional options, such as 
taking over operations and maintenance or issuing a competitive 
solicitation for a new utility services contract. Conversely, the 
analysis noted that by following DOD's preferred approach of permanent 
conveyance without reversion, the government would be locked into 
procuring utility services from the contractor for as long as the Army 
needed the services and this approach might not be in the government's 
best interest. Because of its concerns, Fort Campbell sought and 
obtained approval from Army headquarters to enter into a privatization 
contract that included ownership reversion. 

Conclusions: 

Utility privatization has helped installations achieve major system 
improvements that, according to DOD, would not have been otherwise 
possible given competing appropriation priorities. Nevertheless, the 
utility privatization program generally increases military utility 
costs well above historical levels because the program leverages 
private sector capital to achieve utility system improvements. To pay 
for these improvements over time, DOD's funding obligations will likely 
increase, not decrease, by hundreds of millions of dollars and 
operations and maintenance budgets will need to be adjusted, as 
necessary. Yet, the services' economic analyses give an unrealistic 
sense of savings to this program because they estimate that approved 
projects will reduce the government's long-term costs for utility 
services. The amount of estimated long-term savings, however, is merely 
the services' estimated difference between the costs of two options--
privatization and government ownership--and both options will result in 
increased utility costs compared to historical levels, although perhaps 
in different time frames. Moreover, as long as selecting the less-
costly option is expected to be a key factor in utility privatization 
decision making, it is important that the supporting analyses are 
reliable. Unless DOD revises the guidance for preparing economic 
analyses for proposed utility privatization projects so that the 
analyses are based on actual anticipated costs, the result will 
continue to be analyses that could lead DOD to enter into long-term 
privatization agreements that result in higher, not lower, costs 
compared to continued government ownership. Reliability also will 
continue to be an issue until DOD starts requiring an independent 
review of the economic analyses supporting proposed privatization 
projects. Without such a review, the services' economic analyses could 
continue to include inaccuracies and decision makers will be hampered 
in their ability to make economically sound choices about which option 
should be followed to achieve utility systems improvements. 

Unless DOD places greater scrutiny on the implementation of the fair 
market value requirement in proposed utility privatization contracts in 
order to minimize cases where contractors recover more than the amounts 
they paid for system conveyances, some utility privatization contracts 
may cost more than necessary. Also, until the services issue specific 
utility privatization contract administration guidance including the 
clear assignment of responsibilities and ensure that resources are 
provided to perform adequate contract oversight, the services' 
oversight of utility privatization contracts may continue to be 
limited. Inadequate oversight could result in the services paying 
contractors for work not performed or for work performed in an 
unsatisfactory manner. Also, as long as DOD's preferred approach is for 
installations to permanently convey utility system ownership, 
contractors may continue to have an advantage when it comes time to 
negotiate contract changes and renewals. DOD must deal with the 
contractor or pay significant amounts to construct a new utility 
distribution system to replace the one that had been conveyed to the 
contractor, attempt to purchase the system from the contractor, or 
institute legal action to reacquire the system through condemnation 
proceedings. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) to take the 
following six actions: 

* As long as savings are expected to be a key factor in utility 
privatization decision making, revise the guidance for preparing 
economic analyses so that the analyses compare the cost of a proposed 
privatization contract with the cost of continued government ownership 
on the basis of the actual planned expenditures and the timing of these 
expenditures. 

* Require an independent review, perhaps by DOD headquarters or the 
services' audit agencies, of the economic analyses supporting proposed 
privatization projects. 

* Provide general program guidance emphasizing the need to consider 
increased utility costs under privatization as the military services 
prepare their operation and maintenance budget requests. 

* Place greater scrutiny on the implementation of the fair market value 
requirement in proposed contracts to minimize cases where contractors 
recover more than the amounts they paid for system conveyances. 

* Issue program guidance, specific to utility privatization, 
emphasizing the importance of contract oversight. 

* Reassess whether permanent conveyance of utility systems should be 
DOD's preferred approach to obtaining improved utility services. 

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Secretaries of the military departments to take the following two 
actions: 

* Ensure that installation operations and maintenance budgets are 
adjusted as necessary to reflect increased costs from utility 
privatization projects. 

* Issue specific utility privatization contract administration guidance 
including the clear assignment of responsibilities and ensure that 
resources are provided to perform adequate contract oversight. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

On the basis of DOD's comments on our recommendations, as discussed 
below, the Congress may wish to consider requiring DOD to address the 
issues and recommendations discussed in this report before proceeding 
with further utility privatization efforts. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (Installations and Environment) did not concur with our report 
findings or recommendations and raised several concerns. DOD stated 
that we had a limited understanding of the utilities privatization 
program and characterized our findings as being outdated and not well 
founded. In addition, DOD suggested that our report represented an 
unwarranted characterization of our findings as being systemic problems 
of the program. We disagree. 

We believe that our review of the utility privatization program was 
objective, balanced, and represented program conditions existing at the 
time we completed our review in March 2005. We remain confident that 
our conclusions and recommendations are soundly based upon the findings 
discussed in the report. In response to the comments, however, we 
modified two of our recommendations, as noted below, to improve their 
clarity and more precisely identify responsible parties. We also added 
two recommendations regarding program guidance, as noted below. We 
believe it is appropriate to emphasize, as explained in the scope and 
methodology section of this report, that we followed our professional 
practices and validated the facts and statistics presented in the 
report with DOD and service officials prior to preparation of the draft 
report. 

In its comments, DOD did not provide any information suggesting any 
inaccuracies in our report, but rather contended that our case studies 
were outdated and related to problems that occurred during the start of 
the program in the late 1990s. DOD's contention is incorrect. Of the 
seven utility privatization projects we reviewed in detail, the 
associated contracts for four projects were awarded in 2004, and the 
contracts for two projects were awarded in 2003. The economic analyses 
supporting these projects should have been current and reliable at the 
time the contracts were awarded; but as noted in this report, they were 
not. Further, Office of the Secretary of Defense officials used three 
of the projects we reviewed in detail as examples of cost-saving 
utility privatization projects in program briefings presented to us in 
July 2004. As noted in the scope and methodology section of this 
report, we recognize that the limited number of case studies completed 
does not make them projectable to the universe of DOD utility 
privatization projects. However, given other corroborating information, 
including statements of continuing program concerns raised by cognizant 
service and installation officials and similar concerns reported by the 
Army Audit Agency and more recently by the Naval Inspector General, we 
believe the findings of this report have much broader applicability 
than the limited number of cases we studied.[Footnote 31] Even the 
Deputy Under Secretary recently noted significant challenges in 
managing the program. In March 2, 2005, testimony before a House 
Appropriations Subcommittee, the Deputy Under Secretary noted 
difficulties in conducting long-term economic analyses, determining 
fair market value for the government's utility systems, and making 
price adjustments to long-term contracts for utility services.[Footnote 
32] We make the following observations regarding DOD's comments on the 
individual recommendations in the draft report. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation to revise the guidance for 
preparing economic analyses so that the analyses would compare the cost 
of a proposed privatization contract with the cost of continued 
government ownership on the basis of the actual planned expenditures 
and the timing of these expenditures. DOD stated that it is impossible 
to predict with any measure of accuracy what DOD would spend to 
maintain a system, particularly with regard to military construction, 
beyond more than a few years. Thus, DOD believes that its current use 
of a "should-cost" estimate, based on what a private utility company 
would engage in by way of recapitalization, results in an estimate with 
some reasonable accuracy. Our issue with DOD's estimates primarily 
concerns what DOD would actually spend on the systems over the near 
term where, based on its comments, it does know what it plans to spend 
with some accuracy. As long as selecting the less-costly option--i.e., 
government ownership or privatization--is expected to be a key factor 
in utility privatization decisions, as required by statute, we continue 
to believe that the supporting analyses should be based on realistic 
anticipated costs, as is the intent of our recommendation. DOD also 
commented that use of its current estimating method was consistent with 
the underlying rationale of the program--that private industry can 
normally provide more efficient utility service than can the 
government. As our report makes clear, however, DOD did not provide any 
studies or other documentation to support its contention. Given that 
the private sector faces higher interest costs than the government and 
strives to make a profit whereas the government does not, it is not 
certain that utility services provided by the private sector would be 
less costly than utility services provided by the government through 
the use of up-front appropriations. Thus, as we have recommended, sound 
economic analyses based on actual planned expenditures are needed to 
determine the most cost-effective option for providing utility services 
to DOD installations. 

DOD disagreed with our draft recommendation that the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) ensure that 
installation operations and maintenance budgets are adjusted as 
necessary to reflect increased costs from utility privatization 
projects. DOD properly noted that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Installations and Environment) does not manage the operations and 
maintenance budgets of the installations. Accordingly, we have modified 
the recommendation to state that the Secretary of Defense should direct 
the Secretaries of the military departments to take this action. 
Further, given the magnitude of the program and the fact that many of 
these facilities, as well as base operating support budgets from which 
utility-related contracting costs are paid, have been historically 
underfunded, we believe it would be appropriate for the Deputy Under 
Secretary to provide general program guidance emphasizing the need to 
consider increased utility costs under privatization as the military 
services prepare their operations and maintenance budget requests. 
Accordingly, we have added supporting information in the text on this 
point and a new recommendation to address this issue. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation to require an independent review, 
perhaps by DOD headquarters or the services' audit agencies, of the 
economic analyses supporting proposed privatization projects. DOD 
stated that the military departments have the authority to ensure a 
sufficient review and have adopted processes that conduct such a 
review. DOD stated that our concerns, while factual, occurred during 
the start of the program. We agree that the military departments have 
the authority to ensure sufficient review of the economic analyses, but 
we disagree that the military departments have adopted processes that 
ensure reliable analysis, as noted by the examples in this report. As 
explained above, the case studies we reviewed and their economic 
analyses are associated with recent privatization contracts mostly 
signed within the past 2 years--not at the beginning of the program in 
1997--and thus reflect current concerns. Also, we do not understand 
DOD's reluctance to provide additional scrutiny of the economic 
analyses for proposed utility privatization projects in view of the 
errors we found in the cases we examined and the fact that DOD already 
provides for such independent reviews of economic analyses associated 
with proposed projects in the housing privatization program. Thus, we 
continue to believe, as we have recommended, that an independent review 
is needed to help ensure the accuracy and reliability of the economic 
analyses supporting proposed privatization projects. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation to place greater scrutiny on the 
implementation of the fair market value requirement in proposed 
contracts to minimize cases where contractors recover more than the 
amounts they paid for system conveyances. DOD again commented that the 
examples mentioned in this report happened during the start of the 
program and that contracting officers are now aware of the potential 
for contractors to recover more than they pay in fair market value and 
take steps to minimize the risk. Contrary to DOD's comments, the two 
examples of concerns in this area that we reviewed and cite in this 
report, Dobbins Air Reserve Base and Fort Lee, were privatized in April 
2004 and June 2004, respectively--7 years after the start of the 
program in 1997. Also, given that DOD contends that contracting 
officers are now aware of the concern and are taking steps to minimize 
the risk, we continue to believe, as we have recommended, that it is 
appropriate for DOD to place greater scrutiny on the implementation of 
the fair market value requirement to ensure that these steps are 
successful. 

DOD disagreed with our draft recommendation that the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) issue specific 
utility privatization contract administration guidance and provide 
funding for personnel to perform contract oversight. DOD commented that 
the services are responsible for funding and performing post-award 
contract administration of utility contracts, just as with any other 
contract. We agree, in part, and therefore clarified and changed our 
recommendation to state that the Secretary of Defense should direct the 
Secretaries of the military departments to take this action. However, 
given the magnitude of the utility privatization program and its use of 
50-year service contracts, we believe, as our report makes clear, that 
it would be beneficial for the Deputy Under Secretary to issue program 
guidance, specific to utility privatization, to emphasize the 
importance of contract oversight. We have added a separate 
recommendation to address this issue. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation to reassess whether permanent 
conveyance of utility systems should be DOD's preferred approach to 
obtaining improved utility services. DOD commented that the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense determined that owning, operating, and maintaining 
utility systems are not core functions of the DOD and that the issue of 
title transfer has been reviewed repeatedly during the life of this 
program. As noted in this report, DOD has no studies or other 
documentation showing that its approach to utility privatization is 
based on private sector best practices. On the other hand, the services 
have two consultant reports which state that DOD's approach actually 
differs from typical private sector practices and raise the concern 
that DOD's preferred approach of permanently conveying ownership may 
give the contractor an advantage when negotiating service contract 
changes or renewals. Moreover, there is not universal agreement within 
DOD concerning what is or is not a core function. For example, the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force stated in March 2005 
congressional testimony that "the Air Force considers utility operation 
and maintenance a core competency, without which we could not fly and 
fight".[Footnote 33] In its comments, DOD also stated that while there 
are compelling arguments on each side, the department continues to 
believe that the best practice--i.e., its practice--is to transfer 
title to the utility system in line with the statutory intent. We 
disagree. First, just because many DOD systems have been conveyed in 
that manner does not make it a best practice. As noted, most utility 
service contracts are long-term agreements and it may take many years 
before DOD knows whether the practice of conveyance is successful or 
whether it results in long-term problems and added costs to DOD. 
Second, while the utility privatization statute permits title transfer, 
it is not clear that the statute's language shows intent for the 
services to convey utility ownership. Thus, we continue to believe, as 
we have recommended, that DOD should reassess whether permanent 
conveyance of utility systems should be DOD's preferred approach to 
obtaining improved utility services. 

DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 
committees; the Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force; and 
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff has any questions on the matters discussed in this 
report, please contact me at (202) 512-5581 or my Assistant Director, 
Mark Little, at (202) 512-4673. Gary Phillips, Sharon Reid, Harry 
Knobler, and Kenneth Patton were major contributors to this report. 

Signed by: 

Barry W. Holman, 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the status of the Department of Defense's (DOD) utility 
privatization program, we reviewed past and present privatization 
plans, initiatives, and costs. We reviewed the legislative history of 
the privatization program and assessments of the program performed by 
service audit agencies and others. We compared current goals and 
milestones with previous ones and interviewed DOD and service 
headquarters officials responsible for the program to determine reasons 
for the changes. We reviewed applicable DOD and military service 
policies and procedures. Using data from the services' quarterly 
program status reports to DOD, we summarized the program implementation 
status by service and compared the status to the current goals and 
milestones for the program. We confirmed the quarterly reports' status 
data on seven privatization projects but did not otherwise test the 
reliability of the data. We discussed with DOD and service officials 
issues affecting implementation of the program such as questions 
regarding contract termination liability. We visited selected 
installations to review and discuss utility privatization projects at 
the installations. Specifically, we visited five military 
installations--Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Lee, Virginia; Fort Irwin, 
California; Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Georgia; and Bolling Air Force 
Base, Maryland. The installations were selected because they have 
projects that were privatized using the legislative authorities 
specifically provided for privatizing military utility systems. In 
addition, DOD often cites three of the installations visited as having 
financially successful utility privatization projects. We did not 
select a Navy or Marine Corps privatization project to review because 
the Navy had approved only one project under the legislative 
authorities provided for the program and the Marine Corps had approved 
none. The Navy project did not involve a typical utility privatization 
effort in that it converted a fuel service contract into a 
privatization contract. 

To determine whether the services' estimates of savings from utility 
privatization projects are reliable, we reviewed the services' utility 
costs and funding information and discussed with DOD and service 
officials how utility costs under privatization compare to historical 
utility costs, the reasons for the cost differences, and whether 
funding the utility privatization program could affect the funding 
available for other installation functions. We also selected and 
reviewed the economic analyses for seven privatization projects located 
at the five installations visited. We selected three analyses for 
review because DOD often cites the associated privatization projects as 
examples of successful, cost-saving projects. The other four analyses 
were selected because they represented a cross section of typical 
utility privatization projects, according to service officials. For 
each analysis, we evaluated the basis for the estimates and assumptions 
used and assessed consistency and compliance with DOD guidance. We 
examined the analyses for the use of appropriate life-cycle 
methodologies and accuracy of the calculations. We did not otherwise 
attempt to independently determine estimates of long-term costs for the 
seven projects. We shared the results of our analyses with DOD and 
service officials and incorporated their comments as appropriate. We 
discussed with DOD and service officials the procedures they use to 
ensure the consistency, reasonableness, and accuracy of the completed 
economic analyses. We also reviewed reports from the services' audit 
agencies related to utility privatization projects and their 
assessments of the reliability of the economic cost analyses. 

To determine how DOD implements the fair market value requirement for 
conveyed utility systems, we reviewed DOD and service policies and 
procedures dealing with implementation of the fair market value 
requirement, discussed with officials how receipt of fair market value 
is ensured, and assessed the amounts received as consideration for the 
seven privatization project conveyances associated with our review of 
the economic analyses. For each project, we examined how the fair 
market value was determined and reviewed what effect the amounts 
received and the associated contract terms had on the government's 
costs for privatization. We shared the results of our analyses with DOD 
and service officials. 

To determine whether other issues might impact DOD's execution of the 
utility privatization program, we reviewed DOD and service guidance for 
utility privatization contract administration, discussed contract 
oversight with DOD and service officials, and discussed and reviewed 
the oversight provided at the five installations visited. We also 
reviewed reports on utility privatization contract administration from 
the Army Audit Agency. In addition, we obtained and reviewed 
information from DOD, service, and installation officials and from 
service consultant reports on how DOD's approach to utility 
privatization compares with private sector practices. We visited one of 
the services' consultants, CNA, to discuss details with the authors of 
the CNA report on utility privatization. 

We conducted our review between July 2004 and March 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section]

Appendix II: Results of GAO's Review of the Services' Economic Analyses 
Supporting Seven Utility Privatization Projects: 

We reviewed seven utility privatization project analyses and identified 
inaccuracies, unsupported cost estimates, and noncompliance with 
guidance for performing the analyses. In general, the cost estimates in 
the analyses we reviewed favored the privatization option by 
understating long-term privatization costs or overstating long-term 
government ownership costs. The results of our review are summarized 
below. 

Fort Lee Water System Privatization: 

The economic analysis for privatizing Fort Lee's water distribution 
system did not consider the system's value at the end of the analysis 
period--the residual value--under the government ownership option, as 
required by DOD guidance.[Footnote 34] Consideration of residual value 
recognizes that, under the government ownership option, the government 
would own the system and that the system would have some value at the 
end of the analysis period. In contrast, under the privatization 
option, the contractor, not the government, would own the system at the 
end of the analysis period. Not including the residual value in the 
analysis resulted in favoring the privatization option by overstating 
government ownership costs. We recomputed costs by including a residual 
value for the system at the end of the 50-year contract. The result was 
to change the outcome of the analysis from estimating that 
privatization would be less costly over the long term to estimating 
that government ownership would be less costly over the long term. 

DOD's guidance also requires that a system's economic analysis consider 
costs over the proposed project's contract term. However, the analysis 
for Fort Lee's water distribution system considered costs over a 25-
year period instead of the contract's 50-year period. Although 
information was not available to determine how this discrepancy 
affected the results of the analysis, the example demonstrates the need 
for independent review to help ensure accuracy and compliance with 
guidance. 

Fort Lee Electric System Privatization: 

The economic analysis for the privatization of Fort Lee's electric 
distribution system also did not consider the system's residual value 
under the government ownership option. We recomputed costs by including 
a residual value for the system at the end of the 50-year contract. 
Army officials suggested that the residual value should approximate 
$16.5 million, the system's current replacement cost less depreciation. 
Using this amount in the analysis would show the privatization option 
to still be less costly than government ownership over the long term, 
but the estimated cost difference between the options would decrease 
from 15.0 percent to 4.6 percent. However, the analysis assumed that 
the system would be upgraded and maintained in accordance with industry 
standards over the 50-year analysis period and showed that, under the 
government ownership option, the Army would spend $17.7 million in 
today's dollars for system improvements. As such, we believe that it is 
reasonable to assume that the residual value should approximate the 
system's current replacement cost of $23.3 million. Using this amount 
in the analysis would change the outcome of the analysis and show that 
government ownership would be slightly less costly than privatization 
over the long term. 

Fort Campbell Water and Wastewater Systems Privatization: 

The economic analysis supporting privatization of Fort Campbell's water 
and wastewater systems contained several errors. First, the analysis 
did not follow DOD guidance when estimating contract oversight costs 
for the privatization option and as a result, understated these costs. 
Second, the analysis included errors in estimating general and 
administrative costs under the government ownership option and as a 
result, overstated these costs. Third, the analysis used faulty 
assumptions in estimating self-insurance costs for potential property 
and liability losses under the government ownership option and as a 
result, overstated these costs. We recomputed the cost estimates by 
making corrections for these errors. The result was to change the 
outcome of the analysis from estimating that privatization would be 
less costly over the long term to estimating that continued government 
ownership would be less costly over the long term. 

Fort Irwin Electric System Privatization: 

The economic analysis for privatizing Fort Irwin's electric 
distribution system overstated annual operations and maintenance costs 
under the government ownership option. Specifically, to estimate these 
costs, the analysis adjusted the installation's historical operations 
and maintenance costs upward to reflect the estimated amount that the 
installation should be spending in accordance with industry standards. 
However, part of this estimate included predicted future costs for 
emergency repairs. Fort Irwin's historical emergency repair costs were 
about $175,000 annually and, to adjust for some items that were not 
included in the historical costs and estimate the amount that the 
installation should be spending for emergency repairs, the analysis 
increased the historical amount by over 100 percent to about $357,000 
annually. Fort Irwin officials stated that emergency repair costs were 
high in the past because the system consisted primarily of old, 
antiquated equipment that had not been adequately maintained. However, 
under the government ownership option, as under privatization, the 
analysis assumed that the system would be quickly upgraded and 
maintained to industry standards. As such, the officials stated that 
future emergency repair costs should decrease, not increase. To adjust 
for the overstated emergency repair cost estimate and to be 
conservative, we recalculated the total costs under the government 
ownership option assuming that emergency repair costs would not 
increase or decrease but remain at the historical level. The result was 
to change the outcome of the analysis from estimating that 
privatization would be less costly over the long term to estimating 
that continued government ownership would be less costly over the long 
term. 

Changes in the economic analysis supporting the Fort Irwin electric 
distribution system privatization also raised questions about 
reliability. In October 2000, an Army consultant completed an economic 
analysis of the proposed system privatization. The analysis estimated 
that the government ownership option would be less costly than 
privatization in the long term. Specifically, in today's dollars, the 
analysis estimated that the government ownership option would cost 
about $14.7 million less over the long term than if the system were 
privatized. Yet, about 2 and a half years later in February 2003, the 
same consultant completed a new economic analysis for the proposed 
project. This analysis concluded the opposite--that privatization would 
be less costly than the government ownership option by about $3.6 
million in today's dollars. Details explaining the basis for the 
significantly changed estimates were not included in the new analysis 
and could not be explained by Fort Irwin officials. 

Dobbins Air Reserve Base Electric System Privatization: 

According to DOD guidance, the economic analyses for proposed 
privatization projects should estimate and compare costs assuming that 
the government would upgrade and improve the system to industry 
standards, as the privatization contractor would be required to do. 
However, we questioned whether the analysis for Dobbins Air Reserve 
Base's electric system privatization followed this guidance because of 
the large cost difference between estimated improvement costs under the 
privatization and government ownership options. The economic analysis 
estimated that under privatization the contractor's costs to complete 
system improvements over the contract period would be about $1.6 
million in today's dollars. In contrast, the analysis estimated that 
system improvement costs under the government ownership option over the 
same period would be about $4.7 million in today's dollars, a 
difference of $3.1 million, or 194 percent, more. In response to our 
questions, Air Force officials stated that an error had been made in 
calculating improvement costs under the government option and that the 
improvement costs were overstated by about $2 million. We recomputed 
costs to make a correction for the error. The result was to change the 
outcome of the analysis from estimating that privatization would be 
less costly over the long term to estimating that continued government 
ownership would be less costly over the long term. 

Bolling Air Force Base Water and Wastewater Systems Privatization: 

The economic analyses supporting privatization of the water and 
wastewater systems at Bolling Air Force Base were not valid because 
they did not accurately reflect system improvements to be performed by 
the contractor. Bolling Air Force Base officials stated that the 
analyses assumed that the contractor would complete many upgrades and 
improvements to the systems during the first 5 years of the contracts. 
However, the officials also stated that the privatization contract 
process was delayed after the analyses were prepared and that military 
construction funding was obtained and used to complete about 90 percent 
of the improvement projects that the analyses assumed the contractor 
would do. Because the analyses were not updated to reflect the changes 
in the planned work, the results of the analyses include estimated 
savings from contractor work that will not be performed. We did not 
have sufficient information to recalculate estimates in analyses. 
However, installation officials stated that they believed that 
continued government ownership of the systems would have been less 
costly than privatization over the long term. 

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON: 
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:

Mr. Barry Holman:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548:

APR 29 2005:

Dear Mr. Holman:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, `DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE: Management Issues Requiring Attention 
in Utility Privatizations', dated March 31, 2005 (GAO-05-433, Code 
350557). Detailed comments on the report are enclosed. Our comments 
support my conclusion that the draft report reflects a limited 
understanding of the Utilities Privatization program and an unwarranted 
characterization of all findings to be systemic problems of the 
program. 

To the extent that the report characterizes findings which appear to be 
outdated and not well founded, I urge your strongest consideration to 
revisit this report and to comprehensively address the issues we have 
raised prior to issuing this report in final form. My staff is prepared 
and willing to assist your team to more accurately assess the program. 
We would also appreciate an additional opportunity for review prior to 
any final publication. 

Signed by: 

Philip W. Grone:

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment):

Enclosure: As stated:

GAO DRAFT REPORT-DATED MARCH 31, 2005 GAO CODE 350557/GAO-05-433:

"DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE: Management Issues Requiring Attention In 
Utility Privatization:"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 
Environment to revise the guidance for preparing economic analyses so 
that the analyses compare the cost of a proposed privatization contract 
with the cost of continued government ownership on the basis of the 
actual planned expenditures and the timing of these expenditures. (pp. 
33/GAO Draft Report):

DOD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. In establishing the economic costs to be 
compared for purposes of meeting the statutory requirements of 10 
U.S.C. § 2688, the DoD effectively had two choices: (1) it could assume 
that future costs of ownership by DoD would be the equivalent of the 
level of maintenance that would occur if owned by private industry, 
i.e., "should-cost"; or, (2) it could assume that future costs of 
ownership by DoD would reflect the likely levels of actual expenditures 
that DoD would invest in the system. In either case, the resulting 
numbers would be, at best, an estimate of future costs. The more 
accurate estimate, however, is the "should-cost" estimate. This is 
because it is impossible to predict with any measure of accuracy what 
the DoD would itself spend to maintain a system, particularly with 
regard to military construction, beyond more than a few years. DoD does 
not effectively budget beyond that for purposes of utility system 
capitalization. On the other hand, using the "should-cost" estimate is 
substantially more accurate since it represents what a private utility 
company would engage in by way of re-capitalization. This is an 
estimate the DoD can ascertain with some reasonable accuracy. Given the 
choice between a reasonably accurate number and a number that would be 
unreliable, the DoD chose the more reliable number-the "should-cost" 
estimate. 

This is also consistent with the underlying rationale of the program, 
that private industry can normally provide more efficient utility 
service than can the Government. It is reasonable to assume that the 
comparison, for purposes of the economic evaluation, should be between 
equivalent operations. To do this, the DoD has to assume that the 
utility system will be maintained at essentially the same level whether 
privately or Government owned. The alternative-assuming little or no 
Government investment, but very large private investment-would result 
in the authority of section 2688 never being used for the simple reason 
that the costs of not maintaining a system, even if it doesn't perform, 
is always going to be less expensive than the costs of maintaining the 
system. 

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Defense 
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 
Environment to adjust installation operations and maintenance budgets 
as necessary to reflect increased costs from utility privatization 
projects. (p. 34/GAO Draft Report):

DOD Response: Nonconcur. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Installations and Environment does not manage the operations and 
maintenance budgets of the installations. The Military Departments are 
responsible for funding the utility services contracts resulting from a 
system conveyance. The Services make the required adjustments for these 
must-pay contract costs as part of their programming and budgeting 
responsibilities. 

The example on page 18 concerning funding of the Fort Irwin electrical 
distribution services contract illustrates how the Services prioritize 
requirements in a rational manner. The Army centrally programs and 
budgets for the increased cost of utilities due to privatization for a 
period of two years following contract award. By that time, the 
increased cost becomes part of the historic data and is captured by the 
Army's programming and budgeting system. 

RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Defense 
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 
Environment to require an independent review, perhaps by DoD 
headquarters or the services audit agencies, of the economic analyses 
supporting proposed privatization projects. (p. 34/GAO Draft Report):

DOD Response: Nonconcur. The Military Departments have authority to 
ensure a sufficient review and have adopted processes that conduct such 
a review. The Service Secretary is responsible for ensuring that a 
proper economic analysis is conducted per guidance that has been in 
effect since October 10, 2002. While some of the GAO concerns are 
factually correct, they occurred during the start of the program. The 
Services have implemented program improvements (standard RFPs and 
economic analysis models) to achieve uniform and consistent processes 
and have shared lessons on a regular basis. The Services achieve 
independent review of the economic analysis by using the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency and consultants to conduct reviews at all stages 
of the procurement process. DUSD(I&E) will continue to monitor progress 
in this area in it's oversight role. 

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Defense 
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 
Environment to place greater scrutiny on the implementation of the fair 
market value requirement in proposed contracts to minimize cases where 
contractors recover more than the amounts they paid for system 
conveyances. (p. 34/GAO Draft Report):

DOD Response: Nonconcur. 10 U.S.C § 2688 states that the Secretary 
concerned shall require as consideration for a conveyance an amount 
equal to the fair market value of the right, title, or interest of the 
United States conveyed. This requires that the contractor make an 
investment in the system. It also avoids issues related to taxes for 
contributions in aid of construction. Business practices will normally 
yield some return on that investment, as does any investment in capital 
plant by a business. The form of that return and the cost of the 
transaction are highly variable depending on the industry sector. The 
examples mentioned in the GAO report happened during the start of the 
program. Contracting Officers are now aware of the potential for 
contractors to recover more than they pay in Fair Market Value and take 
steps to minimize the risk. 

RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Defense 
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 
Environment to issue specific utility privatization contract 
administration guidance and provide funding for personnel to perform 
contract oversight. (p. 34/GAO Draft Report):

DOD Response: Nonconcur. The Services are transitioning their emphasis 
from pre-award functions to post award contract administration. The 
Services are responsible for funding and performing post-award contract 
administration of utility contracts just as with any other contract. 
Specific utility privatization guidance is best developed by Service 
contracting authorities as a regular order of business using 
established contract administration procedures and best business 
practices. 

RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Defense 
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 
Environment to reassess whether permanent conveyance of utility systems 
should be DOD's preferred approach to obtaining improved utility 
services. (p. 34/GAO Draft Report):

DOD Response: Nonconcur. The Deputy Secretary of Defense determined 
that owning, operating, and maintaining utility systems are not core 
functions of the Department of Defense. When conveyance with full title 
transfer is uneconomical, the Military Services are already able to 
consider if conveyance of a lesser estate will result in long-term 
savings. As an example, the Army determined that full title transfer of 
the water and wastewater systems at Fort Campbell is uneconomical. The 
Army then determined that conveyance of the systems at a lesser estate 
is economical and completed the transaction. 

The issue of title transfer has been reviewed repeatedly during the 
life of this program. While there are compelling arguments on each 
side, the Department continues to believe, supported by numerous 
completed actions, that the best practice is to transfer title to the 
utility system in line with the statutory intent. This effectively gets 
the Department out of a non-core mission and makes the Department a 
utility customer instead of a utility provider. As of 2nd quarter FY 
2005, the Services have issued RFPs or made privatization decisions for 
most of DOD's utility systems. A re-assessment of DOD's policy at this 
point would create confusion without adding value to the few remaining 
solicitations. 

[End of section]

(350557): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. 
L. No. 105-85, § 2812, (1997). 

[2] The conveyance may consist of all right, title, and interest of the 
United States in the utility system or such lesser estate as the 
Secretary of a military department considers appropriate to serve the 
interests of the United States. 

[3] See note 1. 

[4] See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-136, § 1031(a)(12), which changed the timing of the 
reporting requirement. The seven utility privatization projects we 
reviewed were under the earlier requirement. 

[5] See Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the 
Military Departments and others, Subject: Department of Defense Reform 
Initiative Directive #9--Privatizing Utility Systems (Department of 
Defense: Washington, D.C., Dec. 10, 1997). 

[6] See Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the 
Military Departments and others, Subject: Department of Defense Reform 
Initiative Directive #49--Privatizing Utility Systems (Department of 
Defense: Washington, D.C., Dec. 23, 1998). 

[7] See Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force and Director of the Defense Logistics Agency, 
Subject: Revised Guidance for the Utility Privatization Program 
(Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., Oct. 9, 2002). 

[8] GAO, Defense Reform Initiative: Organization, Status, and 
Challenges, GAO/NSIAD-99-87 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 1999) and 
Defense Infrastructure: Improved Performance Measures Would Enhance 
Defense Reform Initiative, GAO/NSIAD-99-169 (Washington, D.C: Aug. 4, 
1999). 

[9] GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Sustain Reform 
Initiatives and Achieve Greater Results, GAO/NSIAD-00-72 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 25, 2000). 

[10] GAO, Defense Management: New Management Reform Program Still 
Evolving, GAO-03-58 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2002). 

[11] See GAO, Military Housing: Privatization Off to a Slow Start and 
Continued Management Attention Needed, GAO/NSIAD-98-178 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 17, 1998); Military Housing: Continued Concerns in 
Implementing the Privatization Initiative, GAO/NSIAD-00-71 (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 30, 2000); and Military Housing: Management Improvement 
Needed As the Pace of Privatization Quickens, GAO-02-624 (Washington, 
D.C.: June 21, 2002). 

[12] See GAO, Defense Budget: DOD Should Further Improve Visibility and 
Accountability of O&M Fund Movements, GAO/NSIAD-00-18 (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 9, 2000); and Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding 
Priorities and Strategic Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of 
Military Facilities, GAO-03-274 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2003). 

[13] Because the budget does not reflect up front the full costs of the 
improvements to be obtained through utility privatization, it may be 
more difficult for decision makers to consider the full financial 
commitment that the government undertakes when it enters into long-term 
privatization contracts. This could lead to a situation in which budget 
decisions favor utility privatizations over programs that include their 
full costs up front in the budget. 

[14] 62 Comp. Gen. 569 (1983). 

[15] 62 Comp. Gen. at 572 and 575, n.8. 

[16] We do not presume the government will default on its contractual 
obligations. 

[17] System improvements normally include capital equipment upgrades 
and enhanced operations and maintenance to increase utility system 
reliability and reduce safety and environmental risks. 

[18] Fort Campbell privatized its water and wastewater systems under 
one contract and prepared one economic analysis for the project. 

[19] Under the government ownership option, the Fort Campbell economic 
analysis assumed that operations and maintenance levels would be 
enhanced and a series of capital projects would be undertaken to 
upgrade the systems. Our estimate was based on delaying the planned 
capital projects, not the enhanced operations and maintenance levels, 
for 5 years. 

[20] See DOD Instruction 7041.3, Subject: Economic Analysis for 
Decisionmaking, November 7, 1995. 

[21] U.S Army Audit Agency, Potable Water and Wastewater Utility 
Systems Contract, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, A-2004-0186-IMO 
(Alexandria, Va.: Apr. 27, 2004). 

[22] See Memorandum for Distribution, Subject: Utility Systems 
Privatization--Fair Market Value, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Installation Management (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2002). Navy and Air 
Force officials stated that their guidance on fair market value was 
consistent with DOD's general guidance. 

[23] U.S. Army Audit Agency, Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of 
Staff for Installation Management, Subject: Review of the Fair Market 
Value for Privatized Electrical Distribution Systems, AA 02-701 
(Alexandria, Va.: Oct. 5, 2001). 

[24] U. S. Army Audit Agency, Electrical Distribution System Contract, 
U.S. Army Infantry Center and Fort Benning, A-2002-0395-IMO 
(Alexandria, Va.: May 23, 2002). 

[25] See note 21. 

[26] Army Audit Agency, Privatization of Utility Distribution Systems, 
Fort Hamilton, New York, A-2003-0216-IMO (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 
2003). 

[27] See note 24. 

[28] U.S. Army Audit Agency, Electrical Distribution System Contract, 
Virginia Army National Guard Maneuver Training Center, Fort Pickett, 
Virginia, A-2003-0337-IMO (Alexandria, Va.: June 27, 2003). 

[29] CNA, Utility Privatization Initiatives: Concerns, Metrics, 
Priorities, CRM D0003236.A2 (Alexandria, Va.: March 2001). 

[30] Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., Program Assessment for Utilities 
Privatization in the U.S. Air Force (March 2002). 

[31] See notes 21, 23, 24, 26, and 28, and Naval Inspector General, 
Utilities Privatization Study (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005). 

[32] See Statement of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations 
and Environment) before the Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life 
and Veterans' Affairs, Committee on Appropriations, United States House 
of Representatives, March 2, 2005. 

[33] See Statement by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
(Installations) before the Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and 
Veterans' Affairs, Committee on Appropriations, United States House of 
Representatives, March 2, 2005. 

[34] See DOD Instruction 7041.3, Subject: Economic Analysis for 
Decisionmaking, Nov. 7, 1995. 

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E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Public Affairs: 

Jeff Nelligan, managing director,

NelliganJ@gao.gov

(202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office,

441 G Street NW, Room 7149

Washington, D.C. 20548: