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entitled 'Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon 
Programs' which was released on March 31, 2005. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

March 2005: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs: 

GAO-05-301: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-301, a report to congressional committees: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on a number of efforts to 
enhance warfighting and the way the department conducts business. Major 
investments are being made to develop improved weapon systems to combat 
various threats to U.S. security. While the weapons that DOD ultimately 
develops have no rival in superiority, weapon systems acquisition 
remains a long-standing high-risk area. GAO’s reviews over the past 30 
years have found consistent problems with weapon acquisitions such as 
cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In 
addition, DOD faces several budgetary challenges that underscore the 
need to deliver its new major weapon programs within estimated costs 
and to obtain the most from those investments. DOD can help resolve 
these problems by using a more knowledge-based approach for developing 
new weapons. 

This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an 
independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs 
that identifies potential risks and needed actions when a program’s 
projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best practice. It 
can also highlight those programs that employ practices worthy of 
emulation by other programs. GAO plans to update and issue this report 
annually. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO assessed 54 programs, which represent an investment of over $800 
billion, ranging from the Missile Defense Agency’s Airborne Laser to 
the Army’s Warfighter Information Network-Tactical. GAO’s assessments 
are anchored in a knowledge-based approach to product development that 
reflects best practices of successful programs. This approach centers 
on attaining high levels of knowledge in three elements of a new 
product or weapon–technology, design, and production–at key consecutive 
junctures in development. If a program is not attaining these levels of 
knowledge, it incurs increased risk of technical problems, with 
significant potential cost and schedule growth implications (see 
figure). If a program is falling short in one element, like technology 
maturity, it is harder to attain the requisite amount of knowledge to 
prudently proceed in succeeding elements. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The majority of programs GAO assessed are costing more and taking 
longer to develop than planned. Most of the programs proceeded with 
less knowledge at critical junctures than suggested by best practices, 
although some programs came close to meeting best practice standards. 
For example, technology and design for the F/A-22 matured late in the 
program contributing to large cost growth and schedule delays. The 
JASSM program, in contrast, has achieved a high level of knowledge at 
critical junctures while experiencing minimal cost increases or 
schedule delays. 

Managing these levels of knowledge takes on additional significance as 
DOD’s share of the discretionary budget faces increasing pressure from 
the growth in mandatory spending and the demands of ongoing military 
operations. For these reasons, if DOD approves programs with low levels 
of knowledge and accepts the attendant likely adverse cost and schedule 
consequences, it will probably get fewer quantities for the same 
investment or face difficult choices on which investments it cannot 
afford to pursue. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-301. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202) 
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 

[End of section]

Contents: 

Foreword: 

Letter: 

A Challenging Time for Weapon System Investments: 

Current Programs Are Costing More and Taking Longer to Develop: 

A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes: 

Most Programs Have Proceeded with Lower Levels of Knowledge at Critical 
Junctures: 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Airborne Laser (ABL): 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD): 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF): 

Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA): 

Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS): 

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS): 

Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS): 

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System 
(ATIRCM/CMWS): 

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP): 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP): 

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP): 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC): 

CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F): 

Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM): 

Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21: 

DD(X) Destroyer: 

E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (E-10A): 

E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE): 

EA-18G: 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)-Atlas V, Delta IV: 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM): 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

F/A-22 Raptor: 

Future Combat Systems (FCS): 

Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS: 

Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR): 

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM): 

Joint Common Missile (JCM): 

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): 

Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW): 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1: 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5: 

Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS): 

Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI): 

Land Warrior: 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS): 

Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA): 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

MQ-9 Predator B: 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB): 

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

Tactical Tomahawk Missile: 

Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT): 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft: 

Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS): 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T): 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Scope of Our Review: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Examples of Programs with Reduced Buying Power: 

Table 2: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems: 

Table 3: Cost and Cycle Time for the Same Programs: 2004 Assessment and 
2005 Assessment: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: RDT&E and Procurement Funding--Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs: 

Figure 2: Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key 
Junctures: 

Figure 3: Percent of Programs Achieving Design Stability at Key 
Junctures: 

Figure 4: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared 
with Best Practices: 

Abbreviations: 

ACTS: AEHF Comsec/Transec System: 

BAMS: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance: 

BTERM: Ballistic Trajectory Extended Range Munition: 

DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: 

DCMA: Defense Contract Management Agency: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

EKV: exoatmospheric kill vehicle: 

FY: fiscal year: 

GAO: Government Accountability Office: 

GEO: geosynchronous earth orbit: 

GPS: Global Positioning System: 

HEO: highly elliptical orbit: 

HLV: heavy lift vehicle: 

IMIS: Integrated Maintenance Information System: 

ISR: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance: 

JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition: 

JSSEO: Joint Single Integrated Air Picture Systems Engineering 
Organization: 

MDA: Missile Defense Agency: 

NA: not applicable: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

OT&E: Operational Test and Evaluation: 

PDR: Preliminary Design Review: 

RDT&E: Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation: 

SDACS: Solid Divert and Attitude Control System: 

SM-3: Standard Missile 3: 

TBD: to be determined: 

TF/TA: Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance: 

TRL: Technology Readiness Level: 

UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: 

UHF: ultra high frequency: 

U.S.C.: United States Code: 

USMC: United States Marine Corps: 

March 31, 2005: 

Congressional Committees: 

Fiscal realities demand that the Department of Defense (DOD) get better 
outcomes from its weapon system investments. Federal discretionary 
spending, along with other federal policies and programs, will face 
serious budget pressures in the coming years. While providing for the 
common defense is in the Constitution, defense spending is considered 
"discretionary" from a budget sense. Furthermore, investments in new 
capabilities such as weapon systems are more discretionary than other 
aspects of defense spending, such as personnel costs and the costs of 
supporting and maintaining current force operations. As a result, it is 
imperative that DOD's limited resources be allocated to the most 
appropriate weapon system investments based on current and reasonably 
expected threats and that the investments yield the results promised 
(such as performance, cost, and timing) within the constraints imposed 
by those resources. 

We have assessed weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area since 1990. 
Although U.S. weapons are the best in the world, the programs to 
acquire them often take significantly longer and cost significantly 
more money than promised and often deliver fewer quantities and other 
capabilities than planned. It is not unusual for estimates of time and 
money to be off by 20 to 50 percent. When costs and schedules increase, 
quantities are cut, and the value for the warfighter--as well as the 
value of the investment dollar--is reduced. In these times of 
asymmetric threats and netcentricity, individual weapon system 
investments are getting larger and more complex. Just 4 years ago, the 
top five weapon systems cost about $281 billion; today, in the same 
base year dollars, the top five weapon systems cost about $521 billion. 
If these megasystems are managed with traditional margins of error, the 
financial consequences can be dire, especially in light of a 
constrained discretionary budget. 

Our work on the development of successful commercial and defense 
products has shown that it is possible to get better outcomes from 
investments if decisions are based on high levels of knowledge. Defense 
acquisition policies support such an approach to managing weapon system 
programs. However, actual practice is not yet consistently following 
written policy. As this annual assessment of major weapon acquisitions 
shows, most programs are proceeding with inadequate levels of 
knowledge, with attendant increased risks for traditional rates of cost 
growth, along with schedule delays and performance shortfalls. On the 
other hand, this assessment also includes programs that are proceeding 
with high levels of knowledge, showing that practice can follow policy. 

This is our third annual assessment of weapon system programs. The 
experiences catalogued in this report provide insights on how programs 
can be better positioned to succeed. To the extent that programs are 
not so positioned, the report can be used by decision makers to take 
actions to reduce risks by building higher levels of knowledge. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

Letter March 31, 2005: 

Congressional Committees: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on a number of efforts to 
enhance warfighting capabilities. Primary among these efforts are the 
investments being made to develop improved weapon systems with 
technological superiority and enhanced lethality to combat threats to 
U.S. security. Investment in programs such as the Army's Future Combat 
Systems and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, the Missile 
Defense Agency's suite of land, sea, air, and space systems, the Navy's 
advanced ships such as the DD(X) Destroyer, and the Air Force's space 
systems such as the Transformational Satellite Communications System 
are likely to dominate the budget and doctrinal debate well into the 
next decade. Many of these embody the dual challenge of employing 
complex technology with a rapid pace of development. Fiscal realities, 
coupled with the larger scope of key acquisitions, reduce the ability 
of budgets to accommodate typical margins for error in terms of cost 
increases and schedule delays. Identifying risks early and addressing 
them before they become problems can lessen cost increases and schedule 
delays and thus enable budgets to buy what was planned. 

In this report, we assess 54 programs that represent an investment of 
approximately $800 billion.[Footnote 1] Our objective is to provide 
decision makers with independent, knowledge-based assessments of 
individual systems' attained knowledge and potential risks. 

A Challenging Time for Weapon System Investments: 

DOD has entered a period of high investment. A significant portion of 
this investment is for the acquisition of weapon systems that offer 
technologically advanced capabilities. The investment in the research, 
development, and procurement of major weapon systems is expected to 
rise from $144 billion in fiscal year 2005 to $185 billion in fiscal 
year 2009. Major Defense Acquisition Programs make up about 45 percent, 
or $65 billion, as shown in figure 1, of the fiscal year 2005 
investment request.[Footnote 2] DOD's total planned investment in these 
programs is approximately $1.3 trillion, with about $812 billion of 
that investment yet to be made. 

Figure 1: RDT&E and Procurement Funding--Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

There are several challenges to getting the most from that investment. 
First, because DOD's investment in weapon systems represents one of the 
largest discretionary items in the federal budget, DOD's budget faces 
growing pressures from increases in mandatory federal 
spending.[Footnote 3] According to the Congressional Budget Office, 
federal deficits are expected to average $250 billion through fiscal 
year 2009 and new budgetary demands stemming from demographic trends 
lie beyond that time frame. In calendar year 2004, discretionary 
spending accounted for about 39 percent of the federal budget, and 
current projections show that because of increases in mandatory 
spending, discretionary spending is likely to decrease to 33 percent of 
the federal budget by fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 4] It will be 
difficult for DOD to increase its budget share to cover cost increases 
in weapon programs in that environment. 

Second, DOD faces competing demands within its own budget, such as from 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since September 2001, DOD has 
needed $158 billion in supplemental appropriations to support the 
global war on terrorism.[Footnote 5] The budget implications of these 
operations further increase the demand made of the defense dollar and 
therefore the investment in new weapon programs. For example, current 
military operations are causing faster wear on existing weapons, which 
will need refurbishment or replacement sooner than planned. These needs 
will compete with the investment in new weapon programs. 

Third, DOD programs typically take longer to develop and cost more to 
buy than planned, placing additional demands on available funding. 
These programs increasingly compete for resources and are sometimes 
forced to make trade-offs in quantities, resulting in a reduction of 
buying power. As a result, funds are not available for other competing 
needs and programs yield fewer quantities for the same, if not higher, 
cost. Table 1 illustrates seven programs with the greatest reduction of 
buying power. Some of these programs experienced higher costs for the 
same initial quantity. 

Table 1: Examples of Programs with Reduced Buying Power: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

If DOD cannot deliver its major new programs within estimated costs, 
difficult choices have to be made regarding which investments to pursue 
and which to discontinue. 

Current Programs Are Costing More and Taking Longer to Develop: 

The majority of programs in our assessment are costing more and taking 
longer to develop than estimated. As shown in table 2, total RDT&E 
costs for 26 common set[Footnote 6] weapon programs increased by nearly 
$42.7 billion, or 42 percent, over the original business case (the 
first full estimate). The same programs have also experienced an 
increase in the time needed to develop capabilities with a weighted-
average schedule increase of nearly 20 percent.[Footnote 7]

Table 2: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems: 

Billions of constant 2005 dollars. 

Total cost; 
First full estimate: $479.6; 
Latest estimate: $548.9; 
Percent change: 14.5%. 

RDT&E cost; 
First full estimate: $102.0; 
Latest estimate: $144.7; 
Percent change: 41.9%. 

Weighted-average acquisition cycle time[A]; 
First full estimate: 146.6 months; 
Latest estimate: 175.3 months; 
Percent change: 19.6%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] This is a weighted estimate of average acquisition cycle time for 
the 26 programs based on total program costs at the first full and 
latest estimates. The simple average for these two estimates was 94.9 
months for the first full estimate and 114.7 months for the latest 
estimate, resulting in a 20.8 percent change. 

[End of table]

Quantities for 10 of the common set programs have been reduced since 
their first estimate.[Footnote 8] In addition, the weighted-average 
program acquisition unit cost of 25 of the 26 programs increased by 
roughly 50 percent.[Footnote 9]

During the last year, cost and schedule estimates for the same 26 
programs have increased noticeably since our last assessment, as shown 
in table 3. 

Table 3: Cost and Cycle Time for the Same Programs: 2004 Assessment and 
2005 Assessment: 

Billions of constant 2005 dollars. 

Total cost; 
2004 assessment: $480.3; 
2005 assessment: $548.9; 
Percent change: 14.3%. 

RDT&E cost; 
2004 assessment: $127.3; 
2005 assessment: $144.7; 
Percent change: 13.7%. 

Weighted-average acquisition cycle time[A]; 
2004 assessment: 166.1 months; 
2005 assessment: 175.3 months; 
Percent change: 5.5%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] This is a weighted estimate of average acquisition cycle time for 
the 26 programs based on total program cost estimates for the 2004 
assessment and the 2005 assessment. The simple average for these two 
estimates was 110.7 months for the 2004 assessment and 114.7 months for 
the 2005 assessment, resulting in a 3.6 percent change. 

[B] These estimates also include the Land Warrior program. Although 
this program was not included in the 2004 assessment, the program is 
included in the common set because data were available from the 
December 2002 Selected Acquisition Report for inclusion in this 
estimate. 

[End of table]

Some of DOD's largest programs have driven these increases. For 
example, research and development costs for the Army's Future Combat 
Systems, a $108 billion investment, increased by approximately 51 
percent over the past year while in the midst of a major restructuring 
of the program. Likewise, the Joint Strike Fighter, a $199 billion 
investment, has reported a research and development cost increase of 
over 19 percent in the past year. 

A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes: 

Over the last several years we have undertaken a body of work that 
examines weapon acquisition issues from a perspective that draws upon 
lessons learned from best system development practices. We found that 
successful programs take steps to gather knowledge that confirms that 
their technologies are mature, their designs stable, and their 
production processes are in control. Separating technology development 
from product development is important to this effort. Successful 
programs make a science and technology organization, rather than the 
program or product development manager, responsible for maturing 
technologies. Such steps can help to reduce costs and deliver a product 
on time and within budget. DOD's current acquisition guidance embraces 
the use of evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition practices proven 
to be more effective and efficient in developing new products. By fully 
implementing these practices, DOD can better leverage its investments 
by shortening the time it takes to develop capabilities with more 
predictable costs and schedules, thereby maintaining its buying power. 

Successful product developers ensure a high level of knowledge was 
achieved at key junctures in development. We characterize these 
junctures as knowledge points. These knowledge points and associated 
indicators are defined as follows: 

* Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. This level of knowledge 
occurs when a sound business case is made for the product--that is, a 
match is made between the customer's requirements and the product 
developer's available resources in terms of knowledge, time, and money. 
Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system 
development is an important indicator of whether this match has been 
made. This means that the technologies needed to meet essential product 
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended 
environment. 

* Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This level of knowledge 
occurs when a program determines that a product's design is stable--
that is, it will meet customer requirements and cost and schedule 
targets. A best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-
level critical design review, usually held midway through development. 
Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at the system 
design review provides tangible evidence that the design is stable. 

* Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature. This level of 
knowledge is achieved when it has been demonstrated that the product 
can be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A best 
practice is to ensure that all key manufacturing processes are in 
statistical control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, and 
capable of consistently producing parts within the product's quality 
tolerances and standards--at the start of production. 

The attainment of each successive knowledge point builds on the 
preceding one. While the knowledge itself builds continuously without 
clear lines of demarcation, the attainment of knowledge points is 
sequential. In other words, production maturity cannot be attained if 
the design is not stable, and design stability cannot be attained if 
the critical technologies are not mature. 

Seeking to improve acquisition outcomes, DOD revised its acquisition 
policy in May 2003 to incorporate a knowledge-based, evolutionary 
framework. The policy adopts lessons learned from successful commercial 
companies. For example, the policy attempts to separate technology 
development from product development and requires the demonstration of 
technologies to high readiness levels. The policy also allows managers 
to develop a product in increments rather than trying to incorporate 
all of the desired capabilities in the first version that comes off the 
production line. 

Most Programs Have Proceeded with Lower Levels of Knowledge at Critical 
Junctures: 

Most of the programs we reviewed proceeded with lower levels of 
knowledge at critical junctures and attained key elements of product 
knowledge later in development than specified in DOD policy, which 
resulted in cost increases and schedule delays. 

Development Start: 

Our work shows that the demonstration of technology maturity by the 
start of system development is the key measure for achievement of 
knowledge point 1. A program that proceeds into product development 
without demonstrating mature technologies does so with increased risk 
of cost growth and schedule delays throughout the life of the program. 

Only 15 percent of the programs we assessed began development having 
demonstrated all of their technologies mature, as illustrated in figure 
2. 

Figure 2: Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key 
Junctures: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

More often than not, programs sought to mature technologies well into 
system development when they should have focused on maturing system 
design and preparing for production. The programs that started 
development with mature technologies experienced lower development and 
unit cost increases than those programs that started development with 
immature technologies. For example, RDT&E costs for the programs that 
started development with mature technology increased by an average of 9 
percent over the first full estimate, whereas the development costs for 
the programs that started development with immature technologies 
increased an average of 41 percent over the first full estimate. 
Likewise, program acquisition unit costs for the programs with mature 
technology increased by less than 1 percent, whereas the programs that 
started development with immature technologies experienced an average 
program acquisition unit cost increase of nearly 21 percent over the 
first full estimate.[Footnote 10] Finally, the programs with mature 
technology experienced an average schedule delay of 7 months--a 9 
percent increase--whereas the schedule for the programs that started 
development with immature technology increased an average of 13 months-
a 13 percent increase. 

Design Review: 

As illustrated in figure 3, 42 percent of the programs that held a 
design review achieved design stability at that key juncture. 

Figure 3: Percent of Programs Achieving Design Stability at Key 
Junctures: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

With the exception of the Navy's V-22, which has experienced 
significant design changes since development start in 1986, these 
programs have experienced a 6 percent increase in development costs and 
an average schedule increase of 11 months since the first full 
estimate.[Footnote 11] Those programs that did not achieve design 
stability have experienced a combined development cost increase of 46 
percent and an average schedule increase of 29 months since the first 
full estimate.[Footnote 12]

Design stability cannot be attained if key technologies are not mature. 
Ten programs held design review without demonstrating mature critical 
technologies.[Footnote 13] Out of the 10 programs, 7 had experienced a 
cost increase, schedule delay, or both.[Footnote 14] The unit cost of 5 
of these programs increased by at least 10 percent.[Footnote 15] In 
contrast, 3 programs entered product development with mature 
technologies. These three programs kept program unit cost increases to 
a minimum, with costs either falling or increasing by single 
digits.[Footnote 16]

Nine programs are scheduled to hold their system design review in the 
next year.[Footnote 17] Only two of those programs, the B-2 Radar 
Modernization and the Excalibur program, expect their technologies to 
be mature at the time of their design reviews. The remaining seven 
programs project that their technologies will not attain maturity until 
after their critical design reviews. 

Production Start: 

To determine if a product's design is reliable and producible, 
successful programs use statistical process control to bring 
manufacturing processes under control so they are repeatable, 
sustainable, and consistently producing parts within quality standards. 
The collection of process control data prior to a production decision 
can enable a smooth transition from product development to the 
production phase. Of the 19 programs in production or approaching a 
production decision in the next year, only 2 collected or plan to 
collect statistical process control data to measure the maturity of 
production processes.[Footnote 18] While the absence of the data does 
not mean that production processes were immature, it does prevent an 
assessment against an objective standard. 

How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed: 

We assess each program in 2 pages and depict the extent of knowledge in 
a stacked bar graph and provide a narrative summary at the bottom of 
the first page. As illustrated in figure 4, the knowledge graph is 
based on the three knowledge points and the key indicators for the 
attainment of knowledge: technology maturity (depicted in orange), 
design stability (depicted in green), and production maturity (depicted 
in blue). A "best practice" line is drawn based on the ideal attainment 
of the three types of knowledge at the three knowledge points. In some 
cases, we obtained projections from the program office of future 
knowledge attainment. These projections are depicted as dashed bars. 
The closer a program's attained knowledge is to the best practice line, 
the more likely the weapon will be delivered within estimated cost and 
schedule. A knowledge deficit at the start of development--indicated by 
a gap between the technology knowledge attained and the best practice 
line--means the program proceeded with immature technologies and faces 
a greater likelihood of cost and schedule increases as technology risks 
are discovered and resolved. 

Figure 4: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared 
with Best Practices: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system 
development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing 
knowledge point 1. Knowledge point 2 was not attained at the design 
review as some technologies were still not mature and only a small 
percentage of engineering drawings had been released. Projections for 
the production decision show that the program is expected to achieve 
greater levels of maturity but will still fall short. It is likely that 
this program would have had significant cost and schedule increases. 

We conducted our review from July 2004 through March 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix II 
contains detailed information on our methodology. 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Our assessments of the 54 weapon systems follow. 

[End of section]

Airborne Laser (ABL): 

MDA's ABL element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks to destroy enemy missiles during the boost phase of their 
flight. Carried aboard a highly modified Boeing 747 aircraft, ABL 
employs a beam control/fire control subsystem to focus the beam on a 
target, a high-energy chemical laser to rupture the fuel tanks of enemy 
missiles, and a battle management subsystem to plan and execute 
engagements. We assessed the Block 2004 design that is under 
development and expected to lead to an initial capability in a future 
block. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Kirtland AFB, N. Mex. 
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $2,386.9 million; 
Funding, FY05-FY09: Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Funding, FY05-FY09: Total funding: $2,386.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 09/2003: $5,515.8; 
Latest 07/2004: $5,055.3; 
Percent change: -8.4%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 09/2003: $0.0; 
Latest 07/2004: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 09/2003: $5,515.8; 
Latest 07/2004: $5,055.3; 
Percent change: -8.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: TBD. 

Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be 
determined. 

[End of table]

Although program officials expected ABL to provide an initial 
capability during Block 2006, this event has been delayed and only one 
of its seven critical technologies is fully mature. During Block 2004, 
the program continues work on a prototype that is expected to provide 
the basic design for a future operational capability. Program officials 
expect to demonstrate the other six technologies during a prototype 
flight test that will assess ABL's lethality. Difficulty in integrating 
prototype components could delay this effort from 2005 to 2008. MDA has 
released about 94 percent of the engineering drawings for the 
prototype's design, which will be the basis for an initial operational 
capability during a future block if the test is successful. However, 
additional drawings may be needed if the design is enhanced or if 
problems encountered during flight testing force design changes. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

ABL Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only one of ABL's seven critical technologies--managing the high-power 
beam--is fully mature. The program office assessed three technologies-
-the six-module laser, missile tracking, and atmospheric compensation-
-as nearly mature. The remaining three technologies--transmissive 
optics, optical coatings, and jitter control--are the least mature. 
According to program officials, all of these technologies are needed to 
provide the system with an initial operational capability. 

While the program office has assessed the six-module laser as being 
close to reaching full maturity, the power generated by grouping six 
laser modules together must be demonstrated before full maturity can be 
reasonably assessed. The recent demonstration of the simultaneous 
firing of all six laser modules reduces risk in this area. Additional 
testing, planned over the next 6 months, must still be completed to 
demonstrate the full power and duration of the laser segment prior to 
installation on the aircraft. 

The transmissive optics, optical coatings, and jitter control are the 
least mature critical technologies and consist of prototypes that have 
only been tested in the laboratory or demonstrated through analysis and 
simulation. The program plans to demonstrate all technologies in an 
operational environment during a flight test of the system prototype, 
referred to as lethal demonstration, in which ABL will attempt to shoot 
down a short-range ballistic missile. Challenges with integrating the 
laser and beam control/fire control subcomponents could delay this test 
into 2008, but the final schedule is to be determined. Upon successful 
completion of this test, MDA expects to develop a second aircraft that 
will provide an initial operational capability. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess the design stability because ABL's initial 
capability will not be fully developed until the second aircraft--what 
is expected to provide an initial capability--is well underway. While 
the program has released 10,280 of the 10,910 engineering drawings for 
the prototype, it is unclear whether the design of the prototype 
aircraft can be relied upon as a good indicator of design stability for 
the second aircraft. More drawings may be needed if the design is 
enhanced or if problems encountered during flight testing force design 
changes. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the production maturity of ABL because MDA has not 
made a production decision. The program is producing a limited quantity 
of hardware for the system's prototype. Program officials explained 
that they continue to experience problems maintaining a stable 
manufacturing base for prototype subcomponents. 

Other Program Issues: 

Technological challenges caused the prime contract to approach its cost 
ceiling during fiscal year 2004. In early April 2004, MDA directed the 
ABL program to restructure the contract, increase its cost ceiling, and 
refocus the contractor's efforts on making technical progress. As a 
result, the cost ceiling was increased by $1.5 billion and the period 
of performance was extended to 2008 from 2005. The contract is 
currently valued at approximately $3.6 billion. 

The focus of current work is on two near-term events. The first event 
was the six-module laser test in a ground test facility that the 
program completed in November 2004. The second event was the initial 
Beam Control/Fire Control flight test, which occurred in December 2004. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA maintained that the 
current design is stable despite the assessed technology maturity. 
Officials told us that because the ABL operational environment is 
impractical to duplicate on the ground, the technology maturity 
assessment will understate actual maturity until after 100 percent of 
the drawings are released. While the officials expect changes to future 
blocks as part of capability-based spiral acquisition, they believe the 
basic design will directly migrate to subsequent blocks. 

[End of section]

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD): 

MDA's Aegis BMD element is a sea-based missile defense system being 
developed in incremental, capability-based blocks to protect deployed 
U.S. forces and critical assets from short-and medium-range ballistic 
missile attacks. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 radar, hit-
to-kill interceptors, and command and control systems. It will also be 
used as a forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and tracking of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. We assessed only Block 2004 of the 
element's interceptor--the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3). 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon (SM-3); 
Program office: Arlington, Va. 
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $4,005.3 million; 
Funding, FY05-FY09: Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Funding, FY05-FY09: Total funding: $4,005.3 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/2003: $7,071.6; 
Latest 07/2004: $7,878.9; 
Percent change: 11.4%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/2003: $0.0; 
Latest 07/2004: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/2003: $7,071.6; 
Latest 07/2004: $7,878.9; 
Percent change: 11.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: 65. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: TBD. 

Table reflects total Aegis BMD program costs for all blocks--not only 
for Block 2004 SM-3--from program inception in fiscal years 1996 
through 2009. Procurement cost has yet to be determined. 

[End of table]

According to program officials, the first increment of SM-3 missiles 
being fielded during 2004-2005 has mature technologies and a stable 
design. However, the program has been struggling with the technology 
that maneuvers the missile's kinetic warhead (kill vehicle) to its 
target. Partial functionality of this "divert" technology was 
successful in 4 flight tests, but full functionality has only been 
demonstrated in ground tests--it failed during a June 2003 flight test. 
Design modifications were identified but will not be implemented in the 
first 8 missiles being fielded. Program officials noted that even with 
a reduced capability, these missiles provide a credible defense. All 
drawings for the first increment of missiles have been released to 
manufacturing. The program is not collecting statistical data on its 
production process but is using other means to gauge production 
readiness. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Aegis BMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials estimate that all three technologies critical to the 
SM-3 are mature. These technologies--the third stage rocket motor, the 
infrared seeker of the kinetic warhead, and the Solid Divert and 
Attitude Control System (SDACS) of the kinetic warhead--were all tested 
in flight. While the first two technologies were fully demonstrated in 
flight tests, the SDACS, which generates divert pulses to steer the 
kinetic warhead, was only partially demonstrated. As noted previously, 
full "divert" technology succeeded in ground testing but partially 
failed during a June 2003 flight test. According to program officials, 
the test failure was likely caused by a defective subcomponent within 
the SDACS, a problem that should be corrected through specific design 
modifications. Program officials note that only partial functionality 
of the SDACS is required for Block 2004, which was successfully 
demonstrated in flight tests. Although the kinetic warhead of these 
interceptors will have reduced divert capability, they provide a 
credible defense against a large population of the threat and can be 
retrofitted upon the completion of design updates and testing. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials reported that the design for the first eight 
interceptors being fielded during Block 2004 is stable with 100 percent 
of its drawings released to manufacturing. The program plans to 
implement design changes in subsequent configurations of the SM-3 
(delivered during 2006-2007) to resolve the SDACS failure witnessed in 
the June 2003 flight test. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the production maturity of the missiles being 
procured for Block 2004. Program officials stated that given the low 
quantity of missiles being produced, statistical process control data 
on the production process would have no significance. The Aegis BMD 
program is using other means to assess progress in production and 
manufacturing--such as integrated product teams, risk reviews, and SM-3 
metrics--as part of its overall development of the SM-3. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Aegis BMD element builds upon the existing capabilities of Aegis-
equipped Navy cruisers and destroyers. Planned hardware and software 
upgrades to these ships will enable them to carry out the ballistic 
missile defense mission. In particular, the program is working to 
upgrade Aegis destroyers for surveillance and tracking of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Because this function is new to 
the element--allowed only after the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty--the program office faced a tight schedule to 
fully develop and test this added functionality, which it completed in 
September 2004 with the deployment of the first destroyer for this 
mission. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that Aegis BMD progress remains on track. For example, the program 
deployed the first operational destroyers (for the long-range 
surveillance and tracking mission) to the Sea of Japan, delivered 5 
missiles in November, and successfully ground tested the redesigned 
SDACS. It noted, however, that our review focused on the SM-3, a junior 
portion of the overall cost and development of the Aegis BMD system. 

In addition, the program office reiterated that SDACS technology was 
successful in four of five Aegis BMD flight tests. The current SDACS 
configuration is fully capable of defeating the Block 2004 threat set, 
and a design update is in progress to complete the final increment of 
capability. As an application of capabilities-based acquisition, the 
warfighter is provided a significant capability years earlier (albeit 
using partial SDACS functionality) instead of waiting for a perfect 
design. 

[End of section]

Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF): 

The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing 
Milstar system with higher capacity, survivable, jam-resistant, 
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and tactical 
warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission control 
segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications are 
acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international 
partnership program that includes Canada, United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands. We assessed the satellite and mission control segments. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $1,819.5 million; 
Procurement: $501.6 million; 
Total funding: $2,321.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 1. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,222.8; 
Latest 12/2003: $4,502.2; 
Percent change: 6.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,249.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $501.6; 
Percent change: -59.8%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $5,471.8; 
Latest 12/2003: $5,003.7; 
Percent change: -8.6%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,094.362; 
Latest 12/2003: $1,667.910; 
Percent change: 52.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 5; 
Latest 12/2003: 3; 
Percent change: -40.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 111; 
Latest 12/2003: 118; 
Percent change: 6.3%. 

[End of table]

According to the program office, the AEHF program's technologies are 
mature and the design is stable. However, the high risk strategy of 
concurrently developing two critical path items has led to further 
schedule delays and cost increases. The program is relying on the 
concurrent development of the AEHF Comsec/Transec System (ACTS) suite 
of cryptological equipment, which limits access to authorized users, 
and terminals used for satellite command and control. Both of these 
items are being developed outside the program office. Delivery delays 
of the ACTS and command and control terminals resulted in an additional 
12-month launch delay and an estimated 20 percent cost increase, 
incurring a Nunn-McCurdy breach (10 U.S.C. 2433) at the 15 percent 
threshold. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

AEHF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All of the 14 critical technologies are mature, according to the 
program office. In addition, all 19 of the application-specific 
integrated circuits critical to functioning of the communications 
payload have been flight qualified through demonstration and testing. 

Design Stability: 

AEHF's design is now stable since more than 97 percent of the design 
drawings have been released. While the program completed its system 
level critical design review in April 2004 with only about two-thirds 
of the drawings released, the AEHF contractor has since resolved all 
outstanding issues from that review. 

Production maturity could not be assessed as the program office does 
not collect statistical process control data. In June 2004, the formal 
decision was made to acquire the third and final satellite. 

Other Program Issues: 

The concurrent development of two critical path items--the ACTS and the 
command and control terminals--has led to further schedule delays and 
cost growth. The ACTS is a suite of cryptological equipment installed 
in both the satellite and the terminals to limit access to authorized 
users and is being developed and produced by the National Security 
Agency. The ACTS has already experienced significant cost growth and 
schedule delays due to production problems and changing security 
requirements. In September 2003, ACTS delivery delays and development 
problems led the program office to delay the launch of the first two 
satellites by 4 months. The second critical path item--the command post 
terminals--is developed and funded by another Air Force program office. 
These terminals must be in place and tested prior to the first launch 
or there will be a day-for-day slip in the satellite launch schedule. 

The concurrent development of the AEHF satellites, terminals, and the 
ACTS has led to further delays and cost increases. Delayed delivery of 
the ACTS had resulted in an additional 12-month delay. Launches for the 
three AEHF satellites are now scheduled for April 2008, April 2009, and 
April 2010. The launch delays along with added payload component 
testing and replacement of critical electronic parts are expected to 
increase the overall program cost by about 20 percent. In December 
2004, the Air Force notified Congress of a Nunn-McCurdy breach at the 
15 percent threshold. 

In December 2002, satellites four and five were deleted from the AEHF 
program because the new Transformational Satellite Communications 
System (TSAT), assessed elsewhere in this report, is to replace these 
satellites if they are sufficiently developed. The Air Force scheduled 
an interim review point in November 2004 to determine whether to buy 
additional AEHF satellites or rely on TSAT. However, in light of the 12-
month program slip, the decision was delayed until November 2005. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section]

Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA): 

The Navy's AESA radar is one of the top upgrades for the F/A-18E/F 
aircraft. It is to be the aircraft's primary search/track and weapon 
control radar and is designed to correct deficiencies in the current 
radar. According to the Navy, the AESA radar is key to maintaining the 
Navy's air-to-air fighting advantage and will improve the effectiveness 
of the air-to-ground weapons. When completed, the radar will be 
inserted in new production aircraft and retrofitted into lot 26 and 
above aircraft. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: McDonnell Douglas, Corp. 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $165.3 million; 
Procurement: $1,814.7 million; 
Total funding: $1,980.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 395. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2001: $526.8; 
Latest 12/2004: $599.1; 
Percent change: 13.7%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2001: $1,690.2; 
Latest 12/2004: $2,029.2; 
Percent change: 20.1%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2001: $2,217.0; 
Latest 12/2004: $2,628.3; 
Percent change: 18.6%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2001: $5.342; 
Latest 12/2004: $6.333; 
Percent change: 18.6%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2001: 415; 
Latest 12/2004: 415; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2001: 69; 
Latest 12/2004: 68; 
Percent change: -1.4%. 

Procurement funding for the radar is included in the funding for the 
F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft programs. 

[End of table]

The AESA radar's critical technologies were not mature at the start of 
system development or at the design review, but they now appear to be 
mature. The design also appears stable. However, radar development is 
continuing during production. The program is tracking a number of risks 
with the technical performance of the radar. If problems are 
discovered, they could require design changes while the radar is in 
production. For example, the software schedule leaves little room for 
error or rework, and development of the radar simulation model puts 
training at risk. In addition, there are some production risks that 
could affect the quality of the initial radars and the aircraft 
delivery schedule. Antitamper protection for the radar is currently in 
design. The AESA program also has interdependencies with other programs 
that could make the radar vulnerable to delays in their progress. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

AESA Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The latest technology readiness assessment for the radar determined 
that the four critical technologies were mature. To further ensure 
technology maturity, a mini-technology assessment is planned prior to 
the full-rate production decision. By then, the technologies should 
have been demonstrated in their final form and under expected 
conditions. 

Design Stability: 

As of July 2004, all engineering drawings for the radar and its 
subsystems had been released. At the design review in 2001, 59 percent 
had been released. Development of the radar has continued during 
production. The program office has identified some development risks 
that could result in design changes. According to a program office risk 
assessment, the top current challenge involves the software. The lack 
of timely software delivery puts the program at significant risk, and 
could also require radar hardware rework due to delays in the flight 
test program. Another risk is that the radar simulation model 
integrated into the F/A-18 training simulator may not accurately 
represent the operation and performance of the radar, which could 
result in some training that is unrealistic. Further, the number of 
flight tests that can be conducted may not be adequate to mature radar 
software. Other current risks include whether the radar: will be able 
to track sufficient targets simultaneously; radiation emissions will 
interfere with F/A-18E/F weapon systems; and will have the capability 
to detect tail aspect targets at low altitude. Mitigation plans are in 
place to address all design risks. 

Production Maturity: 

During 4 low-rate production runs, 84 radars are planned--20 percent of 
the 415 radars to be procured. The program is currently in the second 
production run. Most radars are planned to be installed in F/A-18E/Fs 
on the aircraft production line. However, 135 radars will have to be 
retrofitted into already produced F/A-18E/Fs--a more costly process 
upfront, that, according to the Navy, is expected to save money on 
support costs later. We could not assess production maturity because 
statistical process control data are not being collected. Officials 
said they are comfortable with manufacturing processes based on audits 
and inspections conducted at some key manufacturers. Nonetheless, radar 
production currently faces a number of risks. The radar contractor may 
have difficulty transitioning from development to production due to 
production risks, which could cause some late aircraft deliveries. 
Other risks include reliability problems with one of the radar's 
critical technologies may not allow initial radars to meet a 
specification and qualification tests may not be complete in time, 
resulting in delivering radar hardware that is not fully qualified. 
Moreover, full-rate production costs could increase significantly if 
the projected payoff from cost reduction initiatives is not fully 
realized. However, program officials expect significant savings from 
the cost reduction initiatives. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program office is closely tracking interdependencies that could 
place the radar at risk. Successful development of other Navy programs 
is required for the radar to meet key performance parameters. Also, the 
radar program is being developed, in part, with funding from 
contractors. Changes in the flow of this funding would affect the AESA 
program, but program officials stated that almost all of the contractor 
funding has been provided. 

In 1999, DOD directed the services to implement antitamper protection 
to guard against exploitation of critical U.S. technologies. This 
protection was not one of the radar's original requirements. While 
officials said there is a requirement for this protection to have no 
effect on radar performance, operational tests of antitamper models are 
not planned until after operational tests of radars without this 
protection, which may identify problems that require design changes to 
the protection package. 

The program's strategy for a depot has changed. Plans have been 
canceled to stand up a Navy depot maintenance facility for the radar in 
2010 at North Island, California. Instead, Raytheon will conduct depot 
maintenance at its facility in El Segundo, California, at substantial 
cost savings, according to program officials. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section]

Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS): 

The Navy's AMNS is designed to relocate, identify, and neutralize 
bottom or moored sea mines. AMNS consists of an operating console and a 
launch and handling system containing up to four neutralizers. When 
deployed, the MH-60S helicopter hovers near the target mine and lowers 
AMNS via a tow cable into the water. A neutralizer, controlled through 
fiber-optic cable, exits the launch and handling system and uses sonar 
to find the mine and fires a lethal charge, destroying the mine and the 
neutralizer. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon IDS; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $31.7 million; 
Procurement: $109.3 million; 
Total funding: $154.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 58. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 06/2003: $53.1; 
Latest 08/2004: $66.7; 
Percent change: 25.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 06/2003: $82.5; 
Latest 08/2004: $109.3; 
Percent change: 32.4%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 06/2003: $148.7; 
Latest 08/2004: $189.1; 
Percent change: 27.2%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 06/2003: $3.164; 
Latest 08/2004: $3.100; 
Percent change: -2.0%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 06/2003: 47; 
Latest 08/2004: 61; 
Percent change: 29.8%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 06/2003: 50; 
Latest 08/2004: 50; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

The procurement quantity of 58 units includes the acquisition of 58 
launch and handling systems and 580 neutralizers. 

[End of table]

The AMNS program began system development with none of its four 
critical technologies mature. While progress has been made since then, 
program officials do not expect to achieve technology maturity until 
developmental tests are conducted in mid-2005. The AMNS program's 
design is stable, with approximately 90 percent of the drawings 
complete. However, since the AMNS technologies are not expected to 
demonstrate maturity until developmental testing is conducted, the 
program runs the risk that problems identified during that testing will 
require drawings to be modified. To maintain an initial operational 
capability of June 2007, the program office requested a $13 million 
increase in research and development funds in order to support 
alternate testing on the MH-53E helicopter and to support delayed 
testing on the MH-60S helicopter. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

AMNS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The AMNS launch and handling system, the deployment subassembly, the 
warhead assembly, and the neutralizer are not fully mature. The 
neutralizer, which was demonstrated in a relevant environment, is 
approaching full maturity. The program office describes the neutralizer 
as a nondevelopmental item because it is already operational. However, 
it needs to undergo safety and performance improvements before it will 
be ready for AMNS. The other three technologies have not been 
integrated or demonstrated outside of a laboratory environment, but 
program officials have stated that no technology hurdles remain, merely 
engineering challenges. Program officials expect all four technologies 
to demonstrate maturity during developmental testing that is scheduled 
to take place between May and October 2005. 

Among risks identified by program officials are concerns that the 
neutralizer will not launch properly in an environment of strong water 
currents. The program office is attempting to mitigate this risk by 
establishing plans and funding for testing the neutralizer in strong 
water currents, including flume tank testing. Additionally, program 
officials noted concerns about the survivability of the launch and 
handling system in an underwater explosives environment. The program 
office plans for this risk to be mitigated through an analysis of 
launch and handling system internal parts and an analysis to prove that 
the launch and handling system can tolerate environments of up to 50G 
levels. 

Design Stability: 

Approximately 90 percent of the AMNS drawings are currently releasable. 
Moreover, the program office projects all drawings to be releasable to 
manufacturing at the completion of the design readiness review in March 
2005. According to program officials, top level assembly drawings will 
be considered at the design readiness review. Detailed designs of AMNS 
components were validated through 17 interim design reviews held by the 
program office. 

Because the AMNS technologies are not expected to demonstrate maturity 
until developmental testing is conducted in mid-2005, the program runs 
the risk that any problems identified during testing would require 
drawings to be modified. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program office has requested an approximately $13 million increase 
in research and development funds for the fiscal year 2006 budget. 
According to program officials, this increase is required to support 
alternate testing on the MH-53E helicopter and to support a 16-month 
delay in completion of testing on the MH-60S helicopter. The MH-60S 
helicopter will not be available to support the current AMNS 
development and test schedule. Without alternate testing on the MH-53E 
helicopter, the program will not be able to make a low-rate initial 
production decision in February 2006 or, more importantly, maintain an 
initial operational capability of June 2007. For the MH-60S helicopter, 
development testing is not scheduled to start until 6 months after a 
low-rate initial production decision has been made. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
program quantity increased from 47 to 61 as a result of a change in 
Navy strategy to deploy the system from Littoral Combat Ships rather 
than aircraft carriers. Regarding technology maturity, it noted that 
currently the program's critical technologies, for example the warhead 
assembly, are slightly more mature than indicated in the assessment. In 
addition to performing an analysis to prove that the launch and 
handling system can tolerate high-pressure underwater environments, the 
Navy intends to conduct Underwater Explosive Testing as further risk 
mitigation. 

Regarding other program issues, the Navy stated that while alternate 
platform testing on the MH-53E helicopter would enable the program to 
meet its low-rate initial production decision and initial operational 
capability targets, alternate platform testing is pending approval by 
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and 
Acquisition). It also indicated that constraints in the availability of 
MH-60S test assets have the potential to delay the program's schedule 
and increase its cost beyond the projections presented in the 
assessment. 

[End of section]

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS): 

The Army's APKWS is a precision-guided, air-to-surface missile designed 
to engage soft and lightly armored targets. The system will add a new 
laser-based seeker to the existing Hydra 70 Rocket System and is 
expected to provide a lower cost, accurate alternative to the Hellfire 
missile. Future block upgrades are planned to improve system 
effectiveness. We assessed the laser guidance technology used in the 
new seeker. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $23.2 million; 
Procurement: $1,531.4 million; 
Total funding: $1,710.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 89,539. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2002: $117.4; 
Latest 03/2004: $91.8; 
Percent change: -21.8%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2002: $1,546.9; 
Latest 03/2004: $1,531.4; 
Percent change: -1.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2002: $1,820.0; 
Latest 03/2004: $1,778.9; 
Percent change: -2.3%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2002: $0.020; 
Latest 03/2004: $0.020; 
Percent change: -2.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2002: 89,420; 
Latest 03/2004: 89,539; 
Percent change: 0.1%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2002: 60; 
Latest 03/2004: 69; 
Percent change: 15.0%. 

[End of table]

The APKWS entered system development and held its design review before 
demonstrating that its critical guidance technology was fully mature. 
While the system's design was otherwise stable at the time of the March 
2004 design review, initial system-level testing identified problems 
with the design. Program plans call for a production decision in 
September 2005 and low-rate production contract award in December 2005. 
We were unable to assess the program's production maturity because 
program officials do not expect to begin collecting statistical data on 
their key manufacturing processes until the start of production. 
Remaining efforts include completing developmental and operational 
testing. If subsequent testing identifies further problems with the 
design, additional costs of redesign and modification of drawings late 
in development could be incurred. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

APKWS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The APKWS program has not demonstrated full maturity of its only 
critical technology--laser guidance. Although a prototype guidance 
system was successfully demonstrated under the Low Cost Precision Kill 
Advanced Technology Demonstration, the current design for the guidance 
system includes numerous hardware changes to improve system cost, 
performance, and producibility. The new guidance system will not be 
fully integrated and tested from an aircraft until winter 2005. Program 
officials noted that although the prototype system design exists, 
reverting to it would increase cost and degrade the system's 
performance and producibility. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials released 100 percent of the drawings after a system-
level design review in March 2004. Recently completed testing, however, 
uncovered the need for design changes. The APKWS, to date, has 
completed two test flights. The first test flight went as planned. The 
second flight test missile, however, experienced a mechanical failure 
of the wing lock mechanism, causing the test missile to veer off 
target. The program office identified a design solution, and flight 
testing resumed in September 2004. 

Production Maturity: 

Program officials expect that there will be nine key processes 
associated with manufacturing the APKWS. The program plans to collect 
statistical data on these processes when production begins in fiscal 
year 2006. 

Other Program Issues: 

According to program officials, the Army cut APKWS research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding by 22.1 percent due 
to other funding priorities. These officials noted that this reduction 
affects planned improvements to the warhead, fuze, seeker, and 
propulsion subsystems. Furthermore, the program has experienced a 15.3 
percent growth in acquisition cycle time as the result of slower 
initial production of the system than originally planned. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army concurred with 
this assessment. 

[End of section]

Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS): 

The Special Operations Forces' ASDS is a battery-powered, dry interior 
minisubmarine developed for clandestine insertion and extraction of 
Navy SEALs and their equipment. It is carried to its deployment area by 
a specially configured SSN-688 class submarine. It is intended to 
provide increased range, payload, on-station loiter time, and endurance 
over current submersibles. The 65-foot long, 8-foot diameter ASDS is 
operated by a two-person crew and equipped with a lock out/lock in 
chamber to allow divers to exit and reenter the vehicle. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $8.5 million; 
Procurement: $1,218.0 million; 
Total funding: $1,259.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 5. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 09/1994: $141.8; 
Latest 10/2004: $465.1; 
Percent change: 228.0%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 09/1994: $125.7; 
Latest 10/2004: $1,347.5; 
Percent change: 972.1%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 09/1994: $281.7; 
Latest 10/2004: $1,876.6; 
Percent change: 566.1%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 09/1994: $93.913; 
Latest 10/2004: $312.759; 
Percent change: 233.0%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 09/1994: 3; 
Latest 10/2004: 6; 
Percent change: 100.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 09/1994: NA; 
Latest 10/2004: TBD. 

[End of table]

One of ASDS's three critical technologies--the lithium ion battery--has 
not reached maturity, and the first boat has required some design 
changes. The production decision has been delayed from June 2004 until 
December 2005 to allow time to produce and test a new battery and 
develop and test other vehicle design changes. The Navy selected a 
design for the lithium ion battery and, in May 2004, it awarded a 
contract to develop a full shipset unit for ASDS. Battery production 
will take about 1 year, and at-sea demonstration is expected in fiscal 
year 2005. Concurrent with battery replacement, other vehicle 
improvements are being developed and tested and design problems are 
being addressed. Acoustic signature issues are being addressed; 
however, this requirement does not have to be met until delivery of the 
second ASDS boat. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

ASDS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Of the three critical technologies identified by the ASDS program 
office, one--the lithium ion battery--has not reached maturity. 
However, it is expected to be mature before the December 2005 
production decision for additional boats. 

Acoustic, or noise level, problems are being addressed; however, the 
first boat is not quiet enough to meet acoustic stealth requirements. 
In earlier tests, the ASDS propeller was the source of the most 
significant noise, and a new composite propeller was installed before 
operational test and evaluation in 2003. Although program officials 
believe it meets requirements, precise acoustic measurements have not 
been made and are not scheduled to be done before the production 
decision. Other acoustic issues will be addressed on a time-phased 
basis because the acoustic requirement has been deferred until delivery 
of the second boat. 

Design Stability: 

Although all engineering drawings for ASDS have been released to 
manufacturing, ASDS design changes have been required based on 
additional improvements, test results, and other issues since ASDS 
reached initial operational capability in November 2003. An assessment 
of ASDS survivability design features is also underway; however, the 
Vulnerability Assessment Report will not be completed until April 2005. 

An updated ASDS operational requirements document was approved in June 
2004. The number of key performance parameters (those elements that are 
so significant that a failure to meet them could call into question a 
system's ability to perform missions) were reduced from 16 to 8, and 
they include one new requirement (operational availability). Other 
requirements are categorized as system critical requirements. 

Until all requirements are addressed, technical problems are solved, 
and testing is completed, we believe ASDS's final design will remain 
uncertain and may have cost and schedule implications. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy completed an independent cost estimate, including life-cycle 
costs, in March 2004. However, data were not released, and the 
estimates are now out-of-date because they do not reflect the impact of 
the 2-year delay in production of the second boat. According to the 
June 2004 Selected Acquisition Report, the U.S. Special Operations 
Command was preparing a new proposed program plan to account for the 
delay in the production decision and updated cost information was 
expected to be reported in the December 2004 report. However, according 
to the Navy's January 2005 update, the revised program plan and updated 
cost estimate will be developed, reviewed, and approved as part of the 
production decision, which has been delayed until December 2005. Since 
the program's first cost estimate was originally approved in 1994, 
research and development costs have more than tripled. 

The Navy plans to conduct follow-on testing to verify that deficiencies 
and vulnerabilities identified during the May 2003 operational 
evaluation are corrected. However, not all results will be known before 
the scheduled production decision. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section]

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System: 

The Army's and the Special Operations Command's ATIRCM/CMWS is a 
component of the integrated infrared countermeasures suite planned to 
defend U.S. aircraft from advanced infrared guided missiles. The system 
will be employed on Army and Special Operations aircraft. The system 
includes an active infrared jammer, a missile warning system, and a 
countermeasure dispenser capable of loading and employing expendables, 
such as flares, chaff, and smoke. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: BAE Systems North America; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $54.6 million; 
Procurement: $2,097.1 million; 
Total funding: $2,151.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 2,583. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 03/1996: $576.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $608.5; 
Percent change: 5.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 03/1996: $2,355.8; 
Latest 12/2003: $2,260.3; 
Percent change: -4.1%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 03/1996: $2,931.8; 
Latest 12/2003: $2,868.9; 
Percent change: -2.1%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 03/1996: $0.948; 
Latest 12/2003: $1.075; 
Percent change: 13.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 03/1996: 3,094; 
Latest 12/2003: 2,668; 
Percent change: -13.8%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 03/1996: Classified; 
Latest 12/2003: Classified; 
Percent change: Classified. 

[End of table]

The ATIRCM/CMWS program entered production in November 2003 with 
technologies mature and designs stable. Currently, the program's 
production processes are at various levels of control. The CMWS portion 
of the program entered limited production in February 2002 to meet 
urgent deployment requirements. However, full-rate production for both 
components was delayed because of reliability problems. Over the past 
several years, the program has had to overcome cost and schedule 
problems brought on by shortfalls in knowledge: key technologies were 
demonstrated late in development and only a small number of design 
drawings were completed by design review. At the low-rate production 
decision point, the Army developed a new cost estimate reducing program 
procurement cost substantially. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

ATIRCM/CMWS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The ATIRCM/CMWS's five critical technologies are mature. However, they 
did not mature until after the design review in February 1997. Most of 
the early technology development effort was focused on the application 
to rotary wing aircraft. When system development began in 1995, the 
requirements were expanded to include Navy and Air Force fixed wing 
aircraft. This change caused problems that largely contributed to cost 
increases of more than 150 percent to the development contract. The 
Navy and the Air Force subsequently dropped out of the program, 
rendering the extra effort needless, but the Navy and the Army are 
currently pursuing future joint production planning. 

Design Stability: 

The basic design of the system is complete with 100 percent of the 
drawings released to manufacturing. The design was not stable at the 
time of the design review, with only 22 percent of the drawings 
complete. This was primarily due to the expanded requirements. It was 
not until 2 years after the design review that 90 percent of the 
drawings were released and the design was considered stable. This 
resulted in inefficient manufacturing, rework, additional testing, and 
a 3-year schedule delay. The system design was successfully 
demonstrated through engineering and manufacturing development and 
transitioned to production. 

Production Maturity: 

The production maturity could not be assessed based on the information 
provided by the program office. According to program officials, the 
ATIRCM/CMWS program has 16 key manufacturing processes in various 
phases of control. They stated that ATIRCM statistical process controls 
are in development, control plans are being enhanced and as the program 
continues in production and data are gathered, lessons learned will be 
included in the processes. The Army entered limited CMWS production in 
February 2002 to meet an urgent need of the U.S. Special Operations 
Command. Subsequently, full-rate production was delayed for both 
components due to reliability testing failures. The program implemented 
reliability fixes to six production representative subsystems that will 
be used for initial operational test and evaluation. These systems were 
delivered in March 2004. The full-rate production decision for the 
complete system is now scheduled for 2006. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Army procured an initial 32 systems in fiscal year 2002 for use on 
the U.S. Special Operations Command's CH-47 helicopters. The Army plans 
to procure a total of 99 systems to outfit special operations aircraft 
between fiscal year 2003 and 2009. Currently, program officials are 
working to integrate CMWS on 16 additional platform types and models, 
which will result in an increase in quantity and funding. The CMWS low-
rate initial production quantity increased by 141 systems to a total of 
200. The Army procured all 200 of these systems, and deliveries are on 
schedule. 

At the low-rate production decision point, the Army developed a new 
cost estimate for the program that featured a variety of different 
program assumptions. For example, program officials deleted 17 years of 
Contractor Logistics Support, reducing potential duplication, and 
deleted 29 training systems. As a result, program officials report that 
procurement cost was reduced by 17 percent. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army concurred with this assessment and provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. Additionally, the 
Army commented that in January 2004, it directed the acceleration of 
CMWS for deployment on Operation Iraqi Freedom aircraft. Initial 
operational tests and evaluation will be completed during fiscal year 
2005 for CMWS and in fiscal year 2006 for ATIRCM. 

[End of section]

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP): 

The Air Force's B-2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system 
to resolve potential conflicts in frequency band usage. To comply with 
federal requirements, the frequency must be changed to a band where the 
B-2 will be designated as a primary user. The modified radar system is 
being designed to support the B-2 stealth bomber and its combination of 
stealth, range, payload, and near precision weapons delivery 
capabilities. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $693.7 million; 
Procurement: $510.6 million; 
Total funding: $1,204.3 million; 
Procurement quantity: 21. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 08/2004: $892.9. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 08/2004: $510.5. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 08/2004: $1,403.5. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 08/2004: $66.832. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 08/2004: 21. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 08/2004: 63. 

[End of table]

The B-2 RMP entered system development in August 2004 with two critical 
technologies mature and two approaching maturity. All critical 
technologies are planned to be mature by the June 2005 design review. 
The program has released 71 percent of its design drawings and plans to 
have 85 to 95 percent released by the June 2005 design review. Program 
officials indicated that production maturity metrics will be formulated 
during development and that these metrics may or may not include 
manufacturing process control data. The program plans to build six 
radar units during development for pilot training with the B-2 
operational wing prior to the planned completion of flight testing. 
Even though these units are necessary, building them early in 
development adds to the risk of later design changes because most of 
the radar flight-test activity will not occur until after these units 
are built. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

B-2 RMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The B-2 RMP entered development in August 2004 with two of four 
critical technologies mature and two others approaching maturity. Last 
year the program reported having two critical technologies, but a 
formal technology readiness assessment conducted in February 2004 
concluded that two additional technologies should be considered 
critical. The additional two technologies, the receiver/exciter for the 
electronic driver cards and aspects of the antenna designed to help 
keep the B-2's radar signature low, are not considered fully mature but 
are approaching maturity. There are no backup technologies for two 
technologies approaching maturity, but both completed their design 
phases in April 2004 and the program office estimates that both will be 
fully mature by the final design review in June 2005. 

Design Stability: 

The program has completed and released 71 percent of its engineering 
drawings to manufacturing. The program office has scheduled the design 
readiness review for June 2005 and plans to have 85 to 95 percent of 
its drawings released by that time. The program, however, does not use 
the release of design drawings as a measure of design maturity but 
instead uses the successful completion of design events, such as 
subsystem design reviews, as its primary measure of design maturity. 

Production Maturity: 

Production maturity metrics are planned to be formulated during 
development. These metrics, which may or may not include manufacturing 
process control data, are planned to be used as measures of progress 
toward production maturity during a production readiness review prior 
to the start of production in February 2007. The program is also 
involved in a proof-of-manufacturing effort to demonstrate that the 
transmit/receive modules can be built to specifications. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program plans to build six radar units during development and later 
modify these units for placement on operational B-2 aircraft. The Air 
Force needs these radar units available when the current B-2 radar 
frequency becomes unavailable, in order to continue air crew training 
and proficiency operations. Even though these units are necessary, 
building them early in development adds risk because most of the radar 
flight-test activity will not occur until after these units are built. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force concurred with this assessment. It commented that the 
program recognizes a level of risk associated with building the six 
development units prior to formal testing in order to satisfy a 
critical schedule constraint. It stated that, as a result, the program 
office has placed a heavy emphasis on risk reduction and that the 
program is progressing well thus far in system development. It further 
commented that it is important to note that these six development units 
are also planned to be used for collection of field level reliability 
and maintainability data. It also noted that the program has 
successfully completed its proof-of-manufacturing effort for the 
transmit/receive modules, has now delivered over 600 modules, and has 
completed and released approximately 70 percent of its engineering 
drawings. 

[End of section]

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP): 

The Air Force's C-130 AMP standardizes the cockpit configurations and 
avionics for 14 different mission designs of the C-130 fleet. It 
consolidates and installs the mandated DOD Navigation/Safety 
modifications, the Global Air Traffic Management systems, and the C-130 
broad area review requirements. It also incorporates other reliability, 
maintainability, and sustainability upgrades and provides increased 
situational awareness capabilities and reduces susceptibility of 
Special Operations aircraft to detection/interception. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $815.0 million; 
Procurement: $2,936.1 million; 
Total funding: $3,751.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 479. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 07/2001: $666.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $1,234.7; 
Percent change: 85.4%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 07/2001: $2,883.3; 
Latest 12/2003: $2,936.1; 
Percent change: 1.8%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 07/2001: $3,549.3; 
Latest 12/2003: $4,170.9; 
Percent change: 17.5%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 07/2001: $6.839; 
Latest 12/2003: $8.512; 
Percent change: 24.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 07/2001: 519; 
Latest 12/2003: 490; 
Percent change: -5.6%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 07/2001: TBD; 
Latest 12/2003: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

[End of table]

The C-130 AMP is using primarily commercial and modified off-the-shelf 
technologies, and it entered system development with all but one of its 
six critical technologies mature. The remaining technology is nearing 
full maturity; however, there is concern that it may not meet current 
performance requirements. Program officials reached agreement with the 
user to field a lesser set of requirements equivalent to the current 
capability in fiscal year 2008. Program officials plan to release 90 
percent of engineering drawings by the design review and have made 
progress toward that goal. Currently, 48 percent of the engineering 
drawings are releasable compared to 14 percent a year ago. 
Additionally, the program office recently modified the contract to 
accelerate the installation on Special Operations aircraft by 1 year, 
placing additional pressure on the already compressed schedule. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

C-130 AMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Five of the C-130 AMP's six critical technologies are fully mature, as 
the program is primarily utilizing proven commercial and modified off-
the-shelf technology for all AMP capabilities. The remaining critical 
technology, the Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA) 
capability, was demonstrated through the Air Force Research Lab's Quiet 
Knight advanced technology demonstration program and is nearing full 
maturity. There is a risk, however, that the TF/TA technology may not 
meet a key requirement to operate at 250 feet. Program officials worked 
with the user to agree on initially fielding TF/TA capability between 
250 and 1,000 feet, which is the current capability of the technology. 
Program officials plan to determine through analysis the residual 
capability of the TF/TA technology to fly lower. However, if such 
capability cannot be achieved, redesign may be necessary or the user 
will have to accept current capability. 

Design Stability: 

The program office has made progress toward meeting its goal of 
releasing 90 percent of the design drawings by design readiness review, 
scheduled for August 2005. This will be 9 months sooner than 
anticipated last year, due to the acceleration of key program dates to 
meet Special Operations Command requirements. Currently, 48 percent of 
the design drawings are complete and could be released to 
manufacturing. Program officials stated they are committed to meeting 
the required 90 percent drawing release by design review. 

The modernization effort is divided into a number of capability spirals 
due to the various aircraft designs. The first spiral will outfit C-130 
aircraft with core capabilities and an integrated defensive system. 
Special Operations C-130 aircraft will be outfitted first, and future 
spirals are planned for these aircraft because they require additional, 
and unique, defensive systems integration and enhanced situational 
awareness. 

Other Program Issues: 

Funding reductions in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 delayed the C-130 
AMP's development program, which resulted in a rescheduling of program 
milestones and rebaselining of the program. The design review, low-rate 
initial production, and production readiness decisions were all 
delayed. While program officials stated that the delay in schedule 
would provide more time to resolve issues with the TF/TA technology and 
software, the delay in fielding was not acceptable to the Special 
Operations Command. They added funding to mature the TF/TA technology 
through a series of flight demonstrations prior to the formal 
developmental test and evaluation period. The system integration 
schedule was compressed by 9 months by accelerating installation of 
core and mission-unique capabilities on Special Operations aircraft; 
however, this allows less time to reduce manufacturing risks and 
further compresses an already optimistic time line. 

The program is also at risk if less software is reused than originally 
estimated, which may cause an increase in development costs and delay 
the program's schedule. Software integration remains a risk due to its 
complexity, number of suppliers, potential for developmental growth, 
certification of a secure operating system, and software safety 
standards. The program office is working to mitigate these risks 
through modeling and simulation, utilizing the systems integration 
laboratory built by the contractor, and through flight demonstrations. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
program officials worked with the user to agree on initially fielding 
TF/TA capability between 250 and 1,000 feet and that an analysis will 
be accomplished to determine residual TF/TA technology capability to 
fly lower. The Air Force also commented that funding reductions in 
fiscal years 2003 and 2004 delayed the C-130 AMP development program. 
It further stated that a delay in fielding MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft 
until fiscal year 2010 was unacceptable to the Special Operations 
Command, which added funding to mature TF/TA technology through flight 
demonstrations prior to a formal developmental test and evaluation 
period. The Air Force also commented that the special operations 
warfighter needs are driving an aggressive schedule. 

[End of section]

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP): 

The Air Force's C-5 AMP is the first of two major upgrades for the C-5 
to improve the mission capability rate, transport capabilities and 
reduce ownership costs. The AMP implements Global Air Traffic 
Management, navigation and safety equipment, modern digital equipment, 
and an all-weather flight control system. The second major upgrade, the 
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), replaces the 
engines and modifies the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic systems. We 
assessed the C-5 AMP. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $10.8 million; 
Procurement: $204.2 million; 
Total funding: $215.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 27. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/1998: $344.6; 
Latest 02/2004: $372.2; 
Percent change: 8.0%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/1998: $602.8; 
Latest 02/2004: $407.1; 
Percent change: -32.5%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/1998: $947.4; 
Latest 02/2004: $779.3; 
Percent change: -17.7%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/1998: $7.519; 
Latest 02/2004: $14.169; 
Percent change: 88.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/1998: 126; 
Latest 02/2004: 55; 
Percent change: -56.3%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/1998: 83; 
Latest 02/2004: 83; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

[End of table]

The program office considers the C-5 AMP's critical technologies and 
design to be mature as they are relying on commercial-off-the-shelf 
technologies that are installed in other commercial and military 
aircraft. The C-5 AMP plans to complete developmental test and 
evaluation in December 2004, a 2 month slip from last year. The main 
challenge to the program is the development and integration of 
software--to which this schedule delay has been attributed. The Air 
Force plans to modify 55 of the 112 C-5 aircraft. The Air Force is also 
seeking funding to modify the remaining 57 C-5s, however, that decision 
will not be made until the Air Force determines the correct mix of C-5 
and C-17 aircraft needed to meet DOD's airlift needs. If the Air Force 
decides to use the C-17s, it may not upgrade some, or all, of the 
remaining 57 C-5s. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

C-5 AMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess the C-5 AMP's critical technologies because the 
program used commercial technologies that are considered mature. 
Program officials stated that those technologies are in use on other 
aircraft and that they have not significantly changed in form, fit, or 
function. For example, the new computer processors are being used in 
the Boeing 777, 717, other commercial aircraft, the KC-10, and a Navy 
reconnaissance aircraft. 

Design Stability: 

The design appears stable as the contractor has released 100 percent of 
the drawings for the AMP. In addition, seven major subsystem-level 
design reviews were completed, and integration activities are currently 
ongoing. Demonstration of these integration activities is scheduled 
during development test and evaluation, which started in December 2002 
and should be completed in December 2004. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the production maturity because most components are 
readily available as commercial-off-the-shelf items. This equipment is 
being used on other military and commercial aircraft. In addition, the 
C-5 AMP is incorporating many other off-the-shelf systems and 
equipment, such as the embedded global positioning system, the inertial 
navigation system, and the multifunction control and display units. To 
ensure production maturity, the program office is collecting data 
regarding modification kit availability and the installation schedules. 

Other Program Issues: 

Program officials indicated the greatest risk to the AMP is software 
development and integration. Several new software programs must be 
developed and integrated with several other commercial off-the-shelf 
software packages. According to officials, the 2 month slip in 
development test and evaluation can be attributed to software 
development delays as well as overall systems integration (hardware and 
software) delays. More specifically, program officials stated that the 
two primary causes for delays were (1) the unavailability of systems 
integration facilities, including equipment, simulation software, and 
engineering simulator, and (2) less robust than expected integration 
test scripts and computer software configuration item designs. Program 
officials stated that they have applied lessons learned from the AMP 
experience to the RERP program. The C-5 RERP is assessed elsewhere in 
this report. 

The overall quantity of the C-5 fleet has been reduced from 126 to 112 
due to the retirement of 14 aircraft. The C-5 aircraft must undergo the 
AMP modifications prior to the RERP modifications. However, only 55 
aircraft have been approved for the AMP upgrades, while 112 are 
awaiting the RERP upgrades. The Air Force needs to determine how many 
of the remaining 57 C-5s will receive the AMP upgrades. That decision 
will not be made until it determines the correct mix of C-5 and C-17 
aircraft needed to meet DOD's airlift needs. According to program 
officials, the Air Force is currently performing mobility studies that 
will be used to make a mobility mix decision. Until it is decided 
whether to use C-17s to replace some, or all, of the earlier 57 C-5s, 
the number of aircraft to undergo the AMP and RERP modernization will 
remain uncertain. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated 
that the unit cost comparison between the November 1998 and the latest 
AMP position does not accurately portray the program's cost growth. The 
November 1998 position represents the original 126-aircraft program. 
The program has since been restructured to a 55-aircraft program. 
According to the Air Force, such a change would increase unit costs by 
a large amount because it would be less expensive, on a unit cost 
basis, to procure for a greater number of aircraft than it would be to 
procure for fewer aircraft. 

GAO Comments: 

While the program has established a new cost and performance baseline 
since the November 1998 decision to begin development, the comparison 
presented provides an accurate picture of change since that major 
decision. Although DOD may update its baseline for management purposes, 
our goal is to provide an aggregate or overall picture of the program's 
history. 

[End of section]

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. The 
RERP is designed to enhance the reliability of the aircraft through the 
replacement of engines and modifications to subsystems such as the 
electrical, fuel, hydraulic and flight controls systems, while the C-5 
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) is designed to enhance the 
avionics. These upgrades are part of a two-phased modernization effort 
to improve the mission capability rate, transport capabilities and 
reduce ownership costs. We assessed the C-5 RERP. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $908.2 million; 
Procurement: $7,565.1 million; 
Total funding: $8,476.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 109. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/2001: $1,505.3; 
Latest 02/2004: $1,537.4; 
Percent change: 2.1%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/2001: $7,858.0; 
Latest 02/2004: $7,565.1; 
Percent change: -3.7%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/2001: $9,366.5; 
Latest 02/2004: $9,105.9; 
Percent change: -2.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/2001: $74.338; 
Latest 02/2004: $81.302; 
Percent change: 9.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/2001: 126; 
Latest 02/2004: 112; 
Percent change: -11.1%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/2001: 100; 
Latest 02/2004: 116; 
Percent change: 16.0%. 

[End of table]

The RERP is utilizing demonstrated commercial off-the-shelf components 
that require little or no modification.The program ensured that the 
technology was mature and that the design was stable at critical points 
in development, closely tracking best practice standards. The program 
is currently in system development and plans to enter low-rate 
production in March 2007. The major challenge to the program is 
software development and integration. Also, the program is dependent on 
the number of aircraft approved to undergo the C-5 AMP modernization 
program. Until additional aircraft are approved for the AMP, it is 
uncertain how many aircraft will undergo the RERP. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

C-5 RERP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The C-5 RERP's technologies are mature based on an independent 
technology readiness assessment conducted in October 2001. New engines 
account for 64 percent of the expected improvement in mission 
capability rate for the aircraft. The new engines are commercial jet 
engines currently being used on numerous aircraft. According to the Air 
Force technology assessment, these engines have over 70 million flying 
hours of use. 

Design Stability: 

The C-5 RERP's design is stable. As of November 2003, 98 percent of the 
design drawings were complete. In addition, the seven major subsystem-
level design reviews were completed before the December 2003 system-
level design review. 

According to program officials, the greatest risk to the RERP is 
software development and integration activities. Several new software 
programs must be developed, and these programs as well as other 
commercial off-the-shelf software packages must be integrated. The 
program has experienced software problems in the past and has taken 
actions to improve software activities. The program is taking advantage 
of AMP-developed products and lessons learned in the RERP to reduce the 
risk of schedule slips associated with software development and 
integration. For example, according to program officials, the baseline 
software and systems integration facilities that were developed for the 
AMP will not have to be completely redeveloped for RERP activities. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the C-5 RERP's production maturity because the Air 
Force is buying commercially available items. However, we expect that 
production maturity would be at a high level because the engines have 
been commercially available for many years. 

Other Program Issues: 

The C-5 RERP is dependent on the C-5 AMP (assessed elsewhere in this 
report), as the aircraft has to undergo avionics modernization prior to 
other enhancements. Over the past year, software development resources 
that were planned for the RERP were shifted to the AMP to ensure 
completion of its software activities. According to program officials, 
while shifting of resources currently has not caused a significant 
schedule slip to the RERP, they do acknowledge that it will have a 
greater impact on the RERP if the AMP continues to slip and resources 
originally planned for use on the RERP are retained to complete the AMP 
work. 

Due to the retirement of 14 aircraft, the quantity of C-5 RERP aircraft 
was reduced from 126 to 112. Although the RERP program has been 
authorized for 112 aircraft, the avionics modernization has only been 
authorized for 55 aircraft. Therefore, until the Air Force decides on 
how many C-5 aircraft will undergo avionics modernization, it is 
uncertain how many aircraft will undergo the RERP. That decision is 
contingent upon the results of ongoing mobility studies that are 
examining the appropriate mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft for DOD's 
overall airlift needs. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated 
that the unit cost comparison between the November 2001 and the latest 
RERP position does not accurately portray the program's cost growth. 
The November 2001 position represents the original 126-aircraft 
program. The program has since been restructured to a 112-aircraft 
program. It further stated that such a change would increase unit costs 
by a large amount because it would be less expensive, on a unit cost 
basis, to procure for a greater number of aircraft than it would be to 
procure for fewer aircraft. 

GAO Comments: 

While the program has established a new cost and performance baseline 
since the November 2001 decision to begin development, the comparison 
presented provides an accurate picture of change since that major 
decision. Although DOD may update its baseline for management purposes, 
our goal is to provide an aggregate or overall picture of the program's 
history. 

[End of section]

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC): 

The Navy's CEC is designed to connect radar systems to enhance 
detection and engagement of air targets. Ships and planes equipped with 
their version of CEC hardware and software will share real-time data to 
create composite radar tracks--allowing the battle group to see the 
same radar picture. A CEC-equipped ship can then detect and engage 
targets its radar cannot see. We assessed the current shipboard and 
airborne versions of the CEC. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon Systems Corporation; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $405.3 million; 
Procurement: $1,180.1 million; 
Total funding: $1,585.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 181. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/1995: $1,172.4; 
Latest 06/2004: $2,524.6; 
Percent change: 115.3%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/1995: $1,308.8; 
Latest 06/2004: $2,171.6; 
Percent change: 65.9%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/1995: $2,528.0; 
Latest 06/2004: $4,696.2; 
Percent change: 85.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/1995: $13.814; 
Latest 06/2004: $16.594; 
Percent change: 20.1%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/1995: 183; 
Latest 06/2004: 283; 
Percent change: 54.6%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/1995: 16; 
Latest 06/2004: 16; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

[End of table]

The CEC's production maturity could not be assessed because the 
government does not collect the necessary data on the commercially 
available portions of the ship-based and airborne versions of the CEC. 
However, program and contractor officials consider the production 
processes capable of producing a quality product on time and within 
cost. The technologies and design of both the ship-based and airborne 
versions of the CEC are fully mature. In April 2002, the shipboard 
version was approved for full-rate production. The airborne version 
remains in low-rate production and may proceed to full-rate production 
pending a full-rate production decision anticipated in September 2005. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

CEC Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All six of the CEC's critical technologies are mature. While the 
shipboard and airborne versions have different hardware, they share the 
same critical technologies. 

Design Stability: 

The CEC's basic design appears stable, as all of the drawings needed to 
build the shipboard and airborne versions have been released to 
manufacturing. Additional drawings for each version continue to be 
released to incorporate advances in commercially available 
technologies, which comprise approximately 60 percent of CEC hardware. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity as data were not available. 
According to program officials, CEC production is mature and 
noncommercial portions do not involve critical manufacturing processes. 
Officials indicated that they do not have insight into whether the 
manufacturing processes for the commercial portions are critical and 
are under statistical control. However, program officials are confident 
that a quality product can be delivered on time and within cost given 
contractor past performance. 

The program office plans to seek full-rate production approval for the 
airborne version in September 2005. During operational testing, the 
airborne version was determined to be operationally effective but not 
operationally suitable. According to the program office, it is 
implementing corrections that will be verified in time to support the 
full-rate production decision. 

Other Program Issues: 

In November 2003, the Navy announced plans to improve CEC 
interoperability by pursuing open architecture and functionality 
changes with the Joint Single Integrated Air Picture Systems 
Engineering Organization (JSSEO). The CEC Program Office discontinued 
planning for a Block 2 development effort and began working with JSSEO 
to jointly engineer sensor measurement and radar tracking management 
solutions that will be available to all services to ensure optimum 
interoperability across the battlespace. The joint track management 
software being developed is intended to interface with CEC software to 
improve data sharing throughout different computing environments and to 
facilitate component upgrades without redesigning the entire system. 

CEC officials consider the joint track management software a technical 
risk since JSSEO is using a relatively new approach for combat system 
software development. The officials also consider it a schedule risk 
that could impact timely delivery of Navy platforms, including the 
DD(X) and the Littoral Combat Ship, which are to be equipped with CEC. 
To mitigate risks, the CEC program manager is closely monitoring joint 
track manager progress to determine whether the software can be 
incorporated into the CEC on schedule. If JSSEO does not deliver an 
acceptable product by September 2005, the Navy plans to continue using 
current CEC software and explore alternatives. 

With discontinuation of a Block 2 effort, the program also initiated a 
preplanned product improvement effort for CEC hardware. This effort 
takes advantage of advances in technology to reduce size, weight, and 
cost without adding new critical technologies. Improved hardware will 
operate with current CEC software and joint track manager software, 
once ready. The program began testing of the improved hardware in 
August 2004 and plans to obtain Office of the Secretary of Defense 
approval for incorporating improvements by October 2005. The program is 
also developing a miniterminal land version for the Marine Corps. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that it 
generally concurred with our assessment but provided clarifying 
comments. Regarding the schedule risk associated with joint track 
management, the Navy stated that it, along with the other services, is 
working with JSSEO to reach agreement on a joint architecture for track 
management, combat identification, and tactical data link integration. 
It explained that the joint architectural agreement will allow 
appropriate existing solutions to be integrated into the joint track 
manager and will be extensible to multiple networks and different 
communication devices. The Navy stated that this will reduce the risk 
of providing joint track management capability in fiscal year 2008. 

[End of section]

CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F): 

The Army's CH-47F heavy lift helicopter is intended to provide 
transportation for tactical vehicles, artillery, engineer equipment, 
personnel, and logistical support equipment. It is also expected to 
operate in both day and night. The program is to enhance performance 
and extend the useful life of the CH-47. This effort includes 
installing a digitized cockpit, rebuilding the airframe, and reducing 
aircraft vibration. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Helicopters; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $0.0 million; 
Procurement: $5,499.9 million; 
Total funding: $5,499.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 314. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/1998: $149.4; 
Latest 12/2003: $172.3; 
Percent change: 15.3%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/1998: $2,615.9; 
Latest 12/2003: $6,221.3; 
Percent change: 137.8%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/1998: $2,765.3; 
Latest 12/2003: $6,393.6; 
Percent change: 131.2%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/1998: $9.157; 
Latest 12/2003: $18.860; 
Percent change: 106.0%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/1998: 302; 
Latest 12/2003: 339; 
Percent change: 12.3%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/1998: 82; 
Latest 12/2003: 113; 
Percent change: 37.8%. 

[End of table]

CH-47F production maturity could not be assessed as the program is not 
collecting statistical process control data on key manufacturing 
processes. Program officials believe that CH-47F production is low risk 
because no new technology is being inserted into the aircraft, two 
prototypes have been produced, and the production process was 
demonstrated during the delivery of one low-rate initial production 
aircraft. The CH-47F technologies appear mature and the design stable, 
with 100 percent of the engineering drawings released for 
manufacturing. The Army has regained 6 months of a schedule delay 
anticipated when it was directed to produce additional MH-47s for 
special operations. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

CH-47F Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess technology maturity or determine the number of 
critical technologies in detail. The CH-47F is a modification of the 
existing CH-47D helicopter. Program officials believe that all critical 
technologies are mature and have been demonstrated prior to integration 
into the CH-47F development program. 

Design Stability: 

The Army completed the CH-47F engineering development and manufacturing 
phase, with 100 percent of the drawings released to manufacturing. 
However, at the design review, only 37 percent of the system's 
engineering drawings were complete. Since that time, the number of 
drawings completed increased substantially. The majority of the new 
drawings were instituted to correct wire routing and installation on 
the aircraft; changes the program office believed could not be 
determined until after the first prototype was delivered. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity because the CH-47F program does 
not collect statistical process control data on its production of 
helicopters. The program office relies on inspections as its means to 
ensure acceptable production results. 

According to the program office, the CH-47 production is low risk 
because two prototypes have been produced during development and the 
Army recently took delivery of its first low-rate initial production 
aircraft. Further, the program reported that during low-rate 
production, it made significant advances in the development and 
refinement of the system that are designed to increase production 
efficiencies. Advances include the implementation of the automated 
management execution system and the introduction of laser tracking to 
identify key mounting points. These enhancements are geared toward 
improving the manufacturing learning curve. However, the program office 
acknowledges that the program will lose some of the learning benefits 
during the anticipated break in production of the CH-47F in favor of 
producing more MG-47s during the next lot of production. 

Other Program Issues: 

In 2002, DOD directed the Army to produce 16 MH-47G aircraft for the 
Special Operations Command before the start of the Army's low-rate 
production for the CH-47F helicopters and to deliver those aircraft as 
soon as possible. The Army initially estimated that this transfer of 16 
aircraft for special operations would result in a 15-month delay in its 
first unit equipped date for the CH-47F. However, according to the 
program office, scheduling issues between the Army and the Special 
Operations Command have been resolved. The Army now estimates that the 
15-month schedule slip has been reduced by about 6 months. The program 
office reported that the CH-47F and MH-47G program strategy has been 
approved by the Defense Acquisition Executive. 

Further, the Army has recently approved the production of additional CH-
47F aircraft in the most recent Program Objective Memorandum 
submission. Additionally, the Army included in this submission an 
escalation of 19 CH-47F aircraft that had previously been scheduled at 
the end of the program. These quantity changes resulted from the recent 
Army Aviation Transformation Group's recommendations. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army concurred with this assessment and provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. Additionally, it 
commented that the full-rate production decision was approved on 
November 22, 2004, by the Army Acquisition Executive. Further, the 
program was rebaselined to include a revised Acquisition Objective of 
510 aircraft. Details of this rebaselined program will be outlined in 
the December 2004 Selected Acquisition Report. 

[End of section]

Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM): 

The Army's CKEM is a hypervelocity missile designed to provide superior 
lethality against current tanks, bunkers, buildings, and future 
advanced threat armor. It is designed to provide a high rate of fire 
and a high probability of kill beyond the range of tank guns, and at 
half the size and weight of current kinetic energy missiles. The CKEM 
is a potential candidate for use on the current Stryker Brigade and 
Future Combat System vehicles. The Army is currently developing the 
CKEM in an Advanced Technology Demonstration program. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin-Missiles and Fire Control; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $63.6 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $63.6 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 07/2004: $229.2. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 07/2004: $0.0%. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 07/2004: $229.2. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 07/2004: NA. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 07/2004: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 07/2004: TBD. 

Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be 
determined. 

[End of table]

Program officials believe the CKEM technologies will be mature when the 
program enters system development. The Army is using an advanced 
technology demonstration to develop the CKEM technologies to satisfy 
future Army missile requirements. The technologies have already been 
demonstrated in a relevant environment. Work remains to reduce the 
technologies to the right size and show they can withstand the high g-
force environment. Funding inconsistencies and increased costs have 
hampered technology development efforts and increased program risk. 
Program officials expect at least one design change iteration once the 
CKEM enters system development, which could happen in 2006 after full-
scale weapon system flight testing. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

CKEM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Although none of its critical technologies are fully mature, the CKEM 
is over a year from entering system development and all four 
technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant environment. Program 
officials believe all CKEM critical technologies will be fully mature 
when the program proceeds with system development. The missile's four 
critical technologies are a solid rocket motor, an attitude control 
system, penetrator/lethality mechanisms, and guidance systems. CKEM 
engineers are pioneering many of the system's technologies to satisfy 
future missile requirements, which include reduced infrared signatures, 
longer ranges, nondetonable propellants, and smaller size and weight. 

Existing missile guidance and control components will not satisfy the 
size and weight requirements and will not withstand the g-forces 
potentially exerted by the CKEM. As a result, CKEM developers are 
working to miniaturize existing components and improve tolerances for 
use under greater velocities. The program completed testing of smaller 
guidance and control prototypes in a high g-force environment. 
Engineers are also designing a motor with an increased burn rate, 
advanced materials, and innovative structural designs. They 
successfully tested a new solid-fuel rocket motor, and they plan to 
begin controlled flight testing in April 2005. They also demonstrated 
the missile's lethality against a tank target with advanced armor. 
However, system officials said that additional technology funding is 
needed to fully develop component technologies and produce a missile 
that will meet the size and performance goals. 

Program officials believe they can mature technologies to the point 
that only a single design iteration will be needed to satisfy Army 
objective requirements during system development. They noted that the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology instructed them to forego involvement in the development of 
fire control systems and instead focus solely on missile development. 
This could result in integration problems that would require future 
design changes. 

Other Program Issues: 

Program officials believe that inconsistent funding has hampered 
development efforts. Over the last 3 years, the budget has been reduced 
over $21 million. Those reductions were offset by reprogramming $17 
million back into the program. Initially, competitive contracts were 
awarded to two prime contractors. Citing funding discontinuity and 
higher-than-expected contractor proposals, program officials did not 
exercise an option for the second contractor's continued involvement. 
They also cited funding as the reason the Army suspended international 
cooperative agreements for assistance in developing associated 
technologies. 

The Army has not included a CKEM system development program in its 
future funding plans. Nonetheless, program officials hope to have the 
system ready to transition to system development in late 2006. CKEM 
technologies can also be used to improve existing kinetic energy 
missiles, namely the Line-of-Sight Anti-Tank missile. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army concurred with our assessment. 

[End of section]

Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21: 

The Navy's CVN-21 class is the successor to the Nimitz-class aircraft 
carrier and includes a number of advanced technologies in propulsion, 
aircraft launch and recovery, weapons handling, and survivability. 
These technologies will allow for increased sortie rates and decreased 
manning rates as compared to existing systems. Many of the technologies 
were intended for the second ship in the class, but they were 
accelerated into the first ship in a December 2002 restructuring of the 
program. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Newport News; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $2,630.8 million; 
Procurement: $24,760.5 million; 
Total funding: $27,391.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 3. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 04/2004: $4,125.7. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 04/2004: $26,430.2. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 04/2004: $30,555.9. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 04/2004: $10,185.315. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 04/2004: 3. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 04/2004: 183. 

[End of table]

The CVN-21 entered system development in April 2004 with very few of 
its critical technologies fully mature. This is due in part to DOD's 
decision to accelerate the installation of a number of technologies 
from the second ship to the first. The accelerated technologies are at 
much lower levels of maturity. Program officials state that the 
extended construction and design period that ends in 2014 allows 
further time for technology development. Program officials have 
established a risk reduction strategy that includes decision points for 
each technology's inclusion based on a demonstrated maturity level. 
These points coincide with key design milestones and include 
consideration of the fallback use of mature technologies for all but 
two technologies. The program office has stated that those two 
technologies are already mature and operational. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

CVN-21 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials reported that 3 of the 14 critical technologies were 
mature at development start and that 4 more were approaching maturity. 
An additional 7 were at much lower levels of readiness. The Navy 
expects that 10 of the 14 technologies will be mature or close to 
mature by the design review in fiscal year 2006. 

Some of the CVN-21 critical technologies are being developed by other 
programs, not by the CVN-21 program. As a result, events in those 
programs could affect the CVN-21 development time line. Those 
technologies are the Volume Search Radar, Multi-Function Radar, 
Advanced Arresting Gear, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile and Joint 
Precision Approach and Landing System. CVN-21 program officials 
reported that they are working closely with all critical technology 
leads in those offices to ensure that their time lines are integrated 
with the needs of the CVN-21 program. In case those technologies do not 
mature in time for insertion into the carrier, the CVN-21 program has 
identified existing or fully mature alternate systems as backup 
technologies. 

Since entering development, the program office has added 9 1,100-ton 
air conditioning plants as a critical technology, and has added them to 
the baseline design for the ship. The plants are not near maturity. The 
Navy added the plants because the CVN 21's requirements for chilled 
water are significantly higher than existing aircraft carriers. The 
Navy considers this a low-risk development effort since they are using 
a proven commercial design with upgrades to meet military shock, 
vibration, and noise requirements. 

Two of the four remaining technologies that are not mature, the Omni-
Directional Vehicle and Automated Weapons and Materials Movement 
Technologies, are primarily mobile vehicles that can be accommodated 
late in the design and construction schedule because they are not 
installed as part of the ship. In addition, the Advanced Arresting Gear 
is not near maturity, but according to program officials, it does not 
pose a significant risk to the program because it is located high in 
the ship and as such will be integrated in the latter stages of 
construction. 

Program officials stated that it is not possible to mature some systems 
to the best practices standard this early in development. One such 
system is the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, a replacement for 
the current steam catapult system used to launch aircraft off carriers. 
This system has been in development since the late 1990s, but due to 
the size and complexity of the system, a prototype of it cannot be 
tested aboard a surrogate ship. 

Other Program Issues: 

Program cost estimates increased by more than $18 billion over the 
amount reported last year as a result of the development start 
decision, which added a second follow-on ship to the program, for a 
total production run of three ships. Previous estimates were based on a 
single follow-on ship and were not fully developed estimates for the 
entire program. In addition, the cost estimates at development start 
more accurately reflect potential inflation incurred by the shipbuilder 
during design and construction of the ship. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy generally concurred with this assessment and reiterated that 
the time frames for design and construction of an aircraft carrier 
allow for evolving technologies to be brought to the ship later in the 
construction cycle. It stated that if a certain technology does not 
mature in time for ship construction, the technology will be replaced 
by a fall back technology that may not meet projected capability, but 
it will at least be equal to current capability. 

[End of section]

DD(X) Destroyer: 

The Navy's DD(X) destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed to 
provide advanced land attack capability in support of forces ashore and 
contribute to U.S. military dominance in littoral operations. The 
program is currently in the system design phase, and the Navy plans to 
authorize detailed design and construction of the lead ship in March 
2005. The Navy plans to demonstrate the ship's critical technologies by 
building and testing 10 developmental subsystems, referred to as 
engineering development models. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Ship Systems; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $6.467.9 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $6.467.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 01/1998: $1,956.5; 
Latest 08/2004: $10,120.9; 
Percent change: 417.3%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 01/1998: $0.0; 
Latest 08/2004: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 01/1998: $1,956.5; 
Latest 08/2004: $10,120.9; 
Percent change: 417.3%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 01/1998: NA; 
Latest 08/2004: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
As of 01/1998: 0; 
Latest 08/2004: 1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 01/1998: 128; 
Latest 08/2004: 180; 
Percent change: 40.6%. 

[End of table]

Costs increased due to changes in cost estimating, additional 
technology development, and a program restructuring, and include 
procurement of the lead ship in research and development. 

None of the DD(X) technologies included in the 10 engineering 
development models were mature at the start of development, and none 
are expected to be mature at the March 2005 decision to authorize 
detailed design and construction of the lead ship. Current plans call 
for demonstrating 3 of the 10 subsystems by the end of the program's 
design review in August 2005 and an additional 3 in September 2005. 
Backups are available for only 2 of the 10 developmental subsystems. As 
most of the testing of the engineering development models will take 
place in the months immediately before and after the design review, it 
is not likely that design stability will be achieved by the time of 
that review. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

DD(X) Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of the DD(X) technologies were mature at the start of development, 
and none are expected to be mature at the March 2005 decision to 
authorize detailed design and construction of the lead ship. By the end 
of the design review in August 2005, only three subsystems are expected 
to complete testing: the autonomic fire suppression system, the hull 
form, and the infrared mock-ups. The integrated power system, 
peripheral vertical launch system, and total ship computing environment 
are expected to complete testing in September 2005. The dual band radar 
and integrated deckhouse are to complete testing well after the design 
review. The advanced gun system and undersea warfare system will not be 
tested as fully integrated systems until after installation on the 
first ship. 

The current plans for the integrated undersea warfare system include 
testing the functionality of components, such as the ability of one of 
two sonar arrays to detect mines, but not demonstrating the system as a 
whole. 

Component testing of the advanced gun system is ongoing and has 
resulted in changes to some components. The weight of the gun system 
increased as a result of an effort to improve producibility and cost 
efficiency. Land-based testing of the gun system is planned for the 
summer of 2005, and flight tests for the munition are to be completed 
in September 2005. The two technologies will not be tested together 
until after ship installation. 

The dual band radar is not scheduled to complete testing until fiscal 
year 2008, well after the design review. Program officials have made 
some assumptions about where in the deckhouse it will be placed. If its 
weight increases or other technical factors cause it to be relocated, a 
redesign effort may be needed. In addition, recent component testing 
and design reviews of portions of the radar have revealed shortfalls in 
performance. 

The integrated power system recently completed a change in design, 
which helps mitigate previously experienced weight issues. These design 
changes will not be tested until after design review. In addition, 
technical issues with components of the Permanent Magnet Motor have 
arisen that could affect schedule and cost. Plans for the integrated 
power system do include the use of a fallback technology, but would 
require trade-offs in requirements. 

Design Stability: 

Most of the testing of the engineering development models will take 
place around the time of design review. Even if tests are successful, 
they will not be completed in time to achieve design stability. 
Problems found in testing could result in changes in the design, delays 
in product delivery, and increases in cost. Detailed knowledge about 
subsystems and their component technologies is necessary for developing 
the system design. If this information is not available and assumptions 
about operating characteristics have to be made, redesign may be 
necessary when reliable information is available. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy acknowledges the aggressive DD(X) schedule but maintains that 
the ability to deliver revolutionary capabilities to the fleet with 
reduced crew necessitates some element of risk. Congress has expressed 
support for the Navy's approach, stating in the report accompanying the 
fiscal year 2005 national defense authorization act "the conferees 
believe that taking such risks is warranted to ensure that the DD(X) 
technologies are not obsolete, and that the Navy has taken adequate 
steps to mitigate the risks before ship construction begins."

The Navy disagrees with the assessment that the DD(X) will not achieve 
design stability prior to design review. It stated that the ship design 
is stable and reflects release of the final baseline leading to design 
review. It also stated that the results from continued engineering 
development model testing will be incorporated in the design and that 
permission to begin design review will be based on meeting specific 
entrance criteria that measure the availability of the appropriate data 
on technologies. 

GAO Comments: 

Design stability requires detailed knowledge of the form, fit, and 
function of all technologies as well as the integration of individual, 
fully matured subsystems. As testing for DD(X) technologies continues 
beyond the dates scheduled for design review, this knowledge may not be 
achieved when required. 

[End of section]

E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (E-10A): 

The Air Force's E-10A program is being designed to exploit emerging 
radar sensor technologies for airborne surface surveillance and focused 
air surveillance for cruise missile defense. It will consist of an 
active electronically scanned array radar; a modified Boeing 767 
commercial airframe; and a battle management, command and control 
computer mission subsystem. Development of the radar has already begun; 
and while funding of the first airframe has begun, the overall program 
has not yet entered development. We assessed the entire system. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass. 
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $2,083.8 million; 
Procurement: $1,171.3 million; 
Total funding: $3,255.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 3. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 01/2005: $3,986.5. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 01/2005: $3,394.9. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 01/2005: $7,381.4. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 01/2005: $1,054.486. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 01/2005: 7. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 01/2005: TBD. 

Total program cost is not available. Baseline cost information is 
through fiscal year 2013. Research and development includes Global Hawk 
radar development costs. 

[End of table]

We have not assessed the technology maturity of the overall E-10A 
program because program officials have not yet completed their 
identification and assessment of the system's critical technologies. 
However, they assessed the radar's critical technologies in October 
2003, prior to the radar's Milestone B decision. At that time, 
officials determined that six of the radar's nine critical technologies 
were mature. The remaining three radar technologies are not expected to 
reach full maturity until the first E-10A flight in 2010. Development 
challenges for the overall E-10A program include the integration of the 
radar, airframe, and battle management subsystems and the software 
development for the battle management subsystem. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

E-10A Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Because program officials have not yet completed their identification 
and assessment of the program's critical technologies, we were unable 
to assess the technological maturity of the overall E-10A system. 
Program officials are preparing a technology development strategy as 
well as a technology readiness assessment in support of the upcoming 
development decision for the overall weapon system. 

Program officials have identified and assessed the critical 
technologies associated with the radar subsystem. They determined that 
six of the nine critical technologies were mature. The remaining three 
radar technologies are not expected to reach full maturity until the 
first E-10A flight in 2010. Tests on a smaller prototype have 
demonstrated the functional capabilities of the radar, but are not 
representative of the E-10A radar's form or fit. The final form of the 
radar will be significantly larger and will not be integrated on the 
airframe until flight testing in 2010. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess design stability for the E-10A as the overall 
system has not yet entered system development. As a result, the total 
number of drawings has not yet been determined. However, a final design 
review of the radar subsystem was conducted in June 2004. Program 
officials stated that over 90 percent of the expected drawings for the 
radar had been released at that point. They do not expect the number of 
radar drawings to change significantly because key subsystems for the 
radar are already being produced for other weapon systems. 

Other Program Issues: 

In fiscal years 2003 and 2005, the E-10A's proposed budget was reduced 
by Congress. Both budget cuts resulted in a restructuring of the 
program. As part of the last restructuring, program officials requested 
that the system development milestone decision be accelerated from July 
to April 2005. However, in a recent budget decision, DOD reduced the 
program's fiscal year 2006 and 2007 budget request by a total of $600 
million. If this reduction is sustained, the E-10A program will have to 
undergo yet another restructuring. 

According to program officials, the software development for the battle 
management command and control subsystem is the most critical program 
risk. This subsystem will provide the machine-to-machine communications 
capability needed to operate with prospective and legacy command and 
control systems. The development of the battle management subsystem has 
lagged behind the radar and airframe; the Air Force just awarded a 
development contract for the subsystem in September 2004. 

The 767 airframe is a commercial derivative that will be modified to 
meet the E-10A's military requirements. In addition, the integration of 
the large scale radar and the battle management subsystem may 
necessitate additional modifications. The Air Force has only contracted 
for one aircraft, which will be used as a testbed. As a result of the 
budget cuts, the delivery of this aircraft has slipped about 1 year. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
the E-10A program has been restructured to accommodate both an Office 
of the Secretary of Defense directed development decision delay and 
congressional budget cuts. It further noted that the restructuring has 
been accomplished with minimal impact to ongoing design activities and 
has retained the radar/E-10A synchronization necessary to deliver an E-
10A weapon system that is responsive to warfighter requirements. The 
Air Force also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section]

E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE): 

The Navy's E-2 AHE is an all-weather, twin engine, carrier-based, 
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. It 
is the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C 
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The E-2 AHE is 
designed to improve battle space target detection and situational 
awareness, especially in littoral areas; support Theater Air and 
Missile Defense operations; and improve operational availability. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corp. 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $2,805.9 million; 
Procurement: $9,510.0 million; 
Total funding: $12,315.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: 69. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 06/2003: $3,299.1; 
Latest 12/2003: $3,336.1; 
Percent change: 1.1%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 06/2003: $9,371.9; 
Latest 12/2003: $9,510.0; 
Percent change: 1.5%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 06/2003: $12,671.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $12,846.1; 
Percent change: 1.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 06/2003: $168.947; 
Latest 12/2003: $171.281; 
Percent change: 1.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 06/2003: 75; 
Latest 12/2003: 75; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 06/2003: 95; 
Latest 12/2003: 94; 
Percent change: -1.1%. 

[End of table]

The E-2 AHE program entered system development in June 2003 without 
demonstrating that its four critical technologies had reached full 
maturity. Since that time, one of the program's four critical 
technologies has reached full maturity. Program officials do not expect 
to achieve maturity on the remaining three critical technologies until 
after the design review. While more mature backup technologies exist 
for the three critical technologies, use of the backup technologies 
would result in degraded system performance or reduced ability to 
accommodate future system growth. The program office has made progress 
on completing design drawings and plans to have the majority of 
drawings completed by the time of design review in November 2005. 
However, until the technologies are mature, the potential for design 
changes remains. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

E-2 AHE Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

One of the E-2 AHE's four critical technologies (the space time 
adaptive processing algorithms and associated processor) is mature. The 
program expects the remaining technologies (the rotodome antenna, a 
silicon carbide-based transistor for the power amplifier to support UHF 
radio operations, and the multichannel rotary coupler for the antenna) 
to be fully mature after the November 2005 design review but before the 
start of production in March 2009. 

More mature backup technologies exist for the three technologies (the 
rotodome antenna, the silicon carbide-based transistor, and the 
multichannel rotary coupler) and were flown on a larger test platform 
in 2002 and 2003. However, use of the backup technologies would result 
in degraded system performance or reduced ability to accommodate future 
system growth due to size and weight constraints. The next AHE 
technology readiness assessment is to be performed prior to the 
production decision for the system in fiscal year 2008, and the program 
office anticipates that the critical technologies will be mature at 
that time. 

Design Stability: 

The program had completed almost 35 percent of its engineering drawings 
at the time of our review. Program officials project that they will 
have 81 percent of the drawings completed by the time of design review 
in November 2005, and 100 percent completed by the planned start of 
production in March 2009. However, the technology maturation process 
may lead to more design changes. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
AHE program successfully executed Preliminary Design Review (PDR) in 
October 2004. The program office also completed PDRs for each of the 
AHE subsystems, to include critical technologies, and documented 
appropriate risks. The Navy noted that all program risks and associated 
mitigation plans, including those for critical technologies, were 
reviewed for PDR. According to the Navy, critical technologies do not 
currently represent a high risk to the AHE program. Navy officials 
stated that the program is on schedule and meeting cost and performance 
objectives. 

Flight tests of the critical technologies are planned during system 
design and development. The Navy noted that flight tests will 
inherently increase the technology readiness levels (TRLs) of the 
critical technologies. These TRLs will be formally assessed before the 
production decision in fiscal year 2009. 

[End of section]

EA-18G: 

The Navy's EA-18G is an electronic attack aircraft designed to jam 
enemy radar and communications and conduct electronic warfare as part 
of a battle group. The program was approved as a replacement for the EA-
6B aircraft, and it will integrate its electronic warfare technology 
and components into the F/A-18F platform. Because of the heavy use of 
the aging EA-6B aircraft, a large number are being retired due to wear. 
To prevent a gap in electronic warfighting capabilities, DOD intends to 
begin fielding the EA-18G in 2009. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $1,428.5 million; 
Procurement: $6,182.6 million; 
Total funding: $7,611.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 90. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/2003: $1,653.3; 
Latest 12/2003: $1,644.9; 
Percent change: -0.5%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/2003: $6,108.7; 
Latest 12/2003: $6,182.6; 
Percent change: 1.2%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/2003: $7,762.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $7,827.5; 
Percent change: 0.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/2003: $86.244; 
Latest 12/2003: $86.972; 
Percent change: 0.8%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/2003: 90; 
Latest 12/2003: 90; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/2003: 70; 
Latest 12/2003: 69; 
Percent change: -1.4%. 

[End of table]

The EA-18G entered system development without demonstrating that its 
five critical technologies had reached full maturity. Three 
technologies were very close to maturity, and two technologies have not 
been demonstrated in the form they will exist on the aircraft. While 
the EA-18G's critical technologies are similar to mature technologies 
on the EA-6B and the F/A-18F, integrating them into the EA-18G will 
involve form and fit challenges. The EA-18G will rely on planned 
capability upgrades developed for the EA-6B, which could increase 
program risk. In addition to these challenges, the program also faces 
risks with software integration. The program office could not project 
the number of releasable drawings until the design review in April 
2005. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

EA-18G Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of the EA-18G's five critical technologies are fully mature. While 
they are similar to the mature technologies found on the EA-6B and the 
F/A-18F, integrating those technologies on the EA-18G will involve form 
and fit challenges. Three of the critical technologies, the ALQ-99 
pods, the F/A-18F platform, and the tactical terminal system, are 
approaching full maturity. The remaining two technologies, the receiver 
system and the communications countermeasures set, are not mature. 

The Navy is funding a study to develop a new tactical terminal system, 
which it hopes to incorporate into the EA-18G to help reduce weight, 
conserve power, and reduce cooling requirements. According to the 
program office, similar systems are already in use in DOD. For example, 
the Special Operations Forces are using a system the size of a credit 
card, significantly lighter than the current 50-pound system. If the 
new system is not developed in time for the start of aircraft 
production, the program plans to use a modified version of the tactical 
terminal system currently in use on the EA-6B. 

Raytheon Systems is developing the communications countermeasures set 
for the EA-18G, which will be based on a similar system currently used 
on the C-130J aircraft. Raytheon is expected to begin delivery of the 
system in January 2005. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess the design stability of the EA-18G as the number of 
releasable drawings is not yet available. The EA-18G Program Office 
does not expect to have an estimate of the number of design drawings 
until the design review, currently planned for April 2005. By not 
having sufficient design drawing information, the program places itself 
at increased cost and schedule risk. 

Other Program Issues: 

The EA-18G Program Office plans to build one-third of its aircraft 
during low-rate initial production due to the need to begin replacing 
retiring EA-6Bs by 2009. Any problems identified in testing during 
production could result in costly modifications to the already produced 
aircraft. The program office has indicated it may proceed into 
production even if minor known deficiencies exist. 

Because the EA-18G is using the same airframe as the F/A-18F, the 
program office is conducting a study to determine what impact the 
increased vibration of the EA-18G will have on the life span of the 
airframe. The program office also plans to certify the aircraft to land 
aboard ship at 47,000 pounds, which is 3,000 pounds heavier than the 
similar F/A-18F aircraft. 

The F/A-18E/F aircraft has experienced problems with "wing buffet," 
which can affect performance. The F/A-18F Program Office has made 
design changes, which it expects will resolve the issue. 

The ALQ-99 pods successfully completed shake testing, which evaluated 
their ability to handle the increased vibrations of the EA-18G. 

The EA-18G program may experience minor cost growth if cuts are made in 
the number of EA-6Bs that are upgraded because the EA-18G program plans 
to procure some of the same components as those used in the EA-6B ICAP 
III upgrade. Decreased purchases by the EA-6B program would increase 
unit costs of these items, thereby increasing the cost to the EA-18G. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section]

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)-Atlas V, Delta IV: 

The Air Force's EELV program acquires commercial satellite launch 
services from two competitive families of launch vehicles--Atlas V and 
Delta IV. The program is an industry partnership to support and sustain 
assured access to space and reduce the life-cycle cost of space 
launches by at least 25 percent over previous systems while meeting the 
government's launch requirements. Different types of lift vehicles may 
be used, depending on the particular mission. We assessed both the 
Atlas V and Delta IV. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin & Boeing Launch Services; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $72.6 million; 
Procurement: $23,970.9 million; 
Total funding: $24,043.5 million; 
Procurement quantity: 122. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/1998: $1,529.2; 
Latest 06/2004: $1,793.4; 
Percent change: 17.3%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/1998: $13,394.7; 
Latest 06/2004: $25,952.1; 
Percent change: 93.7%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/1998: $14,923.9; 
Latest 06/2004: $27,745.5; 
Percent change: 85.9%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/1998: $82.452; 
Latest 06/2004: $201.054; 
Percent change: 143.8%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/1998: 181; 
Latest 06/2004: 138; 
Percent change: -23.8%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/1998: TBD; 
Latest 06/2004: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

[End of table]

Although the EELV Program Office has access to technology, design, and 
production maturity information, it has not formally contracted for 
this data because it is acquiring the launch service rather than 
developing the system itself. To date, seven successful EELV launches 
have occurred--two government and five commercial. With a history of 
launch delays, the heavy lift vehicle (HLV) had its first demonstration 
flight in 2004. The EELV program's total costs have increased about 86 
percent due to a decline in the commercial launch market upon which the 
business case was based. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

EELV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We could not assess the technology maturity of EELV because the Air 
Force has not formally contracted for information on technology 
maturity from its contractors. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess the design stability of EELV because the Air Force 
has not formally contracted for the information needed to conduct this 
assessment. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the production maturity of EELV because the Air 
Force has not formally contracted for information that would facilitate 
this assessment. 

Other Program Issues: 

The decline in commercial satellite launch needs in the late 1990s 
resulted in program cost increases and a reduction in the anticipated 
number of Atlas V and Delta IV launches. Cost increases greater than 25 
percent over the program's objective triggered a Nunn-McCurdy breach 
(see 10 U.S.C. 2433), requiring a review by the Secretary of Defense 
and a report to Congress. As provided by the law, DOD certified in 
April 2004 that the program is critical to national security and its 
cost estimates are reasonable. In conjunction with the certification, 
the Air Force is updating the 1994 Space Launch Modernization Plan 
(which examines launch alternatives), and it revised its mission model 
to reflect a reduction of launch vehicles. Also, the Air Force is 
reviewing contract structures that could include cost type provisions 
for the follow-on procurement of EELV services. 

The EELV program has continued to experience schedule changes to the 
Delta IV heavy lift vehicles (HLV). The Delta IV heavy-lift 
demonstration flight that was planned for July 2004 did not occur until 
December 2004 and the HLV first operational flight was delayed by 6 
months. According to the Air Force, these delays occurred due to a 
number of factors, including other launch priorities, slips in launch 
dates for the first three Delta IV missions, modifications to the HLV 
launch pad, and design problems encountered during launch pad testing. 
In addition, both contractors are addressing technical issues related 
to meeting program requirements. The Boeing Company is addressing a 
Delta IV issue related to the separation of the payload fairing device 
(which encloses and protects the payload). Lockheed Martin is dealing 
with an Atlas V intermediate class booster issue regarding the 
excessive vibration caused by the noise generated at liftoff. 

According to DOD, initiatives are in place to reduce EELV risk and 
ensure access to space. The initiatives are aimed at critical rocket 
components, improving the producibility of the upper stage engine, 
systems engineering processes, and the availability of critical staff 
and facilities. Related to these initiatives, there are three technical 
issues that the Air Force is addressing. Parts of the RL-10 upper stage 
engine are common to both the Delta IV and the Atlas V and an engine 
flaw could potentially ground both vehicles. However, the Air Force 
maintains that the RL-10 has flown successfully since the 1960s. Also, 
the Atlas V continues to rely on the Russian-made RD-180 propulsion 
technology (though the contractor plans to start building this 
technology in the United States with a first military launch by 2012). 
Additionally, until the West Coast launch pad becomes operational in 
2005 in time for the first U.S. government need in 2006, the Air Force 
is limited to launching the Atlas V from its East Coast launch pad. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force acknowledged 
that technology, design, and production maturity data are not required 
as a deliverable, and therefore it does not have the authority to 
provide this information. However, daily interaction with both 
contractors provides insight into the readiness of the launchers as 
well as the potential for cost increases and schedule issues. 

[End of section]

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

The Marine Corps' EFV (formerly called the Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle) is designed to transport troops from ships offshore to their 
inland destinations at higher speeds and from farther distances than 
the existing Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7A1 (AAV-7A1). It is designed 
to be more mobile, lethal, reliable, and effective in all weather 
conditions. The EFV will have two variants--a troop carrier for 17 
combat equipped Marines and 3 crew and a command vehicle to manage 
combat operations in the field. We assessed both variants. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics; 
Program office: Woodbridge, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $644.6 million; 
Procurement: $7,355.5 million; 
Total funding: $8,046.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 1,012. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2000: $1,419.0; 
Latest 08/2004: $1,972.6; 
Percent change: 39.0%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2000: $6,364.0; 
Latest 08/2004: $7,470.1; 
Percent change: 17.4%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2000: $7,864.7; 
Latest 08/2004: $9,517.4; 
Percent change: 21.0%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2000: $7.673; 
Latest 08/2004: $9.285; 
Percent change: 21.0%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2000: 1,025; 
Latest 08/2004: 1,025; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2000: 138; 
Latest 08/2004: 165; 
Percent change: 19.6%. 

[End of table]

The EFV's technology is mature and the design is stable. However, at 
the start of development, only four out of five critical technologies 
were mature. The demonstration of the moving map, the last of these 
technologies, has led to full technology maturation. The design was 
close to meeting best practice standards at the design review, 
signifying the design was relatively stable. Early development of fully 
functional prototypes and other design practices have facilitated 
design stability. Based on the functional prototyping, the program 
expects changes to roughly 12 percent of the drawings. The 
demonstration of production maturity remains a concern because the 
contractor does not collect statistical process control data. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

EFV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All five of the EFV's critical technologies are mature. The moving map 
navigation technology, which was not mature at the start of product 
development, was recently demonstrated in an operational environment on 
the full-up system prototype. The moving map technology provides 
situational awareness. 

Design Stability: 

The program has now released all of its drawings for the troop carrier 
variant. However, 12 percent require design changes to address 
reliability issues. At the time of critical design review in 2001, 84 
percent of the expected drawings had been released, signifying the 
design was approaching stability. The program is currently seeking to 
reduce the threshold for the reliability key performance parameter 
based on a USMC reevaluation of concept of operations. According to 
program officials, reliability is a moderate risk but may elevate to 
high risk if the requirement change is not approved. Program officials 
expect the EFV to meet revised reliability thresholds by initial 
operational testing in November 2007. 

According to the program, recent tests of an improved track and wheel 
design demonstrated significant improvements in reducing vibration on 
the vehicle. Program officials estimate that vibration levels have been 
reduced by up to 50 percent over previous measurements. The new track 
and wheel design will be incorporated on the vehicles used for the 
operational assessment in March 2005. 

Production Maturity: 

The program expects to enter low-rate production in December 2005. It 
will do so without requiring the contractor to use statistical process 
controls to demonstrate that the 12 critical processes are producing 
quality and reliable products. Instead, the contractor plans to have 95 
percent of the production tooling and manufacturing processes in place 
by low-rate production start. These processes are being utilized and 
refined to build the prototype vehicles. Additionally, the program and 
the contractor are in planning stages for production readiness reviews 
that assess production processes, identify any additional critical 
manufacturing processes, and determine the benefit of using statistical 
process controls. Because the final EFV production facility is not 
ready, the contractor is using the planned manufacturing processes to 
build prototypes at the development facility. This will provide 
verification of these manufacturing processes. However, when production 
moves to the new facility, processes will need to be validated again to 
ensure they work as expected. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program tracks a number of entrance criteria for low-rate 
production and is on track to meet most of those criteria. One key 
entrance criterion is an operational assessment scheduled for March 
2005. The assessment will include the demonstration of a launch and 
recovery from an amphibious ship; transportation of Marines on water 
and on land; and negotiation of the vehicle in a 4-foot surf. Another 
key entrance criterion, demonstration of system reliability, is a 
moderate risk and may delay low-rate production. 

Agency Comments: 

The EFV Program Office was provided an opportunity to comment on a 
draft of this assessment, but it did not have any comments. 

[End of section]

Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM): 

The Navy's ERGM is a rocket-assisted projectile that is fired from 
guided missile destroyers. ERGM is one concept the Navy is considering 
to meet its fire support requirement. ERGM can be guided to targets on 
land at ranges of between 15 and 50 nautical miles to provide fire 
support for ground troops. It is expected to offer greater range and 
accuracy than the Navy's current 13 nautical mile gun range. ERGM 
required modifications to the 5-inch gun, a new munitions-handling 
system, and a new fire control system. We assessed the projectile. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems; 
Program office: Arlington, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: TBD; 
Procurement: TBD; 
Total funding: TBD; 
Procurement quantity: TBD. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/1997: $78.6; 
Latest 08/2004: $393.6; 
Percent change: 400.5%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/1997: $310.7; 
Latest 08/2004: $204.8; 
Percent change: -34.1%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/1997: $389.3; 
Latest 08/2004: $598.4; 
Percent change: 53.7%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/1997: $0.045; 
Latest 08/2004: $0.191; 
Percent change: 319.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/1997: 8,570; 
Latest 08/2004: 3,141; 
Percent change: -63.3%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/1997: 50; 
Latest 08/2004: 150; 
Percent change: 200.0%. 

[End of table]

Latest funding and schedule data are based on the fiscal year 2005 
defense budget and a notional development time frame for the extended 
range munition program. 

Since our last assessment, the ERGM program has not demonstrated 
additional technology maturity or design stability. Due to problems 
with the rocket motor and propelling charge, flight testing was halted, 
and the program has been unable to demonstrate the maturity of 7 of its 
20 critical technologies. The program plans to resume flight testing in 
February 2005. If that test is successful, four technologies will 
demonstrate maturity. The program also stated that ERGM's design 
drawings will not be completed because of limited program funding. 
Therefore, ERGM will not reach design maturity under Raytheon's current 
contract. Finally, due to concerns about ERGM's inconsistent test 
performance and projected unit cost, the Navy plans to recompete the 5-
inch guided projectile requirement and restart development by mid-
fiscal year 2006. If ERGM is not selected, it will cease to be a 
program. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

ERGM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Thirteen of ERGM's 20 critical technologies are mature. The program has 
completed development work on six of the seven remaining technologies, 
but has yet to test them in an operational environment. Program 
officials currently project that four of the remaining technologies, 
the tactical telemeter and the three unitary warhead-related 
technologies, will be demonstrated during a February 2005 flight test. 
The program's fiscal year 2005 budget request was reduced from $11.3 
million to $4.5 million, and the program's funds will be exhausted in 
March 2005. Unless the program receives additional funding, none of the 
three remaining critical technologies--antijam electronics, safe and 
arm device and fuze, and data communication interface--will achieve 
maturity under the current contract since the Navy plans to recompete 
the 5-inch guided projectile requirement and restart development in 
early to mid-fiscal year 2006. If the ERGM concept is selected, the 
program office projects that all ERGM critical technologies would be 
demonstrated in an operational environment by 2008. 

Design Stability: 

The program has released approximately 51 percent of its 140 production 
representative drawings. None of ERGM's production representative 
engineering drawings were released at its May 2003 design review. 
Instead, the program conducted this review with less mature drawings 
and used them to validate the design of the development test rounds. In 
our March 2004 report, the program office stated that it would have a 
complete and updated drawing package by October 2004. However, because 
of a lack of funds and the 5-inch guided projectile competition that 
will end the current ERGM contract, the contractor will not complete 
this drawing package. If the ERGM concept is selected, the option 
exists to complete this drawing package. 

Production Maturity: 

Since the future of the ERGM concept will not be determined until 
January 2006, it is unclear whether and when the program will proceed 
to production. If the ERGM concept is chosen, the current manufacturing 
plan states the contractor will identify key product characteristics 
and then determine how to implement statistical process control. 

Other Program Issues: 

In May 2004, the Navy awarded a contract to ATK to demonstrate an 
alternative precision-guided munition concept--the Ballistic Trajectory 
Extended Range Munition (BTERM). BTERM will likely be one of the 
concepts competing for the new development contract. In fiscal years 
2004 and 2005, the Navy budgeted $35 million for the BTERM effort. The 
BTERM technology demonstration includes six guided flight tests in 
2005. At this point, none of the BTERM critical technologies have 
reached maturity. However, according to the project office, the six 
flight tests, if successful, will demonstrate most of BTERM's critical 
technologies in a relevant or operational environment. Finally, the 
latest ERGM program cost and schedule estimates do not reflect the 
potential cost and time needed to complete the 5-inch guided projectile 
development effort. The Navy is currently considering an acquisition 
strategy that would start a new development program with a revised 
program baseline, which could delay initial operational capability 
until 2011 depending on the maturity of the concept selected. The 
procurement cost of this new program will likely be much higher than is 
currently reported for ERGM because the latest cost estimate for the 
ERGM program is based on the procurement funding available in the 
future year defense plan, not current inventory requirements. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that it 
intends to issue a request for proposal in fiscal year 2005 and select 
an Extended Range Munition (ERM) development contractor in fiscal year 
2006. It will request that the program start the system development 
phase due to the maturity of guided projectile concepts that could meet 
ERM requirements. The Navy also stated that research, development, 
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds in fiscal year 2006-2011 will be 
used for the ERM development effort, resulting in an initial 
operational capability of no later than fiscal year 2011. Depending 
upon the maturity of the concept selected, development could end as 
early as fiscal year 2008 with a fiscal year 2009 initial operational 
capability. In this case, fiscal year 2006-2008 RDT&E funding (about 
$58.4 million) would be used to complete the program and fiscal year 
2009-2011 funding (about $87.3 million) would support spiral 
development and/or product improvement initiatives. 

[End of section]

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based, 
fire-and-forget, 155-mm cannon artillery precision munitions. It is 
intended to improve the accuracy and range of cannon artillery. Also, 
the Excalibur's near vertical angle of fall is intended to reduce the 
collateral damage area around the intended target, making it more 
effective in urban environments than the current artillery projectiles. 
The Future Combat Systems' non-line-of-sight cannon requires the 
Excalibur to meet its required range. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon; 
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, N.J. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $484.5 million; 
Procurement: $2,597.4 million; 
Total funding: $3,081.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 61,483. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/1997: $60.3; 
Latest 08/2004: $828.5; 
Percent change: 1,273.3%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/1997: $676.7; 
Latest 08/2004: $2,597.4; 
Percent change: 283.8%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/1997: $737.0; 
Latest 08/2004: $3,426.0; 
Percent change: 364.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/1997: $0.004; 
Latest 08/2004: $0.055; 
Percent change: 1,405.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/1997: 200,000; 
Latest 08/2004: 61,752; 
Percent change: -69.1%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/1997: 160; 
Latest 08/2004: 136; 
Percent change: -15.0%. 

[End of table]

The Excalibur program's critical technologies are not fully mature, 
even though product development began over 7 years ago. Program 
officials expect to have technology maturity by June 2005. The program 
has achieved design stability. Currently, almost all of the Excalibur 
drawings are completed and could be released to manufacturing. However, 
the Excalibur is undergoing testing that may lead to design changes. 
The program has encountered a number of challenges since development 
began, including a decrease in planned quantities, a relocation of the 
contractor's plant, early limited funding, technical problems, and 
changes in program requirements. It merged with the Trajectory 
Correctable Munition program in 2002. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Excalibur Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of the Excalibur's three critical technologies--the guidance 
control system, the airframe, or the warhead--are fully mature. 
According to program officials, all three have been demonstrated in a 
relevant environment, and they are expected to reach full maturity 
before the design review in June 2005. The warhead was not considered a 
critical technology in 1997 because the Excalibur design called for a 
warhead that was under production for other munitions. At the Army's 
direction, the program has undertaken development of a different 
warhead that is currently undergoing testing. 

Design Stability: 

The most recent program restructure divided the design review into two 
reviews. The first, scheduled for June 2005, freezes the first article 
test design and the second, scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal 
year 2006, freezes the production design. The program recently 
completed an Early Fielding Technical Data Package review of the design 
drawings. The review found that about 97 percent of the Excalibur 
engineering drawings are complete and releasable to manufacturing. The 
program office plans to have all of the drawings complete by the June 
2005 design review. The Excalibur has to complete safety and other 
testing before it is ready for production. This testing could lead to 
design changes. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program has gone through many changes since the beginning of 
product development in May 1997. It was almost immediately restructured 
due to limited funding, and it was restructured again in 2001. The 
program was again restructured and merged with a joint Swedish/U.S. 
program known as the Trajectory Correctable Munition. This merger has 
helped the Excalibur deal with design challenges, including issues 
related to its original folding fin design. In May 2002, due to the 
cancellation of the Crusader, the Army directed the restructure of the 
program to include the Future Combat Systems' non-line-of-sight cannon. 
In December 2002, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics) approved an early fielding plan for the 
unitary version. The plan currently includes developing the unitary 
version of the Excalibur in three spirals. In the first spiral, the 
projectile would meet its requirements for accuracy in a nonjammed 
environment and lethality and would be available for fielding to Joint 
Lightweight 155mm cannon in September 2006. In the second spiral, the 
projectile would be improved to meet its requirements for accuracy in a 
jammed environment and reliability and would be available for fielding 
to the Future Combat Systems' non-line-of-sight cannon in September 
2008. Finally, in the third spiral, the projectile would be improved to 
meet its range requirement and would be available for fielding to all 
systems in late fiscal year 2011. 

The net effect of these changes has been to increase the program's 
schedule and to substantially decrease planned procurement quantities. 
As a result, the program's overall costs and unit costs have 
dramatically increased. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section]

F/A-22 Raptor: 

The Air Force's F/A-22, originally planned to be an air superiority 
fighter, will also have air-to-ground attack capability. It is being 
designed with advanced features, such as stealth characteristics, to 
make it less detectable to adversaries and capable of high speeds for 
long ranges. It also has integrated aviation electronics (avionics) 
designed to greatly improve pilots' awareness of the situation 
surrounding them. It is designed to replace the Air Force's F-15 
aircraft. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $2,755.4 million; 
Procurement: $25,242.2 million; 
Total funding: $28,361.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 203. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/1992: $21,542.9; 
Latest 12/2003: $31,726.2; 
Percent change: 47.3%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/1992: $56,602.1; 
Latest 12/2003: $40,812.9; 
Percent change: -27.9%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/1992: $78,405.1; 
Latest 12/2003: $73,098.5; 
Percent change: -6.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/1992: $120.996; 
Latest 12/2003: $262.002; 
Percent change: 116.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/1992: 648; 
Latest 12/2003: 279; 
Percent change: -56.9%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/1992: 203; 
Latest 12/2003: 230; 
Percent change: 13.3%. 

[End of table]

The F/A-22 entered production without ensuring that production 
processes were in control. The Air Force expects to have about 27 
percent of the aircraft on contract prior to the full-rate decision in 
March 2005, yet quality issues remain. For example, the F/A-22 has not 
achieved important reliability goals and some components, like the 
canopies, are not lasting as long as expected. Technology and design 
matured late in the program and have contributed to numerous problems. 
Avionics problems were discovered late in development, which resulted 
in large cost increases and caused testing delays. The potential for 
further cost increases and schedule delays exists until initial 
operational testing and follow-on testing are completed. Additionally, 
$7 billion in cost reductions has to be achieved to keep cost growth 
within the congressionally mandated production cost limitation. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

F/A-22 Raptor Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The three critical F/A-22 technologies (supercruise, stealth, and 
integrated avionics) appear to be mature. However, two of these 
technologies, the integrated avionics and stealth, did not mature until 
several years after the start of development. Integrated avionics have 
been a source of major problems, delaying developmental testing and the 
start of initial operational testing. Since 1997 the costs of avionics 
have increased by over $801 million and problems discovered late in the 
program were the major contributor. In April 2004, the Air Force began 
initial operational test and evaluation after reporting that these 
problems were corrected. 

Design Stability: 

The F/A-22 design is essentially complete, but it matured slowly, 
taking over 3 years beyond the critical design review to meet best 
practice standards. The late drawing release contributed to parts 
shortages, work performed out of sequence, delayed flight testing and 
increased costs. Design changes resulted from flight and structural 
tests. For example, problems with excessive movement of the vertical 
tails and overheating problems in the fuselage and engine bay required 
design modifications. The Air Force completed development testing in 
December 2004 and operational testing in November 2004. The Air Force 
is in the process of evaluating the results of operational testing. The 
results of this evaluation could result in additional design changes. 

Production Maturity: 

The program office stopped collecting process control information in 
November 2000. The contractor estimated that nearly half of the key 
processes had reached a marginal level of control, but not up to best 
practice standards. The Air Force has 67 production aircraft on 
contract. The Air Force relies on the contractor's quality system to 
verify manufacturing and performance requirements are being met. 
However, the Air Force has not demonstrated the F/A-22 can achieve its 
reliability goal of 3 hours mean time between maintenance. It does not 
expect to achieve this goal until 2008 when most of the aircraft will 
have already been bought. Best practices call for meeting reliability 
requirements before entering production. As of mid-October 2004, the 
Air Force had only demonstrated about 22 percent of the reliability 
required. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Air Force is counting on future cost reduction plans to offset 
estimated cost growth and enable the program to meet the latest 
production cost estimate. If these cost reduction initiatives are not 
achieved as planned, production costs could increase. 

The Integrated Maintenance Information System (IMIS), a paperless 
computerized maintenance system, is used by the Air Force to maintain 
the F/A-22. The system collects and analyzes problem data and develops 
a maintenance solution. The system has not functioned properly causing 
unnecessary maintenance actions. This has affected the Air Force's 
ability to fly the test aircraft on schedule. The Air Force installed 
new software in February 2004 to address many of the errors generated 
by IMIS and uncovered additional errors. According to the Air Force, 
these problems were resolved in July 2004. In November 2004, the Air 
Force upgraded IMIS to a commercially supportable operating platform 
and database that added new functionality such as wireless 
connectivity. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. The Air 
Force also stated that, in coordination with the DCMA and contractor 
teammates, the program is aggressively pursuing cost reduction 
initiatives to meet cost goals. It stated that these goals represent a 
significant reduction in per aircraft cost and include substantial 
improvements to production by the primes and subcontractors. The Air 
Force disagreed, however, with the value we reported in our draft 
assessment. It stated that the initiatives total $2.5 billion. The Air 
Force also indicated that the reliability of the F/A-22, while 
maturing, is already comparable to legacy Air Force fighter aircraft 
while delivering a required combat capability that cannot be achieved 
by legacy platforms. 

GAO Comments: 

We reviewed the Air Force's comments concerning projected production 
cost reduction savings and determined that the Air Force will have to 
reduce the current production estimate by approximately $7 billion to 
execute the program within a congressional mandated cost cap. 

[End of section]

Future Combat Systems (FCS): 

The FCS, a program that will equip the Army's new transformational 
modular combat brigades, consists of a family of systems composed of 
advanced, networked combat and sustainment systems, unmanned ground and 
air vehicles, and unattended sensors and munitions. Within a system-of-
systems architecture, the first increment of the FCS features 18 major 
systems and other enabling systems along with an overarching network 
for information superiority and survivability. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Hazelwood, Mo. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $16,639.9 million; 
Procurement: $60,669.2 million; 
Total funding: $77,924.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: 15. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/2003: $18,573.6; 
Latest 09/2004: $28,007.2; 
Percent change: 50.8%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/2003: $60,646.5; 
Latest 09/2004: $79,960.0; 
Percent change: 31.8%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/2003: $79,835.8; 
Latest 09/2004: $107,967.2; 
Percent change: 35.2%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/2003: $5,322.388; 
Latest 09/2004: $7,197.811; 
Percent change: 35.2%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/2003: 15; 
Latest 09/2004: 15; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/2003: 91; 
Latest 09/2004: 139; 
Percent change: 52.7%. 

[End of table]

Quantities refer to complete brigade-sized Units of Action. Each 
contains many FCS systems and platforms. 

The FCS program began a major restructuring in July 2004, which delays 
fielding 4 years, until 2014, and spirals various FCS technologies to 
the current force. The restructuring increased the priority for 
developing and demonstrating the FCS network. The program also 
continues refining requirements. In some cases, the Army has decided to 
use different technologies, which are less mature than the original 
technologies. The program expects all of its 54 critical technologies 
to be mature by the end of fiscal year 2008. Technology maturation will 
continue throughout system development, with an associated increase in 
the risk of cost growth and schedule delays. Since the FCS will 
dominate Army investment accounts over the next decade, cost growth and 
schedule delays could affect all Army acquisitions. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

FCS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

One of the FCS program's 54 critical technologies is currently mature. 
Overall, the program's current technology maturity is slightly less 
than it was in May 2003 when the program began development. 

The program is not appropriately applying best practices to maturing 
its critical technologies. It considers technical risk acceptable as 
long as it can estimate that the technologies will be demonstrated in a 
relevant environment before design review. Also, it does not 
consistently include form or fit in technology maturation because it 
views sizing the technology as an integration risk, not a technology 
risk. In addition, the program could assess a technology as mature 
simply because it is part of another program. For example, it assesses 
the maturity of the technologies enabling the Active Protection System 
as mature, even though the Army is developing the system for a current 
combat vehicle that is much larger than the FCS vehicles. The 
technologies will need to be reduced in size before the system can be 
incorporated into the FCS vehicles. Overall, the program must continue 
to mature its technologies while developing the FCS. 

In some cases, as the FCS requirements are refined, the Army has 
decided to use different technologies that are less mature than the 
original technologies. For example, in February 2004, the program 
assessed the maturity of ground-to-air combat identification as fully 
mature primarily because similar identification systems were readily 
available in air defense systems. In September 2004, however, it 
reduced the technology's maturity because it refined the FCS 
requirements and determined that in order to provide required 
interoperability with NATO systems, the program would have to use an 
operating mode that required the development of a new interrogator. As 
a result, it assessed the technology as very immature. 

Design Stability: 

The program estimates that 80 percent of its 42,750 drawings will be 
released by the design review scheduled for September 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

The FCS program began a major restructuring in July 2004, which delays 
fielding an initial FCS capability until 2014, 48 months later than 
planned. The revised strategy helps meet the needs of an Army at war by 
making $9 billion available for investment in future capabilities for 
the current force, which include FCS technologies that are expected to 
be transitioned to the current force between 2008 and 2014. It also 
increases the priority of development and demonstration of the FCS 
network and system-of-systems architecture along with munitions, 
sensors, and unmanned vehicles. 

The concept of a modular FCS equipped brigade-sized combat unit, known 
as a Unit of Action, represents a major departure in the way the Army 
has conducted combat operations and is a major part of the Army's 
transformation efforts. To successfully develop the FCS, the Army faces 
a number of technological and programmatic challenges, including 
equipping Units of Action with a common family of networked vehicles 
and other systems. These vehicles and systems are expected to be a 
fraction of the weight of existing heavy fighting vehicles in order to 
improve transportability such as being airlifted by a C-130 transport. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. In addition, it considers technical risk acceptable as 
long as it can estimate that the technologies would be demonstrated in 
a relevant environment before design review. The restructured FCS 
program also includes a process for periodically spiraling out 
technologies to the current force as they reach acceptable levels of 
maturity. Additional efforts to mature these technologies will continue 
as needed under the main program. The Army believes this approach will 
ensure that all technologies are proven before fielding of full FCS-
equipped Units of Action. Finally, the Army noted that, in addressing 
transportability challenges, the FCS program will continue to develop 
and analyze alternative technical approaches to find the design 
solution that best meets the broad spectrum of user needs. 

GAO Comments: 

The Army is holding FCS technologies to a lower maturity standard than 
best practices and DOD policy calls for. This increases the risk of 
program cost growth and schedule delays. 

[End of section]

Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: 

The Air Force's Global Hawk system is a high altitude, long endurance 
unmanned aerial vehicle with integrated sensors and ground stations 
providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. 
After a successful technology demonstration, the system entered 
development and limited production in March 2001. Considered a 
transformational system, the program was restructured twice in 2002 to 
acquire 7 air vehicles similar to the original demonstrators (the RQ-
4A) and 44 of a new, larger, and more capable model (the RQ-4B). 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $1,481.1 million; 
Procurement: $2,744.5 million; 
Total funding: $4,320.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: 41. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 03/2001: $894.7; 
Latest 09/2004: $2,528.9; 
Percent change: 182.7%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 03/2001: $3,709.6; 
Latest 09/2004: $3,367.7; 
Percent change: -9.2%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 03/2001: $4,631.4; 
Latest 09/2004: $6,025.8; 
Percent change: 30.1%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 03/2001: $73.515; 
Latest 09/2004: $118.152; 
Percent change: 60.7%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 03/2001: 63; 
Latest 09/2004: 51; 
Percent change: -19.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 03/2001: 54; 
Latest 09/2004: 57; 
Percent change: 5.6%. 

[End of table]

Key product knowledge on Global Hawk is now less than it was in March 
2001 due to the 2002 program restructurings. Officials had planned to 
first produce systems very similar to technology demonstrators and then 
slowly develop and acquire more advanced systems. Technology maturity 
and design stability approached best practice standards for this plan. 
However, program restructurings accelerated deliveries, overlapped 
development and production schedules, and added the new, larger air 
vehicle with advanced sensors. These actions increased development and 
program unit costs. While the platform design is fairly mature, 
production of the new air vehicle began with advanced sensor 
technologies still immature and operational tests not planned until 
much later. Production maturity cannot be assessed using knowledge-
based criteria because statistical process control data are not used. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Global Hawk Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Five of 14 critical technologies associated with the Global Hawk system 
are mature, 3 technologies are approaching maturity, and 6 are less 
mature. Three of the mature technologies are uniquely associated with 
the RQ-4A. Two of the 11 RQ-4B's critical technologies are mature--one 
more than last year. The less mature technologies include the airborne 
signals intelligence payload and the multiplatform radar technology 
insertion program. These desired capabilities largely drove the 
decision to develop and acquire the new RQ-4B air vehicles, which can 
carry 50 percent more payload than the original model, the RQ-4A. 

Production of the first RQ-4B began in July 2004. Integrating and 
testing these advanced sensors on the air vehicle will not be completed 
until late in the program when most of the fleet will already have been 
bought. There is risk that the sensor technologies and final designs 
may not meet the space, weight, and power limitations of the RQ-4B, 
resulting in extended development times, costly reworks, or diminished 
capabilities. The airborne signals intelligence payload currently 
exceeds its weight allocation, and the power requirements for the 
multiplatform radar requirements near the RQ-4B's limit. 

Design Stability: 

The RQ-4A design is stable, and 75 percent of RQ-4B engineering 
drawings were completed by the time of its design review in April 2004. 
By late fiscal year 2004, over 90 percent of the engineering drawings 
were completed. However, the Air Force has not built a prototype of the 
RQ-4B to demonstrate a stable design and has not established a 
reliability growth plan prior to initiating production--both 
characteristics of best practices used to assure design maturity. 
Additionally, the Air Force plans to buy almost half the fleet before 
it completes initial operational test and evaluation to verify the air 
vehicle design works as required. This increases the potential that 
testing may identify a need to redesign and retrofit aircraft. 

Production Maturity: 

Although production experience and lessons learned on the RQ-4A will 
benefit the RQ-4B program, the new model requires different and more 
complex manufacturing processes and tooling than the original model. 
Officials have not implemented, and do not plan to implement, a 
comprehensive statistical process control program to demonstrate that 
new manufacturing processes are in control and capable of meeting cost, 
schedule, and quality targets. Officials have started to identify 
critical manufacturing processes and will continue to collect 
performance data such as defect and rework rates to measure product 
quality. There are continuing concerns about the quality and timeliness 
of several key subcontractors, which negatively affect cost and 
schedule of both design and production work. We note that the 
acceptance of the second production RQ-4A was delayed due to defects 
and flight deficiencies. 

Other Program Issues: 

Restructuring the Global Hawk program has accelerated planned 
deliveries of advanced capabilities and made development, test, and 
production cycles highly concurrent. Cost increases, schedule slips, 
and performance trade-offs have already occurred. We recently reported 
that slowing down production to enable closing the gaps in product 
knowledge and operationally testing the aircraft should be considered. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
our knowledge-based criteria do not effectively assess Global Hawk's 
evolutionary acquisition strategy. It stated that Global Hawk's spiral 
approach fosters efficiency, flexibility, and innovation and includes 
the controls essential to manage program risk and achieve effective 
program results. The Air Force further noted that the Global Hawk 
program is managing development risks as it migrates from the RQ-4A to 
the larger, multiple-intelligence RQ-4B configuration. It noted that 
the RQ-4B is an evolutionary design change, built upon the successful 
RQ-4A design, years of extensive testing, and over 5,000 RQ-4A flight 
hours, and also stated that establishing accurate RQ-4B size, weight, 
and power constraints provides accurate design requirements for 
development of advanced sensors, further reducing future risk. The Air 
Force further commented that by using concurrent development and 
production processes, the Global Hawk program plans to achieve initial 
operational capability approximately 5 years after program initiation, 
fielding greater capability than initially planned. 

[End of section]

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

MDA's GMD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks to defend the United States against limited long-range ballistic 
missile attacks. The first block consists of a collection of radars and 
an interceptor--a three-stage booster and an exoatmospheric kill 
vehicle (EKV)--integrated by a central control system that formulates 
battle plans and directs the operation of GMD components. We assessed 
all technologies critical to the Block 2004 GMD element, but only the 
design and production maturity of the interceptor. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Company; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $9,687.3 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $9,687.3 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2003: $22,809.3; 
Latest 08/2004: $25,719.9; 
Percent change: 12.8%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2003: $0.0; 
Latest 08/2004: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2003: $22,809.3; 
Latest 08/2004: $25,719.9; 
Percent change: 12.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2003: NA; 
Latest 08/2004: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2003: NA; 
Latest 08/2004: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2003: NA; 
Latest 08/2004: TBD. 

Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be 
determined. 

[End of table]

Three of GMD's 10 critical technologies were fully mature, and its 
design seemed stable in September 2004 when MDA placed five ground-
based interceptors in silos for the initial capability. The remaining 
technologies were nearing full maturity. However, there is a risk that 
design changes could occur during Block 2004 because a solution to a 
technical problem in the kill vehicle has not been proved in flight 
tests and additional problems could be identified during the flight 
tests scheduled to occur before the end of the block. Although MDA has 
not made a formal production decision, it is currently producing 
hardware for operational use. We could not, however, assess the 
stability of MDA's production processes as the program is not 
collecting statistical data on its production processes. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

GMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials estimate that 3 of GMD's 10 critical technologies are 
mature: fire control software, the EKV's infrared seeker, and the 
Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) booster. The remaining seven 
technologies are nearing maturity. These technologies are the Lockheed 
Martin BV+ booster; Sea-based X-Band radar; Cobra Dane radar; Beale 
radar; EKV on-board discrimination; EKV guidance, navigation, and 
control subsystem; and the in-flight interceptor communications system. 
The program expected to demonstrate 3 of these technologies by the end 
of fiscal year 2004, but flight test delays prevented the 
demonstrations. However, program officials expect that the maturity of 
all 7 technologies will be demonstrated before the end of Block 2004. 

Design Stability: 

The Block 2004 ground-based interceptor design is stable with 100 
percent of its drawings released to manufacturing. The ongoing effort 
to mature critical technologies and solve an ongoing engineering 
problem, however, may lead to more design changes. 

Production Maturity: 

Officials have not made an official production decision, although they 
are delivering interceptors for the Block 2004 emergency capability. We 
could not assess the production maturity of these interceptors because 
the program is not collecting statistical control data on the 
production process. According to program officials, data are not 
tracked because the current quantities of GMD component hardware are 
small. Instead, the GMD element measures production capability and 
maturity with a monthly evaluation process that assesses critical 
manufacturing indicators for both readiness and execution. 

To reduce program risk, MDA is following a dual booster strategy, 
developing the BV+ and the OSC boosters, each of which has a different 
design. Although this strategy offers two different capabilities and 
has helped to mitigate production risks, MDA has experienced ongoing 
problems with the BV+ booster. After an explosion at the facility that 
mixes propellant for the BV+ booster motors, the facility's contractor 
ceased operations. A new contract has been awarded for the production 
of the BV+ 2nd and 3rd stage motors. MDA hopes to restart manufacturing 
in fiscal year 2005. Therefore, all Block 2004 interceptors will use 
the OSC booster. 

EKV and booster delivery is on schedule for the December 2005 initial 
capability. MDA delivered 5 interceptors for initial defensive 
operations by September 2004, and it plans to have a total of 18 on 
alert by December 2005. MDA originally planned to have 20 interceptors 
by this time; however, two of these interceptors were later designated 
as test assets. 

Other Program Issues: 

Increased cost of the EKV and the explosions at the BV+ propellant-
mixing facility were leading causes of $175 million in GMD cost growth 
during fiscal year 2004. To avoid a delay in fielding the initial 
defensive operation on September 30, 2004, MDA funded the cost overrun 
by having other groups within MDA perform some tasks that GMD was 
budgeted to complete. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA stated that a formal 
production decision is not anticipated or planned in the GMD 
acquisition approach. It emphasized that it is not feasible to collect 
data on most GMD production processes due to the extremely low 
quantities of system hardware being procured, but statistical data are 
collected and available on those subsystems/parts produced in 
sufficient volume. It also pointed out that ongoing efforts to mature 
critical technologies and solve technical problems are an inherent part 
of the capability-based acquisition/block development approach and that 
design changes are to be expected as the system is evolved through 
subsequent blocks. Technical comments were also provided and 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section]

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS: 

GPS is an Air Force-led joint program with the Army, Navy, Department 
of Transportation, National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, United 
Kingdom, and Australia. This space-based radio-positioning system 
nominally consists of a 24-satellite constellation providing navigation 
and timing data to military and civilian users worldwide. In 2000, 
Congress approved the modernization of Block IIR and Block IIF 
satellites. In addition to satellites, GPS includes a control system 
and receiver units. We focused our review on the Block IIF. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin and Boeing; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $526.5 million; 
Procurement: $1,253.7 million; 
Total funding: $1,780.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 10. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2002: $1,891.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $2,112.0; 
Percent change: 11.7%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2002: $3,448.7; 
Latest 12/2003: $3,875.5; 
Percent change: 12.4%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2002: $5,339.7; 
Latest 12/2003: $5,987.5; 
Percent change: 12.1%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2002: $161.810; 
Latest 12/2003: $161.826; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2002: 33; 
Latest 12/2003: 37; 
Percent change: 12.1%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2002: TBD; 
Latest 12/2003: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Costs and quantities include Block IIR, IIR-M, and IIF satellites, and 
the Operational Control System (OCS). Lockheed Martin is the contractor 
for IIR and IIR-M, Boeing is the contractor for IIF and OCS. 

[End of table]

According to the program office, the Block IIF technologies are mature. 
Since the start of the GPS program in 1973, GPS satellites have been 
modernized in blocks with the newer blocks providing additional 
capabilities and benefits. The GPS II modernization effort required new 
technology for the atomic clocks on the IIF satellites, and this 
technology has been tested in space on IIR satellites. However, the 
contractor was not required to provide data on design drawings and 
statistical process control techniques are not being used to monitor 
production. As a result, design stability and production maturity could 
not be assessed. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

GPS Block II Modernization Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The only new critical technology on the Block IIF satellites, the space-
qualified atomic frequency standards, was tested in space on Block IIR 
satellites, and it is considered mature. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess design stability because the Block IIF contract 
does not require that design drawings be delivered to DOD. However, the 
program office assesses design maturity by reviewing contractor 
development testing, participating in technical interchange meetings 
and periodic program reviews, and conducting contractor development 
process and configuration audits. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because the contractor does not 
collect statistical process control data. However, the program office 
reviews earned value management reports, integrated master schedules, 
and test dates as a means of monitoring the contractors' production 
efforts. 

Other Program Issues: 

The current Block IIF contract calls for the procurement of 12 
satellites. The Air Force estimated that this number would be 
sufficient for constellation sustainment until the launch of the first 
GPS III satellite, scheduled for 2010. However, in fiscal year 2003, 
the Air Force restructured the GPS III launch schedule and delayed the 
first launch to 2012. Consequently, four additional satellites will 
need to be acquired to sustain the GPS constellation due to this delay. 
To build these additional satellites, several subsystems would require 
parts that are no longer available and must be newly manufactured. 
Additional funding has been requested for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 to 
pay for the nonrecurring engineering required to manufacture these 
parts for the additional Block IIF satellites. 

The GPS Operational Control System consists of monitor stations that 
passively track the navigation signals of all the satellites and a 
master control station that updates the satellites' navigation 
messages. Certain components of the control system have been delayed 
because funds from this development were reallocated to complete the 
Block IIF development in support of constellation sustainment. 
Specifically, M-Code and Flex Power capabilities, part of the control 
system, will be delayed 3 years, but according to the program office, 
this will not result in underutilization of the satellites on orbit. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
the GPS constellation first achieved final operational capability of 24 
healthy and operational satellites in July 1995 and since then has 
consistently exceeded this requirement. It also stated that beginning 
in 2000, the joint program office initiated a modernization and upgrade 
program to more rapidly introduce new capabilities for the warfighter 
and civil users. It further stated that, as of December 2004, the joint 
program office's current estimate for launch availability of the first 
modernized satellite (IIR-M) will be April 2005 and that the Block IIF 
will continue the modernization program with its first satellite launch 
availability in September 2006. 

[End of section]

Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR): 

The Marine Corps' HLR system will perform the marine expeditionary 
heavy-lift assault transport of armored vehicles, equipment, and 
personnel to support distributed operations deep inland from a sea-
based center of operations. The HLR program is expected to replace the 
current CH-53 helicopter with a new design to improve range and 
payload, survivability, reliability and maintainability, coordination 
with other assets, and overall cost of ownership. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding, FY05-FY15: 

R&D: $3,120.5 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $3,120.5 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 09/2004: $3,130.2. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 09/2004: $0.0. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 09/2004: $3,130.2. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 09/2004: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 09/2004: 11. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 09/2004: 126. 

Latest data include all development costs and quantities from the 
program's inception through fiscal year 2015. Information on 
procurement funding and quantities was not available. 

[End of table]

The critical technologies for the HLR program are not expected to be 
fully mature before the start of development in February 2005. An 
initial readiness assessment for the program identified 10 critical 
technologies. A subsequent assessment reduced that number to 3--the 
main rotor blades, the main rotor viscoelastic lag damper, and the main 
gearbox. Elements of the 7 eliminated technology areas, including the 
engines, may still present challenges to the program. The gearbox and 
the rotor blades are not expected to reach full maturity until 2011 and 
2012, respectfully. Currently, an aggressive acquisition strategy is 
being planned. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

HLR Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The three critical technologies for the HLR program--the main rotor 
blades, the main rotor viscoelastic lag damper, and the main gearbox--
are not expected to be fully mature before the start of development in 
February 2005. A lag damper similar to that planned for use is 
currently in operation on another program, but it must be resized for 
use on the HLR and therefore will not reach full maturity until the 
critical design review in 2008. The gearbox and the rotor blades 
represent new technology areas that have only been demonstrated in a 
low fidelity laboratory environment and are not expected to reach full 
maturity until 2011 and 2012, respectively. 

Other development items may present future challenges to the HLR 
program. While 10 critical technologies were originally identified for 
the program, an assessment conducted in September 2004 reduced those to 
the 3 above. Of the 7 technologies eliminated, 2 are being developed by 
the HLR program and 5 are being developed by or used on other programs 
and will then have to be integrated onto the HLR platform. In either 
case, this integration can represent potential risks to cost and 
schedule. For example, the program is still considering five different 
engine design options. While the Navy has determined that none of the 
engine designs are expected to use new or novel technology or represent 
a new relevant environment for use, each requires different levels of 
design change, developmental risk, and qualification. For two other 
technologies, less desirable backup systems will have to be used if the 
technologies are not developed as planned. 

Other Program Issues: 

In September 2003, the Navy evaluated seven existing aircraft platforms 
and determined that only the CH-53E (with substantial enhancements) was 
capable of meeting requirements for performance, inventory, operational 
capability dates, operating and support costs, and survivability. 
Previous assessments concluded that the CH-53 airframe was experiencing 
substantial fatigue due to age and lack of regular upgrades and 
modifications. Program officials told us that this situation is even 
worse now due to increased operational use in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 
2003 analysis evaluated four alternative CH-53E designs and recommended 
one of these to meet range and payload requirements and minimize 
effects to service capability dates, inventory, support costs, and 
risk. However, after refining operational requirements for the HLR, the 
Navy selected a different alternative that offered additional 
performance and reliability improvements but added additional schedule 
and technical risk. To address these challenges, the Navy expects to 
implement an aggressive acquisition strategy for the HLR program, 
including sole-source contracting to Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation and 
a single-step acquisition approach. The program also intends to 
manufacture 50 of the 154 total helicopters (32 percent) during low-
rate initial production and concurrent with initial operational 
testing. This concurrent production may help to field the systems 
sooner, but it could also result in greater retrofit costs if 
unexpected design changes are required. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
HLR program was developed to replace the aged CH-53E and support Marine 
Corps Sea Basing and other 21st Century joint operations. It added that 
the program balances operational and programmatic risks and that delays 
to the current HLR planned schedule will result in significant 
additional procurement and operation and support costs to support the 
CH-53E legacy aircraft and Marine Corps Heavy Lift shortfalls. The Navy 
noted that the Office of Naval Research endorsed the HLR program 
initiation at Milestone B and that the approved HLR Technology 
Readiness Assessment and maturation plan include the application of 
engineering trade and risk reduction prior to program initiation at 
Milestone B. It also noted critical technology item maturation events 
coincide with key system development events such as critical design 
review and prototype production. As the HLR program matures, risk 
reduction will continue to be abetted through sustained selection of 
nondevelopmental technologies, with an emphasis on employment of mature 
technologies common to Marine, Navy, and DOD weapon systems. 

[End of section]

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM): 

The JASSM is a joint Air Force and Navy missile system designed to 
provide a new capability to attack surface targets outside of the range 
of area defenses. The JASSM will be delivered by a variety of aircraft 
including the F-16 C/D, the B-52H, the F/A-18E/F, the B-2, and the B-
1B. The system includes the missile, software, and software interfaces 
with the host aircraft and mission planning system. We assessed all 
components. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Fort Walton Beach, Fla. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $206.8 million; 
Procurement: $2,355.2 million; 
Total funding: $2,562.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 3,853. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/1998: $877.3; 
Latest 12/2003: $1221.0; 
Percent change: 39.2%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/1998: $1,092.3; 
Latest 12/2003: $2,547.8; 
Percent change: 133.3%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/1998: $1,990.6; 
Latest 12/2003: $3,768.8; 
Percent change: 89.3%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/1998: $0.806; 
Latest 12/2003: $0.863; 
Percent change: 7.1%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/1998: 2,469; 
Latest 12/2003: 4,366; 
Percent change: 76.8%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/1998: 75; 
Latest 12/2003: 87; 
Percent change: 16.0%. 

[End of table]

The JASSM program entered production in December 2001 without ensuring 
that production processes were in control. However, program officials 
indicated that they have demonstrated the production processes by 
sampling statistical data at the subsystem level and that four missiles 
are selected from each production lot and tested for quality. The JASSM 
program used mature technology, and the missile design was stable at 
the design review. Although there were some test failures in the 
developmental and operational tests run from April 2002 to September 
2003, program officials incorporated fixes that subsequent tests 
demonstrated to be successful. However, in recent follow-on tests, the 
program continued to have test failures, and the Air Force suspended 
testing until the causes of these failures can be determined. 
Nevertheless, the JASSM was approved for full-rate production in July 
2004. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

JASSM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JASSM program identified three critical technologies--global 
positioning system antispoofing receiver module, low observable 
technology, and composite materials--and stated that all three are 
mature. They are new applications of existing technologies. 

Design Stability: 

The contractor has released 100 percent of the drawings to 
manufacturing. The program office completed developmental and 
operational tests and entered follow-on test and evaluation. Fourteen 
developmental flight tests were performed, with three tests failing to 
meet the test objectives. Program officials identified the issues 
involved and incorporated fixes, which were successfully tested in 
later developmental tests. Fifteen operational tests were conducted 
from June 2002 to September 2003. According to the Air Force 
Operational Test and Evaluation Command, 7 of these were successful, 5 
were failures, and 3 were "no test." Based on the developmental and 
operational tests, the Command considered the JASSM to be capable 
against the required targets but not reliable. Therefore, it rated the 
missile as effective and potentially suitable and recommended approval 
of full-rate production. Since that time, in follow-on test and 
evaluation, the missile had three successful tests and three failures. 
The Air Force halted further testing and convened a failure review 
board to determine the causes for the test problems. This board was to 
report its findings in October 2004. 

Production Maturity: 

Program officials do not collect production process control data at the 
system level. However, they stated that all production processes had 
been demonstrated and that statistical data are collected at the 
subsystem level and are sampled as required. Program officials 
indicated that the contractor has produced at the rates required for 
the low-rate initial production buy of 176 missiles and that it will be 
able to produce at the full-rate production level of 250 missiles per 
year. Three production lots are on contract and deliveries are on 
schedule. Program officials believe that none of the manufacturing 
processes that affect critical system characteristics are a problem, 
although there are key production processes that have cost 
implications, such as bonding for the low observable materials and the 
painting/coating application. The missile was approved for full-rate 
production in July 2004. 

Other Program Issues: 

A contract for development of an extended range version of the missile 
was awarded in February 2004. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
as a result of two test failures this summer, the Air Force Program 
Executive Office for Weapons convened a Reliability Enhancement Team on 
August 16, 2004, to investigate ways to improve reliability of the 
JASSM. It further stated that the team completed its work in October 
and concluded the JASSM design was sound, concurred with the joint 
program office return to test plan, and recommended award of the next 
lot's production contract--awarded November 2004. Also, the team 
recommended the Joint Program Office/Lockheed Martin pursue a more 
focused effort on subtier supplier manufacturing process quality 
controls and implement a robust test program to improve missile 
reliability. The Air Force stated that the key stakeholders (Air Force, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Congress) concurred with the 
team's recommendations and the joint program office's way ahead plan 
and noted that the JASSM team continues to address near-term 
reliability issues identified by the Reliability Enhancement Team. 

[End of section]

Joint Common Missile (JCM): 

The Joint Common Missile is a joint Army/Navy program with Marine Corps 
participation and United Kingdom involvement. It is an air-launched and 
potentially ground-launched missile designed to target tanks; light 
armored vehicles; missile launchers; command, control, and 
communications vehicles; bunkers; and buildings. It is to provide line-
of-sight and beyond line-of-sight capabilities and can be employed in a 
fire-and-forget mode or a precision attack mode. The missile will 
replace systems such as Hellfire and Maverick. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $875.0 million; 
Procurement: $5,876.6 million; 
Total funding: $6,751.6 million; 
Procurement quantity: 48,613. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 06/2004: $982.2. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 06/2004: $5,876.6. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 06/2004: $6,858.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 06/2004: $0.141. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 06/2004: 48,815. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 06/2004: 65. 

[End of table]

The Joint Common Missile entered system development of the air-launched 
version in April 2004, before any of its critical technologies were 
fully mature. At this time, program officials do not know the number of 
drawings that will be released by design review in March 2006. Program 
officials currently project that the critical technologies will reach 
maturity 3 months prior to design review, about half way through 
product development. Until all technologies are demonstrated, the 
potential for design change remains. Mature backup technologies are 
available should the new technologies fail to mature; however, use of 
backup technologies could degrade system performance or increase costs. 
By beginning integration before these technologies have been 
demonstrated, the potential for cost growth, schedule delay, or 
decreased performance exists. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Joint Common Missile Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of the Joint Common Missile's three critical technologies have 
demonstrated full maturity according to best practices. These 
technologies include a multimode seeker for increased countermeasure 
resistance, boost-sustain propulsion for increased standoff range, and 
a multipurpose warhead for increased lethality. Program officials noted 
that many of the components of these technologies are currently in 
production on other missile systems, but they have not been fully 
integrated into a single missile. Maturing technologies concurrently 
with product development increases the potential for cost growth and 
schedule delays. According to program officials, while backup 
technologies exist for each of the critical technologies, substituting 
any of them would result in degraded performance or increased costs. 

Design Stability: 

Currently, about 16 percent of the drawings for the Joint Common 
Missile have been released to manufacturing. Program officials project 
that approximately 41 percent of the drawings will be released by May 
2005, the end of what they term a risk mitigation phase. However, 
program officials have not projected the number of drawings that will 
be released by design review in March 2006. Officials project full 
integration of the subsystems into the Joint Common Missile will occur 
by April 2005, although the system will reach technology maturity by 
December 2005, over a year and a half after the start of system 
development. 

Program officials stated that the program's modular design will reduce 
life-cycle costs, including demilitarization, and will enable 
continuous technology insertion to provide improved capability against 
advancing threats. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that during the first and second quarters of fiscal year 2004, a 
comprehensive Technology Maturity and Readiness Assessment, along with 
a risk assessment, was performed by subject matter experts from the 
Aviation and Missile Research and Engineering Center and the Army Test 
and Evaluation Command and coordinated with respective offices within 
the Army and the Navy. This assessment was reviewed by the Department 
of the Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Director 
of Defense Research and Engineering and concluded that the Joint Common 
Missile technology was at an appropriate maturity level to support 
entry into System Design and Development. Further, it is anticipated 
that progress will continue. The system technologies combined with 
control test vehicle firing(s) will substantiate maturity according to 
best practices by April 2005. 

[End of section]

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): 

The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy, 
strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. 
allies, with maximum commonality to minimize costs. The carrier 
suitable version will complement the Navy's F/A-18 E/F. The 
conventional take-off and landing version will primarily be an air-to-
ground replacement for the Air Force's F-16 and A-10 aircraft, and will 
complement the F/A-22. The short take-off and vertical landing version 
will replace the Marine Corps' F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Arlington, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $28,664.3 million; 
Procurement: $154,854.5 million; 
Total funding: $183,678.6 million; 
Procurement quantity: 2,443. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $33,478.4; 
Latest 12/2003: $43,566.3; 
Percent change: 30.1%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $148,528.2; 
Latest 12/2003: $154,854.5; 
Percent change: 4.3%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $183,561.2; 
Latest 12/2003: $198,624.5; 
Percent change: 8.2%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $64.048; 
Latest 12/2003: $80.840; 
Percent change: 26.2%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 2,866; 
Latest 12/2003: 2,457; 
Percent change: -14.3%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 185; 
Latest 12/2003: 196; 
Percent change: 5.9. 

[End of table]

The JSF entered system development in 2001 with its critical 
technologies immature, and recent assessments indicate that this is 
still the case. Other risks exist as well. For example, the preliminary 
design review revealed a significant weight problem that led to 
numerous design and requirement changes. This resulted in delays of 16-
22 months for the design reviews and increased costs. The program 
expects 35 percent of its drawing packages to be completed by the 
design reviews. Also, the program expects to produce a significant 
number of production aircraft with little demonstrated knowledge about 
performance, reliability, software maturity, and producibility. In 
2004, the program reported a Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) unit cost 
breach largely due to design maturation efforts, schedule extensions, 
and revised labor and overhead rates. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

JSF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JSF entered system development without demonstrating the maturity 
of its 8 critical technologies. Data provided by the program office 
indicate that the technology maturity has not significantly changed. In 
2004, an independent review team examined the program and identified 
several technical challenges related to the critical technologies. For 
example, it found that the highly integrated subsystems still have risk 
and that major challenges remain with the mission systems and software 
integration. The team reported that prognostics and health management 
technologies needed a focused initiative to mature them. 

Design Stability: 

When development began, the design was not well defined, leading to 
changes in requirements and design. The preliminary design review held 
in March 2003 revealed significant airframe weight problems--eventually 
exceeding targets by as much as 25 percent--that affected the 
aircraft's ability to meet key performance requirements. Actions to 
resolve the problem have added 18 months and $4.9 billion to the 
development program. 

Program officials indicated that no drawings have been completed for 
any production representative variant. Critical design reviews are 
scheduled for the 2006 time frame, a 16-to 22-month delay. At the time 
of the design reviews, the program expects to have released about 85 
percent of the critical structural drawings but only 35 percent of the 
total engineering drawing packages needed to build the aircraft. This 
relatively low level of design knowledge will continue beyond the 
production decision in 2007. At the time of that commitment, the JSF 
will (1) have done limited flight testing on only one nonproduction 
representative aircraft; (2) not have flight-tested an integrated 
aircraft (with critical mission systems and prognostics technologies); 
(3) have less than 40 percent of the software lines of code needed for 
expected system functionality released. By 2013, when development is 
scheduled to be complete, DOD plans to have bought around 500 low-rate 
production aircraft at an estimated cost over $50 billion. This highly 
concurrent strategy of producing and developing aircraft increases the 
risks of cost growth and delays in delivering capability to the 
warfighter. 

Production Maturity: 

The program office is collecting information on the JSF production 
processes. The contractor is currently in the process of identifying 
the key characteristics, critical manufacturing processes and capturing 
some early data. At the time of the production decision, the program 
will not have demonstrated that the aircraft can be produced 
efficiently or with expected reliability. These uncertainties are major 
contributors for DOD plans to rely on cost reimbursable type contracts 
for the early production buys. Fixed price contracts, the norm for 
production, are not expected until the air vehicle has a mature design, 
has been demonstrated in flight tests, and is producible at established 
cost targets. 

Other Program Issues: 

In 2004, the program reported a Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) program 
unit cost breach. According to the program office, total program unit 
costs have increased by 19.4 percent largely due to aircraft design 
maturation efforts, schedule extensions, and revised labor and overhead 
rates. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided the 
following information. A 2001 DOD review concluded the JSF had 
demonstrated sufficient technical maturity for entry into development. 
Design reviews were completed March 2004 on all areas except the 
airframe. By the airframe design review, 85 percent of the critical 
structural drawings will be complete. Subsystem hardware/software 
integration in the lab is ahead of schedule, occurring sooner than 
legacy fighter programs. Significant progress has been made in weight 
and performance issues. The short take-off and vertical landing variant 
includes over 2,700 pounds of weight reductions achieved through design 
optimization. More weight improvements were achieved by modest 
requirement changes endorsed by the warfighters. Requirements for other 
variants were not changed. Manufacture of the first test aircraft is 
underway, with assembly times less than planned. Over 1,500 test hours 
have been achieved on seven engines. Some replan refinements are in 
work. Program concurrency reflects spiral development strategy. 

[End of section]

Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW): 

The JSOW is a joint Air Force and Navy guided bomb to attack targets 
from outside the range of most enemy air defenses. A dispenser variant 
(JSOW A) carries submunitions to attack soft targets. In 2002, the 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council deferred production of an 
antiarmor JSOW variant (JSOW B). The unitary variant (JSOW C) uses a 
seeker, autonomous targeting acquisition software, and a single warhead 
to attack targets. All the variants use a common air vehicle. We 
assessed the unitary variant and the common air vehicle. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $0.0 million; 
Procurement: $761.2 million; 
Total funding: $761.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 2,861. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/1995: $334.6; 
Latest 08/2004: $326.1; 
Percent change: -2.5%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/1995: $4,037.6; 
Latest 08/2004: $848.1; 
Percent change: -79.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/1995: $4,372.2; 
Latest 08/2004: $1,174.2; 
Percent change: -73.1%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/1995: $0.561; 
Latest 08/2004: $0.391; 
Percent change: -30.2. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/1995: 7,800; 
Latest 08/2004: 3,000; 
Percent change: -61.5%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/1995: 89; 
Latest 08/2004: 117; 
Percent change: 31.5%. 

[End of table]

The JSOW program began low-rate production in June 2003 without knowing 
whether production processes were in control. However, the contractor 
has since identified seven critical production processes and has five 
of the seven under statistical process control and performing at an 
acceptable quality level. The contractor is working with the remaining 
two processes to collect enough data to verify that the processes are 
under control. Operational evaluation was completed in September 2004, 
and the beyond low-rate production and live fire test reports required 
to support the full-rate production decision were received in December 
2004. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

JSOW Unitary Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JSOW Unitary variant's technology is mature. The program office 
identified the imaging infrared seeker with the autonomous acquisition 
software as the only critical technology for the system. The seeker was 
not mature at the start of development, but it did demonstrate maturity 
in October 2001--about three-fourths through development--when it was 
flown aboard an aircraft in a captive flight test. Program officials 
stated that in seven developmental tests, three free-flight tests with 
the seeker only and four combined seeker/warhead tests, the seeker's 
performance substantially exceeded requirements. The seeker has 
demonstrated greater accuracy than required during operational testing. 

Design Stability: 

The JSOW unitary variant's basic design is complete. At the system 
design review in May 2002, the program office had completed 99 percent 
of the drawings. The Navy has completed 10 developmental tests (adding 
one combined seeker/warhead test in 2003) in its development program--3 
sled tests with the warhead, 3 free-flights with the seeker, and 4 
combined warhead/seeker tests. After some delay in beginning 
operational tests due to problems with the fuze, the Navy completed 
operational testing in September 2004 and reported that the fuze 
reliability met requirements. 

Production Maturity: 

Raytheon and the Navy identified seven critical processes unique to 
seeker development and collected data during low-rate production to 
determine that five of the seven were in control. Raytheon is working 
to collect data sufficient to characterize the remaining two processes. 
The Navy reports that delivery of the seekers is ahead of schedule and 
that there is low risk to meeting the quantity requirements of 17 per 
month. Raytheon has maintained its on-time deliveries for the common 
air vehicle for more than 33 months. 

Other Program Issues: 

The JSOW completed operational testing in September 2004. Preliminary 
analysis of the data indicated that the missile, its seeker, and 
warhead met performance requirements. The final report rated the weapon 
as operationally effective but noted some deficiencies in training 
affecting the rating for suitability. According to a program office 
official, the issues have been resolved and the revised assessment 
rates the weapon as operationally effective and suitable. Reports 
detailing the analysis of the testing and the weapon's operational 
suitability and effectiveness and its live fire test results were 
received in December 2004. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, 
which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section]

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1: 

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and significantly increase 
communications capabilities. A joint service program office is 
responsible for developing the JTRS architecture and waveforms, while 
service-led program offices will develop and procure radio hardware for 
platforms with similar requirements. This is an assessment of Cluster 
1, led by the Army, which is developing radios for ground vehicles and 
helicopters. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $475.1 million; 
Procurement: $14,673.0 million; 
Total funding: $15,148.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 108,685. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 06/2002: $875.9; 
Latest 08/2004: $895.1; 
Percent change: 2.2%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 06/2002: $14,088.0; 
Latest 08/2004: $14,674.9; 
Percent change: 4.2%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 06/2002: $14,963.9; 
Latest 08/2004: $15,570.0; 
Percent change: 4.0%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 06/2002: $0.138; 
Latest 08/2004: $0.143; 
Percent change: 3.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 06/2002: 108,388; 
Latest 08/2004: 109,002; 
Percent change: 0.6%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 06/2002: 55; 
Latest 08/2004: 60; 
Percent change: 9.1%. 

[End of table]

The JTRS program's demonstrated knowledge continues to be difficult to 
characterize. Program officials believe that the design is stable and 
production processes are in control. However, design and production 
knowledge are dependent on technology maturity. None of the program's 
20 critical technologies are mature, and the number of drawings has 
nearly tripled since last year. The program is proceeding under an 
accelerated strategy that does not allow for testing the radio's full 
functionality before initial low-rate production begins. Requirements 
changes are being considered that could result in design changes. The 
Army is proposing to restructure the program, which may add time to the 
development schedule. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

JTRS Cluster 1 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

While the program office has made some progress in maturing critical 
technologies, none of the JTRS Cluster 1 program's 20 critical 
technologies are mature. Many of these critical technologies have been 
used in other radio applications but cannot be assessed as mature 
because they have not been integrated into a complex radio like Cluster 
1. Mature backup technologies exist for some critical technologies, but 
program officials have cautioned that substituting them would 
complicate integration or result in degraded performance. Program 
officials pointed out several challenges in achieving technological 
maturity. In particular, the program continues to reconcile size, 
weight, and power requirements. Meeting the performance objectives of 
the Wideband Networking Waveform is also a challenge. Program officials 
expect to demonstrate maturity of all 20 critical technologies during 
an early operational assessment scheduled to end in April 2005. 

Design Stability: 

The program reports achieving design stability for the basic Cluster 1 
radio design. However, while all drawings have been released to 
manufacturing, the total number of drawings has nearly tripled from 
last year's assessment. Program officials primarily attribute the large 
increase to additional drawings required for certain components as the 
design matured and more specificity of the initial component drawings. 
Furthermore, program officials report that the number of drawings is 
likely to change again as a result of the upcoming operational 
assessment and as they move toward production. Given that the critical 
technologies have yet to mature, the significant changes to the number 
of drawings raise concerns about the program's design stability. 

Production Maturity: 

The program reports that all production processes to be utilized in 
manufacturing the JTRS radios are mature and in control. However, as 
the program office expected, the number of processes has decreased from 
last year's assessment. According to the program office, the number has 
decreased because of design enhancements. The program office expects 
the number of processes to change again as further design requirements 
take place. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program has a software development plan with insufficient schedule 
reserve to incorporate knowledge gained from initial development 
increments. It also has a compressed test and evaluation phase that 
leaves little room for rework. For example, the production decision is 
scheduled to occur immediately upon completion of an early operational 
assessment limited to pre-engineering development models that are not 
fully functional. The program office also reported an increase in 
procurement costs of over $600 million primarily due to an error in 
estimating manufacturing costs. The JTRS Cluster 1 information security 
certification approach is also unprecedented, and the radios must go 
though a certification process that is outside the program office's 
control. In addition, the joint program office is exploring additional 
requirements including the development of additional waveforms that 
operate at above 2GHz--that may be tasked to the JTRS Cluster 1 program 
and may also necessitate hardware modifications. Because of emerging 
requirements and other technical challenges, the Army is considering 
restructuring the program, which may add more time to the development 
schedule. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
generally agreed with the information provided in this report. Program 
officials also provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
where appropriate. 

[End of section]

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5: 

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and also increase communications and 
networking capabilities. A joint service program office is developing 
the architecture and waveforms, while service-led program offices are 
developing radio hardware. The Army-led JTRS Cluster 5 is developing 
handheld, manpack, and small embedded radios for applications such as 
ground sensors. Spiral 1 will field a two-channel manpack. Spiral 2 
will develop and field all versions. We assessed Spiral 2. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics Design Systems, Inc. 
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, N.J. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $426.1 million; 
Procurement: $8,209.1 million; 
Total funding: $8,635.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 328,514%. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 04/2004: $471.0. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 04/2004: $8,209.1. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 04/2004: $8,680.1. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 04/2004: $0.026. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 04/2004: 329,574. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 04/2004: 34. 

[End of table]

JTRS Cluster 5 began system development with one of its six critical 
technologies mature for Spiral 2. The program considers the five other 
technologies low risk and anticipates increased levels of maturity, 
though not full maturity, by the production decision in March 2008. We 
did not assess design stability because no production representative 
drawings had been released at the time of our assessment for either 
Spiral 1 or Spiral 2. The total number of drawings has also not been 
identified. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

JTRS Cluster 5 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JTRS Cluster 5 program has identified six critical technologies--
identical for both of the Cluster 5 spirals. Spiral 1 is based on 
technologies that are either commercial-off-the-shelf or 
nondevelopmental items, and is focused on a two-channel manpack with 
narrowband capability operating seven of the designated JTRS waveforms. 
Spiral 2 is to evolve and expand Spiral 1 two-channel manpack 
capabilities as well as fully developing the one-and two-channel 
handheld and small form fit variants meeting the wideband and 
networking requirements. 

The program office has assessed one of Cluster 5 critical technologies, 
termed environmental protection, as mature for use in Spiral 2. It has 
also assessed two other critical technologies, antenna and power 
management, at a high level of readiness, although not fully mature. 
However, the power management technology may not be as mature as 
assessed given the Cluster 5 requirement to support a JTRS Wideband 
Networking Waveform. This waveform is essential to providing JTRS 
networking services to ensure interoperability over a wide range of 
frequencies. While it is not designated a Cluster 5 critical 
technology, the JTRS Operational Requirements Document designates it as 
a key performance parameter. Operation of this waveform carries with it 
a large power requirement. Because of that power requirement and the 
technical challenges of meeting that requirement in an acceptable size 
and weight, the Cluster 5 program is seeking some relief from the 
waveform's requirements, and attempting to optimize the software code 
to increase its power efficiency. It is also evaluating alternative 
waveforms such as the Soldier Radio Waveform to provide in a power 
efficient way the needed networked services for radios with limited 
power and antenna size. 

The remaining Cluster 5 critical technologies--antennas, 
microelectronics, multichannel architecture, and security--require 
additional development. According to the program office, however, all 
four represent a low level of risk and are anticipated to reach 
increased levels of maturity by the production decision. 

Additionally, the program continues to address size, weight, and power 
requirements. The Cluster 5 manpack radios to be fielded in Spiral 2 
are to have a maximum weight of 9 pounds. In comparison, Spiral 1 units 
weigh up to 13 pounds. With the help of the Army's Communications-
Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center, the program 
is pursuing power trade-offs and technical solutions to achieve the 
Spiral 2 requirement. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess the design stability of JTRS Cluster 5 because the 
total number of drawings is not known and there are currently no 
releasable drawings complete for either spiral. 

Other Program Issues: 

An Acquisition Decision Memorandum in May 2004 authorized the movement 
of the single channel handheld radios requirement from Spiral 1 to 
Spiral 2. The memorandum also expressed concern about the immaturity of 
the Spiral 2 definition and required the program to update the cost and 
affordability assessment during the second quarter of fiscal year 2006. 
Furthermore, in recognition of the criticality of JTRS, it directed the 
Cluster 5 program to conduct a review in the first quarter of fiscal 
year 2005 to assess the maturity of the plans for Spiral 2. The JTRS 
Cluster 5 development contract was awarded in July 2004. However, 
immediately thereafter, the contractor was issued a stop-work order 
because of a bid protest. Work was stopped until late October 2004, 
when we denied the protest and work resumed. Impact of the stop-work 
order is still being assessed by the Cluster 5 product manager. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
provided some technical comments and suggested a number of editorial 
changes including additional clarifying information, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. The program office indicated the critical 
technologies will reach an acceptable level of maturity by the 
production decision in 2008. 

GAO Comments: 

While the program office commented that the critical technologies will 
reach an acceptable level of maturity by the time of the production 
decision, best practices call for attaining a higher level of maturity 
by the start of development. 

[End of section]

Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS): 

The J-UCAS program is a combined effort of the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Force, and the Navy to 
demonstrate the technical feasibility and operational value of a 
networked system of high performance and weaponized unmanned air 
vehicles. Expected missions include the suppression of enemy air 
defenses, electronic attack, precision strike, and surveillance. The 
program consolidates two formerly separate service projects and is to 
develop larger, more capable, and interoperable aircraft. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing/Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Arlington, Va. 
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $3,694.1 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $3,694.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 09/2004: $4,042.0. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 09/2004: $0.0. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 09/2004: $4,042.0. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 09/2004: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 09/2004: 6. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 09/2004: TBD. 

Latest cost is funding through fiscal year 2009 for technology 
development and prototypes. Procurement funding and quantities for 
future acquisitions are not yet identified. 

[End of table]

The J-UCAS program began in October 2003 with technologies that 
officials project will sufficiently mature to support a possible 2010 
start of operational system development. The program plans to develop 
and demonstrate the next generations of the original Air Force and Navy 
demonstrators that will have common performance objectives and utilize 
common subsystems and technologies. The program expects to conduct an 
early operational assessment starting in fiscal year 2007 and then 
provide the Air Force and the Navy with several program options for 
follow-on efforts. A December 2004 program budget decision would 
restructure the program and reduce funding. At the time of our review, 
it was not clear how these changes will impact the schedule for 
achieving key product knowledge. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

J-UCAS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

While none of the J-UCAS' six critical technologies are currently 
mature, program officials project that they will be sufficiently ready 
to support the early operational assessment scheduled to begin in 
fiscal year 2007 and to provide options to the Air Force and the Navy 
for follow-on efforts starting in fiscal year 2010. Program officials 
identified the following critical technologies needed to produce a high 
performance and networked system of low observable air vehicles capable 
of operating in high-threat environments for extended periods of time: 
(1) signature reduction; (2) advanced tactical targeting; (3) secure 
robust communications; (4) force integration, interoperability, and 
global information grid compatibility; (5) adaptive autonomous 
operations; and (6) operations in aircraft carrier-controlled airspace. 
These technologies are still maturing as would be expected at this 
early presystem development stage. The targeting and autonomous 
operations technologies are considered the most mature and carrier 
operations technology the least mature. 

Other Program Issues: 

The previous service-specific efforts combined in the joint program had 
different primary missions and operating environments. The Air Force 
began developing its system to suppress and attack enemy air defenses, 
while the Navy's primary interest was for a carrier-based unmanned 
aerial vehicle to provide persistent armed surveillance for the battle 
group. The joint program is expected to maintain a competitive 
environment and continue to develop next-generation versions of both 
Air Force and Navy demonstrators. Both versions will be expected to be 
capable of performing all required missions of the two services. By 
merging the Air Force and Navy efforts, DOD hopes for synergy and cost 
savings by developing interoperable and networked systems utilizing 
common operating systems, sensors, and weapons. 

The program cost of over $4 billion from startup in fiscal year 2004 
through fiscal year 2009 does not include the approximately $500 
million spent on the two service-specific projects prior to 
consolidation. The program will compete for funding with current 
operational systems such as the Predator and the Global Hawk and other 
unmanned and manned systems in varying stages of development, some with 
similar missions. Congress reduced J-UCAS funding in fiscal year 2005 
because the program had not properly coordinated with the two services 
and directed that the technology demonstrators be completed in support 
of Air Force and Navy requirements. 

A December 2004 program budget decision by DOD restructured J-UCAS by 
realigning adjusted resources to the Air Force to establish a joint 
program with Navy representation. It reduced total funding by about 
$1.1 billion from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2011. 

Emerging challenges include adaptation for carrier operations and 
development of the common operating system. The projected weight for 
the new models increased from earlier estimates in order to meet range, 
payload, and persistence requirements. The common operating system is 
expected to integrate and provide for interoperability of J-UCAS air 
vehicles and is required to control groups of vehicles flying in a 
coordinated manner and functioning in the absence of human inputs. The 
program director said the common operating system is the most 
technically challenging aspect of the entire J-UCAS program. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, DARPA stated that the J-
UCAS program, newly established when Congress considered fiscal year 
2005 funding, is run under the guidance of a high-level executive 
committee and jointly manned with DARPA, Air Force, and Navy personnel. 
The Air Force and the Navy have fully coordinated on the demonstration 
approach using the X-45C and X-47B in support of service priorities. 
According to officials, the J-UCAS concept does not compete directly to 
replace any specific manned or unmanned system but will augment a 
transformed force structure and provide options to better address 
military needs in deep, denied adversary environments. DARPA also 
stated that in addition to the capabilities identified by the services 
today, J-UCAS will offer insights into new warfighting concepts. It 
will also preserve opportunities for competition in follow-on and 
derivative programs. Finally, DARPA noted that the common operating 
system, while technically challenging, encompasses essential mission 
functionality and offers the greatest potential return in flexibility 
and affordability. 

[End of section]

Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI): 

MDA's KEI element is a new missile defense system designed to destroy 
long-range ballistic missiles during the boost phase of flight, the 
period after launch during which the missile's rocket motors are 
thrusting. KEI would also engage missiles in the early ascent-phase, 
the period immediately after booster burnout. Key components include 
hit-to-kill interceptors, launchers, and battle management units. We 
assessed the proposed land-based KEI capability, which is planned to 
become available during 2012-2013 (Block 2012). 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Fair Lakes, Va. 
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $7,485.1 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $7,485.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 09/2003: $8,619.2; 
Latest 07/2004: $7,771.2; 
Percent change: -9.8%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 09/2003: $0.0; 
Latest 07/2004: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 09/2003: $8,619.2; 
Latest 07/2004: $7,771.2; 
Percent change: -9.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 09/2003: TBD; 
Latest 07/2004: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: 8. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 09/2003: NA; 
Latest 07/2004: TBD. 

Table reflects cost of program from inception through fiscal year 2009. 
As of November 2004, planned program funding was reduced further, from 
$7.8 billion to $3.6 billion. 

[End of table]

All 7 KEI critical technologies are at a relatively low level of 
maturity, ranging from proofs of concept established through analytical 
or laboratory studies to new applications of existing technologies. For 
example, the program is leveraging existing interceptor technologies--
infrared seeker, third stage rocket motor, and divert system--that are 
currently used in other MDA programs. The program office rates the 
development of 2 critical technologies as high risk. The first involves 
one of the interceptor's booster motors, which demands high performance 
for KEI engagements. In addition, the program office judges the 
algorithm enabling the kill vehicle to identify the missile's body from 
the luminous exhaust plume as a high-risk technology. MDA expects to 
mature these technologies and integrate them into a land-and sea-based 
capability under the prime contract awarded in December 2003. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

KEI Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All 7 KEI critical technologies are at a relatively low level of 
maturity. These technologies are part of the element's interceptor, the 
weapon component of the element consisting of a kill vehicle mounted 
atop a boost vehicle. Of the 7 technologies, 4 pertain to the boost 
vehicle that propels the kill vehicle into space. They are its 2 types 
of booster motors, attitude control system, and thrust vector control 
system. The remaining 3 technologies pertain to the kill vehicle--its 
infrared seeker, divert system, and plume-to-hardbody algorithms. 
Although all technologies are immature, 3 of the 7 are derived from 
existing components in other missile defense programs. The infrared 
seeker and the third stage rocket motor come from the Aegis BMD 
program, and the divert system comes from the GMD program. Backup 
technologies exist for all but the infrared seeker, however, they are 
at the same low level of maturity as the critical technologies. 

The program office noted that KEI critical technologies are not at a 
low level of maturity in and of themselves. The program's assessment--
which rated each technology as relatively immature--was made from a 
systems perspective (i.e., it characterized the risk associated with 
integrating and demonstrating these technologies in the KEI 
environment). The 7 critical interceptor technologies will be assessed 
as mature if the program successfully completes its first intercept 
attempt of a boosting missile. This flight test is expected to be 
conducted sometime after 2010. 

Design Stability: 

At this time, the KEI program office does not have an estimate for the 
total number of drawings for any of its Block 2012 components 
(interceptor, launcher, and battle management unit). In addition to the 
number of drawings, the program plans to use other metrics to assess 
design maturity. Those metrics will include design, manufacturing, 
producibility, and quality measures for hardware and measures of 
maturity of the system's software. 

Other Program Issues: 

In fiscal year 2004, the KEI program underwent a program replan to 
compensate for anticipated fiscal year 2005 funding cuts and the 
addition of new requirements (e.g., nuclear hardening) imposed by MDA. 
The original program called for a Block 2010 land-based capability to 
be available by the end of 2011. In the replan, the land-based 
capability was combined with the sea-based capability of Block 2012, 
both of which utilize the same interceptor. The KEI program is 
undergoing further restructuring. Based on comments received from the 
program office (see below), anticipated funding cuts beyond fiscal year 
2005 are delaying the sea-based capability into Block 2014 (2014-2015 
time frame) and deferring other activities indefinitely. 

Because completion of the land-based capability continues to be pushed 
further in the future, the program's funding profile has changed. Under 
the plan to demonstrate an initial capability in the Block 2012 time 
frame, near-term funding through fiscal year 2009 was reduced by about 
10 percent, with the balance shifted into later years. The latest 
restructuring noted by the program office further reduced funding by 
over 50 percent. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
provided information on the latest restructure of the KEI program. In 
short, program funding through fiscal year 2009 was reduced from $7.8 
billion (as listed) to $3.6 billion and, accordingly, program 
activities such as development of the sea-based capability were delayed 
into future blocks. 

In addition, the program office indicated that "mission assurance" is 
the program's number one priority. In other words, the program's 
approach to element development is knowledge-driven, which places an 
emphasis on upfront systems engineering and analysis and other risk 
reduction activities. 

[End of section]

Land Warrior: 

The Army's Land Warrior system is a modular, integrated, soldier-worn 
system of systems intended to enhance the lethality, situational 
awareness, and survivability of dismounted combat and support soldiers. 
Land Warrior comprises a computer-radio, integrated helmet assembly, 
weapon, software subsystem, and protective clothing. The Army 
terminated Block I (Land Warrior-Initial Capability) in 2003 due to low 
reliability in developmental testing and proceeded to Block II (Land 
Warrior-Stryker Interoperable). We assessed Block II. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics; 
Program office: Fort Belvoir, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $497.0 million; 
Procurement: $8,220.1 million; 
Total funding: $8,717.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 58,900. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2003: $753.6; 
Latest 12/2003: $977.0; 
Percent change: 29.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2003: $1,762.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $8,220.1; 
Percent change: 366.5%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2003: $2,515.6; 
Latest 12/2003: $9,197.1; 
Percent change: 265.6%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2003: $0.157; 
Latest 12/2003: $0.156; 
Percent change: -1.0%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2003: 15,985; 
Latest 12/2003: 59,038; 
Percent change: 269.3%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2003: 145; 
Latest 12/2003: 166; 
Percent change: 14.5%. 

Due to a recent program restructuring, the November 2004 design review 
did not occur. Future events noted above were for Block II and are no 
longer valid. 

[End of table]

Land Warrior entered system development in 1994 and today, two of the 
system's four critical technologies are mature. The program expects one 
of the remaining two--the personal area network--to be mature before 
the June 2006 low-rate production decision. The other technology--radio 
communications--is a risk area for the program because JTRS Cluster 5 
embedded radios will not be available when needed. We could not assess 
the design stability of Land Warrior because the program was unable to 
supply complete design data. The program reported significant cost 
growth in 2003, due to an increase in the Army's planned procurement of 
Land Warrior systems and to increased Block II software and integration 
costs. The Army recently restructured the program, putting Block II on 
indefinite hold as the program focuses on fielding elements of the Land 
Warrior system to the current force. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Land Warrior Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Two of the Land Warrior system's four critical technologies (the helmet-
mounted display and power) are mature. Officials told us that despite 
concerns about the ability of industry to produce the helmet-mounted 
display in the quantities needed, the technology involved in the unit 
(which provides data and video) has been demonstrated and is mature. 
The commercial battery technology that will power Land Warrior is also 
mature, though overall power management remains a challenge due to 
irregularities in components' power consumption. 

The other two critical technologies, the personal area network and 
radio communications, are not mature. The personal area network 
includes the connectors, cables, and interfaces that will link 
components of the soldier-worn ensemble to one another. Although such 
connections have in the past proven difficult, officials expect this 
technology to reach maturity before the June 2006 low-rate production 
decision. Land Warrior will eventually utilize the JTRS Cluster 5 
embedded radio (assessed elsewhere in this report) when it becomes 
available in fiscal year 2011. Technology for this radio is not mature. 
In the interim, the Land Warrior program intends to use the Raytheon 
MicroLight Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), a 
single-channel, commercial-off-the-shelf radio. Program officials 
characterize the MicroLight as a cost-effective, short-term solution. 
Technology for the MicroLight could not be assessed as fully mature 
because it has not yet been integrated into the Land Warrior ensemble. 
Program officials said the MicroLight is smaller than other EPLRS 
radios in use today. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess the design stability of the Land Warrior system 
because the program was unable to supply complete data on design 
drawings. The program cited changes resulting from an impending merger 
with the Army's Future Force Warrior technology integration effort as 
the complicating factor. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the maturity of production processes for Land 
Warrior because the program is not collecting statistical process 
control data at this time. Officials told us General Dynamics has not 
fully identified the key manufacturing processes, but that the company 
will measure production maturity in the future. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Land Warrior program has experienced significant challenges and 
delays in its 10-year history. The program restructured after 
contractor prototypes failed basic certification tests in 1998. 
Government testing in 2002 and 2003 revealed technical and reliability 
problems with Block I. The program manager terminated Block I shortly 
thereafter, and focused on developing Block II. 

The Army recently restructured the program again, in response to 
congressional direction to immediately field some Land Warrior 
capabilities to the current force. The restructured program will 
produce capabilities in five spirals and has placed Block II on 
indefinite hold as it moves to field the Commander's Digital Assistant 
and the MicroLight EPLRS radio in "Spiral 0." The Army received a 
partial waiver in December 2004 to purchase a limited number of 
MicroLight radios, but radio communications will remain a risk area for 
the program until this issue is fully resolved. Officials said Spiral 0 
is now the program's most pressing concern, and that the schedule for 
future spirals is being determined at this time. In addition, the 
program is planning to merge its efforts with the Army's Future Force 
Warrior technology integration effort, as directed in the Conference 
Report accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 
Fiscal Year 2005. Congress also reduced the program's fiscal year 2005 
budget by $15 million due to anticipated efficiencies resulting from 
this merger. 

The program reported significant cost growth in 2003, due mainly to an 
increase of more than 40,000 units in the Army's planned procurement of 
Block II Land Warrior systems to equip a broader range of soldiers than 
previously envisaged. Development costs also increased nearly 30 
percent due to software development and vehicle integration 
requirements for Block II. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army generally 
concurred with our assessment and provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section]

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship is to be a fast, maneuverable, shallow 
draft, surface combatant optimized for littoral warfare. LCS will 
employ innovative hull designs and reconfigurable mission packages to 
counter antiaccess threats in three mission areas: mine, antisubmarine, 
and surface warfare. This review focuses on the technology maturity of 
the mission packages associated with the acquisition of the first group 
of ships. Since competition for the remainder of the ships continues, 
we assessed only the mission modules. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $1,092.0 million; 
Procurement: $810.1 million; 
Total funding: $1,902.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 4. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/2004: $1,187.9; 
Latest 08/2004: $1,227.4; 
Percent change: 3.3%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/2004: $752.6; 
Latest 08/2004: $810.4; 
Percent change: 7.7%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/2004: $1,940.5; 
Latest 08/2004: $2,037.8; 
Percent change: 5.0%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/2004: $485.135; 
Latest 08/2004: $509.446; 
Percent change: 5.0%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/2004: 4; 
Latest 08/2004: 4; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/2004: 41; 
Latest 08/2004: 41; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

The first and third ships will be procured using research and 
development funds. Quantity shown is the number of ships procured, 
seven mission packages will also be procured with funds shown. 

[End of table]

The program office identified 42 critical technologies. In June 2004, 
the LCS program entered system development with 14 of these 42 
technologies mature. Five of the remaining 28 technologies are close to 
being mature. However, none of the 28 technologies were projected to 
demonstrate full maturity until after design review in November 2004. 
The acquisition schedule for LCS calls for deploying several critical 
technologies as prototypes or engineering development models for the 
first group of ships. The technologies that have not reached maturity 
affect all three of the littoral warfare missions: mine warfare, 
antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare. The program office 
designated certain information competition sensitive. As a result, we 
have depicted only the level of knowledge for the LCS mission packages. 
The Navy has stated that the total program level of knowledge is 
higher. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

LCS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Nine of the technologies under development for LCS are used in multiple 
applications or mission packages. Since these technologies are used on 
different platforms or in different environments, the program office 
chose to assess each use as a separate technology. This resulted in a 
total of 42 critical technologies, 14 of which are currently mature. 

The first set of the mine warfare mission package will align with the 
delivery of the first ship in January 2007. As part of this mission, 
the MH-60S helicopter is to carry subsystems for either the detection 
or neutralization of mines. MH-60S and its technologies for mine 
detection are currently expected to complete testing in fiscal year 
2005, after first ship design review for LCS. Its mine neutralization 
technologies will complete testing in fiscal year 2007, after delivery 
of the first ship. 

The Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle is an unmanned 
helicopter, and will employ the Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and 
Analysis System for detection of mines on the beach. By delivery to LCS 
in 2006, the platform will be an engineering development model and its 
payload will still be in testing. The Unmanned Surface Vehicle will be 
used for all three littoral warfare missions. For mine warfare, it is 
expected to deploy a mine neutralization system, but neither the 
vehicle nor its payload will be fully mature by the design review. 

The first spirals for antisubmarine and surface warfare packages will 
align with delivery of the second ship in fiscal year 2008. MH-60R will 
be used for both these missions. The helicopter and its subsystems are 
fully mature in the antisubmarine warfare configuration and mostly 
immature in the surface warfare configuration. It will complete testing 
for both missions in September 2005. 

The Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle is a communications relay 
station for other platforms performing antisubmarine warfare. For 
surface warfare, it may use the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System 
and an Electro-Optical Infrared system. Currently, none of the 
technologies are fully mature and most will remain in testing by the 
second ship's design review in August 2005. In its antisubmarine 
warfare configuration, the Remote Minehunting Vehicle will use 
subsystems that are currently immature and will be delivered to LCS as 
engineering development models. As an antisubmarine warfare platform, 
the Unmanned Surface Vehicle will carry detection systems that are not 
yet mature. For surface warfare operations, the program will use a gun 
system and a missile system. A nonlethal weapon system is also being 
considered. This vehicle and its technologies are currently immature in 
all of its mission configurations. 

A missile and a gun system for surface warfare will also be on the ship 
itself, but currently neither of these technologies is fully mature. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess design stability due to the competition sensitive 
nature of the ship's designs. 

Other Program Issues: 

While the MH-60R and MH-60S complete testing in fiscal years 2005 and 
2007, respectively, they will be unavailable for deployment with LCS 
until fiscal year 2009. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
primary objectives of LCS Flight 0 (the first group of LCS ships) are 
the harvesting of mission systems to deliver immediate warfighting 
capability in critical gaps and the design and validation of the 
modular open system architecture. It also stated that the key to 
attaining these objectives is the creation of a common interface that 
enables the independent development of sea frames and mission packages 
and that the use of this interface is critical for the development and 
evaluation of sea frames and mission packages to ensure effective 
interoperability. The result is a total system design that is highly 
adaptable to changes over the life of the program, but isolates impact 
to production schedules. The mission package technology risks described 
in this report are well understood, subject to rigorous risk management 
including appropriate backup technologies, and generally independent 
from the successful achievement of LCS Flight 0 key performance 
parameters. 

[End of section]

Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS): 

The Army's MEADS is developing a mobile air defense system to protect 
deployed maneuver forces and critical assets against short-and medium-
range theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-breathing 
threats. In 2004, the Army combined management, development, and 
fielding of the Patriot air defense missile system and MEADS. Although 
the Army combined the programs, MEADS remains an international 
development effort among the United States, Germany, and Italy. We 
assessed the MEADS fire unit portion of the combined program. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: MEADS International; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding, FY05-FY11: 

R&D: $2,839.3 million; 
Procurement: $1,216.8 million; 
Total funding: $4,056.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 07/2004: $4,590.2. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 07/2004: $12,154.7. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 07/2004: $16,744.8. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 07/2004: $348.851. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 07/2004: 48. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 07/2004: 158. 

The program office expects the first complete MEADS fire unit to be 
available in fiscal year 2015. 

[End of table]

MEADS began development start in July 2004 with two mature critical 
technologies, three critical technologies nearing maturity, and one 
immature critical technology. Program plans call for a system design 
review in 2009, but program estimates currently project that only one 
of the six technologies will be more mature at that time than at 
development start. The program office anticipates that all critical 
technologies will be fully mature by the start of production in the 
first quarter of fiscal year 2013. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

MEADS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only two of the six critical technologies--launcher electronics and PAC-
3 missile integration--were mature at development start in July 2004. 
Three other critical technologies--low noise exciter that manages the 
radars' frequencies, cooling system for the radars, and slip ring that 
carries power and coolants to the radars--were nearing maturity. The 
remaining critical technology--the transmit/receive module that 
transmits/receives signals for the fire control radar--was immature. 

The program office noted that four of the six critical technologies 
have been demonstrated or employed. According to the office, the MEADS 
launcher will employ electronics already being developed for the 
Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) and Patriot launcher, and 
these "common launch electronics" completed design review in May 2003. 
Likewise, the integration of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile 
into MEADS will be similar to integrating the missile into the existing 
Patriot system. Furthermore, the office indicated that a prototype of 
the low noise exciter met some 90 percent of its performance 
specifications during the MEADS risk reduction phase that ended in 
2004. The office stated that this prototype provided the information on 
exciter design necessary to take corrective actions in the MEADS 
development phase. In addition, the office stated that the technology 
used in the transmit/receive module has been employed in THAAD and 
demonstrated that MEADS performance requirements could be met. However, 
the U.S.-developed technology as demonstrated on THAAD is not 
releasable to the MEADS European partners. The partners are developing 
their own transmit/receive module for MEADS, but the design has 
achieved only about 75-80 percent of the performance needed. 

The program office projects that the transmit/receive module will 
increase in maturity by the time of the system design review planned 
for 2009. The program office expects that the five other critical 
technologies will be at the same maturity levels as they were at 
development start. The office expects all critical technologies to be 
fully mature by the start of production in late 2012. There are no 
backup technologies for any of the MEADS critical technologies, with 
the exception of the transmit/receive module. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess the design stability of MEADS because the number of 
releasable drawings and total drawings expected was not available. The 
program office expects to know the total number of releasable drawings 
at the design review in 2009. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program has adopted an incremental acquisition approach. There are 
three increments, with the first beginning in 2008, another in 2010, 
and the final in 2013. The program office plans for each increment to 
introduce new or upgraded capability into the program. The Army expects 
MEADS to achieve initial operational capability in 2017 with four 
units. 

The contract award for the United States, Italy, and Germany to proceed 
into design and development together has been delayed by about 9 
months. The Army originally expected the contract award to occur in 
June/July 2004, but the award did not occur. In September 2004, the 
United States and Italy signed a memorandum of understanding to proceed 
to design and development, and a letter contract was awarded to 
initiate that phase. The contract has a 6-month period of performance, 
which coincides with the March 2005 date when the Army expects Germany 
to sign the memorandum. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army generally concurred with this assessment. It indicated that we 
addressed critical technologies that were already areas of intense 
management focus. Additionally, it stated that the transmit/receive 
module's maturity assessment changed due to international memorandum of 
understanding negotiations and U.S. National Disclosure Policy that 
changed the source of the modules. The Army also noted that it still 
expects all technologies to be fully mature by production and further 
stated that there are risk mitigation plans for the maturing 
technologies as well as alternate backup technologies now identified 
for the transmit/receive module. Additionally, the Army stated that, at 
the design review in 2009, the design work in the critical technologies 
will be at the maturity level required to fabricate system prototypes 
and thus demonstrate system capabilities. 

GAO Comments: 

The MEADS Program Office clarified that the transmit/receive module's 
maturity had decreased and we revised our assessment accordingly. 

[End of section]

Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA): 

The Navy's MMA is one element of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 
(BAMS) family of systems, along with the BAMS Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) and Aerial Common Sensor programs. The MMA is manned, and it will 
sustain and improve armed maritime and littoral intelligence 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of the U.S. Navy. The 
primary roles of the MMA are persistent antisubmarine and antisurface 
warfare. It is the replacement for the P-3C Orion. DOD is discussing 
international partner participation in the program. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Integrated Defense Systems; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $6,337.9 million; 
Procurement: $20,205.5 million; 
Total funding: $26,662.5 million; 
Procurement quantity: 108. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 06/2004: $6,513.0. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 06/2004: $20,205.5. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 06/2004: $26,837.5. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 06/2004: $233.370. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 06/2004: 115. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 06/2004: 160. 

[End of table]

The MMA program entered development with none of its four critical 
technologies mature. According to the program office, these 
technologies will be demonstrated in a relevant environment by design 
review and tested in an operational environment by the production 
decision. The system's technology maturity will be demonstrated at 
least 3 years later than recommended by best practice standards. 
However, the program has identified mature backup technologies. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

MMA Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of the 4 critical technologies--integrated rotary sonobuoy 
launcher, electronic support measures digital receiver, data fusion, 
and acoustic algorithms--are mature. These technologies have not moved 
beyond the laboratory environment. For three of the technologies, the 
components have not been integrated into a prototype system. The 
program expects the four technologies to be demonstrated in a relevant 
environment by design review in July 2007 and tested in an operational 
environment by the production decision in May 2010. The system's 
technology maturity will be demonstrated at least 3 years later than 
recommended by best practice standards. 

The program office and the contractor developed maturation plans and 
identified mature backup technologies for each of the critical 
technologies. According to program officials, the MMA would lose some 
capabilities but still meet its minimum system requirements if it used 
these backups. For example, one of the biggest technology challenges 
for the MMA identified by program officials is the electronic support 
measures digital receiver. This technology exists as a prototype and 
has been demonstrated in a high fidelity laboratory environment. The 
program is leveraging the digital receivers currently in development on 
the EA-18G program. If the EA-18G digital receiver program is 
unsuccessful, the program will have to use legacy analog off-the-shelf 
receivers, which would prevent them from gaining an increased 
sensitivity for certain signals. 

The four technologies we assessed were identified in the MMA's 
technology readiness assessment. The program evaluated six other 
technologies but decided they were not critical because they had 
already been demonstrated in a relevant or operational environment. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess design stability as the number of releasable drawings 
is not yet available. 

Other Program Issues: 

In addition to its primary roles of antisubmarine warfare and 
antisurface warfare, the MMA shares the persistent intelligence 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) role with the BAMS UAV. The BAMS 
UAV program will not start development until fiscal year 2005, and if 
it does not develop as expected, the MMA program is the fall back to 
perform its mission. According to program officials, in order to 
fulfill this mission, the Navy would have to procure 14 additional 
aircraft by 2018, increasing the overall cost of the program. If the 
MMA fails to develop as expected or experiences schedule slippage, the 
Navy will have to rely on its aging P-3C Orion fleet, which, according 
to DOD, is plagued by serious airframe life issues, poor mission 
availability rates, high ownership costs, and limited system growth 
capacity. 

The MMA program is discussing international participation with 
Australia, Canada, and Italy for the development phase of the program. 
This participation could include both the MMA and BAMS UAV programs. 
DOD expects to benefit from improved interoperability, strengthened 
allies, and lower production costs due to increased sales. Program 
officials stated that they are incorporating lessons learned from the 
Joint Strike Fighter international program, particularly in managing 
partner expectations regarding technology transfer. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy generally 
concurred with our characterization of the MMA program. It stated that 
the four critical technologies are tracking along their current 
maturation plans and that it is confident that by design readiness 
review, these technologies will be demonstrated in a relevant 
environment. It noted that these four technologies are being matured 
through the MMA risk management process. 

With regard to the BAMS mission, the Navy stated that an analysis of 
alternatives conducted in May 2002 concluded that 14 additional 
aircraft would have to be in place by 2018 to replace the Legacy P-3 
ISR requirements that were allocated to the BAMS UAV. It further stated 
that since that time, a BAMS UAV Operational Requirements Document has 
been approved that identified additional UAV specific missions and 
requirements that were not considered in the May 2002 analysis of 
alternatives. It noted that there is no current completed analysis that 
encompasses how many aircraft, based on new approved BAMS UAV 
operational requirements document, would be required if the BAMS UAV 
does not develop as expected. 

[End of section]

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to 
provide low data rate voice and data communications capable of 
penetrating most weather, foliage, and manmade structures. It is 
designed to replace the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On satellite 
system currently in operation and provide support to worldwide, 
multiservice, mobile, and fixed-site terminal users. MUOS consists of a 
network of advanced UHF satellites and multiple ground segments. We 
assessed both the space and ground segments. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems; 
Program office: San Diego, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $3,219.0 million; 
Procurement: $2,894.0 million; 
Total funding: $6,308.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 4. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 09/2004: $3,474.0. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 09/2004: $2,894.0. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 09/2004: $6,579.0. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 09/2004: $1,096.500. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 09/2004: 6. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 09/2004: 91. 

[End of table]

In September 2004 the MUOS program was authorized to begin development. 
The program currently has eight of nine critical technologies mature. 
The remaining technology is projected to be mature by April 2007 in 
time for the critical design review. The program intends to order long 
lead items for the first two satellites before achieving a stable 
design. This early procurement could lead to rework causing cost 
increases and schedule delays if relevant designs change prior to 
critical design review. In addition, the MUOS development schedule 
remains compressed, posing several risks to the program. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

MUOS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Eight of nine critical technologies were mature at the development 
start decision in September 2004. The remaining technology, a new 
cryptographic chip, is expected to be mature by the time the program 
reaches its critical design review in April 2007. A mature backup 
technology exists for this chip in the event that it fails to mature in 
time. However, the use of the backup technology would increase the 
vulnerability to attacks on the transmissions of signals that are used 
to ensure the satellites remain properly placed in their orbits around 
the earth. 

Design Stability and Production Maturity: 

The MUOS program intends to procure long lead items for the first two 
satellites before achieving a stable design. The September 2004 
development start decision authorized the program to procure long lead 
items for these satellites. According to the program office, ordering 
of long lead items is to begin in 2005 after segment-level preliminary 
design reviews, but well before critical design review in April 2007. 
This early procurement could lead to rework if relevant designs change 
prior to critical design review, causing program cost increases and 
schedule delays. According to the program office, long lead procurement 
is necessary to preserve the program schedule and delaying such 
procurement until after critical design review would cause the program 
schedule to slip. It also noted that the dollar amount of long lead 
procurement prior to critical design review is not large, at $65.9 
million. 

In addition, the program office has yet to determine the total number 
of design drawings needed to build the satellites. According to the 
program office, the development contract requires completion of 90 
percent of design drawings as a condition of conducting critical design 
review. 

Other Program Issues: 

DOD delayed the first MUOS satellite launch as well as its initial 
operational capability by 1 year to fiscal year 2010. Despite the 
delays, the MUOS schedule remains compressed and poses several risks to 
the program. For example, initial operational capability is to be 
declared before on-orbit operational testing is to occur. Usually, the 
results of such testing are used to support decisions for declaring 
operational capability and identifying problems that may necessitate 
design changes. Furthermore, the time period between the critical 
design review and the first satellite launch is shorter for the MUOS 
program, at about 2.7 years, than that of the previous UHF Follow-On 
program, at about 3 years. This schedule comparison is important given 
the significant leap in increased capability that MUOS is expected to 
provide. While the UHF Follow-On program increased communications 
capability by up to a factor of 3, the MUOS program is expected to 
increase communications capability by a factor of 20. The program 
office, however, considers the development of the satellite to be low 
risk. In addition, program officials stated that the initial 
operational capability was changed to mean initial MUOS on-orbit 
capability, and initial operational capability would be declared after 
on-orbit operational testing takes place. 

In addition, an independent program assessment states that the program 
is schedule-driven primarily because of the software development 
effort. According to the program office, software development for the 
MUOS ground segment represents one of the highest risks to the program 
due to the size and complexity of the contractor's design. The program 
office stated that the ground software segment is to be developed 
incrementally to mitigate schedule risk. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section]

MQ-9 Predator B: 

The Air Force's MQ-9 Predator B is a multirole, medium-to-high altitude 
endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at higher 
speeds and higher altitudes than its predecessor the MQ-1 Predator A. 
The Predator B is designed to provide a ground attack capability and 
will employ fused multispectral sensors to find and track small ground 
mobile or fixed targets. As envisioned, each Predator B system will 
consist of four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite 
communication suite. We assessed only the air vehicle. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 
Funding, FY05-FY09: 

R&D: $136.1 million; 
Procurement: $279.6 million; 
Total funding: $415.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 18. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 08/2004: $173.7. 

Procurement cost
Latest 08/2004: $452.3. 

Total program cost
Latest 08/2004: $626.1. 

Program unit cost
Latest 08/2004: $9.938. 

Total quantities
Latest 08/2004: 63. 

Acquisition cycle time (months)
Latest 08/2004: 70. 

[End of table]

Total program cost is not available. The latest baseline cost 
information is through fiscal year 2009. 

The Predator B entered system development in February 2004 with three 
of its four critical technologies mature. The fourth, needed for 
weapons launch, has not matured as expected. The Air Force expects this 
technology to be ready in August 2005--a slip of 13 months. No backup 
technology is available. If this technology fails to mature, it will 
prevent the Predator B from performing its primary mission to destroy 
enemy targets. The program recently changed to incrementally develop 
versions of the Predator B. The Air Force believes most drawings for 
increment one will be complete by the 2006 critical design review. The 
program has also concurrently started to produce Predator B aircraft, 
and operational testing is not scheduled to be complete until 2007 when 
one-third of them will be on contract. Concurrency increases the risk 
of redesign and need to retrofit already acquired system. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Predator B Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Three of the Predator B's four critical technologies, the synthetic 
aperture radar, the multispectral targeting system, and the air 
vehicle, are fully mature. The avionics subsystem technology designed 
to integrate and store data necessary to launch munitions is still 
being evaluated in a laboratory environment. It is expected to be ready 
by August 2005, a 13-month schedule slip. No backup technology is 
available. If this critical technology fails to mature, it will prevent 
the Predator B from performing its primary mission to destroy enemy 
targets. The Air Force plans to retrofit these and other air vehicles 
that are under production once this capability has been fully 
demonstrated. 

Design Stability: 

Subsequent to Milestone B approval in February 2004, the program office 
was directed by Headquarters Air Force to develop Predator B in three 
increments. DOD is in the process of defining the increments. The 
program office expects 94 percent of the expected increment one 
drawings to be completed by the April 2006 critical design review, 
which has been delayed about 7 months since our last report. Program 
officials acknowledge that additional drawings will be needed for 
subsequent increments. Design changes and modification of drawings are 
likely to occur late in development, increasing the need to retrofit 
already acquired systems. 

Production Maturity: 

Program officials said the contractor does not plan to use statistical 
process controls to ensure product quality. Instead, they plan to use 
other quality control measures such as scrap, rework, and repair to 
track product quality. Also, initial operational testing of increment 
one, which is to demonstrate a product is ready for production, is not 
scheduled to be complete until September 2007. Testing for remaining 
increments has not been determined. 

Other Program Issues: 

In February 2004, Headquarters Air Force directed the program office to 
quickly field an interim combat capability to the warfighter by fiscal 
year 2006. This delayed the start of the system development and 
demonstration phase by 9 months to November 2004. However, the Air 
Force is already concurrently on contract to produce 15 Predator Bs. 
The decision to make Predator B an incremental development program has 
also extended the completion of development by nearly 4 years. An 
incremental approach is the preferred approach to weapon acquisitions. 
However, the Air Force does not plan to have formal decisions approving 
entry into development for subsequent increments as required by DOD 
acquisition policy. To reduce the risks of concurrently developing and 
producing Predator Bs, the program office lowered annual buy quantities 
and extended production 5 years. The estimated program completion date 
is now 2014. 

The Air Force is still evaluating a variety of lightweight munitions 
for use on the Predator B. The Air Force is also weighing the 
possibility of adding new system capabilities such as launching very 
small or micro unmanned aerial vehicles from the Predator B and 
equipping it with air-to-air missiles. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force disagreed 
with our evaluation of the Predator B development risks. It stated that 
the stores management system technology is mature and that the system 
is being tested. It also noted that the existing weapons release system 
provides a backup capability. It also disagreed with our assessment 
that the Predator B development had been extended by 4 years. It stated 
that, as planned, the initial operational capability will follow the 
completion of the first increment in December 2009. Future increments 
are to be determined. Before starting future increments, the Air Force 
stated that proper approval will be obtained from the milestone 
decision authority. Also, its acquisition plan has phased production 
rates to the development effort, and the increased concurrent 
production before operational testing has been driven by congressional 
actions. 

GAO Comments: 

The program planned to deliver the full capability Predator B in 2006, 
but due to acquisition approach changes the full capability Predator B 
is now scheduled for delivery in 2010--a 4 year extension. 

[End of section]

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

NPOESS is a triagency National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), DOD, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
satellite program to monitor the weather and environment through the 
year 2020. Current NOAA and DOD satellites will be merged into a single 
national system. The program consists of five segments: space; command, 
control, and communications; interface data processing; launch; and 
field terminal software. We assessed all segments. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology; 
Program office: Silver Spring, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $3,027.5 million; 
Procurement: $1,182.3 million; 
Total funding: $4,209.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: 4. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 08/2002: $4,562.3; 
Latest 12/2003: $4,933.6; 
Percent change: 8.1%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 08/2002: $1,177.8; 
Latest 12/2003: $1,182.3; 
Percent change: 0.4%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 08/2002: $5,740.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $6,115.9; 
Percent change: 6.5%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 08/2002: $956.675; 
Latest 12/2003: $1,019.313; 
Percent change: 6.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 08/2002: 6; 
Latest 12/2003: 6; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 08/2002: 172; 
Latest 12/2003: 175; 
Percent change: 1.7%. 

[End of table]

In August 2002, the NPOESS program committed to the development of 
satellites with operational capability without having demonstrated 
technology maturity or design stability. Only 1 of its 14 critical 
technologies is mature. The program expects that all but 4 of these 
will be mature by the design review in April 2006. The program has 
released about half of its design drawings and expects to complete 
about 94 percent by design review. It is not collecting statistical 
process control data to assess production maturity because of the small 
number of units being produced. At present, the program office 
considers the three critical sensors to be key program risks because of 
technical challenges. Due to a recent program restructuring, the 
program office estimates that the cost of the program will increase to 
$8.1 billion. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

NPOESS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only 1 of the program's 14 critical technologies were (and currently 
are) mature at the production decision in August 2002. This is less 
than reported last year due to the program office's more accurate 
application of the technology standards. The program projects that all 
but 4 of the technologies will be mature by the design review in 2006. 

The program undertook the NPOESS Preparatory Project, a demonstration 
satellite, to reduce risk and provide a bridging mission for NASA's 
Earth Observing System. This satellite, scheduled for launch in 2006, 
is planned to demonstrate three critical sensors in an operational 
environment. This will provide data processing centers with an early 
opportunity to work with sensors, ground controls, and data processing 
systems and allow for incorporating lessons learned into the 
satellites. The three critical sensors are experiencing continued 
technical problems and schedule delays. The program office considers 
these sensors as top program risks. 

Design Stability: 

In August 2002, the program committed to the development of two 
satellites with operational capability before achieving design 
stability or production maturity. Program officials indicated that 
about 50 percent of the design drawings were released to manufacturing 
and expects to release about 94 percent by the design review in 2006. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because, according to the 
program office, it does not collect statistical process control data 
due to the small number of units to be built. However, the ground 
segment contractor uses various metrics such as schedule and cost 
performance indices, rework percentages, and defect containment to 
ensure production is proceeding as planned. According to the program 
office, monthly reviews of these metrics reveal acceptable results. 

Other Program Issues: 

In 2002, DOD extended the launch date of one of its legacy 
meteorological satellites to 2010, delaying the need for NPOESS. DOD 
and NOAA thus reduced their NPOESS funding by about $144 million 
through fiscal year 2007 and the program delayed the launch of the 
first satellite 7 months, to November 2009. 

The recent funding reductions prompted a restructuring of the NPOESS 
program. The program office estimates that the cost will increase to 
$8.1 billion. This increase reflects changes to the contract and 
increased program management costs. The program office reports that the 
increases include costs associated with extending the development 
schedule, increased sensor costs, and additional funds needed for 
mitigating risks. 

The program office is planning to present a new cost estimate to its 
executive oversight committee in January 2005 to ensure the program is 
adequately funded. Other factors could further affect the revised cost 
and schedule estimates. Specifically, the contractor is not meeting 
expected cost and schedule targets of the new baseline because of 
technical issues in the development of key sensors. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the program office stated that 
it lowered its technologies' maturity levels in September 2004 at our 
request. Program officials also commented that since the government can 
no longer afford full-up research and development satellites, few 
instruments can attain technology maturity and systems cannot achieve 
design stability or production maturity prior to entering full-scale 
development. The program office stated that it spent 5 years in the 
Preliminary Design and Risk Reduction phase driving down sensor and 
system risk, thereby significantly increasing the technology and sensor 
design maturity before entering the Acquisition and Operations phase in 
August 2002. It also noted that the current instrument problems 
highlighted above result from design/manufacturing process issues, 
which are not related to the listed critical technologies. 

GAO Comments: 

The NPOESS program's technology maturity levels were lowered because 
the program office more accurately applied the technology standards. In 
addition, these standards do not require the launch into space of a 
full-up research and development satellite in order to achieve full 
maturity. Rather, a representative model demonstrating the full 
functionality of the subsystems in a relevant environment is 
sufficient. 

[End of section]

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: 

The Air Force's SBIRS High program is a satellite system intended to 
provide missile warning information and to support the missile defense, 
technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization missions. It 
also is intended to replace the Defense Support Program and to consist 
of four satellites (plus one spare) in geosynchronous earth orbit 
(GEO), two sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), 
and associated fixed and mobile ground stations. We assessed the 
sensors and satellites only. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $3,126.4 million; 
Procurement: $1,421.2 million; 
Total funding: $5,164.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 3. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/1996: $3,758.9; 
Latest 06/2004: $7,497.4; 
Percent change: 99.5%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/1996: $0.0; 
Latest 06/2004: $1,517.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/1996: $3,948.0; 
Latest 06/2004: $9,866.7; 
Percent change: 149.9%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/1996: $789.601; 
Latest 06/2004: $1,973.330; 
Percent change: 149.9%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/1996: 5; 
Latest 06/2004: 5; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/1996: TBD; 
Latest 06/2004: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

Acquisition cycle time is now unknown because Air Force Space Command 
has not defined the initial operational capability. 

[End of table]

The SBIRS High program's critical technologies have demonstrated 
acceptable levels of maturity after many years of difficult 
development. The design is now mature since approximately 98 percent of 
the expected design drawings have been released. Production maturity 
could not be determined because the contractor does not collect 
statistical control data. In August 2004 the contractor delivered the 
first payload (the HEO 1 sensor) after a delay of 18 months. This 
created additional delays and cost increases. As a result, the program 
is again being replanned. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

SBIRS High Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The SBIRS High program's three critical technologies--the infrared 
sensor, thermal management, and on-board processor--are mature. Program 
officials indicated that the hardware was tested in a thermal vacuum 
chamber under expected flight conditions. These technologies were not 
mature at the start of development. 

Design Stability: 

The design of SBIRS High was not stable at the critical design review 
in August 2001 since only 30 percent of the expected design drawings 
had been released at that time. The design is now stable with about 98 
percent released. 

Design stability has been an issue for SBIRS High. The first HEO sensor 
was delivered in August 2004 after a delay of 18 months due to 
excessive electromagnetic interference (radio waves emitted by the 
sensor's electronics that interfered with the host satellite). The 
program office reports that it applied the knowledge gained from the 
design problems on this sensor to the second HEO sensor, which is now 
due for delivery in February 2005--a 13-month delay from the 
restructured schedule. Initial testing of the second sensor revealed 
one electromagnetic interference issue. The program office anticipates 
the approval of a waiver to this deviation. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the production maturity of SBIRS High because the 
contractor does not collect statistical process control data. However, 
the program office tracks and assesses production maturity through 
detailed monthly manufacturing and test data and monthly updates on 
flight hardware qualifications. In addition, the program office 
recently assigned detailed entrance criteria to all major manufacturing 
and test events. These criteria must be fully satisfied prior to 
program office approval to enter the specific event. According to the 
program office, this new "event-driven" philosophy will significantly 
improve insight into the maturity of the production process. 

Other Program Issues: 

The delayed delivery of the first HEO sensor affected cost and schedule 
for the remainder of the program. For example, resources needed for the 
second HEO sensor and GEO satellites were instead used on the first HEO 
sensor. The deliveries of the first two GEO satellites have now each 
been delayed by over a year (to April 2008 and April 2009). 

In May 2004, the program incurred a second Nunn-McCurdy breach (10 
U.S.C. 2433), this time at the 15 percent threshold. Since program 
delays and the extension of the contract through 2011 yielded a 
substantial funding shortfall, Congress increased the SBIRS High fiscal 
year 2005 budget by $91 million. The program office reports that future 
risks are being mitigated by addressing high-risk elements earlier in 
the development phase as well as earlier and more robust testing. It 
also plans to convene an independent review team in early 2005 to 
assess the program's progress and future risks. 

Because of the lag time between the procurement of the first two GEO 
satellites and the last three, the Air Force is able to consider 
upgrading the on-board processors for the GEO satellites 3-5. A revised 
acquisition program baseline will be submitted in March 2005 after a 
decision on this upgrade is finalized and the cost impact is 
determined. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Air Force stated that the 
February 2005 delivery of the second HEO sensor is well before the need 
date of mid-June 2005. It also noted that the GEO satellite's signal 
processor assembly power supply and the common gyro reference 
assemblies were integrated onto the payload structure (both are key 
steps toward the payload's first thermal vacuum test) and that GEO 
spacecraft testing has been successful in the early identification and 
mitigation of hardware/software integration issues before they become 
schedule critical path concerns. It also commented that the Defense 
Support Program-capable Multi-Mission Mobile Processors are in test and 
are on track for operational certification by December 2005 and that 
initial SBIRS High support to the Missile Defense Agency mission is in 
place. 

[End of section]

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB): 

The Air Force's SDB is a small autonomous, conventional, air-to-ground, 
precision bomb able to strike fixed and stationary targets. The weapon 
will be installed on the F-15E aircraft and is designed to work with 
other aircraft, such as the F/A-22. Potential follow-on capabilities, 
such as precision strike against moving targets, are being considered. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Eglin AFB, Fla. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $128.6 million; 
Procurement: $1,237.3 million; 
Total funding: $1,365.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 24,000. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2003: $382.7; 
Latest 07/2004: $382.3; 
Percent change: -0.1%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2003: $1,211.6; 
Latest 07/2004: $1,237.3; 
Percent change: 2.1%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2003: $1,594.2; 
Latest 07/2004: $1,619.5; 
Percent change: 1.6%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2003: $0.066; 
Latest 07/2004: $0.067; 
Percent change: 1.6%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2003: 24,070; 
24,070; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2003: 62; 
Latest 07/2004: 61; 
Percent change: -1.6%. 

[End of table]

The six critical technologies for the SDB appear mature, and the design 
is stable. The program office held the design review prior to starting 
system development and, although data were not collected, the program 
maintains that the contractor released over 90 percent of the 
production drawings. In 2004, the program began a test program, which 
combines developmental, live fire, and operational testing, in an 
effort to decrease time spent in system development. Although the first 
three flight tests were successful, this concurrent approach may 
increase program risks. A low-rate production decision is expected to 
be made in April 2005. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

SDB Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The program office assessed all six critical technologies for the SDB 
as mature. The technologies are the airframe, the Anti-Jam Global 
Positioning System, the fuze, the Inertial Navigation System, the 
carriage, and warhead. Program officials stated that many of the 
program's critical technologies were demonstrated in a free-flight 
environment. They also stated that they have flight-tested the system 
with the properly sized components. 

Design Stability: 

The design review was held prior to the start of system development 
and, although data were not collected, the program office maintains 
that Boeing released over 90 percent of the production drawings. 
According to the program office, although the contractor has ultimate 
responsibility for the weapon system and has given the government a 20-
year "bumper to bumper" warranty, the program office has insight into 
the contractor's configuration control board process and all changes 
are coordinated with the government. 

The SDB program began a program of developmental, live fire, and 
operational testing in 2004. This combined testing approach is designed 
to eliminate or reduce redundant testing. However, this process could 
expose the program to additional risk of design changes, as there may 
be more concurrency between system developmental and operational tests 
than there would be under a traditional test program. As of the date of 
this review, 3 of 16 planned flight tests had been conducted, each 
meeting its objectives. These flight tests were conducted with live 
fuzes but not with live warheads. Eleven of the 16 flight tests are 
planned to be conducted prior to the low-rate production decision 
point. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because statistical process 
control data were not available. In developing the SDB, Boeing used 
many key components that are common with the Joint Direct Attack 
Munition (JDAM). The SDB production line will be colocated in the same 
facility used to produce the JDAM. According to program officials, the 
production line layout is very similar to the processes currently used 
for the JDAM. As of the date of this review, no critical manufacturing 
processes that impact the critical system characteristics had been 
identified. A low-rate production decision is expected to be made in 
April 2005. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred 
with the information presented and provided technical comments, which 
were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section]

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 

MDA's STSS element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks designed to track enemy missiles throughout their flight. The 
initial increment is composed of two demonstration satellites built 
under the Space Based Infrared System Low program. MDA plans to launch 
these satellites in 2007 to assess how well they work within the 
context of the missile defense system. MDA is also studying 
improvements to the STSS program, and it will be building next 
generation satellites. We assessed the two demonstration satellites. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $870.7 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $870.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
Latest 02/2004: $3,320.4. 

Procurement cost; 
Latest 02/2004: $0.0. 

Total program cost; 
Latest 02/2004: $3,320.4. 

Program unit cost; 
Latest 02/2004: TBD. 

Total quantities; 
Latest 02/2004: 2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
Latest 02/2004: TBD. 

Latest column includes all costs and quantities from the program's 
inception through fiscal year 2009, but excludes data on the next 
generation satellites. 

[End of table]

Four of the STSS program's five critical technologies are mature, and 
the remaining technology is expected to reach maturity in March or 
April 2005. The STSS design appears stable, with all drawings released 
to manufacturing. However, until all STSS technologies demonstrate 
maturity, the potential for design changes remains. The program is 
currently in the process of conducting system level assembly, 
integration, and testing activities and software development. Until 
that work is complete, certain risk areas, such as payload hardware and 
software integration, will remain. Additionally, a number of systemic 
quality and systems engineering problems with the payload have 
persisted. Despite these issues, the program office still expects early 
delivery and launch of the satellites. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

STSS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Four of five critical technologies--satellite communication cross-
links, on-board processor, acquisition sensor, and track sensor--are 
mature. The acquisition sensor reached maturity in October 2004 (a 
month later than reported last year) when the thermal vacuum testing 
was completed. The track sensor reached maturity in December 2004 when 
the payload for the first satellite completed thermal vacuum testing, 
which is 3 months later than reported last year. The single-stage 
cryocooler will be mature when the payload for the first satellite 
completes thermal vacuum testing in March or April 2005--about 15 
months earlier than reported previously. Last year the program had a 
sixth technology, the two-stage cryocooler, but it is no longer 
considered critical and will not be used on the first increment of the 
STSS program. 

Design Stability: 

The STSS program's design is stable, with all drawings released to 
manufacturing. When the STSS program started in 2002, design drawings 
and the satellite components for the partially built satellites from 
the Space Based Infrared System Low effort were released to 
manufacturing. By the time STSS went through its design review in 
November 2003, the program office had released all subsequent design 
drawings. However, until the maturity of the STSS technologies has been 
demonstrated, the potential for design changes remains. 

Other Program Issues: 

The STSS program is in the process of completing the assembly, 
integration, and testing of the satellite components and software 
development. Until that work is complete, certain risk areas will 
remain. Some of these include complex infrared payload hardware and 
software integration; completion of the ground segment and infrared 
sensor software development and testing; modifications to the tracking 
sensor, system integration and testing; and handling issues related to 
parts obsolescence. 

In addition, the payload subcontractor has had a number of systemic 
quality and systems engineering problems. These problems have continued 
for the last year and have contributed to some cost and schedule 
overruns on the payload subcontract. The quality and engineering 
problems are the result of the subcontractor's lack of experience and 
systems engineering procedures that are not clearly written. In 
response, the prime contractor reviewed the subcontractor's quality 
program. During this time, there was a 2-month stoppage of work at the 
subcontractor facility and the majority of the subcontractor's effort 
was concentrated on resolving failures noted during assembly, 
integration, and testing of the satellite components. When work 
restarted at the facility, the subcontractor continued to encounter 
difficulties in assembling the sensors and preparing the appropriate 
test equipment needed for sensor-level testing. Based on these factors 
and the significant remaining tasks, the prime contractor stepped up 
its presence at the subcontractor's facility. In addition, the 
subcontractor added technicians who have more experience working with 
space hardware and brought in systems engineers to work with the 
technicians. 

Despite these issues, the program office still expects the prime 
contractor to deliver and launch the satellites earlier than the 
contract date of July 2007. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA generally concurred 
with our assessment and provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section]

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

MDA's THAAD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks to provide a ground-based missile defense system able to defend 
against short-and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD will 
include missiles, a launcher, an X-band radar, and a command and 
control/battle management system. We assessed the design for the Block 
2006 initial capability of one fire unit that MDA plans to hand off to 
the Army for concurrent operation and testing in fiscal year 2009. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $3,461.7 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $3,461.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: TBD. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 9/2003: $10,909.5; 
Latest 08/2004: $11,273.3; 
Percent change: 3.3%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 9/2003: $0.0; 
Latest 08/2004: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 9/2003: $10,909.5; 
Latest 08/2004: $11,273.3; 
Percent change: 3.3%. 

Program unit cost: TBD. 

Total quantities: TBD. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): TBD. 

Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be 
determined. 

[End of table]

Program officials assess THAAD's technologies as mature and its design 
as generally stable. The technology assessments, however, are sometimes 
based on tests of earlier component designs. The design of Block 2006, 
which is expected to provide a limited operational capability, is a 
further maturation of THAAD's Block 2004 design. While 91 percent of 
the Block 2004 engineering drawings have been released, the total 
number of drawings for the 2006 capability could increase if problems 
are identified in flight tests scheduled to begin early next year. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

THAAD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials assess all of THAAD's critical technologies as 
mature. These technologies are included in four major components: the 
command, control, and battle management component; the interceptor; the 
launcher; and the radar. 

After experiencing early test failures, program officials made changes 
in the execution of the THAAD program that allowed it to make progress 
in maturing critical technologies. Officials placed more emphasis on 
risk reduction efforts, including adopting technology readiness levels 
to assess technological maturity. 

Design Stability: 

THAAD's basic design is nearing completion, with approximately 91 
percent of the expected engineering drawings released for the basic 
design that is expected to provide the initial capability. However, the 
THAAD Program Office reported a decrease in the percentage of drawings 
released this year (91 percent) compared to the percentage reported 
last year (100 percent). In 2003, the program reported that it had 
released all of the expected 9,852 drawings. However, as the design 
matured, the program office recognized that 11,221 engineering drawings 
would be required and that it had released only 10,221 of those 
drawings. The number of drawings increased as information was gained 
from testing, the design of experimental items was completed, existing 
drawings were revised, and as new subcomponents were needed to replace 
obsolete ones. The program office successfully conducted a design 
review in December 2003. However, if problems are identified during 
flight testing, the number of drawings may increase as the design 
matures during Block 2006. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess THAAD's production maturity because MDA does not know 
when it will transition THAAD to the Army for production. The one fire 
unit that will be handed off to the Army in 2009 for limited 
operational use is considered to be primarily a test asset. Prior to a 
production decision, the program office plans to assess production 
maturity using Baseline Manufacturing Readiness Risk Assessments and 
Block Process Verification Reviews for assurance of the contractor's 
readiness to proceed with repeatable processes and quality. 

Other Program Issues: 

Although the THAAD program has implemented many procedures to reduce 
program risk, it continues to encounter some problems. For example, the 
program experienced a major workmanship problem in a shelter subsystem 
within the command, control, and battle management component. In 
addition, an explosion at the Pratt & Whitney propellant mix facility 
is causing the program to seek an alternate source. The program 
office's risk assessment states "source replacements have the potential 
for delaying booster delivery during the flight test program and into 
production."

MDA officials are examining whether one THAAD component can be deployed 
early. Officials are assessing whether a THAAD-like radar can serve as 
a forward-deployed radar for the Ballistic Missile Defense System. 
Development, customization, and testing of the radar under another MDA 
program have begun in an effort to provide this capability within the 
next 2 years. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, MDA provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section]

Tactical Tomahawk Missile: 

The Navy's Tactical Tomahawk Block IV will allow ships and submarines 
to attack land targets. Program officials say it incorporates new 
subsystem features like an improved antijamming global positioning 
system, in-flight retargeting, and transmission of imagery prior to 
impact. They also said it will have greater reliability and its average 
per unit cost will be $729,000 versus the $1.4 million of its 
predecessor. The Block IV includes the missile, the weapon control 
system, and the mission planning system. We assessed only the missile. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $0.0 million; 
Procurement: $1,737.5 million; 
Total funding: $1,737.5 million; 
Procurement quantity: 2,055. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 09/1997: $567.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $609.8; 
Percent change: 7.5%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 09/1997: $1,250.4; 
Latest 12/2003: $2,604.1; 
Percent change: 108.3%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 09/1997: $1,817.5; 
Latest 12/2003: $3,213.8; 
Percent change: 76.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 09/1997: $1.331; 
Latest 12/2003: $1.152; 
Percent change: -13.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 09/1997: 1,365; 
Latest 12/2003: 2,790; 
Percent change: 104.4%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 09/1997: 58; 
Latest 12/2003: 71; 
Percent change: 22.4%. 

[End of table]

The Tactical Tomahawk Block IV program entered low-rate production and 
awarded its full-rate production contract without the knowledge needed 
to ensure its production processes were in control but with mature 
technology and design knowledge. The program received its first low-
rate production missile in May 2004. Other missiles such as those used 
in operational testing, while production representative, were mostly 
put together one at a time, so their manufacture was insufficient for 
collecting statistical data necessary for process control. Officials 
did not expect that the program would produce and test sufficient 
missile quantities to have the necessary knowledge about its production 
processes until sometime during March or April of 2005. Delivery of its 
first full-rate production missiles in January 2006 depends on 
completing substantial testing/verification. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Tomahawk Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess the readiness level of the key technologies for the 
Tactical Tomahawk Block IV because its subsystems were derivative from 
other programs or upgrades to preexisting subsystems. Therefore, 
according to program officials, the critical technologies for the 
missile's key subsystems like the antijamming global positioning 
system, the digital scene matching area correlator, and the cruise 
engine were already mature. 

Design Stability: 

The design of the Tactical Tomahawk missile is complete. At the design 
review in June 2000, about 47 percent of the drawings had been released 
to manufacturing. By the end of technical evaluation in October 2003, 
100 percent of the drawings had been released. Technical evaluation was 
successfully completed, and the program entered operational evaluation 
in December 2003. Operational evaluation was completed in 2004, and the 
missile was judged operationally effective and suitable. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the production maturity of the Tactical Tomahawk 
Block IV missile because program officials said statistical process 
data needed for production maturity were not available. Although the 
Block IV uses much existing technology to reduce costs, the technology 
is arranged inside the missile in a new manner. The new layout makes 
the production process sufficiently different enough that it requires 
development of new production processes and statistical controls. 
Officials said the program had not yet produced and tested sufficient 
missile quantities to attain this statistical control information. 
Tomahawk officials currently project the program will obtain production 
maturity prior to January 2006. 

The Navy's Operational Test and Evaluation Force judged the missile 
operationally suitable and effective for combat operations but also 
recommended review of quality assurance processes. Prior to this 
recommendation, the program had engaged outside experts to conduct a 
quality audit. The audit team concluded the audited facilities would 
consistently supply material to meet the program's requisite product 
and process capability requirements. The team also noted opportunities 
for improvement in areas like statistical process control. Officials 
said a follow-up Navy/Raytheon (the prime contractor) review indicated 
that progress had been made in all areas identified for improvement. 
They also said Raytheon had contracted for ongoing outside support for 
implementation of quality initiatives. 

Other Program Issues: 

At the time of our review, a full-rate 5-year production contract had 
been awarded, with the multiyear feature designed to provide earliest 
replenishment of inventory at lowest cost. Full-rate production is 
planned for fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2008. 

Agency Comments: 

Commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. It also noted that 
all Block IV production processes have been fully defined and are 
maturing. 

[End of section]

Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT): 

The Air Force's TSAT system is designed to provide survivable, jam-
resistant, global, secure, and general-purpose laser cross-links with 
other air and space systems, including the planned AEHF satellite 
system, reviewed elsewhere in this report. TSAT will serve as the 
cornerstone of a new DOD communications infrastructure by providing 
high bandwidth connectivity to the warfighter. The system consists of a 
constellation of five satellites, plus a sixth satellite to ensure 
mission availability. We assessed the six satellites. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, 
Booz Allen Hamilton; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $12,012.7 million; 
Procurement: $3,576.1 million; 
Total funding: $15,663.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 4. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 01/2004: $12,463.7; 
Latest 06/2004: $12,463.7; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 01/2004: $3,576.1; 
Latest 06/2004: $3,576.1; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 01/2004: $16,114.6; 
Latest 06/2004: $16,114.6; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 01/2004: $2,685.771; 
Latest 06/2004: $2,685.771; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 01/2004: 6; 
Latest 06/2004: 6; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 01/2004: 117; 
Latest 06/2004: 122; 
Percent change: 4.3%. 

In 2004 we reported a total quantity of 10 satellites, including 4 
replenishment satellites. The approved quantity is currently 6 
satellites. 

[End of table]

TSAT entered the risk reduction and design development phase in January 
2004 with only one of its seven critical technologies mature. The 
program expects to demonstrate technology maturity but not design 
stability or production maturity before awarding a contract to acquire 
operational satellites in 2006. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

TSAT Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The TSAT program is in the risk reduction and design development phase, 
with only one of its seven critical technologies mature. The program is 
being developed in two increments--six of the technologies are 
associated with the first increment and all seven are associated with 
the second increment. 

Of the six technologies associated with the first increment, only one 
technology--the packet processing payloads--is mature. The other five-
-communication-on-the-move nulling antenna, dynamic bandwidth and 
resource allocation technologies, protected bandwidth efficient 
modulation waveforms, information assurance, and single access laser 
communications--are scheduled to reach maturity in early 2006, about 2 
years after the start of development. The single access laser 
communications has no backup technology, and according to program 
officials, any delay in maturing this technology will cause the 
expected first satellite launch date to slip beyond 2012. 

The seventh critical technology, the multiaccess laser communications, 
is part of the second increment. It will not reach maturity until the 
production decision for the last four operational satellites in 2008, 
about 4 years after the planned start of development. 

Other Program Issues: 

Unlike current communications satellites, TSAT will be equipped with 
laser-optical payloads for high-capacity links to other air and space 
platforms. AEHF will depend on the first TSAT satellite, now scheduled 
for launch by the end of 2012, to provide full global coverage. Because 
military users are concerned with the aggressive acquisition strategy, 
the Air Force scheduled an interim review point for November 2004 to 
determine whether the technology development had progressed 
sufficiently to meet the required launch date and decided to continue 
with both AEHF and TSAT development. A second interim review point is 
scheduled for November 2005, at which point the Air Force must decide 
on alternatives, one of which is to buy an additional AEHF satellite. 
Air Force officials are in the process of defining the evaluation 
criteria they intend to use to assess TSAT's progress or identify 
alternatives. 

TSAT is currently being rebaselined as a result of a congressional 
reduction totaling $300 million in research and development funding for 
fiscal year 2005. The defense authorization conference report indicated 
that funding was reduced because of continuing concerns related to the 
risk of the current acquisition approach. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that, 
based on commercial and DOD best practices, all TSAT technologies meet, 
or exceed, the level of maturity appropriate for the current risk 
reduction and design development phase and that this phase provides the 
data (technology readiness and design maturity) necessary for a 
production contract award. It also commented that all key technologies 
are on schedule to achieve maturity 10 months prior to Preliminary 
Design Review and that, to further reduce risk, TSAT has backup 
technologies in all areas in the event that a technology is not ready. 
It noted that the backup technologies would still provide a large 
increase in warfighter capability and allow for technologies to be used 
on later TSAT satellites. It also noted that to be effective, risk 
reduction and preliminary design must be done concurrently and 
iteratively. If not, the program risks maturing technology that does 
not support the system design, resulting in scrap and rework. It 
believes that this strategy delivers the greatest warfighter capability 
at minimum risk and cost. 

GAO Comments: 

Our prior work has shown that technologies should demonstrate a high 
level of maturity before starting development to reduce the risk of 
cost, schedule, and performance problems. Although the program started 
development a year ago, we found that several critical technologies had 
demonstrated very low levels of maturity involving analytical studies 
and the demonstration of nonscale individual components in a laboratory 
environment. 

[End of section]

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft: 

The V-22 Osprey is a tilt rotor, vertical takeoff and landing aircraft 
being developed by the Navy for Joint Service application. It is 
designed to meet the amphibious/vertical assault needs of the Marine 
Corps, the strike rescue needs of the Navy, and the special operations 
needs of the Air Force and the U.S. Special Operations Command. The MV-
22 version will replace the CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters of the Marine 
Corps. We assessed the MV-22 Block A, which has been undergoing changes 
to make it safe and operational. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Bell-Boeing JPO; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $654.3 million; 
Procurement: $27,314.7 million; 
Total funding: $27,997.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 386. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/1986: $3,647.9; 
Latest 12/2003: $10,723.7; 
Percent change: 194.0%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/1986: $30,591.3; 
Latest 12/2003: $35,518.0; 
Percent change: 16.1%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/1986: $34,442.5; 
Latest 12/2003: $46,293.8; 
Percent change: 34.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/1986: $37.724; 
Latest 12/2003: $101.078; 
Percent change: 167.9%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/1986: 913; 
Latest 12/2003: 458; 
Percent change: -49.8%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/1986: 117; 
Latest 12/2003: 288; 
Percent change: 146.2%. 

[End of table]

MV-22 Block A technologies are mature and the design is considered 
stable. Problems identified during recent tests are expected to be 
resolved prior to the next operational test, according to program 
officials. Some redesign efforts have been identified as candidates for 
preplanned product improvements. Parts issues and delayed reporting of 
test results could delay the operational performance certification 
needed to increase production in fiscal year 2006. Decisions on whether 
to lift current flight restrictions, prior to the completion of 
operational evaluation, will be made on a case-by-case basis. Recent 
tests found interoperability and human factors as high-risk issues that 
may impact this evaluation. Also, the contractors were asked to propose 
cost reduction initiatives targeted at reducing aircraft unit cost to 
$58 million by fiscal year 2010. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

V-22 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Although we did not assess the MV-22's technology maturity, the program 
office states that based on DOD criteria, the Block A technologies are 
mature. During recently completed limited operational tests, technology 
maturity was assessed in a range of environmental conditions. Program 
officials state that problems were identified and corrective plans 
implemented to insure a successful operational test and evaluation 
assessment. 

Design Stability: 

Design for Block A is considered stable. However, additional changes to 
later blocks of the aircraft have been identified. These changes 
include redesign of the forward cabin; redesign of the rear cabin 
seating, which is considered inadequate for combat equipped troops; 
redesign of a extendable tube for fuel jettison operations; and 
enhancements to improve wheel brake control and effectiveness. 

Production Maturity: 

Process management is becoming more robust at the final assembly site 
on each major fixture assembly using Six Sigma. Program officials point 
to the delivery of aircraft as an indication of manufacturing maturity. 

An independent review assessed a V-22 parts problem at one of the 
contractors' plants that could affect its ability to support full-rate 
production and concluded that in the near term they believe the current 
parts shortage could be addressed with heroics. However, the team and 
program officials are concerned with the institutionalization of long-
term process improvements and recommended development of a plan that 
addresses both short-term part shortages and implementation of a full-
rate production plan. 

The Navy plans to increase annual production of the aircraft starting 
in fiscal year 2006, provided the Secretary of Defense certifies to 
Congress that the program successfully completed operational testing by 
demonstrating several capabilities related to V-22 safety, 
effectiveness, maintainability, and reliability (Section 123, Pub. Law 
107-107, Dec. 28, 2001) through operational test. The certification 
would allow the program to increase annual production above the current 
minimum sustaining rate. Program officials are concerned that the 
certification cannot be done before completion of the fiscal year 2006 
budget process and, as a result, the request to increase production may 
not be granted. 

Other Program Issues: 

The V-22 is currently being tested with operating limits, such as 
defensive combat maneuver capability. Decisions on whether to relax or 
remove specific restrictions will be made on a case-by-case basis prior 
to the completion of operational evaluation in June 2005. The decisions 
on these restrictions will impact the result of the upcoming 
operational assessment. A recently completed limited assessment 
concluded that out of 16 critical operational issues, 2 were at high 
risk and 6 at medium risk of not achieving a satisfactory resolution 
during upcoming operational testing. The high-risk issues are 
interoperability and human factors. The medium-risk issues are 
reliability, availability, logistics support, compatibility, 
documentation, and diagnostics. Recently, the program requested that 
the contractor submit a proposal for combining cost reduction 
initiatives to reduce the aircraft unit price to a target price of $58 
million in fiscal year 2010. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the V-
22 Joint Program Office continues to execute a disciplined, event-
driven test and program schedule. It noted that since returning to 
flight in 2003, the V-22 has flown over 4,000 hours, both in 
development and operational tests. It also stated that the Block A V-22 
has demonstrated reliability and maintainability on par with fleet 
aircraft and that multiship sorties and operations have been 
demonstrated for nearly all missions. It further commented that the 
range and speed capability of the V-22 has spawned new tactics and 
realized logistics efficiencies that will reduce time, resources and 
save lives. 

The Navy also stated that it remains committed to fielding a V-22 
weapon system when it is tested and ready and noted that a talented 
team of government and industry professionals champions the 
transformational capability that the V-22 brings and is committed to 
its success. It further stated that the test and training programs will 
continue to ensure operators and maintainers are ready and capable from 
day one to ensure the warfighter has the best equipment with the best 
information. 

[End of section]

Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS): 

WGS is a joint Air Force and Army program intended to provide essential 
communications services to U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition 
partners during all levels of conflict short of nuclear war. It is the 
next generation wideband component in DOD's future Military Satellite 
Communications architecture and is composed of the following principal 
segments: space segment (satellites), terminal segment (users), and 
control segment (operators). We assessed the space segment. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Satellite Systems; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $61.8 million; 
Procurement: $660.9 million; 
Total funding: $722.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 2. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2000: $183.7; 
Latest 12/2003: $228.2; 
Percent change: 24.2%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2000: $840.6; 
Latest 12/2003: $1,293.1; 
Percent change: 53.8%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2000: $1,024.2; 
Latest 12/2003: $1,521.3; 
Percent change: 48.5%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2000: $341.412; 
Latest 12/2003: $304.262; 
Percent change: -10.9%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2000: 3; 
Latest 12/2003: 5; 
Percent change: 66.7%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2000: 50; 
Latest 12/2003: 75; 
Percent change: 50.0%. 

[End of table]

The WGS program's technology, design, and production are now mature. 
Manufacturing problems did contribute to a delay in the launch of the 
first WGS satellite by almost 2 years. The program office is increasing 
its oversight of the contractor to help rectify these issues and 
believes the problems have been resolved. A decision to procure the 
fourth and fifth satellites is expected to add millions of dollars to 
the program's cost, but the program office will not know the cost of 
these satellites until it receives a proposal from the contractor. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

WGS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

WGS has two technologies that are vital to program success: the digital 
channelizer and the phased array antenna. According to program 
officials, both technologies were mature when the program entered 
production in November 2000. 

Design Stability: 

The WGS design is essentially complete, as the program office has 
released over 97 percent of the expected drawings to manufacturing. 
Last year we reported that the contractor had problems integrating the 
antenna into the satellite because experience the contractor expected 
to gain on commercial satellite orders did not materialize. The 
integration problems have since been resolved, and testing of the 
antenna engineering models demonstrated that the design worked as 
required. 

Production Maturity: 

Due to the commercial nature of the WGS acquisition contract, the 
program office does not have access to production process control data. 
Despite not being able to access these data to determine production 
maturity, unit level manufacturing for WGS is essentially complete, as 
all units have been manufactured and delivered for the first satellite. 
The contractor continues to experience difficulties in manufacturing 
one of the components of the phased array antenna, making the antenna 
production the top risk to the program. Approximately 254 of these 
antenna components were being built when thin cracks in the copper 
striplines were noticed during inspection. An early analysis showed 
that poor handling procedures of inexperienced personnel contributed to 
the cracks, and a screening test revealed that inconsistencies in the 
thickness of the copper trace used to build the striplines were also to 
blame. The contractor replaced all the flawed striplines with properly 
manufactured parts and implemented additional process controls. In 
resolving these production issues, program officials stated that they 
inspected the manufacturing facilities, reviewed test plans and 
procedures, started screening parts, and now hold monthly program 
reviews with the contractor. Manufacturing problems with the phased 
array antenna contributed to delaying the launch of the first WGS 
satellite by almost 2 years. As a result of the delay, the Air Force 
revised its acquisition strategy program baseline, which was approved 
in February 2004. 

Other Program Issues: 

In December 2002, DOD directed the addition of WGS satellites four and 
five, with launch dates of fiscal years 2009 and 2010, respectively. 
Therefore, the current contract options must be extended and 
renegotiated to cover the cost of the likely 2-to 3-year production gap 
between satellites three and four. The cost estimate for the additional 
satellites has grown because of a greater than anticipated effect of 
parts obsolescence and loss of manufacturing knowledge to be gained 
during the production of the first three satellites. In addition, the 
production costs of the first three satellites have been higher than 
expected. The procurement of satellites four and five is expected to 
add millions of dollars to the cost of the WGS program, but the exact 
amount will not be known until the program office receives a proposal 
from the contractor. Negotiation for the two satellites is to begin in 
the second half of fiscal year 2006. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that even though manufacturing process information is unavailable, it 
believes the production knowledge of WGS is mature based upon 
similarities to the contractor's commercial communications satellites. 
In addition, the delays experienced in the delivery of the first 
satellite were primarily due to inadequate adherence to manufacturing 
and quality assurance standards at subcontractor facilities rather than 
production knowledge immaturity. 

[End of section]

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T): 

WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone 
communications network. It is to provide reliable, secure, and seamless 
video, data, imagery, and voice services, allowing users to communicate 
simultaneously at various levels of security. The network is to have 
the ability to be initialized and modified based upon unit task 
organization. It is to connect Army units with higher levels of command 
and provide Army's tactical portion of the Global Information Grid. WIN-
T is being fielded in blocks. We assessed the first block. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics Government Systems Corp. 
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, N.J. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $586.8 million; 
Procurement: $9,634.7 million; 
Total funding: $10,221.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 1. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 07/2003: $730.3; 
Latest 12/2003: $730.3; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 07/2003: $9,392.7; 
Latest 12/2003: $9,634.7; 
Percent change: 2.6%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 07/2003: $10,123.0; 
Latest 12/2003: $10,365.0; 
Percent change: 2.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 07/2003: $10,123.037; 
Latest 12/2003: $10,365.008; 
Percent change: 2.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 07/2003: 1; 
Latest 12/2003: 1; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 07/2003: 78; 
Latest 12/2003: 78; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

[End of table]

WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies 
close to full maturity. None of the technologies will be fully mature 
at the time production begins in March 2006. Eight have backup 
technologies available, but only three of these are fully mature, and 
use of backup technologies would degrade system overall robustness and 
capabilities. Due to significant interdependencies among critical 
technologies, and the fact that some determine network functionality, 
it may not be possible to demonstrate that those technologies are fully 
mature until after production begins. Design stability could not be 
assessed because the program office does not track the number of 
releasable drawings. WIN-T is primarily an information technology 
system integration effort rather than a manufacturing effort. 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

WIN-T Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies 
close to reaching full maturity. While program officials do not expect 
these technologies to reach full maturity until the network is built 
and can be demonstrated in an operational environment, they do expect 
the technologies to have been demonstrated in a simulated operational 
environment by the time the critical design review is held in September 
2005. An independent Army technology readiness assessment determined 
that WIN-T would enter system development prior to full definition of 
the first block's design and specific technology-based components, 
systems, or subsystems. WIN-T will include technologies such as mobile 
and static communications nodes, network operations and support 
centers, transmission relays, joint gateway nodes, points of presence 
for future force and command elements, vehicular wireless packages, 
airborne wireless communication packages, and personal communications 
devices. 

Design Stability: 

Design stability could not be assessed because the program office does 
not plan to track the number of releasable drawings as a design metric. 
According to the program, WIN-T is not a manufacturing effort, but 
primarily an information technology system integration effort. 
Consequently, the government does not obtain releasable design drawings 
for many of WIN-T's components, particularly commercial components. The 
WIN-T design will evolve using performance-based specifications and 
open systems design, and it is to conform to DOD's Joint Technical 
Architecture. 

Other Program Issues: 

Among other issues, the program will need to pay close attention to the 
interdependent nature of the WIN-T, FCS, and JTRS programs, the 
interrelationship between WIN-T and FCS and Global Information Grid 
requirements, the scalability of WIN-T, the challenge of linking all 
the nodes and networks of the Army's system-of-systems, and the 
coordination of unmanned relay programs with FCS. The program will also 
have to track external factors that will impact WIN-T such as the DOD 
Net-Centric Data Strategy. WIN-T deployment will be essential for FCS 
deployment and as each system evolves, integration demonstrations will 
need to be performed to ensure WIN-T and FCS interoperability. 

In addition, a major revision to the WIN-T acquisition strategy is 
underway. WIN-T was originally envisioned to support the Army's Future 
Force. However, the global war on terrorism and the lessons learned 
from recent military operations have shifted the Army's focus toward 
providing WIN-T capabilities sooner. To accomplish this, DOD, in 
September, approved a decision to combine the competing contractor 
teams for WIN-T's system design and development. The two originally 
competing contractors are now teaming to establish a single 
architecture for WIN-T that, according to the revised acquisition 
strategy, will leverage each contractor's proposed architecture to 
provide the Army with a superior technical solution for WIN-T. 
Establishing the single WIN-T architecture a year earlier than 
originally planned is expected to allow other Army programs to begin to 
follow that architecture for near-term force procurements and build on 
that architecture for the Future Force. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army noted that, as a 
result of merging the two competing prime contractors under a new 
acquisition strategy, the "best of breed" critical technologies will be 
used in the updated WIN-T architecture. This new strategy is also 
expected to increase the range of available technical products and 
developing technologies, thereby lowering the risk of maturing critical 
technologies for production and fielding. The Army also provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD did not provide general comments on a draft of this report, but it 
did provide technical comments. These comments, along with agency 
comments received on the individual assessments, were included as 
appropriate. (See app. I for a copy of DOD's response.)

Scope of Our Review: 

For the 54 programs, each assessment provides the historical and 
current program status and offers the opportunity to take early 
corrective action when a program's projected attainment of knowledge 
diverges significantly from the best practices. The assessments also 
identify programs that are employing practices worthy of emulation by 
other programs. If a program is attaining the desired levels of 
knowledge, it has less risk--but not zero risk--of future problems. 
Likewise, if a program shows a gap between demonstrated knowledge and 
best practices, it indicates an increased risk--not a guarantee--of 
future problems. The real value of the assessments is recognizing gaps 
early, which provides opportunities for constructive intervention--such 
as adjustments to schedule, trade-offs in requirements, and additional 
funding--before cost and schedule consequences mount. 

We selected programs for the assessments based on several factors, 
including (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and (3) 
congressional interest. The majority of the 54 programs covered in this 
report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. A 
program is defined as major if its estimated research and development 
costs exceed $365 million or its procurement exceeds $2.19 billion in 
fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. (See app. II for details of the 
scope and methodology.)

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. 
We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions on this report, please contact me at (202) 
512-4841 or Paul Francis at (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Katherine V. Schinasi: 
Managing Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable John W. Warner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 
ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS: 

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON: 
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000: 

MAR 07 2005: 

Mr. Paul Francis: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Francis: 

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report, 
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, dated 
February 11, 2005 (GAO Code 120350/GAO-05-301). We have enclosed 
technical comments to ensure accuracy. These comments should be 
reflected in the final report and in the individual program summaries. 
My point of contact is Mr. Skip Hawthorne, (703) 692-9556, or e-mail: 
skip.hawthorne@osd.mil. 

Sincerely,

Signed for: 

Deidre A. Lee: 

Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy: 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

[End of section]

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and risk data from 
each of the programs included in this report. We summarized our 
assessments of each individual program in two components--a system 
profile and a product knowledge assessment. We did not validate the 
data provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). However, we took 
several steps to address data quality. Specifically, we reviewed the 
data and performed various quality checks, which revealed some 
discrepancies in the data. We discussed the underlying data and these 
discrepancies with program officials and adjusted the data accordingly. 
We determined that the data provided by DOD were sufficiently reliable 
for our engagement purposes, after reviewing DOD's management controls 
for assessing data reliability. 

Macro Analysis: 

Data for major defense acquisition program research, development, test, 
and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement funding in figure 1 were 
obtained from DOD's selected acquisition reports or from data obtained 
directly from the program offices and then aggregated across programs 
between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2009. Data used to assess the 
fiscal year 2005 RDT&E and procurement funding plan were drawn from the 
2003 selected acquisition reports or obtained directly from the program 
office. For the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) programs for which a 
baseline was not available, we used the latest available cost 
information. 

To assess the total cost, schedule, and quantity changes of the 
programs included in our assessment, it was necessary to identify those 
programs with all of the requisite data available. Of the 54 programs 
in our assessment, 26 programs constituted the common set of programs 
where data were available for cost, schedule, and quantity at the first 
full estimate, generally milestone B, and the latest estimate. Data 
utilized in this analysis were drawn from information contained in 
selected acquisition reports or data provided by program offices as of 
January 14, 2005. We summed the costs associated with RDT&E and total 
costs consisting of research, development testing and evaluation, 
procurement, military construction, and acquisition operation and 
maintenance. The data were also used for a comparison between the 2004 
assessment period and the 2005 assessment period. The schedule 
assessment is based on the change in the average acquisition cycle 
time, defined as the number of months between program start and the 
achievement of initial operational capability or an equivalent fielding 
date. 

The weighted calculations of acquisition cycle time and program 
acquisition unit cost for the common set of programs were derived by 
taking the total cost estimate for each of the 26 programs and dividing 
it by the aggregate total cost of all 26 programs in the common set. 
The resulting quotient for each program was then multiplied by the 
simple percentage change in program acquisition unit costs to obtain 
the weighted unit cost change of each program. Next, the sum of this 
weighted cost change for all programs was calculated to get the 
weighted unit cost change for the common set as a whole. To assess the 
weighted-average acquisition cycle time change, we multiplied the 
weight calculation by the acquisition cycle time estimate for each 
corresponding program. A simple average was then taken to calculate the 
change between the first full estimate and the latest estimate, and 
between the 2004 assessment period and the 2005 assessment period. We 
believe these calculations best represent the overall progress of 
programs by placing them within the context of the common set's 
aggregate cost. 

To assess the number of programs with technology maturity and design 
stability at each critical juncture, we identified programs that had 
actually proceeded through the start of development and the system 
design review and obtained their assessed maturity. This information 
was drawn from data provided by the program office as of January 14, 
2005. For more information, see the product knowledge assessment 
section in this appendix. 

System Profile Assessment: 

In the past 4 years, DOD revised its policies governing weapon system 
acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major acquisition 
events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more consistent across 
the 54 program assessments, we standardized the terminology for key 
program events. In the individual program assessments, program start 
refers to the initiation of a program; DOD usually refers to program 
start as milestone I or milestone A, which begins the concept and 
technology development phase. Similarly, development start refers to 
the commitment to system development that coincides with either 
milestone II or milestone B, which begins DOD's system development and 
demonstration phase. The production decision generally refers to the 
decision to enter the production and deployment phase, typically with 
low-rate initial production. Initial capability refers to the initial 
operational capability, sometimes also called first unit equipped or 
required asset availability. For the MDA programs that do not follow 
the standard DOD acquisition model, but instead develop systems in 
incremental capability-based blocks, we identified the key technology 
development efforts that lead to an initial capability for the block 
assessed. 

The information presented on the funding needed to complete from fiscal 
2005 through completion, unless otherwise noted, draws on information 
from selected acquisition reports or on data from the program office. 
In some instances the data were not yet available, and we annotate this 
by the term "to be determined" (TBD), or not applicable, annotated 
(NA). The "Latest" program costs used in cost comparisons are the 
latest estimates provided by the individual programs. The quantities 
listed only refer to procurement quantities. Satellite programs, in 
particular, produce a large percentage of their total operational units 
as development quantities, which are not included in the quantity 
figure. 

To assess the cost, schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we 
reviewed DOD's selected acquisition reports or obtained data directly 
from the program offices. In general, we compared the latest available 
selected acquisition report information with a baseline for each 
program. For systems that have started system development--those that 
are beyond milestone II or B--we compared the latest available selected 
acquisition report to the development estimate from the first selected 
acquisition report issued after the program was approved to enter 
development. For systems that have not yet started system development, 
we compared the latest available data to the planning estimate issued 
after milestone I or A. For systems not included in selected 
acquisition reports, we attempted to obtain comparable baseline and 
current data from the individual program offices. For MDA systems for 
which a baseline was not available we compared the latest available 
cost information to the amount reported last year. 

All cost information is presented in base year 2005 dollars, unless 
otherwise noted, using Office of the Secretary of Defense approved 
deflators to eliminate the effects of inflation. We have depicted only 
the programs' main elements of acquisition cost--research and 
development and procurement; however, the total program costs also 
include military construction and acquisition operation and maintenance 
costs. Because of rounding and these additional costs, in some 
situations the total cost may not match the exact sum of the research 
and development and procurement costs. The program unit costs are 
calculated by dividing the total program cost by the total quantities 
planned. These costs are often referred to as program acquisition unit 
costs. In some instances, the data were not applicable, and we annotate 
this by using the term "NA." In other instances, the current absence of 
data on procurement funding and quantities precludes calculation of a 
meaningful program acquisition unit cost and we annotate this by using 
the term "TBD." The quantities listed refer to total quantities, 
including both procurement and development quantities. 

The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, defined as 
the number of months between the program start, usually milestone I or 
A, and the achievement of initial operational capability or an 
equivalent fielding date. In some instances, the data were not yet 
available, and we annotate this by using the term TBD, or was 
classified. 

The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate or overall 
picture of a program's history. These assessments represent the sum 
total of the federal government's actions on a program, not just those 
of the program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of 
detailed analyses of changes that attempt to link specific changes with 
triggering events or causes. Our analysis does not attempt to make such 
detailed distinctions. 

Product Knowledge Assessment: 

To assess the product development knowledge of each program at key 
points in development, we submitted a data collection instrument to 
each program office. The results are graphically depicted in each 2-
page assessment. We also reviewed pertinent program documentation, such 
as the operational requirements document, the acquisition program 
baseline, test reports, and major program reviews. 

To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a 
tool, referred to as technology readiness levels, for our analysis. The 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally developed 
technology readiness levels, and the Army and Air Force Science and 
Technology research organizations use them to determine when 
technologies are ready to be handed off from science and technology 
managers to product developers. Technology readiness levels are 
measured on a scale of one to nine, beginning with paper studies of a 
technology's feasibility and culminating with a technology fully 
integrated into a completed product. (See appendix III for the 
definitions of technology readiness levels.) Our best practices work 
has shown that a technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a 
technology in an operational environment--is the level of technology 
maturity that constitutes a low risk for starting a product development 
program. In our assessment, the technologies that have reached 
technology readiness level 7, a prototype demonstrated in an 
operational environment, are considered mature and those that have 
reached technology readiness level 6, a prototype demonstrated in a 
relevant environment, are assessed as attaining 50 percent of the 
desired level of knowledge. Satellite technologies that have achieved 
technology readiness level 6 are assessed as fully mature due to the 
difficulty of demonstrating maturity in an operational environment--
space. 

In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of 
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of 
maturity. We sought to clarify the technology readiness levels in those 
cases where information existed that raised concerns. If we were to 
conduct a detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies 
assessed, the readiness level demonstrated, or both. It was not always 
possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system 
at key decision points after the passage of many years. 

To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the 
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for 
completion by the design review, the production decision, and as of our 
current assessment. In most cases, we did not verify or validate the 
percentage of engineering drawings provided by the program office. We 
sought to clarify the percentage of drawings completed in those cases 
where information existed that raised concerns. Completed engineering 
drawings were defined as the number of drawings released or deemed 
releasable to manufacturing that can be considered the "build to" 
drawings. 

To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify 
the number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to 
quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those 
processes. In most cases, we did not verify or validate this 
information provided by the program office. We sought to clarify the 
number of critical manufacturing processes and percentage of 
statistical process control where information existed that raised 
concerns. We used a standard called the Process Capability Index, which 
is a process performance measurement that quantifies how closely a 
process is running to its specification limits. The index can be 
translated into an expected product defect rate, and we have found it 
to be a best practice. We sought other data, such as scrap and rework 
trends, in those cases where quantifiable statistical control data were 
unavailable. 

Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators of potential 
risks, by themselves, they do not cover all elements of risk that a 
program encounters during development, such as funding instability. Our 
detailed reviews on individual systems normally provide for a fuller 
treatment of risk elements. 

[End of section]

Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Technology Readiness Level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported; 
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples 
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties; 
Hardware Software: None (Paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration Environment: None. 

Technology Readiness Level: 2. Technology concept and/or application 
formulated; 
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative 
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. 
Examples are still limited to paper studies; 
Hardware Software: None (Paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration Environment: None. 

Technology Readiness Level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept; 
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. 
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or 
representative; 
Hardware Software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale 
individual components (pieces of subsystem); 
Demonstration Environment: Lab. 

Technology Readiness Level: 4. Component and/or breadboard. Validation 
in laboratory environment; 
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish 
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity" 
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad 
hoc" hardware in a laboratory; 
Hardware Software: Low fidelity breadboard. Integration of nonscale 
components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or 
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach 
suitable for flight articles; 
Demonstration Environment: Lab. 

Technology Readiness Level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment; 
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. 
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably 
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a 
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory 
integration of components; 
Hardware Software: High fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent 
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc.) 
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of 
several components with reasonably realistic support 
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality; 
Demonstration Environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form 
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate 
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies. 

Technology Readiness Level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment; 
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity 
laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment; 
Hardware Software: Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit and 
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and 
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full 
functionality of the subsystem; 
Demonstration Environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or 
limited/restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. 
Integration of technology is well defined. 

Technology Readiness Level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an 
operational environment; 
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of 
an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an 
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a 
test bed aircraft; 
Hardware Software: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function 
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate 
full functionality of subsystem; 
Demonstration Environment: Flight demonstration in representative 
operational environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator 
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data. 

Technology Readiness Level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration; 
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the 
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and 
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if 
it meets design specifications; 
Hardware Software: Flight qualified hardware; 
Demonstration Environment: DT&E in the actual system application. 

Technology Readiness Level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through 
successful mission operations; 
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and 
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test 
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug 
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the 
system under operational mission conditions; 
Hardware Software: Actual system in final form; 
Demonstration Environment: OT&E in operational mission conditions. 

[End of table]

Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration data. 

[End of section]

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841: 

Acknowledgments: 

David B. Best, Alan R. Frazier, and Bruce H. Thomas made key 
contributions to this report. Other key contributors included Robert L. 
Ackley, D. Catherine Baltzell, Maricela Cherveny, Tana M. Davis, Thomas 
J. Denomme, Arthur Gallegos, William R. Graveline, David J. Hand, 
Michael J. Hazard, Barbara H. Haynes, Leslie M. Hickey, John E. 
Oppenheim, Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Nancy Rothlisberger, Rae Ann H. 
Sapp, James L. Morrison, Wendy P. Smythe, Sharon E. Sweeney, Robert S. 
Swierczek, and Karen S. Zuckerstein. The following staff were 
responsible for individual programs: 

System: Airborne Laser (ABL); 
Primary Staff: LaTonya D. Miller. 

System: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD); 
Primary Staff: Randolph S. Zounes. 

System: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF); 
Primary Staff: Bradley L. Terry/Lisa P. Gardner. 

System: Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA); 
Primary Staff: Joseph E. Dewechter/Jerry W. Clark. 

System: Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS); 
Primary Staff: Ian A. Ferguson/Brendan S. Culley/Angela D. Thomas. 

System: Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS); 
Primary Staff: John S. Warren/Thomas L. Gordon/Michele R. Williamson. 

System: Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS); 
Primary Staff: Mary K. Quinlan. 

System: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning 
System (ATIRCM/CMWS); 
Primary Staff: Jonathan E. Watkins/Danny G. Owens. 

System: B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP); 
Primary Staff: Don M. Springman/Arthur L. Cobb. 

System: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP); 
Primary Staff: Dayna L. Foster/Christopher A. Deperro. 

System: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP); 
Primary Staff: Cheryl K. Andrew/Sameena N. Ismailjee. 

System: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP); 
Primary Staff: Sameena N. Ismailjee/Cheryl K. Andrew. 

System: Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC); 
Primary Staff: Johana R. Ayers/W. William Russell. 

System: CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F); 
Primary Staff: Wendy P. Smythe/Leon S. Gill. 

System: Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM); 
Primary Staff: Marcus C. Ferguson/Wendy P. Smythe. 

System: Future Aircraft Carrier (CVN-21); 
Primary Staff: Brendan S. Culley/Trevor J. Thomson. 

System: DD(X) Destroyer; 
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Angela D. Thomas. 

System: E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (E-10A); 
Primary Staff: Rae Ann H. Sapp/David R. Schilling. 

System: E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE); 
Primary Staff: Gary L. Middleton/Bruce H. Thomas. 

System: EA-18G (EA-18G); 
Primary Staff: Christopher R. Miller/Brian T. Mullins. 

System: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV); 
Primary Staff: Maria A. Durant/Maricela Cherveny. 

System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV); 
Primary Staff: Alan R. Frazier/Ronald E. Schwenn. 

System: Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM); 
Primary Staff: Shelby S. Oakley/Ronald E. Schwenn/Margaret B. McDavid. 

System: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile; 
Primary Staff: Lawrence D. Gaston/John P. Swain. 

System: F/A-22 Raptor; 
Primary Staff: Marvin E. Bonner/Arthur L. Cobb. 

System: Future Combat Systems (FCS); 
Primary Staff: John P. Swain/Lawrence D. Gaston/Marcus C. Ferguson. 

System: Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle; 
Primary Staff: Bruce D. Fairbairn/Steven M. Hunter. 

System: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD); 
Primary Staff: Ivy G. Hubler. 

System: Global Positioning System II (GPS II); 
Primary Staff: Jean N. Harker/Michael L. Gorin. 

System: Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR); 
Primary Staff: Brian T. Mullins/Wesley A. Johnson. 

System: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM); 
Primary Staff: Beverly A. Breen/Carrie R. Wilson. 

System: Joint Common Missile; 
Primary Staff: Danny G. Owens/Jonathan E. Watkins. 

System: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF); 
Primary Staff: Matthew B. Lea/David R. Schilling. 

System: Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW); 
Primary Staff: Carol T. Mebane/Bradley J. Trainor. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1; 
Primary Staff: Ridge C. Bowman/James P. Tallon. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5; 
Primary Staff: Subrata Ghoshroy/Paul G. Williams. 

System: Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS); 
Primary Staff: Bruce D. Fairbairn/Matthew T. Drerup. 

System: Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI); 
Primary Staff: Randolph S. Zounes. 

System: Land Warrior; 
Primary Staff: Joel C. Christenson/Candice N. Wright. 

System: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); 
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Angela D. Thomas. 

System: Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS); 
Primary Staff: Tana M. Davis. 

System: Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA); 
Primary Staff: Matthew F. Ebert/Ronald E. Schwenn/Heather L. Barker. 

System: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS); 
Primary Staff: Richard Y. Horiuchi/Tony A. Beckham. 

System: MQ-9 Predator B; 
Primary Staff: Steven M. Hunter/Travis J. Masters. 

System: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System (NPOESS); 
Primary Staff: Suzanne S. Olivieri/Carol R. Cha/James P. Tallon. 

System: Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High); 
Primary Staff: Nancy Rothlisberger/Maricela Cherveny. 

System: Small Diameter Bomb (SDB); 
Primary Staff: Carrie R. Wilson/Beverly A. Breen. 

System: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS); 
Primary Staff: Sigrid L. McGinty/Tony A. Beckham. 

System: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); 
Primary Staff: William S. Lipscomb. 

System: Tactical Tomahawk Missile; 
Primary Staff: Bradley J. Trainor/Carol T. Mebane. 

System: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT); 
Primary Staff: Arturo Holguin Jr./Travis J. Masters. 

System: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (V-22); 
Primary Staff: Jerry W. Clark/Bonita P. Oden. 

System: Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS); 
Primary Staff: Tony A. Beckham/Richard Y. Horiuchi. 

System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T); 
Primary Staff: James P. Tallon/Ridge C. Bowman. 

[End of table]

Source: GAO. 

[End of section]

Related GAO Products: 

Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to 
Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-393] GAO-04-393. Washington, 
D.C.: March 1, 2004. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices, 
but More Controls Are Needed. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-04-53] GAO-04-53. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2003. 

Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon 
Systems' Total Ownership Costs. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-03-57] GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2003. 

Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early 
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-02-701] GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best 
Practices. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-469T] 
GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002. 

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-01-288] GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2001. 

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better 
Weapon System Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-199] GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 
31, 2000. 

Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon 
System Decisions. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-
NSIAD-00-137] GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2000. 

Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Program 
Implement Best Practices. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-206] GAO/NSIAD-99-206. Washington, D.C.: August 
16, 1999. 

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve 
Weapon System Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-162] GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington, D.C.: July 
30, 1999. 

Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program 
Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-99-
116] GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999. 

Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123] GAO/T-
NSIAD-98-123. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1998. 

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires 
Changes in DOD's Environment. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-56] GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.: February 
24, 1998. 

Major Acquisitions: Significant Changes Underway in DOD's Earned Value 
Management Process. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-97-108] GAO/NSIAD-97-108. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 
1997. 

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer 
Improvements for DOD. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-96-162] GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.: August 
26, 1996. 

(120350): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] This estimate includes total research, development, test, and 
evaluation (RDT&E); procurement; military construction; and acquisition 
operation and maintenance appropriations to develop the weapon systems. 

[2] Major Defense Acquisition Programs are programs identified by DOD 
as programs that require eventual RDT&E expenditures of more than $365 
million or $2.19 billion in procurement in fiscal year 2000 constant 
dollars. 

[3] Mandatory spending is controlled by laws other than appropriation 
acts. Discretionary spending is provided in appropriations acts. 

[4] Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015. (Washington, D.C.: January 2005.)

[5] Estimate as of May 2004. Another supplemental was expected in 
January 2005 to cover costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

[6] The common set refers to the 26 weapon system programs that we were 
able to assess since development began and between annual assessment 
periods. The 26 programs are AESA, AEHF, APKWS, C-5 AMP, C-5 RERP, CH-
47F, CEC, E-2 AHE, EA-18G, Excalibur, EFV, ERGM, F/A-22, FCS, Global 
Hawk, JASSM, JSOW, JSF, JTRS Cluster 1, Land Warrior, NPOESS, Tomahawk, 
SDB, V-22, WIN-T, and WGS. We limited this analysis to these 26 
programs because all data including cost, schedule, cycle time, and 
quantities were available for comparison between program estimates. 

[7] A weighted average gives more expensive programs a greater value. 

[8] The 10 programs are AEHF, C-5 AMP, C-5 RERP, Excalibur, ERGM, F/A-
22, Global Hawk, JSF, JSOW, and V-22. 

[9] This estimate is a weighted average based on total program cost and 
does not include the Excalibur program because of its extreme unit cost 
growth. The simple average program unit cost increase for the same 25 
programs is 40 percent. The weighted average, including the Excalibur, 
is 52 percent. 

[10] These percentages are program cost weighted averages. The simple 
average increase for program acquisition unit costs is 0.68 percent for 
the programs that started development with mature technologies and 25 
percent for the programs that started development with immature 
technologies. 

[11] This estimate does not include cost and schedule data for three 
programs: the V-22, Aegis BMD, and STSS. Aegis BMD and STSS were not 
included in the cost and schedule estimates because they are missile 
defense elements that do not provide baseline cost and schedule 
estimates against which to measure progress. 

[12] The cost and schedule estimates do not include the THAAD system or 
the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system because they are missile 
defense elements that do not provide baseline estimates against which 
to measure progress. The schedule estimate does not include the 
ATIRCM/CMWS because a key date is classified. 

[13] The 10 programs are AESA, Aegis BMD, APKWS, ATIRCM/CMWS, EFV, 
ERGM, F/A-22, GMD, JTRS 1, and STSS. The F/A-22 held its design review 
in 1995 and while we did not formally assess the technology maturity at 
that point, the F/A-22 technologies and design matured late in the 
program (e.g. the F/A-22 program had released 21 percent of drawings at 
design review). 

[14] This estimate does not include the missile defense elements (Aegis 
BMD, GMD, and STSS) because they do not provide baseline estimates 
against which to measure progress. 

[15] The five programs are AESA, ATIRCM/CMWS, EFV, ERGM, and F/A-22. 

[16] The three programs are the C-5 RERP, JASSM, and the Tactical 
Tomahawk. C-5 RERP and JASSM were assessed to have design stability at 
design review. C-5 RERP had a program unit cost increase of 8.2 
percent; JASSM had a program unit cost of increase of 7.1 percent; and 
Tactical Tomahawk had a decrease of program unit cost of-13.5 percent. 

[17] The nine programs are AMNS, B-2 RMP, C-130 AMP, CVN-21, DD(X), E-2 
AHE, EA-18G, Excalibur, and WIN-T. 

[18] The two programs are APKWS and ASDS. 

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