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Report to Congressional Committees:

March 2004:

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS:

Assessments of Major Weapon Programs:

GAO-04-248:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-248, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Although the weapons that the Department of Defense (DOD) develops have 
no rival in superiority, there still remain ways in which they can be 
improved. GAO’s reviews over the past 20 years have found consistent 
problems with weapon acquisitions—cost increases, schedule delays, and 
performance shortfalls—along with underlying causes, such as pressure 
on managers to promise more than they can deliver. DOD can resolve 
these problems by using a knowledge-based approach derived from the 
best practices of successful product developments. 

GAO’s goal for this report is to provide congressional and DOD decision 
makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected 
defense programs that identifies potential risks and offers an 
opportunity for action when a program’s projected attainment of 
knowledge diverges from the best practice. It can also highlight those 
programs that employ practices worthy of emulation by other programs. 
GAO plans to update and issue this report annually.

What GAO Found:

GAO assessed 51 defense programs ranging from the Missile Defense 
Agency’s Airborne Laser to the Army’s Warfighter Information Network. 
GAO’s assessments are anchored in a knowledge-based approach to product 
development that reflects best practices of successful programs. This 
approach centers on attaining high levels of knowledge in three 
elements of a new product or weapon—technology, design, and production. 
If a program is not attaining this level of knowledge, it incurs 
increased risk of technical problems, with potential cost and schedule 
growth (see figure). If a program is falling short in one element, like 
technology maturity, it is harder to attain knowledge in succeeding 
elements.

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Most of the programs GAO assessed proceeded with less knowledge at 
critical junctures than suggested by best practices, although several 
came close to meeting best practice standards. GAO also found that 
programs generally did not track statistical process control data, a 
key indicator for production maturity. Program stakeholders can use 
these assessments to recognize the gaps in knowledge early and to take 
advantage of opportunities for constructive intervention—such as 
adjustments to schedule, trade-offs in requirements, and additional 
funding. 

GAO has summarized the results of its assessments in a 2-page format. 
Each 2-page assessment contains a profile of the product that includes 
a description; a timeline of development; a baseline comparison of 
cost, schedule, and quantity changes to the program; and a graphical 
and narrative depiction of how the product development knowledge of an 
individual program compared to best practices. Each program office 
submitted comments and they are included with each individual 
assessment as appropriate.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-248.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Paul Francis at (202) 
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Foreword: 

Letter: 

A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes: 

Knowledge-Based Assessments: 

General Observations: 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Airborne Laser (ABL):

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD):

Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite (AEHF):

Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA):

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS):

Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS):

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile 
Warning System (ATIRCM/CMWS):

Advanced Wideband Satellite/Transformational Satellite (AWS/TSat):

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP):

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP):

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP):

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP):

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC):

CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F):

Comanche Reconnaissance Attack Helicopter (RAH-66):

Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21:

DD(X) Destroyer:

E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (E-10A):

E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE):

EA-18G Growler (EA-18G):

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle --Atlas V, Delta IV (EELV):

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):

Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM):

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile:

F/A-22 Raptor:

Future Combat Systems (FCS):

Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle:

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM):

Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS):

Joint Common Missile:

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF):

Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW):

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS):

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):

Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS):

Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program (MM III GRP):

Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (MM III PRP):

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):

National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS):

Guided Missile System Air Defense (Patriot) PAC-3 Program:

MQ-9 Predator B:

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High:

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB):

RQ-7A Shadow 200 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System (Shadow 200):

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):

Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):

Tactical Tomahawk Missile:

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (V-22):

Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS):

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T):

Agency Comments: 

Scope of Our Review: 

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products:

Figures: 

Figure 1: Building Knowledge at Key Points in Product Development 
Reduces the Risk of Unknowns: 

Figure 2: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System Program's Knowledge as 
Compared with Best Practices: 

Abbreviations: 

ACTS: AEHF Comsec/Transec System:

AEA: Airborne Electronic Attack:

DOD: Department of Defense:

EKV: exoatmospheric kill vehicle:

GAO: General Accounting Office:

GEO: geosynchronous:

GPS: global positioning system:

HEO: highly elliptical orbit:

HLV: heavy lift vehicle:

IMIS: Integrated Maintenance Information System:

ISO: International Organization for Standardization:

KSDI: Key System Development Integration:

MDA: Missile Defense Agency:

MEADS: Medium Extended Air Defense System:

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association:

SAR: synthetic aperture radar:

SDACS: Solid Divert Attitude Control System:

SDD: system development and demonstration:

TBD: to be determined:

TF/TA: Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance:

USAF: United States Air Force:

USMC: United States Marine Corps:

USN: United States Navy:

Foreword March 31, 2004:

Congressional Committees:

The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the midst of a modernization and 
transformation effort that will drive its spending priorities well into 
the next decade. DOD is investing heavily in programs that it believes 
will provide a new portfolio of military capabilities to decisively 
combat the full spectrum of threats to U.S. security. Investment in the 
research, development, and procurement of major weapon systems is 
expected to grow considerably as these efforts progress, rising from 
$135 billion in fiscal year 2004 to a projected $166 billion in 2009. 
DOD's total investment will, in fact, approach almost $1 trillion 
during the same period. These efforts to transform and modernize major 
weapon systems will not achieve their full potential if they are 
stymied by the cost growth and schedule delays that have limited the 
buying power of the defense investment dollar in the past.

For this reason alone, DOD needs to seek better outcomes from its new 
investments. It is also possible that these outcomes could have a 
significant affect on yet more urgent challenges to be faced by the 
federal budget in the forthcoming years. Health-care costs are growing 
at double-digit rates, and spending on homeland security will likely 
grow as the United States seeks to defeat terrorism worldwide. This 
country also faces an oncoming demographic tidal wave--by 2035, the 
number of people who are 65 or over will have doubled. These and other 
factors will substantially increase the demand on funding for 
associated entitlement programs, as well as create further pressures on 
discretionary funding--such as investments in weapon systems. 
Therefore, it is critical that DOD get the most out of these:

investments for the amounts budgeted. We believe that this report can 
provide useful insights on key risks in weapons development, allow 
decision makers to take corrective actions, and place needed and 
justifiable programs in a better position to succeed.

Signed by: 

David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States:

Letter March 31, 2004:

Congressional Committees:

The Department of Defense (DOD) develops weaponry that is unmatched in 
levels of technological sophistication and lethality. In an effort to 
transform the military, DOD is on the threshold of several major 
investments in improved weapon systems that are likely to dominate the 
budget and doctrinal debates well into the next decade. These programs 
include such systems as the Missile Defense Agency's suite of land, 
sea, air, and space defense systems; the Army's Future Combat Systems; 
the Air Force's, Marine Corps', and Navy's Joint Strike Fighter; and 
overarching systems, such as the Advanced Wideband Satellite/
Transformational Satellite.

Despite their superiority, these weapon systems will routinely take 
much longer to field, cost more to buy, and require more support than 
provided for in investment plans. An alternative approach must be found 
to develop these systems. Our work on best practices has found that 
programs managed within a knowledge-based approach--where high levels 
of product knowledge are demonstrated at critical points during 
development--are better positioned to deliver superior performance 
within cost and schedule estimates. We believe that by employing this 
approach, DOD can get similar outcomes from its weapon system programs.

This annual report is one step in our effort to help DOD adopt a more 
knowledge-based approach. In this current report, we assess 51 major 
weapon systems whose combined program costs exceed $672 billion. Each 
assessment is presented in a 2-page summary that analyzes each 
program's attainment of knowledge as compared with best practices, 
along with its cost and schedule status. Our objective is to provide 
decision makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of 
individual systems that identifies potential risks and allows decision 
makers to take early actions, if warranted, to put programs in a better 
position to succeed.

A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes:

Over the last several years, we have undertaken a body of work that 
examines weapon acquisition issues from a different, more cross-cutting 
perspective--one that draws lessons learned from best system 
development practices to see if they apply to weapon system 
development. We found that successful product developers employed 
specific practices to ensure that a high level of knowledge regarding 
critical facets of the product was achieved at key junctures in 
development. We characterized these junctures as three knowledge 
points. We also identified key indicators that can be used to assess 
the attainment of knowledge. When tied to major events on a program's 
schedule, they can disclose whether gaps or shortfalls exist in 
demonstrated knowledge, which can presage future cost, schedule, and 
performance problems. These knowledge points and associated indicators 
are defined as follows.

Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs are matched. This level of 
knowledge is attained when a match is made between a customer's needs 
and the developer's technical, financial, and other resources. 
Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system 
development is a particularly important best practice. This means that 
the technologies needed to meet essential product requirements have 
been demonstrated to work in their intended environment.

Knowledge point 2: The product design is stable. This level of 
knowledge is attained when the product's design is shown to meet the 
customer's requirements. A best practice is to achieve design stability 
at the system-level critical design review, usually held midway through 
development. Completion of engineering drawings at the system design 
review provides tangible evidence that the design is stable.

Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature. This level of 
knowledge is attained when it is demonstrated that the product can be 
manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A best 
practice is to achieve production maturity at the start of production. 
This means that all key manufacturing processes produce output within 
statistically acceptable limits for quality.

As illustrated in figure 1, the attainment of each successive knowledge 
point builds on the preceding one. While the knowledge itself builds 
continuously without clear lines of demarcation, the attainment of 
knowledge points is sequential. In other words, production maturity 
cannot be attained if the design is not mature, and design maturity 
cannot be attained if the key technologies are not mature.

Figure 1: Building Knowledge at Key Points in Product Development 
Reduces the Risk of Unknowns:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

For the most part, all three knowledge points are eventually attained 
on a completed product. The difference between highly successful 
product developments--those that deliver superior products within cost 
and schedule projections--and problematic product developments is how 
this knowledge is built and how early in the development cycle each 
knowledge point is attained. If a program is attaining the desired 
levels of knowledge, it has less risk--but not zero risk--of future 
problems. Likewise, if a program shows a gap between demonstrated 
knowledge and best practices, it indicates an increased risk--not a 
guarantee--of future problems.

Knowledge-Based Assessments:

Our assessment of each program is summarized in two components--(1) a 
system profile and (2) a product knowledge assessment.

The system profile presents a general description of the product in 
development; a picture of the product or of one of its key elements; a 
schedule timeline identifying key dates in the program; a table 
identifying the prime contractor, the program office location, and the 
funding remaining from fiscal 2004 through completion, if available; 
and a table summarizing the cost, schedule, and quantity changes to the 
program.

The rest of the assessment analyzes the extent to which product 
knowledge at the three key knowledge points has been attained. We 
depict the extent of knowledge in a stacked bar graph and provide a 
narrative summary at the bottom of the first page. The second page is 
devoted to a narrative assessment of technology, design and production 
maturity, as well as other program issues identified and comments from 
the program office.

As shown is figure 2, the knowledge graph is based on the three 
knowledge points and the key indicators for the attainment of 
knowledge. A "best practice" line is drawn based on the ideal 
attainment of the three types of knowledge at the three knowledge 
points. As can be seen, knowledge about the technology, design, and 
production of a new product builds over time. The closer a program's 
attained knowledge is to the best practice line, the more likely the 
weapon will be delivered within its estimated cost and schedule. A 
knowledge deficit at the start of development--indicated by a gap 
between the technology knowledge attained by the weapon system and the 
best practice line--means the program proceeded with immature 
technologies and may face a greater likelihood of cost and schedule 
increases as technology risks are discovered and resolved.

The first knowledge point on the best practice line represents two 
facts: a commitment to a new system development has been made and the 
key technologies needed for the new product are mature. The orange bar 
indicates the actual technology maturity attained for a program's key 
technologies as measured at the start of development--normally 
milestone II or milestone B in DOD's acquisition process.[Footnote 1] 
The second major point on the best practice line captures technology 
maturity plus:

design maturity. A green bar indicates the design knowledge attained by 
a weapon system program. A design is considered mature when 90 percent 
of the engineering drawings have been released or deemed releasable to 
manufacturing. The third major point on the best practice line captures 
the sum of technology maturity, design maturity, and production 
maturity. A blue bar indicates the production knowledge attained by a 
weapon system program. Production is considered mature when all key 
production processes are in statistical control.[Footnote 2] The blue 
bar is stacked on top of the orange and green bars to indicate whether 
any cumulative technology, design, and production gaps exist at the 
time production begins. In some cases, we obtained projections from the 
program office of future knowledge attainment. These projections are 
depicted as dashed bars.

Figure 2: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System Program's Knowledge as 
Compared with Best Practices:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system 
development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing 
knowledge point 1. Knowledge point 2 was not attained at the design 
review as some technologies were still not mature and only a 
small percentage of engineering drawings had been released. Projections 
for the production decision show that the program is expected to 
achieve greater levels of maturity, but will still fall short. It is 
likely that this program would have had significant cost and schedule 
increases.

We found two situations in which programs were unable to provide key 
knowledge indicators. We used two types of labels in the knowledge 
graphs to depict those situations. Programs with these labels are 
distinguished from those that have elected not to collect data that can 
be used to assess progress against best practices. First, some programs 
were unable to reconstruct the relevant knowledge indicator because the 
event happened too many years ago. In these situations, we annotate the 
graph with the phrase "Data not available." Second, a few programs have 
not followed the traditional acquisition model. For example, some 
programs combined the development start decision with the production 
decision. Other programs used commercial off-the-shelf components, 
which negated the need to monitor production processes. In these 
situations, we annotate the graph with the phrase "Not applicable.":

We conducted our review from June 2003 through March 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix II 
contains detailed information on our methodology.

General Observations:

Most of the programs we assessed proceeded with lower levels of 
knowledge at critical junctures and attained key elements of product 
knowledge later in development. In addition, while most programs were 
able to assess technology maturity using technology readiness levels 
and were able to track the status of engineering drawings, few programs 
collected or analyzed information on production process controls. We 
did find some programs that attained relatively high levels of key 
product knowledge. Examples of programs that demonstrated relatively 
high levels of technology, design, and production maturity are provided 
below, along with examples of programs where levels of product 
knowledge were low. While DOD has announced the cancellation of the 
Comanche program to reallocate resources, the program still 
demonstrated relatively high levels of design and production knowledge. 
The examples below include Comanche because it remains a good example 
of attaining key product knowledge.

Technology Maturity:

The following programs attained a greater level of technology maturity 
before entering system development than most weapon systems we 
assessed:

* The B-2 Radar Modernization program demonstrated full technology 
maturity in advance of the start of system development. A formal 
technology readiness assessment is planned for completion prior to the 
start of development in May 2004. The program has already built and 
tested some transmit/receive modules, and several key elements of the 
modules were already tested in an operational environment.

* The MQ-9 Predator B aircraft program has matured three of the 
program's four technologies, and the fourth--an avionics subsystem 
designed to integrate and store data necessary to launch munitions--is 
comprised of several off-the-shelf components and is being evaluated in 
a laboratory environment.

In some programs, the consequences of proceeding with immature 
technologies have already been felt. For example:

* The Extended Range Guided Munition program began system development 
in 1996 with only 1 of its 20 critical technologies mature. While 
progress has been made, full technology maturity was still not 
demonstrated at the time of the design review in 2003. The lack of 
mature technologies contributed to cost increases, schedule delays, and 
test failures. These test failures later led the program to miss a Navy 
deadline that required successful completion of two land-based flight 
tests by November 2003. The Navy is conducting an independent 
assessment of the program's readiness to proceed with further 
flight-testing. The Navy has also issued a solicitation for alternative 
precision-guided munition concepts that could offer cost savings.

* The Advanced SEAL Delivery System began system development over 
9 years ago, and currently has technologies that are not fully mature. 
During that time, total program costs increased 571 percent. While 
progress has been made within the past year, the technologies are not 
expected to reach maturity until the second boat is built in 2008.

* The Advanced Wideband Satellite/Transformational Satellite program 
has only matured one of its five critical technologies, with the 
remaining four scheduled to reach maturity in early 2006. This is more 
than 2 years after the planned start of development. While the 
program's acquisition strategy allows for concurrent technology and 
system development, concern over this aggressive acquisition strategy 
led the Air Force to schedule an interim review for November 2004. This 
review will determine whether the program's technology development has 
progressed sufficiently or whether alternative action should be taken. 
To date, program costs have increased 148 percent.

Design Maturity:

In a number of these programs, having mature technology at the start of 
system development resulted in having more design stability at the time 
of the design review. Some examples include:

* The Theater High Altitude Area Defense System program attained full 
technology and design maturity in advance of the design review in 
December 2003. This program made significant strides following a 
problematic preliminary development phase where the delayed 
demonstration of technologies and components, and reliance on 
full-system testing to discover problems, nearly caused the 
cancellation of the program. The program has since structured a system 
development phase with a much greater emphasis on risk reduction, 
including the use of technology readiness levels. The program achieved 
design stability by releasing 100 percent of engineering drawings 
before the design review.

* The National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System achieved 86 percent technology maturity before committing to 
system development, and the program has completed half of the currently 
identified drawings well in advance of the design review in April 2006. 
The program is also taking steps to reduce program risk by 
demonstrating three critical sensors on a demonstrator satellite prior 
to their inclusion on the new satellite.

* The Comanche Reconnaissance Attack Helicopter program released 
84 percent of design drawings by the time of its design review. 
Additionally, the tools used to gather and validate knowledge on the 
Comanche's design were required by contract, with targeted award 
fees that provided additional incentives for building knowledge.

Other programs proceeded with their design review without having the 
requisite level of technology knowledge. This lack of knowledge 
affected the level of design stability attained. For example:

* The F/A-22 Fighter program began system development in 1991 without 
having mature technologies--deferring knowledge point 1--and 
subsequently attained only a quarter of the desired amount of 
engineering drawings at the time of the design review in 1995. While 
the program now has mature technology and design stability, the program 
experienced substantial cost increases and schedule delays in the 
latter stages of development.

* The Guided Missile System Air Defense (Patriot) PAC-3 program 
attained less technology maturity and design maturity than best 
practices suggest. At the time of the design review in 1996, the 
program only had 23 percent design maturity, and the technologies were 
still not mature. The seeker technology did not demonstrate maturity 
until close to the production decision. The cost of the seeker 
increased by 76 percent and contributed to a 2-year delay in the 
program's schedule.

* The Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning 
System held its design review in 1997 with only 22 percent design 
maturity. While the basic design of the system is now complete, it was 
not until 2 years after the design review that 90 percent of the 
drawings were released and the design was considered stable. This 
resulted in inefficient manufacturing, rework, additional testing, and 
a 3-year schedule delay.

Production Maturity:

Unlike technology readiness levels, which can be applied at any time, 
and engineering drawing release data, which is captured on all 
programs, few programs collected statistical process control data. 
While the absence of this data does not necessarily mean that 
production processes were immature, it does prevent an assessment 
against an objective standard. Other indicators of production maturity, 
such as scrap and rework rates, can indicate positive trends, but are 
not prospective--that is, they are not useful in guiding preparations 
for production. To some extent, statistical process control data is not 
collected because DOD is delegating more responsibility to prime 
contractors and reducing the amount of data requested. The lack of such 
data may put program offices in a disadvantaged position to gain 
insights about a contractor's production progress. Some programs, 
however, have started changing this trend, making the collection of 
statistical process control data part of the contract requirements. For 
example:

* The Comanche Reconnaissance Attach Helicopter program called for 
collecting more knowledge about production processes and maturity than 
we have seen on many programs. Specifically, the Army planned 
to collect information on control over the production processes and 
reliability and included these requirements in the Comanche contract. 
In addition, the contractor had established reliability growth plans 
and goals and had started conducting reliability growth testing.

* The Tactical Tomahawk missile program has begun collecting 
statistical control data from the assembly of components for the first 
low-rate production cycle. Initial data in support of verifying 
critical process compliance is expected in March 2004. Program 
officials plan to establish preliminary boundaries for upper and lower 
control limits by the full-rate production decision in June 2004, and 
metrics are expected to be fully stable by the completion of the low-
rate deliveries in November 2004.

Assessments of Individual Programs:

Our assessments of the 51 weapon systems follow.

[End of section]

Airborne Laser (ABL):

MDA's ABL element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks to destroy enemy missiles during the boost phase of their 
flight. Carried aboard a highly modified Boeing 747 aircraft, ABL 
employs a beam control/fire control subsystem to focus the beam on a 
target; a high-energy chemical laser to rupture the skin of enemy 
missiles; and a battle management subsystem to plan and execute 
engagements. We assessed the Block 2006 configuration. Program 
officials expect this block to provide an initial capability, but not 
before 2006.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding to complete through 2009:
R&D: $3,274.3 million:
Procurement: $0.0 million:
Total funding: $3,274.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 0:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be 
determined. NA = not applicable:

[End of table]

Only one of ABL's seven critical technologies is fully mature, yet MDA 
has released about 93 percent of the current block's engineering 
drawings. Program officials plan to use the first ABL block to 
demonstrate these technologies, but until this occurs, the potential 
for design change remains. Additional drawings may also be needed if 
the design is enhanced during the next block. The program experienced a 
$242-million cost increase during fiscal year 2003, mainly because of 
difficulties manufacturing components that could meet requirements. 
Program officials recently postponed the procurement of the second 
aircraft because of testing delays. This postponement allowed them to 
shift funds to cover fiscal year 2003 cost overruns associated with 
efforts to build the first aircraft.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

ABL Program:

Technology Maturity:

Only one of ABL's seven critical technologies--managing the high power 
beam--is fully mature. The remaining six other technologies--the six-
module laser, missile tracking, atmospheric compensation, transmissive 
optics, optical coatings, and jitter control--are not fully mature. The 
last three technologies are the least mature. All the above 
technologies are necessary for generating and directing laser energy 
onto a boosting missile.

While the program office has assessed the six-module laser as being 
close to reaching full maturity, the power generated by grouping six 
laser modules together must be demonstrated before this assessment can 
be validated. The transmissive optics, optical coatings, and jitter 
control are the least mature and consist of prototype technologies that 
have only been tested in the laboratory, or demonstrated through 
analysis and simulation. They have not been tested during the operation 
of the six-module laser. The program plans to prove that all 
technologies will work in an operational environment during a flight 
test when ABL will attempt to shoot down a short-range ballistic 
missile. Because the program cannot replicate an operational 
environment on the ground, this flight test will provide the first 
opportunity for many technologies to demonstrate their maturity.

Design Maturity:

The ABL program has completed 93 percent, or over 9,900, of the 
expected 10,631 engineering drawings for the first block. Although 
releasing this percentage of drawings suggests that ABL's design is 
stable, it is a measurement of the current block's design stability 
rather than the stability of future ABL blocks. Technology maturation 
and future enhancements may lead to more design changes.

Production Maturity:

We did not assess the production maturity of ABL's current block 
because of the limited quantity of hardware being produced. 
Accordingly, statistical process control data is not available. Program 
officials explained that it has been difficult to maintain a stable 
manufacturing base for some subcomponents and that this problem has not 
been resolved.

Other Program Issues:

Program officials recently identified performance of the ABL system 
being developed during the current block as one of their greatest risks 
toward achieving an initial capability. Between October 2002 and 
September 2003, development costs increased by about $242 million. 
Program officials attributed the cost overruns to difficulties with 
component manufacturing and integration. They noted, for example, that 
the leading cause of cost growth in the current effort is the 
difficulty in manufacturing advanced optics and laser components.

Planned testing of the six integrated laser modules continues to slip, 
and as of early February, the program had not rescheduled the test. 
Program officials attribute the delays to the complexity and volume of 
integration activities. This delay could affect subsequent program 
events and has already caused the program to postpone procurement of a 
second aircraft. The delay allowed program officials to shift those 
funds, along with funds intended for other program activities, to cover 
fiscal year 2003 cost overruns associated with efforts to build the 
first aircraft.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA maintained that the 
current design is stable despite the assessed technology maturity. 
Officials told us that because the ABL operational environment is 
impractical to duplicate on the ground, the technology maturity 
assessment process will understate actual maturity until after 100 
percent of the drawings are released. While the officials expect 
changes to future blocks as part of spiral development, they believe 
the basic design will directly migrate to subsequent blocks.

With respect to the timing of the purchase of the second aircraft, 
officials said the decision is still under deliberation as MDA 
constantly assesses progress toward all objectives, including technical 
maturity.

[End of section]

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD):

MDA's Aegis BMD element of missile defense is being developed in 
incremental, capability-based blocks to protect deployed U.S. forces 
and other assets from ballistic missiles. Its two missions are long-
range surveillance and tracking in support of the Ballistic Missile 
Defense System and engagement of short-and medium-range ballistic 
missiles using the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). We assessed the maturity 
of the Block 2004 SM-3 missile.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin/Raytheon:
Program office: Crystal City, Va.
Funding to complete through 2009:
R&D: $3,918.1 million:
Procurement: $0.0 million:
Total funding: $3,918.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 0:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be 
determined. NA = not applicable:

According to the program office, the SM-3 technologies are mature and 
the design is stable. However, the technology that enables the 
interceptor's kill vehicle to maneuver itself to hit and destroy its 
target has not been fully demonstrated. This "divert" technology 
succeeded in ground testing but failed during a flight test in June 
2003. MDA expects Aegis BMD to perform long-range surveillance and 
tracking in support of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element 
beginning in September 2004. Agency plans call for Aegis BMD to be 
capable of engaging short-and medium-range ballistic missiles by 
December 2005.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

AEGIS BMD Program:

Aegis BMD Element-Block 2004:

SM-3 development began with the "ALI" Program, a series of intercept 
flight tests to demonstrate critical technologies of an interceptor 
launched from a Navy cruiser. The SM-3 interceptor builds upon the SM-
2 missile, a two-stage missile in operational use by the U.S. Navy, but 
incorporates a third stage rocket motor and a kinetic warhead--the kill 
vehicle.

The third stage rocket motor and the infrared seeker of the kill 
vehicle have been demonstrated in previous flight tests. However, while 
the new solid divert attitude control system (SDACS) passed a series of 
ground tests, it failed during its first flight test in June 2003. 
According to program documents, the most likely cause of the failure 
was a defective component within SDACS. The Aegis BMD Program Office 
expects to resolve the issue by early 2004.

Design Maturity:

The SM-3 missile design is stable. At the time of the critical design 
review in May 2003, 98 percent of the total expected drawings were 
releasable to the manufacturer.

Production Maturity:

To meet a presidential directive requiring the fielding of an initial 
missile defense capability beginning in 2004, five SM-3 missiles are 
being developed in fiscal year 2004. These missiles are accelerated 
test assets that could also be used, if needed, in a national 
emergency. However, the missiles will not have a fully functional 
SDACS. We did not assess statistical control processes for the five 
missiles because these missiles are not production representative.

Other Program Issues:

Another component of the Aegis BMD program involves an upgrade of the 
Aegis Weapon System--an operational asset comprised of the AN/SPY-1 
Radar and Weapon Control System software--to accommodate the BMD 
mission. Program officials told us that development and delivery of the 
Aegis Weapon System are proceeding on schedule.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
generally concurred with the information presented. It added that the 
latest flight test, held in December 2003, provided a successful 
demonstration of SDACS.

GAO Comments:

While the program did conduct an SDACS test in December, this test did 
not fully address SDACS issues because the divert system operated in 
sustain mode. In sustain mode, the system does not use its two pulse 
motors to steer the warhead during the final minutes before reaching 
the target. To be considered fully functional, SDACS will require 
successful testing using the two pulse motors.

[End of section]

Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite (AEHF):

The Air Force's AEHF satellite system is intended to replenish the 
existing Milstar system with higher capacity, survivable, jam-
resistant, worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic 
and tactical warfighters. The system also includes a mission control 
segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications are 
acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international 
partnership program that includes Canada, United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands. First launch is scheduled for December 2006.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,452.0 million:
Procurement: $473.6 million:
Total funding: $2,925.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 1:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The AEHF satellite program demonstrated most of its critical 
technologies at development start and expects to have all technologies 
demonstrated by the design review. The program has released two-thirds 
of its drawings and expects to complete 90 percent by the design 
review. In September 2003, the program office decided to delay the 
launch of the first two satellites by 4 months. The delay was necessary 
to accommodate changing security requirements and resolve fabrication 
issues relating to the critical cryptological equipment.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

AEHF Program:

Technology Maturity:

Eleven of the critical technologies identified by the program office 
are mature. The remaining three technologies have engineering models 
and are undergoing testing in a relevant environment to simulate both 
launch and space atmosphere. Two of these three technologies have 
mature backup technologies. Only one technology, a component of the 
phased array antenna, does not have a backup technology that meets 
operational requirements. Program officials expect all technologies to 
be mature by the design review scheduled for April 2004.

Design Maturity:

The program office has released over two-thirds of its expected 
drawings. The program office expects to release 90 percent of the 
expected drawings by the scheduled design review. In addition, 
preliminary design reviews are complete and the program office has 
initiated the subsystem design reviews. The program is also developing 
early software builds for the ground and space segments.

Production Maturity:

The production maturity could not be assessed because the program 
office does not have statistical process control data. The Air Force 
currently plans to buy only three satellites. However, there have been 
some problems in producing a critical system component. The AEHF 
Comsec/Transec System (ACTS) is a suite of cryptological equipment 
installed in both the satellites and the terminals to limit access to 
authorized users. ACTS has already experienced significant cost growth 
and schedule delays due to changes in satellite architecture design, 
interface, and other requirements changes. ACTS consists of computer 
chips whose fabrication is more technically challenging than producing 
other computer chips. The challenge results from a security requirement 
to have separate foundries produce components of the chips that must be 
integrated together. During a major functional test in September 2003, 
a problem was discovered, and the program is evaluating ways to resolve 
the problem.

Concurrent development of ACTS and the AEHF satellite payload has 
resulted in a 4-month delay in the launch of the first two AEHF 
satellites, now scheduled for April 2007 and April 2008, respectively. 
ACTS is managed by the National Security Agency and is on the AEHF 
satellite payload critical path. The program office stated the launch 
delay was necessary to accommodate changes in ACTS security 
requirements and resolve ACTS production issues.

Other Program Issues:

The current development contract includes the first two satellites and 
the mission control segment. A decision to buy a third satellite is 
planned after the design review. In December 2002, two satellites were 
deleted from the program because the newly developed Transformational 
Communications Architecture calls for the Transformational Satellite, 
assessed elsewhere in this report, to replace these AEHF satellites. 
Because the Transformational Satellites are early in development and 
may not progress in time to meet the military need, the Air Force has 
scheduled a progress review and decision point in early fiscal year 
2005 to determine if additional AEHF satellites will be needed to meet 
operational requirements.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office noted 
that the AEHF program continues to progress through the system 
development and demonstration phase, meeting all scheduled milestones 
and is projected to meet all key performance parameters.

[End of section]

Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA):

The Navy's AESA radar is one of the top upgrades for the F/A-18E/F 
aircraft. It is to be the aircraft's primary search/track and weapon 
control radar and is designed to correct deficiencies in the current 
radar. According to the Navy, the AESA radar is key to maintaining the 
Navy's air-to-air fighting advantage and will improve the effectiveness 
of the air-to-ground weapons. When completed, the radar will be 
inserted in new production aircraft and retrofitted into the existing 
aircraft.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: McDonnell Douglas, Corp.
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $219.9 million:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The AESA radar's technology appears mature and the design is stable. 
The program entered system development with technologies leveraged from 
other DOD programs. However, the program identified four critical 
technologies new to radar application. These technologies were not 
mature at the start of system development or at the design review, but 
they are now mature. Design changes have been identified as a result of 
completed development tests, and more changes are anticipated as 
development and operational tests continue during production. The 
program anticipates retrofitting 135 aircraft with the radar at a cost 
of about $424 million. These numbers could increase if operational 
evaluation is delayed. Program officials estimate that the AESA radar's 
first low-rate production units will exceed the cost target by 27 
percent. Cost reduction initiatives are underway.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

AESA Program:

Technology Maturity:

The AESA radar program utilizes technologies from other DOD programs. 
Four critical technologies are new to radar application. These 
technologies were evaluated using technology readiness levels and 
determined to be mature based on initial testing. Software maturity 
must be increased before this radar can be fully tested.

Design Maturity:

The AESA radar's design is stable. The program had 67 percent of 
drawings released at design review. Additional drawings, however, may 
be needed to address engineering design changes evolving out of ongoing 
development tests and to address immature hardware and software that 
existed during recently completed development tests. Software 
development, to support development tests and technical evaluation, is 
planned through most of fiscal year 2004. Operational evaluation, to 
determine radar effectiveness and suitability, will be completed in the 
summer of 2006. A recent initial operational test identified a number 
of risks that will need to be addressed through development tests 
before operational evaluation of the radar.

The program is tracking a number of technical, cost, and schedule risks 
and challenges. First, the AESA radar places excessive loads on the 
environmental control system. Second, parallel F/A-18E/F development 
efforts may affect AESA integration and tests and delay production and 
delivery schedules. Third, AESA radar operations could degrade 
performance of other subsystems, resulting in unacceptable weapon 
system performance.

Production Maturity:

We could not assess production maturity because statistical control 
data was not available.

Other Program Issues:

The AESA radar's first low-rate production units are expected to exceed 
the cost target by 27 percent. Most of the cost increase is 
attributable to subcontractor development cost. The increase will not 
affect the three favorably negotiated low-rate production lot options. 
Cost increases during full-rate production, however, will occur if cost 
reduction initiatives are not pursued. Cost reduction initiatives are 
underway to reduce the cost overruns once the fix priced options 
expire, but the initiatives are not fully funded. A recent cost 
estimate, however, projects the program to be fully funded throughout 
the 5-year defense plan.

Delivery of the first production AESA radars, for insertion into F/A-
18E/F aircraft on the production line, is scheduled for fiscal year 
2005. This will result in only 8 of the planned 45 F/A-18E/F aircraft 
in that fiscal year being equipped with the AESA radar on the 
production line. A match between AESA radar production and F/A-18E/F 
production will occur, with deliveries in fiscal year 2008. As a result 
of the mismatch, 135 of the radars will need to be retrofitted into 
already produced aircraft at a projected cost of $424 million. This 
cost does not include the cost of legacy radars that must be installed 
on aircraft that are not receiving the AESA radar. The need to retrofit 
could be reduced if more radars were made available sooner. However, 
while excess radar production capacity exists, program management does 
not want to ramp up this production beyond current plans because it 
would add risk to the program and take the radar into production prior 
to completion of operational evaluation in mid fiscal year 2006. Delay 
of operational evaluation would result in greater retrofit numbers.

Program Office Comments:

The AESA program office concurred with this assessment and provided 
clarifying comments. The AESA radar received approval for the second 
low-rate initial production effort from the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, Research Development and Acquisition in January 2004. The first 
F/A-18F with the AESA radar installed recently demonstrated high 
resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR) modes at 3 times the 
resolution and 2-1/2 times the range of the current operationally 
deployed F/A-18 radar. This high resolution SAR mode capability 
represents the first step in multiple areas that the AESA radar will 
greatly improve the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet's air-to-air and air-to-
ground radar capabilities in addition to adding modes not currently 
available to the fleet.

[End of section]

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS):

The Army's APKWS is a precision-guided, air-to-surface missile designed 
to engage soft and lightly armored targets. The system will add a new 
laser-based seeker to the existing Hydra 70 Rocket System and is 
expected to provide a lower cost, accurate alternative to the Hellfire 
missile. Future block upgrades are planned to improve system 
effectiveness. We assessed the laser guidance technology used in the 
new seeker.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics:
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $93.5 million:
Procurement: $1,530.0 million:
Total funding: $1,777.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 89,420:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The APKWS entered system development before demonstrating that its 
critical guidance technology was fully mature. Program officials 
currently project that the technology will not demonstrate maturity 
until after the system design review. The program has released about 
half of expected drawings, and program officials expect all will be 
released by the time of the design review in March 2004. If immature 
technology persists at the design review, risks of redesign and 
modification of drawings late in development will be incurred.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

APKWS Program:

Technology Maturity:

The APKWS' critical laser guidance technology has not demonstrated full 
maturity. Although a prototype guidance system was successfully 
demonstrated under the Low Cost Precision Kill Advanced Technology 
Demonstration, the current design for the guidance system includes 
numerous hardware changes to improve system cost, performance, and 
producibility. The new design will not be fully integrated and tested 
until June 2004, 3 months after the design review. Program officials 
noted that although the prototype system design exists, reverting to 
that design would increase cost and degrade the system's performance 
and producibility.

Design Maturity:

Program officials expect to release 100 percent of the drawings by the 
system-level design review in March 2004. At the time of our review, 
the program had released only 55, or about 48 percent, of the 115 total 
planned drawings to manufacturing.

Production Maturity:

Program officials expect that there will be nine key processes 
associated with manufacturing the APKWS. The program plans to collect 
statistical data on these processes when production begins.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that it demonstrated the technology maturity required by DOD 
acquisition system policy during the Low Cost Precision Kill Advanced 
Technology Demonstration. The APKWS technologies were successfully 
demonstrated in both a high fidelity hardware-in-the-loop test facility 
and a live-fire flight test environment. Program officials also stated 
that although the system's final design requires some modification to 
meet affordability, producibility, and operational requirements, these 
design changes are consistent with the intent of the system development 
and demonstration phase.

[End of section]

Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS):

The Special Operations Forces' ASDS is a battery-powered, dry interior 
minisubmarine developed for clandestine insertion and extraction of 
Navy SEALs and their equipment. It is carried to its deployment area by 
a specially configured SSN-688 class submarine. ASDS is intended to 
provide increased range, payload, on-station loiter time, and endurance 
over current submersibles. The 65-foot long, 8-foot diameter ASDS is 
operated by a two-person crew, and equipped with a lock out/lock in 
chamber to allow divers to exit and reenter the vehicle.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Washington, D.C.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $35.8 million:
Procurement: $1,268.0 million:
Total funding: $1,341.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 5:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Two of ASDS' three critical technologies, the battery and the 
propulsion, are not fully mature, even though system development began 
over 9 years ago. Key technical problems with the battery and the 
propeller were discovered late--during testing on the first boat--
rather than in component-or subsystem-level testing. Although 
significant progress has been made in the past year, all critical 
technologies have not achieved maturity and will not reach maturity 
until the second ASDS boat is produced, currently estimated to be in 
2008. However, program officials believe technology maturity may be 
reached as early as 2005. In April 2003, DOD designated ASDS as a major 
defense acquisition program, entailing greater oversight by high-level 
decision makers. Most of the engineering drawings are complete; 
however, these will be updated after the contract is awarded for the 
second ASDS boat.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

ASDS Program:

Technology Maturity:

Two of ASDS' three critical technologies--the battery and the 
propulsion--have not reached maturity, and they are not expected to be 
mature before the production decision for additional boats.

The silver-zinc propulsion battery has experienced premature failures 
and short demonstrated life. Although the Navy continues to mature the 
silver-zinc battery for the first boat, it intends to replace it with a 
lithium-ion battery. The Navy has three contractors exploring this 
technology. Two contracts were awarded to identify and test viable 
lithium-ion battery technology for a battery that can be housed inside 
the existing ASDS titanium battery bottles. Program officials expect to 
receive battery samples in early 2004. A third contractor is developing 
an alternative design for a battery that is contained in fiberglass 
housings and will fit in the same area as the existing silver-zinc 
battery. Lithium-ion battery technology, like silver-zinc, is not new; 
however, the challenge lies in adapting the technology to ASDS' size 
and environment.

The most significant noise offender, the propeller, was replaced with a 
composite propeller before operational test and evaluation. However, 
acoustic measurements have not been made, and other acoustic signature 
issues still need to be addressed. The acoustic requirement has been 
deferred until delivery of the second ASDS boat.

Design Maturity:

About 99 percent of the 4,999 engineering drawings have been released 
to manufacturing for the second ASDS boat. After contract award for the 
second ASDS boat, the contractor will prepare revised and new drawings 
to account for part item substitutions, and to reflect updates in 
commercial off-the-shelf equipment availability, especially for the 
integrated control and display system.

The first ASDS boat has not demonstrated the ability to meet all of the 
program's key performance parameters. Specifically, the first boat is 
not quiet enough to meet acoustic stealth requirements, and compliance 
with survivability requirements has not yet been verified and approved. 
In addition, the Navy's operational evaluation of ASDS included 
numerous recommendations to correct deficiencies and vulnerabilities 
and recommended additional operational testing and evaluation to verify 
corrections prior to full operational capability.

According to the program office, the follow-on ASDS boats--numbers two 
through six--will be substantially similar to ASDS-1. It believes the 
above changes and the change to a lithium-ion battery will have only 
minor affects on the design. However, until survivability issues are 
addressed, technical problems are solved, and testing is completed, we 
believe the ASDS' final design will remain uncertain and may have cost 
and schedule implications.

Other Program Issues:

Future testing issues could affect the program, but these results will 
not be known before the production decision for additional boats 
scheduled in early 2004. For example, the Commander, Operational Test 
and Evaluation Force, recommended an additional phase of operational 
test and evaluation to verify that deficiencies and vulnerabilities 
identified during the May 2003 operational evaluation are corrected 
prior to full operational capability. In addition, since the program's 
first cost estimate was originally approved in 1994, research and 
development costs have more than tripled, and the Navy has not yet 
issued an updated cost estimate for follow-on boats and has not 
provided a life-cycle cost estimate for the ASDS program.

Program Office Comments:

The ASDS program office provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate.

[End of section]

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System:

The Army's and the Special Operations' ATIRCM/CMWS is a component of 
the integrated infrared countermeasures suite planned to defend U.S. 
aircraft from advanced infrared-guided missiles. The system will be 
employed on Army and Special Operations aircraft. The system includes 
an active infrared jammer, a missile warning system, and a 
countermeasure dispenser capable of loading and employing expendables, 
such as flares, chaff, and smoke.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: BAE Systems North America:
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $61.4 million:
Procurement: $2,608.6 million:
Total funding: $2,670.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 2,673:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The ATIRCM/CMWS program entered production in November 2003 with 
technologies mature, designs stable, and production processes in 
control. The CMWS portion of the program entered limited production in 
February 2002 to meet urgent deployment requirements. However, full-
rate production for both components was delayed because of reliability 
problems. Over the past several years, the program has had to overcome 
cost and schedule problems brought on by shortfalls in knowledge: key 
technologies were demonstrated late in development and only a small 
number of design drawings were completed by design review.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

ATIRCM/CMWS Program:

Technology Maturity:

The ATIRCM/CMWS' five critical technologies are mature. However, they 
did not mature until after the design review in February 1997. Most of 
the early technology development effort was focused on the application 
to rotary wing aircraft. When system development began in 1995, the 
requirements were expanded to include Navy and Air Force fixed wing 
aircraft. This change caused problems that largely contributed to cost 
increases of more than 150 percent to the development contract. The 
Navy and the Air Force subsequently dropped out of the program, 
rendering the extra effort needless.

Design Maturity:

The basic design of the system is complete with 100 percent of the 
drawings released to manufacturing. The design was not mature at the 
time of the design review, with only 22 percent of the drawings 
complete. This was primarily due to the expanded requirements. It was 
not until 2 years after the design review that 90 percent of the 
drawings were released and the design was considered stable. This 
resulted in inefficient manufacturing, rework, additional testing, and 
a 3-year schedule delay.

Production Maturity:

The ATIRCM/CMWS program has all 15 key manufacturing processes in 
control. The Army entered limited CMWS production in February 2002 to 
meet an urgent need of the Special Operations Command. The ATIRCM 
subsystem's production was delayed due to reliability testing failures. 
The program is implementing reliability fixes to six production 
representative subsystems that will be used for initial operational 
test and evaluation. The subsystems will be delivered in March 2004. 
The full-rate production decision for the complete system is now 
scheduled for 2005.

Other Program Issues:

The Army procured an initial 32 systems for use on Special Operations' 
CH-47 helicopters in fiscal year 2002 that only included CMWS. The Army 
plans to procure a total of 99 systems to outfit Special Operations' 
aircraft between fiscal years 2003 and 2009.

Program Office Comments:

The ATIRCM/CMWS program office concurred with this assessment and 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 
Additionally, it commented that the Army acquisition executive approved 
the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council's recommendation that 
ATIRCM/CMWS transition from system development and demonstration to 
production and deployment. Initial operational tests and evaluation 
will be completed in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. A full-rate production 
decision review is planned in August 2005.

[End of section]

Advanced Wideband Satellite/Transformational Satellite (AWS/TSat):

The AWS/TSat system is designed to provide improved, survivable, jam-
resistant, worldwide, secure, and general purpose communications to 
support DOD in conjuction with systems that support NASA and the 
intelligence community. It will replace the current Milstar satellite 
system and supplement the AEHF satellite system, reviewed elsewhere in 
this report. It will include multiple satellite systems and be a 
cornerstone of the new DOD communications architecture.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: In Competition:
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: 8:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The AWS/TSat program entered system development in December 2003 with 
only one of its five critical technologies mature. The remaining four 
technologies are not expected to reach maturity until 2006. The product 
development period requires concurrent technology maturation and 
product development activities to maintain schedule.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

AWS/TSat Program:

Technology Maturity:

Of the five AWS/TSat critical space technologies, one is mature while 
the other four are scheduled to reach maturity in early 2006, more than 
2 years after the planned start of development. Three of the four 
immature technologies have a backup technology available in case of 
development difficulties. However, use of any of the backup 
technologies would degrade overall system performance. The Single 
Access Laser Communications technology has no backup, and according to 
program officials, any delay in maturing this technology would cause 
the expected first satellite launch date to slip beyond 2011.

Other Program Issues:

The AWS/TSat acquisition strategy allows the system's technology 
development and product development to be conducted concurrently prior 
to the production decision. Because the military users expect new 
communications capability by 2011 and they were concerned with the 
aggressive acquisition strategy of the AWS/TSat program, the Air Force 
scheduled an interim review point in November 2004. The review is 
intended to determine if technology development has progressed 
sufficiently to ensure the military users' needs can be met no later 
than 2011. If not, the Air Force must decide on alternatives, one of 
which is to buy an additional AEHF satellite. Air Force officials have 
not defined the evaluation criteria they intend to use to assess AWS/ 
TSat's progress or determine alternatives.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the current AWS/TSat development plan matures all critical path 
technologies sufficiently before the preliminary design review. The Air 
Force believes this is consistent with both government and commercial 
best practices. Furthermore, it noted that nearly all technologies that 
are not now mature have backup technologies that provide significantly 
increased capability to the warfighter. The only exception is the laser 
communications subsystem that it believes is a low risk for production.

[End of section]

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP):

The Air Force's B-2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system 
to resolve potential conflicts in frequency band usage between the B-2 
and a commercial communication satellite system under development. To 
comply with federal requirements, the frequency must be changed to a 
band where the B-2 will be designated as a primary user. The modified 
radar system is being designed to support the B-2 stealth bomber and 
its combination of stealth, range, payload, and near precision weapons 
delivery capabilities.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $696.1 million:
Procurement: $498.9 million:
Total funding: $1,195.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 21:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The B-2 RMP's two critical technologies are fully mature well in 
advance of development start, scheduled for May 2004. A date has not 
been set for the final design readiness review. The program plans to 
build six radar units during development for pilot training with the B-
2 operational wing. These prototypes will later become operational 
units on the B-2 aircraft.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

B-2 RMP Program:

Technology Maturity:

The B-2 RMP's two critical technologies, the transmit/receive modules 
of the AESA antenna and the beam steering controller software, appear 
mature. A formal technology readiness assessment is planned for 
completion prior to the start of development in May 2004. In an effort 
to further reduce risk, the program has already built and tested some 
transmit/receive modules. In addition, several key elements of the 
modules have already been tested in an operational environment. Over 
half of the beam steering controller software has been demonstrated on 
prior AESA upgrade programs.

Design Maturity:

The contractor built and tested some transmit/receiver modules as part 
of a proof-of-design phase prior to the start of development. However, 
the contractor has not released any manufacturing drawings because the 
program is not scheduled to start development until May 2004. A date 
has not yet been set for the final design readiness review.

Production Maturity:

Both the prime contractor and the major subcontractor plan to collect 
manufacturing process control data. Production is scheduled to begin in 
January 2007. The program plans to conduct a production readiness 
review prior to the planned start of production. The program is also 
involved in a proof-of-manufacturing effort to demonstrate that the 
transmit/receive modules can be built to specifications.

Other Program Issues:

The program plans to build six radar units during development and later 
modify these units for placement on operational B-2 aircraft. The Air 
Force needs these six radar units when the current B-2 radar frequency 
becomes unavailable, in order to continue vital air crew training and 
proficiency operations. Building these six units early in development 
adds risk because most of the radar flight-test activity will not occur 
until after these units are built.

Program Office Comments:

The B-2 Program Office concurred with this assessment.

[End of section]

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP):

The C-130 AMP standardizes the cockpit configurations and avionics for 
all 14 different mission designs of the C-130 fleet. It consolidates 
and installs the mandated DOD navigation/safety modifications, the 
Global Air Traffic Management systems, and the C-130 broad area review 
requirements. It also incorporates other reliability, maintainability, 
and sustainability upgrades and provides increased situational 
awareness capabilities.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $900.2 million:
Procurement: $2,876.1 million:
Total funding: $3,776.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 479:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The C-130 AMP is utilizing commercial and modified off-the-shelf 
technologies, and it entered system development with all but one of its 
six critical technologies mature. The remaining technology is nearing 
full maturity; however, there is concern that it may not meet current 
performance requirements. Program officials are working with the user 
to lower requirements to match resources. Program officials plan to 
release 90 percent of engineering drawings by the design review. The 
program office recently delayed program milestones in response to 
funding reductions. While this delay provides extra time to achieve 
design stability, it reduces the time available to achieve production 
knowledge. Plans to accelerate the installation on Special Operations 
aircraft and software integration challenges are placing additional 
pressure on the compressed schedule.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

C-130 AMP Program:

Technology Maturity:

Five of the C-130 AMP's critical technologies are fully mature. The 
program utilizes primarily proven commercial and modified off-the-shelf 
technology for all AMP capabilities. The remaining critical technology, 
the Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA) capability, has 
been demonstrated through the Air Force Research Lab's Quiet Knight 
advanced technology demonstration program, and it is nearing full 
maturity. There is a risk that the TF/TA technology may not meet a key 
requirement to operate at 250 feet. Program officials are working with 
the user to lower the requirements to operate between 250 and 1,000 
feet, which will more closely match the capability of the TF/TA 
technology. Failure to make this change may necessitate a redesign.

Design Maturity:

Currently, 14 percent of the design drawings are complete and could be 
released to manufacturing. Program officials stated they are committed 
to meeting the required 90 percent drawing release by design review, 
now scheduled for May 2006.

The modernization effort is divided into a number of capability spirals 
due to the various aircraft designs. The first spiral will outfit C-130 
aircraft with core capabilities and an integrated defensive system. 
Future spirals are planned for Special Operations Command's C-130 
aircraft because they require additional, unique defensive systems 
integration and enhanced situational awareness.

Other Program Issues:

Funding reductions in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 delayed the C-130 
AMP's development program and resulted in a rescheduling of program 
milestones. The design review, low-rate initial production, and 
production readiness decisions have all been delayed. Program officials 
stated that the delay in schedule would provide more time to resolve 
issues with the TF/TA technology and software. Despite this additional 
time, the time available for system integration has been compressed by 
9 months, giving less time to reduce manufacturing risks. There is also 
a new plan to accelerate Special Operations Command aircraft deliveries 
by 12-14 months, further compressing an already optimistic timeline.

The program is also at risk if less software is reused than originally 
estimated, which may cause an increase in development costs and delay 
the program's schedule. Software integration remains a risk due to its 
complexity, number of suppliers, potential for developmental growth, 
certification of a secure operating system, and software safety 
standards. The program office is working to mitigate these risks 
through modeling and simulation, utilizing the systems integration 
laboratory built by the contractor, and through flight demonstrations.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials stated 
that the technology demonstrated during the Quiet Knight demonstration 
is mature and that the remaining technological challenge lies in 
integrating all TF/TA system components and coupling them with the 
other avionics functions. An early study identified a risk that the TF/ 
TA system may not meet a key requirement to operate at 250 feet caused 
by errors attributable to the integrated subsystems. The study 
identified fixes to minimize errors, and program officials stated they 
worked closely with the user and the contractor for implementation to 
ensure a match between requirements and the TF/TA System capabilities. 
Only this key engineering requirement was loosened to match the 
capability of the currently fielded systems. Program officials further 
stated that the risk of the compressed schedule should be reduced by a 
robust predevelopment test and evaluation TF/TA flight demonstration 
and having two aircraft in development testing.

[End of section]

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP):

The Air Force's C-5 AMP is the first of two major upgrades for the C-5 
to improve the mission capability rate and transport capabilities and 
reduce ownership costs. The AMP implements Global Air Traffic 
Management, navigation and safety equipment, modern digital equipment, 
and an all-weather flight control system. The second major upgrade, the 
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), replaces the 
engines and modifies the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic systems. We 
assessed the C-5 AMP.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $76.3 million:
Procurement: $280.1 million:
Total funding: $356.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 45:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The program office considers the C-5 AMP's critical technologies to be 
mature because they are relying on commercial off-the-shelf 
technologies that are installed in other commercial and military 
aircraft. The main challenge involves the development and integration 
of software. The Air Force plans to modify 55 of the 112 C-5 aircraft, 
and the program office has let the production contract for the first 8 
C-5 AMP modifications. The Air Force is also seeking funding to modify 
the remaining 57 C-5s; however, that decision will not be made until 
the Air Force determines whether it will use C-17s instead of the C-5s 
to meet its airlift requirements. If the Air Force decides to use the 
C-17s, it may not upgrade some, or all, of the remaining 57 C-5s.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

C-5 AMP Program:

Technology Maturity:

We did not assess the C-5 AMP's critical technologies as the program 
used commercial technologies that are considered mature. Program 
officials indicated that the technologies are in use on other aircraft. 
For example, the new computer processors are being used in the Boeing 
777, 717, other commercial aircraft, the KC-10, and a Navy 
reconnaissance aircraft.

Design Maturity:

The design appears stable as the contractor has released 100 percent of 
the drawings for the AMP. In addition, the seven major subsystem-level 
design reviews were completed before the December 2003 system-level 
design review. Demonstration of these integration activities is 
scheduled during development test and evaluation, which was started in 
December 2002 and should be completed in October 2004.

Production Maturity:

We could not assess the production maturity because most components are 
readily available as commercial off-the-shelf items. This equipment is 
being used on other military and commercial aircraft. In addition, the 
C-5 AMP is incorporating many other off-the-shelf systems and 
equipment, such as the embedded global positioning system (GPS), the 
inertial navigation system, and the multifunction control and display 
units. To ensure production maturity, the program office is collecting 
data regarding modification kit availability and installation 
schedules.

Other Program Issues:

Program officials indicated the greatest risk to the AMP is software 
development and integration. Several new software programs must be 
developed and integrated with several other commercial off-the-shelf 
software packages. Program officials stated that the software 
development risks stem from a variety of issues, including an 
aggressive cost and schedule baseline and a geographically diverse 
software development team. To overcome these problems, the prime 
contractor added additional staff. Program officials are confident that 
the problems will be satisfactorily resolved within the current 
schedule.

The C-5 aircraft must undergo the AMP modifications prior to the RERP 
modifications. However, only 55 aircraft have been approved for the AMP 
upgrades, while 112 are awaiting RERP upgrades. The Air Force needs to 
determine how many of the remaining 57 C-5s will receive the AMP 
upgrades. That decision will not be made until the Air Force determines 
the correct mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft that are needed to meet DOD's 
airlift needs. Until it is decided whether to use C-17s to replace 
some, or all, of the earlier 57 C-5s, the number of aircraft to undergo 
the AMP and RERP modernization will remain uncertain.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the program office said 
that the cost comparison of the November 1998 AMP position to the 
latest AMP position, for the purpose of calculating a percentage change 
to the unit cost, does not accurately portray the program's cost 
growth. The November 1998 position represents the original 126-aircraft 
program. The program has since been restructured to a 55-aircraft 
program. Such a change would increase costs by a large amount because 
it would be less expensive, on a unit cost basis, to procure a greater 
number of aircraft than it would be to procure fewer aircraft.

GAO Comments:

While the program has established a new cost and performance baseline 
since the November 1998 decision to begin development, the comparison 
presented provides an accurate picture of change since that major 
decision. Although DOD may update its baseline for management purposes, 
our goal is to provide an aggregate or overall picture of the program's 
history.

[End of section]

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP):

The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5 
aircraft. The RERP is designed to enhance the reliability of the 
aircraft by replacing engines and modifying subsystems such as the 
electrical, fuel, hydraulic, and flight controls systems, while the C-
5 AMP is designed to enhance the avionics. These upgrades are part of a 
two-phased modernization effort to improve the mission capability rate 
and transport capabilities and reduce ownership costs. We assessed the 
C-5 RERP.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,093.2 million:
Procurement: $7,514.1 million:
Total funding: $8,610.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 109:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The program ensured that the technology was mature and that the design 
was stable at critical points in development, closely tracking best 
practice standards. The RERP is utilizing demonstrated commercial off-
the-shelf components that require little or no modification. The major 
challenge to the RERP is software development and integration, which 
has experienced problems. Also, the RERP is dependent on the number of 
aircraft approved to undergo the C-5 AMP upgrades. Until additional 
aircraft are approved for the C-5 AMP, it is uncertain how many 
aircraft will undergo the RERP.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

C-5 RERP Program:

Technology Maturity:

The C-5 RERP technologies are mature based on an independent technology 
readiness assessment conducted in October 2001. New engines account for 
64 percent of the expected improvement in mission capability rate for 
the aircraft. The new engines are commercial jet engines currently 
being used on numerous airlines. According to the Air Force technology 
assessment, these engines have over 70 million flying hours of use.

Design Maturity:

The C-5 RERP design is mature. As of November 2003, 98 percent of the 
design drawings were complete. In addition, the seven major subsystem-
level design reviews were completed before the December 2003 system-
level design review.

According to program officials, the greatest risk to the C-5 RERP is 
software development and integration activities. Several new software 
programs must be developed and integrated together as well as with 
other commercial off-the-shelf software packages. The program has 
experienced problems during software development and integration, and 
it believes these problems are linked to pressures caused by an 
aggressive cost and schedule baseline and different geographical 
locations of the software development team. A program official stated 
that the prime contractor has started to take actions to improve 
program software development activities.

Production Maturity:

We did not assess the C-5 RERP production maturity because the Air 
Force is buying commercially available items. However, we expect that 
production maturity would be at a high level.

Other Program Issues:

The C-5 RERP is dependent on the C-5 AMP, as the aircraft has to 
undergo avionics modernization prior to the RERP. The C-5 RERP has been 
authorized for 112 of the C-5 aircraft, but the AMP has only been 
authorized for 55 aircraft. Therefore, until the Air Force decides on 
how many C-5 aircraft will undergo avionics modernization, it is 
uncertain how many aircraft will undergo the RERP upgrades.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the program office 
stated that the cost comparison of the November 2001 RERP position to 
the latest RERP position, for the purpose of calculating a percentage 
change to the unit cost, does not accurately portray the program's cost 
growth. The November 2001 position represents the original 126-aircraft 
program. The program has since been restructured to a 112-aircraft 
program. It further stated that such a change would increase costs by a 
large amount because it would be less expensive, on a unit cost basis, 
to procure a greater number of aircraft than it would be to procure 
fewer aircraft.

GAO Comments:

While the program has established a new cost and performance baseline 
since the November 2001 decision to begin development, the comparison 
presented provides an accurate picture of change since that major 
decision. Although DOD may update its baseline for management purposes, 
our goal is to provide an aggregate or overall picture of the program's 
history.

[End of section]

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC):

The Navy's CEC is designed to connect radar systems to enhance 
detection and engagement of air targets. Ships and planes equipped with 
their version of CEC hardware and software will share real-time data to 
create composite radar tracks--allowing the battle group to see the 
same radar picture. A CEC-equipped ship can then detect and launch 
missiles against targets its radar cannot see. We assessed the current 
shipboard and airborne versions of CEC.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon Systems Corporation:
Program office: Washington, D.C.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $487.0 million:
Procurement: $1,353.1 million:
Total funding: $1,840.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 221:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

CEC's production maturity could not be assessed because the government 
does not collect the necessary data on the commercially available 
portions of the shipboard and airborne versions of CEC. However, 
program and contractor officials consider the production processes to 
be capable of producing a quality product on time and within cost. The 
technologies and design of both the shipboard and airborne versions are 
fully mature. In April 2002, the shipboard version was approved for 
full-rate production, and the airborne version was approved for 
continued low-rate initial production.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

CEC Program:

Technology Maturity:

All six of CEC's critical technologies are considered mature, based on 
operational assessments by the Office of Naval Research issued in 
January 2002. While the shipboard and airborne versions have different 
hardware, they share the same six critical technologies.

Design Maturity:

CEC's basic design appears stable. All drawings needed to build the 
shipboard and airborne versions have been released to manufacturing.

CEC program officials noted that new drawings for both versions will 
continue to be released. They explained that as commercially available 
technologies, which comprise approximately 60 percent of the CEC 
hardware, become more advanced, portions of the system will need to be 
redesigned to incorporate those advances.

Production Maturity:

We could not assess production maturity as data was not available. 
According to program officials, the noncommercially available portions 
of CEC do not involve any critical manufacturing processes. Officials 
indicated that they do not have insight into the manufacturing 
processes for the commercially available portion, including whether 
these processes are critical and whether the contractor has them under 
statistical control.

Program officials and the contractor are confident that a quality 
product can be delivered on time and within cost based on the 
contractor's adherence to industry standards and past performance on 
low-rate initial production contracts for the shipboard version. Also, 
according to program officials, a production readiness review of the 
airborne version is planned for the second quarter of fiscal year 2004.

Other Program Issues:

In November 2003, the Navy announced plans to resolve outstanding 
issues associated with CEC's interoperability by pursuing open 
architecture and functionality changes in coordination with the Joint 
Single Integrated Air Picture Systems Engineering Organization (JSSEO). 
The CEC Program Office then discontinued planning for a Block 2 
development effort and began working with JSSEO to jointly engineer 
sensor measurement and radar tracking management solutions. According 
to the CEC Program Office, the JSSEO's goal is to have a common set of 
solutions available to all services to implement, thereby ensuring 
optimum interoperability across the battlespace.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that it generally concurred with our assessment. The program office 
also noted it will be incorporating a new antenna assembly, which is a 
critical technology, into the shipboard version starting in fiscal year 
2005. This antenna assembly will eliminate the current need for two 
antenna arrays on some ships. The new antenna array, which is expected 
to be less expensive, will be produced using commercial processes. The 
program office plans to hold a production readiness review on the new 
antenna assembly in the second quarter of fiscal year 2004.

[End of section]

CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F):

The Army's CH-47F heavy lift helicopter is intended to provide 
transportation for tactical vehicles, artillery, engineer equipment, 
personnel, and logistical support equipment. It is also expected to 
operate in both day and night. The purpose of the CH-47F program is to 
enhance performance and extend the useful life of the CH-47 helicopter. 
This effort includes installing a digitized cockpit, rebuilding the 
airframe, and reducing aircraft vibration.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Helicopters:
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $10.4 million:
Procurement: $5,594.9 million:
Total funding: $5,605.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 330:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The CH-47F helicopter began low-rate production in December 2002, 
although key production processes were not in control. Program 
officials believe that production is low risk because no new technology 
is being inserted into the aircraft, two prototypes have been produced, 
and the production process has been demonstrated during the development 
phase. The CH-47F technologies and design appear mature, although a low 
percentage of engineering drawings were released at the design review. 
In 2002, production unit costs more than doubled due to contractor rate 
increases, new system requirements, and initial underestimation of 
program cost.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

CH-47F Program:

Technology Maturity:

Although we did not assess technology maturity in detail, the CH-47F 
helicopter is a modification of the existing CH-47D helicopter. Program 
officials believe that all critical technologies are mature and have 
been demonstrated prior to integration into the CH-47F development 
program.

Design Maturity:

The CH-47F design is complete, with 100 percent of the drawings 
released to manufacturing. However, at the design review only 37 
percent of the system's engineering drawings were complete. Since that 
time, the number of drawings completed increased substantially. The 
majority of the new drawings were instituted to correct wire routing 
and installation on the aircraft, changes the program office believed 
could not be determined until after the first prototype was developed.

Production Maturity:

The CH-47F's production maturity could not be determined because 
statistical process control data was not available. According to 
Boeing, this data is available at the contractor; however, the CH-47F 
program is not reviewing it. Although program office officials believe 
the CH-47F's production is low risk, because two prototypes were 
produced during development, there is no evidence to show that its 
critical manufacturing processes are under control. In the absence of 
this data, the program office started its second low-rate initial 
production in December 2003.

Other Program Issues:

In addition to the cost increases experienced in the CH-47F program 
last year, further cost increases and schedule delays are expected due 
to DOD's direction to remanufacture more helicopters for the Special 
Operations Command, which have not yet been reflected in the costs of 
the program. According to the CH-47F deputy program manager, DOD 
directed the Army to remanufacture an additional 16 MH-47G helicopters 
for the Special Operations Command before the start of the Army's low-
rate initial production for its CH-47F helicopters. The program office 
maintains that DOD's decision affected the program's cost and schedule 
estimates and resulted in a schedule rebaselining of the CH-47F 
program. The restructuring will result in a schedule slippage of 15 
months and a cost increase of about $630 million, the majority of which 
will go toward replacing helicopters provided to the Special Operations 
Command.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the CH-47F product manager 
generally concurred with this assessment, but provided clarifying 
comments. Regarding manufacturing control processes, the CH-47F product 
manager stated that quality control measures that are more realistic 
than the statistical process control metrics are in place and are being 
monitored to ensure production maturity. For example, both contractor 
and government personnel are inspecting all flight safety parts, and 
the program office reviews this data monthly.

The product manager believes that the initial program cost increase 
associated with the additional helicopters for the Special Operations 
Command has been absorbed into the current program and will have a 
minimal effect on average unit cost. Further, a revised program 
deviation report addressing the schedule slip for the first unit-
equipped date is pending approval by the Army acquisition executive.

[End of section]

Comanche Reconnaissance Attack Helicopter (RAH-66):

The Army has terminated the Comanche program to reallocate resources. 
It was the Army's next generation armed reconnaissance aircraft system 
and its technology would have provided the Army with a system capable 
of operating in adverse weather conditions across a wide spectrum of 
threat environments. It would have replaced AH-1, OH-6, and OH-58A/C/D 
helicopters. We have retained the Comanche assessment because it 
remains a good example of attaining key product knowledge.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Sikorsky:
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $4,968.8 million:
Procurement: $21,955.4 million:
Total funding: $26,962.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 646:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Most critical technologies have demonstrated acceptable levels of 
maturity, and the program has confirmed the stability of the first 
design iteration through its recent critical design review. This level 
of maturity follows years of difficult development. In 2002, the 
program was restructured to incorporate an evolutionary acquisition 
approach and reduce concurrency and lower overall risk. The 
restructured program includes aspects of a knowledge-based acquisition 
approach that provides better balance in the program by spreading out 
requirements and adding resources and time for development.The prime 
contract calls for the collection of drawing release data and 
statistical process control data; its award fee provides incentives for 
demonstrating increasing levels of design stability.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Comanche Program:

Technology Maturity:

Seven of the Comanche's eight critical technologies are considered 
mature. However, the radar cross-section technology, needed for low 
observability, requires additional development. The Army does not 
expect this technology will reach maturity until fiscal year 2005--1 
year before the production decision.

Design Maturity:

The Comanche program essentially attained design stability for the 
initial configuration of the aircraft. At the completion of the design 
review, 84 percent of the helicopter's engineering design drawings were 
complete and released to the manufacturer.

Prior to the 2002 program restructuring, integration of critical 
technologies was considered high risk, even though most of the 
technologies had demonstrated individual maturity. The restructuring 
adopted an evolutionary acquisition approach, realigned program 
requirements, added about $4.0 billion for additional testing, added 
time and testing capabilities, and adopted methods for improving 
contractor performance. The additional resources, coupled with fewer 
initial requirements, allowed the program to build more design 
knowledge before committing to production--thereby reducing risks. The 
tools used to gather and validate design knowledge are required by the 
contract, and targeted award fees provide additional incentives for 
building knowledge.

One remaining design risk is that development testing of a fully 
integrated Comanche will not take place until after the production 
decision. Discovering and correcting design problems during production 
will be much costlier than problems discovered during development.

Production Maturity:

The restructured Comanche program calls for collecting more knowledge 
about production processes and production maturity than we have seen on 
many programs. Specifically, the Army plans to collect information on 
control over the Comanche's production processes and reliability, and 
it has included these requirements in the Comanche contract. In 
addition, the contractor has established reliability growth plans and 
goals and has started conducting reliability growth testing. At this 
point, two risks for demonstrating production maturity remain: (1) it 
is not clear that all key aircraft characteristics will be identified 
by the critical design review and (2) the Army has not set a standard 
for what constitutes an acceptable level of production process control.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
generally concurred with the information presented in this report. It 
noted however that comparing the current program with the acquisition 
program baseline dated October 2002 would show essentially no variance.

GAO Comments:

While the program has established a new cost and performance baseline 
since the July 2000 decision to begin development, the comparison 
presented provides an accurate picture of change since that major 
decision. Although DOD may update its baseline for management purposes, 
our goal is to provide an aggregate or overall picture of the program's 
history.

[End of section]

Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21:

The Navy's CVN-21 class is the successor to the Nimitz-class aircraft 
carrier and includes a number of advanced technologies in propulsion, 
aircraft launch and recovery, weapons handling, and survivability. 
These technologies will allow for increased sortie rates and decreased 
manning rates as compared to existing systems. Many of the technologies 
were intended for the second ship in the class, but they were 
accelerated into the first ship in a December 2002 restructuring of the 
program.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Newport News:
Program office: Washington, D.C.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,862.9 million:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: 1:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The CVN-21 is expected to enter system development in April 2004 with 
very few of its critical technologies fully mature. This is due in part 
to DOD's decision to accelerate the installation of a number of 
technologies from the second ship into the first ship. The accelerated 
technologies are at much lower levels of maturity. Program officials 
state that the extended construction and design period that ends in 
2014 allows further time for technology development. Program officials 
established a risk reduction strategy that includes decision points for 
each technology's inclusion based on demonstrated maturity level. These 
decision points coincide with key design milestones and include mature 
backup technologies for all but two technologies.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

CVN-21 Program:

Technology Maturity:

Program officials currently estimate that 3 of the 13 critical 
technologies will be mature by system development, and that 3 more will 
be approaching maturity. An additional seven will be at much lower 
levels of readiness. The technologies vary widely in maturity due to a 
mix of factors, including decisions by acquisition officials, standard 
practices in Navy shipbuilding, and feasibility of sea-based testing.

Of the six critical technologies identified at or just below 
recommended maturity levels by system development, all were a part of 
the original acquisition approach for the first ship. These 
technologies were well into development by December 2002 when the 
program was restructured and technologies were accelerated from the 
second ship into the first ship. For example, the original technologies 
included the reverse osmosis desalinization plant, critical to the 
functioning of the nuclear propulsion system as well as daily 
functions. Through a series of land-and sea-based tests, this 
technology has been brought to recommended maturity levels.

In contrast, technologies accelerated during the restructuring are at 
lower levels of maturity. For example, the advanced weapons elevator 
will exceed the current elevator load capacity by 70 percent or more 
while increasing sortie rates and decreasing operating costs. 
Development of this technology did not begin until February 2003, and 
it will not be fully mature by the start of system development.

Program officials stated that the risk associated with development of 
some CVN-21 technologies is manageable due to the nature of ship 
construction. Critical technologies, such as the radar systems and the 
advanced arresting gear, reside in the upper decks of the ship and are 
not slated for ship installation until late in the process.

Program officials stated that it is not possible to mature some systems 
to the best practices standard early in development. One such system is 
the electromagnetic aircraft launch system, a replacement for the 
current steam catapult system used to launch aircraft off carriers. 
This system has been in development since the late 1990s, but due to 
the size and complexity of the system it cannot be prototype tested 
aboard a surrogate ship. While land-based demonstrations of form, fit, 
and function are possible, a full operational environment is not 
reasonably achievable.

The program's risk reduction strategy defines a timeline for making 
decisions about a technology's maturity. For the majority of the 
technologies, a readiness review will occur in early fiscal year 2005. 
Other technologies, primarily those included in later stages of design, 
will be assessed later. If technologies are not ready for inclusion, 
fallback technologies will be used. The program has mature fallback 
technologies for all systems except nuclear propulsion and 
desalinization systems.

Other Program Issues:

System development was delayed by the decision to restructure the 
program; however, the dates for construction start and commissioning 
the ship have not been moved. The date for delivering the ship to the 
fleet is driven by the decommissioning of the U.S.S. Enterprise, which 
will reach the end of its service life in 2014. This schedule 
compression raises the risk of costly redesign late in development.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
emphasized that the CVN-21 program has established a technology 
development strategy to manage the risk associated with bringing new 
technologies into the design. Each new technology has a development 
timeline with identified decision points for evaluating technology 
maturity. These decision points are linked to key events in the 
platform design schedule and the technology development schedule. 
Program officials stated that if sufficient maturity has not been 
demonstrated at the decision points, an "off-ramp" can be selected to a 
fallback technology. Fallback plans identify existing, mature 
technologies that can be incorporated into the design within ship 
delivery schedule constraints. Program officials indicated that in some 
cases selection of an off ramp would result in a loss of projected 
operational capability, but at least equal current capability. 
Technologies that do not mature in time will continue development for 
follow-on ships.

[End of section]

DD(X) Destroyer:

The Navy's DD(X) is a multimission surface combatant designed to 
provide advanced land attack capability in support of forces ashore and 
contribute to U.S. military dominance in littoral operations. In 
November 2001, the Navy restructured the DD(X) program to focus on 
developing and maturing a number of transformational technologies. 
These technologies will provide a baseline to support development of a 
range of future surface ships such as the future cruiser and the 
Littoral Combat Ship.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Ship Systems:
Program office: Washington, D.C. Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $7,452.1 million:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Costs increased due to changes in cost estimates, technology 
development programs, and program restructuring. Current estimate 
includes detailed design and construction of the lead ship.

DD(X) is scheduled to enter system development with none of its 12 
critical technologies fully mature. The program is pursuing risk 
mitigation by constructing and testing engineering development models 
for its critical technologies. The acquisition strategy calls for 
engineering development model construction and testing concurrent with 
system design. Because of schedule slippage, only two models will be 
mature by the award of the lead ship construction contract, currently 
planned for September 2005. Backups are available for only 2 of the 12 
technologies. Program progress has been hampered by changes in desired 
ship size and capabilities.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

DD(X) Program:

Technology Maturity:

None of the 12 critical technologies for DD(X) are fully mature. The 
Navy does not anticipate any of these technologies reaching maturity 
prior to entering system development. At the time of the first ship 
production decision, the Navy expects to have only two critical 
technologies sufficiently tested to demonstrate maturity. Only two 
backup technologies exist, one for the integrated power system and one 
for the hull form. While the backup technology for the integrated power 
system is mature, the alternate hull form remains in development. If 
other critical technologies do not mature as planned, system redesign 
would occur.

The DD(X) Program Office is managing risk in part by constructing and 
testing engineering development models for each of the 12 critical 
technologies. The program's acquisition strategy scheduled these models 
to be fully built and tested concurrent with system design and 
completed before authorizing construction of the first ship. Current 
testing schedules call for the integrated power system, dual band radar 
suite, total ship computing environment, and peripheral vertical 
launching system to continue development beyond lead ship production 
decision.

A second element in the risk reduction strategy is "design budgeting." 
According to the program manager, this approach consists of designing 
the requirements for technologies with a margin for growth. The DD(X) 
program allows for a 10 percent margin to account for necessary 
increases in size, weight, or manpower discovered through testing of 
the engineering development models. If the 10 percent margin is 
exceeded, system redesign would occur.

Modifications to ship size and capabilities affected the progress of 
the technology maturation process. In June 2003, the weight of the ship 
was reduced, prompting redesign of the advanced gun system and hull 
form engineering development models. Multiple reevaluations of radar 
characteristics contributed to a delay in the development of the dual 
band radar engineering development model.

Other Program Issues:

The DD(X) acquisition strategy focuses on developing and maturing 
technologies that could be leveraged across multiple ship classes. If 
DD(X) critical technologies do not reach maturity or are delayed, risks 
will increase for other programs in development. For example, the delay 
associated with the DD(X) dual band radar suite has already affected 
the CVN 77 Nimitz class aircraft carrier program. As a result, the 
aircraft carrier was forced to use a legacy radar system, leading to 
costly redesign and rework.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this analysis, the program office stated 
that the ability of DD(X) to deliver revolutionary capabilities with 
reduced crew necessitates some element of development and production 
risk. Program officials expect that the spiral development approach 
adopted in 2001, combined with robust testing of the engineering 
development models, will mitigate that risk. Officials indicated that, 
since the 2002 contract award, the only significant schedule change was 
due to dual band radar changes.

The program office also stated that the time required to design and 
build a ship makes the process unique from other weapon systems. DOD 
policy states that ship technologies must be mature in time for 
installation, and the program office stated that all DD(X) engineering 
development models will meet this requirement. At design review, the 
program expects that most engineering development models will be 
nearing maturity, and that design budgeting will enable incorporation 
of changes.

GAO Comments:

The program will be integrating technologies into a ship-level system 
design at the same time that it is maturing individual technologies. 
Should any of these innovative technologies encounter challenges that 
cannot be accommodated by design budgeting, redesign of other 
technologies and of the integrated system may be needed. Redesign would 
likely result in additional costs and schedule delays as well as affect 
the planned installation schedule.

[End of section]

E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (E-10A):

The Air Force's E-10A aircraft (formerly known as the MC2A) is planned 
to provide the next generation of airborne surface surveillance 
capability and focused air surveillance for cruise missile defense. It 
will consist of a modified, commercial Boeing 767 airframe, an active 
electronic scanned array radar, and a battle management, command and 
control computer mission subsystem. Development of the radar and 
funding of the first airframe have begun. We assessed only the radar.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman (prime)/Boeing/Raytheon:
Program office: Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.
Funding to complete through 2009:
R&D: $1,907.9 million:
Procurement: $1,311.2 million:
Total funding: $3,219.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 2:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The latest costs reflect all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009, and are for the entire E-10A system.

Only the radar subsystem of the E-10A aircraft has entered system 
development. Six of the radar's nine critical technologies are fully 
mature. The remaining three are nearing full maturity, but they are not 
expected to reach full maturity until the first E-10A flight in 2009. 
The entire E-10A weapon system is scheduled to enter system development 
in July 2005. At that time, the program plans to integrate the radar 
with the airframe and the battle management, command and control 
computer mission subsystem. The Air Force has identified ongoing 
changes to requirements and software development as high risks. The 
program is projected to provide initial operational capability by 2013, 
1 year later than required, due to a fiscal year 2003 congressional 
funding reduction.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

E-10A Program:

Technology Maturity:

At the start of the radar's product development in December 2003, six 
of the nine critical technologies were mature and had been demonstrated 
in an operational environment. The remaining three technologies are 
nearing full maturity, but they are not expected to reach full maturity 
until the first E-10A flight in 2009.

Design Maturity:

We did not assess the design maturity of the E-10A radar as the number 
of releasable drawings is not yet available.

Other Program Issues:

The development of the entire E-10A platform includes the radar, the 
Boeing 767 airframe, and the battle management, command and control 
computer mission subsystem and is scheduled to begin in July 2005. At 
that time, the computer mission subsystem must achieve software and 
hardware maturity to demonstrate the machine-to-machine communications 
capability needed to operate with legacy command and control systems. 
The radar and antenna need to be incorporated into the Boeing 767, as 
do other capabilities, such as adding air-refueling, hardening the 
airframe hull against electro-magnetic interference, strengthening the 
cabin floor, and increasing the onboard electric power generation. 
Hosting the radar on the Boeing 767 involves incorporating an open 
systems architecture and interfaces that have yet to be designed.

The program office identified a number of high risks in the program. 
For example, design changes to the platform may be needed to address 
weight and drag issues, which can affect range and time on station. 
Ongoing reviews of the operational requirements, and changes to the 
requirements, may also affect system function and design. In addition, 
software development is considered a high risk because of the large 
number of lines of code, range of applications needed, and changing 
requirements.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently directed that the Air 
Force delay the start of development for the E-10A from July 2004 to 
July 2005. This was done to better align program reviews with the 
delivery of the test bed aircraft in December 2005 and to provide 
sufficient time to complete a study on ground-moving target indicator 
capability.

The program office implemented a spiral development approach to 
incrementally deliver E-10A capability. Program officials stated that 
the E-10A will reach its initial capability in 2013, 1 year later than 
the operational need date of 2012, due to a $343 million congressional 
cut in fiscal year 2003 program funding.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials stated 
that the E-10A program is on track to provide the initial capability of 
the next-generation airborne surface surveillance, and is focused on 
surveillance for cruise missile defense, to the warfighter by 2013 in 
accordance with the current program schedule and funding.

[End of section]

E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE):

The Navy's E-2 AHE is an all-weather, twin engine, carrier-based 
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. It 
is the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has acquired for the E-2C 
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The E-2 AHE is 
designed to improve battle space target detection and situational 
awareness, especially in littoral areas; support Theater Air and 
Missile Defense operations; and improve operational availability.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corp.
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,123.3 million:
Procurement: $9,483.2 million:
Total funding: $12,606.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 69:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The E-2 AHE program entered system development in June 2003 without 
demonstrating that its four critical technologies had reached full 
maturity. Program officials do not expect to achieve maturity on those 
critical technologies until at least a third of the way through product 
development. The program office plans to have the majority of drawings 
completed by the time of design review in November 2005. However, until 
the technologies are mature, the potential for design changes remains.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

E-2 AHE Program:

Technology Maturity:

None of the E-2 AHE's four critical technologies are fully mature. The 
four critical technologies are the rotodome antenna, the Silicon 
Carbide-based transistor for the Power Amplifier Module to support E-2 
UHF radio operations, the Multi-channel Rotary Coupler for the antenna, 
and the Space Time Adaptive Processing algorithms and associated 
processor. The program expects to have these technologies matured after 
critical design review but before production, which is scheduled to 
start in March 2009.

More mature backup technologies exist for three of those technologies 
(the rotodome antenna, the Silicon Carbide-based transistor, and the 
Multi-channel Rotary Coupler) and are currently being flown on a larger 
test platform. However, use of the backup technologies would result in 
degraded system performance or reduced ability to accommodate future 
system growth due to size and weight constraints. While there is no 
backup for the fourth technology (Space Time Adaptive Processing 
algorithms and associated processor), the program office is confident 
that the technology will operate well on the test aircraft in 2005.

Design Maturity:

While none of the engineering drawings are complete, program officials 
project that they will have 81 percent completed by the time of 
critical design review in November 2005 and that 100 percent will be 
completed by the time of the production decision in March 2009. 
However, the technology maturation process may lead to more design 
changes.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the AHE program entered system development and demonstration after 
6 years of research development and 18 months of presystem development 
work. Program officials also stated that in preparation for entry into 
system development a technology readiness assessment was performed 
using industry, academic, and government experts and that the results 
of that assessment were approved in accordance with DOD's acquisition 
guidance. The program office noted that the maturity of the 
technologies examined in that assessment was primarily based on 
demonstrations conducted in 1997 and 1999 and did not include recent 
accomplishments, including AHE test-bed flights conducted through the 
summer of 2003.

The next AHE technology readiness assessment is to be performed prior 
to the production decision for the system in fiscal year 2008, and the 
program office anticipates that the critical technologies will be 
mature at that time. In addition, program officials noted that a mature 
risk process, with mitigation plans, exists for the entire AHE program, 
including critical technologies, which focuses on risks associated to 
operational requirements.

[End of section]

EA-18G Growler (EA-18G):

The Navy's EA-18G is an electronic attack aircraft designed to jam 
enemy radar and communications and conduct electronic warfare as part 
of a battle group. The program was approved as a replacement for the 
EA-6B aircraft, and will integrate its electronic warfare technology 
into the F/A-18F platform. Because of the heavy use of the aging EA-6B 
aircraft, a large number are being retired due to wear. To prevent a 
gap in electronic war-fighting capabilities, DOD intends to begin 
fielding the EA-18G in 2009.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,632.2 million:
Procurement: $6,030.5 million:
Total funding: $7,662.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 90:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The EA-18G entered system development without demonstrating that its 
five critical technologies had reached full maturity. Three 
technologies were very close to maturity and two technologies require 
substantial adjustments. In addition to the mechanical challenges of 
integration, the program also faces risks with software integration. 
The EA-18G will rely on technological upgrades developed for the EA-6B, 
which could increase program risk.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

EA-18G Program:

Technology Maturity:

None of EA-18G's five critical technologies are fully mature. While 
they are similar to the mature technologies on the EA-6B and the F/A-
18F, integrating the technologies into the EA-18G requires significant 
modification. Three critical technologies, the ALQ-99 pods, the F/A-18F 
platform, and the tactical terminal system, are approaching full 
maturity. The remaining two technologies, the receiver system and the 
communications countermeasures set, are not mature.

Both of the less mature technologies, the receiver system and the 
communications countermeasures set, require substantial modification 
to operate on the EA-18G. The receiver system will be similar to the 
system on the EA-6B, with adjustments to allow it to fit onboard the F/ 
A-18F platform. Several of the receiver's components, such as the 
antenna preselectors, will also need to be upgraded, mainly because 
some have become obsolete. The communications countermeasures set on 
the EA-6B is no longer in production, and a contractor will be selected 
to develop a new set for the EA-18G. While the new set will be based on 
existing technology, there is additional risk to the program until the 
new set is produced and demonstrated to work in the EA-18G.

The electronic warfare equipment on the EA-18G will be subject to a 
more severe operating environment than on the EA-6B. Advanced 
technologies will be needed to counter the higher levels of vibration.

Other Program Issues:

The EA-18G program plans to build one-third of its aircraft during low-
rate initial production due to the need to begin replacing retiring EA-
6Bs by 2009. Any problems that arise during production could result in 
costly modifications to the already produced aircraft.

Additionally, the increased weight and vibration caused by the 
electronic warfare equipment added to the F/A-18F platform may limit 
the life span of the aircraft. Although the program office asserts that 
the design will meet life span requirements, it plans to conduct 
additional testing and design work to further extend the life span of 
the aircraft.

Program Office Comments:

The EA-18G weapon system integrates proven EA-6B Airborne Electronic 
Attack (AEA) systems onto the combat proven F/A-18F platform. Due to 
the maturity of the systems, the EA-18G program risk is significantly 
less than a new weapon system development. To date, the program has not 
identified any major technical inabilities to achieving the current 
design approach within cost and schedule constraints. Program officials 
believe that all five critical items are fully mature, including the 
ALQ-99 pods that have been in existence for 30 years, and the F/A-18F 
platform and tactical terminal, which are both in production for the 
Navy.

GAO Comments:

While the ALQ-99 pods have existed for 30 years, they are being 
physically modified to be compatible with the F/A-18F pylons and will 
have a pod interface unit added to them for communications with the F/ 
A-18F platform. The F/A-18F platform is being modified to support the 
installation of the AEA suite and to increase auxiliary memory. The 
tactical terminal will be modified to fit inside the F/A-18F platform 
and will have a new antenna. Because of these changes to form and fit, 
these systems, while approaching full maturity, are not yet fully 
mature.

[End of section]

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle --Atlas V, Delta IV (EELV):

The Air Force's EELV program is an industry partnership to acquire 
commercial satellite launch services from two competitive families of 
launch vehicles--Atlas V and Delta IV. The program's goal is to meet 
the government's launch requirements while reducing the life-cycle cost 
of space launches by at least 25 percent over existing systems. 
Different types of lift vehicles may be used, depending on the 
particular mission. We assessed both the Atlas V and the Delta IV.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin & Boeing Launch Services:
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $45.3 million:
Procurement: $15,854.7 million:
Total funding: $15,899.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 173:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Implicit in the government's decision to purchase launch services, is 
the assumption that the Delta IV and Atlas V launch vehicles are 
capable of carrying satellite payloads. The program office does not 
believe it needs formal information on EELV's technology, design, and 
production maturity because it is buying the service. It does have 
access to this data, however. The core launch vehicles are mature, and 
since August 2002, there have been six successful launches--two 
government and four commercial. However, the heavy lift vehicle (HLV) 
has yet to complete production and fly a demonstration mission.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

EELV Program:

Technology Maturity:

We could not assess the technology maturity of the EELV because the Air 
Force has not formally contracted for information on the technology 
maturity of the EELV launchers from its contractors. Program officials 
state that they ensure that all government missions are on track for 
their currently scheduled launch dates through daily insight and 
interaction in contractors' development, engineering, manufacturing, 
and operations processes.

Design Maturity:

We could not assess the design maturity of the EELV because the Air 
Force was not able to provide information needed to conduct this 
assessment.

Production Maturity:

We could not assess the production maturity of the EELV because the Air 
Force was not able to provide information needed to conduct this 
assessment.

Other Program Issues:

Initial plans for the EELV program projected a much more robust 
commercial launch market. However, the decline in the commercial launch 
market since the late 1990s significantly reduced the anticipated 
number of Atlas V and Delta IV launches, making the government the 
primary customer for both launch vehicles. This reduction, in turn, 
caused anticipated prices for government launch services to increase 
significantly. According to the Air Force, EELV production rates vary 
and depend on the overall condition of the launch market. Contractors 
do not begin producing a launch vehicle until they receive an order for 
a launch service--usually about 2 years before launch.

The EELV program has recently experienced schedule and program cost 
changes. The program milestone schedule has slipped more than 6 months 
for the HLV demonstration mission and first operation flights. 
According to the Air Force, the delay occurred because of other launch 
priorities, slips in launch dates of the first three Delta IV missions, 
and modifications to the HLV launch pad.

A requirement to maintain two viable launch contractors over the next 5 
years and efforts to improve government oversight have contributed to a 
$539-million increase in program costs. Other factors that contributed 
to the cost increase included an increase in launch price due to 
reallocating missions among the EELV contractors, an anticipated award 
of four additional missions, increases in satellite weight growth, and 
increases in support costs for a West Coast launch pad.

Although the EELV concept of launch vehicle families emphasizes 
commonality of hardware and infrastructure, EELV program officials are 
currently addressing technical risks. Both Delta IV and Atlas V use 
versions of the RL-10 upper stage engine, meaning an engine flaw could 
ground both vehicles. Until production of the Russian made RD-180 
propulsion technology starts in the United States, the Atlas will 
continue to rely on this engine.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
generally concurred with our assessment. It acknowledged that it did 
not contract for technology, design, or production maturity 
deliverables, but daily government insight, interaction, and access to 
contractor data ensure readiness. Also, cost and schedule changes 
primarily resulted from a downturn in the commercial market and the 
addition of funding to maintain two viable launch competitors. The 
anticipated number of launches decreased significantly, increasing 
prices for government launches. The Delta IV HLV demonstration slipped; 
however, officials said they are ready to provide required launch 
services.

[End of section]

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):

The Marine Corps' EFV (formerly called the Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle) is designed to transport troops from ships off shore to their 
inland destinations at higher speeds and from farther distances than 
the existing AAV-7. It is designed to be more mobile, lethal, reliable, 
and effective in all weather conditions. EFV will have two variants--a 
troop carrier for 17 Marines and a command vehicle to manage combat 
operations in the field. We assessed both variants.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics:
Program office: Woodbridge, Va.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $882.9 million:
Procurement: $7,378.4 million:
Total funding: $8,306.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,012:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

EFV demonstrated most technology and design knowledge at critical 
junctures in the program. At the start of the program, all but one of 
the critical technologies were mature. The design was close to meeting 
best practice standards at the design review, signifying the design was 
stable. Early development of fully functional prototypes and other 
design practices facilitated design stability. However, the remaining 
technology has not matured as expected, which may lead to some 
redesign. Also, the demonstration of production maturity remains a 
concern because the program does not plan to use statistical process 
controls to achieve quality. The EFV production decision is not 
scheduled until September 2005. Remaining efforts include 
developmental, operational, and reliability testing.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

EFV Program:

Technology Maturity:

Four of EFV's five critical technologies are mature. The remaining 
technology, the moving map navigation technology, is not expected to 
reach maturity until the summer of 2004. This is a 1-year delay from 
what was reported last year on the EFV program. The moving map 
navigation is to provide situational awareness. As of November 2003 the 
technology had been demonstrated in a high fidelity laboratory 
environment on representative EFV system hardware. By next year, it 
should be demonstrated in an operational environment.

Design Maturity:

The EFV has released nearly all of its drawings for the development 
prototype currently being manufactured. At the time of the critical 
design review in 2001, 77 percent of the drawings had been released, 
signifying the design was stable. After building the first seven 
development prototypes, the program identified changes that would 
affect about 10 percent of the drawings. Program officials said the 
changes to the drawings are mostly to attain better manufacturing 
efficiencies in producing the EFV and will be incorporated into the 
last two of the nine development prototypes. Program officials stated 
they will have additional design reviews prior to starting low-rate and 
full-rate production and that additional changes may result from 
ongoing development testing. Finally, until the moving map technology 
has been demonstrated and incorporated into the EFV design, the 
potential exists for additional design changes.

Within the last year, the program delayed the start of developmental 
testing by 3 months to fix defects in test vehicles. Based on lessons 
learned earlier in the program, the contractor put the initial EFV test 
prototypes through a short shakedown period before sending them to the 
developmental test location. The shakedown was intended to identify 
problems that could affect EFV availability during testing to avoid 
unnecessary increases in the testing costs. Also, reliability testing 
remains to be done.

Production Maturity:

The program expects a low-rate production decision in September 2005, 
but does not require the contractor to use statistical process controls 
to ensure its critical processes are producing high quality and 
reliable products. Instead, the program has directed the contractor to 
develop a production readiness plan to ensure its critical processes 
are in control. The plan consists primarily of collecting 
postproduction quality data on items produced.

Because the final EFV production facility is not ready, the contractor 
is using the planned manufacturing processes to build prototypes at the 
development facility. This will provide verification of these 
manufacturing processes. However, when production moves to the new 
facility, processes will need to be validated again to ensure they work 
as expected. Furthermore, skills gained by staff working in the 
development facility may be lost if different people are hired at the 
production facility.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the acquisition plan is based on four design, build, and test 
iterations of EFV to mature the design and to prove its readiness for 
production and operation. The second iteration is currently underway as 
part of the system development and demonstration (SDD) phase of the 
program. The improvements from the first-generation prototypes will be 
demonstrated during extensive testing of the second generation of SDD 
vehicles. This testing began during the third quarter of fiscal year 
2003 and will continue through a comprehensive operational assessment 
in fiscal year 2005.

General Dynamics is working toward certification to the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9001:2000 quality management 
standard. Various quality assurance methods are being implemented to 
meet the ISO standard. Statistical process control is one of the 
approaches to be used where applicable during low-rate and full-rate 
production.

[End of section]

Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM):

The Navy's ERGM is a rocket-assisted projectile that is fired from a 
gun aboard ships. It can be guided to targets on land at ranges of 
between about 15 and 50 nautical miles to provide fire support for 
ground troops. ERGM is expected to offer increased range and accuracy 
compared to the Navy's current gun range of 13 nautical miles. ERGM 
requires modifications to existing 5-inch guns, a new munitions-
handling system (magazine), and a new fire control system. We assessed 
the projectile only.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Washington, D.C.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $50.8 million:
Procurement: $156.8 million:
Total funding: $207.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 3,055:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The ERGM program began development with very few of its critical 
technologies mature, and while progress has been made, program 
officials do not expect to achieve maturity on all critical 
technologies until at least February 2004. No production representative 
engineering drawings were released to manufacturing by the design 
review; however, over half of these drawings have since been released. 
The program office expects to have a complete and updated drawing 
package by October 2004. Finally, due to several test failures, the 
program did not meet a Navy deadline that required successful 
completion of two land-based flight tests by November 2003. The Navy is 
conducting an independent assessment of the program's readiness to 
proceed with further flight-testing. The Navy has also issued a 
solicitation for alternative precision-guided munition concepts that 
could offer cost savings.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

ERGM Program:

Technology Maturity:

Fifteen of ERGM's 20 critical technologies have demonstrated 
technological maturity. The remaining 5 technologies are approaching 
maturity, and program officials expect that all 20 critical 
technologies will be demonstrated in an operational environment by 
February 2004, almost 8 years after the start of system development. 
Four of these five technologies are related to the unitary warhead 
design change, which was made in January 2002. In our May 2003 
assessment, the program office projected that these technologies would 
be mature by the end of 2003. However, a series of flight test failures 
prevented the program from demonstrating these technologies as 
projected.

Design Maturity:

The program released approximately 54 percent of drawings, and the 
program office plans to have all production representative drawings 
complete by October 2004, over 1 year after the design review. This 
updated and mature drawing package will reflect knowledge gained from 
18 flight tests and qualification tests and will be used to build 
production representative operational test rounds.

At the May 2003 design review, none of ERGM's 128 production 
representative engineering drawings had been released. Instead, the 
program conducted this review with less mature drawings and used them 
to validate the design of the development test rounds.

According to program officials, seemingly minor design and quality 
assurance problems have been responsible for the recent test failures. 
For example, one of the causes of a June 2003 test failure was a design 
flaw in the rocket motor's igniter, a .012-inch gap between two parts, 
which caused it to fall out after gun launch. This problem was 
addressed, and the igniter functioned properly during three later 
flight tests. Another critical test was delayed when excessive paint on 
the round made it slightly too large to fit in the gun barrel. As a 
result of these test issues and others, the program office failed to 
meet a Navy deadline that required the successful completion of two 
land-based flight tests by November 2003. In February 2004, a 
component-level flight test of the rocket motor was also unsuccessful. 
As a result, ERGM guided flight tests, scheduled for February 2004, 
have been postponed. An independent failure investigation, which will 
determine the program's readiness to proceed with further guided flight 
tests, has been initiated.

Production Maturity:

Since the ERGM program will not begin to build production 
representative rounds until October 2004, Raytheon has not started to 
collect information on production process maturity. The manufacturing 
plan states the contractor will identify key product characteristics 
and then determine how to implement statistical process control. 
However, it is not clear when this will occur.

Other Program Issues:

Future program costs are not accurately reflected in the latest program 
cost estimate because the estimate is based on a much lower production 
quantity than is contained in current program documents and the Navy 
has yet to establish a firm ERGM inventory requirement. A new program 
baseline with revised cost and quantity information will not be 
available until at least March 2004.

In October 2003, the Navy issued a solicitation for alternative 
precision-guided munition concepts that could be a complement or 
competitor to ERGM. In particular, the Navy is concerned about the unit 
cost of the ERGM round and is looking to develop alternatives that 
could offer cost savings. The Navy plans to spend $35 million in fiscal 
years 2004 and 2005 to pursue a technology demonstration of other 
extended range munition concepts by September 2005.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office noted 
that it is investigating a number of options for restructuring the ERGM 
program to address technical, budget, and schedule issues. The program 
office also provided separate technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate.

[End of section]

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile:

The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based, 
fire-and-forget, 155-mm cannon artillery precision munitions. It is 
intended to improve the accuracy and range of cannon artillery. Also, 
the Excalibur's near vertical angle of fall is intended to reduce the 
collateral damage area around the intended target, making it more 
effective in urban environments than the current artillery projectiles. 
It would allow the Future Combat Systems' non-line-of-sight cannon to 
fire from farther away and defeat threats more quickly.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, N.J. Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $425.4 million:
Procurement: $3,407.4 million:
Total funding: $3,832.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 76,408:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The Excalibur program's critical technologies are not fully mature, 
even though product development began over 6 years ago. Currently, 
about one-half of the drawings are at a level that could be released to 
manufacturing. Program officials expect to have technological maturity 
and design stability by the design review in 2005. The program has 
encountered a number of challenges since development began, including a 
decrease in planned quantities, a relocation of the contractor's plant, 
early limited funding, technical problems, and changes in program 
requirements. This past year, it completed a major restructuring by 
merging with the Trajectory Correctable Munition program.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Excalibur Program:

Technology Maturity:

None of the Excalibur's three critical technologies--the guidance 
control system, the airframe, or the warhead--are fully mature. 
According to program officials, all three have been demonstrated in a 
relevant environment and are expected to reach full maturity before the 
design review in June 2005. The warhead was not considered a critical 
technology in 1997 because the Excalibur design called for a warhead 
that was under production for other munitions. At the Army's direction, 
the program has undertaken development of a different warhead that is 
undergoing testing.

Design Maturity:

Currently, 55 percent of the Excalibur's engineering drawings are 
releasable to manufacturing. The program office plans to have all 
drawings complete by the design review in June 2005. The program 
recently successfully conducted a preliminary design review to verify 
that the Excalibur's initial design has the potential to satisfy system 
requirements.

Other Program Issues:

The program has gone through many changes since the beginning of 
product development in May 1997. It was almost immediately restructured 
due to limited funding, and it was restructured again in 2001. In the 
past year, the program was again restructured and merged with a joint 
Swedish and U.S. program known as the Trajectory Correctable Munition. 
This merger has helped the Excalibur deal with design challenges, 
including issues related to its original folding fin design. In May 
2002, due to the cancellation of the Crusader, the Army directed the 
restructure of the program to include the Future Combat Systems' non-
line-of-sight cannon. In December 2002, the Secretary of Defense 
approved the early fielding plan, which includes fielding to the Joint 
Lightweight 155mm cannon in fiscal year 2006, the non-line-of-sight 
cannon in fiscal year 2008, and the enhanced unitary round in fiscal 
years 2010-2011.

The net effect of these changes has been to increase the program's 
schedule and to substantially decrease planned procurement quantities. 
As a result, the program's overall costs and unit costs have 
dramatically increased.

Program Office Comments:

The Excalibur program office provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate.

[End of section]

F/A-22 Raptor:

The Air Force's F/A-22, originally planned to be an air superiority 
fighter, will also have air-to-ground attack capability. It is being 
designed with advanced features, such as stealth characteristics, to 
make it less detectable to adversaries and capable of high speeds for 
long ranges. It has integrated aviation electronics (avionics) designed 
to greatly improve pilots' awareness of the situation surrounding them. 
It is designed to replace the Air Force's F-15 aircraft.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,642.2 million:
Procurement: $29,004.1 million:
Total funding: $33,081.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 225:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The F/A-22 Raptor entered production without assurance that production 
processes were in control. The Air Force expects to have about 27 
percent of the aircraft on contract prior to the full-rate decision in 
December 2004, yet quality issues remain. For example, the F/A-22 has 
not achieved important reliability goals, and some components, like the 
canopy, are not lasting as long as expected. Technology and design 
matured late in the program, which contributed to numerous problems. 
Avionics have experienced major development problems, which caused 
large cost increases and testing delays. The potential for further cost 
increases and schedule delays exists as a significant amount of testing 
remains. Additionally, production costs could increase if the assumed 
$25 billion in offsets from cost reduction plans is not realized.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

F/A-22 Raptor Program:

Technology Maturity:

The three critical F/A-22 technologies (supercruise, stealth, and 
integrated avionics) appear to be mature. However, two of these 
technologies, integrated avionics and stealth, did not mature until 
several years after the start of the development program. Integrated 
avionics has been a source of major problems, delaying developmental 
testing and the start of initial operational testing. Since 1997, the 
development costs of avionics have increased by over $980 million. The 
avionics is still considered unstable, and initial operational testing 
has not started. Until testing demonstrates the avionics work as 
intended, the program is subject to additional delays and cost 
increases.

Design Maturity:

The F/A-22 design is essentially complete, but it matured slowly, 
taking over 3 years beyond the critical design review to meet best 
practice standards. The late drawing release contributed to parts 
shortages, work performed out of sequence, delayed flight testing, and 
increased costs. Design changes have resulted from flight and 
structural tests. For example, problems with excessive movement of the 
vertical tails and overheating problems in the fuselage and engine bay 
required design modifications. The Air Force is still conducting 
development testing and has not started operational testing. Until 
testing is completed, now scheduled for September 2004, the possibility 
of additional design changes remains.

Production Maturity:

The program office stopped collecting process control information in 
November 2000. The contractor estimated that nearly half of the key 
processes had reached a marginal level of control, but not up to best 
practice standards. The Air Force has 52 production aircraft on 
contract with 22 more scheduled for contract before full-rate 
production approval, expected in December 2004. The contractor 
continues to revise its manufacturing process to gain greater 
efficiency and quality. However, the Air Force has not demonstrated the 
F/A-22 can achieve its reliability goal of 3 hours mean time between 
maintenance. It does not expect to achieve this goal until 2008 when 
most of the aircraft will have been bought. Best practices strive to 
achieve reliability requirements before entering production. As of mid-
January 2004, the Air Force had only demonstrated about 18 percent of 
the reliability required at maturity.

Other Program Issues:

The Air Force is counting on over $25 billion in future cost reduction 
plans to offset estimated cost growth and enable the program to meet 
the latest production cost estimate. If these cost reduction plans are 
not achieved, production costs could increase.

The Integrated Maintenance Information System (IMIS), a paperless 
computerized maintenance system, is used by the Air Force to maintain 
the F/A-22. The system collects and analyses problem data and develops 
a maintenance solution. The system has not functioned properly, causing 
unnecessary maintenance actions. This has affected the Air Force's 
ability to fly the test aircraft on schedule. The Air Force expects new 
software, planned to be released in February 2004, to address many of 
the errors generated by IMIS.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
recommended technical changes. We incorporated these comments where 
appropriate. The program office also pointed out that while only 18 
percent of the reliability requirement had been demonstrated to date, 
corrections had been identified that should increase the value to 28 
percent, once they are implemented. The program office also pointed out 
it has an interim reliability goal of 1.95 hours mean time between 
maintenance for the end of development.

[End of section]

Future Combat Systems (FCS):

The Army's FCS is a family of systems composed of advanced, networked 
combat and sustainment systems, unmanned ground and air vehicles, and 
unattended sensors and munitions. Within a system-of-systems 
architecture, FCS will eventually feature 18 major systems and other 
enabling systems. Increment one currently includes 14 systems, and it 
will rely on an overarching network for information superiority and 
survivability. Additional systems and new technologies will be 
introduced as they mature and funding is available.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Warren, Mich.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $18,214.6 million:
Procurement: $59,987.8 million:
Total funding: $78,811.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 15:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Quantities refer to complete brigade-sized Units of Action. Each unit 
contains many FCS systems or platforms.

The FCS program began system development with only 4 of its 52 critical 
technologies mature and only 2 additional technologies are expected to 
reach full maturity by the time of the design review in July 2006, more 
than half way through product development. The program expects product 
maturation to continue throughout system development and full 
integration to be demonstrated at the time of operational testing. 
Maturing technologies concurrently with product development increases 
the risk of cost growth and schedule delays. Since FCS will dominate 
Army investment accounts over the next decade, cost growth and schedule 
delays could affect all Army acquisitions. While system development 
began in May 2003, the program will be reviewed in November 2004 to 
determine if the Army should continue the development phase and to 
authorize prototypes.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

FCS Program:

Technology Maturity:

Only 4 of the FCS program's 52 critical technologies are mature and 
only 2 additional technologies are expected to be mature at the time of 
the design review in July 2006. By maturing technology while developing 
the FCS products, the Army has increased the risk of cost growth and 
schedule delays.

Design Maturity:

The FCS program projects that about 80 percent of the estimated 42,750 
drawings will be released to manufacturing by the time of the design 
review for increment one in July 2006. However, DOD may authorize 
developmental prototype production as early as November 2004, about 20 
months prior to the design review and before these production drawings 
are available. These developmental prototypes, which are not intended 
to be production representative, will be used, along with simulations, 
in tests conducted before the 2008 initial production decision, to 
generate additional acquisition knowledge needed to help mitigate cost 
and schedule risks.

The FCS program represents a major integration effort, both at the 
weapon systems platform level and at the networked systems level. The 
total program involves over 33 million lines of software code and 14 
weapon systems or platforms networked together. Given the size of the 
program, it will be a challenge to demonstrate the maturity of the 
entire system of systems.

Other Program Issues:

The concept of an FCS equipped brigade-sized combat unit, known as a 
Unit of Action, represents a major departure in the way the Army has 
conducted combat operations and is a major part of the Army's 
transformation efforts. To successfully develop FCS, the Army faces a 
number of technological and programmatic challenges. One challenge is 
to equip Units of Action with a common family of networked vehicles and 
other systems. These vehicles and systems are expected to be a fraction 
of the weight of existing heavy fighting vehicles to improve 
transportability. For example, vehicles must be light and small enough 
to be airlifted by a C-130 transport, which could require lighter armor 
on each vehicle than existing vehicles.

Another challenge involves developing multiple systems and a network in 
less time than DOD typically needs to develop a single advanced system. 
The schedule for developing FCS is challenging and currently focuses on 
obtaining an initial operating capability in 2010. Even though the 
weapon systems have yet to be clearly defined, DOD may authorize 
prototype builds for testing as early as November 2004 to generate 
additional information needed for the 2008 production decision. 
Combined with the projected state of design maturity, this could result 
in the prototypes being significantly different than production units.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the Army guideline for technology maturity is less stringent than 
that recommended by GAO and that DOD is monitoring the Army's efforts 
to mature critical technologies to that level. The DOD approved FCS 
acquisition strategy indicates that critical technologies should be at 
the maturity level required by the Army at the time of the program's 
preliminary design review in April 2005 and at the maturity level 
recommended by us prior to the FCS production decision in 2008.

[End of section]

Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle:

The Air Force's Global Hawk is a high altitude, long endurance unmanned 
aerial vehicle with integrated sensors and ground stations providing 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Following 
a successful technology demonstration, Global Hawk entered system 
development and limited production in March 2001. Identified as a 
transformational system, the program was restructured in 2002 to 
implement an evolutionary acquisition strategy intending to more 
quickly develop and field a larger and more capable air vehicle.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems:
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,634.6 million:
Procurement: $2,717.5 million:
Total funding: $4,469.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 45:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Due to program restructuring to more quickly field the larger and more 
capable system, key product knowledge on Global Hawk is now less than 
it was in March 2001. Officials originally planned to first produce 
systems very similar to technology demonstrators and then slowly 
develop and acquire more advanced systems. Technology and design 
maturity approached best practice standards for this plan. However, 
program restructuring in 2002 accelerated deliveries, overlapped 
development and production schedules, and added the new, larger air 
vehicle with enhanced sensors. These actions increased development and 
program unit costs. Technology and design knowledge for the 
restructured plan are below best practices, but they should be 
increased by the full-rate production decision date. Production 
maturity is not known; statistical process controls are being planned 
but are not yet in place.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Global Hawk Program:

Technology Maturity:

Four of 14 critical technologies associated with the Global Hawk system 
are mature, another 4 technologies are approaching maturity, and 6 are 
less mature. Overall, technology maturity is less than it was in March 
2001 when the Global Hawk program was approved for product development 
and low-rate production. At that time, the plan was to acquire air 
vehicles similar to technology demonstrators in operation and whose 
maturity levels for its three critical technologies approached best 
practice standards.

The restructured program acquires 7 air vehicles similar to the 
demonstrators (RQ-4A) and 44 larger and more capable models (RQ-4B). 
The RQ-4B air vehicle has not been built or tested, and only 1 of its 
11 critical technologies is considered mature. It is to have a 50 
percent larger payload capacity and incorporate advanced capabilities 
that depend on new sensors and other enhancements in various stages of 
development. In particular, three critical technologies to meet user 
requirements--two signals intelligence sensors and an improved radar 
capability--are not expected to be demonstrated until after a 
significant number of RQ-4Bs are already produced. Officials intend to 
develop and integrate new technologies in a series of spiral 
developments, adding them to the production line as they mature. 
Production approval for the air vehicles with the most advanced sensors 
is planned for fiscal year 2007.

Design Maturity:

Design maturity for the Global Hawk has not yet been achieved and 
varies between the two models. Engineering drawings are complete for 
the RQ-4A, the first seven production units. About 60 percent of the 
drawings for the RQ-4B have been released to manufacturing. Officials 
project that almost 80 percent of the drawings will be complete by the 
design review date in March 2004. This approaches the best practices 
standard of 90 percent.

The restructured program and the evolutionary acquisition approach 
accelerated deliveries and increased concurrency of development and 
production activities, resulting in greater risks to cost, schedule, 
and performance. Testing of the basic design of the new, larger RQ-4B 
will not be completed until 13 are on order and advanced procurement 
awarded for seven more. Problems found late in development, while 
production activities are taking place, may require more time, money 
and effort to fix. Delays or failures in developing, producing, or 
testing enhanced sensor capabilities, especially new signals 
intelligence and radar components, could severely affect cost and 
schedule. Production decisions for the advanced payloads will be made 
later as the technologies mature.

Production Maturity:

Statistical process control is not yet in place at the assembly 
facility. As a result, Global Hawk entered low-rate production with no 
assurance that production processes were in control. Program officials 
said that the contractor is in the process of planning and collecting 
data to implement control techniques for key manufacturing tasks. 
Manufacturing performance is currently monitored by such quality 
control measures as manufacturing defects per opportunity and rework 
data. The quality data for the second production vehicle shows 
improvement over the first vehicle. Contract performance data indicates 
that work is slightly behind schedule and over cost.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
generally concurred and provided the following statements on 
acquisition strategy and risk management. A successful technology 
demonstration supported a coordinated development and initial 
production start. The evolutionary acquisition strategy was implemented 
to deliver an early combat capability followed by time-phased 
incremental improvements. Program risk is managed through incremental 
production decisions, tailored testing, interim management reviews, and 
contract awards of each new capability. The program benefited by 
operational experiences gained in the technology demonstration and in 
extensive combat missions in the war on terror. These experiences 
helped refine operational needs and allowed user-requested improvements 
to be incorporated into first deliveries with minimal program impact. 
The Global Hawk system transforms military operations providing 
persistent, near real-time intelligence to combat commanders.

[End of section]

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):

MDA's GMD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks to defend the United States against limited long-range ballistic 
missile attacks. The first block consists of a collection of radars and 
an interceptor--a three-stage booster and an exoatmospheric kill 
vehicle (EKV)--integrated by a central control system that formulates 
battle plans and directs the operation of GMD components. We assessed 
the initial capability to be fielded in September 2004, and Block 2004 
to be completed by December 2005.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Company:
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding to complete through 2009:
R&D: $9,532.8 million:
Procurement: $0.0 million:
Total funding: $9,532.8 million:
Procurement quantity: TBD:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be 
determined. NA = not applicable:

Three of GMD's 10 critical technologies are mature, and the design 
appears stable. Three technologies are expected to be fully mature by 
the third quarter of fiscal year 2004. Of the remaining four 
technologies, three are expected to reach maturity by December 2005, 
but it is not known when the final technology will reach maturity. The 
program has released about 89 percent of system engineering drawings, 
but until all technologies are demonstrated, the potential for design 
change remains. By beginning integration before these technologies have 
been demonstrated, MDA has accepted higher risks associated with 
potential cost growth, schedule slippage, or decreased performance. 
Finally, questions over whether the contractors can produce the 
interceptor at planned rates and problems with one of the boosters 
raise concerns about the program's ability to field the expected 
capability by December 2005.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

GMD Program:

Technology Maturity:

Only 3 of GMD's 10 critical technologies are mature--one of the 
boosters; the EKV's infrared seeker; and the fire control software of 
the battle management component. MDA expects to demonstrate the 
maturity of 3 other technologies--two EKV technologies and the battle 
management component--by the third quarter of fiscal year 2004. Three 
critical technologies--a second booster, the sea-based X-Band Radar, 
and the early warning radar at Beale Air Force Base, California--are 
expected to be fully mature by December 2005. It is not clear if the 
final technology--the upgraded Cobra Dane radar--will reach maturity by 
September 2004.

Although MDA is developing two boosters, only one booster--known as 
OSC--will have reached maturity prior to the initial capability in 
September 2004. While the OSC booster was tested successfully in August 
2003, the other booster--known as BV+--has experienced continual delays 
in flight and booster tests, indicating development problems. GMD's 
three radar components, needed to detect and track enemy missiles, are 
the least mature. Software for the Beale radar is still under 
development. Although the planned sea-based X-Band Radar uses existing 
technology, it has not been demonstrated in its new environment, a 
platform located in the ocean. Finally, it is unclear if the Cobra Dane 
Upgrade--GMD's primary radar when first fielded--will reach full 
maturity prior to September 2004 because MDA does not plan to 
demonstrate its capability in integrated flight tests. The anticipated 
launch of foreign test missiles might serve as a test of the radar, but 
testing in this manner might not provide all of the needed information, 
since MDA will not control the configuration of the target or the 
flight environment.

Design Maturity:

The GMD program has released about 89 percent of all engineering 
drawings needed to produce an initial capability, indicating design 
stability. The ongoing effort to mature critical technologies, however, 
may lead to more design changes.

Production Maturity:

We did not assess the production maturity of GMD because process 
control data was unavailable. The program plans to deliver five 
interceptors to meet the initial capability target in September 2004, 
with 15 additional interceptors to be delivered by December 2005, 
splitting booster production between two manufacturers. It remains 
unclear whether GMD can meet this schedule and program officials admit 
that the interceptor production schedule is high risk. The contractors 
have not yet proven that they can manufacture the EKV at the planned 
rate or that they can accelerate production of the OSC booster quickly 
enough to manufacture all five boosters needed for the initial 
capability. Finally, due to an explosion at a subcontractor facility 
and questions related to its development, the BV+ booster is at risk of 
not meeting its production goals for the December 2005 capability.

Other Program Issues:

Approximately $3.4 billion in funding that MDA expects to use to 
accomplish activities in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 contribute directly 
to the development of Block 2004, but were budgeted as future block 
activities. While funding has not been moved between blocks, the actual 
estimated cost of Block 2004 will be higher than the amount reflected 
in budget estimates. In addition, using contractor cost performance 
data, we independently estimate that the contract will overrun its 
budget by between $237 million and $467 million at its completion in 
2007, with the interceptors accounting for approximately 84 percent of 
this overrun.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
acknowledged that a portion of the funding budgeted for Block 2006--the 
next increment--directly supports Block 2004 efforts. Program officials 
expressed concern that our assessment could give the incorrect 
impression that Block 2004 has incurred a $3.4 billion cost overrun or 
that funding is intentionally being moved to complete Block 2004. The 
program office also noted that the prime contractor is reporting no 
cost overrun at the completion of the contract. Although the contractor 
estimates that the interceptor will have an overrun of approximately 
$135 million at its completion, it will be offset by underruns in other 
program areas.

[End of section]

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM):

JASSM is a joint Air Force and Navy missile system designed to attack 
surface targets outside of the range of area defenses. JASSM will be 
delivered by a variety of aircraft including the F-16 C/D, the B-52H, 
the F/A-18E/F, the B-2, and the B-1B. The system includes the missile, 
software, and software interfaces with the host aircraft and mission 
planning system. We assessed all components.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Fort Walton Beach, Fla.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $262.7 million:
Procurement: $2,458.3 million:
Total funding: $2,721.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 4,164:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The JASSM program entered production in December 2001 without ensuring 
that production processes were in control. However, program officials 
indicated that they have demonstrated the production processes by 
sampling statistical data at the subsystem level. The program used 
mature technology, and the design was stable at the design review. 
Although there were some developmental and operational test failures, 
program officials incorporated fixes that subsequent tests demonstrated 
to be successful. The contractor has been able to produce at the rates 
required for the initial production.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

JASSM Program:

Technology Maturity:

The JASSM program used existing technologies and the level of 
technology maturity is high. Although none of the subsystems are based 
on new technologies, three critical technologies are new applications 
of existing technologies. These three technologies are the global 
positioning system anti-spoofing receiver module, the low observable 
technology, and the composite materials. These technologies are mature.

Design Maturity:

The contractor has released 100 percent of the drawings to 
manufacturing and has completed developmental and operational tests. 
The full-rate production decision is scheduled for March 2004, pending 
an analysis of these tests. Developmental tests were completed in March 
2003. Fourteen developmental flight tests were performed, with 3 tests 
failing to meet the test objectives. Program officials stated that they 
identified the issues involved and incorporated fixes. The fixes were 
successfully tested in later developmental tests. Eleven operational 
tests were also performed from June 2002 to September 2003. The Air 
Force Operational Test and Evaluation Command evaluated the results of 
these tests and rated the JASSM as effective and potentially suitable 
and recommended for full-rate production.

Production Maturity:

Program officials do not collect production process control data at the 
system level. However, they stated that all production processes had 
been demonstrated and that statistical data is collected at the 
subsystem level and is sampled as required. Program officials indicated 
that the contractor has produced at the rates required for the low-rate 
initial production buy of 176 missiles and that it will be able to 
produce at the full-rate production level of 250 missiles per year. 
Program officials believe that none of the manufacturing processes that 
affect critical system characteristics are a problem, although there 
are key production processes that have cost implications, such as 
bonding for the low observable materials and the painting/coating 
application.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the JASSM program development phase concluded during 2003. All 
developmental test vehicles were delivered and successfully tested 
during this period. This year also included the required deliveries 
from the first low-rate initial production of 76 missiles, with the 
second low-rate initial production contract of 100 missiles ongoing, 
and the third contract for 200 missiles awarded in December 2003. 
Additionally, the contractor built 3 more operational test missiles 
than planned during this time period. Lastly, the program office 
expects to award a contract for an extended range JASSM in early 2004.

[End of section]

Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS):

JHMCS is a joint Air Force and Navy program, led by the Air Force. The 
system is designed to cue radars and weapons at a target based on where 
the pilot is looking. This avoids having to line up the aircraft with 
the intended target. The system works with the Navy and Air Force AIM-
9X missile on the F-18, F-15, and F-16 aircraft. JHMCS also provides 
situational awareness by displaying information about the aircraft and 
weapons. Development is jointly funded by the services, and procurement 
is funded by the aircraft platforms.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $0.0 million:
Procurement: $161.2 million:
Total funding: $161.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 924:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Although JHMCS has been in production for 3 years, data has not been 
collected on whether its production processes are in control. The 
program has experienced design defects and quality control problems. 
Operational testing, completed in August 2002, found that while the 
system was operationally effective, it was not suitable to be fielded 
due to low reliability and maintainability. JHMCS is in its fourth low-
rate initial production effort, and a decision for full-rate production 
is anticipated in February 2004. We did not assess the maturity of 
critical technologies at development start.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

JHMCS Program:

Technology Maturity:

All six of the JHMCS program's critical technologies are mature and 
have been demonstrated in an operational environment using production 
representative hardware. We did not assess critical technology maturity 
at development start because the program is well into production.

Design Maturity:

The JHMCS design appears complete. Operational testing, completed in 
June 2002, found that while the system was operationally effective, it 
was not suitable to be fielded due to low reliability and 
maintainability caused by design defects and poor quality control. The 
recently released Beyond Low Rate Initial Production Report indicates 
some improvement in these areas. However, JHMCS is still not compatible 
with pilot night vision systems or laser eye protection, a finding that 
partly led to the conclusion that the system was operationally not 
suitable. Resolving these issues could result in design changes.

Production Maturity:

Production maturity could not be determined because the contractor does 
not use statistical process controls to ensure that production 
processes are stable. To date, approximately 218 systems have been 
delivered to the Air Force and 124 systems to the Navy. The program is 
in its fourth low-rate initial production buy and the full-rate 
production decision is likely to be made early next year.

Other Program Issues:

The Air Force and the Navy purchased 35 percent of the total quantities 
of the system under low-rate initial production, despite reliability 
and maintainability issues identified in testing.

The full capability of the JHMCS program will not be available until it 
is deployed with the AIM-9X missile. However, almost 85 percent of the 
total JHMCS quantities for the F-16 will be under contract before the 
AIM-9X missile is fielded on the aircraft. In addition, the Air Force 
deferred indefinitely incorporation of JHMCS onto the F-22. Current 
plans call for a separate development effort for a helmet mounted 
cueing system for the aircraft.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the JHMCS capability is not dependent on AIM-9X deployment, nor is 
the JHMCS utility limited to the air-to-air arena. Users are finding 
the increased situational awareness, while using JHMCS air-to-ground, 
is outstanding. JHMCS is being installed in aircraft at logical, cost-
effective times, principally in planned aircraft modification and 
production lines, and is not necessarily linked to other weapons or 
avionics upgrades.

JHMCS has basic production maturity. Companies producing the bulk of 
system hardware are ISO-9000 certified. Statistical process controls 
are used, but data is not reported to the program office.

JHMCS reliability has more than doubled in the last year via system 
improvements and increased user proficiency.

A separate program is underway to integrate night vision devices with 
JHMCS. An interim solution to laser eye protection has been identified. 
Further improvements will require a new laser eye protection program.

[End of section]

Joint Common Missile:

The Joint Common Missile is an air-launched and potentially ground-
launched missile designed to target tanks; light armored vehicles; 
missile launchers; command, control, and communications vehicles; 
bunkers; and buildings. It will be a joint Army and Navy program with 
Marine Corps participation and United Kingdom involvement. It will 
provide line-of-sight and beyond line-of-sight capabilities. It can be 
employed in a fire-and-forget mode--providing maximum survivability--
or a precision attack mode, providing the greatest accuracy.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon/Boeing/ Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The Joint Common Missile is scheduled to enter system development of 
the air-launched version before any of its critical technologies are 
fully mature. Program officials currently project that the critical 
technologies will reach maturity 3 months after design review, about 
half way through product development.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Joint Common Missile Program:

Technology Maturity:

None of the Joint Common Missile's three critical technologies have 
demonstrated full maturity according to best practices. These 
technologies include a multi-mode seeker for increased countermeasure 
resistance, boost-sustain propulsion for increased standoff range, and 
a multi-purpose warhead for increased lethality capability. Program 
officials noted that many of the components of these technologies are 
in production on other missile systems, but they have not been fully 
integrated into a single missile. While backup technologies exist for 
each of the critical technologies, substituting any of them would 
result in degraded performance or increased costs.

Design Maturity:

Program officials project that full integration of the subsystems into 
the Joint Common Missile will occur by June 2005 and that the system 
will reach maturity by December 2005, over 1-1/2 years after the start 
of system development and demonstration.

Program officials believe that the program's modular design will reduce 
life-cycle costs, including demilitarization, and will enable 
continuous technology insertion to ensure improvements against 
advancing threats.

Other Program Issues:

Current cost estimates are likely to increase because the program has 
yet to incorporate the full Army and Navy quantities. The Army's 
previous estimate of 54,290 was based on the AH-64D Apache and the 
Comanche. The current estimate does not include the Comanche. The 
Navy's previous estimate of 23,000 increased because of additional 
requirements.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that during the fourth quarter of 2003 the Army recommended, and DOD 
approved, the restructure of the Joint Common Missile system 
development and demonstration program from a 36-month spiral 
development to a 48-month two-phase program to reduce risk. A risk 
reduction phase of 12 to 14 months will allow full integration of the 
subsystems in a missile prior to the initiation of system 
demonstration. Program officials stated that they demonstrated the 
technology maturity required by DOD acquisition system policy via tower 
tests, captive flight tests and the development and submittal to the 
government for verification of an integrated flight simulation using 
the tactical seeker software. Joint Common Missile development will be 
demonstrated in an operational environment in December 2005. A system 
integration and demonstration phase of 36 months will lead to a low-
rate initial production decision in April 2008. Beginning in fiscal 
year 2009 and running through fiscal year 2012, additional 
capabilities, such as man-in-the-loop target update and antiradiation 
homing variant, will be added. This portion of the program does not 
currently have a DOD approved acquisition strategy.

[End of section]

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF):

The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy, 
strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, 
and U.S. allies, with maximum commonality to minimize life-cycle costs. 
The carrier suitable version will complement the Navy F/A-18 E/F. The 
Air Force version will primarily be an air-to-ground replacement for 
the F-16 and the A-10, and complement the F/A-22. The short take-off 
and vertical landing version will replace the Marine Corps F/A-18 and 
AV-8B. Significant foreign military purchases are expected.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics:
Program office: Arlington, Va.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $26,080.6 million:
Procurement: $128,860.8 million:
Total funding: $155,173.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 2,443:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The JSF program entered system development without demonstrating the 
maturity of its eight critical technologies. The JSF program no longer 
focuses on those technology areas; instead it uses a different method 
of integration and risk management that tracks 28 program level risks. 
We were unable to assess the new risk areas, but program data indicates 
that 5 are high, 20 are moderate, and 3 are low risk. We obtained no 
data that indicates that the technological maturity has changed. 
Contractor efforts since the start of product development have focused 
on the design and producibility of technology, not on further 
demonstrating technology maturity. By its design review in 2005, the 
program expects to have 100 percent of its critical drawings (referred 
to as build-to-packages) completed for the Air Force and Marine Corps 
versions and 80 percent completed for the Navy version.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

JSF Program:

Technology Maturity:

During its concept development phase, JSF had eight critical 
technologies: short take-off vertical landing/integrated flight 
propulsion control, prognostic and health management, integrated 
support systems, subsystems technology, integrated core processor, 
radar, mission systems integration, and manufacturing. We reported in 
May 2000, and again in October 2001, that low levels of maturity in 
these technologies could increase the likelihood of cost and schedule 
growth.

An independent review performed by DOD in 2001, using a different 
method than technology readiness levels, concluded that the overall 
technology maturity of the JSF program was sufficient to enter into 
system development. Contractor efforts since that time have focused on 
the design and producibility of the technology elements, not on 
furthering the technology beyond that already demonstrated at the start 
of the current phase. We obtained no data that indicates that the 
technological maturity has changed. The program now uses Lockheed 
Martin's Key System Development Integration approach to monitor overall 
technology and design integration. Further, the program currently 
tracks 28 program level risk areas and has assessed 5 as high, 20 as 
moderate, and 3 as low risk. This represents an increase in risk from 
last year when only 23 overall program risks were identified with 2 
high, 18 moderate, and 3 low risk areas. We did not evaluate the 
current JSF technique for assessing risks.

Design Maturity:

The program office has not provided information on the number of 
drawings completed for any of the JSF versions. The preliminary design 
review in March 2003 revealed significant issues related to airframe 
design immaturity and other areas. At that time, estimates were about 
5,000 pounds above targets.

While much of this overage has been reduced through better estimating, 
design changes, and improved structural efficiency, the program will 
still require reductions in aircraft specifications to meet 
requirements for the Air Force version. Further estimating and weight 
reduction assessments are being performed to determine the impact on 
the Navy and Marine Corps versions. In addition, Lockheed Martin's 
detailed design efforts for the Air Force version have been delayed by 
2 months due to immature design tools, required structural analysis, 
design team training, and redesigns because of overweight items. 
Consequently, the program has a current $103 million unfavorable 
schedule variance and the first flight for all three versions could be 
delayed by 3 months.

Other Program Issues:

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, expects numerous test 
challenges for the program, including the integration of highly 
advanced sensors with the avionics systems, vertical thrust capability 
for the Marine Corps version, and performance and maintenance 
requirements of the low observable capabilities. According to program 
documentation, vulnerability assessments for live fire test and 
evaluation indicate that the current design will not meet requirements.

In July 2003, we recommended increased program oversight to adequately 
plan for incorporation of foreign suppliers to protect sensitive U.S. 
technology and meet program goals.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that DOD conducted an independent review in 2001 and concluded that the 
technology maturity was sufficient to proceed into system development. 
For this phase, JSF has adopted Lockheed Martin's approach of Program 
Risk mitigation and Key System Development Integration (KSDI) plans to 
monitor overall technology development and design integration as a best 
practice. The program continues to address the 8 critical technology 
categories through the this process. All 8 categories are mapped to the 
KSDI, while 4 of the 8 are also mapped to Program Risk plans. 
Furthering technology maturity is inherent in the development and risk 
management process. Teams have traveled throughout the world looking 
for better technologies to fit requirements. Also, existing Small 
Business and Innovative Research and Science and Technology efforts 
across the Navy, Air Force, and partner countries are focused on this 
area. JSF is addressing technical issues primarily focused on weight. 
Maturity of the original eight technology categories is not related to 
current weight issues.

[End of section]

Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW):

JSOW is a joint Air Force and Navy guided bomb to attack targets from 
outside the range of most enemy air defenses. A dispenser variant (JSOW 
A) carries submunitions to attack soft targets. In 2002, the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council deferred production of an antiarmor JSOW 
variant (JSOW B). The unitary variant (JSOW C) uses a seeker, 
autonomous targeting acquisition software, and a single warhead to 
attack targets. All the variants use a common air vehicle. We assessed 
the unitary variant and the common air vehicle.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems:
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $0.0 million:
Procurement: $784.6 million:
Total funding: $784.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 2,915:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The JSOW program began low-rate production in June 2003 without knowing 
whether production processes were in control. However, the contractor 
has begun studies to determine the feasibility of using statistical 
process controls for production. The program relies on an after-
production process of inspection to discover defects. An operational 
assessment is complete, but operational evaluation will not start 
before award of the low-rate production contract.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

JSOW Program:

Technology Maturity:

The JSOW unitary variant's technology appears mature. The program 
office identified the imaging infrared seeker with the autonomous 
acquisition software as the only critical technology for the system. 
The seeker was not mature at the start of development, but it did 
demonstrate maturity in October 2001--about three-fourths through 
development--when it was flown aboard an aircraft in a captive flight 
test. Program officials stated that in seven developmental tests, three 
free-flight tests with the seeker only and four combined seeker/warhead 
tests, the seeker's performance substantially exceeded requirements.

Design Maturity:

The JSOW unitary variant's basic design appears complete. At the system 
design review in May 2002, the program office had completed 99 percent 
of the drawings. The Navy completed 10 developmental tests (adding one 
combined seeker/warhead test in 2003) in its development program--three 
sled tests with the warhead, three free-flights with the seeker, and 
four combined warhead/seeker tests. However, the Navy delayed the 
beginning of operational evaluation to resolve a problem with the fuze. 
In the third warhead test, the charge penetrated the target, but the 
follow-through charge failed to detonate. The program office identified 
the cause, incorporated a change, and confirmed the change through 
additional testing.

Production Maturity:

JSOW production maturity could not be determined because the contractor 
does not use statistical process controls. Rather, the contractor uses 
a process of post-production inspection to control production quality. 
Raytheon is investigating a defect reduction program and is evaluating 
the use of statistical process controls where feasible. According to 
program officials, 20 percent of their suppliers already use 
statistical process controls. Program officials report that the 
contractor has met the production schedule for more than 2 years for 
the JSOW baseline variant and that the scrap and rework rates remain 
low.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this report, the program office said that 
Raytheon Missile Systems, the JSOW prime contractor, is responsible for 
final assembly of the missile and that the assembly process does not 
lend itself to a heavy statistical process control program. However, 
components of the process, such as the circuit card assembly, have a 
robust statistical process control program, and many of Raytheon's key 
subcontractors have active statistical process control programs where 
processes are closely monitored and controlled. Further, Raytheon's 
Supplier Management Teams that manage first-and second-tier suppliers, 
meet monthly, at a minimum, or more often if necessary, to address 
issues.

[End of section]

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS):

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and significantly increase 
communications capabilities. A joint service program office is 
responsible for developing the JTRS architecture and waveforms, while 
service-led program offices will develop and procure radio hardware for 
platforms with similar requirements. We assessed Cluster 1, led by the 
Army, which is developing radios for ground vehicles and helicopters.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $641.8 million:
Procurement: $7,453.4 million:
Total funding: $8,095.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 108,097:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The JTRS Cluster 1 program's demonstrated knowledge is difficult to 
characterize. Almost all engineering drawings have been completed, and 
key production processes are in control, suggesting design stability 
and production maturity. However, until the technologies are 
demonstrated, the potential for change remains. Officials do not expect 
to achieve technology maturity until late 2004, when prototype radios 
will be tested. In December 2003, the program attained design stability 
for the Cluster 1 radio, though the program projects the need for 
additional design drawings for various installation packages to install 
on different platforms. The program claims to have production processes 
in statistical control at this point; however, as development 
transitions to low-rate production, the program expects this may change 
as a result of design enhancements and technology insertion.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

JTRS Program:

Technology Maturity:

None of the JTRS Cluster 1 program's 20 critical hardware and software 
technologies are mature according to best practice standards. Many of 
these critical technologies have been used in other radio applications, 
but cannot be assessed as mature because they have not been integrated 
into a Cluster 1 radio set. Mature backup technologies exist for some 
critical technologies, but program officials have cautioned that 
substituting them could complicate integration or result in degraded 
performance. The program recently experienced a 4-month schedule slip 
that officials attribute to short-term technology deviations affecting 
size, weight, and power requirements of Cluster 1 radio sets. Program 
officials do not expect these issues to be resolved until the system is 
in full-rate production.

Design Maturity:

The program reports achieving design stability for the basic Cluster 1 
radio design. The program recently completed its design review after a 
delay of 5 months. The program's design consists of two major 
components--the B kit, which is the basic Cluster 1 radio, and the A 
kit, which is the installation components to integrate the radio with 
the host platforms. The B-kit design is complete. The A-kit design 
drawings are expected to increase as the platforms to be equipped with 
Cluster 1 radios are better defined. The program does not attribute 
this expected increase to the design of the Cluster 1 radio itself, 
which it considers stable, but rather to the uncertainty about the 
design of the A-kit, which involves mounting fixtures, cables, 
antennas, and other such components required for integration of the 
radio with host platforms. As more platforms are identified for Cluster 
1 sets, more A-kit design drawings will be required. The undefined 
design centers largely on the Army's FCS components.

Production Maturity:

The program reports that most production processes to be utilized in 
manufacturing the JTRS radios are mature and in statistical control. 
The program office, however, expects the number of processes to change 
due to anticipated design enhancements and/or technology insertion.

Other Program Issues:

The JTRS Cluster 1 program has made considerable progress, but it faces 
several challenges that could affect a successful outcome. The program 
entered product development with an ambitious schedule that program 
officials recognized as high risk. In particular, the program has a 
software development plan with insufficient schedule reserve to 
incorporate knowledge gained from initial development increments and a 
compressed test and evaluation phase that leaves little room for 
rework. The JTRS Cluster 1 information security certification approach 
is also unprecedented, and the radios must go through a certification 
process that is outside the program office's control. Further technical 
challenges that could affect the program include platform integration, 
networking, and spectrum certification.

Program Office Comments:

The program office generally concurred with our assessment and noted 
that the number of slots in the Cluster 1 radio design decreased from 
six to five mainly as a result of heat dissipation issues encountered 
during the critical design review completed in December 2003. In 
response to further questions, officials stated that they do not expect 
the change to reduce the number of channels the radio will run, but 
acknowledged that some of the channels will need to be mounted in 
external vehicle mounts rather than in the radio itself. Officials 
added that they do not anticipate this change having any additional 
impact on performance.

[End of section]

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):

The Navy's LCS will be a fast, maneuverable, shallow draft ship for 
littoral warfare. It will use innovative hull designs to create a self-
deploying and self-sustaining ship. LCS will utilize interchangeable 
mission modules to address three mission areas: mine, antisubmarine, 
and small boat surface warfare. This review focuses on the technology 
maturity of the mission modules for the two ships that comprise the 
initial acquisition. Because competition for the hull is continuing, we 
did not assess maturity of the sea frame itself.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon:
Program office: Washington, D.C.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $632.9 million:
Procurement: $208.2 million:
Total funding: $841.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 2:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Data represents a program office estimate for the cost of the first two 
ships. In the 2004 President's Budget, the funding for the initial two 
ships and future ships are combined.

The LCS program has 22 mission related critical technologies, and is 
scheduled to enter system development with 10 of those technologies 
fully mature. Nine of the remaining 11 technologies will be close to 
reaching full maturity by the start of system development. The 
technologies that have not reached maturity affect all 3 of the 
littoral warfare missions--mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and 
surface warfare.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

LCS Program:

Technology Maturity:

Ten of the 22 critical technologies on LCS will be fully mature at the 
start of system development. Six technologies are not expected to 
mature until after the design review.

Four critical technologies act as platforms, which employ other 
technologies as payloads. These platforms will support operations 
across the three littoral warfare missions--mine warfare, antisubmarine 
warfare, and surface warfare. Three of these technologies--the MH-60R, 
MH-60S, and Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Uninhabited Aerial 
Vehicle--have reached acceptable levels of technology maturity or they 
will do so by program development. One technology, the Spartan 
uninhabited surface vehicle, is not expected to be fully mature until 
the lead ship award date.

The MH-60R is a helicopter capable of operating as an antisubmarine 
warfare platform as well as a surface warfare combatant. At the time of 
our review, the MH-60R and its critical technologies were undergoing 
technical and operational evaluation for operations in both mission 
areas.

The MH-60S is a helicopter that will be used in mine warfare and 
surface warfare missions. At the time of our review the MH-60S in its 
mine warfare configuration had reached maturity. The technologies used 
for mine detection have reached maturity, but the technologies used for 
mine neutralization are not expected to reach maturity by system 
development. To operate in the surface warfare role, the MH-60S 
requires structural changes. While the technologies planned for use by 
the MH-60S in this mission are mature, the MH-60S itself will lack full 
maturity by system development.

The Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle is 
an uninhabited helicopter originally developed for the role of 
reconnaissance. For operations with LCS, the vehicle will be integrated 
with a number of different technologies for operations in littoral 
warfare missions. To operate as a mine warfare platform, it will 
utilize the Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis System, a 
system that is not expected to be fully mature by system development. 
At the time of our review, no systems had been chosen for operations in 
the antisubmarine or surface warfare roles.

In contrast to the three aerial platforms, the Spartan is an 
uninhabited surface vessel. While it was first developed to support 
reconnaissance, Spartan will be used in all three littoral warfare 
missions. A prototype of this technology is being tested on deployed 
naval assets for reconnaissance and force protection functions. These 
tests should be completed in fiscal year 2004. The technologies that 
will support other littoral warfare mission will be mature or near 
maturity at the start of system development, but there is some 
uncertainty about the complexity of integration with Spartan.

Several additional systems will operate independent of these platforms. 
These include three uninhabited undersea vehicles for mine warfare that 
have been used on other naval vessels. Also in development are two 
distributed sensing systems that will not be mature by system 
development. A final technology under consideration is Netfires, a 
missile system being developed by the Army for FCS. This system will 
not be fully mature by system development. No fallback technologies for 
any systems have been identified due primarily to the redundant 
capabilities among the mission modules.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the first two LCS ships would employ mission modules composed of 
existing technologies including, but not limited to, those discussed in 
this report. Future LCS vessels will utilize newly developed mission 
module packages and will leverage lessons learned from the initial two 
vessels, including risk mitigation for new technologies such as 
advanced materials and nontraditional hull types.

The program office also stated that an important aspect of the LCS 
program is the development of open interfaces between the ship and the 
mission modules. LCS modular mission payloads will plug into an open 
modular architecture through a set of standard systems interfaces. This 
will mitigate the potential that a single mission package system could 
negatively affect ship design viability and allow for rapid 
introduction of new capabilities to the Fleet.

[End of section]

Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS):

The Navy's LMRS is a mine reconnaissance system that employs unmanned 
undersea vehicles. These vehicles are launched and recovered from 
submarine torpedo tubes. LMRS is designed for autonomous operation to 
survey potential minefields in support of amphibious and other battle 
group operations. The Navy plans to obtain 12 operational systems and 1 
development system. Each system consists of two unmanned vehicles, 
ship-deployed command, control and recovery equipment, and shore-based 
maintenance equipment.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Washington D.C.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $41.6 million:
Procurement: $324.0 million:
Total funding: $365.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 12:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The LMRS program began system development with neither of its two 
critical technologies mature. While progress has been made in the past 
7 years, program officials do not expect to achieve maturity on the 
technologies until July 2004, at the earliest. While the design is 
currently mature, only about two-thirds of the drawings were complete 
at the time of the design review. According to program officials, 
issues with sonar and software development delayed the test program for 
LMRS. The impact of these delays is being evaluated by the program 
office.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

LMRS Program:

Technology Maturity:

Neither of LMRS' critical technologies, the sonar suite and the lithium 
energy system, are fully mature. Program officials expect both 
technologies to be fully mature by April 2004 and July 2004, 
respectively. The program began product development in 1996 with both 
technologies in conceptual form only.

Full technology maturity for the lithium energy system is contingent on 
receiving a U.S. Navy safety certification so the technology can be 
tested in an operational environment. Program officials stated that 
lithium batteries aboard submarines can pose a deadly safety hazard but 
that it would take a catastrophic incident to release lithium battery 
byproducts. Program officials indicated that they are taking 
appropriate actions to reduce this risk to an acceptable level. The 
lithium energy system is particularly critical as no other technology 
exists to meet LMRS' endurance requirements.

Design Maturity:

The LMRS program's design is mature, with approximately 95 percent of 
the drawings currently releasable. However, the design was not fully 
mature at the design review, with only two-thirds of the drawings 
releasable to manufacturing. Program officials did note that LMRS had 
developed computer-aided design models by that time in order to assess 
system agreement with the design.

Program officials told us two significant issues facing the program are 
sonar and software development. When the program started, sonar 
development received lower priority and fewer resources compared to 
other program areas because sonar development was deemed a medium to 
lower risk. Similarly, at program start, the program office decided not 
to purchase a software development test set that would have allowed for 
earlier testing of LMRS software. Although a report summarizing test 
results is not yet available, program officials informed us that recent 
tests identified problems with sonar and software development. The 
program office is evaluating the affect of resulting delays on the 
program.

Other Program Issues:

Future costs are expected to increase. According to program officials, 
three preplanned product improvements that will enhance LMRS' 
resolution, range, and identification of mines are scheduled for 
incorporation into six LMRS units. The cost of these improvements was 
not included in the latest cost figures from the program office. In 
addition, delays in sonar development will likely affect the cost and 
schedule of these improvements.

The initial operating capability of LMRS was delayed by approximately 1 
year. Work on the program was suspended for 1 year due to a funding 
mismatch between government funds and contractor requirements. 
Additionally, cost overruns resulted from unrealistic program 
projections.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the program started as an acquisition streamlining initiative and 
began with a panel of experts performing a risk assessment. The panel 
identified five moderate risk areas, including acoustic sensors and 
energy systems, and no high risk areas. Program officials indicated 
that risk mitigation plans for the moderate risks were implemented. In 
the acoustic sensor area, program officials stated that electrical 
noise and interference problems have delayed development; the effect of 
this delay is being assessed. Officials indicated that lithium energy 
batteries are on track to achieve certification to support system test 
schedules and that all risk areas are undergoing evaluation and are 
expected to be mitigated to an acceptable level. Program officials also 
stated that the program cost estimate and schedule for the preplanned 
product improvements are being assessed in conjunction with the 
acoustic sensor issue. Program officials emphasized that the program is 
progressing and will deliver a much needed capability to the 
warfighter.

[End of section]

Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program (MM III GRP):

The Air Force's Minuteman III is an intercontinental ballistic missile 
that can be launched from nuclear-hardened silos located throughout the 
United States. First deployed in 1970, the system includes the missile, 
the launch facilities, and the communications network. We assessed the 
program that is replacing the aging guidance system. This and other 
life-extension programs are designed to ensure the reliability and 
supportability of the weapon system through 2020.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Mission Systems:
Program office: Hill Air Force Base, Utah:

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $0.0 million:
Procurement: $794.4 million:
Total funding: $794.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 257:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The technology and design of the GRP appear fully mature, and the 
production appears fairly mature. The program entered full-rate 
production in November 1999, and it is currently eight sets ahead of 
its original delivery schedule. This level of maturity follows several 
years of difficult development. The program's low-rate decision was 
deferred to 1998 as a result of two restructuring decisions: one in 
1995 to reduce program risk from concurrency between program 
development and production and another in 1997 to analyze design 
functionality.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

MM III GRP Program:

Technology Maturity:

Although we did not assess technology maturity in detail, the GRP 
upgrades and extends the life of the 1960s era mature technology used 
in the Minuteman III guidance system with electronic components that 
were successfully demonstrated in the commercial sector in the 1990s. 
The electronics in the guidance system require replacement because 
current electronic components continue to degrade and are becoming 
unreliable and unsupportable.

Design Maturity:

The GRP's design is mature because the program has released only 25 
additional drawings out of 1,600 since production began. Four hardware 
fixes to the configuration baseline have been implemented in 
production. All previously produced guidance sets will be brought up to 
the latest configuration with no impact on the production schedule or 
cost.

Production Maturity:

The program's production processes appear to be fairly mature. Three 
major production processes use statistical process control measures. Of 
the eight key subprocesses that are used to monitor these three major 
production processes, seven use statistical process control data. Five 
of those seven are meeting the best practice standard. Other production 
metrics that are used to assess production processes, such as cost of 
quality (rework), are meeting expectations. As of July 2003, the GRP's 
production was eight sets ahead of its original fiscal year 1998 
baseline delivery schedule. The sets have a performance requirement of 
15,000 hours between failures and are averaging 17,000 hours after 
about 2.3 million hours of operation.

Other Program Issues:

Because the main navigation unit--the gyrostabilized platform--was 
designed and built in the 1960s, the demand for parts required to 
support the platform has decreased and vendors no longer make the 
parts. Currently, the repair depot has been using parts from 
decommissioned Minuteman II and Peacekeeper guidance sets to maintain 
both the old and new Minuteman III sets. It is important that this 
problem be resolved since the guidance system needs to stay viable 
through 2020. However, the latest estimates available indicate that 
parts may only be available through fiscal year 2008 or 2009. To 
address this problem, the Air Force will need to identify qualified 
vendors and provide funding prior to and in sufficient time to avoid 
any interruptions in parts availability.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials noted 
that total program and unit costs only increased 7.8 percent when 
compared with the latest approved fiscal year 1999 acquisition program 
baseline. Program officials also noted that the program is executing 
its third, fourth, and fifth production options and is currently 1 
month ahead of schedule. In addition, the GRP utilizes statistical 
process control data to measure production processes when possible, but 
there is also extensive work that does not fit a classical statistical 
process control format, e.g., cable harness, gyrostabilized platform, 
and missile guidance set assembly, which are final component 
assemblies. The program employs learning curve and cost of quality 
metrics to address these assemblies. The GRP has approved two 
engineering changes to further streamline the production process and 
reduce costs. Demonstrated field performance is excellent, according to 
program officials.

GAO Comments:

While the program has established a new cost and performance baseline 
since the August 1993 decision to begin development, the comparison 
presented provides an accurate picture of change since that major 
decision. While DOD may subsequently update its baseline for management 
purposes, our goal is to provide an aggregate or overall picture of a 
program's history.

[End of section]

Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (MM III PRP):

The Air Force's Minuteman III is an intercontinental ballistic missile 
that can be launched from nuclear-hardened silos located throughout the 
United States. First deployed in 1970, the system includes the missile, 
the launch facilities, and the communications network. We assessed the 
program's remanufacturing of the missile's three-stage solid-
propellant rocket motors. This and other life-extension programs are 
designed to ensure the reliability and supportability of the weapon 
system through 2020.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Mission Systems:
Program office: Hill Air Force Base, Utah:

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $0.0 million:
Procurement: $1,101.3 million:
Total funding: $1,101.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 378:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The program currently has three-fourths of its critical production 
processes under statistical control. Production maturity has 
deteriorated from the 100 percent that was in control at the September 
2001 full-rate production decision due to recent explosions at a 
subcontractor facility, where the stage 2 and 3 motors are 
manufactured. Although a new vendor has been requalified for the 
production of these stages, the program office does not know if the 
final procurement schedule for fiscal year 2007 can be met. Technology 
and design of the solid-propellant rocket motors program appear fully 
mature.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

MM III PRP Program:

Technology Maturity:

The PRP technologies appear mature because the program is using 
existing commercial technology previously used on the Minuteman III 
motors. The upgrade involves chemicals that are compliant with current 
environmental standards.

Design Maturity:

The PRP's design is mature because the program released 100 percent of 
the drawings to manufacturing at the design review in July 1998. Since 
that time, obsolete production methods, materials, or components have 
resulted in minor engineering changes to the design. Further stability 
has been demonstrated by the successful firing of 20 remanufactured 
motors and the operational launching of 5 Minuteman III missiles using 
remanufactured motors.

Production Maturity:

According to the program office, 75 percent of critical manufacturing 
processes are in control. In September 2001, 100 percent were in 
control, but due to recent problems at a subcontractor facility, this 
number has declined.

Other Program Issues:

The August and September 2003 explosions are the latest in a series of 
incidents at the stage 2 and 3 motor remanufacturing facility, 
including a December 2002 incident in which small lead pellets from a 
cracked dead blow mallet were found in 12 stage 2 motors and 9 stage 3 
motors. In response to the December 2002 incident, a joint independent 
team of government and industry experts addressed many problems. 
According to the program office, these problems included a lack of 
adherence to procedures and a lack of commitment to producing quality 
products. In response to other incidents, the program office began 
withholding progress payments until the subcontractor provided a 
recovery plan to address the problems. Moreover, the program office is 
now addressing issues through management reviews of the production 
facility. However, program officials stated that they do not yet know 
how the latest incidents will affect the critical path of all Minuteman 
III life extension programs needed to make the weapon system 
operational through 2020.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
generally agreed with the information in this report. Program officials 
noted that the PRP requalified a new vendor for stage 2 and 3 rocket 
motor production. The new vendor successfully met its first major 
milestone involving casting trials. Transitioning the tooling and 
material from the previous vendor to the new one is on track. The new 
vendor is expected to reach full-rate production in July 2004. The PRP 
is mitigating risk to national security by augmenting the remaining 
production line with spare motor assets to keep rocket motor production 
moving.

[End of section]

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):

The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to 
provide low data rate voice and data communications capable of 
penetrating most weather, foliage, and manmade structures. It is being 
developed to replace the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On satellite 
system currently in operation and is required to support worldwide, 
multiservice, mobile and fixed-site terminal users. MUOS consists of a 
network of advanced UHF satellites and multiple ground segments. We 
assessed both the space and ground segments.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems or Raytheon Company:
Program office: San Diego, Calif.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,421.0 million:
Procurement: $4,052.0 million:
Total funding: $5,651.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 4:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The MUOS satellite program plans to enter the development phase in 
February 2004 with five of eight critical technologies mature. The 
remaining three technologies are projected to be mature by March 2006 
in time for the critical design review. Mature backup technologies are 
available should the new technology fail to mature; however, use of 
backup technologies could degrade system performance in some key areas. 
The product development period will likely require concurrent 
technology maturation and product development activities to maintain 
schedule.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

MUOS Program:

Technology Maturity:

None of MUOS' eight critical technologies have demonstrated full 
maturity, although program officials expect five of the eight critical 
technologies to be mature by the start of the development program in 
February 2004. The remaining three technologies are expected to be 
mature by the time the program reaches its critical design review, in 
March 2006. The eight critical technologies have mature backup 
technologies in the event that they fail to mature. However, the use of 
backup technologies could cause MUOS performance to fall below its 
minimum requirements in some key areas.

The two contractors currently competing for the MOUS program are 
developing their own unique designs that could be based on different 
technologies. Therefore, it is possible that a technology now expected 
to be immature at the start of the development program will not be 
included in the winning contractor's design. However, due to source 
selection sensitivity, no specific information regarding either 
contractors' design or associated program cost could be disclosed.

Design Maturity:

The program's acquisition strategy requiring concurrent technology 
maturation and product development could affect the timely achievement 
of a stable design. The critical design review is scheduled for March 
2006. Until a development contractor is selected, design maturity 
information is considered source selection sensitive.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
generally agreed with our characterization of the MUOS program. In 
response to our concern about concurrent technology maturation and 
product development, it noted that the initial operational capability 
was moved out 1 year, which it believes will allow the MUOS contractor 
more time to mature the necessary technology and finalize the system 
design.

In addition to the comments noted above, technical comments were 
provided and appropriate changes were made to the assessment.

[End of section]

National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS):

NPOESS is a triagency National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), DOD, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
satellite program designed to monitor the weather and environment. 
Current NOAA and DOD satellites will be merged into a single national 
system with projected savings of at least $1.3 billion. The program 
consists of five segments: space; command, control, and communications; 
interface data processing; launch; and system integration. We assessed 
all segments.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology:
Program office: Silver Spring, Md.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,087.6 million:
Procurement: $1,272.2 million:
Total funding: $4,846.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 4:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The NPOESS program entered system development in August 2002 with 12 of 
its 14 critical technologies mature. While the total number of design 
drawings has yet to be determined, the program has completed half the 
currently identified engineering drawings, well in advance of the 
design review. Over 5 years ago, program officials considered the 
program to have several high-risk areas, but since then, officials have 
taken steps to reduce program risk. One significant step being taken is 
to demonstrate three critical sensors on a demonstrator satellite to 
assess how well those sensors work within the context of the overall 
system. Recently, however, the sensor schedule has slipped and combined 
with new funding challenges, both design review and first satellite 
launch have slipped to 2006 and 2009, respectively.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

NPOESS Program:

Technology Maturity:

Twelve of the NPOESS 14 critical technologies were fully mature at the 
start of development in August 2002. The two technologies that are not 
mature are needed for two key sensors--the cross-track infrared sounder 
and the conical microwave imager/sounder. The program projects that all 
technologies will reach full maturity by the time of the design review 
in 2006.

The NPOESS program plans to demonstrate three critical sensors in an 
operational environment through a demonstration satellite that is to be 
launched in 2006. The sensors to be tested include the visible/infrared 
imager radiometer suite, the cross-track infrared sounder, and the 
advanced technology microwave sounder. The program will use the 
demonstration to provide data processing centers with an early 
opportunity to work with sensors, ground controls, and data processing 
systems, thereby incorporating lessons learned into the NPOESS 
satellites. By July 2003, however, development schedules for these 
sensors were extended due to performance problems.

Program officials indicated that they achieved maturity on other 
technologies by concentrating on the early development of key 
individual sensors. The acquisition strategy focused on maturing key 
sensor technologies, using individual development contracts structured 
to demonstrate the maturity of each sensor through a component-level 
design review prior to the system-level design review.

Design Maturity:

Program officials indicated that at least 50 percent of the 6,971 
currently identified drawings have been completed and released to 
manufacturing; however, the total number of engineering drawings has 
yet to be determined. Program officials project that all currently 
identifiable drawings will be complete by the system design review in 
2006.

Contract Management:

In late 2002, DOD extended the launch date of one of its legacy 
meteorological satellites to 2010, delaying the need for the NPOESS 
replacement satellites. In view of this, DOD and NOAA reduced their 
funding for the NPOESS program by about $130 million. Program officials 
also extended the deployment of the first NPOESS satellite launch about 
21 months to November 2009.

The recent funding reductions prompted officials to restructure the 
NPOESS program. A revised plan was completed in December 2003. Program 
officials stated that the revised plan will necessitate few design 
changes for the NPOESS satellites and that any changes will be 
executable within the current 5-year budget.

Program Office Comments:

The NPOESS integrated program office concurred with this assessment and 
provided information on updated project milestones and the 
restructuring plan, which have been incorporated.

[End of section]

Guided Missile System Air Defense (Patriot) PAC-3 Program:

The Army's Patriot system is a long-range, high-medium altitude air and 
missile defense system. The PAC-3 program is designed to enhance the 
Patriot's ability to detect and identify missiles and other targets, 
increase system computer capabilities, increase the number of missiles 
in each launcher, improve communications, and incorporate a new hit-to-
kill missile. The PAC-3 system has two primary components, the fire 
unit and the missile. We assessed both components.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon (prime), Lockheed Martin (missile):
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $379.2 million:
Procurement: $4,049.2 million:
Total funding: $4,428.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,281:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The PAC-3 program continues to report that only a limited number of 
critical production processes are under control, causing production and 
testing problems. The technologies and design are stable on the 
existing system. The Army will award a new contract in 2004 for an 
additional 135 missiles. These missiles incorporate three alternative 
technologies that will either reduce the missile's production cost or 
increase its capability. These technologies have not yet reached full 
maturity.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Patriot PAC-3 Program:

Technology Maturity:

Although the PAC-3's critical technologies appear mature, the program 
office plans to incorporate three alternative technologies into the 
missile under the fiscal year 2004 production contract. These 
technologies are not yet fully mature. The advanced master frequency 
generator and the simplified inertial measurement unit are intended to 
offer lower cost than current components through the use of common 
commercial off-the-shelf components. The multi-band radio frequency 
down link will provide added capability for the missile at a higher 
unit cost. Each of these alternative technologies is scheduled for 
environment qualification and missile level ground testing between 
March and April 2004. Flight-testing is scheduled between April and 
September 2004. Should these new technologies fail to mature, program 
officials said they could stay with existing technology.

Design Maturity:

The PAC-3's basic design is complete, with 100 percent of the drawings 
released to manufacturing. However, as a result of the technology 
insertion program, funded under the fiscal year 2004 production 
contract, there will be an additional 103 drawings. Of the 103 total 
drawings, 75 have been released thus far. The remaining drawings will 
be released between March and April 2004.

Production Maturity:

The program has 23 percent of the key manufacturing processes used to 
assemble the missile and the seeker under control. Significant 
improvement in bringing additional processes under control has not 
occurred, and production and testing problems remain. However, program 
officials noted that rework needed before the seeker passes inspection 
has decreased from an average of about three times to less than two 
times within the past year.

Proposals are being considered from Lockheed to convert the fiscal year 
2002 and 2003 contracts from fixed price incentive to firm fixed price. 
A new contract for fiscal year 2004 production is projected to be 
awarded by December 2003.

Other Program Issues:

On July 29, 2003, the PAC-3 and Medium Extended Air Defense System 
(MEADS) programs were combined. MEADS, which will use the PAC-3 
missile, is designed to be more mobile on the battlefield. The combined 
system is intended to provide a more robust capability against theater 
ballistic and cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and rotary-and 
fixed-wing threats. MEADS is scheduled to be deployed in 2012.

Program Office Comments:

The Patriot PAC-3 program office concurred with this assessment.

[End of section]

MQ-9 Predator B:

The Air Force's MQ-9 Predator B is a multirole, medium-to-high altitude 
endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at higher 
speeds and higher altitudes than its predecessor, the MQ-1 Predator A. 
The Predator B is designed to provide a ground attack capability and 
will employ fused multispectral sensors to find and track small ground 
mobile or fixed targets. As envisioned, each Predator B system will 
consist of four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite 
communications suite operated by 55 military personnel.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated:
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: 49:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The Predator B is scheduled to enter system development with three of 
its four critical technologies mature. The fourth technology is 
comprised of several off-the-shelf components and is expected to be 
mature by July 2004. Unlike the other technologies, no backup is 
available in the event this critical technology fails to mature as 
expected.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Predator B Program:

Technology Maturity:

Three of the Predator B's four critical technologies, the synthetic 
aperture radar, the multispectral targeting system, and the air 
vehicle, are fully mature. The one immature technology is the stores 
management system. This system, which is an avionics subsystem designed 
to integrate and store data necessary to launch munitions, is currently 
being evaluated in a laboratory environment. Program officials expect 
this technology will be ready by July 2004. They believe there is low 
risk associated with this technology since it is comprised of off-the-
shelf components. However, they did acknowledge that no backup 
technology is available at this time.

Design Maturity:

By the start of system development, the program office expects about 22 
percent of its engineering drawings, which reflect the aircraft's 
baseline configuration, will be released. Further, it projects 91 
percent of the drawings will be complete and released to manufacturing 
by the September 2005 critical design review. The program office 
believes the current design benefits from incorporating several common 
components from the Predator A aircraft and the current design and 
development of two prototype Predator B aircraft.

Production Maturity:

According to program officials, the contractor does not plan to use 
statistical process control techniques. Instead, the contractor plans 
to use other quality control techniques such as scrap, rework, and 
repair to track and measure the quality of its manufacturing processes. 
We have found this approach reactive versus prospective and may result 
in cost and schedule increases.

Other Program Issues:

Recent changes to the Predator B acquisition strategy may create 
additional program risks. In July 2003, at the direction of Air Force 
headquarters, the Predator B acquisition approach was changed to 
standardize the development process. This, along with recent budget 
cuts, caused program officials to consider how best to restructure the 
program. The Air Force had planned to procure 62 aircraft through 2009. 
Program officials are now considering a plan to procure the 62 aircraft 
through 2014, 5 years longer than the original plan. Program risk 
assessments are underway to prioritize and match user requirements with 
program resources. No final decisions will be made until early 2004.

Because of altitude limitations, the Army's Hellfire laser-guided 
missile is no longer the weapon of choice for the Predator B. The Air 
Force is considering other lightweight munitions.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
acknowledged it did not contractually require collection of statistical 
process control data on critical manufacturing processes. Program 
officials stated that their program strategy to demonstrate 
manufacturing process maturity includes building, testing, and 
evaluating production representative aircraft; conducting multiple 
readiness reviews; and utilizing low-rate initial production to test 
production processes. The contractor is also performing statistical 
data analyses on nonconformance items, defects, unscheduled depot 
returns, and supplier performance. Program officials also stated the 
system user is reassessing the Predator B system profile. The Predator 
B's modular, open-ended design has resulted in operational improvements 
and may no longer require a system of four aircraft. Thus, the actual 
number of aircraft, supporting equipment, and personnel needed to 
support a Predator B system has yet to be determined.

[End of section]

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High:

The Air Force's SBIRS High program is a satellite system intended to 
provide missile warning information and to support the missile defense, 
technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization missions. It 
is intended to replace the Defense Support Program and will consist of 
four satellites (plus one spare) in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), 
two sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and 
associated ground stations. Our assessment discusses the sensors and 
satellites only.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company:
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,677.0 million:
Procurement: $1,358.3 million:
Total funding: $4,603.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 3:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The SBIRS High program's critical technologies have demonstrated 
acceptable levels of maturity after many years of difficult 
development. The level of design stability is unknown since the 
contractor was unable to provide information on the total number of 
releasable drawings. Similarly, production maturity could not be 
determined because the contractor does not collect statistical control 
data. In August 2002, the program underwent a major restructuring after 
program costs increased to the point of triggering a departmental-level 
review. Though corrective measures have been taken, the program is 
still beset with technical problems and scheduling delays.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

SBIRS High Program:

Technology Maturity:

The SBIRS High program's three critical technologies--the infrared 
sensor, thermal management, and onboard processor--are mature. Program 
officials indicated that the hardware was built and tested in a thermal 
vacuum chamber under expected flight conditions. These technologies 
were not mature at the start of development.

Design Maturity:

The SBIRS High design was immature at the time of the design review. 
Less that 50 percent of the current drawings had been released at that 
time. We could not assess the program's current design stability 
because program officials do not know how many total design drawings 
are expected for the program.

Design stability has been an issue for SBIRS High. The delivery of the 
first HEO sensor has been delayed over 12 months since the program was 
restructured in August 2002, due to excessive electromagnetic 
interference (radio waves emitted by the sensor's electronics that 
interfere with the host satellite). The first HEO sensor is now 
scheduled for delivery in February 2004.

The program office has reported that it is applying the knowledge 
gained from the design problems on this sensor to the second HEO sensor 
which is now due for delivery in June 2004--a 5-month delay from the 
restructured schedule.

Production Maturity:

We could not assess the production maturity of SBIRS High because the 
contractor does not collect statistical process control data. However, 
the program office does track and assess production maturity through 
detailed monthly manufacturing and test data and monthly updates on 
flight hardware qualifications. According to the program office, these 
updates continue to reveal acceptable results.

Other Program Issues:

The delayed delivery of the first of two HEO sensors will likely have 
long-term consequences for the remainder of the program. For example, 
resources needed for the second HEO sensor and GEO satellites were 
pulled and used on the first HEO sensor. As a result, the program will 
likely encounter additional delays.

The Air Force has decided to purchase two additional HEO sensors for 
constellation replenishment but has yet to fund them. Its current 
acquisition strategy is to procure them separately at an estimated cost 
of $314 million for the third HEO sensor and $237 million for the 
fourth. In addition, the Air Force had considered accelerating the 
schedules for the last three GEO satellites after concerns were 
expressed by Congress over plans to delay these acquisitions. The Air 
Force has now determined not to accelerate the GEO production schedule 
and that the right time to begin procurement of these satellites is in 
fiscal year 2006 (it plans to include $1.3 billion for this purpose in 
fiscal years 2006 and 2007 budget requests). The Air Force believes 
this schedule provides the optimal balance among concurrency, 
operational needs, and industrial base sustainment.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that as part of the restructure activities, the program office 
instituted incentive fees for cost performance, rigorous management 
mechanisms to improve program stability and executability, and 
increased senior-level oversight. It also continues to focus on 
minimizing the downstream effects resulting from the initial program 
shortcomings.

Additionally, program officials agreed that the difficulties 
encountered on the HEO sensor have added pressure to the overall SBIRS 
High schedule, but they noted that the program office is committed to 
stabilizing requirements by following disciplined processes and 
continues to assess and mitigate, when possible, cost and schedule 
risks. Despite these changes, program officials project that SBIRS High 
will continue to face the consequences associated with earlier program 
decisions for several more years, but they asserted that the program 
remains postured to identify and respond to them within the current 
budget.

[End of section]

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB):

The Air Force's SDB is a small autonomous, conventional, air-to-ground, 
precision bomb able to strike fixed and stationary targets. The weapon 
will be installed on the F-15E aircraft and is designed to accommodate 
integration with other aircraft, such as the F/A-22. Potential follow-
on capabilities, such as precision strike against moving targets, are 
being considered.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Fort Walton Beach, Fla.
Funding to complete through 2009:
R&D: $260.8 million:
Procurement: $379.0 million:
Total funding: $639.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 24,000:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The program office assessed all eight critical technologies for the SDB 
as mature. The program office held the design review prior to starting 
system development and, although data was not collected, the program 
maintains that the contractor released over 90 percent of the 
production drawings prior to system development. Beginning in 2004, the 
program will begin its seamless verification test program, which 
combines developmental, live fire, and operational testing, in an 
effort to decrease time spent in system development. This concurrent 
approach may increase program risks.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

SDB Program:

Technology Maturity:

The program office assessed all eight critical technologies for the SDB 
as mature. Program officials stated that many of the critical 
technologies have been demonstrated in a free-flight environment. They 
also stated that they have flight tested the system with the properly 
sized components.

Design Maturity:

The program office held the design review prior to the start of system 
development. Also, although data was not accumulated, the program 
office maintains that Boeing released over 90 percent of the production 
drawings prior to system development. According to the program office, 
although the contractor has ultimate responsibility for the weapon 
system and has given the government a 20-year warranty, the program 
office has insight into the contractor's configuration control board 
process and all changes are coordinated with the government.

The SDB program plans to combine developmental, live fire, and 
operational testing beginning in 2004, and early test objectives will 
be primarily defined by the contractor. It believes this combined 
testing will eliminate or reduce redundant testing. This process could 
expose the program to additional risk, as there may be more concurrency 
between system developmental and operational tests.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the SDB program concluded a highly successful source selection 
with a preproduction weapon that met all requirements. Program 
officials also noted that the 2-year competition achieved the 
following: design reviews completed; early live fire tests conducted; 
over 80 percent production representative hardware flown; and Boeing 
conducted six SDB free flights. This maturity resulted in a budgeted 
average unit production price below the program objective goal with 
significant savings to the government. A seamless verification test 
program was designed to involve the operational community earlier in 
the test process, reduce the test schedule and assets, and meet 
requirements. SDB is on track to meet its production decision, 18 
months after system development, and meet its 2006 fielding date.

[End of section]

RQ-7A Shadow 200 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System (Shadow 200):

The Army's Shadow system is intended to be a ground commander's 
reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and battle damage 
assessment system. The system is comprised of four air vehicles, 
payloads, ground control stations, launch and recovery equipment, and 
communications equipment. The small, lightweight air vehicle is 
intended to provide up to 4 hours of operations at 50 kilometers from 
the launch and recovery site. The program entered product development 
and limited production simultaneously in December 1999.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: AAI Corporation:
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $71.0 million:
Procurement: $266.2 million:
Total funding: $344.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 19:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The Shadow program's technology is mature and the basic design is 
complete. However, the program began production in December 1999 before 
achieving design stability or production maturity. Because the design 
was not mature, testing revealed product reliability problems, delaying 
operational testing and the full-rate production decision. The 
contractor only recently started to capture statistical control data on 
its manufacturing processes. Despite resultant cost increases and 
operational shortfalls, the Army was still able to quickly deliver a 
needed capability to the warfighter that has been used during recent 
operations.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Shadow 200 Program:

Technology Maturity:

All of the Shadow's critical technologies are mature because they have 
been demonstrated using actual hardware in realistic conditions. At the 
limited production decision, which coincided with product development 
start, four of the five technologies critical to the system's 
performance were considered mature. The one immature technology, task 
automation, is now considered mature. Prior to limited production, a 
representative air vehicle was flown and evaluated to demonstrate 
feasibility before a commitment to limited production was made. It was 
not until about 3 years later that the last technology reached 
maturity.

Design Maturity:

The basic design of the Shadow is now complete. However, the design was 
not considered stable when it entered low-rate production. At that 
time, the program had completed 67 percent of the drawings. Subsequent 
testing revealed examples of design immaturity, especially relating to 
the reliability of the system. Early testing revealed significant 
problems. For example, testing revealed problems with the air vehicle 
alternator and fuel bladders that resulted in restrictions on the 
endurance and altitudes that could be flown. An immature design and 
testing delays caused the Army to postpone its decision to enter full-
rate production by about 6 months from that planned at the low-rate 
production decision.

Production Maturity:

According to the program office, the contractor only recently started 
to track statistical control data for its critical manufacturing 
processes. As a result, the program entered full-rate production in 
September 2002 without ensuring that manufacturing processes were 
mature. The program did conduct a production readiness review that 
identified some low-to moderate-risk areas but concluded the contractor 
could successfully execute the full-rate production contract.

The delay in achieving design maturity affected attainment of 
production knowledge and delayed operational testing. Problems 
encountered during early tests forced the program to delay the 
completion of operational testing by about 1 year. The Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation reported in December 2002 that the 
Shadow was not operationally suitable, survivable, and may not be 
affordable. During operational tests, the system did not meet its 
reliability or maintainability requirements. The Army decided to field 
the system as is, rather than meeting 100 percent of the operational 
requirements. Since the beginning of the program, it has been 
recognized that deficiencies would exist and would be corrected through 
subsequent block upgrades. However, the lack of funding has deferred 
some of these improvements. As of December 2003, 12 systems (48 air 
vehicles) had been fielded, and according to Army leadership, the 
Shadow has provided critical intelligence during operations in Iraq.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the Army's requirement was to field an unmanned aerial vehicle 
system as quickly as possible. It was understood the system would be 
modified in production to achieve a time-phased incorporation of 
objective and growth capabilities. The program entered engineering and 
manufacturing development and low-rate initial production in December 
1999. The program received a successful full-rate production decision 
in September 2002. The successful full-rate production decision is a 
first for any DOD unmanned aerial vehicle program and was accomplished 
in only 33 months. To date, 12 systems have been fielded, including 4 
to Operation Iraqi Freedom, which are operating at five to six times 
their peacetime operational tempo. The systems are receiving 
outstanding feedback from the field, and commanders are requesting that 
fieldings be expedited. The Army considers the program and its 
acquisition strategy successful.

[End of section]

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):

STSS is being developed in incremental, capability-based blocks 
designed to track missiles throughout their flight. The initial 
increment is composed of two demonstration satellites built under the 
Space-Based Infrared System-low (SBIRS-low) program. MDA plans to 
launch these satellites in 2007 to assess how well they work within the 
context of the missile defense program. MDA may also develop a new 
constellation of satellites and plans to launch the first of these in 
2011. We assessed the two demonstration satellites.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology:
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding to complete through 2009:
R&D: $3,970.4 million:
Procurement: $0.0 million:
Total funding: $3,970.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 0:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be 
determined. NA = not applicable:

Only two of the initial STSS increment's six critical technologies have 
reached an acceptable level of maturity, two are expected to reach 
maturity in September 2004, and the remaining two are not expected to 
reach full maturity until June 2006--1 year prior to launch. We could 
not assess the design or production maturity, as there was no data 
available from the program office. The initial STSS increment 
demonstration satellites were partially built under the previous SBIRS-
low effort and put into storage 5 years ago. SBIRS-low was stopped 
after the Air Force encountered significant cost and scheduling 
increases and spent nearly $1.7 billion without launching a single 
satellite. Prior to launch, the program must complete testing on the 
satellite components and perform assembly, integration, and system 
level testing activities.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

STSS Program:

Technology Maturity:

Only two of six critical technologies--satellite communication cross-
links and on-board processor--are nearing maturity. Of the remaining 
four technologies, the acquisition sensor and the tracking sensor are 
expected to reach maturity by September 2004 and the single-stage 
cryocooler and the two-stage cryocooler are not expected to achieve 
maturity until June 2006, about 1 year before the satellites are to be 
launched.

Design Maturity:

We did not assess the design maturity of the STSS demonstrator 
satellites because drawing release data was not available. The program 
currently has prototypes for the two mature technologies.

To launch the satellites, the STSS program must address certain risk 
areas. Some of these areas include assessing the working condition of 
the satellite hardware and software; dealing with insufficient time to 
complete the ground segment, payload, and infrared software development 
and testing; analyzing critical tests for acceptable performance prior 
to launch; making modifications to the tracking sensor; and handling 
issues related to parts obsolescence. The program faces other 
challenges to get the satellites ready for launch within budget and on 
schedule. A number of space segment design activities are still needed 
for the existing satellite hardware and are proving to be more complex 
or require more effort than originally planned. In addition, the 
payload subcontractor has had a number of program management and 
quality process problems that have led to delays in developing the 
software and the upgrades to improve tracking sensor performance.

Other Program Issues:

Neither the prime contractor nor the payload subcontractor has 
demonstrated a consistent ability to identify and correct problems 
without strong program office involvement. The program office stated 
that it has frequently taken steps to ensure the quality control of 
this program.

The STSS program also includes plans for developing a new constellation 
of missile tracking satellites in support of the ballistic missile 
defense system. The new satellites could be different and more capable 
than the ones to be launched in 2007. This part of the program is still 
in a conceptual stage. MDA plans to start work on the new constellation 
of satellites in 2005 or 2006 and launch a demonstrator satellite in 
2011. The satellites are to serve as a baseline for follow-on 
satellites that will comprise the STSS constellation.

We reported in May 2003, that by pursuing efforts to get the existing 
satellites ready for launch in 2007, MDA may be missing an opportunity 
to spend more time and money developing technologies needed for the new 
constellation of satellites. Further, by focusing on the newer 
constellation of satellites, MDA could launch the first new satellite 
earlier than 2011 as now planned.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the remaining work to mature the four technologies is to integrate 
the various components into the satellite end-item system. Program 
officials further noted that most of the design difficulties relate to 
improving tracking sensor performance and accommodating the launch of 
the two satellites on a single booster. With the completion of a system 
critical design review in November 2003, they believe these design 
issues are behind them and should not cause any further significant 
variances. Additionally, program officials noted that they and the 
prime contractor have had a relationship that has not required any more 
program office intervention than originally envisioned. Finally, they 
stated that MDA had considered other alternatives to launching the 
existing satellites but found them not to be prudent in the context of 
the overall ballistic missile defense system.

GAO Comments:

Our prior work has shown that MDA's assessment of alternatives to 
launching the demonstration satellites did not fully consider the 
option of focusing solely on development of new technology, which could 
offer operational capability sooner.

[End of section]

Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):

MDA's THAAD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks to provide a ground-based missile defense system. This system is 
designed to protect forward-deployed military forces, population 
centers, and civilian assets from short-and medium-range ballistic 
missile attacks. THAAD will include missiles, launcher, X-band radar, 
and a command and control battle management system. We assessed the 
Block 2008 initial capability expected to be available in 2009.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding to complete through 2009:
R&D: $3,853.1 million:
Procurement: $0.0 million:
Total funding: $3,853.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 0:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be 
determined. NA = not applicable:

THAAD's technologies are mature, and the design is stable. The 
capability of the design will be demonstrated in flight tests that are 
scheduled to begin in 2004. THAAD's initial deployment could occur 
sooner than planned if early flight tests are successful. The current 
THAAD acquisition strategy, as demonstrated by its extensive test 
program, shows a strong emphasis on attaining knowledge and using that 
knowledge to make acquisition decisions.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

THAAD Program:

Technology Maturity:

The THAAD program office assessed all of its 50 critical technologies 
as mature. These technologies are included in four major components: 
command and control battle management and communications (C2BMC); 
interceptor; launcher; and radar. A new component, a primary power 
unit, will be added in the next few years, but this unit will most 
likely be purchased as a commercial off-the-shelf item.

Despite early test failures, the THAAD development program of the 1990s 
made progress in maturing critical technologies. Early flight-test 
failures were caused primarily by the program's compressed schedule and 
missile quality control problems. After these failures, program 
officials placed more emphasis on risk reduction efforts, which 
included using technology readiness levels to assess the maturity of 
critical technologies.

Design Maturity:

The basic design of THAAD is essentially complete because the program 
has released approximately 100 percent of its engineering drawings. The 
program office successfully conducted the design review in December 
2003.

THAAD's design is expected to change little between the design review 
and initial capability in 2009, when MDA plans to incorporate the 
element into the Ballistic Missile Defense System. However, if problems 
are identified during flight-testing, scheduled from 2004 to 2008, 
design changes could occur.

Other Program Issues:

THAAD program officials stated their principal objective for the 
current block is the demonstration of a missile defense capability 
through flight-testing, enabling an initial defensive capability in 
2009. However, achieving this capability will require approval to 
fabricate equipment for fielding and approval to redirect funds for 
this purpose. MDA is examining opportunities to deploy an earlier THAAD 
capability. For example, if early flight-testing is successful, MDA may 
consider reallocating funds to deliver a THAAD capability in 2006 or 
2007. MDA officials are also examining whether THAAD's radar can serve 
as a forward-deployed radar for the Ballistic Missile Defense System. 
Further development, customization, and testing of the radar have begun 
in an effort to provide this capability in the next 2 years.

According to the program manager, the contractor has completed 
approximately 50 percent of the work under the existing THAAD contract 
and is performing work slightly ahead of schedule and under cost. Our 
analysis of contractor data confirms this assessment. The contract is 
being modified to align the program with MDA's block approach.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA generally agreed with 
the information provided in this report. Program officials also 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.

[End of section]

Tactical Tomahawk Missile:

The Navy's Tactical Tomahawk (Block IV) is a major upgrade to the 
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (Block III). The Tactical Tomahawk missile 
will provide ships and submarines with enhanced capability to attack 
targets on land. New features include improved antijamming global 
positioning system, in-flight retargeting, and the ability to transmit 
battle damage imagery. The system includes the missile, the weapon 
control system, and the mission planning system. We assessed only the 
missile.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems:
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $19.6 million:
Procurement: $1,920.3 million:
Total funding: $1,939.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 2,194:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The Tactical Tomahawk missile entered low-rate production without 
ensuring that production processes were in control. Although program 
officials have identified critical processes and have procedures to 
capture statistical process control data, only preliminary data, 
gathered from the assembly of low-rate missiles, will be available by 
the full-rate decision in June 2004. Trend analysis is not expected 
until after the first complete low-rate delivery, scheduled for 
November 2004. Not until this time does the program expect to have 
tested sufficient missile quantities and have obtained adequate 
knowledge to determine whether the chosen process control metrics are 
valid and viable. The technology and design have reached full maturity.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Tomahawk Program:

Technology Maturity:

We did not assess the technology readiness levels of the key 
technologies for the Tactical Tomahawk missile because at the time of 
our review, critical technologies were already mature. According to the 
program office, the critical technologies for the key subsystems--
antijamming global positioning system, digital scene matching area 
correlator, and cruise engine--were modified derivatives from other 
programs or upgrades to existing Tomahawk subsystems.

Design Maturity:

The design of the Tactical Tomahawk missile is complete. At the time of 
the design review in June 2000, approximately 47 percent of the 
drawings had been released to manufacturing. By the end of technical 
evaluation in October 2003, 100 percent of the drawings had been 
released. Technical evaluation was successfully completed and the 
program entered operational evaluation in December 2003. Operational 
evaluation is scheduled to be completed in March 2004.

Production Maturity:

Raytheon concluded that processes and controls are in place to 
successfully enter full-rate production. Officials have begun 
collecting statistical control data from the assembly of components for 
the first low-rate production cycle. Initial data in support of 
verifying critical process compliance is expected in March 2004. 
Program officials plan to establish preliminary boundaries for upper 
and lower control limits by the full-rate production decision in June 
2004, but metrics are not expected to be fully stable until completion 
of the low-rate deliveries in November 2004. Full-rate production is 
planned as a multiyear procurement, from fiscal 2004 through fiscal 
year 2009.

Other Program Issues:

Additional funding is expected from the Iraq Freedom Fund to accelerate 
replenishment of missiles expended in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 
funding is expected to support a third low-rate production lot or an 
increase in full-rate quantities by an estimated 183 missiles. At the 
time of our review, negotiations had not been completed nor had the 
Navy acquisition strategy been approved.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office noted 
that the Tactical Tomahawk missile successfully completed the technical 
evaluation test phase with an unprecedented eight for eight flight-test 
record. Program officials maintain that the design is sufficiently 
mature to enter full-rate production based on the completion of design 
reviews, technical evaluation, and the manufacture of 15 flight-test/ 
qualification missiles prior to low-rate deliveries. The missile 
utilizes proven technologies from the Block 3 Tomahawk program and 
other currently fielded military programs. Key technologies utilized 
have been successfully demonstrated during development verification 
testing. Low-rate production has validated critical manufacturing 
processes and assured that critical design parameters are maintained. 
The program is currently meeting all fleet performance requirements and 
remains within acquisition program baseline cost, schedule, and 
performance thresholds.

[End of section]

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (V-22):

The V-22 Osprey is a tilt rotor, vertical takeoff and landing aircraft 
being developed by the Navy for joint service application. It is 
designed to meet the amphibious and vertical assault needs of the 
Marine Corps, the strike rescue needs of the Navy, and the special 
operations needs of the Air Force and Special Operations Command. The 
MV-22 version will replace the CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters of the 
Marine Corps. We assessed the MV-22 Block A, which has been undergoing 
changes to make it safe and operational.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Bell-Boeing JPO:
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,106.8 million:
Procurement: $28,533.9 million:
Total funding: $29,671.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 397:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

MV-22 Block A technologies are considered mature and the design is 
considered stable. Significant modification and redesign have taken 
place to address aircraft deficiencies that surfaced after fatal 
mishaps in 2000. The program's production effort has had parts 
shortages and quality issues with excessive scrap and rework. 
Corrections are in place and are being monitored to verify a positive 
and permanent fix. The program is using a new spiral development 
approach. Operational assessment of Block A is scheduled for January 
2005 to April 2005 to support a recommendation regarding fleet 
introduction. However, the Marine Corps considers Block B the preferred 
configuration for operational deployment. Block B will have capability, 
reliability, and maintainability improvements. Operational assessment 
of the Block B configuration will not be completed until 2006.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

V-22 Program:

Technology Maturity:

Although we did not specifically assess the MV-22's technology 
maturity, the program office states that based on DOD criteria, that 
the Block A technologies are considered mature.

Design Maturity:

Design of Block A is essentially stable. Additional development tests 
directed after two fatal mishaps in 2000 resulted in redesigning the 
hydraulic and electrical lines. This increased the total number of 
drawings by 31 percent. Currently, 100 percent of drawings have been 
completed and released to manufacturing.

Production Maturity:

The program office was not able to provide statistical process control 
data for measuring critical manufacturing processes. Contractors have 
recently begun to measure production maturity using Six Sigma, process 
certification, and process surveillance programs. Parts shortages and 
excessive scrap and rework, which have caused inefficiencies in 
assembly operations and cost growth, have been a production issue. 
However, corrective actions have been taken and a positive trend has 
emerged.

Other Program Issues:

The V-22's $74 million unit cost is 28 percent greater than the $58 
million unit cost the contractors believe is needed to generate V-22 
sales. About a third of more than 100 identified cost reduction 
initiatives will be implemented using $58 million budgeted through 
fiscal year 2003. An August 8, 2003, program acquisition decision 
memorandum decreased program risk by limiting production. The savings 
from this adjustment will be used for interoperability improvements and 
further cost reduction initiatives to reduce production costs.

Concerns have been raised about the V-22's ability to operate safely 
while performing evasive maneuvers, especially in high workload and 
stressful situations. Also, while not a requirement, the aircraft 
cannot safely perform auto rotation while in helicopter mode. 
Operational effectiveness and suitability of Block A is scheduled to 
begin in January 2005. A number of key performance parameters--which 
are capabilities that if not met can be cause for program reevaluation, 
reassessment, or termination--were removed from the operational 
requirements document in October 2001 and redesignated so that they are 
no longer absolute requirements.

The Marine Corps states that the Block B aircraft is the preferred 
configuration for operational deployment. Block B development tests are 
scheduled for August 2003 to December 2005. Operational assessment of 
Block B is scheduled to begin in January 2006. Current plans are to 
shift MV-22 initial operational capability from September 2004 to 
fiscal year 2007.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the program successfully implemented significant design changes 
that resulted from two catastrophic mishaps, as well as rebaselined the 
program. These changes have been implemented into delivered V-22s. An 
extremely comprehensive, event driven flight test program, reinitiated 
in May of 2002, accomplished 1,000 flight test hours on 9 test aircraft 
without mishap. A May 23, 2003, program acquisition decision memorandum 
stated that the program is proceeding well and that the V-22 has 
demonstrated safe and reliable operations in the flight envelope, 
combat maneuverability superior to helicopters, effective formation 
flying, acceptable handling qualities in low-speed flight with 
crosswinds, and other areas. The V-22 is meeting requirements for all 
its key performance parameters and reliability and maintainability 
metrics.

[End of section]

Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS):

WGS is a joint Air Force and Army program intended to provide 
communications to the U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition partners 
during all levels of conflict short of nuclear war. It is the next 
generation wideband component in DOD's future Military Satellite 
Communications architecture.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Satellite Systems:
Program office: Los Angeles Air Force Base, Calif.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $61.7 million:
Procurement: $664.6 million:
Total funding: $726.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 2:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The WGS program technology, design, and production are mature. However, 
integration issues and manufacturing problems have contributed to a 
delay in the launch of the first WGS satellite by over a year. The 
integration issues have since been rectified, but the manufacturing 
problems remain unresolved. A decision to delay the procurement of the 
fourth and fifth satellites is expected to increase program costs.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

WGS Program:

Technology Maturity:

WGS' two key technologies were mature when the program entered 
production in November 2000. According to program officials, one of 
these technologies has been demonstrated successfully in the commercial 
sector.

Design Maturity:

The WGS design is essentially complete, as the program office has 
released over 97 percent of the expected drawings to manufacturing. 
However, the contractor has experienced problems in integrating the 
phased array antenna into the satellite. The contractor assumed the 
antenna would be easily integrated because of similarity with portions 
of another commercial program. However, subsequent efforts invalidated 
this assumption and WGS experienced unanticipated design changes. 
Though the problems with integrating the antenna have since been 
resolved, they have contributed to a delay in the launch of the first 
satellite by over a year.

Production Maturity:

According to program officials, the contractor has two key 
manufacturing processes, the automated wire-bonding and epoxy attach, 
both of which are under control. However, the automated wire-bonding 
process was not in control at the start of production due to the 
quality of the materiel supplied by the subcontractor. While this 
quality issue has been rectified, other manufacturing problems continue 
to delay the launch of the first satellite.

The manufacturing processes employed for the phased array antenna and 
the digital channelizer are relatively new. The contractor was relying 
on experiences gained in manufacturing these technologies in the 
commercial sector, but anticipated commercial orders for these 
technologies did not materialize and the manufacturing processes did 
not mature as expected. As a result, the contractor has experienced 
manufacturing problems with both technologies. The problems with 
manufacturing the digital channelizer have been resolved, but the 
contractor is still having difficulty manufacturing components for the 
phased array antenna at the rate required to meet the program schedule, 
further delaying the program.

Other Program Issues:

DOD directed that launches for satellites four and five be delayed to 
fiscal years 2009 and 2010, respectively. However, these dates are 
outside the allowable dates of the WGS contract option clauses and will 
likely cause a production gap. A decision to delay the procurement of 
the fourth and fifth satellites will increase program costs; however, 
the actual program increase will not be known until negotiations with 
the contractor are completed.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that manufacturing problems with components on the phased array antenna 
continue to cause schedule delays. While the WGS Program Office and the 
contractor are trying to resolve the problems, the contractor has 
requested a delay in the launch of the first WGS satellite to December 
2005. The 2-year gap in production caused by delaying the procurement 
of satellites four and five will result in higher costs for those 
satellites. The higher costs are the result of parts obsolescence, loss 
of manufacturing expertise, and greater costs to produce the first 
three satellites than the government or contractor originally 
predicted. The program office is assessing the expected cost increase 
to identify funding needs and will address it in the fiscal year 2006 
President's Budget.

[End of section]

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T):

WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone 
communications network. It will provide reliable, secure, and seamless 
video, data, imagery, and voice services, allowing users to communicate 
simultaneously at various levels of security. The network will have the 
ability to be initialized and modified based upon unit task 
organization. WIN-T is being fielded in blocks, and we assessed the 
first block.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics:
Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J.

Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $661.1 million:
Procurement: $9,290.7 million:
Total funding: $9,951.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 1:

Program Performance (fiscal year 2004 dollars in millions):

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

The WIN-T program entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical 
technologies close to reaching full maturity. None of these 
technologies are expected to be fully mature until after design review 
in March 2005. Eight have mature backup technologies available. 
However, use of these technologies would degrade system overall 
reliability, security, and performance. Because of the significant 
interdependencies among critical technologies, and the fact that some 
describe network functionality, it may not be possible to fully mature 
these technologies until after production begins. Design and production 
maturity could not be assessed because the program office does not 
track the number of releasable drawings or the number of production 
processes in control as metrics. WIN-T is primarily an information 
technology system integration effort rather than a manufacturing 
effort.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

WIN-T Program:

Technology Maturity:

WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies 
close to reaching full maturity. While program officials do not expect 
these technologies to reach full maturity until the network is built 
and can be demonstrated in an operational environment, they do expect 
the technologies to have been demonstrated in a simulated operational 
environment by the time design review is held in March 2005. A 
technology readiness assessment determined that WIN-T would enter 
system development prior to full definition of the first block's design 
and specific technology-based components, systems or subsystems. WIN-T 
will include technologies such as switching/routing and subscriber 
access nodes; handheld terminal; information assurance; information 
dissemination; transmission systems; and network management, some of 
which are expected to undergo continuous maturation up until the design 
review.

Design Maturity:

Design maturity could not be assessed because the program office does 
not plan to track the number of releasable drawings as a design metric. 
According to the program office, WIN-T is not a manufacturing effort, 
but primarily an information technology system integration effort. 
Consequently, the government does not obtain releasable design drawings 
for many WIN-T components, particularly commercial components. The WIN-
T design will evolve using performance-based specifications and open 
systems design and is to conform to DOD's Joint Technical Architecture.

Production Maturity:

Production maturity for the entire system could not be assessed because 
the program does not plan to track manufacturing metrics for all WIN-T 
components. According to the program office, WIN-T is not a 
manufacturing effort, but primarily an information technology system 
integration effort. Consequently, the government does not collect 
information on the manufacturing statistical process control for many 
WIN-T components, including commercial components. To ensure industrial 
capabilities are reasonably available, a production readiness review 
will be conducted prior to the end of system development.

Other Program Issues:

Additional areas that will require close attention by the program 
office include the interdependence of WIN-T with FCS and JTRS programs; 
the interdependence between WIN-T, FCS, and Global Information Grid 
requirements; the scalability of WIN-T; the system-of-systems challenge 
of linking all nodes and networks; the coordination of unmanned relay 
programs with FCS; tracking external factors that will affect WIN-T 
such as the DOD Net-Centric Data Strategy, U.S. Strategic Command's 
oversight of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Network Operations and 
others; and coordination of Technology Transition Agreements. WIN-T 
deployment will be essential for FCS deployment. As each system 
evolves, integration demonstrations will need to be performed to ensure 
WIN-T and FCS interoperability.

Program Office Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that it is managing risks related to technology, design, and production 
maturity by requiring contractors to develop critical technology 
maturation plans and to demonstrate technology maturity prior to or 
during the developmental testing/operational testing event scheduled 
soon after the March 2005 design review. The program office is also 
monitoring the maturity of form, fit, and function of prototype 
equipment to be demonstrated in the testing event relative to the 
production design.

Agency Comments:

DOD did not provide general comments on a draft of this report, but did 
provide technical comments on individual assessments. These comments, 
along with program office comments, are included with each individual 
assessment as appropriate. (See app. I for a copy of DOD's response.):

Scope of Our Review:

For the 51 programs, each assessment provides the historical and 
current program status and offers the opportunity to take early 
corrective action when a program's projected attainment of knowledge 
diverges significantly from the best practices. The assessments also 
identify programs that are employing practices worthy of emulation by 
other programs. If a program is attaining the desired levels of 
knowledge, it has less risk--but not zero risk--of future problems. 
Likewise, if a program shows a gap between demonstrated knowledge and 
best practices, it indicates an increased risk--not a guarantee--of 
future problems. The real value of the assessments is recognizing gaps 
early, which provides opportunities for constructive intervention--
such as adjustments to schedule, trade-offs in requirements, and 
additional funding--before cost and schedule consequences mount.

We selected programs for the assessments based on several factors, 
including (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and (3) 
congressional interest. The majority of the 51 programs covered in this 
report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. A 
program is defined as major if its estimated research and development 
costs exceed $365 million or its procurement exceeds $2.19 billion in 
fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. 
We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions on this report, please contact me at (202) 
512-4841 or Paul Francis at (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix IV.

Signed by:

Katherine V. Schinasi:
Managing Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:

List of Congressional Committees:

The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:

The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:

The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Jerry Lewis:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:

[End of section]

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON 
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:

MAR 17 2004:

Mr. Paul Francis:

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Mr. Francis:

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report, 
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, dated 
February 17, 2004 (GAO Code 120272/GAO-04-248). We have enclosed 
technical comments to ensure accuracy. These comments should be 
reflected in the final report and in the individual program summaries. 
My point of contact is Mr. Skip Hawthorne, (703) 692-9556, or e-mail: 
skip. hawthorne@osd.mil.

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Deidre A . Lee:

Director,
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy:

Enclosure: As stated:

[End of section]

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:

In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and risk data from 
each of the programs included in this report. We summarized our 
assessments of each individual program in two components--a system 
profile and a product knowledge assessment. We did not validate or 
verify the data provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). However, 
we took several steps to address data quality. Specifically, we 
reviewed the data and performed various quality checks, which revealed 
some discrepancies in the data. We discussed these discrepancies with 
program officials and adjusted the data accordingly.

System Profile Assessment:

In the past 3 years, DOD revised its policies governing weapon system 
acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major acquisition 
events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more consistent across 
the 51 program assessments, we standardized the terminology for key 
program events. In the individual program assessments, program start 
refers to the initiation of a program; DOD usually refers to program 
start as milestone I or milestone A, which begins the concept and 
technology development phase. Similarly, development start refers to 
the commitment to system development that coincides with either 
milestone II or milestone B, which begins DOD's system development and 
demonstration phase. The production decision generally refers to the 
decision to enter the production and deployment phase, typically with 
low-rate initial production. Initial capability refers to the initial 
operational capability, sometimes also called first unit equipped or 
required asset availability.

The information presented on the funding needed to complete from fiscal 
2004 through completion, unless otherwise noted, draws on information 
from Selected Acquisition Reports or on data from the program office. 
In some instances this data was not available, and we annotate this by 
the term "to be determined" (TBD). The program cost comparisons are the 
latest estimates provided by the individual programs. The quantities 
listed refer to total quantities, including both procurement and 
development quantities.

To assess the cost, schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we 
reviewed DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports or obtained data directly 
from the program offices. In general, we compared the latest available 
Selected Acquisition Report information with a baseline for each 
program. For systems that have started system development--those that 
are beyond milestone II or B--we compared the latest available Selected 
Acquisition Report to the development estimate from the first Selected 
Acquisition Report issued after the program was approved to enter 
development. For systems that have not yet started system development, 
we compared the latest available data to the planning estimate issued 
after milestone I or A. For systems not included in Selected 
Acquisition Reports, we attempted to obtain comparable baseline and 
current data from the individual program offices.

All cost information is presented in base year 2004 dollars, unless 
otherwise noted, using Office of the Secretary of Defense approved 
deflators to eliminate the effects of inflation. We have depicted only 
the programs' main elements of acquisition cost--research and 
development, and procurement; however, the total program costs also 
include military construction and acquisition operation and maintenance 
costs. Because of rounding and these additional costs, in some 
situations the total cost may not match the exact sum of the research 
and development and procurement costs. The program unit costs are 
calculated by dividing the total program cost by the total quantities 
planned. These costs are often referred to as program acquisition unit 
costs. In some instances, the data was not applicable and we annotate 
this by using the term "NA.":

The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, defined as 
the number of months between the program start, usually milestone I or 
A, and the achievement of initial operational capability or an 
equivalent fielding date. In some instances, the data was not available 
or classified, and we annotate this by using the term TBD.

The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate or overall 
picture of a program's history. These assessments represent the sum 
total of the federal government's actions on a program, not just those 
of the program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of 
detailed analyses of changes that attempt to link specific changes with 
triggering events or causes. Our analysis does not attempt to make such 
detailed distinctions.

Product Knowledge Assessment:

To assess the product development knowledge of each program at key 
points in development, we submitted a data collection instrument to 
each program office. The results are graphically depicted in each 2-
page assessment. We also reviewed pertinent program documentation, such 
as the operational requirements document, the acquisition program 
baseline, test reports, and major program reviews.

To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a 
tool, referred to as technology readiness levels, for our analysis. The 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally developed 
technology readiness levels, and the Army and Air Force Science and 
Technology research organizations use them to determine when 
technologies are ready to be handed off from science and technology 
managers to product developers. Technology readiness levels are 
measured on a scale of one to nine, beginning with paper studies of a 
technology's feasibility and culminating with a technology fully 
integrated into a completed product. (See appendix III for the 
definitions of technology readiness levels.) Our best practices work 
has shown that a technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a 
technology in an operational environment--is the level of technology 
maturity that constitutes a low risk for starting a product development 
program. In our assessment, the technologies that have reached 
technology readiness level 7, a prototype demonstrated in an 
operational environment, are considered mature and those that have 
reached technology readiness level 6, a prototype demonstrated in a 
relevant environment, are assessed as attaining 50 percent of the 
desired level of knowledge. Satellite technologies that have achieved 
technology readiness level 6 are assessed as fully mature due to the 
difficulty of demonstrating maturity in an operational environment--
space.

In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of 
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of 
maturity. We sought to clarify the technology readiness levels in those 
cases where information existed that raised concerns. If we were to 
conduct a detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies 
assessed, the readiness level demonstrated, or both. It was not always 
possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system 
at key decision points after the passage of many years.

To assess design maturity, we asked program officials to provide the 
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for 
completion by the design review, the production decision, and as of our 
current assessment. Completed engineering drawings were defined as the 
number of drawings released or deemed releasable to manufacturing that 
can be considered the "build to" drawings.

To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify 
the number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to 
quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those 
processes. We used a standard called the Process Capability Index, 
which is a process performance measurement that quantifies how closely 
a process is running to its specification limits.[Footnote 3] The index 
can be translated into an expected product defect rate, and we have 
found it to be a best practice. We sought other data, such as scrap and 
rework trends in those cases where quantifiable statistical control 
data was unavailable.

Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators of potential 
risks, by themselves, they do not cover all elements of risk that a 
program encounters during development, such as funding instability. Our 
detailed reviews on individual systems normally provide for a fuller 
treatment of risk elements.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels:

Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported;

Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples 
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties;

Hardware software: None (Paper studies and analysis);

Demonstration environment: None.

Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application 
formulated;

Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative 
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. 
Examples are still limited to paper studies;

Hardware software: None (Paper studies and analysis);

Demonstration environment: None.

Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept;

Description: Active research and development is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. 
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or 
representative;

Hardware software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale 
individual components (pieces of subsystem);

Demonstration environment: Lab.

Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard. Validation 
in laboratory environment;

Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish 
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity" 
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad 
hoc" hardware in a laboratory;

Hardware software: Low fidelity breadboard. Integration of nonscale 
components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or 
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach 
suitable for flight articles;

Demonstration environment: Lab.

Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment;

Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases 
significantly. The basic technological components are integrated with 
reasonably realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be 
tested in a simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" 
laboratory integration of components;

Hardware software: High fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent 
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc.). 
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of 
several components with reasonably realistic support elements/
subsystems to demonstrate functionality;

Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form 
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate 
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies.

Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment;

Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity 
laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment;

Hardware software: Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit and 
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and 
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full 
functionality of the subsystem;

Demonstration environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or limited/ 
restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. Integration 
of technology is well defined.

Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an 
operational environment;

Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of 
an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an 
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a 
test bed aircraft;

Hardware software: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function 
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate 
full functionality of subsystem;

Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative 
operational environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator 
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data.

Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration;

Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the 
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and 
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if 
it meets design specifications;

Hardware software: Flight qualified hardware;

Demonstration environment: DT&E in the actual system application.

Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through 
successful mission operations;

Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and 
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test 
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug 
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the 
system under operational mission conditions;

Hardware software: Actual system in final form;

Demonstration environment: OT&E in operational mission conditions.

Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration data.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Paul Francis (202) 512-4841:

Acknowledgments:

David B. Best, Leslie M. Hickey, and James L. Morrison made key 
contributions to this report. Other key contributors included Robert L. 
Ackley, Dora C. Baltzell, Cristina T. Chaplain, Lily J. Chin, Thomas J. 
Denomme, James A. Elgas, Arthur Gallegos, William R. Graveline, David 
J. Hand, Barbara H. Haynes, Sigrid L. McGinty, John E. Oppenheim, 
Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Rae Ann H. Sapp, Ronald E. Schwenn, Wendy P. 
Smythe, Michael J. Sullivan, Robert S. Swierczek, Adam Vodraska, and 
Karen S. Zuckerstein. The following staff were responsible for 
individual programs:

System: Airborne Laser (ABL);
Primary staff: Marcus C. Ferguson/ Tana M. Davis.

System: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD);
Primary staff: Tana M. Davis/ Richard A. Cederholm.

System: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite (AEHF);
Primary staff: Bradley L. Terry/ Brian W. Eddington.

System: Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA);
Primary staff: Jerry W. Clark/ Gaines R. Hensley/ Bonita P. Oden.

System: Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS);
Primary staff: John S. Warren Jr./ Wendy P. Smythe.

System: Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS);
Primary staff: Mary K. Quinlan.

System: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning 
System (ATIRCM/CMWS);
Primary staff: Jonathan E. Watkins/ Danny G. Owens.

System: Advanced Wideband Satellite/Transformational Satellite (AWS/ 
TSat);
Primary staff: Matthew R. Mongin/ David G. Hubbell/ Travis J. Masters.

System: B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2);
Primary staff: Don M. Springman/ Arthur L. Cobb.

System: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP);
Primary staff: Katrina D. Taylor/ Christopher A. Deperro.

System: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP);
Primary staff: Roger S. Corrado/ Sameena S. Nooruddin.

System: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP);
Primary staff: Sameena S. Nooruddin/ Roger S. Corrado.

System: Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC);
Primary staff: Johana R. Ayers/ Leslie M. Hickey.

System: CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47);
Primary staff: Leon S. Gill/ Wendy P. Smythe.

System: Comanche Reconnaissance Attack Helicopter (RAH-66);
Primary staff: Wendy P. Smythe/ Leon S. Gill.

System: Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21;
Primary staff: J. Kristopher Keener/ Tedra Cannella.

System: DD(X) Destroyer;
Primary staff: J. Kristopher Keener/ Chris Durbin.

System: E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (E-10A);
Primary staff: Joseph E. Dewechter/ Jerry W. Clark/ Bonita P. Oden.

System: E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE);
Primary staff: Bruce H. Thomas/ Gary L. Middleton.

System: EA-18G Growler (EA-18G);
Primary staff: Christopher R. Miller/ Brian T. Mullins/ Lillian I. 
Slodkowski.

System: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV);
Primary staff: Maria A. Durant.

System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV);
Primary staff: Chad R. Holmes/ Dayna L. Foster.

System: Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM);
Primary staff: Ronald E. Schwenn/ Shelby S. Oakley/ Carmen T. Donohue.

System: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile;
Primary staff: Lawrence D. Gaston Jr./ John P. Swain.

System: F/A-22 Raptor;
Primary staff: Marvin E. Bonner/ Edward R. Browning.

System: Future Combat Systems (FCS);
Primary staff: John P. Swain/ Lawrence D. Gaston Jr.

System: Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle;
Primary staff: Bruce D. Fairbairn/ Matthew B. Lea.

System: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD);
Primary staff: Diana L. Dinkelacker/ Randolph S. Zounes.

System: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM);
Primary staff: Beverly A. Breen/ LaTonya D. Miller.

System: Joint Common Missile;
Primary staff: Danny G. Owens/ Jonathan E. Watkins.

System: Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS);
Primary staff: Dayna L. Foster/ Michael W. Aiken.

System: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF);
Primary staff: Brian T. Mullins/ Brendan S. Culley.

System: Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW);
Primary staff: Carol T. Mebane/ Ivy G. Hubler.

System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS);
Primary staff: Joel C. Christenson/ James P. Tallon.

System: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS);
Primary staff: J. Kristopher Keener/ Tedra Cannella.

System: Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS);
Primary staff: Ian A. Ferguson/ Ricardo A. Marquez/ Gaines R. Hensley.

System: Minuteman III Guided Replacement Program (MM III GRP);
Primary staff: Brian W. Eddington/ Arturo Holguin Jr.

System: Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (MM III PRP);
Primary staff: Arturo Holguin Jr./ Brian W. Eddington.

System: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS);
Primary staff: Travis J. Masters/ Matthew R. Mongin.

System: National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System (NPOESS);
Primary staff: Yvonne J. Vigil/ Bruce H. Thomas.

System: Guided Missile System Air Defense (Patriot) PAC-3 Program;
Primary staff: James A. Elgas/ William S. Lipscomb.

System: MQ-9 Predator B;
Primary staff: Steven M. Hunter/ Cheryl K. Andrew.

System: Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High);
Primary staff: Nancy Rothlisberger/ Maricela Cherveny.

System: Small Diameter Bomb (SDB);
Primary staff: LaTonya D. Miller/ Beverly A. Breen.

System: RQ-7A Shadow 200 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System (Shadow 200);
Primary staff: Matt B. Lea.

System: Space Tracking & Surveillance System (STSS);
Primary staff: Sigrid L. McGinty/ Richard Y. Horiuchi.

System: Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD);
Primary staff: Carrie R. Wilson/ Tana M. Davis.

System: Tactical Tomahawk Missile;
Primary staff: Ivy G. Hubler/ Carol T. Mebane.

System: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (V-22);
Primary staff: Jerry W. Clark/ Joseph E. Dewechter/ Bonita P. Oden.

System: Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS);
Primary staff: Tony A. Beckham/ Arthur Gallegos.

System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T);
Primary staff: James P. Tallon/ Joel C. Christenson.


Source: GAO.

[End of table]

[End of section]

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(120272):

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Technology maturity is attained when a technology demonstrates that 
it works in an operational environment. See appendix III for 
definitions of technology readiness levels.

[2] We used a standard called the Process Capability Index, which is a 
process performance measurement that quantifies how closely a process 
is running to its specification limits. (See app. II for further 
information.):

[3] Process Capability Index provides assurance that production 
processes are under 100 percent statistical control. A high index value 
equates to fewer defects per part based on statistical process control 
data. The general rule of thumb used by the manufacturing industry 
states that if the index value for a process is less than 1.33, then 
the process is not capable of producing a part with acceptable 
consistency.

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To order by Phone:

Voice: (202) 512-6000:

TDD: (202) 512-2537:

Fax: (202) 512-6061:

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:

Public Affairs:

Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.

General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.

20548: