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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:

February 2004:

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but 
Performance Reporting Can Be Improved:

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-330]: 

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-330, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 
Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study:

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department of 
Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats posed by 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the September 11, 2001, 
attacks, the visibility of DTRA’s role has increased as federal 
agencies and military commanders have looked to the agency for 
additional support and advice. 

GAO was asked to report on DTRA’s (1) mission and the efforts it 
undertakes to fulfill this mission; (2) relationship with other 
government entities, specifically the Department of Energy and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and (3) process that it uses to 
prioritize resources and assess progress toward organizational goals. 

What GAO Found:

Since its establishment in 1998, DTRA has worked to address the threat 
of WMD. DTRA addresses WMD threats through four core functions: threat 
control, threat reduction, combat support, and technology development. 
The agency supports the implementation of arms control treaties by 
conducting inspections in other countries and by supporting 
inspections of U.S. facilities, reduces the threat of WMD by 
eliminating and securing weapons and materials in the former Soviet 
Union, supports military commanders by providing technical and 
analytical support regarding WMD, and develops technologies that 
support efforts to address the WMD threat.

DTRA also uses its specialized capabilities and services in various 
ways to support other government efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA 
has a formal relationship with Energy to maintain the U.S. nuclear 
weapons stockpile. DTRA’s relationship with DHS is subject to the 
broader DOD-DHS relationship and may change as the relationship 
between DOD and DHS evolves.

The agency uses a strategic planning process modeled on the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to prioritize its resources 
and assess progress toward its organizational goals. DTRA’s planning 
process identifies long-term goals, establishes short-term objectives 
by which to measure progress in meeting goals, and collects data to 
assess progress. DTRA’s planning process is influenced by funding, 
most of which is appropriated for specific programs. GAO found that 
the performance report resulting from its internal review summarized 
DTRA’s accomplishments and activities but did not compare them with 
established goals and objectives nor explain the actions needed to 
achieve or modify these unmet goals as called for under GPRA. 

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that the Director of DTRA improve the agency’s annual 
performance report by comparing the agency’s actual performance 
against planned goals and, where appropriate, explain why goals were 
not met and the agency’s plan to address these unmet goals in the 
future.

DTRA agreed with the GAO recommendation that it improve its annual 
performance report. DTRA stated that it is refining its performance 
report methodology to better address the linkage of reported 
performance to planned goals and future efforts. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-330.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff 
at (202) 512-8979.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DTRA's Mission Is to Address All Aspects of the WMD Threat: 

DTRA Works with Other Government Agencies: 

DTRA's Planning Process Establishes Priorities and Summarizes Progress, 
but Achievements Are Not Reported against Goals: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix:

Appendix I: Comments from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency: 

Related GAO Products:

GAO Products Covering the CTR Program: 

Tables: 

Table 1: DTRA's Budget and Personnel: 

Table 2: DTRA Role in Nine Treaties and Agreements: 

Figures Figures: 

Figure 1: DTRA Locations: 

Figure 2: Establishment of DTRA and Significant Changes: 

Figure 3: DTRA Activities That Address the Threat of WMD: 

Figure 4: DTRA's Funding Profile, Fiscal Year 2004: 

Figure 5: GPRA Performance Reporting Requirements Compared with DTRA's 
2002 Performance Report: 

Abbreviations: 

ASCO: Advanced Systems Concepts Office:

CBDP: Chemical and Biological Defense Program:

CMAT: Consequence Management Advisory Team:

CTR: Cooperative Threat Reduction:

DHS: Department of Homeland Security:

DOD: Department of Defense:

DTRA:  Defense Threat Reduction Agency:

GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act of 1993:

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:

NWC: Nuclear Weapons Council:

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Letter 
February 13, 2004:

The Honorable Pat Roberts: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities: 
Committee on Armed Services 
United States Senate:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department of 
Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats posed by 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). With a fiscal year 2004 budget 
request of more than $2.3 billion, the agency has a broad range of 
responsibilities, including the support of combat commanders in 
defending against nuclear, chemical, and biological threats on the 
battlefield and monitoring international arms control treaties. Since 
the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York 
City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the anthrax attack in 
Washington, D.C., federal agencies and military commanders have 
increasingly looked to DTRA for support and advice.

Because of the increased visibility of this agency's role within DOD 
and in relation to other federal agencies, particularly the Departments 
of Energy and Homeland Security (DHS), you asked us to report on DTRA's 
(1) mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill this mission; (2) 
relationship with other government entities, specifically Energy and 
DHS; and (3) process that it uses to prioritize resources and assess 
progress toward organizational goals.

To meet these objectives, we reviewed DTRA's 2000, 2001, and 2003 
strategic plans and interviewed its Director. We reviewed supporting 
documentation, including budget documents, historical records, program 
and project plans, and assessments. We also interviewed senior 
officials from each of DTRA's core functions and other DTRA officials 
and contractors associated with specific programs. We met with 
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss their 
assessments of DTRA and the agency's relationships with other 
government entities. In addition, we interviewed officials from Energy 
to discuss its interaction with DTRA, including the management of the 
nuclear weapons stockpile.

Results in Brief:

Since its establishment in 1998, DTRA has worked to address the threat 
of WMD. DTRA program documents show that its mission is carried out 
through four core functions--(1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, 
(3) combat support, and (4) technology development. First, the agency 
works to control the threat of WMD by verifying other countries' 
compliance with arms control treaties and by meeting U.S. obligations 
to support inspections of U.S. facilities. For example, DTRA personnel 
inspect Russian facilities to ensure compliance with treaties limiting 
WMD delivery systems and provide support for Russian inspections of 
similar U.S. facilities. Second, DTRA works to reduce the threat of WMD 
by eliminating and securing weapons and materials through the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program in the former Soviet Union. Third, 
DTRA works to support military commanders by providing technical and 
analytical support regarding WMD. For example, DTRA provides commanders 
with information on the vulnerabilities of their forces and 
installations to a WMD attack. Finally, the agency develops 
technologies that support efforts to address the WMD threat. For 
example, the agency develops computer programs that model the effects 
of WMD releases, specialized weapons for use against WMD targets, and 
sensors to detect the presence of WMD materials.

DTRA's specialized capabilities and services are also used to support 
civilian agencies' efforts to address WMD threats, particularly the 
efforts of Energy and DHS. DTRA has a formal relationship with Energy's 
National Nuclear Security Administration, resulting from legislation 
requiring DOD and Energy to share responsibility for maintaining the 
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The Nuclear Weapons Council, to which 
DTRA provides staffing and expertise, manages this responsibility, 
which includes the production, inventorying, and dismantlement of all 
nuclear weapons. DTRA works with Energy on several other programs, 
including securing nuclear materials in Russia. However, as we reported 
in March 2003, these efforts face several coordination issues.[Footnote 
1] DTRA also works with DHS on a variety of programs, such as the 
International Counterproliferation Program. DTRA's relationship with 
DHS may change as the relationship between DOD and DHS evolves. DTRA 
also works with and supports other federal entities, state and local 
governments, and governments with which the United States has bilateral 
agreements. For example, DTRA provides training for emergency personnel 
responding to WMD incidents and assesses the vulnerability of personnel 
and facilities to WMD threats.

DTRA uses a strategic planning process to prioritize resources and 
assess progress toward its organizational goals; however, its 
performance report does not document the extent to which the agency's 
accomplishments and activities may or may not have met these goals. 
DTRA's strategic planning process incorporates elements of the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993; the agency's process 
identifies long-term goals, establishes short-term objectives by which 
to measure progress in meeting goals, and collects data to assess 
progress. The resources prioritized through this process consist of 
personnel and funds for the agency's use, funds for the congressionally 
directed Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and the Chemical and 
Biological Defense Program administered by DTRA. Both the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense assess DTRA's 
performance biennially, and their most recent reviews concluded that, 
in general, DTRA supports the requirements of the operating military 
forces by providing useful products and services. For example, the 2001 
assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff commended DTRA's focus on 
supporting military commanders. In 2002, DTRA completed an internal 
self-assessment that resulted in the 2002 performance report. While 
DTRA management quarterly tracks the agency's progress against its 
goals, the 2002 performance report summarizes the agency's 
accomplishments and activities but does not compare these 
accomplishments and activities with the established goals and 
objectives, nor does it explain why performance goals may not have been 
met. For example, it discusses the number and types of vulnerability 
assessments conducted in 2002 without discussing how many were planned.

We are recommending that DTRA improve its annual performance report by 
comparing its actual performance against planned goals and, where 
appropriate, explain why goals were not met and how these unmet goals 
will be addressed in the future.

Background:

In the early 1990s, DOD officials recognized that the proliferation of 
chemical, biological, and nuclear materials that could be used to 
develop WMD was a growing threat. A series of terrorist attacks 
highlighted by the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in Tokyo's 
subway system heightened concerns about U.S. vulnerability to a 
terrorist attack involving WMD. Senior DOD leaders, supported by a 
Defense Science Board study, concluded that DOD was not properly 
organized to focus on nonproliferation and counterproliferation.

On October 1, 1998, DTRA was established, with a budget of 
approximately $1.7 billion and almost 2,000 military and civilian 
personnel, to address all aspects of the WMD threat. The agency reports 
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy providing 
input into several of DTRA's programs. Additionally, DTRA responds to 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pertaining to the agency's 
support of military commanders. Table 1 provides data on DTRA's budget 
and personnel since the agency's inception. DTRA's budget has increased 
by over $650 million (about 40 percent) since its establishment, of 
which over $450 million was due to increases in the funding of the 
Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP). Total personnel at DTRA 
also have increased.

Table 1: DTRA's Budget and Personnel:

Dollars in millions: 

DTRA; 
Fiscal Year: 1999: $1,044.7; 
Fiscal Year: 2000: $1,122.5; 
Fiscal Year: 2001: $1,175.4; 
Fiscal Year: 2002: $1,291.2; 
Fiscal Year: 2003: $1,359.2; 
Fiscal Year: 2004: $1,253.9.

CBDP; 
Fiscal Year: 1999: 642.0; 
Fiscal Year: 2000: 762.5; 
Fiscal Year: 2001: 874.6; 
Fiscal Year: 2002: 1,118.2; 
Fiscal Year: 2003: 1,070.7; 
Fiscal Year: 2004: 1,104.7.

Total budget; 
Fiscal Year: 1999: $1,686.7; 
Fiscal Year: 2000: $1,885.0; 
Fiscal Year: 2001: $2,050.0; 
Fiscal Year: 2002: $2,409.4; 
Fiscal Year: 2003: $2,429.9; 
Fiscal Year: 2004: $2,358.6.

Civilian personnel; 
Fiscal Year: 1999: 881; 
Fiscal Year: 2000: 917; 
Fiscal Year: 2001: 957; 
Fiscal Year: 2002: 972; 
Fiscal Year: 2003: 875; 
Fiscal Year: 2004: 1,022.

Military personnel; 
Fiscal Year: 1999: 941; 
Fiscal Year: 2000: 970; 
Fiscal Year: 2001: 872; 
Fiscal Year: 2002: 866; 
Fiscal Year: 2003: 771; 
Fiscal Year: 2004: 888.

Total personnel; 
Fiscal Year: 1999: 1,822; 
Fiscal Year: 2000: 1,887; 
Fiscal Year: 2001: 1,829; 
Fiscal Year: 2002: 1,838; 
Fiscal Year: 2003: 1,646; 
Fiscal Year: 2004: 1,910. 

Source: DTRA.

Note: Fiscal years 1999 to 2003 data are actual figures, and fiscal 
year 2004 data are based on personnel authorizations and program budget 
decisions.

[End of table]

DTRA is currently headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; maintains 
test facilities in the United States; maintains a Defense Nuclear 
Weapons School in New Mexico; and maintains permanent staff at other 
locations, including Germany, Japan, and the Russian Federation, as 
seen in figure 1. DTRA also maintains liaison officers at several 
locations, including the combatant commanders' headquarters, the 
National Guard Bureau, and the Pentagon.

Figure 1: DTRA Locations:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

DTRA was established in 1998 through the consolidation of three 
agencies and two programs, as shown in figure 2. The Defense Special 
Weapons Agency tested, analyzed, and provided assistance in developing 
new technologies for maintaining and modernizing the nation's nuclear 
weapons. The agency also worked to counter the effects of the use of 
chemical and biological weapons against U.S. military bases and forces. 
The Defense Technology Security Administration managed the DOD license 
review process for the export of munitions and critical technologies 
that have both civilian and military applications. As part of this 
effort, the Defense Technology Security Administration oversaw U.S. 
satellites launched abroad. The On-Site Inspection Agency, established 
as a result of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, carried 
out on-site inspections to verify that treaty implementation was done 
in accordance with all treaty requirements. Throughout the 1990s, the 
agency's responsibilities were expanded as new treaties were ratified, 
and, in 2000, the agency was asked to support the United Nation's 
mission to monitor and eliminate WMD in Iraq.[Footnote 2]

Figure 2: Establishment of DTRA and Significant Changes:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The two additional programs included in DTRA's formation dealt 
extensively with the threats posed by WMD and related materials. The 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program implemented a 
congressionally mandated program to assist the nations of the former 
Soviet Union in securing and eliminating their WMD stockpiles. We have 
undertaken several reviews of the DTRA-managed CTR program. A list of 
our reports concerning the CTR program appears at the end of this 
report. In addition, CBDP was established in 1994 to consolidate, 
coordinate, and integrate the chemical and biological defense 
requirements of all the services into a single DOD program. DTRA was 
given the responsibility to administer the distribution of program 
funds, but the agency did not directly manage the program.

To integrate these components, DTRA began a strategic planning process 
in January 1999 and published its first strategic plan in March 2000. 
DTRA used the principles of the Government Performance and Result Act 
of 1993 (GPRA) to guide its planning process. The act calls for 
agencies to develop long-term strategic plans, annual performance 
plans, and annual assessment reports. Also in 2000, DTRA realigned 
itself around four core functions (1) threat control, (2) threat 
reduction, (3) combat support (support to military forces), and (4) 
technology development. Among these core functions, DTRA officials have 
stressed combat support as its first priority.

Three major changes have occurred in the agency's responsibilities, as 
illustrated in figure 2. First, in August 2001, responsibility for the 
export license review process shifted from DTRA to the reestablished 
Defense Technology Security Administration. According to senior 
officials, the export license review process did not integrate well 
with other DTRA functions and was more appropriately placed under the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Second, in March 2003, DTRA was 
assigned the mission to support the elimination of WMD materials found 
in Iraq. Third, in April 2003, DTRA was given the responsibility for 
managing the CBDP's science and technology program rather than just 
overseeing the funds disbursement.

DTRA's Mission Is to Address All Aspects of the WMD Threat:

DTRA carries out its mission to address the threat posed by WMD through 
four core functions: (1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, (3) 
combat support, and (4) technology development.[Footnote 3] First, the 
agency controls the threat of WMD through inspections of Russian 
facilities to ensure compliance with treaties limiting WMD, as well as 
supporting inspections of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors. 
Second, DTRA works to reduce the WMD threat by securing and eliminating 
WMD materials, such as destroying aircraft and missiles, through the 
CTR program in the former Soviet Union. Third, DTRA supports military 
commanders by providing technical and analytical support regarding WMD 
threats on the battlefield and U.S. installations. Finally, DTRA 
develops technologies to assist in its threat control and reduction 
efforts and in the support of military operations, such as developing 
weapons and sensor technologies to destroy or detect WMD and related 
materials. Figure 3 provides examples of DTRA activities in each of 
these areas.

Figure 3: DTRA Activities That Address the Threat of WMD:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Threat Control Focuses on Inspection and Treaty Activities:

DTRA implements U.S. responsibilities established under four arms 
control treaties dealing with WMD and other treaties and agreements. 
DTRA conducts on-site inspections at other nations' WMD facilities and 
supports on-site inspections of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors. 
These inspections are carried out in accordance with agreements between 
the U.S. and other governments. The agency provides inspectors, 
transportation, and linguists in support of inspection efforts, and 
also provides visa and passport support for visiting inspection teams. 
Table 2 shows nine treaties and agreements and DTRA's role in each.

Table 2: DTRA Role in Nine Treaties and Agreements:

Treaty/Agreement: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty; 

Objective of treaty/ agreement: Mandates substantial reductions in the 
number of U.S. and former Soviet Union strategic ballistic missiles, 
heavy bombers, submarines, and the nuclear warheads attributed to 
those delivery systems; 

DTRA role: Conducts U.S. inspections of signatory facilities to ensure 
compliance; monitors missile production facility operations in Russia, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus; and provides escorts to teams 
inspecting U.S. facilities.

Treaty/Agreement: Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; 

Objective of treaty/agreement: Requires the U.S. and former Soviet 
Union to eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles 
with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their support structure, 
and equipment; 

DTRA role: Provides inspectors to observe and measure all vehicles 
exiting the Votkinsk missile manufacturing plant and supports Russian 
inspections of U.S. facilities.

Treaty/Agreement: Chemical Weapons Convention; 

Objective of treaty/ agreement: Prohibits the development, production, 
acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, or use of chemical weapons; 
obligates parties to destroy their chemical weapons and production 
facilities; 

DTRA role: Provides escorts for international teams inspecting U.S. 
facilities, including DOD and commercial industry sites.

Treaty/Agreement: Threshold Test Ban Treaty; 

Objective of treaty/ agreement: Prohibits nuclear tests having a yield 
exceeding 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT); 

DTRA role: Provides monitors for Russian tests and escorts for Russian 
teams monitoring U.S. tests.

Treaty/Agreement: Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement; 

Objective of treaty/agreement: Mandates the monitoring of the shutdown 
of U.S. and Russian production reactors and Russia's reprocessed 
plutonium oxide; 

DTRA role: Conducts on-site monitoring of Russian shutdown reactors in 
Seversk, Ozersk, and Zheleznogorsk and plutonium oxide facilities at 
Seversk and Zheleznogorsk and provides escorts to Russian teams 
monitoring shutdown of U.S. reactors.

Treaty/Agreement: Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty; 

Objective of treaty/agreement: Limits five types of conventional 
weapons: tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack 
helicopters, and combat aircraft; 

DTRA role: Conducts on-site inspections and provides escorts for 
inspections of U.S. facilities.

Treaty/Agreement: Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on 
Confidence and Security Building Measures; 

Objective of treaty/ agreement: Limits the number of military 
exercises permitted by signatories and requires signatories to give 
prior notice of large- scale military activities; 

DTRA role: Provides personnel for inspections and evaluations of other 
signatories and provides escorts and liaison officers for inspections 
and evaluations of U.S. facilities.

Treaty/Agreement: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Dayton Accords); 

Objective of treaty/agreement: Outlines peace agreement that 
implements a series of verification measures similar to those under 
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the Vienna 
Documents and imposes limits on various types of offensive arms; 

DTRA role: Represents the United States on international inspection 
teams that inspect facilities of the signatories.

Treaty/Agreement: Open Skies Treaty; 

Objective of treaty/agreement: Promotes openness and transparency in 
military activities through reciprocal, unarmed observation flights; 

DTRA role: Provides inspectors and flight monitors during mission and 
training activities, conducts preflight inspections of U.S. and 
foreign observation aircraft sensor equipment, and operates imaging 
sensors during U.S. observation flights. 

Sources: GAO and DTRA.

[End of table]

Threat Reduction Has Focused on the WMD Threat in the Former Soviet 
Union:

DTRA works to reduce the threat of WMD primarily through its activities 
with the CTR program, which assists the states of the former Soviet 
Union to (1) destroy WMD in the former Soviet Union, (2) safely store 
and transport weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) 
reduce the risk of the WMD proliferation. Our previous reviews of the 
CTR program have found that it has faced two critical challenges: the 
Russian government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program 
costs, and Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access 
to key nuclear and biological sites (see the list of prior GAO reports 
at the end of this report). In addition to the CTR program, DTRA was 
recently tasked to secure and destroy any WMD or related materials that 
might be found in Iraq.

The CTR program has removed nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
and Belarus inherited from the former Soviet Union, and the United 
States continues to work with Russia and other former Soviet states in 
WMD elimination programs. According to agency documents, the CTR 
program had, as of October 31, 2003, overseen the destruction of 520 of 
1,473 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 451 of 831 missile silos, 
122 of 205 strategic bombers, and 27 of 48 strategic missile submarines 
that the United States and former Soviet Union agreed to destroy. WMD 
destruction programs continue with CTR overseeing projects to eliminate 
missile fuel and launcher equipment. DTRA personnel have also 
supervised the securing of chemical weapons and are overseeing the 
construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, 
Russia.

DTRA also assists with the storing and transporting of WMD materials as 
part of the CTR program. For example, DTRA is overseeing the 
construction of a facility that will be used to securely store nuclear 
materials from weapons at Mayak, Russia. This project, however, has 
suffered from both a lack of committed Russian funding and access to 
the site. As a result, the project, once scheduled to begin accepting 
nuclear materials for storage in 1998, will not begin to do so until 
2004. Additionally, DTRA works through the CTR program to enhance the 
security and safety of biological pathogens located at research centers 
in the former Soviet Union, such as at Novosibirsk and Obolensk. 
However, lack of Russian cooperation has affected DTRA's ability to 
access other suspected biological facilities, and, after 4 years of 
effort, DOD has made little progress in addressing security concerns at 
the 49 biological sites where Russia and the United States have 
collaborative programs.

DTRA works to prevent the spread of WMD through continuing contacts 
with former Soviet Union military personnel and providing expertise and 
equipment to the countries of the former Soviet Union to enhance border 
security. According to agency documents, in fiscal year 2002, the CTR 
program sponsored 423 contacts with former Soviet Union military 
personnel in support of various efforts to halt the spread of WMD.

In March 2003, DTRA was also assigned the responsibility of destroying 
any WMD materials found in Iraq. Agency personnel accompanied combat 
forces into Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example, DTRA 
teams were involved in searching the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center 
to recover, inventory, and safeguard several tons of non-weapons-grade 
uranium and other radiological materials. DTRA personnel remain in Iraq 
and continue to support efforts to search for WMD and WMD-related 
materials. If WMD are found, DTRA personnel would have the 
responsibility for securing and eliminating them.

DTRA Supports U.S. Military Forces in Addressing WMD Threats:

DTRA provides a wide variety of support to military commanders in their 
efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA provides liaison officers to 
assist military commanders in their planning and conduct of military 
operations. For example, DTRA personnel assisted military commanders 
during the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq by providing 
information on the appropriate weapons to use on suspected WMD storage 
sites, how to counter the effects of WMD that might be used on 
coalition forces, and how to secure and dispose of any WMD or WMD-
related materials that might be found. DTRA also developed a handbook 
used by troops in Iraq for how to recognize and handle WMD and WMD-
related materials. In addition, these efforts are supported by DTRA's 
operations center, which responds to WMD-related requests for 
expertise, computer modeling of potential events, and support for 
training exercises.

DTRA teams evaluate the security of personnel and facilities worldwide 
and assess the survivability of specific infrastructure crucial to 
maintaining command and control of U.S. forces. According to agency 
documents, DTRA evaluates 80 to 100 DOD installations per year through 
Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, which are broad in 
scope and focus on the overall safety and security of personnel. For 
example, agency teams assess physical security plans, review 
architectural and structural drawings, and perform analyses of 
potential blast effects to recommend procedural, structural, or other 
enhancements to reduce vulnerabilities. These assessments were 
instituted in the aftermath of (1) the Khobar Towers bombing in 
1996[Footnote 4] and (2) the publication of a subsequent DOD report in 
1997 that determined there were no published standards for securing 
personnel and facilities. In addition, DTRA conducts Balanced 
Survivability Assessments to evaluate specific U.S. and allied 
infrastructure crucial in maintaining command and control of all U.S. 
forces. These assessments evaluate the ability of power, heating, 
computer, and communications systems to continue functioning in the 
event of a WMD attack, accident or natural disaster, technological 
failure, or sabotage. According to agency officials, DTRA teams conduct 
an average of 8 Balanced Survivability Assessments per year, but that 
number rose temporarily to 30 to meet additional requirements.

DTRA provides additional support to military commanders through the 
Defense Nuclear Weapons School and Consequence Management Advisory 
Teams (CMAT). DTRA operates the Defense Nuclear Weapons School in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, to train military and civilian personnel in 
various aspects of WMD. The school originally focused on training 
military personnel in the aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons and their 
effects. The school now includes other areas of the WMD threat, such as 
addressing the civil and military responses to radiological, chemical, 
and biological attacks or accidents and preventing the spread of WMD. 
Additionally, DTRA maintains and deploys teams to deal with the effects 
of WMD use. The agency has CMATs whose purpose is to mitigate the 
effects of WMD use or accidents. CMATs also work with military and 
civilian authorities by conducting training exercises that simulate the 
effects of WMD use or accidents in the United States and overseas.

DTRA Works to Develop Technologies to Address the WMD Threat:

To assist in WMD threat control activities, DTRA has developed 
technologies that detect WMD. For example, the agency has been 
developing sensors to help countries of the former Soviet Union prevent 
smuggling of WMD or WMD-related materials across borders. DTRA has also 
developed computer-tracking systems to help member countries comply 
with the reporting obligations stated in treaties and other agreements. 
The agency also works to develop ways to protect military equipment and 
personnel from WMD effects and manages and operates various technology 
testing facilities, such as facilities that simulate the effects of 
electromagnetic energy or radiation on military equipment in the event 
a nuclear weapon is detonated. Additionally, DTRA has also developed 
software to model nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks or 
accidents.

DTRA does not have its own laboratories. Rather, the agency uses 
existing institutions, such as the service laboratories (Departments of 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force), and national laboratories as well as 
academic institutions. For example, in response to the military 
requirement for a specialized weapon to bomb caves and tunnels in 
Afghanistan, DTRA organized a team that employed products and expertise 
from the Navy, Air Force, Energy, and industry, which allowed DTRA to 
develop, test, and deploy a weapon that could be used to attack cave 
and tunnel targets. DTRA has also worked to develop specialized 
incendiary devices that would destroy WMD material held in a storage 
facility.

To support DTRA's efforts to address the WMD threat, the agency's 
Advanced Systems Concepts Office (ASCO) works to address ways to 
identify, anticipate, and address technology gaps to improve agency 
capabilities. For example, ASCO personnel with scientific expertise 
work to analyze the potential threat to military forces of pathogens 
such as bubonic plague, E. coli, and Ebola. DTRA also has overseen a 
project to test the ability of military facilities to protect against 
and recover from the consequences of chemical and biological attacks. 
From 2001 to 2003, DTRA and other military personnel undertook a series 
of exercises, technology demonstrations, and assessments at the U.S. 
Air Force base at Osan, Korea, to determine different ways to defend 
military forces and facilities against chemical and biological attacks.

DTRA Works with Other Government Agencies:

As the DOD agency responsible for addressing all aspects of WMD 
threats, DTRA possesses specialized capabilities and services that can 
assist civilian entities, including Energy and DHS. DTRA has a formal 
relationship with Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) that coordinates and supports legislatively mandated joint DOD-
Energy responsibilities for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. DTRA 
also works with NNSA to secure nuclear materials in Russia. DTRA works 
with DHS offices on programs related to WMD issues, such as the 
International Counterproliferation Program and crisis response 
exercises. DTRA's interface with DHS is through DOD's newly established 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. 
DTRA's relationship with DHS may be subject to change as the broader 
DOD-DHS relationship evolves. In addition to its relations with NNSA 
and DHS, DTRA also works with and supports other federal agencies, 
state and local governments, and governments with which the United 
States has bilateral agreements.

DTRA Works on Many Programs with the Department of Energy:

DTRA works closely with Energy's NNSA[Footnote 5] in matters pertaining 
to the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. This relationship has its roots 
in the 1946 Atomic Energy Act,[Footnote 6] which establishes joint DOD 
and NNSA responsibility for the U.S. nuclear weapons program, including 
ensuring the safety, security, and control of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile. These activities are conducted through the Nuclear Weapons 
Council (NWC), the senior-level body dedicated to these activities. 
DTRA plays an active role in all activities of the NWC, from 
participating as an observer on the NWC to membership on its 
subordinate bodies. In addition, both DTRA and NNSA are responsible for 
providing the working staff for the NWC. DTRA also works with NNSA on 
various nuclear weapons issues associated with the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile stewardship program, such as nuclear surviviability, nuclear 
surety,[Footnote 7] and nuclear weapons effects. According to both DTRA 
and NNSA officials, coordination between DTRA and NNSA on activities 
related to these issues takes place at various levels, such as serving 
on committees and working groups, cooperating on research, and 
participating on various ad hoc working groups. For example, DTRA and 
NNSA are currently engaged in a joint study to understand nuclear 
weapons effects and develop simulation techniques to address 
survivability of U.S. weapons systems in nuclear environments.

DTRA also works with Energy to implement various agreements, research 
projects, and training and exercises. According to DOD documents, DTRA 
works with Energy on a variety of agreements related to nuclear 
weapons, including the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, the 
Plutonium Disposition Agreement, and the Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty.[Footnote 8] In addition, DTRA works with Energy laboratories on 
joint research projects, working groups, and field tests. For example, 
DTRA is currently working with the laboratories on the development of 
DOD's unconventional nuclear warfare defense program, which is 
developing tools for detecting an unconventionally delivered nuclear or 
radiological weapon. DTRA and Energy work on programs to secure nuclear 
warheads in Russia, but, as we reported in March 2003, these efforts 
face several coordination issues, such as deciding which agency will 
secure sites identified in both of their plans and coordinating the 
type of equipment used and guard force training.[Footnote 9]

DTRA's Relationship with DHS Is Dependent on the Broader DOD-DHS 
Relationship:

DTRA worked and continues to work with several government entities that 
are now part of DHS. For example, DTRA works with the U.S. Customs 
Service on the congressionally mandated International 
Counterproliferation Program, which is designed to prevent the illicit 
movement of WMD material, technology, and expertise. As the executive 
agent, DTRA implements this program in cooperation with the U.S. 
Customs Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. DTRA works 
with these two agencies to develop courses and training exercises that 
provide training and equipment to customs, border guards, and law 
enforcement personnel in 25 countries of the former Soviet Union, the 
Baltic region, and Eastern Europe.

DTRA also works with DHS on joint exercises and interagency working 
groups. For example, DTRA, DHS, and Energy recently sponsored and 
participated in a joint atmospheric dispersion study in Oklahoma City. 
According to documentation, the study conducted a series of experiments 
to evaluate current outdoor atmospheric dispersion models and to 
advance the knowledge of the dispersion of contaminants in urban 
environments and building interiors. In addition, DTRA participates 
with DHS entities in interagency working groups that address issues of 
homeland security and preparedness.

According to DTRA officials, the agency is working to share information 
and experiences with DHS for homeland security applications. For 
example, DTRA has shared with DHS information regarding its experience 
on demonstrations conducted as part of the unconventional nuclear 
warfare defense program. In addition, DTRA has also shared with DHS the 
WMD crisis decision guides that it developed for DOD. These guides 
provide response plans for various WMD scenarios. According to DTRA 
officials, DHS used the response plans for WMD scenarios that are 
outlined in these crisis decision guides to develop its own WMD 
response plans.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was recently established 
as the focal point for DOD's interaction with DHS and the interagency 
community for homeland security issues. This newly established office 
is responsible for ensuring internal coordination of DOD policy 
direction and for coordinating activities with DHS. Therefore, the 
coordination of all new activities, programs, and assistance related to 
the threat of WMD that involve DTRA and DHS is the responsibility of 
this office. DTRA's relationship with DHS is subject to the broader 
DOD-DHS relationship and therefore may change. The new relationship 
between DOD and DHS itself is still evolving because the roles and 
responsibilities of the two departments are still under development.

DTRA's Expertise Is Shared with Civilian Entities:

DTRA has provided various capabilities and services, such as 
vulnerability assessments and first-responder training programs to 
civilian government entities. DTRA's capabilities for conducting 
vulnerability assessments are used to perform vulnerability assessments 
of civilian facilities and personnel. After the events of September 11, 
2001, DTRA was called upon to complete vulnerability assessments of 
several federal buildings, such as the U.S. Capitol Building and U.S. 
Supreme Court, as well as vulnerability assessments of commercial U.S. 
ports. DTRA shares its capabilities and expertise by providing training 
programs to civilian entities. For example, the agency provides 
training to the National Guard for performing vulnerability assessment 
of infrastructure. DTRA also provides WMD and first-responder awareness 
training to state and local government entities.

In addition, DTRA provides informational support--ranging from modeling 
to subject matter expertise--to civilian government entities and 
bilateral partners through the services of its operations center. For 
example, the operations center modeled the potential spread of 
contamination resulting from a chemical spill of a derailed train by 
using the agency's software for chemical weapon attack models. Finally, 
DTRA's expertise is also shared with governments with which the United 
States has bilateral agreements. For example, according to senior DTRA 
officials, the WMD handbooks developed by DTRA were provided to allied 
forces supporting U.S. efforts in Iraq, and DTRA has conducted 
vulnerability assessments for allies. Finally, DTRA is also involved in 
interagency programs that address issues related to WMD threats. For 
example, DTRA supports the integration of the DOD Technical Support 
Working Group that conducts a national interagency response and 
development program for combating terrorism. Participants in this 
program include DOD, Energy, State, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the Federal Aviation Administration.

DTRA's Planning Process Establishes Priorities and Summarizes Progress, 
but Achievements Are Not Reported against Goals:

DTRA uses a strategic planning process, guided by the principles of 
GPRA, to prioritize its resources and assess its progress. It has 
developed strategic plans identifying long-term goals and short-term 
objectives by which it measures progress in meeting its goals. These 
objectives are affected by funding that comes from several 
appropriations, some of which must be spent on specific activities, 
such as the funding for the CTR program. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense assess DTRA every 2 years. 
In 2002, DTRA completed its first internal self-assessment, which it 
intends to do annually. We found that the performance report resulting 
from the self-assessment summarized the agency's accomplishments and 
activities but did not assess its progress against established annual 
performance goals.

Strategic Planning Process Establishes Agency's Priorities:

DTRA has incorporated GPRA principles in its planning process. Under 
GPRA, agencies should prepare 5-year strategic plans that set the 
general direction for their efforts. These plans should include 
comprehensive mission statements, general and outcome-related goals, 
descriptions of how those goals will be achieved, identification of 
external factors that could affect progress, and a description of how 
performance will be evaluated. Agencies should then prepare annual 
performance plans that establish connections between the long-term 
goals in the strategic plans with the day-to-day activities of program 
managers and staff. These plans should include measurable goals and 
objectives to be achieved by a program activity, descriptions of the 
resources needed to meet these goals, and a description of the methods 
used to verify and validate measured values. Finally, GPRA requires 
that the agency report annually on the extent to which it is meeting 
its goals and the actions needed to achieve or modify those goals that 
were not met.

DTRA's current strategic plan, issued in 2003, contains most of the 
elements in a strategic plan developed using GPRA standards. This plan 
lays out the agency's five goals, which serve as the basis of its 
individual units' annual performance plans: (1) deter the use and 
reduce the impact of WMD, (2) reduce the present threat, (3) prepare 
for future threats, (4) conduct the right programs in the best manner, 
and (5) develop people and enable them to succeed. These long-term 
goals are further broken down into four or five objectives, each with 6 
to 17 measurable tasks under each objective. These tasks have projected 
completion dates and identify the DTRA unit responsible for the 
specific task. For example, under the goal "deter the use and reduce 
the impact of WMD" is the objective "support the nuclear force." A 
measurable task under this objective is to work with Energy to develop 
support plans for potential resumption of underground nuclear weapons 
effects testing. The technology development unit in DTRA is expected to 
complete this task by the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2004. The 
strategic plan does not discuss external factors that could affect goal 
achievement, but it does have a discussion of how performance will be 
measured externally, by other DOD components, and internally through an 
annual performance report.

Each unit within DTRA develops its own annual performance plan that 
identifies the activities to be completed each year with available 
funding. These plans do not use the same format, but they all include 
goals, performance measures by which to measure achievement of those 
goals, and a link to the strategic plan to show how they support the 
long-term goals of the agency. DTRA's leadership discusses each unit's 
plan to validate the prioritization of resources and establish the 
unit's priorities. DTRA's annual performance plan consists of these 
units' plans and detailed budget annexes. DOD guidance now requires 
DTRA to submit a consolidated annual performance plan to the DOD 
comptroller to facilitate DOD's GPRA reporting. DTRA is in the process 
of making the unit plans more consistent for fiscal year 2004.

DTRA's Planning Is Influenced by Its Funding:

Most of DTRA's funding is appropriated only for specific programs over 
which it has various levels of control. First, it administers the 
funding for CBDP. Second, it receives money that Congress provides 
solely for the CTR program that DTRA is in charge of managing with 
congressional direction. Third, it receives funding that it can spend 
according to its own priorities, while meeting certain mission 
requirements, such as treaty implementation work. Fourth, it receives 
reimbursements from other federal entities for some activities, such as 
vulnerability assessments conducted for non-DOD agencies.[Footnote 10] 
Figure 4 shows the funding profile for DTRA in fiscal year 2004.

Figure 4: DTRA's Funding Profile, Fiscal Year 2004:

[See PDF for image]

Note: Numbers do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

[End of figure]

As shown in figure 4, DTRA's administration of CBDP includes funds that 
it uses, distributes, and manages. DTRA uses a portion of the CBDP 
funds for large-scale technology demonstration projects, such as a 
project that focused on restoring operations at bases attacked by 
chemical or biological agents. The agency distributes a large portion 
of the CBDP funds to others for various purposes, such as procuring 
chemical suits for the military forces. Recently, in April 2003, DTRA 
was given the responsibility for managing the CBDP's Science and 
Technology projects, which are conducted by various laboratories and 
research institutes throughout the country.

DTRA Undergoes External and Internal Reviews, but Reporting on Internal 
Review Could Be Improved:

DTRA undergoes two DOD reviews--the Biennial Defense Review 
commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Combat 
Support Agency Review conducted for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. These reviews focus on how well DTRA meets its customers' 
requirements as a combat support agency. Overall, these two reviews 
have concluded that DTRA supports the requirements of the operating 
military forces and provides useful products and services.

The most recent biennial review was issued December 2002. DTRA was 
assessed on its combat support, technology development, and threat 
reduction and control efforts. DTRA's efforts at threat reduction and 
control received high satisfaction ratings from the customers surveyed. 
The agency received acceptable satisfaction ratings in combat support 
but had below average ratings in the area of technology development.

In 2001, the Combat Support Agency Review Team conducted an assessment 
of DTRA's responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in 
the event of war or threat to national security. The Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff is required by law to conduct assessments of all 
combat support agencies every 2 years. The review team went to the 
commands supported by DTRA and conducted extensive interviewing and 
fieldwork regarding the support provided by DTRA. In the 2001 
assessment, DTRA was commended for significant improvements in customer 
orientation and combat support focus. DTRA was found to be ready to 
support the requirements of the operating forces. A major finding in 
the assessment concerned DTRA's ongoing work on decontamination 
standards for airbases and strategic air and sealift assets. The study 
acknowledged that DTRA was supporting the development of these 
standards, but, as DOD's center of WMD expertise, it needs to provide 
commanders with the best possible information currently available, 
rather than wait until all studies have been completed. A Combat 
Support Agency Review Team official stated that DTRA has addressed the 
findings of the 2001 assessment, and that the 2003 assessment was 
delayed by operations in Iraq but should be released in early 2004.

As part of the GPRA process, DTRA produced its first annual performance 
assessment in 2002. GPRA requires that agencies report on the extent to 
which they are meeting their annual performance goals and the actions 
needed to achieve or modify the goals that have not been met. DTRA's 
performance report did not compare the agency's achievements to its 
goals, discuss the areas where DTRA fell short of its goals, or discuss 
DTRA's plans to address goals that it did not achieve. For example, in 
the threat control area, the agency discussed the number of missions 
conducted and the equipment provided under the International 
Counterproliferation Program without stating the program's goals. In 
the threat reduction area, the report discussed the number of weapons 
systems eliminated in the former Soviet Union and other achievements, 
such as implementing security measures over chemical stockpiles at two 
sites, again, without discussing the goals of the program. In the area 
of combat support, the report discussed the number of vulnerability and 
survivability assessments, training exercises of all types, and number 
of training courses provided, but does not discuss how many of each 
were planned. Finally, in the technology development area, the report 
discussed several technologies developed or under development but does 
not discuss the agency's plans for the year. See figure 5 for a 
comparison of what is expected in an annual performance report and what 
DTRA's report contained.

Figure 5: GPRA Performance Reporting Requirements Compared with DTRA's 
2002 Performance Report:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Although this information is not in DTRA's performance report, we found 
that DTRA leadership meets quarterly to assess progress in meeting each 
unit's goals and discuss activities that are not on track. Further, 
DTRA leadership discusses what needs to be done to get on track and 
whether goals are unrealistic or not within its control. For example, 
according to agency officials, they have in the past transferred 
funding from CTR programs that were having problems into successful CTR 
programs to prevent those funds from being lost because congressionally 
provided funds must be spent within a certain time frame.

Conclusions:

When DTRA was established in 1998, it modeled its strategic planning 
process on GPRA to prioritize resources and assess progress toward its 
organizational goals. Although DTRA officials do measure progress 
against these goals in quarterly reviews, the agency's performance 
report does not capture the findings from these reviews. The 
performance report does not compare accomplishments and activities with 
established goals and objectives, nor does it explain what actions are 
needed to achieve or modify goals that are not met. Providing this 
information would allow decision makers outside of DTRA to have better 
information regarding DTRA's performance.

Recommendations:

We recommend that the Director of DTRA improve the agency's annual 
performance report by comparing the agency's actual performance against 
planned goals and, where appropriate, explaining why the goals were not 
met and the agency's plan for addressing these unmet goals in the 
future.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

DTRA provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are 
reproduced in appendix I. In these comments, DTRA concurred with our 
recommendation to improve DTRA's annual performance report by including 
a comparison of the agency's actual performance against planned goals 
and, where appropriate, explain why goals were not met, and the 
agency's plan for addressing these unmet goals in the future. DTRA 
stated that it is refining its performance report methodology to better 
address the linkage of reported performance to planned goals and future 
efforts. DTRA also separately provided technical comments that we 
discussed with relevant officials and included in the text of the 
report where appropriate.

Scope and Methodology:

To report on DTRA's mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill 
that mission, we reviewed agency documentation. Specifically, we 
reviewed historical documents, including documentation of interviews of 
the DOD senior officials responsible for the creation of DTRA, and 
other agency mission documentation. We relied on our prior work that 
reviewed specific DTRA projects. In addition, we interviewed DTRA 
officials, including the agency's Director, senior leadership from each 
of DTRA's units responsible for the agency's mission, other DTRA staff, 
and DTRA contractor personnel. Finally, we attended a 3-day DTRA 
liaison officer training class to learn how DTRA trains its liaison 
officers about the variety of capabilities and services it can offer to 
military forces in the field. We did not assess the effectiveness of 
DTRA's programs.

To discuss DTRA's relationship with other government entities, we 
reviewed the agency's documentation of programs and activities that it 
undertakes with other government entities. We reviewed documents 
provided by DTRA and NNSA staff regarding NWC responsibilities. In 
addition, we interviewed DTRA, DOD, Energy, and NNSA officials about 
DTRA's coordination with Energy and NNSA. We relied on documentation 
and discussions with DOD officials regarding the nature of DTRA's 
relationship with DHS. We also relied upon our previous audits 
reviewing DHS and DOD to ascertain the nature of the relationship.

To determine how DTRA prioritizes its resources to meet its mission 
objectives, we reviewed DTRA's 2000, 2001, and 2003 strategic plans. We 
reviewed supporting documentation, including budget documents, program 
and project plans, and internal and external assessments of DTRA. 
Specifically, we compared DTRA's strategic plan, each unit's annual 
performance plans for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and documentation on 
the units' ongoing assessments of their activities with what we have 
reported should be found in GPRA-based documents. We met with DTRA 
officials to discuss the agency's planning and review process and with 
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss their 
assessments of DTRA.

We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We performed our review 
from April 2003 to December 2003 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency. We will also make copies available to others 
upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no cost on 
the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

Please contact me at (202) 512-8979 if you or your staff have any 
questions about this report. Key contributors to this report were F. 
James Shafer, Hynek Kalkus, Monica Brym, Tim Wilson, Etana Finkler, 
Lynn Cothern, Martin de Alteriis, and Ernie Jackson.

Sincerely yours,

Signed by:

Joseph A. Christoff, Director: 
International Affairs and Trade:

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Comments from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency:

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
8725 John J. Kingman Road MSC 6201 
Ft Belvoir, VA 22060-6201:

JAN 23 2004:

Mr. Joseph A. Christoff Director:

International Affairs and Trade:

United States General Accounting Office 
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Christoff:

Thank you for the opportunity to review the GAO Draft Report, GAO-04-
330, "WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but Performance Reporting Can Be 
Improved," dated January 9, 2004 (GAO Code 320182). This constitutes 
the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft Report.

The DoD concurs with the finding of the report. Specific comments on 
the finding are enclosed.

Technical comments for accuracy and clarification of this report have 
been provided separately. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on 
the Draft Report.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Stephen M. Younger: 
Director: 

Enclosure: As stated:

GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED JANUARY 9, 2004 GAO-04-330 (GAO CODE 320182):

"WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Addresses 
Broad Range of Threats, but Performance Reporting Can Be Improved":

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:

RECOMMENDATION: The GAO recommended that the Director of the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) improve the Agency's annual performance 
report by comparing the Agency's actual performance against planned 
goals and, where appropriate, explain why goals were not met and the 
Agency's plan for addressing these in the future. (p. 27/GAO Draft 
Report):

DOD RESPONSE: The DoD concurs with the findings of the report. The 2002 
Performance Report referenced in the GAO report provided a summary of 
DTRA's performance achievements once it adopted a balanced scorecard 
approach for assessing performance. DTRA is not required to develop a 
formal performance report, but has done so of its own accord. As part 
of maturing and improving the Agency assessment process, DTRA is 
refining its performance report methodology to better address the 
linkage of reported performance to planned goals and future efforts. 
This revised methodology will be used in developing future performance 
reports.

[End of section]

Related GAO Products:

[End of section]

GAO Products Covering the CTR Program:

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1008R]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2003.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-627R]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2003.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to 
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-482]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and 
Nonproliferation Programs in Russia. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-526T]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2003.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-341R]. 
Washington, D.C.: December 2, 2002.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat 
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-426]. 
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of 
Assistance, but Procedural Limitations Remain. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-694]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2001.

Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers 
Benefits, Poses New Risks. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-138]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some U.S. Assistance to Redirect Russian 
Scientists Taxed by Russia. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-154R]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2000.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD's 1997-98 Reports on Accounting for 
Assistance Were Late and Incomplete. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-40]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce the Threats from 
the Former Soviet Union. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119]. AO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119. 
Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May 
Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi- bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-76].  
Washington, D.C.: April 13, 1999.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: Review of DOD's June 1997 Report on 
Assistance Provided. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-97-218].  
Washington, D.C.: September 5, 1997.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in 
the Former Soviet Union. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-97-101]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 11, 1997.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat 
Assistance Has Improved. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-97-84]. 
Washington, D.C.: February 27, 1997.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-96- 222]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 27, 1996.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent 
States Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls. 
[Hyperlink, http:// www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-96-118].
Washington, D.C.: March 13, 1996.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S Efforts to Improve Nuclear 
Material Controls in Newly Independent States. 
[Hyperlink, http:// www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1996.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Assistance Can Be Improved. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-95-191].  
Washington, D.C.: September 29, 1995.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former 
Soviet Union-An Update. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/ NSIAD-95-165]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 17, 1995.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former 
Soviet Union. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-95-7]. 
Washington, D.C.: October 6, 1994.

Soviet Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Efforts to Help Former Soviet Republics 
Secure and Destroy Weapons. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-93-5].  
Washington, D.C.: March 9, 1993.

Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S. 
Dismantlement Assistance. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-93-154]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1993.

Russian Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Implementation of the Soviet Nuclear 
Threat Reduction Act of 1991. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-92-47]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 27, 1992. 

(320182):

FOOTNOTES

[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to 
Improve Security at Russian Sites, GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 
24, 2003).

[2] In the early 1990s, the On-Site Inspection Agency was asked to 
support the earlier United Nation's efforts in Iraq.

[3] WMD, once defined by DOD as nuclear, biological and chemical, now 
includes radiological and high explosives as well.

[4] In June 1996, 19 U.S. Air Force personnel were killed when 
terrorists detonated a truck bomb near a fence in the American military 
section of Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia, damaging the Khobar Towers 
housing facilities.

[5] In 2001, NNSA was established as a semiautonomous agency within 
Energy that is responsible for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and 
associated nonproliferation activities. NNSA includes all atomic energy 
defense activities, specifically those parts of Energy formerly known 
as Defense Programs, Nonproliferation and National Security, Fissile 
Materials Disposition, and Naval Reactors, as well as the national 
weapons laboratories and other plants and facilities that constitute 
the nuclear weapons complex.

[6] Responsibility for the management of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile was originally established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

[7] DOD defines "surety" as material, personnel, and procedures that 
contribute to the safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons.

[8] The Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement and the Plutonium 
Disposition Agreement are agreements between the United States and 
Russia that are designed to prevent the accumulation of excessive 
stocks of plutonium by both eliminating the reactors that produce 
plutonium and reducing existing stocks of plutonium.

[9] GAO-03-482.

[10] The specific reimbursement arrangements vary by activity and 
agency.

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