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Report to Congressional Committees:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

December 2004:

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION:

Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to 
Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities:

GAO-05-70:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-70, a report to congressional committees

Why GAO Did This Study:

Because future threats the nation may face are uncertain, and with many 
competing demands on its resources, the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
begun to transform its military capabilities, which will involve not 
only the acquisition of new weapon systems but also how the armed 
forces think, train, and fight. In 2003, DOD estimated $263 billion 
would be allocated from fiscal year 2004 through 2009 for 
transformation efforts. In this report GAO (1) describes DOD’s strategy 
to transform joint military capabilities; (2) assesses the extent to 
which DOD has established clear leadership, accountability, and a 
mechanism to integrate transformation efforts; and (3) assesses the 
extent to which DOD’s framework incorporates results-oriented 
management tools to guide transformation efforts. 

What GAO Found:

DOD has taken positive steps to design and implement a complex strategy 
to transform U.S. military capabilities, but it has not established 
clear leadership and accountability or fully adopted results-oriented 
management tools to help guide and successfully implement this 
approach. The responsibility for transforming military capabilities is 
currently spread among various DOD organizations, with no one person or 
entity having the overarching and ongoing leadership responsibilities 
or the accountability for achieving transformation results. In 
addition, although DOD established an informal crosscutting group that 
meets occasionally to discuss transformation issues, this group has no 
charter, formal responsibilities, or authority to direct changes. GAO 
has previously reported that key practices for successful 
transformation include leadership that sets the direction of 
transformation and assigns accountability for results, and the use of 
crosscutting implementation teams, which can provide the day-to-day 
management needed for success. In recent testimony on DOD’s business 
transformation, we underscored the importance of these elements and 
stated that DOD has not routinely assigned accountability for 
performance to specific organizations or individuals who have 
sufficient authority to accomplish goals. DOD officials believe that a 
single organization accountable for transformation results and a formal 
implementation team are not necessary because existing informal 
mechanisms involve key organizations that can individually implement 
needed changes, and an annual assessment of transformation roadmaps is 
prepared for the Secretary of Defense, who can direct the 
transformation efforts of each organization. However, in the absence of 
clear leadership, accountability, and a formal implementation 
mechanism, DOD may have difficulty resolving differences among 
competing priorities, directing resources to the highest priorities, 
and ensuring progress should changes in senior personnel occur. In 
addition, informal mechanisms are not sufficient to provide 
transparency to the process or assurance to Congress that DOD is 
allocating resources to address needed improvements rather than desired 
improvements. 

While DOD’s strategy to transform military capabilities is a good first 
step, DOD has not fully developed results-oriented management tools 
that can help managers effectively implement and manage major efforts, 
and focus on achieving results. Specifically, DOD has not revised its 
initial transformation goals, set in 2001, to reflect new joint 
concepts—thus, DOD lacks a foundation for developing other tools such 
as performance goals and measures and linking specific resources needed 
to achieve each goal. DOD faces challenges in developing these tools 
because the joint concepts are being developed concurrently with its 
plans to acquire new capabilities. But without these results-oriented 
tools, it will be difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which 
its transformation efforts are achieving desired results, to measure 
its overall progress, or to provide transparency for how billions of 
dollars in planned investments are being applied. 

What GAO Recommends:

GAO makes recommendations designed to establish clear leadership, 
accountability, and a more results-oriented management framework to 
guide DOD’s transformation of military capabilities. In oral comments, 
the Office of Force Transformation disagreed with these recommendations 
but did not address the weaknesses described in this report or provide 
convincing evidence to show the recommendations are not warranted. 
Therefore, GAO continues to believe the recommendations are 
appropriate.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-70.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent, (202) 
512-4402.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

DOD's Transformation Strategy Is Evolving and Involves Complex and 
Concurrent Components:

Overall Transformation Leadership, Accountability, and Integrating 
Mechanism Have Not Been Established:

Approach to Transform Military Capabilities Lacks Important Management 
Tools:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

Related GAO Products:

Tables:

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities of Key Offices:

Table 2: Results-Oriented Management Tools Used in Our Analysis:

Table 3: DOD Transformation Goals Presented in Different Defense 
Guidance Documents:

Figures:

Figure 1: Components of DOD's Strategy for Transforming Military 
Capabilities:

Abbreviations:

DOD: Department of Defense:

OUSD: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense:

TPG: Transformation Planning Guidance:

United States Government Accountability Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

December 17, 2004:

The Honorable John W. Warner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Jim Saxton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Martin T. Meehan: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives:

Because of the uncertainties associated with the future threats the 
nation may face, and with many competing demands on its resources, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) has embarked on a major effort to transform 
its business processes, human capital, and military capabilities. The 
transformation of military capabilities, which is the focus of this 
report, will involve not only the acquisition of new weapon systems, 
but also how the armed forces think, train, and fight. Transformation 
is also seen as a process intended to provide continuous improvements 
to military capabilities. In the words of the Secretary of Defense 
"…DOD is building a culture of continual transformation, so that our 
armed forces are always several steps ahead of any potential 
adversaries." One of the fundamental objectives of transformation is to 
enhance joint operations--the coordinated use of all military forces 
that share information across traditional service boundaries and levels 
of command.

This transformation effort will require a significant investment of 
resources at a time when the nation faces a serious fiscal imbalance 
and many competing demands. In 2003, DOD reported that it planned to 
spend about $263 billion for transformation from fiscal year 2004 
through 2009. Concurrently, DOD must also balance resource demands for 
ongoing military operations around the world and maintain existing 
weapon systems.

Because of the importance of successfully adapting U.S. military 
capabilities to address changing threats and the significant 
investments that this will require, we assessed the management 
framework DOD has established to guide its transformation efforts. 
Specifically, in this report we (1) describe DOD's strategy to 
transform joint military capabilities; (2) assess the extent to which 
DOD has clearly established leadership, accountability for achieving 
transformation results, and a mechanism to integrate transformation 
efforts; and (3) assess the extent to which DOD is using results-
oriented management tools to guide implementation of its transformation 
strategy. We prepared this report at our own initiative, and are 
providing a copy to you because of your oversight of defense issues.

To describe DOD's strategy to transform military capabilities, we 
reviewed the department's Transformation Planning Guidance and plans 
for implementing major parts of the strategy. We corroborated and 
clarified our understanding of how DOD intends to implement its 
strategy with appropriate DOD officials. To assess the extent to which 
DOD has clearly established leadership, accountability for achieving 
transformation results, and a mechanism to integrate transformation 
efforts, we examined DOD instructions governing the roles and 
responsibilities of various defense organizations and reviewed relevant 
policy guidance and documents. We also identified similar crosscutting 
initiatives within DOD and examined how it established the authority 
and accountability for those initiatives. We compared this information 
to selected key practices consistently found to be at the center of 
successful mergers and organizational transformations and discussed the 
results with relevant DOD officials. To assess the extent to which DOD 
is using results-oriented management tools to guide transformation 
efforts, we compared DOD's current management framework with management 
principles embodied by the Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993 and discussed our results with appropriate DOD officials. We 
assessed the reliability of the cost data we obtained from DOD reports 
by corroborating the data with knowledgeable agency officials and 
determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. See 
appendix I for a more complete description of our scope and 
methodology. We conducted our work between May 2003 and October 2004 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief:

DOD has taken positive steps to design and implement a complex strategy 
to transform U.S. military capabilities. The foundation of the strategy 
is joint concepts, which are intended to depict how U.S. military 
forces will be integrated to conduct future operations. For example, 
DOD is developing a joint concept called force application that will 
describe how the Joint Force Commander will integrate and rapidly 
maneuver forces across the range of military operations. DOD plans to 
develop and refine these concepts through experimentation efforts led 
by the Joint Forces Command. These concepts are intended to evolve as 
DOD's transformation efforts progress. As DOD defines and develops 
these joint concepts, it has also required each military department and 
the Joint Forces Command to prepare individual plans (called roadmaps) 
to acquire the capabilities to implement these new joint concepts. The 
roadmaps are prepared annually and reflect ongoing initiatives, such as 
the Army's Future Combat System, and also recognize that science and 
technology are expected to yield new capabilities in the future. The 
strategy also calls for an annual assessment of the progress made in 
implementing transformation of military capabilities, the results of 
which are intended to influence future defense guidance and, 
ultimately, investment decisions.

Although the Secretary of Defense has assigned responsibility for 
managing key aspects of transformation, DOD has not established clear 
leadership and accountability for achieving transformation results, nor 
has it established a formal mechanism to coordinate and integrate the 
various transformation efforts within the department. As we have 
previously reported, key practices for successful transformation 
include leadership that sets the direction of transformation, assigns 
accountability for results, and is supported by crosscutting 
implementation teams, which, in turn, can provide the focused, day-to-
day management needed for success.[Footnote 1] In recent testimony on 
DOD's business transformation, we underscored the importance of these 
elements and stated that DOD has not routinely assigned accountability 
for performance to specific organizations or individuals who have 
sufficient authority to accomplish goals.[Footnote 2] Although the 
Secretary of Defense has provided the vision for transformation and set 
the tone for accomplishing it, the responsibility for various parts of 
the transformation strategy for military capabilities is spread among 
several organizations, including the Office of Force Transformation, 
the Joint Staff, each of the services, and the Joint Forces Command; 
and no single individual or organization has been given the overarching 
leadership responsibilities, authority, or the accountability for 
achieving transformation results. In addition, although DOD has 
established an informal crosscutting group that meets occasionally to 
discuss transformation issues, this group has no formal charter, meets 
on an irregular basis, and has no directive authority. DOD officials 
stated that they believe that the current assignment of 
responsibilities among various department organizations is adequate and 
that a formal crosscutting group is not needed because existing 
informal mechanisms involve key organizations that can implement needed 
changes, and the annual assessment of the progress made in 
transformation efforts is prepared for the Secretary of Defense, who 
can direct the transformation efforts of each military department. 
However, in the absence of clear leadership, accountability, and a 
formal implementation mechanism, DOD may have difficulty in resolving 
differences among competing priorities, directing resources to the 
highest priorities, and ensuring progress if changes in senior 
personnel occur. In addition, informal mechanisms are not sufficient to 
provide transparency to the process or provide Congress with assurance 
that DOD is allocating resources to address needed improvements rather 
than desired improvements.

While the strategy designed by DOD to transform military capabilities 
is a good first step toward establishing a framework to guide and 
monitor the results of its transformation efforts, DOD has not fully 
developed results-oriented management tools that provide a means to set 
clear and specific goals and measure progress in achieving them. For 
example, DOD initially established six long-term goals for 
transformation in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, and it 
subsequently articulated additional transformation goals in other 
department documents. DOD has not, however, revised these goals to 
reflect the new joint concepts, which, as previously discussed, are now 
intended to be the foundation of the transformation strategy. Without 
clear and consistent long-term goals grounded in the joint concepts, 
DOD lacks a foundation for developing other important tools such as 
performance goals and measures, and it is limited in its ability to 
link resource needs to specific goals. DOD faces challenges in 
developing these management tools because of the inherently concurrent 
nature of the transformation process--the joint concepts are being 
defined and developed at the same time the services and the Joint 
Forces Command are developing their plans to acquire new capabilities. 
But without tools such as clear long-term goals, performance goals and 
measures, and specific resource requirements that are linked to these 
goals, it will be difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which 
its transformation efforts are achieving desired results, measure its 
overall progress, or provide transparency for how billions of dollars 
in planned investments are being applied.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense establish clear 
leadership and accountability for achieving the transformation of 
military capabilities, establish a formal group to integrate 
departmentwide efforts, and direct this group and the Joint Forces 
Command to more fully incorporate results-oriented management tools to 
help DOD guide the transformation efforts and report on results 
achieved. In official oral comments on a draft of this report provided 
by the Office of Force Transformation, DOD officials generally 
disagreed with our recommendations. In general, their comments 
indicated that they believe the current transformation leadership, 
organizational structures, strategy, and oversight mechanisms are 
adequate and appropriate; therefore the recommendations we make in this 
report are unwarranted. DOD's comments did not, however, address the 
weaknesses we describe in the report, and the additional points they 
raised did not provide convincing evidence that our recommendations 
were unnecessary. Accordingly, we continue to believe our 
recommendations, if implemented, could enhance the department's efforts 
to transform military capabilities and provide Congress with greater 
visibility over how billions of dollars are being applied to achieve 
this goal. DOD's comments and our evaluation are discussed in detail at 
the end of this report.

Background:

DOD defines transformation as "a process that shapes the changing 
nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations 
of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our 
nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric 
vulnerabilities."[Footnote 3] It describes the outcome of 
transformation as "fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed 
forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across 
the battlespace"--that is, transformation should result in maximum 
collaboration among the services and between levels of command, all of 
them having access to the same, integrated computer network, 
geographically dispersed but effectively interconnected, to enable 
quick, real-time decision making and achieve widespread effects. DOD's 
transformation efforts are not limited to military capabilities; DOD is 
also undertaking efforts to transform its business practices, human 
capital,[Footnote 4] and its relationships with interagency and 
multinational partners. The focus of this report is on DOD's efforts to 
transform military capabilities to meet the changing and uncertain 
nature of future threats.

The transformation of joint military capabilities began with DOD's 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review, a congressionally mandated but DOD-led 
study, which concluded that transformation of U.S. forces is needed to 
extend America's military advantages into the future. DOD published its 
strategy for transforming military capabilities in the April 2003 
Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG). The TPG stated that new joint 
concepts are needed to describe how U.S. forces will conduct operations 
in the next 15 to 20 years and that changes in new weapons systems, 
organizations, doctrine, training, leadership and education, 
personnel, and facilities will be needed to provide these capabilities. 
According to a recent DOD report,[Footnote 5] the performance of U.S. 
forces in the successful conduct of Operations Enduring Freedom and 
Iraqi Freedom has provided a glimpse of the future potential of 
emerging concepts, such as sharing information among dispersed forces 
and using existing weapon systems in new ways. In fact, the Deputy 
Commander, Joint Forces Command, testified in February 2004 that these 
operations sharpened DOD's transformation focus by showing the 
effectiveness of integrating forces, such as merging special operations 
and conventional forces.

Implementations of large-scale changes, such as transformations, are 
not simple endeavors and require concentrated efforts to accomplish 
goals. Experience shows that successful changes can take years to 
accomplish and, in the federal government, can be difficult to sustain 
given frequent turnover in leadership. We have reported that DOD's 
force transformation will also require cultural changes and business 
process reengineering that will take years to accomplish.[Footnote 6]

In our past work, we have reported on the advantages of using results-
oriented management tools to help organizations successfully manage 
major efforts such as transformation. Our work on transforming 
organizations highlighted the need for leadership to drive the 
transformation with integrated strategic goals, dedicating a 
crosscutting team to implement the strategy, and the use of performance 
management principles to assign responsibility and ensure 
accountability for the change.[Footnote 7] Similarly, we have reported 
that management principles (or tools) embodied by the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 provide agencies with a framework 
to effectively implement and manage programs and shift the management 
focus from measuring the program activities and processes to measuring 
outcomes.[Footnote 8] Such a shift in focus is especially important for 
efforts such as the transformation of military capabilities, which will 
involve billions of dollars in spending.

DOD's Transformation Strategy Is Evolving and Involves Complex and 
Concurrent Components:

DOD has designed a complex strategy focused on developing and fielding 
improved joint military capabilities and, in fiscal year 2003, it began 
to implement this strategy for the first time. The foundation of DOD's 
strategy is the joint concepts, which are intended to depict how U.S. 
military forces will be integrated to conduct future operations. The 
strategy also requires the Joint Forces Command and each military 
department to prepare roadmaps--that is, implementation plans--for 
developing and acquiring the capabilities needed to implement the joint 
concepts. The roadmaps reflect some programs that are ongoing, such as 
the Army's Future Combat System, and also recognize that science and 
technology are expected to yield new capabilities in the future. DOD 
also performs an annual assessment of the roadmaps, the results of 
which are intended to influence future defense guidance and, 
ultimately, investment decisions.

Joint Transformation Strategy Includes Several Complex Components:

DOD has developed a complex strategy to transform joint military 
capabilities that involves several complex components. Figure 1 
provides a general portrayal of the relationship between these 
components. Fiscal year 2003 was the first year that DOD implemented 
this overall strategy.

Figure 1: Components of DOD's Strategy for Transforming Military 
Capabilities:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

As illustrated in figure 1, the strategy is based on general defense 
guidance reflected in documents such as the National Military Strategy 
and the Quadrennial Defense Review. From this general guidance, DOD is 
developing a "family" of joint operating, functional, and integrating 
concepts, which collectively depict how transformed forces will operate 
in the future. DOD intends to continually develop and evolve each of 
these joint concepts over the next several years through 
experimentation conducted by each service and the Joint Forces Command. 
Each military department and the Joint Forces Command also prepare 
annual roadmaps, which are intended to provide more specific 
information on plans to acquire the capabilities to achieve the joint 
concepts. The strategy also calls for the Director, Office of Force 
Transformation,[Footnote 9] to conduct an annual evaluation of the 
progress made in achieving transformation goals (called a strategic 
assessment) by reviewing the annual roadmaps. DOD officials stated that 
the results of the strategic assessment are incorporated into defense 
guidance that provides direction for budget development. We discuss 
each of these components in more detail below.

Joint Concepts Are Intended to Provide a Foundation for Transformation:

DOD has reported that the key to its transformation strategy is a 
family of joint concepts, which includes an overarching vision 
(articulated in the Joint Operations Concepts) and interrelated 
operating, functional, and integrating concepts. DOD created the Joint 
Operations Concepts to articulate the overarching description of how 
the military will conduct all types of joint operations in the next 15 
to 20 years. It focuses more on how the United States can defeat a 
broad array of capabilities that any adversary may employ rather than 
who the adversaries are and where they may engage U.S. forces or 
interests. The Secretary of Defense signed the Joint Operations 
Concepts in November 2003.

The Joint Operations Concepts calls for the creation of subordinate 
Joint Operating Concepts (hereinafter called operating concepts) that 
collectively describe how the military will operate across the range of 
military operations. According to a Joint Staff official, although DOD 
has drafted the four operating concepts, as of October 2004, the 
Secretary of Defense had not approved them. These four Joint Operating 
Concepts and a general description of each are as follows:

* Major Combat Operations - conduct large-scale military actions.

* Stability Operations - conducted before, during, and after major 
combat operations to provide security, initial humanitarian assistance, 
limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and other 
reconstruction assistance.

* Strategic Deterrence - discourage aggression or any form of coercion 
against the United States or its interests and alter a nation's or 
group's will and ability to attack the homeland, U.S. allies, or 
development of democracies throughout the world.

* Homeland Security - detect, deter, prevent, and defeat attacks 
against the homeland to provide military forces in support of civilian 
authority, and plan for emergencies.

Complementing the four operating concepts are eight functional 
concepts. These functional concepts as described in DOD documents are:

* Command and Control - describes how joint forces will collaborate, 
communicate, and implement commanders' decisions while conducting 
operations as described in the operating concepts.

* Force Application - describes how the Joint Force Commander will 
integrate and rapidly maneuver forces to engage adversaries and defeat 
them across the range of military operations outlined collectively in 
the operating concepts.

* Battlespace Awareness - describes the information about an 
operational environment--including status of friendly, adversary, and 
nonaligned forces and the impacts of physical, cultural, social, 
political, and economic factors on military operations--and how the 
Joint Force Commander can use this information to plan operations.

* Force Protection - describes how the joint force will use active and 
passive capabilities to protect personnel, physical assets, and 
information to prevent adversaries from restricting or preventing U.S. 
forces from conducting operations as described in the operating 
concepts.

* Focused Logistics - describes how DOD will provide the Joint Force 
Commander with equipment and other support on time for simultaneous 
operations conducted over geographically dispersed areas.

* Network-Centric Warfare - currently in development.

* Force Management - currently in development.

* Joint Training - currently in development.

Functional concepts are intended, collectively, to describe the 
capabilities and attributes that will be needed to implement the 
operating concepts. As forces shift from one type of operation to 
another, such as from stability operations to major combat operations, 
the functional capabilities they need may change as well. For example, 
a stability operation may require nonlethal force application 
capabilities, but if the operation shifts to major combat, then lethal 
capabilities may be emphasized. DOD approved the battlespace awareness, 
joint command and control, force application, force protection, and 
focused logistics concepts in February 2004. According to a Joint Staff 
official, as of October 2004, the other three were in development.

The integrating concepts, which crosscut through the operating and 
functional concepts, have the narrowest focus of all the concepts. As 
of October 2004, DOD had begun drafting seven integrating concepts, 
although none were completed and more may be added. The seven concepts 
being drafted are:

* Joint Command and Control,

* Joint Logistics,

* Joint Forcible Entry Operations,

* Integrating Air and Missile Defense,

* Global Strike,

* Seabasing, and:

* Undersea Superiority.

The integrating concepts describe how the capabilities derived from the 
joint and functional concepts are meant to work together. For example, 
according to Office of Force Transformation and Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy (hereafter referred to as OUSD Policy) 
officials, the seabasing concept may describe how the capabilities 
derived from the focused logistics functional concept would be applied 
in a major combat operation. The March 2004 defense guidance directed 
that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop a comprehensive, 
prioritized list of integrating concepts required to support the 
operating concepts before fiscal year 2005 and assign them to specific 
DOD components for development. This guidance also directs that 
undersea superiority operations, seabasing operations, and global 
strike operations be developed prior to the next Quadrennial Defense 
Review. We did not evaluate the status of these concepts during our 
review.

DOD plans to use experimentation[Footnote 10] to help define and 
develop each concept and identify the specific capabilities needed to 
implement them. The Joint Forces Command is responsible for joint 
experimentation on the concepts and integrating results from other 
combatant commanders' experiments. Based on the results, the Joint 
Forces Command will recommend modifications to existing joint concepts 
as well as recommend changes needed in doctrine, organizations, 
training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities to achieve 
the capabilities needed to implement the joint concepts. According to 
the Joint Forces Command's experimentation plan, these recommendations 
should help DOD senior leadership make informed decisions about future 
investments. Experimentation is ongoing--the Joint Forces Command's 
experimentation plan outlines the Command's approach from fiscal year 
2004 through 2011, and it presents in detail events scheduled 
throughout fiscal years 2004 and 2005.

Roadmaps Are Implementation Plans to Develop and Acquire Capabilities 
for Joint Concepts:

The Office of Force Transformation is responsible for managing the 
roadmap process. The 2003 transformation roadmaps were the first ones 
to be prepared under DOD's transformation strategy, and they were 
submitted in November 2003 to the Office of Force Transformation for 
review. They are intended to be implementation plans outlining the 
concrete steps DOD must take to develop and acquire the capabilities 
necessary for implementing the joint concepts. Specifically, the 
Transformation Planning Guidance requires the roadmaps to include 
information such as:

* when and how desired capabilities will be fielded;

* which critical capabilities from other services and agencies are 
required for success;

* changes to the organizational structure, operating concepts, 
doctrine, and skill sets of personnel;

* initiatives intended to improve interoperability;

* measures intended to assess DOD's six transformational goals 
identified in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and joint operating 
concepts; and:

* funding information that includes appropriation breakouts through the 
Future Years Defense Program[Footnote 11] for the desired capabilities.

The military department roadmaps (Army, Naval,[Footnote 12] and Air 
Force) are developed by the services. They provide a broad overview of 
the service capabilities under development to support the joint 
concepts. As the concepts develop over time and specify more precisely 
what capabilities are required, the roadmaps can, in turn, specify more 
precisely how those capabilities will be acquired. The roadmaps also 
reflect some ongoing programs, such as the Army's Future Combat System 
and the Air Force's Space-Based Radar, and recognize that science and 
technology investments are expected to yield new capabilities. The 
Joint Forces Command is responsible for developing the joint roadmap 
using input from the combat support defense agencies.[Footnote 13] The 
purpose of the joint roadmap is to document planned activities to 
achieve transformational improvements in joint capabilities, such as 
joint command and control and joint intelligence, and to facilitate the 
coordination of transformational activities across DOD.

Strategic Appraisal Designed to Assess Transformation Progress:

The TPG requires the Office of Force Transformation to conduct an 
annual strategic appraisal to assist the Secretary of Defense in 
evaluating progress in implementing transformation. The TPG requires 
that the strategic appraisal process include an evaluation of 
transformation progress using specific measures; that barriers to 
transformation be identified; and that recommendations are developed to 
improve transformation for the next TPG or other defense guidance. That 
guidance, in turn, is intended to provide the services with 
instructions for budget development.

According to Office of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy officials, 
the Office of Force Transformation conducted its first strategic 
appraisal of the roadmaps between December 2003 and February 2004, the 
results of which were briefed to the Secretary of Defense in April 
2004. According to Office of Force Transformation officials, 
information provided from the strategic appraisal was incorporated into 
2004 defense guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense. For example, 
the 2004 defense guidance required the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering, to prepare a roadmap for the development of directed-
energy capabilities through 2020. Other results, according to Office of 
Force Transformation and OUSD Policy officials, were incorporated into 
informal guidance that the Office of Force Transformation provided to 
the services and the Joint Forces Command for updating the roadmaps 
that were due to be submitted in July 2004. Neither the strategic 
appraisal's results nor the defense guidance is published outside DOD. 
According to these officials, the 2004 roadmaps were submitted for 
review in July 2004, and the second strategic appraisal process is now 
under way.

According to the TPG, the strategic appraisal process should include 
input from the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, which 
evaluates the transformational value of the service budget requests in 
light of the services' roadmaps. Although this evaluation was not 
completed in the first strategic appraisal, officials from this office 
said that they intend to require the services to show how their 
proposed budgets support their roadmaps, and the services' input will 
become the basis for the evaluation. Furthermore, officials said that 
in cases where the services' budget requests deviate from resource 
requirements articulated in each roadmap, the services are required to 
show how any increases in funding for one program will be offset by 
decreases in other areas.

DOD's Transformation Strategy Is Intended to Link to the Acquisition 
Process:

The transformation strategy is designed to link with the acquisition 
process through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System. This system is DOD's capabilities-based process intended to 
identify, evaluate, and prioritize capabilities needed to implement the 
joint concepts. According to a Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction,[Footnote 14] this process is complex but includes the 
following basic steps. In the first step, a variety of defense 
organizations, including the military services and the combatant 
commands, identifies, analyzes, and prioritizes the gaps between 
current capabilities and those needed to implement the joint concepts. 
Second, these same organizations develop solutions to address these 
gaps through a combination of materiel changes (that is, developing and 
buying new weapon systems) and nonmateriel changes (that is, changes in 
doctrine, organizations, training, leadership, personnel, and 
facilities). Finally, several review boards within the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council[Footnote 15] review the recommended 
solutions. Approved solutions are then funded as part of DOD's budget 
process. For example, the approved solution to providing capability X 
for implementing the force application functional concept may be to 
develop and buy a new weapon system. This new weapon system then 
becomes an acquisition requirement that is funded as part of DOD's 
budget process.

Overall Transformation Leadership, Accountability, and Integrating 
Mechanism Have Not Been Established:

Although the Secretary of Defense has taken some positive steps to 
begin the transformation of military capabilities and assigned 
responsibility for various components of this effort, DOD has not 
established clear leadership and accountability for achieving 
transformation results, nor has it established a formal mechanism to 
coordinate and integrate the various transformation efforts within the 
department. As we have reported, key practices and implementation steps 
for a successful transformation include leadership that sets the 
direction of transformation, assigns accountability for results, and is 
supported by crosscutting implementation teams, which, in turn, can 
provide the focused, day-to-day management needed for success.[Footnote 
16] According to OUSD Policy and Office of Force Transformation 
officials, an informal group consisting of representatives from key 
organizations meets periodically to discuss transformation issues. But 
this group has no official charter designating specific 
responsibilities; it prepares no minutes of its proceedings, and it has 
no directive authority to implement the decisions it makes. Without 
formally designating responsibility and accountability for results, 
sustaining transformation over the long term, choosing among competing 
demands for scarce resources, and resolving differences in priorities 
between various DOD organizations may be difficult and could impede 
DOD's ability to transform in an efficient and timely manner.

Key Practices for Successful Transformation Include Clear Leadership, 
Accountability, and Crosscutting Implementation Team:

We reported in 2003 that key practices and implementation steps for 
successful transformations include clear leadership and 
accountability, and that a dedicated implementation team should be 
responsible for the transformation's day-to-day management, which is 
important to ensuring that various initiatives are integrated.[Footnote 
17] Such an implementation team, vested with the necessary authority, 
would ensure that transformation receives the focused, full-time 
attention necessary to be sustained and effective by establishing 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities, helping to reach agreement 
on work priorities, and keeping efforts coordinated. We recently 
emphasized the importance of these elements in our March 2004 testimony 
on DOD's business transformation efforts before the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services.[Footnote 18] In that testimony, the Comptroller General 
stated that, given the importance of DOD's business transformation 
effort, it is imperative that it receives the sustained leadership 
needed to improve DOD's business operations over a number of years and 
various administrations. Our testimony highlighted that DOD has not 
routinely assigned accountability for performance to specific 
organizations or individuals who have sufficient authority to 
accomplish goals. While DOD's leadership has demonstrated the 
commitment to reforming the department, the day-to-day demands placed 
on the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and others make it difficult 
for these leaders to maintain the oversight, focus, and momentum needed 
to resolve the weaknesses in DOD's business operations. The lack of 
adequate transparency and appropriate accountability across all of 
DOD's major business areas results in billions of dollars in annual 
wasted resources in a time of increasing fiscal constraint. As a 
result, DOD does not have timely, reliable information for management 
to use in making informed decisions. The Comptroller General also 
stated that one way to ensure sustained leadership over DOD's business 
transformation efforts would be to create a position for a chief 
operating officer or chief management official who would serve as the 
Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Management.

In some cases, DOD has taken steps to establish clear accountability 
and authority for other significant transformation efforts. For 
example, DOD has designated the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel 
and Readiness with overall responsibility for training transformation 
and named the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness as 
Executive Agent.[Footnote 19] Supporting the Executive Agent are 
oversight and implementation groups whose members crosscut DOD, that 
is, the Joint Staff, the military services, and representatives from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense that include Program Analysis 
and Evaluation; Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Comptroller; 
and Policy. The implementation group is responsible for providing 
overall daily management, while the oversight groups are to resolve 
issues, manage funding, and ensure collaboration across DOD.

For efforts related to the transformation of military capabilities, the 
Joint Forces Command has recognized the importance of using 
crosscutting groups and assigning overall responsibility and 
accountability for results. First, the Command developed an Integrated 
Interoperability Plan that recommends a crosscutting governance group 
be established to implement and monitor the achievement of 
interoperability objectives, which are key to transformation. According 
to the plan, the purpose of the crosscutting group would be to provide 
oversight and coordination of capability development, synchronizing all 
key DOD processes, and ensuring "holistic" implementation of the 
requirements/acquisition process, from conception to fielding. The plan 
recommended that this group be led by a senior DOD official and include 
participation from the Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, Special 
Operations Command, Strategic Command, services, and defense agencies 
to serve as the senior resolution body for capability and 
interoperability issues cutting across DOD components, and to approve 
joint capability and interoperability measures. According to OUSD 
Policy and Office of Force Transformation officials, however, this 
group has not been established because it was believed to be a layer of 
bureaucracy that was not needed. Second, the Joint Roadmap[Footnote 20] 
prepared by the Joint Forces Command concluded that "[f]ailure to 
successfully integrate the emerging … systems will imperil the 
transformation of DOD military capabilities." The roadmap recommended 
that a coordination group be established to help identify synergies 
between activities and to direct limited resources where they would be 
the most beneficial. The roadmap also recommended that four DOD 
organizations work together to ensure that science and technology 
efforts will be linked to developing the new joint concepts. The Joint 
Forces Command official we spoke with indicated that they were unaware 
of any actions taken to respond to these recommendations.

Clear Leadership and Accountability for Transformation of Military 
Capabilities Have Not Been Established:

As table 1 shows, there are many DOD organizations tasked with specific 
responsibilities for implementing parts of the transformation strategy, 
but none of these organizations have been given the leadership 
responsibilities or the overarching authority and accountability for 
achieving transformation results. According to Office of Force 
Transformation and OUSD Policy officials, the Secretary of Defense is 
ultimately responsible and accountable for all DOD activities, and 
therefore is inherently responsible and accountable for the successful 
transformation of military capabilities. We believe that while DOD 
leadership has demonstrated the commitment to transforming military 
capabilities, as previously stated, the day-to-day demands placed on 
the Secretary make it difficult for him to personally maintain the 
oversight, focus, and momentum needed to sustain transformation 
efforts.

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities of Key Offices:

Organization: Secretary of Defense; 
Responsibilities: Sets transformation policies and objectives.

Organization: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; 
Responsibilities: Oversees joint concept development and validates 
joint requirements.

Organization: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy; 
Responsibilities: Prepares Transformation Planning Guidance and other 
defense guidance.

Organization: Office of Force Transformation; 
Responsibilities: Monitors and evaluates implementation of the 
transformation strategy; advises the Secretary of Defense; assesses the 
roadmaps during the strategic appraisal process.

Organization: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis 
and Evaluation; 
Responsibilities: Analyzes service budgets to see that initiatives in 
transformation roadmaps are funded in budget requests.

Organization: Joint Forces Command (and other combatant commands); 
Responsibilities: Conduct joint concept development and 
experimentation.

Organization: Military services; 
Responsibilities: Build plans (called roadmaps) and budgets to achieve 
transformational capabilities needed to implement the joint concepts. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD guidance.

[End of table]

Two organizations (Office of Force Transformation and the Joint Forces 
Command) have central roles in the transformation strategy but no 
overarching authority or accountability for achieving transformation 
results. First, the Director, Office of Force Transformation, is to 
advise the Secretary of Defense, monitor and evaluate the 
transformation strategy, and assess the roadmaps during the strategic 
appraisal process. The Director does not have the overall authority, 
responsibility, and accountability for implementing DOD's 
transformation strategy. In fact, the Director testified before 
Congress that he "is a catalyst for" and "encourages" but does not 
"direct" transformation.[Footnote 21] Although the Office of Force 
Transformation was created in November 2001, its charter, as of 
September 2004, had not been approved. Second, as previously discussed, 
the Joint Forces Command is responsible for annually preparing the 
joint roadmap. However, Joint Forces Command officials told us the 
Command does not have the overall authority and responsibility to 
implement the roadmap because the Command does not have the authority 
to direct the services' and defense agencies' programs described in the 
roadmap.

Formal Implementation Team Has Not Been Established to Integrate 
Transformation Efforts:

According to OUSD Policy and Office of Force Transformation officials, 
DOD established an informal crosscutting group that meets occasionally 
to discuss transformation issues. But, according to these officials, it 
has no charter designating specific responsibilities for achieving 
transformation goals, assessing transformation performance measures, 
or linking resources to goals. In addition, the group has no specified 
authority to direct changes across various DOD offices, and no minutes 
are kept of its meetings. Therefore, we were unable to determine what 
specific topics were discussed by the group, or the frequency, nature, 
or results of its efforts. Participants in this group are invited as 
needed, but the group generally includes representatives from the 
Office of Force Transformation and others from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (Policy; Program Analysis and Evaluation; 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and Office of Net Assessment), 
the Joint Staff (Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment 
Directorate), and the Joint Forces Command.

Lack of Coordinating Authority Can Hinder Development of Joint 
Capabilities:

Concerns have been raised in several forums about the lack of adequate 
authority to coordinate transformation efforts. For example, the House 
Committee on Armed Services report on the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005 stated that while the services 
have embraced transformation as an objective, the committee remained 
concerned that each military service has embarked on its own 
transformational campaign without an enforceable, integrated joint 
roadmap to ensure that service plans are mutually supportive and 
overlap where necessary.[Footnote 22] For example, in discussing a 
proposed joint program office to improve interoperability among 
systems, the report notes that the services and the defense agencies 
acquire systems to meet their own requirements, not necessarily joint 
concepts.[Footnote 23]

In addition, a June 2004 DOD Inspector General report[Footnote 24] 
recommended that DOD formalize roles, responsibilities, and processes 
for the overall development, coordination, and oversight of DOD 
network-centric warfare efforts.[Footnote 25] The report found that the 
lack of formalized roles and responsibilities resulted in confusion on 
who had decision-making authority. Further, the report states that the 
absence of formalized roles and processes for the overall development, 
coordination, and oversight of network-centric warfare efforts does not 
ensure that ongoing or planned initiatives are properly focused and 
complement each other. According to the report, DOD management agreed 
with the need for leadership improvements.

Likewise, we have issued several reports dealing with the challenges 
DOD faces in fielding joint capabilities:

* We reported in July 2004 that no single office is in charge of the 
Global Information Grid (a key transformation initiative intended to be 
the foundation for implementing all joint concepts), making it more 
difficult to make and enforce trade-off decisions.[Footnote 26] 
Previous DOD efforts to foster interoperability have had limited 
success because management tools and leadership attention were not 
strong enough to provide sufficient oversight and overcome resistance 
by the military services to forgo their unique requirements in favor of 
requirements that would benefit DOD.

* We reported in June 2004 that one of the key factors undermining 
DOD's progress in implementing its capabilities-based strategy is the 
lack of standardized, interoperable equipment and systems in joint 
operations.[Footnote 27] The report noted that although DOD recognizes 
improved interoperability is central to transformation, resolving this 
problem is difficult because military acquisition has traditionally 
focused on service-specific platforms, not joint operations with 
interoperable equipment.

* In a March 2004 report, we recommended that DOD establish an 
appropriate organization to implement a strategic plan for unmanned 
aerial vehicles, ensuring that sufficient authority is provided to 
enforce the plan's direction, promote joint operations, and expend 
funds efficiently.[Footnote 28]

* We reported in December 2002 that the military services and the 
defense agencies have been reluctant to fund acquisition of advanced 
concept technology-proven technologies, especially those focusing on 
joint requirements, because of their competing priorities.[Footnote 29]

Likewise, a Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004 study 
stated that DOD continues to struggle with insufficient 
jointness.[Footnote 30] Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
Freedom underscore interoperability shortcomings in equipment fielded 
by the services. Managing resources along service lines has not 
achieved real interoperability in joint command and control. The study 
team believes that true interoperability in joint command and control 
will not be achieved until it is bought jointly.

A 2003 study chartered by the Secretary of Defense stated that current 
processes do not optimize investment in joint capabilities to meet 
current and future security challenges because the services and the 
defense agencies define their needs at the component level and joint 
needs are forced into the process after each service has developed its 
program.[Footnote 31] The report further states that improving 
interoperability is key, which requires greater coordination at the 
department level.

DOD officials stated that they believe that the Director, Office of 
Force Transformation, has the authority he needs to be effective. The 
Director can persuade others to take action and influence defense 
guidance using results of the strategic appraisal. These officials 
stated that the only benefit to having directive authority is some 
things may happen faster than they would without this authority. DOD 
officials also stated that DOD has not formally established a 
crosscutting group responsible for implementing the transformation 
strategy because, in their opinion, setting up a bureaucratic layer to 
administer DOD's transformation strategy is not needed.

This reasoning, however, is contradictory to the advice and experiences 
of other organizations involved in major transformation efforts that 
considered clearly defined accountability and crosscutting 
implementation teams essential for successful transformations. It is 
also inconsistent with the approach taken by DOD in other cases. 
Without formally designating responsibility and accountability for 
results, choosing among competing demands for scarce resources and 
resolving differences in priorities between various DOD organizations 
may be difficult and could impede DOD's ability to transform in an 
efficient manner. In addition, it may be particularly difficult for DOD 
to sustain transformation progress when key personnel changes occur. As 
we discussed these points and the results of our analysis with DOD 
officials, they recognized that leadership and accountability for 
transformation results may not be clearly identified and DOD is 
considering what, if any, actions need to be taken to address this 
issue.

Approach to Transform Military Capabilities Lacks Important Management 
Tools:

DOD has not fully developed critical components of a management 
framework to guide and monitor the results of its transformation 
efforts. DOD has made progress in adopting some tools--specifically, 
establishing a transformation strategy based on joint concepts, using 
mechanisms to identify and mitigate external factors, and initiating a 
process for reviewing roadmaps. However, it has not (1) revised its 
2001 transformation goals to reflect the new joint concepts, 
(2) established performance goals and performance measures, (3) fully 
identified resources needed to achieve its goals, and (4) established a 
process to assess progress in achieving long-term and performance 
goals. Without fully utilizing these tools, it is difficult for DOD to 
determine the extent to which its transformation efforts are achieving 
the desired results, measure its overall progress, or provide 
transparency for how billions of dollars programmed for transformation 
are being applied.

Studies by several organizations, including us, have shown that 
successful organizations in both the public and private sectors use 
results-oriented management tools to help achieve desired program 
outcomes. These tools, or principles, embodied by the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993, provide agencies with a management 
framework for effectively implementing and managing programs and shift 
program management focus from measuring program activities and 
processes to measuring program outcomes. The framework can include 
various management tools, such as long-term goals, performance goals, 
and performance measures, which can assist agencies in measuring 
performance and reporting results. Table 2 lists the results-oriented 
management framework tools we used in our analysis.

Table 2: Results-Oriented Management Tools Used in Our Analysis:

Long-term goals: Strategies to be used; 
Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes and when to 
expect such results: General methods the agency plans to use to 
accomplish long-term goals.

Long-term goals: External factors; 
Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes and when to 
expect such results: Factors beyond the agency's control that could 
affect the agency's ability to achieve desired results.

Long-term goals: Performance goals; 
Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes and when to 
expect such results: Derived from long-term goals, should establish 
intended performance and focus on results required.

Long-term goals: Performance measures; 
Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes and when to 
expect such results: Specific means of gauging performance.

Long-term goals: Resources; 
Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes and when to 
expect such results: Identification of the resources needed to achieve 
each goal.

Long-term goals: Evaluation plan; 
Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes and when to 
expect such results: An objective and formal assessment of results. 

Source: GAO guidelines.

[End of table]

These management tools can provide DOD and Congress ways to measure 
progress and determine whether initiatives are achieving their desired 
results. The following is our assessment of the extent to which DOD is 
using these tools in implementing its strategy for transforming 
military capabilities:

* Long-term goals: Long-term goals should identify expected results, 
should be results-oriented, and should be expressed in a way that 
allows them to be assessed in terms of achievement. DOD initially 
established six long-term goals for transformation in the 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review, and it subsequently articulated 
transformation goals in other department documents (see table 3). 
According to Office of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy officials, 
the differences in these goals reflect evolution in DOD's vision for 
transformation outcomes. For example, some goals expressed in the 2004 
National Military Strategy are not reflected in the 2003 Transformation 
Planning Guidance. Further, these goals have not been updated to 
reflect the joint concepts emerging from current transformation 
efforts. An Office of Force Transformation official said that DOD's 
initial goals were a good start, but they do not cover the full range 
of military operations that the joint concepts will cover. Although the 
official agreed that these goals would and should change, DOD has not 
begun a process to revise them.

Table 3: DOD Transformation Goals Presented in Different Defense 
Guidance Documents:

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

* Strategy: A strategy should describe the general methods an agency 
plans to use to accomplish long-term goals. As we described in the 
previous section of this report, DOD has made significant progress in 
developing its strategy to transform military capabilities. The 
strategy is linked to the overall defense guidance and is based on 
joint concepts, and many of the strategy's components have been 
initiated. The strategy is also flexible and adaptable to new concepts 
as they are developed through experimentation.

* External factors: Agencies should identify factors beyond their 
control that could affect their ability to achieve desired results and 
develop mitigation plans to address these factors. According to OUSD 
Policy and Office of Force Transformation officials, DOD does have 
mechanisms for examining and mitigating factors beyond its control that 
could affect the achievement of desired results. One of these 
mechanisms is the strategic appraisal process discussed earlier in this 
report. Another is DOD's Risk Management Framework, developed to ensure 
that current defense needs are balanced against future requirements and 
consider trade-offs among four risk areas--force management, 
operational, institutional, and future challenges (that is, 
transformation). According to Office of the Secretary of Defense for 
Program Analysis and Evaluation officials, if resource needs in one 
risk area increase, then resources available for other areas may 
decrease. For example, if demands for current operations increase, then 
fewer resources may be available for transformation.

* Performance goals: Performance goals should establish intended 
performance, should be results-oriented, and should be linked to long-
term goals. Since the joint roadmap is DOD's implementation plan for 
joint military capabilities, we looked for performance goals in the 
2003 joint roadmap. In some parts of the roadmap, goals are not 
included at all; in others, goals are unclear, and references are made 
to goals presented in other documents. For example, the roadmap 
includes several sets of goals for joint intelligence and refers to 
other goals in DOD's Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
Capstone Strategic Plan. As a result, it is not clear whether or how 
these goals support each other, how they relate to the joint concepts, 
or how the various programs described in this section of the roadmap 
will support achievement of these goals. Clearly articulated, results-
oriented performance goals would help DOD explain how the myriad of 
programs described in the roadmap will result in the improved joint 
capabilities necessary to implement each joint concept.

* Performance measures: Performance measures are the specific means of 
gauging performance and should include a baseline and target; should be 
objective, measurable, and quantifiable, and should include a time 
frame. DOD has not developed performance measures to assess progress in 
the following three areas: implementation of the transformation 
strategy across DOD; achievement of joint capabilities through the 
programs described in the joint roadmap; and assessment of the 
contribution of experimentation to transformation.

First, DOD has not developed measures to assess transformation progress 
across DOD. DOD reports departmentwide performance measures in its 
Annual Defense Report, and defense guidance states that DOD must 
develop performance measures based on joint capabilities. The Program 
Analysis and Evaluation Office has begun developing performance 
measures for DOD's balanced scorecard, which will be included in future 
Annual Defense Reports. DOD officials stated that, as part of this 
effort, they plan to develop measures to assess the progress of 
transformation DOD-wide. But to date, no such measures have been 
developed. Further, the few transformation measures included in the 
2003 Annual Defense Report are process rather than results-oriented. 
For example, the measures for "experiment[ing] with new warfare 
concepts" are process-oriented, such as providing a briefing and 
drafting an experimentation plan.

Second, DOD has not developed measures to assess the achievement of 
joint capabilities through the programs described in the 2003 joint 
roadmap. The TPG requires the roadmaps to include performance measures 
to address the joint concepts, but the joint roadmap does not include 
performance measures and does not describe any ongoing efforts to 
develop them. Joint Forces Command officials stated that performance 
measures were not developed because the joint concepts were not drafted 
at the time the roadmap was prepared and that they do not expect to 
include performance measures until the July 2005 joint roadmap, at the 
earliest.

Third, DOD has not developed measures to assess the contribution of 
experimentation to transformation. In 2002, we recommended that the 
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, develop strategic planning tools 
to use in managing and periodically assessing the progress of joint 
experimentation.[Footnote 32] At that time, a Joint Forces Command 
official stated that the Command was developing such measures. DOD 
agreed with this recommendation and stated that subsequent guidance 
would address this issue. Although the Joint Forces Command has drafted 
measures to assess the contribution of experimentation to 
transformation, as of September 2004 it had not approved or implemented 
these measures.

* Resources: Agencies should identify the resources needed to achieve 
each goal and should provide a rationale for how these resources will 
contribute to achieving the expected level of performance. The TPG also 
requires the roadmaps to include the funding necessary to develop the 
desired capabilities. However, we found that DOD has not clearly linked 
resources--either throughout the department or in the joint roadmap--
with the development of capabilities needed to implement the joint 
concepts.

For example, the 2003 Annual Defense Report stated that DOD is 
committed to making budget documents more transparent by clearly 
aligning dollars to specific programs so that senior-level decision 
makers can see directly how they support the defense strategy. This 
report showed $263 billion (for fiscal years 2004-2009) for 
transformation; however, it is difficult to independently verify how 
much DOD plans to spend on transformation--we reported in May 2004 that 
DOD's Future Years Defense Program does not clearly identify those 
programs DOD considers transformational. Further, the Annual Defense 
Report did not fully reflect all the programs planned to develop the 
capabilities needed for each joint concept. Likewise, the joint roadmap 
did not provide a complete description of the programs and resources 
needed to develop the desired capabilities. For example, the roadmap 
states that the Global Information Grid will require changes in 
doctrine, organizational processes, cultures, and behaviors, but it 
does not explain what changes are needed or the funding required for 
these changes.

* Evaluation and corrective action plan: An evaluation plan is an 
objective and formal assessment of the results of a major effort; a 
corrective action plan should describe how evaluation findings will be 
used to improve performance or revise unmet goals. As previously 
discussed, the strategic appraisal process is designed to provide DOD 
with a mechanism for evaluating its transformation efforts and 
identifying corrective actions. It calls for the use of evaluation 
findings to improve performance and identify or implement needed 
actions. According to Office of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy 
officials, any shortfalls identified during the appraisal are corrected 
in one of two ways--either by incorporating required actions into 
directive defense guidance issued by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense or by providing informal guidance to the Joint Forces Command 
and the services regarding issues to be addressed in the next roadmap 
iterations. In fiscal year 2004, the first year a strategic appraisal 
was conducted, DOD reviewed each roadmap prepared by the military 
departments and the Joint Forces Command to determine if any 
significant gaps existed in the capabilities being acquired. The 
assessment did not evaluate the progress achieved in acquiring the 
capabilities needed to implement the joint concepts because the 
concepts were still undefined and under development. In lieu of the 
joint concepts, the first strategic appraisal used lessons learned from 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Secretary of Defense's Top Ten 
priorities as criteria to identify these capability gaps. In reviewing 
information on the strategic appraisal's results, it was not clear what 
measures were used in evaluating how well the roadmaps were addressing 
these gaps. The strategic appraisal could attain more definitive 
results and more clearly identify actions that need to be taken if 
future assessments are based on clearly articulated goals and measures 
founded on the joint concepts.

When we discussed the weaknesses in the current framework guiding the 
transformation effort, DOD officials explained that DOD's 
transformation strategy is new and that many parts are being developed 
simultaneously and continuously evolving. For example, the 
transformation strategy calls for the joint roadmap to be based on the 
joint concepts, but both are being developed at the same time. As the 
concepts mature, DOD officials expect future versions of the roadmaps 
will explain in more detail how capabilities will be developed to 
implement the concepts. DOD officials also stated that the annual 
strategic appraisal is designed to identify capability gaps that future 
roadmaps or defense guidance will address. In their view, this process 
is equivalent to setting goals and measures. Regarding directly linking 
resource requirements to long-term and performance goals, the officials 
stated that the department allocates resources in its budget process 
and did not address how these resources link to long-term or 
performance goals.

Although we agree that the concurrent nature of the transformation 
strategy has required many components to be developed simultaneously, 
we do not believe that this precludes the development of results-
oriented management tools that can help the department manage this 
effort and achieve the desired results. For example, DOD has made 
progress in developing the joint concepts, and although they all are 
not fully developed, they can still provide a basis for establishing 
long-term goals, performance goals, and performance measures. As the 
concepts mature through experimentation, DOD can periodically revise 
the management tools to reflect these changes, possibly as part of the 
annual strategic appraisal process. Without taking the steps to 
establish clear and consistent long-term goals that are grounded in the 
joint concepts, the department's transformation efforts may not fully 
support the desired outcomes. Likewise, the absence of performance 
goals and performance measures limits the department's ability to 
measure progress toward achieving its goals. Finally, without a clear 
link between resource requirements and transformation goals, it is 
unclear what resources will be required to achieve transformation, when 
the funds will be required, or how billions of dollars programmed for 
transformation are being applied.

Conclusions:

The complexity, magnitude, and importance of transforming military 
capabilities demand that an effective, results-oriented management 
framework be established to guide DOD-wide transformation efforts and 
monitor the billions of dollars that will be invested to achieve 
transformation goals. This framework should include clear leadership 
and accountability for achieving results, as well as management tools 
to guide activities and measure outcomes. As discussed in this report, 
DOD has taken significant, positive steps toward establishing this 
framework. The Secretary of Defense has provided a transformation 
vision and instituted some important elements of a results-oriented 
management framework. For example, the overall strategy provides 
flexibility to adapt to new joint operating concepts. Also, planned 
annual updates to each service's roadmap are intended to detail how new 
capabilities may be acquired, and the annual strategic appraisal is a 
mechanism to primarily assess the transformation plans in the roadmaps. 
These positive steps were taken in a relatively short period of time 
and they reflect the dedication of department personnel to transform 
military capabilities and achieve the vision set by the Secretary of 
Defense.

These steps also establish a foundation for DOD to take additional 
actions that can enhance its transformation strategy and develop a more 
comprehensive, results-oriented framework to guide its efforts and 
achieve intended results. Specifically, the overall accountability and 
authority for achieving transformation goals are unclear, and the 
existing working group created to help integrate the multitude of 
transformation efforts underway is informal, having no official charter 
and no directive authority, and meets on an irregular basis. These 
weaknesses can limit DOD's ability to promote an integrated approach to 
transformation, choose between competing priorities, and 
institutionalize a transformation process that will endure over time. 
In addition, the lack of a comprehensive set of results-oriented 
management tools that reflect the joint concepts under development 
limits DOD's ability to manage this complex process with a focus on 
results and clouds the visibility over the significant resources that 
have been expended and will be required to transform military 
capabilities. These factors may ultimately impede progress toward 
achieving the overarching transformation goal--maintaining the 
preeminence of U.S. military capabilities and the ability of U.S. 
forces to defeat all future threats--and the department may have 
difficulty in garnering congressional support for transformation 
efforts unless it adopts a stronger and more result-oriented management 
approach.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To clarify the accountability for achieving the transformation of 
military capabilities and to establish a mechanism to integrate the 
transformation efforts using results-oriented management tools, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:

* Assign clear leadership and accountability for achieving the 
transformation of military capabilities.

* Establish a formal crosscutting transformation group, assign it with 
the responsibility for overseeing and integrating DOD's strategy, 
provide it with the necessary authority to perform their 
responsibilities effectively, and hold it accountable for results. The 
group should:

* Include representatives from the key offices deemed necessary for 
successful implementation.

* Have clearly defined roles and responsibilities.

* Articulate and periodically revise long-term goals for the 
transformation of military capabilities that reflect the joint 
concepts. These long-term goals should identify what transformation 
results are to be expected and when to expect these results.

* Clearly identify the resources that DOD estimates it will need to 
achieve each long-term goal.

* Use the goals and measures as a foundation for the annual assessment 
of transformation progress.

* Prepare an annual report to Congress on the progress in achieving 
transformation goals, including actions taken and outcomes achieved, 
resources expended and programmed, measures used to assess progress 
achieved, and actions planned to meet or revise unmet goals.

To further develop results-oriented management tools that can guide 
DOD's transformation of joint military capabilities, measure progress, 
and determine whether initiatives are achieving their desired results, 
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following action:

* direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to direct the Commander, 
Joint Forces Command, to include in future updates to the Joint 
Transformation Roadmap:

* a discussion of how the capabilities being developed will link with 
and support accomplishment of the long-term goals;

* results-oriented performance goals linked to long-term goals, which 
also reflect the joint concepts and gaps in current capabilities, that 
establish intended performance, focus on outcomes or results expected 
or required, and establish target dates for the achievement of these 
results;

* performance measures based on the performance goals to assess 
progress; and:

* resources required (for nonmateriel as well as materiel efforts) to 
obtain capabilities for each joint concept and linkage of resources 
with each performance goal.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We requested DOD to provide written comments on a draft of this report. 
However, DOD's Office of Force Transformation provided oral comments. 
In official oral comments, DOD officials generally disagreed with our 
recommendations. First, pertaining to our recommendation that the 
Secretary of Defense assign clear leadership and accountability for 
achieving the transformation of military capabilities, DOD stated that 
the Secretary of Defense already provides clear leadership for 
transformation within DOD, the services play a key role in implementing 
the Secretary's priorities, and their roles and responsibilities are 
clearly delineated in the Transformation Planning Guidance. DOD also 
stated that the transformation roadmaps and the strategic appraisal 
process are used to assess transformation progress and inform the 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system.

We agree that the Secretary of Defense has provided overall leadership 
and a vision for the transformation of military capabilities, and have 
highlighted this in our report, but as we also point out, the day-to-
day demands placed on the Secretary make it difficult for him to 
personally maintain the oversight, focus, and momentum needed to 
sustain transformation efforts. In addition, currently individual has 
clear accountability, such as the Deputy Secretary or another senior 
official, to achieve transformation results, and the strategic 
appraisal process has not provided an overall evaluation of the 
progress achieved in acquiring transformational capabilities. Rather, 
the appraisal process has primarily focused on identifying potential 
gaps in the capabilities being acquired by each service. Accordingly, 
we still believe the recommendation to assign clear leadership and 
accountability for transformation results is a critical step needed to 
achieve the transformation of military capabilities.

Second, in commenting on our recommendation to establish a formal 
crosscutting transformation group, assign it the responsibility for 
overseeing and integrating DOD's strategy, and hold it accountable for 
results, DOD stated that this recommendation would result in a parallel 
and overlapping structure that would compete with the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system. DOD also stated that our 
recommended crosscutting group would represent another bureaucratic 
layer and lines of authority would not become clearer, but would rather 
compete for preeminence within DOD. In regard to our recommendation 
that this group also prepare an annual report to Congress on the 
progress made in achieving transformation goals, DOD pointed out that 
DOD's Annual Defense Report includes the current progress of 
transformation.

We disagree that the establishment of a formal crosscutting group would 
compete with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
system, or that it would confuse the lines of authority. Therefore, we 
believe our recommendation is still warranted. As highlighted in this 
report, DOD has chosen to appoint crosscutting implementation teams for 
other transformation efforts, the Joint Forces Command has recognized 
the need to better coordinate and integrate transformation efforts, and 
the advice and experience of other organizations in other government 
agencies and in the private sector argue that crosscutting integration 
teams are essential for successful transformation efforts. Moreover, in 
the absence of such a group, DOD has no routine vehicle for maintaining 
a continued focus on transformation goals set by the Secretary, nor a 
mechanism for resolving implementation issues that may arise. With 
regard to the Annual Defense Report serving as a vehicle to report on 
the results of transformation efforts, while we recognize that DOD has 
begun to develop transformation performance measures that are intended 
to be included in future Annual Defense Reports, to date, these 
measures have not been fully developed, and the few measures included 
in the 2003 Annual Defense Report are process, rather than results-
oriented. Therefore, we continue to believe that an additional 
reporting mechanism that describes the resources devoted to 
transformation efforts and outcomes achieved is needed. Such a 
reporting mechanism could help Congress determine whether the billions 
of dollars being applied to transform military capabilities are 
providing an adequate return on investment in light of the significant 
long-term affordability challenges that DOD faces.

Third, in commenting on our recommendation that future updates to the 
Joint Transformation Roadmap include specific results-oriented tools, 
DOD stated that a combination of the existing strategic appraisal 
process, joint concepts, service transformation roadmaps, Joint 
Transformation Roadmap, and service, combatant command, Joint Staff, 
and Office of the Secretary of Defense inputs to the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system provide the results-
oriented management tools we recommended. We disagree with DOD's 
comments on this point, because, as we discuss in this report, even 
when viewed collectively, these separate elements still lack clearly 
defined goals linked to the joint concepts, specific resource 
requirements to meet the goals, and performance measures to evaluate 
the outcomes of the initiatives. Moreover, DOD's comments did not 
specifically address the need for improvements to the Joint 
Transformation Roadmap. We continue to believe our recommendation is 
needed because of the deficiencies in the joint roadmap we discuss in 
this report, which were also recognized by DOD officials as we 
conducted our review.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, 
Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(Policy), and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also 
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report 
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or my Assistant Director, Robert L. 
Repasky, at (202) 512-9868. Key contributors to this report are listed 
in appendix III.

Signed by: 

Janet St. Laurent, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

To describe the Department of Defense's (DOD) strategy to transform 
joint military capabilities, we reviewed the April 2003 Transformation 
Planning Guidance and discussed the tasks and time frames it 
established with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy (OUSD Policy), the Office of Force Transformation, 
the Joint Staff, and the Joint Forces Command. To describe the concept 
development process, we reviewed the July 2004 Joint Concept 
Development and Revision Plan and discussed the process with Joint 
Staff and Joint Forces Command officials with responsibilities in that 
process. To determine how the joint experimentation process fits into 
the strategy, we reviewed the January 2004 Joint Concept Development 
and Experimentation Campaign Plan and discussed its relationship to 
transformation with officials from the Office of Force Transformation, 
OUSD Policy, the Joint Forces Command, and the Joint Staff. We 
discussed the role of the joint and service transformation roadmaps in 
the transformation strategy with officials from the Joint Staff, the 
Joint Forces Command, and the Office of Force Transformation. We 
documented the strategic appraisal process and discussed it with 
officials from OUSD Policy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the Office of Force 
Transformation. To determine how the transformation strategy links to 
the acquisition process, we reviewed relevant DOD instructions 
governing these processes and discussed them with officials from the 
Office of Force Transformation, OUSD Policy, the Joint Staff, and the 
Joint Forces Command.

To assess the extent to which DOD has clearly established leadership, 
accountability for achieving transformation results, and a mechanism to 
integrate transformation efforts, we examined DOD instructions 
governing the roles and responsibilities of the various defense 
organizations outlined in the April 2003 Transformation Planning 
Guidance (TPG) and assessed whether the TPG clearly designated 
responsibility for implementing the transformation strategy or merely 
parts of the strategy. We also gathered and reviewed relevant policy 
guidance, instructions, and documents related to the transformation 
strategy, including the 2003 Joint Transformation Roadmap issued in 
January 2004, the July 2004 Joint Concept Development Revision Plan, 
the draft directive for the Director of Force Transformation, and the 
January 2004 Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign 
Plan. We identified how DOD has implemented similar large, crosscutting 
efforts such as training transformation and studied DOD reports that 
recognized the importance of clearly designating an entity responsible 
and accountable for transformation efforts and that recommended that 
crosscutting groups be established to successfully implement these 
efforts. We also reviewed various reports that raised concerns about 
the lack of adequate authority to coordinate programs DOD-wide issued 
by the House Committee on Armed Services, us, DOD, and the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. Next, we compared this information 
to selected key practices consistently found to be at the center of 
successful mergers and organizational transformations. These selected 
key practices were ensuring that top leadership drives the 
transformation and dedicating an implementation team to manage the 
transformation process. We discussed the results, with officials from 
OUSD Policy, the Office of Force Transformation, the Joint Staff, and 
the Joint Forces Command responsible for implementing parts of the 
strategy.

To assess the extent to which DOD is using results-oriented management 
tools in implementing its transformation strategy, we compared these 
tools with the management principles embodied in the Government Results 
and Performance Act of 1993 and further refined in the act's user 
guides and our prior reports. After assessing the management tools and 
reviewing our related guidelines, we discussed with DOD officials the 
management tools that were relevant to the transformation strategy. To 
assess whether DOD was using each management tool, we used relevant 
questions derived from our guidelines in analyzing pertinent documents 
such as the April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance, the 2003 Joint 
Transformation Roadmap issued in January 2004, and the January 2004 
Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan. We did not 
assess the extent to which each service's roadmap incorporated these 
management tools. We also discussed our results with appropriate DOD 
officials including the Office of Force Transformation, Joint Forces 
Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director for Program, 
Analysis and Evaluation, and OUSD Policy. Finally, to identify DOD 
estimates for transformation costs DOD-wide and costs for the joint 
capabilities described in the 2003 Joint Transformation Roadmap, we 
obtained cost estimates from official DOD reports. We assessed the 
reliability of the data by corroborating the data with knowledgeable 
agency officials and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for 
our purposes.

Organizations Visited for this Assignment:

Office of the Secretary of Defense:

* Office of Force Transformation:

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics:

* Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation:

Joint Chiefs of Staff:

* Joint Transformation Division, Operational Plans and Joint Force 
Development, J-7:

* Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J-8:

Joint Forces Command:

* Joint Experimentation Directorate, J-9:

* Joint Requirements and Integration and Division, J-8:

* Office of Prototype Oversight, Joint Training Directorate and Joint 
Warfighting Center, J-7:

* Strategy and Analysis Directorate, J-5:

We conducted our review from May 2003 through October 2004 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Robert L. Repasky (202) 512-9868:

Acknowledgments:

In addition to those named above, Brenda Waterfield, John Beauchamp, 
Dawn Godfrey, Mary Jo LaCasse, Sarah E. Veale, Elizabeth H. Curda, 
Cheryl A. Weissman, and David A. Mayfield made key contributions to 
this report.

[End of section]

Related GAO Products:

Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation 
for Achieving Greater Results. GAO-04-38. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 
2004.

Military Transformation: Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles Is Well 
Under Way, but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130 
Aircraft Need to Be Clarified. GAO-04-925. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 
2004.

Defense Acquisitions: The Global Information Grid and Challenges Facing 
Its Implementation. GAO-04-858. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2004.

Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved 
Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress 
Remain. GAO-04-547. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004.

Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency of 
DOD's Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 
2004.

Department of Defense: Further Actions Needed to Establish and 
Implement a Framework for Successful Financial and Business Management 
Transformation. GAO-04-551T. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2004.

Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.

Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements 
for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for 
Future Brigades. GAO-04-188. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.

Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 
Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 
2003.

Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army 
Stryker Brigades. GAO-03-801. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense. 
GAO-03-98. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide 
Perspective. GAO-03-95. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.

Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help Maintain Momentum 
of DOD's Strategic Human Capital Planning. GAO-03-237. Washington, 
D.C.: December 5, 2002.

Defense Acquisitions: Factors Affecting Outcomes of Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstrations. GAO-03-52. Washington, D.C.: December 2, 
2002.

Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Can Benefit from Better 
Analysis and Changes in Timing and Scope. GAO-03-13. Washington, D.C.: 
November 4, 2002.

Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD's Joint 
Experimentation Program. GAO-02-856. Washington, D.C.: August 29, 2002.

Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of 
Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.: May 
17, 2002.

Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its 
Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96. Washington, D.C.: 
November 16, 2001.

Military Transformation: Navy Efforts Should Be More Integrated and 
Focused. GAO-01-853. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2001.

Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems 
Challenges. GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001.

The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide to Assessing Agency Annual 
Performance Plans. GAO/GGD-10.1.20. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 1998.

Agencies' Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate 
Congressional Review (Version 1). GAO/GGD-10.1.16. Washington, D.C.: 
May 1, 1997.

FOOTNOTES

[1] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003).

[2] GAO, Department of Defense: Further Actions Needed to Establish and 
Implement a Framework for Successful Financial and Business Management 
Transformation, GAO-04-551T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004).

[3] Transformation Planning Guidance, Washington, D.C.: April 2003.

[4] GAO, Human Capital: Building on DOD's Reform Effort to Foster 
Governmentwide Improvements, GAO-03-851T (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 
2003).

[5] Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Office of Force 
Transformation, (Washington, D.C.: 2003).

[6] GAO-03-669.

[7] GAO-03-669.

[8] Congress enacted this legislation to provide for, among other 
things, the establishment of strategic planning and performance 
measurement in the federal government. See Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).

[9] The Director, Office of Force Transformation, advises the Secretary 
of Defense on transformation issues.

[10] Experimentation uses various types of assessments to develop, 
refine, and validate joint concepts and their associated capabilities. 
These activities vary in scale but are designed to identify areas to 
explore (that is, develop hypotheses) and then use simulated or live 
experiments to confirm, refute, or modify the ideas.

[11] The Future Years Defense Program is a DOD centralized report that 
provides information on DOD's current and planned outyear budget 
requests. 

[12] The Naval Transformation Roadmap represents the Navy and Marine 
Corps plan.

[13] Defense Agencies that are assigned wartime support missions are 
designated as Combat Support Agencies and include agencies such as the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Information Systems Agency, 
the Defense Logistics Agency, and the National Security Agency.

[14] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01D: Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System. March 12, 2004. 

[15] The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is an advisory council to 
assist the Chariman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and 
assessing the priority of joint military capabilities to meet the 
national military and defense strategies. Chariman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Instruction 5123.01B: Charter of the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council. April 15, 2004. 

[16] GAO-03-669.

[17] GAO-03-669.

[18] GAO-04-551T. 

[19] DOD defines "Executive Agent" as the Head of a DOD Component to 
whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has 
assigned specific responsibilities, functions and authorities to 
provide support..for designated activities that involve two or more 
DOD Components. DOD Directive 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent, Sec. 3.1, 
September 3, 2002. 

[20] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Transformation Roadmap 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 21, 2004).

[21] Hearings on Defense Transformation Before the House Committee on 
Armed Services: Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 
Capabilities, 108th Cong. 5,33 (2004) (statement of Arthur Cebrowski, 
Director, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense). 

[22] H.R. Rept. No. 108-491, pt.1, at Title X, p.355 (2004).

[23] H.R. Rept. No. 108-491, pt.1, at Title X, p.302 (2004).

[24] Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Joint 
Warfighting and Readiness: Management of Network Centric Warfare Within 
the Department of Defense, D-2004-091 (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 
2004).

[25] Network-centric warfare is collaborative information sharing 
linking sensors, decision makers, and shooters, which is intended to 
result in increased mission effectiveness.

[26] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: The Global Information Grid and 
Challenges Facing Its Implementation, GAO-04-858 (Washington, D.C.: 
July 28, 2004). 

[27] GAO, Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved 
Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress 
Remain, GAO-04-547 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004). 

[28] GAO, Force Structure: Enhanced Strategic Planning Can Enhance 
DOD's UAV Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004).

[29] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Factors Affecting Outcomes of Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstrations, GAO-03-52 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2, 
2002).

[30] C.A. Murdock et al, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a 
New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Mar. 2004). 

[31] Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team, Joint Defense Capabilities 
Study: Final Report (Washington, D.C.: December, 2003). 

[32] GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage 
DOD's Joint Experimentation Program, GAO-02-856 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 
29, 2002).

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