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the United States and Russia' which was released on November 19, 2004.

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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

November 2004:

Nuclear Nonproliferation:

DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-
Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and Russia:

GAO-05-57:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-57, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 
Senate: 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Many foreign nuclear research reactors use highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) fuel. Because HEU can be used in nuclear weapons, the Department 
of Energy (DOE) has two programs to return HEU from foreign reactors to 
either the United States or Russia. The U.S. fuel acceptance program 
includes HEU exported by the United States to 34 countries, 11 of which 
have returned all of their HEU. The program also includes low enriched 
uranium (LEU) fuel, which would be very difficult to use in a nuclear 
weapon. DOE imposes a fee on high-income countries to partially offset 
the cost of disposing of HEU and LEU fuel in the United States. Under 
the Russian fuel return program, DOE assists in the return of Russian-
origin HEU from 14 countries to Russia. GAO was asked to examine (1) 
the status of DOE efforts to recover remaining inventories of U.S.-
origin HEU and the extent to which the fees imposed on high-income 
countries support these efforts, and (2) the cost and time frame for 
completing the Russian fuel return program.

What GAO Found:

For a number of reasons, including the cost of converting reactors from 
HEU to LEU fuel, DOE has not reached agreement with reactor operators 
in 11 of the 23 countries that still have U.S.-origin HEU to return all 
of the HEU to the United States. In contrast, reactor operators in 12 
of the countries either have signed contracts with DOE to return all of 
their U.S.-origin HEU or are developing their own means of disposal. 
DOE is considering offering incentives to foreign research reactors to 
return their HEU to the United States but so far has not determined 
what incentives it will offer and to which countries. DOE has not 
revised the fees imposed on high-income countries since establishing 
the fuel acceptance program in 1996. However, DOE reserved the right to 
change the fees in response to changes in circumstances. While lowering 
the fees for returning HEU may encourage additional reactors to 
participate in the program, DOE could recover a greater portion of the 
disposal costs by raising the fees for accepting LEU.

DOE plans to complete the Russian fuel return program by 2009 and 
estimates the program could cost about $100 million, but this estimate 
and time frame may not be reliable because of uncertainties associated 
with planning future shipments. The shipments to date have all 
consisted of fresh (unused) HEU fuel, which DOE considers the highest 
priority for returning to Russia because it is more vulnerable to 
theft. DOE is facing delays in returning spent HEU fuel, which has been 
used in a reactor, in part because Russia is planning to conduct an 
environmental assessment for each shipment. DOE has asked Russia to 
conduct a single environmental assessment for the spent HEU fuel in all 
of the countries participating in the program to expedite future 
shipments of spent fuel, but so far Russia has not agreed to this. DOE 
is considering ways to accelerate the program that could also increase 
the cost of the program by more than $30 million.

Spent Research Reactor Fuel in Transport to a U.S. Disposal Facility: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that DOE (1) consider offering incentives to foreign 
research reactors to return HEU to the United States, including 
lowering fees for accepting HEU from high-income countries; and (2) 
evaluate raising fees for returning LEU to the United States to offset 
as much of the disposal costs as possible. DOE concurred with our 
recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-57.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Eleven of the 23 Countries with U.S.-Origin HEU Do Not Have Plans to 
Return It to the United States or Dispose of It Domestically:

DOE Plans to Complete the Return of HEU to Russia by 2009 at a Cost of 
about $100 Million:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Scope and Methodology:

Appendix I: Details of HEU and LEU Fuel Returned to the United States:

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:

Tables:

Table 1: Shipments of Fresh HEU Fuel to Russia:

Table 2: Countries That Do Not Currently Have Plans to Return All U.S.-
Origin HEU:

Table 3: HEU and LEU Fuel Returned to the United States, by Country, 
and Fees Paid by Research Reactor Operators in High-Income Countries:

Figures:

Figure 1: Example of a Research Reactor Fuel Assembly:

Figure 2: 34 Countries with U.S.-origin HEU Included in DOE's Fuel 
Acceptance Program:

Figure 3: Facility in the Netherlands for Storage of Spent Fuel from 
Research and Power Reactors:

Abbreviations:

DOE: Department of Energy:
FRR SNF: Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance 
program: 
HEU: highly enriched uranium: 
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency: 
IG: Office of Inspector General: 
LEU: low enriched uranium: 
MCC: Material Consolidation and Conversion project: 
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration: 
RERTR: Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program: 
RRRFR: Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return program:

United States Government Accountability Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

November 19, 2004:

The Honorable Pat Roberts: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Civilian nuclear research reactors around the world use and store 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. The reactors are used in medicine, 
agriculture, and industry and for basic scientific research. The United 
States and the Soviet Union began providing the HEU used by many of 
these reactors in the 1950s. HEU can also be used as a key component in 
making a nuclear weapon. As a result, the United States has a long-
standing nonproliferation goal of reducing the amount of HEU that is 
used and stored at these reactors. To accomplish this goal, the 
Department of Energy (DOE) has established three programs: one program 
to convert the reactors from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, 
which is considered to be less of a proliferation threat because it is 
very difficult to use in nuclear weapons, and two related programs to 
take back HEU from foreign research reactors for safe storage and 
disposal in either the United States or Russia, depending on the HEU's 
origin.

We reported on DOE's progress in implementing the first program--the 
Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program--in 
July 2004.[Footnote 1] Since 1978, the goal of this program has been to 
get research reactors around the world to convert from HEU fuel to LEU 
fuel. In our report, we found, among other things, that 66 of the 105 
research reactors included in the program continue to use HEU fuel for 
a number of reasons, including lack of funding for conversion to LEU 
and technical setbacks in developing LEU fuels to replace HEU. We 
recommended that DOE evaluate the costs and benefits of providing 
additional incentives to foreign research reactor operators to convert 
to LEU. DOE's two related programs for returning HEU to the United 
States or Russia are the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Acceptance (FRR SNF) program, created in 1996, and the Russian Research 
Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) program.[Footnote 2] DOE began discussions 
with Russia on the Russian fuel return program in 1999 and signed a 
bilateral agreement in 2004. Figure 1 shows an example of a fuel 
assembly used in a research reactor.

Figure 1: Example of a Research Reactor Fuel Assembly:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

DOE's fuel acceptance program is designed to return U.S.-origin HEU 
from 34 countries to the United States for safe storage and disposal 
and to encourage foreign research reactors to convert to LEU fuel. 
Currently, 11 of the 34 countries have returned all of the HEU to the 
United States, and 23 still possess U.S.-origin HEU fuel. The scope of 
the fuel acceptance program includes an estimated 5,000 kilograms of 
HEU that the United States exported to research reactors in the 34 
countries as well as an estimated 15,000 kilograms of LEU. DOE included 
LEU fuel in the scope of the program, even though LEU does not pose the 
same proliferation risk as HEU, because operators of many foreign 
research reactors had no other way to dispose of LEU fuel. Reactor 
operators need a means to dispose of spent fuel, and by including LEU 
in the fuel acceptance program, DOE provides operators of foreign 
research reactors with an assured means of disposing of spent fuel even 
after converting to LEU.

DOE imposes a fee on research reactors in high-income countries (as 
defined by the World Bank), such as the Netherlands and Japan, to 
offset as much as possible the cost of fuel disposal in the United 
States. The fees were not intended to cover the full cost of managing 
foreign research reactor spent fuel or the long-term cost of permanent 
disposal; DOE kept the fees low to encourage research reactor operators 
to participate in the program. DOE reserved the right to modify the 
fees at any time in response to a change in circumstances, including 
the cost of managing the fuel in the United States. The fees charged to 
reactors in high-income countries, which were established in 1996, do 
not exceed $3,750 to $4,500 per kilogram of LEU (depending on where in 
the United States the LEU is shipped) and $4,500 per kilogram of HEU. 
DOE generally charges less for LEU fuel to avoid penalizing foreign 
reactors that convert to LEU. DOE does not impose fees on research 
reactors in non-high-income countries and, in addition, pays for most 
of the cost of transporting their spent fuel to the United States in 
order to encourage them to participate in the program.

DOE originally planned for the fuel acceptance program to end in 2009. 
DOE had anticipated that by 2009 operators of foreign research reactors 
would have made their own arrangements for managing U.S.-origin spent 
fuel, such as commercial reprocessing (a method for treating fuel prior 
to final disposal) or development of domestic disposal facilities, 
thereby eliminating the need to return the fuel to the United States. 
However, one of the LEU fuels developed by the RERTR program cannot be 
easily reprocessed, hindering efforts to dispose of spent LEU fuel 
other than by returning it to the United States. To assist foreign 
research reactors in developing other spent fuel management options, 
DOE's RERTR program is working to develop a new reprocessable LEU fuel 
that foreign reactor operators can switch to once it is developed and 
available commercially. In 2003, a group of foreign research reactor 
operators petitioned DOE to extend the program beyond 2009, citing 
technical setbacks in the development of a reprocessable LEU fuel. The 
reactor operators feared the expiration of DOE's fuel acceptance 
program and the delay in developing a new LEU fuel would leave reactors 
without a way to dispose of spent fuel. In April 2004, the Secretary of 
Energy announced his intention to extend the U.S. fuel acceptance 
program beyond the original 2009 end date. DOE is considering extending 
the program by 5 or 10 years to support the reactor operators that have 
converted their reactors to LEU.

DOE's final program, aimed at facilitating the return of HEU to Russia, 
has identified research reactors in 17 countries (mostly in the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) that have Russian-origin fuel. DOE 
pays the cost of transporting and disposing of HEU fuel in Russia. The 
Secretary of Energy has estimated that there are about 4,000 kilograms 
of Russian-origin fuel in the 17 countries.[Footnote 3] So far, DOE has 
provided assistance to return about 100 kilograms of fresh (unused) HEU 
fuel from 5 countries (Bulgaria, Libya, Romania, Serbia, and 
Uzbekistan) for storage at two nuclear facilities in Russia--
Dmitrovgrad and Novosibirsk. In addition, DOE plans to pay Russia to 
"blend down" the HEU returned to Dmitrovgrad to LEU, thereby reducing 
the risk that the material could be used in a nuclear weapon. In 
return, operators of foreign research reactors with Russian-origin HEU 
fuel must agree to shut down or convert their reactors to LEU.

In response to your request, we examined DOE efforts to recover HEU 
fuel from foreign research reactors and assessed (1) the status of DOE 
efforts to return remaining inventories of U.S.-origin HEU for storage 
and disposal in the United States and the extent to which the fees DOE 
imposes on high-income countries support these efforts, and (2) DOE's 
estimate of the cost and time frame for completing the Russian fuel 
return program.

To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation from both 
programs, including inventories of HEU fuel and data on fuel returned 
to date. We also analyzed DOE data on expenditures in support of the 
fuel acceptance program and fees paid by reactors in high-income 
countries to return their fuel to the United States. To obtain 
information on how the program is working, we interviewed operators of 
research reactors in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, and Ukraine. We discussed the status of the programs 
with DOE and Russian officials and with officials in the other 
countries we visited. We conducted our review from July 2003 to October 
2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards.

Results in Brief:

DOE has not reached agreement with research reactor operators in 11 of 
the 23 countries that still have U.S.-origin HEU to return all of the 
HEU to the United States. Reactor operators in the 11 countries have 
not made arrangements to return the HEU for a number of reasons, 
including the cost of conversion to LEU. For example, some reactor 
operators are planning to use their HEU, despite DOE's efforts to 
encourage them to convert their reactors to LEU fuel and return the HEU 
fuel to the United States, because they do not want to incur the 
expense of paying for conversion. In addition, in some high-income 
countries such as Austria, the cost of returning the HEU (including 
transportation) may be a factor in not making plans to return the 
material to the United States. DOE is considering offering further 
incentives to reactor operators to convert to LEU and return their HEU 
to the United States but thus far has not determined what incentives it 
will offer and to which countries. Finally, informal diplomatic 
approaches to discuss the return of HEU from research reactors in Iran 
and Pakistan have been unsuccessful. In contrast, operators of reactors 
in 12 of the 23 countries that still have U.S.-origin HEU either have 
signed contracts with DOE to return all of the HEU to the United States 
by 2009 or are developing their own means to dispose of HEU fuel. We 
recommend that DOE consider offering incentives to foreign research 
reactors to return HEU to the United States, including lowering the 
fees for returning HEU.

Furthermore, while DOE has proposed extending the time frame of the 
fuel acceptance program by 5 or 10 years, it has not revised the fees 
it charges to research reactors in high-income countries since 
establishing the program in 1996. DOE set the fees at a level to 
encourage the reactors to convert to LEU fuel and return HEU rather 
than to cover the disposal cost in the United States. However, when DOE 
set the fees, it reserved the right to change them in response to 
changes in circumstances. For example, with the proposed extension of 
the program, the United States would accept larger quantities of LEU 
from foreign research reactors than originally planned. According to 
DOE and State Department officials, failure to extend the fuel 
acceptance program would penalize operators of research reactors that 
the United States encouraged to convert to LEU because the only 
currently available option for disposing of the type of LEU fuel used 
by some reactors is returning it to the United States. Nevertheless, 
the proposed extension could justify an increase in the fees charged to 
high-income countries. While lowering the fees for returning HEU may 
encourage additional countries to participate in the program, DOE could 
recover a greater portion of the cost of the program by raising the 
fees for accepting LEU. We recommend that DOE evaluate raising the fees 
for countries returning LEU to the United States.

DOE plans to complete the Russian fuel return program by 2009 and 
estimates the program could cost about $100 million, but this estimate 
and time frame may not be reliable because of uncertainties associated 
with planning future shipments. The shipments to date have all 
consisted of fresh (unused) HEU fuel, which DOE considers the highest 
priority for returning to Russia because it is less radioactive than 
spent fuel and therefore easier to handle and potentially steal. DOE 
has targeted four more countries for removal of fresh HEU by 2005. 
However, DOE has not provided assistance to return spent HEU fuel to 
Russia from any of the countries. The Russian fuel return program is 
facing delays in returning spent fuel because Russia is planning to 
conduct an environmental assessment for each shipment, and complex 
negotiations are needed to arrange some shipments. DOE has asked Russia 
to conduct a single environmental assessment for all spent fuel in all 
the countries that are participating in the program, which would help 
expedite future shipments of spent fuel, but so far Russia has not 
agreed to this. DOE officials said they expect shipments of spent fuel, 
which is more difficult to dispose of, to cost more than fresh fuel 
shipments. While DOE has spent about $1.5 million in support of four of 
the shipments of fresh HEU fuel, Russia's estimate of the 
transportation and disposal costs for the first shipment of spent fuel, 
from Uzbekistan, is $5.7 million. Furthermore, according to DOE 
officials, Russia has not agreed to a fixed fee for accepting future 
shipments of spent fuel because the costs of managing the fuel in 
Russia could increase. DOE is considering ways to accelerate the 
Russian fuel return program, such as purchasing a cask with a larger 
capacity for transporting HEU fuel than currently available casks and 
developing a new technology to dilute spent HEU fuel into LEU before 
shipping it to Russia. DOE officials estimate that these options could 
also increase the cost of the program by more than $30 million.

Background:

Civilian nuclear research reactors located throughout the world 
contribute to the development of nuclear power, basic and applied 
science, and isotope production for medicine and industry. While many 
of the reactors use LEU fuel, others use or have inventories of HEU. 
The fuel acceptance program and Russian fuel return program are part of 
the Global Threat Reduction Initiative announced by the Secretary of 
Energy in a speech on May 26, 2004, to secure, remove, or dispose of a 
broad range of nuclear and radiological materials that are vulnerable 
to theft. The programs also benefit foreign research reactors by 
providing them with a way to dispose of spent fuel.

DOE's fuel acceptance program identified 34 countries with U.S.-origin 
HEU eligible for return to the United States. Research reactors in 11 
of the 34 countries have returned all of the HEU to the United States. 
In the remaining 23 countries, 11 have returned a portion of their 
U.S.-origin HEU, and 12 have not returned any HEU (see fig. 2). In 
total, DOE estimates it has recovered 914 kilograms of HEU fuel, enough 
to build an estimated 20 nuclear weapons.[Footnote 4] (See app. I for a 
list of the countries that have returned HEU and LEU fuel to the United 
States and the amount returned.)

Figure 2: 34 Countries with U.S.-origin HEU Included in DOE's Fuel 
Acceptance Program:

[See PDF for image]

Notes: In addition to the 34 countries with U.S.-origin HEU, the United 
States exported LEU (but not HEU) to 7 countries--Bangladesh, Congo, 
Finland,A Malaysia, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The amount of HEU 
exported to some of the countries is small. For example, Indonesia has 
a small amount of HEU used for the production of medical isotopes as 
well as LEU fuel (but not HEU fuel), and the research reactor in 
Jamaica has only a small amount of HEU fuel located in the core of the 
reactor.

[A] High-income countries at the beginning of the fuel acceptance 
program in 1996. According to DOE officials, Greece, Portugal, and 
South Korea are now also considered high-income countries.

[End of figure]

The fuel returned to the United States is mostly stored at DOE's 
Savannah River Site, with a small portion also stored at DOE's Idaho 
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. DOE anticipates that 
it will ship the fuel to the geologic repository at Yucca Mountain in 
Nevada for final disposal, assuming the facility is completed as 
planned. DOE completed an environmental impact statement and 
established the fuel acceptance program in 1996.[Footnote 5] The fuel 
acceptance program is a continuation of previous programs that allowed 
foreign research reactors to dispose of U.S.-origin fuel in the United 
States.

In a February 2004 review, DOE's Office of Inspector General (IG) found 
that DOE was likely to recover about half of the HEU eligible under the 
fuel acceptance program, in part because the participation of countries 
with U.S.-origin fuel is voluntary and some countries have chosen not 
to participate.[Footnote 6] Furthermore, the IG found that the program 
did not include another 12,300 kilograms of HEU that the United States 
had exported because DOE, when establishing the fuel acceptance program 
in 1996, limited the types of fuel that would be eligible for return. 
The IG recommended that DOE determine whether the fuel acceptance 
program should be expanded to include all HEU exported by the United 
States and whether improvements could be made to encourage greater 
participation of countries that have HEU fuel covered by the program. 
The IG also recommended that DOE determine whether the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) could more effectively manage the 
program, which is currently being managed by DOE's Office of 
Environmental Management. In response, the Secretary of Energy 
announced that the program would be transferred to NNSA and combined 
with DOE's Russian fuel return program, already being managed by NNSA. 
According to DOE officials, DOE plans to address, through a separate 
program, the IG recommendation regarding U.S.-origin HEU not currently 
covered under the fuel acceptance program because returning additional 
inventories of HEU to the United States would require an analysis of 
environmental impacts, including how the material would be stored. DOE 
officials said they do not want to delay the proposed extension of the 
fuel acceptance program in order to allow time to conduct such an 
analysis.

DOE has identified 17 countries with Russian-origin fuel, 14 of which 
have HEU fuel that DOE has included under the Russian fuel return 
program. The 14 countries are Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Libya, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.[Footnote 7] Two countries, Germany 
and Romania, have both U.S-origin and Russian-origin HEU fuel.

DOE has provided funding and technical assistance for shipments of 
about 100 kilograms of fresh HEU fuel to Russia from 5 countries--
Bulgaria, Libya, Romania, Serbia, and Uzbekistan. (The State Department 
and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a private foundation, also 
participated in the removal of HEU from Serbia.) The fresh HEU fuel 
from Bulgaria, Libya, Serbia, and Uzbekistan was shipped to the 
Research Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dmitrovgrad for downblending 
into LEU to reduce the risk of the material being used in a nuclear 
weapon.[Footnote 8] As of October 2004, DOE had signed a contract with 
Dmitrovgrad to downblend the HEU from Serbia and was negotiating 
contracts to downblend the HEU from Bulgaria, Libya, and Uzbekistan. A 
DOE official estimated that Dmitrovgrad would complete the downblending 
of the HEU from Serbia by spring 2005, after resolving technical 
difficulties encountered in the downblending process. DOE officials 
said that the HEU fuel from Romania was sent to the Novosibirsk site in 
Russia, because the Dmitrovgrad facility did not have the technical 
capability to downblend the HEU fuel from Romania. (Table 1 summarizes 
the five shipments of fresh HEU to Russia.)

Table 1: Shipments of Fresh HEU Fuel to Russia:

Country: Serbia; 
Date shipped: August 2002; 
Amount (kilograms): 48; 
Status: In storage at Dmitrovgrad; anticipated to be downblended to LEU 
by spring 2005.

Country: Romania; 
Date shipped: September 2003; 
Amount (kilograms): 14; 
Status: Cannot be downblended at Dmitrovgrad; sent to Novosibirsk 
instead.

Country: Bulgaria; 
Date shipped: December 2003; 
Amount (kilograms): 17; 
Status: In storage at Dmitrovgrad; contract for downblending under 
negotiation.

Country: Libya; 
Date shipped: March 2004; 
Amount (kilograms): 16; 
Status: In storage at Dmitrovgrad; contract for downblending under 
negotiation.

Country: Uzbekistan; 
Date shipped: September 2004; 
Amount (kilograms): 3; 
Status: In storage at Dmitrovgrad; contract for downblending under 
negotiation. 

Sources: DOE and International Atomic Energy Agency.

[End of table]

Unlike DOE's fuel acceptance program, the Russian fuel return program 
does not include LEU fuel because DOE does not consider LEU a 
proliferation risk. DOE cooperates with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the State Department to implement the Russian fuel 
return program. For example, IAEA conducts fact-finding missions in 
preparation for fuel shipments with assistance from DOE.

Eleven of the 23 Countries with U.S.-Origin HEU Do Not Have Plans to 
Return It to the United States or Dispose of It Domestically:

DOE has not reached agreement with research reactor operators in 11 of 
the 23 countries that still have U.S.-origin HEU to return all of the 
HEU to the United States. The reactor operators have not made 
arrangements to return the HEU for a number of reasons, including the 
cost of conversion to LEU. DOE is considering offering incentives to 
reactor operators to convert to LEU and return their HEU to the United 
States but thus far has not determined what incentives it will offer 
and to which countries. In contrast, reactor operators in 12 of the 23 
countries that still have U.S.-origin HEU either have signed contracts 
with DOE to return all of the HEU to the United States by 2009 or are 
developing their own means to dispose of HEU fuel.

DOE has proposed extending the fuel acceptance program by 5 or 10 
years, but the fees imposed on research reactors in high-income 
countries have not been changed since 1996. According to DOE and State 
Department officials, DOE's proposed extension of the time frame of the 
fuel acceptance program would benefit operators of research reactors 
that the United States encouraged to convert to LEU because the only 
currently available option for disposing of the type of LEU fuel used 
by some reactors is returning it to the United States. The extension of 
the program will primarily result in more LEU being returned to the 
United States by reactors that have converted to LEU fuel that cannot 
be reprocessed. DOE set the fees at a level to encourage reactor 
operators to convert to LEU fuel and return HEU rather than to cover 
the disposal cost in the United States. However, DOE reserved the right 
to change the fees in response to changes in circumstances.

Countries Are Not Returning All of the HEU because They Are Planning to 
Use It in Research Reactors or Lack Funding:

Operators of research reactors in 11 of the 23 countries that still 
have U.S.-origin HEU have not made arrangements to return the HEU for a 
number of reasons. (Table 2 lists the 11 countries that do not have 
plans to return all of their U.S.-origin HEU and the current status of 
any decision to participate in the fuel acceptance program.) Research 
reactors in some of the countries do not plan to continue using the HEU 
but have not reached an agreement with DOE on returning it to the 
United States. For example, according to a DOE official, the operator 
of a university research reactor in Austria would like to return its 
HEU to the United States but lacks funding for transportation. 
According to the official, DOE hopes to combine Austria's remaining HEU 
with a shipment of spent fuel from Greece or Turkey to reduce the 
transportation cost to the operator of the Austrian reactor.

Table 2: Countries That Do Not Currently Have Plans to Return All U.S.-
Origin HEU:

Country: Austria; 
Status: One research reactor has returned all of its HEU to the United 
States, but two additional reactors still have HEU-- one has shut down 
but not finalized plans for returning HEU, and another has not made a 
decision to complete conversion to LEU and return HEU.

Country: Indonesia; 
Status: Research reactor has agreed to stop using HEU for medical 
isotope production by 2006 and return LEU fuel, but plans for returning 
HEU are not finalized.

Country: Iran; 
Status: Research reactor has converted to LEU but there are no plans to 
return HEU.

Country: Israel; 
Status: No plans to convert research reactor to LEU and return HEU.

Country: Jamaica; 
Status: No plans to convert research reactor to LEU and return HEU.

Country: Japan; 
Status: Most Japanese research reactors are returning HEU, but two 
reactors do not have plans to convert to LEU and return HEU.

Country: Mexico; 
Status: No plans to convert research reactor to LEU and return HEU.

Country: Pakistan; 
Status: Research reactor has converted to LEU but there are no plans to 
return HEU.

Country: South Africa; 
Status: Conversion of research reactor to LEU is under consideration.

Country: South Korea; 
Status: Research reactor has shut down and returned spent HEU fuel but 
not agreed to return fresh HEU.

Country: Turkey; 
Status: Conversion of research reactor to LEU is under consideration 
(reactor has partially converted). 

Sources: DOE and State Department.

[End of table]

Other research reactor operators have not made a decision to convert 
their reactors to LEU. For example, operators of research reactors in 
Jamaica and Mexico may continue using their HEU fuel, which is 
sufficient to last many years. Similarly, while most research reactors 
in Japan have returned U.S.-origin HEU fuel, two Japanese research 
reactors have not made plans to convert to LEU fuel and participate in 
the fuel acceptance program. As we reported in our July 2004 review of 
the RERTR program, while operators of some foreign research reactors 
have agreed to fund conversion of their reactors from HEU to LEU, 
others either do not want to incur the additional cost of conversion or 
do not have the necessary funding.[Footnote 9] Research reactor 
operators in South Africa and Turkey are considering converting to LEU, 
which could lead to returning U.S.-origin HEU to the United States. 
(The research reactor operator in Turkey has partially converted the 
reactor to LEU fuel but must completely convert before it can return 
its HEU. However, the reactor operator does not currently have the LEU 
fuel needed to complete the conversion process.)

In Iran, Israel, and Pakistan, DOE relies on State Department 
diplomatic efforts to encourage the countries to participate in the 
fuel acceptance program. Each of the three countries has one research 
reactor with U.S.-origin HEU fuel. The research reactors in Iran and 
Pakistan have converted to LEU fuel, but according to a State 
Department official, informal approaches to discuss the possible return 
of HEU from these two countries have been unsuccessful. The official 
said that recovering the HEU from Iran and Pakistan would require a 
political breakthrough similar to ones that enabled DOE to facilitate 
the removal of HEU from Serbia and Libya under the Russian fuel return 
program in August 2002 and March 2004, respectively. The State 
Department official said that the operators of the Israeli research 
reactor have expressed interest in converting their reactor to LEU, 
which would be the first step in possibly returning the HEU to the 
United States. However, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the international 
body that governs the export of nuclear technologies, prohibits the 
export of LEU fuel to Israel.[Footnote 10] Therefore, unless the 
reactor shuts down, it will likely continue to use its supply of HEU 
fuel rather than return it to the United States.

DOE is considering whether to offer additional incentives to the 
reactor operators that have not agreed to return HEU to the United 
States to encourage their participation in the fuel acceptance program. 
According to a State Department official, such incentives could 
influence some research reactors that are not participating in the fuel 
return program to return their HEU to the United States. For example, 
DOE could offer to purchase LEU fuel to replace HEU fuel that is still 
being used in the reactors. The State Department official said that if 
a research reactor agrees to shut down rather than convert to LEU, DOE 
could offer other incentives, such as research grants.

Operators of research reactors in 12 of the 23 countries that still 
have U.S.-origin HEU fuel have either agreed to return the material to 
the United States or are developing alternative disposal options. DOE 
officials said they have signed contracts with reactor operators in 
Australia, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Romania, and Taiwan to return 
their U.S.-origin HEU to the United States by 2009, the original end 
date of the fuel acceptance program. As part of these arrangements, the 
reactor operators in these countries have agreed to convert to LEU fuel 
or shut the reactors down by 2006. For example, Australia is building a 
new research reactor that uses LEU fuel to replace an older research 
reactor, scheduled to be shut down, that previously used HEU. The 
reactor operator in Romania has agreed to return its HEU after it 
receives new LEU fuel, which is currently being manufactured, to 
replace the HEU. Six countries--Argentina, Belgium, Canada, France, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--are developing alternatives to 
disposing of U.S.-origin HEU in the United States. DOE officials said 
they support the efforts of these countries to develop their own means 
of disposal. For example, Argentina has reached an agreement with DOE 
to blend down part of its remaining inventory of U.S.-origin HEU for 
fabrication into LEU fuel for use in Argentina's research reactors. As 
part of this agreement, the one remaining research reactor in Argentina 
that currently uses HEU fuel will convert to LEU fuel and ship its HEU 
fuel to the United States. In Belgium, a reactor operator is sending 
spent U.S.-origin HEU fuel to France for reprocessing, which includes 
diluting the HEU into LEU and returning radioactive waste to Belgium 
for long-term disposal in an underground repository. As another example 
of a country that is developing an alternative means of disposal, the 
Netherlands has returned some of its U.S.-origin HEU and also completed 
a storage facility in 2003 for the disposal of nuclear waste, including 
spent fuel from research and power reactors located in the country. The 
facility is designed to store the spent fuel for 100 years (see fig. 
3).

Figure 3: Facility in the Netherlands for Storage of Spent Fuel from 
Research and Power Reactors:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

DOE Has Not Revised Fees to Account for Changes in the Fuel Acceptance 
Program:

DOE has not revised the fees it charges to research reactors in high-
income countries since 1996. DOE reserved the right to change these 
fees if circumstances changed, and in fact, a number of changes will 
affect the costs of the program.[Footnote 11] Among the changes that 
will affect the costs of the fuel acceptance program is the proposed 
extension of the program, which would primarily result in more LEU 
being returned to the United States by reactors that have converted to 
LEU fuel that cannot be reprocessed. According to DOE and State 
Department officials, DOE's proposed extension will help reactor 
operators that the United States encouraged to convert to LEU because 
the only currently available option for disposing of the LEU fuel 
(other than in countries such as the Netherlands that have developed 
their own means of disposal) is returning it to the United States. For 
example, research reactor operators in Australia, Germany, Japan, and 
Sweden petitioned DOE to extend the program beyond 2009, so that they 
would have a way to dispose of LEU fuel. A number of the reactor 
operators have either converted to LEU fuel or, in the case of 
Australia, are building a new research reactor that uses LEU fuel to 
replace an older reactor that used HEU fuel.

DOE's primary objective when setting the fees in 1996 was to keep them 
low enough to encourage research reactors to return HEU to the United 
States rather than to cover the full cost of disposing foreign research 
reactors' spent fuel in the United States. For example, DOE set the 
fees at a rate competitive with the estimated cost of reprocessing, so 
that reactor operators would choose to participate in the program 
rather than reprocess spent fuel. Furthermore, DOE set the fees it 
charges for accepting LEU from research reactors in high-income 
countries at a level to encourage the reactors to convert to LEU. 
However, DOE also decided when setting the fees that it would try to 
recover as much of the cost of managing spent fuel from foreign 
research reactors as possible. For this reason, DOE reserved the right 
to revise the fees in response to changes in circumstances, including 
the cost of managing spent fuel in the United States. The fees paid by 
research reactors in high-income countries have covered about 84 
percent of DOE's expenditures for the fuel acceptance program through 
fiscal year 2004. From fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2004, DOE 
received $97.3 million in fees from research reactors in high-income 
countries for disposal of HEU and LEU fuel in the United 
States.[Footnote 12] In comparison, DOE estimates that it spent $116.1 
million from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2004 to implement the 
fuel acceptance program. These expenditures include the cost of 
transporting spent fuel from research reactors in non-high-income 
countries and part of the cost of operating the facilities where fuel 
is placed in interim storage but not the permanent disposal costs. (See 
app. I for a list of the fees paid by research reactors in high-income 
countries.) DOE officials agreed that given changes in the fuel 
acceptance program, including the proposed extension of the program by 
5 or 10 years, reassessing the fees charged to research reactors in 
high-income countries is warranted.

DOE Plans to Complete the Return of HEU to Russia by 2009 at a Cost of 
about $100 Million:

DOE plans to complete the Russian fuel return program by 2009 and 
estimates the program could cost about $100 million, but this estimate 
and time frame may not be reliable because of uncertainties associated 
with planning future fuel shipments. The program is facing delays in 
returning spent HEU fuel because Russia is planning to conduct an 
environmental assessment for each shipment of spent HEU fuel, and 
complex negotiations are needed to arrange some shipments. DOE supports 
Russia's efforts to examine the environmental impacts of returning 
spent HEU fuel to Russia. DOE has asked Russia to conduct a single 
environmental assessment for all spent fuel in all of the countries 
participating in the program, which would help expedite future 
shipments of spent fuel, but so far, Russia has not agreed to this. 
Furthermore, according to DOE officials, Russia has not agreed to a 
fixed fee for accepting future shipments of spent fuel because the 
costs of managing the fuel in Russia could increase. DOE is considering 
ways to accelerate the Russian fuel return program that could also 
increase the cost of the program by more than $30 million.

DOE's Cost Estimate Is Uncertain because Russia Plans to Set the Price 
for Shipments of Spent HEU Fuel on a Case-By-Case Basis:

DOE's estimate for completing the program for $100 million is subject 
to a number of uncertainties, including the cost of returning spent HEU 
fuel to Russia. DOE officials said they expect shipments of spent fuel, 
which is more difficult to dispose of, to cost more than fresh fuel 
shipments. For example, Russia's estimate of the transportation and 
disposal costs for the shipment of spent fuel from Uzbekistan is $5.7 
million. This amount includes the cost of transportation, security, and 
storage of the spent HEU fuel in Russia as well as a spent fuel 
management fee, which pays for improvements to store the fuel in an 
environmentally safe manner. According to DOE officials, Russia has not 
agreed to a fixed fee for accepting future shipments of spent fuel 
because the costs of managing the fuel in Russia could increase. While 
DOE officials said the fees paid to Russia do not include profit, the 
terms of the agreement between DOE and Russia stipulate that the United 
States or a third party will pay the costs of returning HEU to Russia.

On the other hand, the cost of returning fresh HEU fuel to Russia is 
more certain. DOE officials estimate that each shipment generally costs 
about $400,000. In addition, the DOE official in charge of the Material 
Consolidation and Conversion project, which pays for downblending the 
HEU fuel shipped to Dmitrovgrad in Russia, said that DOE has a stable 
price that it pays for downblending the fuel into LEU. DOE's Russian 
fuel return program has so far spent about $1.5 million in support of 
four of the shipments of fresh HEU fuel to Russia.[Footnote 13]

Environmental Assessments and Other Factors Could Cause Delays:

One of the main uncertainties in DOE's plan to complete the Russian 
fuel return program by 2009 is the schedule for shipping spent HEU fuel 
to Russia. DOE has not yet provided assistance to return spent HEU 
fuel.[Footnote 14] According to DOE officials, the main obstacle is 
Russia's requirement that an environmental assessment be conducted 
prior to each shipment of spent fuel, which has been irradiated in a 
reactor and is therefore more radioactive and difficult to dispose of 
than fresh fuel. For example, DOE signed an agreement with Uzbekistan 
in March 2002 to begin work on returning spent HEU fuel to Russia, but 
as of July 2004, the Russian government had not completed the 
environmental assessment for the shipment. Russian officials told us 
that future environmental assessments would take less time. However, if 
a similar amount of time is required for future assessments, spent fuel 
shipments could be delayed. DOE officials said they have asked the 
Russian government to conduct a single environmental assessment for the 
entire scope of the program in order to expedite future shipments of 
spent fuel. Such an assessment could be similar to the one DOE 
conducted prior to initiating the U.S. fuel acceptance program. DOE's 
assessment conducted for the fuel acceptance program identified the 
major components required to complete the program, including the total 
amount of HEU fuel, U.S. ports where the fuel would be shipped, and 
where and how the fuel would be disposed of. However, so far the 
Russian government has not agreed to such an assessment.

The schedule for the Russian fuel return program also depends on the 
level of cooperation in the countries where Russian-origin HEU fuel is 
located. In coordination with Russia and IAEA, DOE prioritized 
shipments of fresh HEU to Russia based on the amount of HEU located at 
a facility and security concerns in the region. However, DOE officials 
said they have acted quickly to take advantage of opportunities that 
arise to remove HEU fuel from a facility. For example, DOE removed 
fresh HEU fuel from Libya in March 2004, after the country unexpectedly 
agreed to participate in the program. Similarly, Romanian officials 
told us that high-level support within the Romanian government for the 
Russian fuel return program resulted in the shipment of HEU taking 
place very quickly. DOE officials said that other countries with 
Russian-origin HEU might be reluctant to participate in the Russian 
fuel return program. For example, DOE officials said they had 
encountered difficulties in negotiating with Belarus and Kazakhstan on 
returning their inventories of HEU to Russia. A Russian official also 
told us that Belarus has no intention of returning fresh HEU to Russia. 
Similarly, according to DOE officials, a facility in Ukraine hopes to 
build a new research reactor that would be fueled by its inventory of 
Russian-origin HEU. If the facility decides not to return its HEU to 
Russia, DOE would try to work with the facility to downblend it into 
LEU.

Another factor that affects DOE's schedule for the Russian fuel return 
program is the development of new LEU fuels to replace HEU in research 
reactors that cannot convert to currently available LEU fuels. In our 
July 2004 report on the RERTR program, we identified several research 
reactors that use Russian-origin HEU fuel that cannot currently convert 
to LEU. For example, a research reactor in Poland is waiting for the 
development of a new LEU fuel before it can convert. However, the 
projected completion of a replacement LEU fuel has been delayed from 
2006 until 2010 as a result of technical setbacks in the development 
process. DOE officials said that rather than try to return the fresh 
HEU fuel from these reactors to Russia before a replacement LEU fuel is 
available, the Russian fuel return program would return the HEU as 
spent fuel, after it is used up in the reactors. Consequently, although 
DOE officials have said they plan to return all fresh HEU to Russia by 
2005, some Russian-supplied research reactors that cannot convert to 
currently available LEU fuels could continue to store fresh HEU fuel 
after that date. (DOE has identified 4 countries for removal of fresh 
HEU by 2005--Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.)

DOE Is Considering Ways to Accelerate the Return of HEU to Russia:

DOE has developed proposals for accelerating the Russian fuel return 
program that could increase the cost of the program by over $30 
million. DOE would like to complete the program by 2009, 4 years sooner 
than its original time frame of 2013. According to DOE officials, one 
possibility is to purchase casks that could be used to transport spent 
HEU fuel by air rather than by train and would also be able to hold 
more fuel, requiring fewer shipments. While the shipments of fresh HEU 
fuel to date have all been by air, currently DOE and Russia do not have 
access to casks that are qualified according to IAEA standards for 
shipment of spent fuel by air. Without the high-capacity casks, DOE 
must transport spent fuel by train. DOE estimates that the high-
capacity casks would require a one-time expenditure of $5.5 million.

DOE officials also said they are considering a "mobile melt-and-dilute" 
system for transforming spent HEU fuel into blocks of LEU. The 
equipment for this system could be transported to reactors that possess 
spent HEU fuel and be used to blend down the HEU on site, without 
returning the fuel to Russia. DOE would use the system as a stopgap 
measure in response to potential delays in returning spent HEU fuel to 
Russia, alleviating security concerns at foreign research reactors with 
Russian-origin spent HEU. DOE officials said they anticipate that the 
LEU blocks could then be returned to Russia at a later date. 
Development of the system has begun at DOE's Savannah River Site, but 
DOE has not yet decided whether to seek funding for this proposal.

DOE had hoped to facilitate the return of spent HEU fuel to Russia by 
using casks that are currently used to store Russian-origin spent HEU 
fuel in Germany. DOE officials said that, with Germany's cooperation, 
the Russian fuel return program would first provide assistance for 
returning spent HEU fuel from Germany to Russia and then reuse the 
casks for shipments of spent HEU from other countries. However, the 
German government has not agreed to participate in the Russian fuel 
return program. In a December 2000 letter to IAEA, Germany cited a 
number of issues that would require clarification before it would agree 
to participate in the program, including how spent HEU fuel returned to 
Russia would be safeguarded and disposed of. Officials at the site in 
Germany where the HEU is stored said they would be willing to 
participate in the Russian fuel return program and that returning the 
HEU would reduce the need for security at the facility. However, German 
government officials told us that Germany plans to dispose of its 
Russian-origin spent HEU fuel domestically and keep the casks for long-
term storage of the fuel. One official said that concerns over Russia's 
ability to secure the HEU played a role in Germany's decision to not 
participate in the Russian fuel return program.

Conclusions:

DOE's efforts to recover U.S.-origin HEU for safe storage and disposal 
in the United States have resulted in the return of enough HEU to build 
more then 20 nuclear weapons. However, despite DOE's intention of 
accelerating the fuel acceptance program, there are still 11 countries 
that have not made plans to return all of their U.S.-origin HEU to the 
United States. Lack of funding for conversion to LEU is one of the 
reasons foreign research reactors continue to use HEU. Foreign research 
reactors that do not plan to convert to LEU generally also do not have 
plans to return HEU fuel to the United States. In our July 2004 report 
on DOE's RERTR program, we recommended that DOE evaluate the costs and 
benefits of providing incentives to foreign research reactors that use 
U.S.-origin HEU to convert to LEU. If DOE decides to provide such 
incentives, operators of some foreign reactors may decide to return 
their HEU fuel to the United States as well as convert to LEU. We 
encourage DOE to consider the increased likelihood of recovering 
additional amounts of HEU as one of the benefits of providing 
additional incentives to foreign research reactors to convert to LEU. 
Similarly, lowering the fees for accepting HEU could encourage 
additional research reactors in high-income countries to return the 
nuclear material to the United States. These actions could support 
DOE's efforts to accelerate the fuel acceptance program.

When DOE implemented the fuel acceptance program in 1996, it reserved 
the right to adjust the fees to meet changing circumstances. Currently, 
one of the biggest potential changes in the program is DOE's proposed 
extension of the program to continue providing operators of research 
reactors that converted to LEU fuel with a means of disposing of spent 
fuel. While we support DOE efforts to assist foreign research reactors 
that have converted to LEU in accordance with U.S. nonproliferation 
objectives, the original intent of DOE's fuel acceptance program was 
not to indefinitely accept spent LEU fuel at below the full cost of 
disposal. DOE has not revised the fees that research reactors in high-
income countries pay for returning their spent fuel to the United 
States since 1996. Continuing the current fee structure through the end 
of as much as a 10-year program extension would mean keeping the 1996 
fees set at the same level for 23 years. While lowering the fees for 
returning HEU may encourage additional countries to participate in the 
fuel return program, re-evaluating the fees for accepting LEU fuel, 
taking into account DOE's proposed extension of the program, may show 
that DOE could raise the fees and recover a greater portion of the 
total disposal costs for accepting LEU from high-income countries. DOE 
may be able to raise the fees while still encouraging operators of 
foreign research reactors to convert to LEU fuel and without unduly 
penalizing foreign reactors that have already converted.

DOE faces a complex set of issues for each shipment of HEU to Russia, 
such as environmental requirements in Russia and negotiations with the 
countries that are returning their HEU to provide them with incentives 
to participate in the program. While DOE would like to accelerate the 
return of HEU to Russia, these issues have the potential to cause 
delays. For DOE to complete the program as quickly and as efficiently 
as possible, the cooperation of Russia and countries that have Russian-
origin HEU is essential. We support DOE's efforts to work with Russia 
to resolve issues that stand in the way of returning HEU as quickly as 
possible and to pursue options such as purchasing high-capacity casks 
that support DOE's objective of accelerating the Russian fuel return 
program.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

We recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the 
National Nuclear Security Administration take the following two 
actions:

* consider offering incentives to foreign research reactors to return 
HEU to the United States, including lowering the fees that DOE charges 
for accepting HEU fuel from high-income countries; and:

* evaluate raising the fees for accepting LEU fuel from research 
reactors in high-income countries to recover as much of the cost for 
disposing of the fuel in the United States as possible, if doing so 
would not adversely affect the conversion of reactors to LEU and the 
return of HEU or create unmanageable financial burdens for the 
reactors.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of Energy 
and State for their review and comment. In its written comments 
(presented as app. II), DOE concurred with our recommendations. State 
did not provide written comments. Both DOE and State provided technical 
comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.

Scope and Methodology:

To review the progress of DOE's fuel acceptance program, we analyzed 
program documentation including DOE's February 1996 Final Environmental 
Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy 
Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel, the May 1996 
Record of Decision establishing the program, and the DOE IG's February 
2004 audit report on the program. In addition, we analyzed documents 
outlining the structure of fees DOE imposes on research reactors in 
high-income countries for returning HEU and LEU:

fuel to the United States and how the fees were derived. We analyzed 
data from DOE on the amount of HEU and LEU fuel returned to the United 
States, the plans of countries that still have U.S.-origin HEU for 
participating in the program, and the amount of fees paid by research 
reactors in high-income countries. We also interviewed key officials at 
DOE; the State Department; the DOE facilities in South Carolina and 
Idaho where HEU and LEU fuel from foreign research reactors is being 
placed in interim storage; and DOE's Argonne National Laboratory, which 
has expertise on the amount and type of U.S.-origin HEU and LEU at 
foreign research reactors.

We visited five countries that have U.S.-origin HEU--Belgium, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Romania. We selected a nonprobability 
sample of countries based on a number of criteria. In particular, we 
selected three countries that have returned HEU to the United States 
under the fuel acceptance program (Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Romania) and two countries that have not returned HEU to the United 
States (Belgium and Portugal). In addition, we selected three high-
income countries (Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands), one non-high-
income country (Romania), and one country that transitioned into a 
high-income country (Portugal). During our site visits, we met with 
research reactor operators and government officials responsible for 
regulating the research reactors and the disposal of spent research 
reactor fuel. We asked a standard set of questions concerning reasons 
for participating or not participating in DOE's fuel acceptance 
program, plans for participating in the future, options for disposing 
of spent fuel other than returning it to the United States, and the 
potential extension of the fuel acceptance program beyond 2009. In 
addition to visiting five countries with U.S.-origin HEU, we 
interviewed representatives of the Australian, Jamaican, and Swedish 
research reactor operators and the group of research reactors that 
petitioned DOE to extend the fuel acceptance program beyond 2009.

We assessed the reliability of data obtained from DOE on the amount of 
HEU and LEU fuel returned to the United States and the amount of fees 
paid by research reactors in high-income countries. In particular, 
officials at the DOE facilities in South Carolina and Idaho where the 
fuel is stored provided responses to a standard set of data reliability 
questions covering issues such as data entry, access, and quality 
control procedures. We asked follow-up questions whenever necessary. We 
also performed a series of checks on the data to ensure that it was 
complete and accurate. We found several errors in the data that we 
brought to the attention of DOE officials, who then reviewed the data 
and provided corrections. Based on our assessment, we determined that 
the data provided by DOE was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We 
converted dollar amounts of DOE expenditures for the fuel acceptance 
program and fees received from research reactors in high-income 
countries into constant fiscal year 2004 dollars.

To review the progress of DOE's Russian fuel return program, we 
analyzed program documentation on the amounts and locations of Russian-
origin HEU at foreign research reactors; reports on DOE fact-finding 
missions to research reactors in seven countries included in the 
Russian fuel return program; DOE's agreements with Russia and 
Uzbekistan on the program; and letters between the IAEA and countries 
with Russian-origin HEU on their potential participation in the 
program. In addition, DOE provided documentation on shipments of fresh 
HEU it has supported to date. We discussed the program with key DOE and 
State Department officials. We also traveled to Russia to discuss the 
program with Russian officials responsible for implementing the program 
with DOE and reviewing the environmental assessment for returning spent 
HEU fuel.

We visited four countries that have Russian-origin HEU--Germany, 
Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. We selected a nonprobability sample of 
countries based on a number of criteria. In particular, we selected one 
country that had returned HEU to Russia under the Russian fuel return 
program (Romania) and three that had not returned HEU. In addition, we 
selected the two countries that are eligible to participate in both the 
U.S. fuel acceptance program and the Russian fuel return program 
(Germany and Romania). During our site visits, we met with research 
reactor operators and government officials responsible for regulating 
the research reactors and the disposal of spent research reactor fuel. 
We asked a standard set of questions concerning reasons for 
participating or not participating in the Russian fuel return program, 
plans for participating in the future, and options for disposing of 
spent fuel other than returning it to Russia.

As part of our review of both programs, we also analyzed NNSA's 2004 
Global Research and Test Reactor Security Initiative Report and 
attended an annual international conference organized by DOE's RERTR 
program. For technical expertise, we relied on GAO's Chief 
Technologist, who participated in meetings with officials at Argonne 
National Laboratory.

We conducted our work from July 2003 to October 2004 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy; the 
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the Secretary 
of State; the Chairman, NRC; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the 
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional 
committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. 
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web 
site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call 
me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report include Joseph 
Cook, Jonathan McMurray, Mehrzad Nadji, Kirstin B.L. Nelson, Judy 
Pagano, Peter Ruedel, F. James Shafer Jr., and Keith Rhodes, GAO's 
Chief Technologist.

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise: 
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Details of HEU and LEU Fuel Returned to the United States:

Table 3: HEU and LEU Fuel Returned to the United States, by Country, 
and Fees Paid by Research Reactor Operators in High-Income Countries:

Country: Argentina; 
HEU (kilograms): 29.

Country: Australia; 
HEU (kilograms): 34; 
Fees (millions): $2.2.

Country: Austria; 
HEU (kilograms): 3; 
LEU (kilograms): 71; 
Fees (millions): $1.3.

Country: Brazil; 
HEU (kilograms): 5; 
LEU (kilograms): 62.

Country: Canada; 
HEU (kilograms): 11; 
Fees (millions): $1.6.

Country: Chile; 
HEU (kilograms): 8.

Country: Colombia; 
HEU (kilograms): 3.

Country: Denmark; 
HEU (kilograms): 6; 
LEU (kilograms): 309; 
Fees (millions): $5.7.

Country: Germany; 
HEU (kilograms): 102; 
LEU (kilograms): 301; 
Fees (millions): $21.9.

Country: Greece; 
HEU (kilograms): 5.

Country: Indonesia; 
LEU (kilograms): 206.

Country: Italy; 
HEU (kilograms): 23; 
LEU (kilograms): 47; 
Fees (millions): $5.3.

Country: Japan; 
HEU (kilograms): 537; 
LEU (kilograms): 298; 
Fees (millions): $36.9.

Country: Netherlands; 
HEU (kilograms): 21; 
Fees (millions): $2.6.

Country: Philippines; 
HEU (kilograms): 3; 
LEU (kilograms): 20.

Country: Portugal; 
LEU (kilograms): 29.

Country: Romania; 
HEU (kilograms): 6.

Country: Slovenia; 
HEU (kilograms): 5; 
LEU (kilograms): 35.

Country: South Korea; 
HEU (kilograms): 20; 
LEU (kilograms): 33.

Country: Spain; 
HEU (kilograms): 4; 
LEU (kilograms): 12; 
Fees (millions): $0.9.

Country: Sweden; 
HEU (kilograms): 47; 
LEU (kilograms): 296; 
Fees (millions): $12.4.

Country: Switzerland; 
HEU (kilograms): 34; 
LEU (kilograms): 73; 
Fees (millions): $3.4.

Country: Taiwan; 
HEU (kilograms): 4; 
LEU (kilograms): 23; 
Fees (millions): $1.6.

Country: Thailand; 
HEU (kilograms): 4.

Country: United Kingdom; 
LEU (kilograms): 17; 
Fees (millions): $1.5.

Country: Uruguay; 
LEU (kilograms): 16.

Country: Venezuela; 
LEU (kilograms): 39.

Country: Total; 
HEU (kilograms): 914; 
LEU (kilograms): 1,887; 
Fees (millions): $97.3. 

Source: DOE.

Notes: The amount of HEU returned, 914 kilograms, is based on the total 
uranium in the fuel after being used in a research reactor. It is 
equivalent to 1,159 kilograms of total uranium before being used in a 
reactor.

Dollars are in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:

Department of Energy:

National Nuclear Security Administration: 

Washington, DC 20585:

NOV 15 2004:

Mr. Gene Aloise:
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Mr. Aloise:

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the 
opportunity to have reviewed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
draft report, GAO-05-57, "NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: DOE Needs to 
Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium 
from Other Countries to the United States and Russia." We understand 
that this draft report is the result of a request from the Senate's 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee 
on Armed Services.

We appreciate the work that GAO performed and their apparent support of 
the programs' efforts. NNSA and the Office of Environmental Management 
concur with the report's recommendations that we should consider 
offering incentives to foreign research reactors to return HEU to the 
United States, including the evaluation of the possibility of modifying 
the existing policy regarding acceptance fees for material returned 
from high-income economy countries. NNSA will work with the Office of 
Environmental Management to determine how best to assess the fee policy 
given current program priorities.

Should you have any questions related to this response, please contact 
Richard Speidel, Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management. He 
may be contacted at 202-586-5009.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Michael C. Kane: 
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:

cc: Paul Longsworth, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: 

Paul Golan, Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management: 

[End of section]

FOOTNOTES

[1] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further 
Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, 
GAO-04-807 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004).

[2] In this report, we refer to the FRR SNF program as the fuel 
acceptance program and the RRRFR program as the Russian fuel return 
program.

[3] According to a DOE official, this estimate includes LEU fuel in 
Serbia.

[4] The estimate of the number of nuclear weapons is based on the 
amount of the isotope uranium-235 in the HEU fuel.

[5] Prior to DOE's establishment of the fuel acceptance program, GAO 
issued a report in March 1994 recommending that DOE complete 
environmental requirements and begin accepting spent fuel from foreign 
research reactors. See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with 
U.S. Delays in Accepting Foreign Research Reactors' Spent Fuel, GAO/
RCED-94-119 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 1994).

[6] DOE IG, Recovery of Highly Enriched Uranium Provided to Foreign 
Countries, DOE/IG-0638 (Washington, D.C; Feb. 9, 2004). 

[7] According to DOE officials, three other countries--China, Egypt, 
and North Korea--have Russian-origin research reactor fuel but are not 
likely candidates for the program--China because it is a nuclear 
weapons state, Egypt because it possesses only LEU, and North Korea 
because of its development of nuclear weapons.

[8] The downblending is part of DOE's Material Consolidation and 
Conversion (MCC) project, which pays to downblend HEU currently stored 
at sites in Russia into LEU. For more information on the MCC project, 
part of DOE's program for improving the security over weapons-usable 
nuclear material in Russia, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security 
of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, 
GAO-01-312 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2001).

[9] Many research reactors are designed to operate on a small amount of 
fuel meant to last the life of the reactor, and conversion would 
require purchasing LEU fuel and disposing of HEU fuel that the reactor 
operator already purchased and is still usable.

[10] The aim of the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines is to ensure 
that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The guidelines stipulate that certain 
items, including LEU, not be transferred to countries such as Israel 
that have not agreed to full-scope IAEA safeguards. For more 
information, see GAO, Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen 
Multilateral Export Control Regimes, GAO-03-43 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 
25, 2002).

[11] The fees do not cover all of the costs of managing spent fuel from 
foreign research reactors, including the long-term cost of maintaining 
the fuel in storage at the facilities in South Carolina and Idaho and 
transporting the fuel to the planned final repository at Yucca 
Mountain.

[12] Dollars are in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars.

[13] The State Department also provided about $2 million to return 
fresh HEU from Serbia. This amount included the cost of transportation 
as well as funding for Dmitrovgrad to conduct research to overcome 
technical difficulties with downblending the material to LEU. The 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, a private foundation, contributed $5 million 
to address safety and environmental problems at the facility in Serbia 
where the HEU was stored in exchange for participating in the Russian 
fuel return program. DOE did not provide information on its 
expenditures in support of the shipment of fresh HEU fuel from 
Uzbekistan.

[14] The five shipments to date have all consisted of fresh HEU fuel.

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