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Alternatives Underscore Need for Additional Assessment' which was 
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Report to Congressional Committees:

April 2005:

DOD schools:

Limitations in DOD-Sponsored Study on Transfer Alternatives Underscore 
Need for Additional Assessment:

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-469]

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-469, a report to congressional committees.

Why GAO Did This Study:

The Department of Defense (DOD) operates 59 elementary and secondary 
schools serving over a dozen military bases in the continental United 
States Periodically, questions have been raised concerning the 
continuing need for such schools. In 2002, DOD commissioned the Donahue 
Institute of the University of Massachusetts to examine the potential 
for transferring these schools to local education agencies (LEAs). 
GAO’s assessment focused on (1) the extent to which DOD has established 
a school closure policy and the effect such policies have on quality-of-
life issues for servicemembers and their dependents; and (2) the 
transfer study, including the clarity of the basis for conclusions 
reached, the overall financial impact, and issues identified but not 
resolved by the study. GAO’s report also identifies issues not 
addressed in the transfer study that could impact the future of DOD’s 
domestic schools.

What GAO Found:

Officials in the DOD Education Activity, which administers the DOD 
school program, said that neither DOD nor Department of Defense 
Education Activity has specific policy guidance related to closing 
domestic dependent elementary and secondary schools. While some 
expansion and contraction of the number of domestic schools operated by 
DOD occurred between the 1950s and early 1970s, relatively few have 
been closed or transferred since then, and most of those have been 
related to base closure activities. For affected military families, the 
retention of these schools is seen as an important quality-of-life 
issue.

The basis for the expert panel recommendations to transfer selected DOD 
schools to LEAs is difficult to ascertain. Specifically, it is often 
unclear how various analytical factors examined led to recommendations 
being made. For example, in one instance the panel recommended transfer 
of educational responsibilities to the neighboring LEA even though the 
LEA’s per pupil costs were higher than DOD’s and the LEA schools were 
cited as mostly “underperforming.” Moreover, the study data indicate 
that DOD could incur an estimated $125 million to repair and upgrade 
existing schools. Under the panel’s recommendations, DOD would also 
have a continuing obligation to maintain the schools even after program 
transfers to the LEAs. Some long-term savings in operating costs could 
accrue to DOD, but many of these costs would need to be absorbed by 
LEAs or other federal programs. The transfer study also indicates that 
various legal restrictions in some states would need to be resolved. 
Finally, ownership of the schools DOD operates needs to be clarified in 
order to ensure that it is properly reflected in property records. 

There are other factors, most not present when the transfer study 
began, that could further complicate school transfer decisions, 
including ongoing DOD plans to relocate about 70,000 military personnel 
and approximately 100,000 family members currently stationed overseas 
to bases in the United States within the next few years; Army efforts 
to reorganize its force structure, with the potential for increased 
numbers of personnel assigned to selected military bases in the United 
States; and the impact of the 2005 base realignment and closure round. 
Likewise, current DOD efforts to privatize housing on its military 
bases could also impact future requirements for schools serving 
military dependents. DOD has appropriately said that it is postponing 
decision making on the results of the transfer study until after base 
closure decisions are finalized later this year. However, the impact of 
troop redeployments and other force structure changes on schools has 
not yet been fully assessed. Given the expected increase of school age 
military dependents on various stateside military bases over the next 
few years, a clear decision on school transfer issues should be made 
after the results of the base closure process and overseas rebasing 
plans are known to ensure adequate planning for facilities by DOD and 
LEAs.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO is making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to ensure DOD 
schools are properly accounted for in real property records and if a 
transfer decision is made, to undertake a more complete assessment of 
impending changes in U.S. basing levels and their impact on educational 
facility requirements to foster appropriate facility planning by DOD 
and/or LEAs. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred 
with GAO’s recommendations.

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-469].

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Barry W. Holman at (202) 
512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov.

[End of Section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

DOD Does Not Have Specific Criteria for Closing Schools:

Expert Panel Recommends Program Transfers to LEAs in Most Instances, 
but Basis for Decisions Are Not Always Clear, and Many Issues Remain to 
be Addressed:

Other Issues Could Impact Decision Making:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Expert Panel Members:

Appendix II: Department of Defense Elementary and Secondary (DDESS) 
Schools in the Continental United States:

Appendix III: Prior Studies on Transferring DDESS Schools to LEAs:

Appendix IV: Transfer Study Rules and Alternatives:

Appendix V: Differing Perspectives on Selected DDESS and LEA Schools 
Contained in Various Transfer Study Report Documents:

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Table:

Table 1: Expert Panel's Recommendations:

Letter April 26, 2005:

The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:

Historically, public elementary and secondary education has been a 
state and local responsibility. However, for many years, the Department 
of Defense (DOD) has also operated a number of such schools (currently 
59) serving over a dozen military bases in the continental United 
States.[Footnote 1] Periodically, questions have been raised within the 
Congress concerning the continuing need for such schools, and various 
studies were commissioned in the 1980s and early 1990s to study the 
potential for transferring responsibility for educating students served 
by these schools to local public school districts--otherwise referred 
to in this report as local education agencies (LEAs). Prior studies 
identified multiple issues that would have to be addressed if a 
transfer of responsibilities were to be attempted, and such transfers 
were not considered feasible. Furthermore, military members served by 
these schools and related support groups have voiced strong support for 
retention of these DOD schools based on quality-of-life considerations.

In 2002, the department's attention once again turned to studying the 
potential for transferring DOD's domestic elementary and secondary 
education program over to LEAs. Officials in the Department of Defense:

Education Activity (DODEA),[Footnote 2] which administers this program, 
have indicated that the new effort was the result of questions raised 
by the then chairman of the House Appropriations Military Construction 
Subcommittee regarding whether there was a need for continued operation 
of these schools by DOD arising from a request for funding for a school-
related project on a military base. Additionally, in 2002, as part of 
its focus on improving management of the department, DOD's senior 
leadership endorsed examining departmental functions to determine 
whether they were core to the department's warfighting mission, with 
expectations that needed products or services associated with non-core 
functions should be obtained from other government agencies or the 
private sector. In announcing that it would begin a new study of 
elementary and secondary schools operated by DOD on 14 installation 
areas in seven states including Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, New York, and Virginia, Department of Defense 
Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools' (DDESS) press 
release indicated that the study would "focus largely on the ability 
and willingness of LEAs to assume educational responsibility for the 
students currently enrolled in DOD's domestic schools." The transfer 
study effort, apart from a facilities analysis phase by Parkhill, 
Smith, and Cooper Inc., was completed under contract by the Donahue 
Institute of the University of Massachusetts.[Footnote 3]

The Donahue Institute retained an independent panel of education 
experts[Footnote 4] which developed recommendations based on the 
Institute's data and the facility data obtained under the Corps of 
Engineers contract. The panel of experts recommended transferring 
educational responsibilities at 10 of 14 installation areas studied 
from DDESS schools to LEAs. DOD does not plan to make a decision 
regarding the recommendations until after decisions on the upcoming 
base realignment and closure round are completed later this year.

Section 597 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2005,[Footnote 5] which was signed into law on October 
28, 2004, required the Comptroller General to prepare a report 
containing:

(1) an assessment of the policy of the Department of Defense, and the 
criteria utilized by the department, regarding the closure of 
Department of Defense dependent elementary and secondary schools, 
including whether or not such policy and criteria are consistent with 
department policies and procedures on the preservation of the quality-
of-life of members of the Armed Forces and their dependents; and:

(2) an assessment of any current or on-going studies or assessments of 
the department with respect to any of the schools.

The legislation required that the report be submitted to the Senate and 
House Armed Services committees not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of the legislation.

Our assessment focused on (1) the extent to which DOD has established a 
school closure policy and the effect such a policy has on quality-of-
life issues for servicemembers and their dependents; and (2) the 
transfer study conducted by the Donahue Institute, including the 
clarity of the basis for conclusions reached, the overall financial 
impact, and issues identified but not resolved by the study. While 
conducting this work, we also noted other issues not addressed in the 
transfer study that could impact decision making regarding the future 
of DOD's domestic elementary and secondary schools.

In completing this engagement, we interviewed DODEA officials regarding 
their policy guidance related to closing schools and reviewed the 
results of the recent study dealing with the potential transfer of 
DDESS schools to LEAs. We discussed the study design and methodology 
with officials of DODEA, DDESS, the Donahue Institute and two of the 
three members of the panel of experts employed by the institute to 
review its data and to develop study recommendations. We examined the 
various study summary documents to try to gauge the basis for the 
study's recommendations and determine how clearly the recommendations 
were linked to the summary information provided. We also reviewed 
summaries of interviews completed by the institute with leaders in 
affected DDESS schools and local education agencies to confirm and 
better understand the range of issues associated with the issue of 
potential transfer of the schools to LEAs. Likewise, we also discussed 
relevant issues concerning federal impact aid and experience in 
transferring federally owned schools to LEAs with officials at the U.S. 
Department of Education. Given time constraints, we did not attempt to 
validate data included in DOD's transfer study, but we did review the 
steps taken by the Donahue Institute to verify its data and analysis 
and to compare key data against other available data sets to 
corroborate its relative accuracy. We obtained other relevant 
statistical data concerning data about DDESS schools from DODEA and 
made limited checks to assure ourselves that the data was sufficiently 
accurate for the purposes of our review.

We conducted this review from January to April 2005 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Further details about 
our scope and methodology appear at the end of this report.

Results in Brief:

While DOD has previously urged its components to examine for potential 
divestiture or outsourcing to the private sector functions not core to 
warfighting efforts, DODEA officials told us that neither DOD nor DODEA 
has specific policy guidance related to closing dependent elementary 
and secondary schools, the retention of which under DOD are seen by 
some servicemembers and their dependents as important to their quality 
of life. The officials noted the elimination of only three domestic 
schools in the past few years; one in 2001 in Georgia as the result of 
military housing privatization when the school transferred to an LEA, 
and two others in 2004 as the result of a base closure in Puerto Rico. 
Survey data from the recent and previous transfer studies clearly 
indicate that for military families, whose dependents attend DDESS 
schools, retention of those schools is an important quality-of-life 
issue. While their children represent a very small percentage of the 
dependent school-age population, affected servicemembers' views of the 
quality of education and related services provided by the dependent 
schools makes the retention of these schools very important to them. 
The importance of these schools has been affirmed in departmental 
guidance concerning what functions could be performed by the private 
sector. That guidance currently permits principals and faculty at DOD 
Dependent Schools to be exempted from outsourcing consideration 
recognizing these functions could be performed by the private sector 
(but without the same effect--i.e., military performance of these 
activities carries special meaning for military personnel and their 
families).[Footnote 6] Nonetheless, the future of these schools has 
been subject to some uncertainty in recent years due to congressional 
concerns and as DOD began emphasizing the assessment of functions not 
core to warfighting missions for potential outsourcing which resulted 
in the initiation of the recent transfer study.

While the recent study sought to complete a more comprehensive 
assessment of the transfer issue than prior studies, the basis for the 
panel of experts recommendations is difficult to ascertain where 
transfers of DDESS' educational responsibilities are recommended. In 
addition to costs that would be incurred by DOD, legal and other issues 
could complicate the implementation of the panel's recommended school 
transfers to LEAs. The panel's recommendations report does not always 
provide a clear or concise indication of the key factors supporting the 
transfer of educational programs from DDESS to LEAs. Specifically, it 
is often unclear how the panel of experts evaluated various analytical 
factors leading to its recommendations based on information provided in 
the various study documents. Two expert panel members we contacted 
acknowledged that the panel's recommendations were subjective but based 
on all the members' collective expertise and experiences. However, 
information provided in the various study report documents sometimes 
raised more questions than it answered. For example, the panel in two 
of three instances where there was more than one affected LEA 
recommended transferring educational responsibilities to one of the 
LEAs even though the local school district was considered to be 
"underperforming" when another "overperforming" LEA was available with 
lower per pupil costs. In addition, the panel recommended a LEA over 
DDESS even though the LEA's per pupil costs were higher and its schools 
were cited as mostly "underperforming."[Footnote 7] The study data 
indicate that DOD could incur an estimated $125 million to repair and 
upgrade existing DDESS schools. In addition, DOD would have a 
continuing obligation to maintain the school facilities even after 
transfer of educational responsibility to the LEAs, under the transfer 
alternative recommended by the panel. Long-term savings in operating 
costs could accrue to DOD but many of these costs would need to be 
absorbed by LEAs and would, to some extent, create an additional burden 
for the U.S. Department of Education as it distributes available 
resources to LEAs that become eligible for increased impact aid as a 
result of educating more military-connected students.[Footnote 8] At 
the same time, numerous other issues would arise if efforts were made 
to implement the transfers, such as clarifying current ownership of the 
schools between DOD and the U.S. Department of Education and 
differences in their relative legislative authorities for transferring 
federally owned schools to LEAs.[Footnote 9] Other legal restrictions 
in some states would likely prohibit LEAs from readily taking 
possession of facilities located on federal lands. The panel of experts 
recognized that any transfers would need to be done on an individual, 
negotiated basis.

Apart from the issues identified in the transfer study, there are other 
factors/issues not addressed in the study, most of which were not 
present when the study began, that could impact DDESS and LEA schools, 
and further complicate school transfer decisions. The study does not 
recognize such ongoing DOD plans as:

* the restationing of about 70,000 military personnel and approximately 
100,000 family members currently stationed overseas to bases in the 
United States within the next few years;

* Army efforts to reorganize its force structure, with the potential 
for increased numbers of personnel assigned to selected military bases 
in the United States; and:

* the impact of the 2005 base realignment and closure round.

DOD has appropriately said that it is postponing decision making on the 
results of the transfer study until after base closure decisions are 
finalized later this year. Likewise, current DOD efforts to privatize 
housing on its military bases, combined with rebasing efforts noted 
previously could also impact future requirements for on-base dependent 
schools. However, the impact of these housing factors has not yet been 
fully assessed. Nevertheless, given the expected increase of school age 
military dependents on stateside military bases over the next few 
years, a clear decision on school transfer issues made sooner rather 
than later would help to ensure adequate planning for facilities by DOD 
and LEAs.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense resolve continuing 
uncertainty regarding the school transfer issue to foster appropriate 
facility planning by DOD and/or LEAs.

Background:

Notwithstanding that public elementary and secondary education 
historically has been a state and local responsibility, DOD has also 
operated such schools at selected U.S. and overseas locations to 
educate military dependents residing on military bases. Collectively, 
the domestic and overseas programs operate over 200 dependent schools 
in the United States, U.S. territories, and overseas,[Footnote 10] with 
59 schools operated in the continental United States. (See appendix II 
for a listing of these DDESS school locations.) Approximately 105,000 
students are enrolled in these combined programs, with approximately 
24,000 students attending the 59 schools in the continental United 
States. DDESS schools mostly serve elementary school-aged students in 
the United States, with older students attending public schools off the 
installations. The overseas DODDS system has approximately 12,000 
employees while the DDESS system has approximately 5,700 employees. The 
combined operating budget for both systems and headquarters in fiscal 
year 2005 is about $1.49 billion of which approximately $367 million is 
for operating DDESS schools.[Footnote 11]

As we have previously reported, the federal government's operation of 
elementary schools in the continental United States to educate military 
dependents residing on military bases traces its history back many 
years and to locations where a suitable free public education was not 
available.[Footnote 12] There were a variety of reasons for 
establishing schools on military bases, including military 
installations that were located in sparsely populated areas and efforts 
to avoid racial segregation at the neighboring school districts.

From 1951 to 1981, funding responsibility for the domestic schools 
resided with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and 
subsequently with the Department of Education. The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-35) transferred funding 
responsibility to DOD. Today, DODEA, the umbrella agency created in 
1994 to administer the overseas (DODDS) and domestic (DDESS) systems, 
operates under the direction of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 
Military Community and Family Policy, and the Under Secretary of 
Defense, Personnel and Readiness.

The DDESS model is but one of several approaches to providing 
elementary and secondary education to dependents of military personnel 
residing on military bases in the United States. There are 33 
Department of Education-owned schools located on military bases but 
operated by LEAs, providing education for military dependents residing 
on those bases. The Department of Education has been gradually 
transferring these schools to LEAs as funds are available to upgrade 
the condition of the schools to encourage acceptance of the schools by 
LEAs.[Footnote 13] In other instances, LEAs own and operate schools 
located on military bases. Finally, in a limited number of instances, 
DOD directly funds LEAs to educate military dependents at schools 
operated on military bases.

Periodically, questions have arisen within the Congress concerning the 
continuing need for such schools within the continental United States, 
and various studies were commissioned in the 1980s and early 1990s to 
evaluate the potential for transferring the schools to LEAs.[Footnote 
14] In December 1986 we examined three methods to educate military 
dependents, then in selected use, which were viewed as alternatives to 
the DOD-funded and operated schools. They included: (1) operation by 
local school districts, with funding from federal, state, and local 
governments; (2) DOD contracting with local school districts for 
educational services; and (3) coterminous operation, whereby 
dependents' schools operated as local school districts whose boundaries 
were the same as the military installations' boundaries, and where 
funding for those districts was shared by the Department of Education 
(through the federal impact aid program) and the responsible state 
government. We reported in December 1986 that creation of school 
districts coterminous with military installations appeared to be the 
best of the three alternatives, in part because such an approach would 
likely minimize the transfer of students from existing schools and 
eliminate costs to DOD. However, according to a DODEA official, most 
states have since passed laws that prohibit the creation of new school 
districts, which eliminates the coterminous option from consideration. 
We also reported that jurisdictional, legal, and other issues could 
impede consideration of all three alternatives. Subsequent studies by 
others offered varying degrees of insights regarding these alternatives 
and difficulties likely to be encountered in trying to implement them, 
and often identified multiple issues that would have to be addressed--
including legal and financial issues, and strong opposition from 
affected military families--if a transfer of responsibilities were to 
be attempted. As a result, school transfers were not considered 
feasible. (See app. III for a synopsis of each of the prior studies.)

In 2002, DOD's attention again turned to studying the potential for 
transferring DOD's domestic elementary and secondary education program 
over to LEAs. DODEA officials have indicated that the new effort was 
the result of questions raised by the then chairman of the House 
Appropriations Military Construction Subcommittee regarding whether 
there was a continuing need for DOD to operate these schools triggered 
by a request for funding for a school-related project on a military 
base. We also note that in 2002, as part of its focus on improving 
management of the department, DOD's Senior Executive Council[Footnote 
15] endorsed a core competency-based approach for DOD sourcing 
decisions--that is, the decision to use a public or private sector 
source to perform a necessary agency function or activity was based on 
whether the function or activity was core to the agency's mission. The 
Senior Executive Council believed that the department should focus its 
energies and talents on those functions that were core or directly 
linked to its warfighting mission. These core functions must be 
performed by the agency, with the expectation that necessary products 
or services associated with non-core functions should be obtained from 
other government agencies or the private sector.[Footnote 16]

A DDESS press release, announcing the planned transfer study in 2002, 
indicated that the study would "focus largely on the ability and 
willingness of LEAs to assume educational responsibility for the 
students currently enrolled in DOD's domestic schools." This transfer 
study was performed in multiple phases that included:

* A facility condition assessment performed by Parkhill, Smith, and 
Cooper, Inc., and contracted through the Army Corps of Engineers. Field 
observer site visits were made to document the current physical 
condition of each school, estimate probable costs for remediation, and 
assess whether renovation or replacement was needed. This assessment 
identified about $125 million in remediation costs for all 58 DDESS 
schools surveyed and about $33 million to replace 4 of the 
schools.[Footnote 17]

* A data collection and analysis phase conducted by the Donahue 
Institute of the University of Massachusetts to examine the feasibility 
of transferring 58[Footnote 18] DDESS schools operating in the 
continental United States to local school districts. A set of transfer 
alternatives was developed and analyzed for each of the DDESS schools.

* Use of a three-person expert panel, approved by DOD and contracted by 
the Donahue Institute to independently assess the Institute's data and 
analysis and make recommendations regarding transfer alternatives.

* A quality-of-life assessment, based on an October 2003 meeting in 
Peachtree City, Georgia, with representatives of the domestic DDESS 
schools and installations where their views were solicited and 
documented. Participants included installation commanders, students, 
parents, union leaders, and special interest groups.

The recommendations of the panel of experts were submitted to DODEA in 
December 2003, but remained closely held without widespread 
dissemination inside the department and without public dissemination 
until February 2005. At the time we completed our work, DOD had not 
made a decision regarding adoption of the panel's recommendations, 
postponing such a decision until later this year after decisions 
related to the 2005 base realignment and closure round are completed.

DOD Does Not Have Specific Criteria for Closing Schools:

While DOD has previously urged its components to examine for potential 
divestiture or outsourcing of functions not core to warfighting efforts 
to the private sector, neither DODEA nor DOD has policy guidance 
related to closing the dependent elementary and secondary schools 
operated by the department. While expansion and contraction of the 
number of domestic schools operated by DOD occurred between the 1950s 
and early 1970s, relatively few have been closed or transferred since 
then, and most of these have been related to base closure activities. 
For affected military families, the retention of these schools is seen 
as a quality-of-life issue, but there are varying perspectives on this 
issue within DOD.

DOD Has Eliminated Few Domestic Schools in Recent Years:

DODEA officials told us they had eliminated only three domestic schools 
in the past few years; one in 2001 in Georgia as the result of military 
housing privatization initiative, and two others in 2004 as the result 
of a base closure in Puerto Rico.[Footnote 19] This contrasts with an 
earlier period between the 1950s and 1970s when there was a more robust 
expansion and contraction in such schools.

Per the 2004 defense appropriations act, the Roosevelt Roads Naval 
Station in Puerto Rico was closed in 2004 and, as part of that closure, 
the DDESS schools on that base also closed. The only other instance of 
a DDESS school being eliminated in recent years occurred in 2001 as a 
result of the department's housing privatization efforts. In that 
instance, land associated with on-base housing at Warner Robins Air 
Force Base, Georgia, was transferred to a contractor and the land 
transferred included one of the base's two schools. As a result, the 
school was subsequently transferred to the LEA, which became 
responsible for educating students at that school. DOD housing 
privatization officials indicated they do not currently anticipate 
similar transfers of schools in the future.

Earlier transfer studies point to expansion and contraction of DOD 
operated schools on military bases between 1950 and 1970. Schools were 
added to the DDESS system as a result of the racial integration of the 
military during the time when the schools in the neighboring LEAs 
remained segregated. At one point, about 100 military installations 
reportedly had schools that belonged to what is now the DDESS system. 
Various studies report a subsequent contraction in the number of these 
schools due to a variety of factors including successful implementation 
of integration policies in many instances that allowed base schools to 
rejoin their former LEAs, pressure from the U.S. Department of 
Education on states and localities to acknowledge responsibility for 
the education of military dependents, and commercial and residential 
development adjacent to some bases that enabled the LEA to provide a 
viable educational program.

Retention of Domestic Dependent Schools Is Seen as a Quality-of-Life 
Issue:

Survey and other data from the current and earlier studies on transfer 
issues clearly indicate that affected military families, whose 
dependents attend DDESS schools, view their retention as a quality-of-
life issue. While their children represent a very small percentage of 
the dependent school-aged population, affected servicemembers' views of 
the quality of education and related services provided by the dependent 
schools makes clear that the retention of these schools is very 
important to them. An October 1997 Defense Manpower Data Center study 
noted that "the loss of the DDESS schools would undoubtedly be viewed 
as another loss of a military quality-of-life benefit. But unlike many 
other benefit cuts… that affect all or most military servicemembers, 
the loss of this benefit would affect a small proportion of military 
servicemembers."

The Defense Manpower Data Center report also indicated that DDESS 
students comprised only three percent of all school-aged children of 
active-duty servicemembers. DODEA provided us with data that indicate 
that figure remains current today. Moreover, only 23 percent of all 
school-aged dependents of military members assigned to the 
installations served by DOD's domestic dependent schools in the 
continental United States attend the schools. This can be attributed to 
the fact that many military families reside in local communities--that 
is, not on the base--and thus are not eligible to attend DDESS schools, 
and the fact that relatively few DDESS schools provide education for 
high school students.

DOD's guidance for deciding what functions the department performs that 
could be considered commercial in nature and readily available in the 
private sector, has exempted DOD schools from outsourcing 
consideration. DOD's guidance stipulates that principals and faculty at 
DOD dependent schools perform functions that could be performed by the 
private sector "but without the same effect--i.e., military performance 
of these activities carries special meaning for military personnel, and 
their families." The guidance also notes that principals and faculty at 
DOD Dependent Schools demonstrate family support, promote quality-of-
life and foster camaraderie for recruitment and retention purposes. 
Accordingly, DOD dependent schools were exempt from private sector 
performance comparisons. In addition, in recent years, DOD has sought a 
more aggressive look at whether various functions are core to the 
department's warfighting mission, and to increase the number of 
functions that might be performed by the private sector. Dependent 
schools are one such function that has sometimes been questioned 
regarding its connection to DOD's core mission.

Conversely, in July 2002, DOD published A New Social Compact: A 
Reciprocal Partnership Between The Department of Defense, 
Servicemembers and Families. The document was issued under the auspices 
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Community and 
Family Policy). It noted that in 2001, the President had issued a 
National Security Presidential Directive requiring the Secretary of 
Defense to undertake a review of measures for improving the quality of 
life for military personnel and provide recommendations for their 
implementation. While the new compact did not specifically address the 
issue of whether DOD dependent schools should be retained or 
transferred to LEAs, it did include a section devoted to enhancing 
educational opportunities provided through DODEA worldwide.

Expert Panel Recommends Program Transfers to LEAs in Most Instances, 
but Basis for Decisions Are Not Always Clear, and Many Issues Remain to 
be Addressed:

The panel of experts recommended transferring most educational 
responsibilities from DDESS schools to LEAs at 10 of 14 installation 
areas studied. The institute sought to contrast DDESS and LEA schools 
to guide the panel's analysis and process for making recommendations. 
Nonetheless, the basis for these recommendations is difficult to 
ascertain based on study report documents. The study indicates that DOD 
could incur significant costs, as well as face legal and other issues 
related to the transfer of schools to LEAs. Finally, the panel 
recognizes that such transfers would have to be done on an individual, 
negotiated basis.

Transfer Study Contrasts DDESS and LEA Schools to Guide Expert Panel's 
Recommendations:

The Donahue Institute study built on the work of prior studies, 
examining many transfer alternatives previously considered in earlier 
studies ranging from the status quo to the transfer of educational 
programs to LEAs. While various issues addressed in the study were 
similar to those previously studied--such as facility conditions and 
remediation costs and identifying transfer options and impediments to 
their use--it sought to make a comparative assessment of DDESS and 
surrounding LEA schools to provide the basis for informed decision 
making. The report noted that the expert panel established the 
following guiding principles to guide its recommendations:

* All students transferred from DDESS to local public schools must be 
provided comparable educational programs, services and facilities.

* School communities gain from diversity.

* Cost effectiveness of government. Any transfer alternative must be 
cost-effective not only to DODEA, but to the state and local entities 
involved.

* Deference to the needs of younger students. It is rarely advisable to 
transfer or otherwise disrupt the educational process of very young 
students.

* Any transfer of DDESS will include just and reasonable compensation 
to the LEA for operational and facilities costs.

* Each installation/LEA will be considered separately.

The report noted that the experts stressed that while each one was 
important, no single principle or criterion would necessarily rule in 
or out a transfer alternative. Rather, the totality of all financial 
and non-financial factors was carefully considered, evaluated, and 
factored into each recommendation. The panel also developed feasibility 
rules associated with any transfer decisions to help assure basic 
equity and fairness for the students, families, and communities that 
might be affected by the study. Appendix IV includes summary 
information on the rules and alternatives considered.

The expert panel recommended that the educational responsibility for 
most schools in 10 of the 14 installation areas be transferred to the 
LEAs, and with use of DDESS operated facilities in most instances, as 
noted in table 1.

Table 1: Expert Panel's Recommendations:

State(s) Affected: Alabama;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Rucker;
Number of Schools: 2;
Affected Local Education Agency: Daleville City Schools; Enterprise 
City Schools; Ozark City Schools;
Study Recommendation: Status quo.

State(s) Affected: Alabama;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Maxwell Air Force Base;
Number of Schools: 1;
Affected Local Education Agency: Montgomery County Schools;
Study Recommendation: Status quo.

State(s) Affected: Georgia;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Benning;
Number of Schools: 7;
Affected Local Education Agency: Muscogee County Schools; Chattahoochee 
County Schools;
Study Recommendation: Transfer responsibility for schooling to LEA.

State(s) Affected: Georgia;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Robins Air Force Base;
Number of Schools: 1;
Affected Local Education Agency: Houston County Schools;
Study Recommendation: Transfer responsibility for schooling to LEA.

State(s) Affected: Georgia;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Stewart;
Number of Schools: 2;
Affected Local Education Agency: Liberty County Schools;
Study Recommendation: Transfer responsibility for schooling to LEA.

State(s) Affected: Kentucky/Tennessee;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Campbell;
Number of Schools: 8;
Affected Local Education Agency: Clarksville-Montgomery County; 
Christian County Schools;
Study Recommendation: Transfer responsibility for schooling to LEA.

State(s) Affected: Kentucky;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Knox;
Number of Schools: 8;
Affected Local Education Agency: Hardin County Schools; Meade County 
Schools;
Study Recommendation: Transfer responsibility for schooling to LEA.

State(s) Affected: New York;
Principal Installation(s) Served: U.S. Military Academy, West Point;
Number of Schools: 2;
Affected Local Education Agency: Highland Falls Central School District;
Study Recommendation: Transfer responsibility for schooling to LEA.

State(s) Affected: North Carolina;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Bragg;
Number of Schools: 9;
Affected Local Education Agency: Cumberland County Schools;
Study Recommendation: Transfer responsibility for schooling to LEA.

State(s) Affected: South Carolina;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Jackson;
Number of Schools: 3;
Affected Local Education Agency: Richland County 2 School District;
Study Recommendation: Status quo.

State(s) Affected: North Carolina;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Camp Lejeune;
Number of Schools: 8;
Affected Local Education Agency: Onslow County Schools;
Study Recommendation: Transfer responsibility for schooling to LEA.

State(s) Affected: South Carolina (Laurel Bay);
Principal Installation(s) Served: Marine Corps Air Station; Parris 
Island; Naval Hospital;
Number of Schools: 2[A];
Affected Local Education Agency: Beaufort County Schools;
Study Recommendation: Status quo for Pre-K-3 grade;
transfer grade 4-6.

State(s) Affected: Virginia;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Dahlgren Naval Surface Warfare Center;
Number of Schools: 1;
Affected Local Education Agency: King George County Schools;
Study Recommendation: Status quo.

State(s) Affected: Virginia;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Quantico Marine Corps Base;
Affected Local Education Agency: Prince William County Schools;
Study Recommendation: Status quo Pre-K-grade 3;
transfer grades 4-12 to LEA.

State(s) Affected: Total;
Number of Schools: 58;

Source: Expert panel's recommendations report.

[A] A third DDESS school, not included in the transfer study, has 
subsequently become operational, increasing the total DDESS domestic 
schools to 59.

[End of table]

The expert panel recommended transferring most school programs to LEAs 
with use of existing school facilities on the military installations, 
but with DOD continuing to be responsible for funding maintenance, 
operations, and improvements for most facilities. The panel of expert's 
recommendation for continued DOD responsibility for the facilities was 
attributed to legal difficulties the expert panel believed existed in 
some states that could prohibit LEAs from expending funds for schools 
located on federal lands, as well as the recognized need to provide 
reasonable assistance to the LEAs. In total, LEAs were projected to use 
45 DDESS operated schools, but take title to only 1 of them.

The recommendations included just a few exceptions to the recommended 
transfer approach wherein DOD would continue to maintain the school 
facilities. For two South Carolina (Laurel Bay area) school programs 
recommended for transfer, one school would be retained by DDESS to 
continue educating Pre-K through grade 3 students, and one school would 
be transferred to the LEA through a title transfer--the only title 
transfer recommended. In another instance--involving Quantico, Virginia 
schools and the Prince William County Schools--responsibility for 
educating about fifty percent of the school children would be 
transferred, but without any of the school facilities. The Prince 
William County LEA reportedly had indicated an unwillingness to use the 
DDESS school facilities. At West Point, New York, responsibility for 
educating all children would be transferred to the LEA and it would use 
only one DDESS facility.

Notwithstanding the panel of expert recommendation that DOD continue to 
fund maintenance and operation for most of the school facilities, we 
found that clarification of ownership of DDESS-operated school 
facilities between DOD and the U.S. Department of Education needs to be 
addressed. In completing this review we found that despite DOD having 
assumed responsibility for operating the current DDESS facilities from 
the U.S. Department of Education many years ago, a majority of the 58 
school facilities had not been formally transferred to DOD. U.S. 
Department of Education officials told us they were working to transfer 
the schools to DOD. Resolution of this issue is important to ensure 
proper accounting for property in the appropriate agency's property 
records. At the same time, we also learned that any efforts by DOD to 
transfer schools to LEAs where it has clear ownership of the property 
could be more difficult and time consuming than for the Department of 
Education since the latter has specific legislative authority 
authorizing such direct transfers.[Footnote 20]

Lack Of Clarity for Selecting LEAs Over Some DDESS Schools And 
Proposing Transfers of Most Schools:

While the methodology used by the Donahue Institute and its expert 
panel reportedly guided data gathering, analysis, and development of 
recommendations, the expert panel's summary comments and various 
binders of data comprising the study report do not always make clear 
the basis for the panel's recommendations. The report stated that the 
panel agreed that no single factor would be the basis of a decision to 
accept or reject a specific alternative. How the panel of experts 
evaluated the various factors in order to come up with recommendations 
is not always clear based on information provided in the various study 
documents. Two of the expert panel members we contacted acknowledged 
that the recommendations were subjective but based on all the members' 
collective expertise and experiences.

Moreover, we found instances where data for selected quality measures 
such as teacher to student ratios and teacher qualifications included 
in various study report documents provide mixed pictures of comparative 
quality factors between DDESS and LEA schools.[Footnote 21] For 
example, in a few instances, the panel recommended transfers to LEA 
districts even though the district schools were considered to be 
"underperforming" while another adjacent LEA's schools were considered 
"overperforming" and with lower per pupil costs; or a LEA was 
recommended over DDESS even though the LEA's per pupil costs were 
higher and its schools were cited as mostly "underperforming."[Footnote 
22] Appendix V highlights examples of the divergent information 
contained in various transfer study documents for four installations.

DOD Would Achieve Savings, but Some Costs Would Be Shifted to 
Department of Education and LEAs:

In transferring the education responsibility to LEAs, DOD would achieve 
savings in costs it currently incurs by operating schools, but many of 
these costs would be shifted to others.[Footnote 23] However, study 
data indicate that DOD could incur costs of about $125 million to 
repair and upgrade existing DDESS school facilities,.[Footnote 24] 
Moreover, DOD would also continue to have ongoing costs to maintain the 
school facilities as the education programs are operated by the LEAs 
under the alternative recommended by the panel of experts. At the same 
time, given various pending changes in basing arrangements that will 
likely increase the number of dependent students at bases in the United 
States, we believe that the facility costs contained in the study would 
be subject to change before any potential decision to approve the study 
recommendations was implemented.

The study, based on data provided by the Department of Education, 
assumes that many costs would be passed on to the state and local 
governments, and that LEAs would be eligible for impact aid from the 
federal Department of Education. [Footnote 25] While the study makes 
various assumptions about likely impact aid to LEAs, we are not able to 
affirm the reliability of those estimates based on the data provided. 
Impact aid is a program that is subject to annual appropriations and 
not an entitlement; and, based on our discussions with Department of 
Education officials, the amount of impact aid to which an LEA would be 
entitled is formula based, and not easily calculated in advance. Also, 
as we note elsewhere in this report, various communities surrounding 
military bases in the United States are expected to experience a 
significant influx of military dependents over the next few years as 
DOD restations many military personnel from bases overseas to ones in 
the continental United States. This could place an increased burden on 
the Department of Education's impact aid program as it distributes 
resources across more LEAs. In addition, states and LEAs would bear an 
additional burden if impact aid funds were not increased.

The recent study, as did prior studies, found unique circumstances that 
could impact costs and would require resolution on a site-by-site 
basis, should an effort be made to transfer educational 
responsibilities from DDESS to LEAs. For example, Fort Campbell has a 
large DDESS student population, with eight schools in two states, and 
agreements would have to be worked out to permit the students to cross 
jurisdictional boundaries to attend the LEA administered school. In a 
couple of other instances, DDESS schools for an installation may fall 
within the jurisdiction of two counties and special arrangements would 
be needed to enable students whose on-base residency falls in one 
county to attend schools in the other county. In other instances, the 
study report noted limitations or caps on numbers of students eligible 
for special education in certain LEAs compared with those in DDESS 
schools that would need to be addressed. Thus, individual negotiations 
at each DDESS location and LEA would be required to address these and 
other issues.

Other Issues Could Impact Decision Making:

Apart from issues identified in the transfer study, there are other 
factors/issues that were not present when the transfer study began that 
could impact DDESS and LEA schools and further complicate school 
transfer decisions. These factors relate to planned overseas basing 
changes, major force structure changes planned by the Army, the 
domestic base closure process, and DOD efforts to privatize housing.

The study did not consider ongoing DOD plans to realign U.S. bases 
overseas and announced plans to restation about 70,000 military 
personnel and approximately 100,000 family members currently stationed 
overseas to bases in the United States. However, the details on where 
many of these personnel and associated units are likely to be 
restationed will not be known until the 2005 base realignment and 
closure decisions are made later this year. Nevertheless, this rebasing 
effort could result in significant increases in populations of various 
bases with many new students requiring education by LEAs. To the extent 
DDESS programs are affected, this could complicate any negotiations 
with LEAs regarding assumption of on-base DDESS programs. Likewise, the 
extent to which DDESS installations will be impacted by the base 
closure process will not be known until later this year.

The study also does not reflect efforts under way by the Army to 
reorganize its force structure, creating new units of action with the 
potential for increased numbers of personnel assigned to selected 
military bases in the United States. A recent Congressional Research 
Service report summarized the magnitude of this effort.[Footnote 26] It 
noted that, "...in what the Army describes as the 'most significant 
Army restructuring in the past 50 years,' the Army intends to redesign 
its current 10 active duty division force to a 43 or 48 brigade-level 
unit of action or UA force by FY 2007." This conversion is expected to 
add over 2,000 personnel to many of these former brigades at various 
installations. A few of these new units of action tentatively have been 
identified for installations in the United States where some DDESS 
schools operate.

DOD has appropriately said that it is postponing decision making on the 
results of the transfer study until after base closure decisions are 
finalized later this year. Importantly, the transfer study, in 
examining educational expenditures, largely considered the cost impact 
on LEAs from a potential transfer decision on an incremental cost 
basis. A large influx of students into LEA or DDESS schools as a result 
of the above factors could require a fuller assessment of funding and 
facility needs than provided for in the existing study.

The transfer study partly touched on current DOD efforts to privatize 
housing on its military bases, but study officials recognize that the 
full impact of that initiative was not available for consideration in 
their report. Additionally, DOD housing officials told us that previous 
plans for housing privatization may need to be adjusted as efforts are 
made to ensure adequate housing for the thousands of military personnel 
scheduled to be redeployed to the United States.

Conclusions:

The transfer study has a number of limitations that present less than a 
clear-cut answer to the feasibility and desirability of transferring 
educational responsibilities from DDESS to LEAs. Moreover, there are 
important issues not addressed in the study such as the anticipated 
restationing of thousands of military personnel and their dependents 
from overseas to U.S. bases, the Army's planned force restructuring, 
and the domestic base closure process that could stress existing 
educational capacities and require expanded capabilities at affected 
bases. DOD has appropriately said that it is postponing decision making 
on the results of the transfer study until after base closure decisions 
are finalized later this year. Until DOD obtains a fuller understanding 
of all these plans and time frames the likely financial impact on DDESS 
and LEAs remains unknown. Without that assessment, the financial 
assessment completed by the current transfer study is incomplete. 
Fundamentally, a decision on whether to transfer educational 
responsibilities from DDESS to LEAs is a policy decision that requires 
balancing fiscal, educational, and other quality of life 
considerations. Once the results of the domestic base closure process 
and overseas rebasing plans are known, a decision on the school 
transfer issue should be made sooner rather than later to ensure 
adequate planning, funding and siting of new school facilities in the 
United States that may be needed to support increasing populations of 
military dependent students. Regardless, there needs to be proper 
accounting for the school facilities in federal property records.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Should a decision be made to transfer some or all of DDESS domestic 
schools to LEAs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in 
conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness require that such efforts be accompanied by a more complete 
assessment of the impact of troop redeployments and other force 
structure changes on educational facility requirements on affected 
installations and surrounding communities to facilitate needed facility 
and operational planning by DOD, the Department of Education and LEAs 
to meet changing needs. Regardless of transfer decisions, we recommend 
that the Secretary ensure DDESS school facilities are properly 
reflected in DOD's property records and removed from the Department of 
Education records.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) concurred with our 
recommendations. The department's response indicated that any decision 
to transfer educational responsibility to local educational authorities 
would occur after the base closure process is complete and would 
involve consultations with the military services and Congress, and that 
it is working with the Department of Education to ensure school 
facilities are properly recorded in real property records. However, the 
department took exception with the title of our report because it 
believed we raised issues that were related to events occurring after 
the study began such as the formulation of the rebasing plan, which 
were outside the scope of the transfer study. We believe, however, that 
the title correctly captures the limitations of the DOD-sponsored study 
as both having to do with external issues affecting the study that 
became known after the study began as well as limitations with the 
study that made unclear the basis for the transfer recommendations. 
Therefore, we did not change our title. The department separately 
provided various technical comments which are incorporated where 
appropriate. DOD's comments are included in appendix VI of this report.

Scope and Methodology:

To determine the extent to which DOD has established a school closure 
policy and the effect such policies have on quality-of-life issues for 
servicemembers and their dependents, we discussed the issue with 
cognizant officials within DODEA and other departmental officials. We 
obtained and reviewed data on DDESS school closures in prior years and 
the basis for those closures, as well as similar information from the 
U.S. Department of Education concerning schools owned by that 
department serving military dependents. We also met with education 
officials to discuss administration of federal impact aid and learn 
about their experience in transferring federally owned schools to LEAs. 
To obtain DOD perspectives concerning the issues of dependent schools 
as a quality of life issue, we obtained and reviewed the Department's 
July 2002, publication entitled A New Social Compact: A Reciprocal 
Partnership Between The Department of Defense, Servicemembers and 
Families. The document was issued under the auspices of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Community and Family Policy) 
providing departmental perspective on a range of quality of life 
issues, including schools. We contrasted that with information obtained 
from the Department's Housing and Privatization Office on criteria for 
considering commercial activities performed by the department for 
potential public/private competitions under OMB Circular A-76. 
Likewise, we contrasted that information with other information 
regarding departmental efforts to more rigorously assess what functions 
are considered core to warfighting efforts with policy direction to 
consider those not designated for potential outsourcing.

To assess the transfer study completed for DODEA by the Donahue 
Institute, including the clarity of the basis for conclusions reached, 
the overall financial impact, and issues identified but not resolved by 
the study, we first reviewed the various summary reports prepared by 
the Donahue Institute, the results of the facility condition assessment 
performed by Parkhill, Smith, and Cooper, Inc., and a summary of the 
phase 3 quality-of-life assessment. We discussed the transfer study 
design and methodology with officials of DODEA, the Donahue Institute 
and two of the three members of the panel of experts employed by the 
institute to review its data and to develop study recommendations. 
Likewise, we also reviewed the results of previous transfer studies to 
understand similarities and differences between previous studies and 
the recent study effort. To assess the basis for recommendations made 
by the expert panel, we examined the data developed for the panel's use 
that was contained in the Donahue Institute's various study summary 
documents to try to gauge the basis for the recommendations and 
determine how clearly the recommendations were linked to the summary 
information provided. Given time constraints, we did not attempt to 
validate financial and other quantitative data included in the study, 
but we did review the steps taken by the Donahue Institute to verify 
its data and analysis and to compare some key data against other 
available data sets to corroborate its relative accuracy. We also 
reviewed summaries of interviews completed by the institute with 
leaders in affected DDESS schools and local education agencies to 
confirm and better understand the range of issues associated with the 
issue of potential transfer of the schools to LEAs--as well as similar 
information contained in prior studies. We obtained other relevant 
statistical data about DDESS schools from DODEA and made limited checks 
to assure ourselves that the data was sufficiently accurate for the 
purposes of our review.

To frame other issues not addressed in the transfer study that could 
impact decision making regarding the future of DOD's domestic 
elementary and secondary schools, we relied on insights gained from 
other ongoing GAO assessments in the Defense area that had the 
potential to impact dependent educational requirements on military 
bases and confirmed our assumptions through discussions with cognizant 
Defense officials.

We conducted this review from January to April 2005 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking 
Minority Members, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittees on 
Defense and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs; Chairmen and 
Ranking Minority Members, House Committee on Appropriations, 
Subcommittee on Quality of Life; Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the 
Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the 
Secretary of Education; and the Director, Office of Management and 
Budget. Copies will be made available to others upon request. In 
addition, this report will be available at no charge on our Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

Please contact me at (202) 512-5581, or my Assistant Director, Michael 
Kennedy, at (202) 512-8333 if you or your staff have any further 
questions regarding this report. Major contributors to this report were 
Maewanda MichaelJackson, Hilary Murrish, and R.K. Wild of GAO's Defense 
Capabilities and Management team, Dr. Nagla'a D. El-Hodiri of GAO's 
Education and Workforce team, and Julia Matta, Office of General 
Counsel.

Signed by:

Barry W. Holman, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:

[End of section]

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Expert Panel Members:

The DDESS Transfer study completed by the Donahue Institute of the 
University of Massachusetts indicated that the results of its data and 
study component analysis were presented to a panel of three leading 
national experts on educational administration and finance. The study 
report provides the following information regarding the three experts:

* Kern Alexander, Ed.D. Dr. Alexander is a national expert in the field 
of school finance. He is Chair of the Board of Editors for the Journal 
of Education Finance. He served as director of the Institute for 
Educational Finance at the University of Florida, and as Director of 
the National Educational Finance Project while it conducted a 
nationwide study of educational fiscal policy involving all 50 state 
education agencies. He has published numerous books, book chapters and 
articles on school finance. He is currently a professor at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;

* Richard Salmon, Ed.D. Dr. Salmon is a nationally recognized expert in 
the fields of school finance and Federal Impact Aid issues. He is a 
professor at Virginia Tech and has authored numerous textbooks, book 
chapters, and articles on public school finance. Dr. Salmon is a member 
of the Board of Editors for The Journal of Education Finance. He also 
consults for the U.S. Department of Education Bureau of Impact Aid and 
has testified for the department in several federal trials. He served 
in the United States Navy for more than 20 years, retiring as Commander 
from the Naval Reserve; and:

* Deborah A. Verstegen, Ph.D. Dr. Verstegen is a national expert in the 
field of school finance. She is a professor of education at the 
University of Virginia, where she teaches a number of courses including 
Educational Finance Policy and Practice, School Finance, and 
Educational Policy Analysis. She has authored many books, book 
chapters, and refereed journal articles and monographs on education 
finance. She is past editor and currently serves on the editorial staff 
of The Journal of Education Finance. She has completed a study of all 
50-state school finance systems for the Education Commission of the 
States, entitled "School Finance at a Glance."

[End of section]

Appendix II: Department of Defense Elementary and Secondary (DDESS) 
Schools in the Continental United States:

State(s) Affected: Alabama;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Rucker;
Number of Schools[A]: 2;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 821;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Daleville City Schools; 
Enterprise City Schools; Ozark City Schools.

State(s) Affected: Alabama;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Maxwell Air Force Base;
Number of Schools[A]: 1;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 448;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Montgomery County Schools.

State(s) Affected: Georgia;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Benning;
Number of Schools[A]: 7;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 2,472;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Muscogee County Schools; 
Chattahoochee County Schools.

State(s) Affected: Georgia;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Robins Air Force Base;
Number of Schools[A]: 1;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 398;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Houston County Schools.

State(s) Affected: Georgia;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Stewart;
Number of Schools[A]: 2;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 1,440;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Liberty County Schools.

State(s) Affected: Kentucky/Tennessee;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Campbell;
Number of Schools[A]: 8;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 4,240;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Clarksville-Montgomery County; 
Christian County Schools.

State(s) Affected: Kentucky;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Knox;
Number of Schools[A]: 8;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 2,784;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Hardin County Schools; Meade 
County Schools.

State(s) Affected: New York;
Principal Installation(s) Served: U.S. Military Academy, West Point;
Number of Schools[A]: 2;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 772;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Highland Falls Central School 
District.

State(s) Affected: North Carolina;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Bragg;
Number of Schools[A]: 9;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 4,352;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Cumberland County Schools.

State(s) Affected: South Carolina;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Fort Jackson;
Number of Schools[A]: 3;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 715;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Richland County School District.

State(s) Affected: North Carolina;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Camp Lejeune;
Number of Schools[A]: 8;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 3,243;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Onslow County Schools.

State(s) Affected: South Carolina (Laurel Bay);
Principal Installation(s) Served: Marine Corps Air Station; Parris 
Island; Naval Hospital;
Number of Schools[A]: 3[B];
Number of Students as of January 2005: 967;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Beaufort County Schools.

State(s) Affected: Virginia;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Dahlgren Naval Surface Warfare Center;
Number of Schools[A]: 1;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 221;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): King George County Schools.

State(s) Affected: Virginia;
Principal Installation(s) Served: Quantico Marine Corps Base;
Number of Schools[A]: 4;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 791;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): Prince William County Schools.

State(s) Affected: Total;
Principal Installation(s) Served: [Empty];
Number of Schools[A]: 59;
Number of Students as of January 2005: 23,664;
Adjacent Local Education Agency(ies): [Empty].

Source: DOD.

[A] These consist of 47 elementary schools, 6 middle schools, 1 junior 
high school, 1 combination elementary/middle school, 1 combination 
middle/high school, and 3 separate high schools.

[B] Transfer study only covered 2 of the three schools; the third 
school became operational after the study was begun.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Prior Studies on Transferring DDESS Schools to LEAs:

* A December 1986 study entitled DOD Schools: Funding and Operating 
Alternatives for Education of Dependents, by GAO. Congress, in enacting 
the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1985 (Public Law 98-407), 
expressed the view that the exclusive federal responsibility for 
funding and operating the military dependents' schools might no longer 
be necessary, and directed us to determine the most suitable 
alternative for funding and operating these schools.

* A July 1988 study entitled The Transfer Of Section 6 
Schools:[Footnote 27] A Case by Case Analysis. The study was completed 
by Rand under the sponsorship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/
Force Management and Personnel as the result of Congress incorporating 
into the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1986, a request to 
the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan "which provides for the 
orderly transfer, not later than July 1990, of all Section 6 schools to 
the appropriate local school districts of the states in which such 
schools are located." DOD later reported to the Congress, in December 
1988, that based on the results of a detailed study of the schools, it 
had decided to suspend efforts to transfer educational responsibilities 
for the schools to LEAs.

* A 1991 study entitled Section 6 Schools in Six States: Eleven Case 
Studies of Transfer Issues. This study was also completed by Rand under 
sponsorship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and 
Personnel), as a supplement to the earlier Rand study.

* A March 1995 study entitled Construction, Repair, and Rehabilitation 
Needs of Dependent School Facilities Located on Military Installations 
in the United States. This study was jointly prepared by the DOD and 
the Department of Education. According to the study, it was the result 
of language contained in the House Committee on Appropriations Report 
on the Fiscal Year 1993 DOD Appropriations Bill, Committee Report 
Number 102-627, dated June 29, 1992, which requested DOD and the 
Department of Education to conduct a study to assess: the condition of 
school facilities on military installations in the United States; the 
requirements for remedial maintenance to bring school facilities up to 
an acceptable condition, including meeting applicable building codes; 
the feasibility and desirability of transferring ownership of 
facilities to local school districts that provide educational services 
at military installations; and a funding plan for correcting the 
maintenance backlog over the next 5 years and the new construction 
backlog over the next 10 years. The study included existing on-base 
dependent school facilities owned by DOD or the Department of Education 
and operated by DOD or LEAs.

* An October 1997 study entitled A Study of Schools Serving Military 
Families in the U.S.: Education Quality, Federal Administration, and 
Funding. The study was completed by the Survey & Program Evaluation 
Division of the Defense Manpower Data Center. It was conducted in 
response to a request contained in the Conference Report on the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-
337), asking the Secretary of Defense to collect information concerning 
the possibility of transferring DOD dependent schools to local 
education agencies. The study included results of a survey of military 
parents on the quality of education provided by DOD dependent schools 
and local education agencies and their perspective on the transfer 
issue.

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Transfer Study Rules and Alternatives:

The transfer study notes that "the deeper the study team got into the 
data collection and site visit process, the more evident it became that 
a limited set of universal principles or rules was needed to help all 
parties achieve two important and complementary purposes. The first 
purpose was to assure basic equity and fairness for the students, 
families and communities that might be affected by the outcomes of 
particular transfer alternatives; the second was to assure that the 
panel of national experts ends up with a package of findings and 
analysis that was sufficiently manageable so it could produce its 
recommendations. It noted that while exceptions might be appropriate on 
a case-by-case basis, applying the following rules to all installations 
helped achieve these dual ends of equity and practicality:

* It would be unfair for some students at the same grade level to 
transfer to the LEA district while other students in the same grade 
remain on base. Therefore, at any installation, any decision affecting 
one DDESS school shall apply to all DDESS schools with the same or 
overlapping grade levels;

* To maintain continuity and effective education, it is not feasible to 
transfer students at a particular grade and then return them to the 
DDESS curriculum at a higher grade. Therefore, if a transfer is made at 
one grade, all succeeding higher grades must transfer as well;

* If a DDESS elementary school with a pre-kindergarten (pre-K) program 
is transferred to an LEA that does not offer a pre-K program, DDESS 
will continue to offer pre-K services, using either on-site or off-site 
resources; and:

* It would be both inefficient and detrimental to educational 
consistency to have some DDESS schools run under contract with the LEA 
while others on the same installation do not. Therefore, if a contract 
or coterminous alternative is chosen for any DDESS school, that 
alternative should apply to all schools on the installation.

The study team developed a set of transfer alternatives for 
consideration including:

* Maintaining the status quo, i.e. DDESS schools would continue to 
operate as they have in the past.

* Transfer responsibilities for the educational program to the LEA 
along with facilities being used by DDESS. The LEA would accept full 
responsibility for educating military children and for the future 
upkeep of the facilities. It assumed the installation school facilities 
would be brought up to LEA maintenance and building standards prior to 
LEA occupancy.

* Transfer without facilities. DDESS students would transfer to the 
neighboring LEA and integrated into the existing school facilities.

* Contract with the LEA to provide educational services on the 
installation.

* Create a public school district within the installation, coterminous 
with its existing boundaries (coterminous alternative). Under that 
assumption, all DDESS schools on base would be included in the newly 
created LEA. DOD would provide the LEA with title of DDESS facilities 
(except where noted otherwise), and buildings and facilities would be 
brought up to LEA standards before being transferred to the LEA.

These were similar to alternatives considered in some prior studies.

[End of section]

Appendix V: Differing Perspectives on Selected DDESS and LEA Schools 
Contained in Various Transfer Study Report Documents:

The DDESS Transfer Study Report prepared by the Donahue Institute with 
its supporting data is contained in multiple binders. The 
recommendations report, prepared by the panel of experts, are contained 
in a binder sometimes referred to as the "green book". Underpinning 
that were additional binders prepared by the Donahue Institute staff. 
They included a so-called book of narratives--referred to as the "white 
book"--providing an overview of each domestic DDESS school and adjacent 
LEAs. Additional information on individual DDESS schools and adjacent 
LEAS is contained in multiple "blue binders" summarizing financial, 
performance, and data on the educational quality of individual schools. 
Additional financial information is then contained in multiple "yellow 
binders" labeled appendixes.

Our examination of individual recommendations and supporting 
information provided in individual study binders sometimes provided 
what appeared to be divergent pictures of school performance, quality, 
and cost factors that did not always fully comport with information 
contained in the recommendations report. Below are key examples.

Fort Benning: The Recommendations Report suggests transferring 
responsibility for schools to Chattahoochee County vice Muscogee County 
(five of seven DDESS schools are within Chattahoochee County). It noted 
that installation officials had expressed concerns about quality of 
Chattahoochee County Schools, but noted DDESS students would represent 
the vast majority of student enrollment within the LEA. It expected 
that most students would still be educated on base and most teachers 
still have opportunity to teach. It said the pupil-teacher ratios and 
the per pupil expenditures of the DDESS and Chattahoochee County are 
already comparable (GAO note: data suggest less comparability in costs 
than stated here).

The White Book points out that salaries and benefits make up 90 
percent, 86 percent, and 84 percent of the Fort Benning DDESS, 
Chattahoochee County, and Muscogee County school budgets. The White 
Book indicates per pupil expenditures of approximately $8,244, $7,345, 
and $5,956 for Fort Benning DDESS, Chattahoochee County, and Muscogee 
County respectively.

The White Book points out that Fort Benning DDESS students test results 
ranged from the 52ND to 65TH percentile for grades 3, 5, and 8. 
Chattahoochee County and Muscogee County test scores were mostly above 
predicted scores for grades 3, 5, and 8.

The Blue Book shows that four of the Benning DDESS schools were deemed 
underperforming and three overperformed. It confirms Muscogee test 
scores were mostly deemed over performing for 5TH grade but some 
underperforming for 8TH grade, while Chattahoochee's were deemed 
underperforming for 8TH grade.

Fort Campbell: The Recommendations Report suggests transferring 
responsibility for schools to LEA, Christian County versus Clarksville-
Montgomery County. The report notes that considering all factors, 
Christian County, Kentucky has higher quality measures than Clarksville-
Montgomery County, Tennessee.

The White Book notes salaries and benefits make up 88 percent, 64 
percent and 64 percent respectively of the Fort Campbell DDESS, and 
Clarksville-Montgomery County and Christian County school budgets. Fort 
Campbell's per pupil expenditure, which is projected to be about $7,962 
in fiscal year 04, has been rising in recent years due to increasing 
costs and decreasing enrollment (reason for decreasing enrollment not 
indicated). Clarksville-Montgomery's per pupil expenditure in fiscal 
year 2004 is $5,166 but will decline because of recent budget cuts. 
Christian County's per pupil cost is about $ 6,589 in fiscal year 2004 
but notes escalating salary costs coupled with relatively stable 
enrollment will likely lead to increased per pupil expenditure.

The White Book indicates that Fort Campbell DDESS students performed at 
or above the 60TH percentile for most subjects and grades. Performance 
of LEA schools of both districts was mixed. Clarksville-Montgomery 
matched or exceeded predicted scores in seven of nine instances cited. 
The Christian County matched or exceeded in five of nine instances 
cited. However, the White Book also notes that Fort Campbell schools 
have a lower student-to-teacher ratio than either LEA and have a higher 
percentage of DDESS teachers (82 percent) with advanced degrees than 
Christian County (68 percent), or Clarksville (52 percent).

The Blue Book rates Fort Campbell schools as mixed in terms of over or 
under performing. Same was true for Christian County schools. The Blue 
Book rates Clarksville-Montgomery County schools as primarily 
underperforming.

Fort Jackson: The Recommendations Report suggests status quo notes 
reductions in state funding of education over recent two years. It 
notes that Richland County's schools are already over capacity, and the 
LEA has little physical room to expand its facilities. (GAO note: Why 
this is a discriminating factor is unclear since most transfer 
recommendations are based on use of DDESS schools.) The Green Book also 
notes that "a transfer to the LEA could jeopardize the quality of 
education now received by students at Fort Jackson, who, as mostly 
younger students, would face substantial disruption of educational 
services in the event of a transfer." (GAO note: report is not clear 
why younger students at Jackson would face substantial disruption yet 
the same issue is not raised in most other transfer recommendations.)

The White Book notes that because Fort Jackson does not track salaries 
and benefits for each type of school employee, salaries and benefits 
were allocated based on the teaching roster and an average salary and 
benefit expenditure. School costs were not laid out comparably to those 
at other installations. However, it projects approximately 90 percent, 
73 percent of Fort Jackson DDESS and LEA budgets respectively to be 
spent on salaries and benefits. It indicated there was per pupil 
expenditures of $10,700 for DDESS versus $6,165 for LEA.

The White Book shows Fort Jackson scores on Tera Nova tests scores 
reported were lower than recorded for many other DDESS systems for 
grades 3 and 5. LEA schools were shown in the White Book as exceeding 
predicted test scores for grades 3 and 5.

The Blue Book does not contain school level testing for Fort Jackson 
schools so doesn't indicate whether they were viewed as over or under 
performing. It shows LEA mixed in terms of over or under performing for 
grade 6 but over performing for grade 8 (at one school).

Fort Knox: The Recommendations Report recommends transferring 
responsibility to adjacent LEA, Hardin County, versus LEA Meade County. 
However, the report notes that while the level of education quality 
indicators for the two LEAs is generally comparable, Hardin County's 
per pupil expenditure exceeds that of Meade County in the instructional 
area. This indicates Hardin County is larger and more capable than 
Meade County to absorb DDESS students, and the executive leadership of 
Hardin County appeared more receptive to a transfer of DDESS students. 
The White Book indicates Hardin is geographically closer to 
installation housing and because of this proximity, Hardin has a closer 
relationship with Fort Knox.

The White Book projects that 88 percent, 78 percent, and 75 percent of 
Fort Knox DDESS, Meade County and Hardin County LEAs school budgets 
respectively were spent on salaries and benefits. This indicated per 
pupil expenditures of $8, 454 for DDESS versus $5,108 in Meade County, 
and $5,493 in Hardin County.

The White Book shows Fort Knox students scored above the 50TH 
percentile for all subjects and grades in Terra Nova testing. At the 
same time, the performance information provided indicated that many 
Hardin County grades scored lower than predicted on testing, while 
Meade County grades nearly always scored higher than predicted.

The Blue Book indicates that Fort Knox DDESS schools presented a mixed 
picture in terms of over or under performing on performance tests. At 
the same time, all Hardin County schools were cited as underperforming 
in testing for grades 3 and 6 and over for one school with grade 9 
scores; at the same time, while Meade County schools were identified as 
over performing for grades 6 and 9.

West Point: The Recommendations Report suggests transferring 
responsibility to LEA, Highland Falls Central School District, but 
grades PK-4 remain in the current school. The report notes that in this 
case, the LEA had a higher per pupil expenditure and a lower pupil-
teacher-ratio than DDESS, both of which are quality indicators. The 
report said the recommendation for transfer was due, in part, to the 
fact that the middle school facility needs to be replaced immediately.

The White Book projects that 84 percent and 76 percent of West Point 
DDESS and Highland Falls school budgets respectively were spent on 
salaries and benefits. However, it notes that the LEA's budget has seen 
10 percent growth, with costs for health and liability insurance and 
special education and retirement system costs rising. It also indicated 
per pupil expenditures of $10, 957 for West Point DDESS (among the 
highest of all DDESS districts mainly due to salaries) and $11,196 for 
Highland Falls. It notes that this is the only district where the per 
pupil expenditure is greater than the corresponding DDESS per pupil 
expenditure.

The White Book shows West Point DDESS schools scored in the 70-80TH 
percentiles in Tera Nova testing. Conversely, Highland Falls Schools 
indicated almost all (three of four) test scores were lower than 
predicted.

The Blue Book indicates that West Point DDESS schools over performed on 
performance tests while Highland Falls schools were mostly cited as 
underperforming.

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:

Mr. Barry Holman:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Holman:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, "DOD Schools: Limitations in 
DoD-Sponsored Study on Transfer Alternatives Underscore Need for 
Additional Assessment," dated April 12, 2005 (GAO Code 350631/GAO-05-
469). The Department has reviewed and concurs with the subject draft 
report as written.

The Department, however, does take exception to the title of the draft. 
Use of the phrase "Limitations in DoD-Sponsored Study" may lead the 
reader to assume that the study failed to address issues that arose 
following the study period or that they were explicitly outside the 
study's scope. As the GAO accurately reports, there were other factors, 
most not present when the study began, that could further complicate 
school transfer decisions.

Responses to the report recommendations are shown in the enclosure. The 
Department would like to express its appreciation to the GAO staff for 
their professionalism and assistance during this review.

Sincerely:

Signed by:

Charles S. Abell:
Principal Deputy:

Enclosure: As stated:

GAO Draft Report-Dated April 12, 2005:
GAO Code 350631/GAO-05-469:

"DOD SCHOOLS: Limitations in DOD-Sponsored Study on Transfer 
Alternatives Underscore Need for Additional Assessment:

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommenations:

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that, should a decision be made 
to transfer some or all of the Domestic Dependent Elementary and 
Secondary Schools (DDESS) to local education agencies (LEAs), the 
Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Personnel and Readiness), require that such efforts be 
accompanied by a more complete assessment of the impact of troop 
redeployments and other force structure changes on educational facility 
requirements on affected installations and surrounding communities to 
facilitate needed facility and operational planning by the Department 
of Education and LEAs to meet changing needs.

DOD Response: Concur. As GAO has pointed out, the DDESS Transfer Study 
began prior to Iraqi Freedom, as well as prior to planned overseas 
basing changes, major force structures planned by the Services, and 
domestic base closures. Based on these activities, the Department took 
specific action to suspend all deliberations on the study 
recommendations until the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAG) 
Commission recommendations take legal effect. During any future 
discussions and before any decision is reached, the Military Services 
will be given opportunity to provide input. Further discussions will 
take place with Congress before any decision is implemented that would 
transfer students to local education authorities.

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that regardless of transfer 
decisions, the Secretary of Defense ensure the DDESS facilities are 
properly reflected in DoD's property records and removed from the 
Department of Education records.

DOD Response: Concur. The Department of Defense Education Activity has 
conferred with the U.S. Department of Education and is currently 
undertaking an effort to locate and document the land grant permits for 
all of the DDESS schools. Officials are working closely with the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers and installation real estate resources to 
complete this task. Once the permits have been authenticated, action 
will be taken to clear the property from Department of Education 
records and to record it on the books of the appropriate agency in 
conjunction with final transfer recommendations.

(350631):

[End of Section]

FOOTNOTES

[1] DOD also operates 165 elementary and secondary schools overseas. 

[2] DODEA, the umbrella agency created in 1994 to oversee the DOD 
school systems, operates under the direction of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense, Military Community and Family Policy, and the 
Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness. Subordinate 
organizations within DODEA are the Department of Defense Domestic 
Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) system, which 
operates schools in the continental United States, Puerto Rico and 
Guam, and the Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS) system, 
which operates schools on military bases overseas.

[3] The Donahue Institute is the public service, outreach, and economic 
development unit of the University of Massachusetts President's Office. 

[4] See appendix I for biographical information on the panel members.

[5] Pub. L. No. 108-375.

[6] Enclosure 6, Manpower Mix Criteria Codes, Office of the Secretary 
of Defense memo, "2003 Commercial and Inherently Governmental 
Activities Inventory Data Call" (Dec. 16, 2003).

[7] The Donahue Institute used student performance on statewide/DDESS 
system-wide academic tests to measure school performance. The institute 
developed a performance index that took into account the socio-
demographic effect of the percentage of students receiving free or 
reduced price lunches on a school's performance. It used a regression 
approach to estimate this effect on schools in each state by subject 
and grade. The institute was then able to categorize each school's 
performance as "overperforming" or "underperforming" relative to the 
school's predicted performance given its percentage of students 
receiving free or reduced price lunches.

[8] LEAs receive federal payments to compensate for the loss in tax 
revenues due to the presence of tax-exempt federal property and 
increased school enrollments due to federal activities.

[9] Resolution of this issue is important toward ensuring proper 
accounting for property in the appropriate agency's property records 
and limiting the government's exposure to legal liabilities.

[10] Overseas schools were added following World War II when the 
military established schools for the children of its servicemembers 
stationed in Europe and the Pacific.

[11] These are operations and maintenance funds, and do not include 
procurement and military construction funding.

[12] See GAO, DOD Schools: Funding and Operating Alternatives for 
Education of Dependents, GAO/HRD-87-16 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 
1986).

[13] This represents some reduction in such schools from an available 
listing of such schools contained in a previous transfer study 
conducted 10 years ago. Some reductions occurred because of base 
closure, demolition, or transfers to LEAs. 

[14] Appendix III provides a list and summary of relevant previous 
reports that examined the potential for transferring schools from DOD 
to LEAs.

[15] The Senior Executive Council, a high-level management committee, 
was established in 2001 to (1) help guide efforts across the department 
to transform and improve the department's business practices, and (2) 
to function as a board of directors for DOD. The Council, chaired by 
the Secretary of Defense, also included the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, the service secretaries, and the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. 

[16] See GAO,, Defense Management: DOD Faces Challenges Implementing 
Its Core Competency Approach and A-76 Competitions, GAO-03-818 
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003).

[17] DOD's Fiscal Year 2006 budget request is for $34.7 million in 
military construction for a new DDESS elementary school at Fort 
Stewart, Ga., and a new elementary/junior high school addition at Fort 
Bragg, N.C.

[18] While DDESS currently operates 59 domestic elementary and 
secondary schools in the United States, only 58 were in operation at 
the time of the study.

[19] A few additional schools were closed during prior base closure 
rounds because of domestic base closure rounds conducted from 1988 
through 1995. Any additional dependent school closures related to the 
2005 base closure process will not be known until later this year when 
base closure decisions will be finalized. 

[20] 20 U.S.C. §7708. Absent specific transfer authority DOD property 
disposal would be subject to the more lengthy procedures of the Federal 
Property and Administrative Services Act, administered by the General 
Services Administration. 

[21] The expert panel's recommendations report, which included summary 
data comparing and contrasting LEA and DDESS schools, did not always 
agree with the comparative data included in various summary reports 
provided by the Donahue Institute staff. 

[22] See footnote 7 on page 5.

[23] An area of savings from transferring educational responsibility to 
LEAs would be in teacher salaries. The transfer study noted significant 
differences in teacher salaries between DDESS and LEA schools.

[24] U.S. Department of Education officials told us that making such 
upgrades had been necessary to encourage LEAs to accept transfer of 
school facilities owned by the Department of Education even though the 
LEAs were already educating dependents in these schools.

[25] LEAs receive federal payments to compensate for the loss in tax 
revenues due to the presence of tax-exempt federal property and 
increased school enrollments due to federal activities.

[26] Congressional Research Service, U.S. Army's Modular Redesign: 
Issues for Congress, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 6, 2005).

[27] Prior to 1981, DDESS schools were referred to as Section 6 
schools, which was a reference to their funding source at that time 
under Section 6 of Public Law 81-874.

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