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Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
June 2003:
Military Operations:
Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not
Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans:
GAO-03-695:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-695, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness
and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) uses contractors to provide a wide
variety of services for U.S. military forces deployed overseas. We
were asked to examine three related issues: (1) the extent of
contractor support for deployed forces and why DOD uses contractors;
(2) the extent to which such contractors are considered in DOD
planning, including whether DOD has backup plans to maintain essential
services to deployed forces in case contractors can no longer provide
the services; and (3) the adequacy of DOD’s guidance and oversight
mechanisms in managing overseas contractors efficiently.
What GAO Found:
While DOD and the military services cannot quantify the totality of
support that contractors provide to deployed forces around the world,
DOD relies on contractors to supply a wide variety of services. These
services range from maintaining advanced weapon systems and setting up
and operating communications networks to providing gate and perimeter
security, interpreting foreign languages, and preparing meals and
doing laundry for the troops. DOD uses contractor services for a
number of reasons. In some areas, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, there are
limits on the number of U.S. military personnel who can be deployed in
the region; contract workers pick up the slack in the tasks that
remain to be done. Elsewhere, the military does not have sufficient
personnel with the highly technical or specialized skills needed in-
place (e.g., technicians to repair sophisticated equipment or
weapons). Finally, DOD uses contractors to conserve scarce skills, to
ensure that they will be available for future deployments.
Despite requirements established in DOD guidance (Instruction 3020.37),
DOD and the services have not identified those contractors that
provide mission essential services and where appropriate developed
backup plans to ensure that essential contractor-provided services
will continue if the contractor for any reason becomes unavailable.
Service officials told us that, in the past, contractors have usually
been able to fulfill their contractual obligations and, if they were
unable to do so, officials could replace them with other contractor
staff or military personnel. However, we found that this may not
always be the case.
DOD’s agencywide and servicewide guidance and policies for using and
overseeing contractors that support deployed U.S. forces overseas are
inconsistent and sometimes incomplete, as in the following examples:
* Of the four services, only the Army has developed substantial
guidance for dealing with contractors.
* DOD’s acquisition regulations do not require any specific contract
clauses or language to cover possible overseas deployments or changes
in deployment locations for contract workers. Of 183 contractor
employees planning to deploy with an Army division to Iraq, for
example, some did not have deployment clauses in their contracts. This
omission can lead to increased contract costs as well as delays in
getting contractors into the field.
* At the sites that we visited in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Persian
Gulf, we found that general oversight of contractors appeared to be
sufficient but that broader oversight issues existed. These include
inadequate training for staff responsible for overseeing contractors
and limited awareness by many field commanders of all the contractor
activities taking place in their area of operations.
What GAO Recommends:
We are making a number of recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
to improve the oversight and management of contractors’ supporting
deployed forces. These include (1) conducting required reviews to
identify mission essential services provided by contractors and
include them in planning; (2) developing and implementing the use of
standard language for contracts; and (3) developing comprehensive
guidance and doctrine to help the services manage contractors’
supporting deployed forces. DOD agreed with most of our
recommendations but believed a section of one was too burdensome. We
do not agree and have retained the recommendation its entirety.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Uses Contractors for a Wide Range of Services Because of Force Size
Limitations and a Lack of Military Capability and Capacity:
DOD and the Services Have Not Identified Essential Services Provided by
Contracts or Developed Plans for Their Continuation Should Contractors
Not Be Available:
Guidance and Contract Language and Oversight Vary within DOD and the
Services:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Table:
Table 1: Selected Services Provided by Contractors in Deployed
Locations:
Figures:
Figure 1: Selected Countries Where Contractors Are Supporting Deployed
Forces, As of April 2003:
Figure 2: DOD Instruction 3020.37 Essential Services Planning
Procedures:
Figure 3: Contracts for Selected Services in Bosnia Are Awarded by Many
Different Agencies:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 24, 2003:
The Honorable John Ensign
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate:
The U.S. military has long used contractors to provide supplies and
services to deployed U.S. forces, and more recently contractors have
been involved in every major military operation since the 1991 Gulf
War, including the recent war in Iraq. Although the Department of
Defense (DOD) considers contractors to be part of the total force,
neither DOD nor the services know the totality of contractor support
being provided to deployed forces.[Footnote 1] However, military
officials believe that the use of contractors for support to these
forces has increased significantly since the 1991 Gulf War. Factors
that have contributed to this increase include reductions in the size
of the military, an increase in the numbers of operations and missions
undertaken, and increasingly sophisticated weapons systems. You asked
us to assess (1) the extent of contractor support to deployed U.S.
forces and why DOD uses contractors; (2) the extent to which such
contractors are considered in DOD planning, including whether DOD has
backup plans to maintain essential services to deployed forces in case
contractors can no longer provide them; and (3) the adequacy of
guidance and oversight mechanisms in place to manage contractors
effectively.
As agreed with your staff, we focused our efforts in the Balkans and
Southwest Asia because the contractors in those theaters provide a
broad range of contractor support activities. We examined a wide range
of contracts in order to assess the diversity of contractor support and
met with officials at all levels of command to gain a comprehensive
understanding of the contracting and contract management and oversight
processes. We did not, however, compare the cost of contractors versus
the cost of military personnel or make policy judgments on whether the
use of contractors is desirable. We conducted our review from August
2002 through April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. We discuss our scope and methodology in
more detail in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
DOD uses contractors to provide U.S. forces that are deployed overseas
with a wide variety of services because of force limitations and a lack
of needed skills. The types of services contractors provide to deployed
forces include communication services, interpreters, base operations
services, weapons systems maintenance, gate and perimeter security,
intelligence analysis, and oversight over other contractors. The
military uses contractors to support deployed forces for several
reasons. One reason is that in some deployed areas, such as Bosnia and
Kosovo, the Executive Branch has limited the number of U.S. military
personnel who can be deployed in those countries at any one time. When
these limits, known as force caps, are in place, contractors replace
soldiers so that the soldiers will be available to undertake activities
with the potential for combat. A second reason that DOD uses
contractors is because either the required skills are not available in
the military or are only available in limited numbers and need to be
available to deploy for other contingencies. For example, when the Air
Force deployed the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, it required
contractor support because the vehicle is still in development and the
Air Force has not trained service members to maintain the entire
vehicle. Finally, DOD uses contractors to conserve scarce skills to
ensure that they will be available for future deployments.
DOD has not fully included contractor support in its operational and
strategic plans. As early as 1988, DOD was aware of the need to
identify contractors providing essential services but has done little
to do so in the ensuing 15 years. In 1991, DOD instructed its
components to identify essential services provided by contractors and
develop plans to ensure the continuation of those services should
contractors become unavailable. However, we found that DOD components
have not conducted the directed reviews to identify those contracts
providing essential services. We also found little in the way of backup
plans in operational plans or as separate documents, finding only one
written backup plan among the locations we visited, which included the
Balkans and several Persian Gulf countries. Many service officials told
us that contractors have supported contingencies in the past and, in
their opinion, it was unlikely that contractors would not be available
to provide support to deployed forces. While most contractors with whom
we met in the Persian Gulf stated their intention to remain in the
event of war with Iraq, contractor employees, could become unavailable
due to enemy attack or accidents. Some commanders noted that although
they have not formalized backup plans, they assumed that should
contractor support become unavailable, the personnel needed to continue
the service would be provided either by other contractors or from
military units. However, without firm plans, there is no assurance that
the personnel needed to provide the essential services would be
available when needed. Finally, DOD has done little to include
contractor support in its strategic human capital planning.
While individual contract oversight in deployed locations appeared to
be sufficient, we identified a number of broader issues associated with
managing contractor support. At the sites we visited, contract
oversight personnel for individual contracts were in place, and
military members we spoke to were generally satisfied with contractor
performance and service. However, broader oversight is lacking in key
areas, making it difficult for commanders to manage contractors
effectively. For example, visibility of all contractor support at a
specific location is practically nonexistent at the combatant commands,
component commands, and deployed locations we visited except in Bosnia,
where a concerted effort has been undertaken to identify all contractor
support. As a result, commanders at deployed locations have limited
visibility and understanding of all contractor activity supporting
their operations and frequently have no easy way to get answers to
questions about contractor support. This lack of visibility inhibits
the ability of commanders to resolve issues associated with contractor
support such as force protection issues and the provision of support to
the contractor personnel. Guidance at the DOD, combatant-command, and
service levels regarding the use of contractors to support deployed
forces varies widely, and mechanisms for managing these contractors are
inconsistent, creating challenges that may hinder the efficient use of
contractors. Only the Army has developed substantial guidance and
policies to deal with contractor support to deployed forces. In
addition, there is no standardization of necessary contract language
for deployment of contractors. This situation can increase costs to the
government as well as impede the local commander's ability to provide
force protection and support to contractor personnel.
We are making a number of recommendations to improve guidance,
training, and contractor visibility at all levels of command.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with three of
our recommendations and partially agreed with three others. We modified
two of our recommendations to address DOD's concerns. However, DOD
expressed concern that our recommendation to provide commanders more
information about the contracts used to support deployed forces could
be overly burdensome. We continue to believe all the recommendations
have merit and will not impose an undue burden. A detailed discussion
of DOD's comments and our response is contained in the body of this
report.
Background:
Since the early 1990s, DOD has used contractors to meet many of its
logistical and operational support needs during combat operations,
peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance missions, ranging
from Somalia and Haiti to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Today,
contractors are used to support deployed forces at a number of
locations around the world as figure 1 shows.
Figure 1: Selected Countries Where Contractors Are Supporting Deployed
Forces, As of April 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
A wide array of DOD and non-DOD agencies can award contracts to support
deployed forces. Such contracts have been awarded by the individual
services, DOD agencies, and other federal agencies. These contracts
typically fall into three broad categories--theater support, external
support, and systems support. Theater support contracts are normally
awarded by contracting agencies associated with the regional combatant
command, for example, U.S. Central Command or service component
commands like U.S. Army-Europe or by contracting offices at deployed
locations such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Contracts can be for recurring
services--such as equipment rental or repair, minor construction,
security, and intelligence services--or for the one time delivery of
goods and services at the deployed location. External theater contracts
are awarded by commands external to the combatant command or component
commands, such as the Defense Logistics Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency. Under
external support contracts, contractors are generally expected to
provide services at the deployed location. The Army's Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program contract[Footnote 2] is an example of an external
theater contact. Finally, system contracts provide logistics support to
maintain and operate weapons and other systems. Systems may be new or
long-standing ones, and often the contracts are intended to support
units at their home stations. These types of contracts are most often
awarded by the commands responsible for building and buying the weapons
or other systems. Within a service or agency, numerous contracting
officers, with varying degrees of knowledge about the needs of
contractors and the military in deployed locations, can award contracts
that support deployed forces.
Depending on the type of service being provided under a contract,
contractor employees may be U.S. citizens, host country
nationals,[Footnote 3] or third country nationals.[Footnote 4]
Contracts to support weapons systems, for example, usually require U.S.
citizens, while contractors that provide food and housing services
frequently hire local nationals or third country nationals.
DOD Uses Contractors for a Wide Range of Services Because of Force Size
Limitations and a Lack of Military Capability and Capacity:
Contractors provide the military with a wide variety of services from
food, laundry, and recreation services to maintenance of the military's
most sophisticated weapons systems. DOD uses contractors during
deployments because limits are placed on the number of U.S. military
personnel assigned to a region, required skills may not be available in
the service, or the services want to husband scarce skills to ensure
that they are available for other contingencies.
Contractors Provide a Full Spectrum of Services to DOD's Deployed
Forces:
Contractors provide a wide range of services at deployed locations. The
scope of contractor support often depends on the nature of the
deployment. For example, in a relatively stable environment such as the
Balkans, contractors provide base operations support services such as
food, laundry, recreational, construction and maintenance, road
maintenance, waste management, fire-fighting, power generation, and
water production and distribution services. Contractors also provide
logistics support such as parts and equipment distribution, ammunition
accountability and control, and port support activities as well as
support to weapons systems and tactical vehicles. In a less secure
environment, as was the case shortly after U.S. forces deployed to
Afghanistan, contractors principally provided support to weapons
systems such as the Apache helicopter and chemical and biological
detection equipment. Table 1 illustrates some types of contractor
support provided at selected deployed locations. We were completing our
work as the 2003 war with Iraq began and so were unable to fully
ascertain the extent of contractor support to U.S. forces inside Iraq.
Table 1: Selected Services Provided by Contractors in Deployed
Locations:
Service: Weapons systems support; Balkans: Yes; Southwest Asia: Yes;
Central Asia: Yes.
Service: Intelligence analysis; Balkans: Yes; Southwest Asia: Yes;
Central Asia: Yes.
Service: Linguists; Balkans: Yes; Southwest Asia: Yes; Central Asia:
Yes.
Service: Base operations support; Balkans: Yes; Southwest Asia: Yes;
Central Asia: Yes.
Service: Logistics support; Balkans: Yes; Southwest Asia: Yes; Central
Asia: No.
Service: Prepositioned equipment maintenance; Balkans: No;
Southwest Asia: Yes; Central Asia: No.
Service: Non-tactical communications; Balkans: Yes; Southwest Asia:
Yes; Central Asia: No.
Service: Generator maintenance; Balkans: Yes; Southwest Asia: Yes;
Central Asia: Yes.
Service: Biological/chemical detection systems; Balkans: No;
Southwest Asia: Yes; Central Asia: Yes.
Service: Management and control of government property; Balkans: Yes;
Southwest Asia: Yes; Central Asia: Yes.
Service: Command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence; Balkans: Yes; Southwest Asia: Yes; Central Asia: Yes.
Service: Continuing education; Balkans: Yes; Southwest Asia: No;
Central Asia: No.
Service: Fuel and material transport; Balkans: Yes; Southwest Asia:
Yes; Central Asia: Yes.
Service: Security guards; Balkans: Yes; Southwest Asia: Yes; Central
Asia: No.
Service: Tactical and non-tactical vehicle maintenance; Balkans: Yes;
Southwest Asia: Yes; Central Asia: No.
Service: Medical service; Balkans: No; Southwest Asia: Yes; Central
Asia: No.
Service: Mail service; Balkans: Yes; Southwest Asia: No; Central
Asia: No.
Source: GAO:
[End of table]
DOD Uses Contractors Because of Limits on Force Size and a Lack of
Military Capability and Capacity:
Limits on the number of military personnel allowed in an area, called
"force caps", lead DOD to use contractors to provide support to its
deployed forces. In some countries or regions the size of the force is
limited due to law, executive direction, or agreements with host
countries or other allies. For example, DOD has limited U.S. troops to
15 percent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization force in Kosovo
while the Philippine government limited the number of U.S. troops
participating in a recent deployment to 660. Since contractors are not
included in most force caps, as force levels have been reduced in the
Balkans, the Army has substituted contractors for soldiers to meet
requirements that were originally met by soldiers. In Bosnia, for
example, the Army replaced soldiers at the gate and base perimeter with
contracted security guards. In Kosovo, the Army replaced its
firefighters with contracted firefighters as the number of troops
authorized to be in Kosovo decreased.[Footnote 5] By using contractors
the military maximizes its combat forces in an area.
In some cases, DOD lacks the internal resources to meet all the
requirements necessary to support deployed forces. The military
services do not always have the people with specific skill sets to meet
the mission. Army National Guard members deployed to Bosnia told us
that they used contractors to maintain their Apache and Blackhawk
helicopters because the Guard has no intermediate maintenance
capability.[Footnote 6],[Footnote 7] In addition, recently fielded
systems and systems still under development may have unique technical
requirements for which the services have not had time to develop
training courses and train service personnel. For example, when the
Army's 4th Infantry Division deployed in support of the recent war in
Iraq, about one-third of the 183 contractor employees that deployed
with the division deployed to support the high tech digital command and
control systems still in development. Similarly, when the Air Force
deployed the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, it required contractor
support because the vehicle is still in development and the Air Force
has not trained service members to maintain the Predator's data link
system. In addition, some weapons systems, such as the Marine Corp's
new truck, were designed to be at least partially contractor supported
from the beginning, or the services made the decision to use contractor
support because the limited number of assets made contractor support
cost effective in DOD's judgment. For example, the Army's Guardrail
surveillance aircraft is entirely supported by contractors because,
according to Army officials, it was not cost effective to develop an
organic maintenance capability for this aircraft.
The increasing reliance on the private sector to handle certain
functions and capabilities has further reduced or eliminated the
military's ability to meet certain requirements internally. For
example, at Air Force bases in the United States contractors now
integrate base telephone networks with local telephone systems. Since
the Air Force eliminated this internal capability to integrate the base
telephone network with the local telephone networks, it no longer has
the military personnel qualified to perform this task at deployed
locations. Also, the use of commercial off-the-shelf equipment results
in an increased use of contractors. For example, the Air Force and the
Navy use commercial communications systems at deployed locations in
Southwest Asia and support this equipment with contractors. According
to one Navy official with whom we spoke, the Navy uses contractors
because it does not train its personnel to maintain commercial systems.
In other cases, required skills are limited, and there is a need to
conserve high-demand, low-density[Footnote 8] units for future
operations. Air Force officials in Southwest Asia told us that they use
contractors to maintain the generators that provide power to the bases
there because the Air Force has a limited number of qualified
maintenance personnel, and their frequent deployment was having a
negative impact on retention.
Impact of Contractors on Training:
While most commanders believed that replacing service members with
contractors in deployed locations had no negative impact on the
training of military members, some believed that service members who
did not deploy with their units were missing valuable training
opportunities. We found opinions varied depending on the skill or
military occupation that was being replaced. For example, commanders
told us that food service personnel and communications personnel would
not benefit from deploying to Bosnia and Kosovo at this time because
these locations no longer replicate field conditions, rather they more
closely resemble bases in Germany or the United States. Other
commanders told us that they believed that logistics personnel as well
as vehicle maintenance personnel were missing the opportunity to work
in high volume situations in a more intense environment.
At some locations, contractor employees who work with military
personnel are providing training although such training may not be a
requirement of the contract. Contractors are training soldiers on
systems they ordinarily would not be exposed to, such as specially
modified high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (Humvees) in
Bosnia and commercial power generators in Kuwait. They also train
soldiers to operate and maintain the newest technologies, such as
computers and communications systems supporting intelligence
operations in Southwest Asia. Training is comprised of not only hands-
on experience but often structured training classes as well.
DOD and the Services Have Not Identified Essential Services Provided by
Contracts or Developed Plans for Their Continuation Should Contractors
Not Be Available:
Contractors provide DOD with a wide variety of services at deployed
locations, and while DOD uses contractors as part of the total force
mix and recognizes the need to continue essential contractor
services[Footnote 9] during crises, it has not included them in
operational and strategic planning. DOD policy requires its
components[Footnote 10] to annually review all contractor services,
including new and existing contracts to determine which services will
be essential during crisis situations. Where there is a reasonable
doubt about the continuation of essential services during crisis
situations by the contractor, the cognizant component commander is
required to prepare a contingency plan for obtaining the essential
service from alternate sources. However, we found that the required
contract reviews were not done, and there was little in the way of
backup plans. Many commanders assumed that other contractors or
military units would be available to provide the essential service if
the original contractors were no longer available. However, the
commanders had no way of knowing if these assets would actually be
available when needed. Additionally, DOD has not integrated its
contractor workforce into its human capital strategy.
DOD Has Directed the Identification of Contractor-Provided Essential
Services That Need to Continue During Crises:
As early as 1988, DOD noted the lack of a central policy or an
oversight mechanism for the identification and management of essential
contractor services. A DOD Inspector General report,[Footnote 11]
issued in November 1988, noted that DOD components could not ensure
that the emergency essential services performed by contractors would
continue during a crisis or hostile situation. The report also stated
that there was "no central oversight of contracts for emergency
essential services, no legal basis to compel contractors to perform,
and no means to enforce contractual terms." The report recommended that
all commands identify (1) "war-stopper" services that should be
performed exclusively by military personnel and (2) those services that
could be contracted out, if a contingency plan existed, to ensure
continued performance if a contractor does not perform. DOD concurred
with the reports findings and recommendations and drafted a directive
to address them. This effort led to the issuance of DOD Instruction
3020.37,[Footnote 12] in November 1990, which addresses the
continuation of essential contractor services during crisis situations.
In 1991, the Department of Defense Inspector General reported[Footnote
13] on this issue again. The Inspector General reported that generally
"contingency plans did not exist to ensure continued performance of
essential services if a contractor defaulted during a crisis
situation." The Inspector General's report also stated that there was
no central policy or oversight for the identification and management of
essential services until DOD Instruction 3020.37 was issued. The
Inspector General's report noted that none of the major or subordinate
commands that they visited could provide them with data concerning all
contracts vital to combat or crisis operations. The report concluded
that although DOD's instruction provided the needed central policy that
promotes the continuation of emergency essential services during crises
and hostile situations, the instruction needed revision to provide
additional assurances such as the identification of war-stopper
services and an annual reporting system identifying the numbers of
emergency essential contracts and their attendant personnel. DOD
concurred with the report findings but believed that since DOD
Instruction 3020.37 had just been issued, the services and agencies
should be given time to implement it.
DOD Instruction 3020.37 Requires Component Heads to Take Action:
DOD Instruction 3020.37 assigns responsibilities and prescribes
procedures to implement DOD policy to assure that components (1)
develop and implement plans and procedures that are intended to provide
reasonable assurance of the continuation of essential services during
crisis situations and (2) prepare a contingency plan for obtaining the
essential service from alternate sources where there is a reasonable
doubt about the continuation of that service. Responsibility for
ensuring that all contractor services are reviewed annually, to include
new and existing contracts, to determine which services will be
essential during crisis situations rests with the heads of DOD
components. They must also conduct an annual assessment of the
unexpected or early loss of essential contractor services on the
effectiveness of support to mobilizing and deployed forces. The results
of these assessments are to be included in the affected contingency or
operations plans.
Planning procedures for component activities using essential contractor
services are specified in DOD Instruction 3020.37. The component is to
identify services that are mission essential and designate them in the
contract statement of work. Where a reasonable assurance of
continuation of essential contractor services cannot be attained, the
component activity commander is to do one of three things. The first is
to obtain military, DOD civilian, or host nation personnel to perform
the services concerned, and, in consultation with legal and contracting
personnel, determine the proper course of action to transition from the
contractor-provided services. The second is to prepare a contingency
plan for obtaining the essential services from other sources if the
contractor does not perform in a crisis. The third option for the
commander is to accept the risk attendant with a disruption of the
service during a crisis situation. Figure 2 shows the essential
planning process required by DOD Instruction 3020.37.
Figure 2: DOD Instruction 3020.37 Essential Services Planning
Procedures:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DOD has also directed regional combatant commanders to identify
contractors providing mission essential services and develop plans to
mitigate their possible loss. In late 2002, the Joint Staff modified
the logistics supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan[Footnote 14] to require the development of a mitigation plan that
details transitioning to other support should commercial deliveries
and/or support become compromised. This was partly in response to
problems with fuel deliveries in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring
Freedom. Also, Joint Staff guidance for the development of operational
plans by the regional combatant commanders requires that those plans
identify mission essential services provided by contractors and
identify the existence of any contingency plans to ensure these
services continue.
Essential Contractor Services Have Not Been Identified:
As noted earlier, DOD Instruction 3020.37 was issued in response to a
1988 DOD Inspector General report, and in 1991 DOD stated that the
components should be given time to implement it. However, as of April
2003, 12 years later, we found little evidence that the DOD components
are implementing the DOD Instruction. The heads of DOD components are
required by the instruction to ensure that the instruction's policies
and procedures are implemented by relevant subordinate organizations.
However, none of the services are conducting the annual review to
identify mission essential services that are being provided by
contractors. Service and combatant command officials we spoke with were
generally unaware of the requirement to review contracts annually and
identify essential services. None of the regional combatant commands,
service component commanders, or installations visited during our
review had an ongoing process for reviewing contracts as required by
DOD Instruction 3020.37. Without identifying mission essential
contracts, commanders do not know what essential services could be at
risk during operations. Furthermore, the commanders cannot determine
when backup plans are needed, nor can they assess the risk they would
have to accept with the loss of contractor services. One Air Force
official indicated that our visit had prompted a review of their
contracts to identify those that provided essential services and that
he became aware of this requirement only when we asked about their
compliance with the instruction.
Additionally, DOD has limited knowledge of the extent to which DOD
Instruction 3020.37 is being implemented. The instruction states that
an office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense will
"periodically monitor implementation of this instruction." However, we
found no evidence that the required monitoring had ever taken place. In
discussion with the office that has primary responsibility for the
instruction (located in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness) we were told that the monitoring process
is informal and that since DOD components have not advised the office
of any significant problems in implementing the instruction (as
required by the instruction) it is assumed that it is being
implemented.
Backup Planning Is Not Being Done:
We found little in the way of backup plans to replace mission essential
contractor services during crises if necessary. This is not surprising
since a prerequisite to developing a backup plan is the identification
of those contracts that provide essential services. Many of the people
we talked to assumed that the personnel needed to continue essential
services would be provided, either by other contractors or organic
military capability and did not see a need for a formal backup plan.
The only written backup plan that we found was for maintenance of the
Air Force's C21J executive aircraft.[Footnote 15] According to the
plan, if contractors are unavailable, Air Force personnel will provide
maintenance. However, according to Air Force officials, no one in the
Air Force is trained to maintain this aircraft.
Our review of unclassified portions of operations plans[Footnote 16]
addressing logistics support revealed no backup planning. For example,
in our review of the logistics portion of the operations plan for the
war in Iraq, which addresses contracting, we found that there were no
backup plans should contractors become unavailable to provide essential
services. The plan provides guidance on certain aspects of contracting,
such as the creation of a joint contracting cell, but there is no
language pertaining to backup plans. In addition, our review of
operations plans for the Balkans did not identify any reference to
plans for the mitigation of the loss of contractor support.
Lack of Backup Plans May Be Shortsighted:
In response to our questions about a lack of backup plans, many DOD
officials noted that contractors have always supported U.S. forces in
deployed locations and the officials expect that to continue.[Footnote
17] While most of the contractor personnel we spoke with in the Persian
Gulf indicated that they would remain in the event of war with Iraq,
they cannot be ordered to remain in a hostile environment or replace
other contractors that choose not to deploy. DOD can initiate legal
action against a contractor for nonperformance, but the mission
requirement the contractor was responsible for remains.
Assuming that existing contractor employees will be available to
perform essential services may not always be realistic. Reasons for the
loss of contractor support can extend beyond contractors refusing to
deploy to or remain in the deployed location. Contractors could be
killed (seven contractor employees were killed in the 1991 Gulf War) or
incapacitated by hostile action, accident, or other unforeseen events.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a contractor will be willing to
deploy to replace the original contractor.
Should contractors become unavailable, many of the people we talked to
assumed that the personnel needed to continue essential services would
be provided either by other contractors or organic military capability,
or they would do without the service. However, these assumptions have
not been vetted, and key questions remain.
The ability to replace existing contractor services with a new
contractor can be dependent on the support being provided. Assumptions
that military resources will be available may not recognize that
multiple commands may be relying on the same unit as backup and that
these units therefore may not be available, or organic capability may
not exist. As we noted earlier the lack of organic capability is one
reason that DOD uses contractors. The Air Force's lack of in-house
maintenance capability for its C21J aircraft mentioned earlier and the
Army's total dependence on contractor support for all its fixed wing
aircraft are examples of the lack of organic capability. For some
contracts, comparably skilled contractor personnel may not be available
from other companies. For example, we were told at one location that
only certain contractors have access to proprietary technical and
backup data from the manufacturers of specific aircraft or systems.
Additionally, the contracted services required for military operations
may also be needed by others. For example, shortages of qualified
linguists to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan delayed
interrogations and signals exploitation. Among the reasons given for
the shortage were the competing demands of other government agencies
for the same skills.
If the decision to do without the essential service is made, the risk
associated with this decision must be examined and determined to be
acceptable, particularly in light of the reliance on contractors.
Without contractor support certain missions would be at risk. For
example, Task Force Eagle in Bosnia relies on contracted linguistic and
intelligence analyst services. We were told that if the contracted
services were lost, it would mean an immediate critical loss would
occur for the military because DOD does not have service personnel with
these skills. Another example is biological detection equipment used by
the Army deployed in Afghanistan in October 2001. The equipment is
operated by Army personnel but is entirely dependent upon contractor
support for maintenance in the field. The loss of this contractor
support would adversely affect the Army's ability to detect biological
threats at deployed locations.
Contractors Are Not Included in DOD's Human Capital Strategic Plan:
DOD relies on contractors as part of the total force. According to
Joint Publication 4-05,[Footnote 18]
"The total force policy is one fundamental premise upon which our
military force structure is built. It was institutionalized in 1973 and
… as policy matured, military retirees, DOD personnel, contractor
personnel, and host-nation support personnel were brought under its
umbrella to reflect the value of their contributions to our military
capability.":
Furthermore, DOD policy states "the DOD Components shall rely on the
most effective mix of the Total Force, cost and other factors
considered, including active, reserve, civilian, host-nation, and
contract resources necessary to fulfill assigned peacetime and wartime
missions."[Footnote 19]
While DOD policy may consider contractors as part of the total force,
its human capital strategy does not. As we recently reported,[Footnote
20] DOD has not integrated the contractor workforce into its overall
human capital strategic plans.[Footnote 21] The civilian plan notes
that contractors are part of the unique mix of DOD resources, but the
plan does not discuss how DOD will shape its future workforce in a
total force context that includes contractors. This situation is in
contrast to what studies on human capital planning at DOD have noted.
For example, the Defense Science Board's 2000 report on Human Resources
Strategy[Footnote 22] states that DOD needs to undertake deliberate and
integrated force shaping of the civilian and military forces, address
human capital challenges from a total force perspective, and base
decisions to convert functions from military to civilians or
contractors on an integrated human resources plan. In addition, the
National Academy of Public Administration noted that as more work is
privatized and more traditionally military tasks require support of
civilian or contractor personnel, a more unified approach to force
planning and management will be necessary; serious shortfalls in any
one of the force elements (military, civilian, or contractor) will
damage mission accomplishment.[Footnote 23]
DOD disagreed with our March 2003 recommendation that it develop a
departmentwide human capital strategic plan that integrates both
military and civilian workforces and takes into account contractor
roles.[Footnote 24] In disagreeing, DOD said that it presently has both
a military and civilian plan; the use of contractors is just another
tool to accomplish the mission, not a separate workforce, with separate
needs, to manage. The intent of our recommendation is that strategic
planning for the civilian workforce be undertaken in the context of the
total force--civilian, military, and contractors--because the three
workforces are expected to perform their responsibilities in a seamless
manner to accomplish DOD's mission. We continue to believe that
strategic planning in a total force context is especially important
because the trend toward greater reliance on contractors requires a
critical mass of civilian and military personnel with the expertise
necessary to protect the government's interest and ensure effective
oversight of contractors' work. Integrated planning could also
facilitate achieving a goal in the Quadrennial Defense Review to focus
DOD's resources (personnel) in those areas that directly contribute to
war fighting and to rely on the private sector for non-core functions.
Guidance and Contract Language and Oversight Vary within DOD and the
Services:
Guidance at the DOD, combatant-command, and service levels regarding
the use of contractors to support deployed forces varies widely as do
the mechanisms for managing these contractors, creating challenges that
may hinder a commander's ability to oversee and manage contractors
efficiently. There is no DOD-wide guidance that establishes baseline
polices to help ensure the efficient use of contractors that support
deployed forces. The Joint Staff has developed general guidance for
regional combatant commanders. At the service level, only the Army has
developed comprehensive guidance to help commanders manage deployed
contractors effectively. Furthermore, there is little or no visibility
of contractors or contracts at the regional combatant or service
component command level. As a result, contractors have arrived at
deployed locations unbeknownst to the ground commander and without the
government support they needed to do their jobs. Moreover, ground
commanders have little visibility over the totality of contractors that
provide services at their installations, causing concerns regarding
safety and security.
Guidance on the Use of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces Varies
Widely:
Guidance for issues that impact all the components originates at the
DOD level. Typically, DOD will issue a directive--a broad policy
document containing what is required to initiate, govern, or regulate
actions or conduct by DOD components. This directive establishes a
baseline policy that applies across the combatant commands, services,
and DOD agencies. DOD may also issue an instruction--which implements
the policy, or prescribes the manner or a specific plan or action for
carrying out the policy, operating a program or activity, and assigning
responsibilities. For example:
* DOD Directive 2000.12[Footnote 25] establishes DOD's antiterrorism
and force protection policy.
* DOD Instruction 2000.16[Footnote 26] establishes specific force
protection standards pursuant to the policy established by DOD
Directive 2000.12.
In the case of contractor support for deployed forces, we found no DOD-
wide guidance that establishes any baseline policy regarding the use of
contractors to support deployed forces or the government's obligations
to these contractors.[Footnote 27] However, there are varying degrees
of guidance at the joint and service level to instruct commanders on
the use of contractors.
The Joint Staff has developed guidance for regional combatant
commanders. Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of
Joint Operations, "Chapter V, Contractors in the Theater"[Footnote 28]
sets forth doctrine on the use of contractors and provides a framework
for addressing contractor support issues. The Joint Publication
describes the regional combatant commander's general responsibilities,
including:
* integration of contractors as part of the force as reflected in the
Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data,[Footnote 29] logistics plans,
and operation plans;
* compliance with international, U.S., and host nation laws and
determination of restrictions imposed by international agreements on
the status of contractors;
* establishment of theater-specific requirements and policies for
contractors and communication of those requirements to the contractors;
and:
* establishment of procedures to integrate and monitor contracting
activities.
No single document informs the combatant commander of his
responsibilities with regards to contractors. Rather, there is a
variety of guidance that applies to contractors and appears in joint or
DOD publications. For example, in addition to Joint Publication 4-0,
the following DOD documents address contractors at deployed locations:
* DOD Directive 2000.12 and DOD Instruction 2000.16, define the anti-
terrorism and force protection responsibilities of the military. These
include force protection responsibilities to contractors as well as
requirements placed on contractors who deploy.
* Joint Publication 3-11,[Footnote 30] includes a requirement that
mission-essential contractors be provided with chemical and biological
survival equipment and training.
* DOD Directive 4500.54[Footnote 31] requires all non-DOD personnel
traveling under DOD sponsorship to obtain country clearance. While the
directive does not specify contractors, it does apply to them, further
complicating the ability of a commander to become aware of this
responsibility.
Joint Publication 4-0 only applies to combatant commanders involved in
joint operations. However, at the regional combatant commands we
visited, contracting, logistics, and planning officials were not
implementing the Joint Publication.
At the service level, only the Army has developed comprehensive
guidance to help commanders manage contractors effectively. As the
primary user of contractors while deployed, the Army has taken the lead
in formulating policies and doctrine addressing the use of contractors
in deployed locations. Army regulations, field manuals, and pamphlets
provide a wide array of guidance on the use of contractors. The
following are examples:
* Army Regulation 715-9--Contractors Accompanying the Force[Footnote
32]--provides policies, procedures, and responsibilities for managing
and using contracted U.S. citizens who are deployed to support Army
requirements.
* Army Field Manual 3-100.21--Contractors on the Battlefield [Footnote
33]--addresses the use of contractors as an added resource for the
commander to consider when planning support for an operation. Its
purpose is to define the role of contractors, describe their
relationships to the combatant commanders and the Army service
component commanders, and explain their mission of augmenting
operations and weapons systems support. It is also a guide for Army
contracting personnel and contractors in implementing planning
decisions and understanding how contractors will be managed and
supported by the military forces they augment.
* Army Pamphlet 715-16--Contractor Deployment Guide[Footnote 34]--
informs contractor employees, contracting officers, and field
commanders of the current policies and procedures that may affect the
deployment of contractors. The guide focuses on the issues surrounding
a U.S. citizen contractor employee who is deploying from the United
States to a theater of operation overseas.
These documents provide comprehensive and detailed direction to
commanders, contracting personnel, and contractors on what their roles
and responsibilities are and how they should meet them. Officials we
spoke with at various levels of the Army were generally aware of the
Army's guidance. For example, in Kosovo we received a briefing from the
commander of the Area Support Group that included the applicable Army
guidance on the use of contractors in deployed locations. Additionally,
the Army Materiel Command has established a Web site[Footnote 35] that
contains links to primary and secondary documents that provide guidance
on the use of contractors on the battlefield.
The other services make less use of contractors to support deployed
forces. Nevertheless, their contractors provide many of the same
services as the Army's contractors, often under similar austere
conditions at the same locations and therefore have similar force
protection and support requirements as Army contractors. For example,
both Air Force and Army contractors work at bases in Kuwait and do not
have significant differences in terms of their living and working
conditions or the types of threats they face. Also, it is not uncommon
to find Air Force contractors deployed in support of the other
services, as is the case in Bosnia where Air Force contractors maintain
the Army's Apache and Blackhawk helicopters.
However, the other services have not developed the same level of
guidance as the Army to guide commanders and contracting personnel on
how to meet those requirements. Like the Army, the Air Force uses
contractors for base operations support (including security, trash
removal, and construction services) in deployed locations. Contractors
also provide many essential services to Air Force units deployed to
Bosnia and Southwest Asia. In Southwest Asia contractors provide
support for base communications systems, systems that generate the
tactical air picture for the Combined Air Operations Center, and
maintenance support for both the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle and
the data links it uses to transmit information. In 2001, the Air Force
issued a policy memorandum[Footnote 36] addressing the use of
contractors in deployed locations. The purpose of the memorandum is to
provide consistent and uniform guidance on the use of U.S. contractor
personnel to augment the support of Air Force operations in wartime and
contingency operations. For example, the memorandum states as follows:
* Any determination regarding commercial support must consider the
essential services that must be maintained and the risks associated due
to contractor non-performance.
* Contractors may be provided force protection and support services
such as housing and medical support commensurate to those provided to
DOD civilians, if the contract requires it.
* Contractors should not be provided uniforms or weapons.
However, the Air Force has not developed the guidance to instruct its
personnel on how to implement this policy. For example, the Air Force
does not have a comparable document to the Army's Contractor Deployment
Guide, to instruct contracting personnel or contractor employees on
deployment requirements such as training, medical screening, and
logistical support.
The Navy and the Marine Corps have also not developed much guidance on
dealing with contractors in deployed locations. The Marine Corps has
issued an order[Footnote 37] addressing the use of contractors, which
is limited to a statement that contractor personnel should not normally
be deployed forward of the port of debarkation and that contractor
logistics support requirements be identified and included in all
planning scenarios. This guidance only addresses contractor support for
ground equipment, ground weapons systems, munitions, and information
systems. As with the Air Force memorandum, the Marine Corps does not
have the guidance in place to instruct personnel on how to implement
this order.
The Navy does not have any guidance related to contractor support of
deployed forces. Navy officials stressed that because most Navy
contractors are deployed to ships, many of the issues related to force
protection and levels of support do not exist. Nevertheless, some
contractors do support the Navy ashore and therefore may operate in an
environment similar to contractors supporting the Army. In fact, of the
seven contractors killed in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, three were
working for the Navy. Furthermore, we learned that there have been
issues with the support of contractors deployed on ships. For example,
officials at the Navy's Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command told us
they were not sure if the Navy was authorized to provide medical
treatment to their contractors deployed on ships.
Some Guidance Is Contradictory and Causes Confusion for Military
Commanders:
The differences in the DOD and service guidance can lead to sometimes
contradictory requirements, complicating the ability of commanders to
implement that guidance. For example, guidance related to providing
force protection to contractor personnel varies significantly. Joint
guidance states that force protection is the responsibility of the
contractor; Army guidance places that responsibility with the
commander; and Air Force guidance treats force protection as a
contractual matter, specifically, as follows:
* Joint Publication 4-0 "Chapter V," states "Force protection
responsibility for DOD contractor employees is a contractor
responsibility, unless valid contract terms place that responsibility
with another party.":
* Army Field Manual 3-100.21 states, "Protecting contractors and their
employees on the battlefield is the commander's responsibility. When
contractors perform in potentially hostile or hazardous areas, the
supported military forces must assure the protection of their
operations and employees. The responsibility for assuring that
contractors receive adequate force protection starts with the combatant
commander, extends downward, and includes the contractor.":
* The Air Force policy memorandum states, "The Air Force may provide or
make available, under terms and conditions as specified in the
contract, force protection … commensurate with those provided to DOD
civilian personnel to the extent authorized by U.S. and host nation
law.":
As a result, the combatant commander does not have a uniform set of
requirements he can incorporate into his planning process but instead
has to work with requirements that vary according to the services and
the individual contracts. In fact, an official on the Joint Staff told
us that the combatant commanders have requested DOD-wide guidance on
the use of contractors to support deployed forces to establish a
baseline that applies to all the services.
Many of the issues discussed in the balance of this report, such as the
lack of standard contract language related to deploying contractors,
the lack of visibility over contractors, and adequate support to
deployed contractors stem in part from the varying guidance at the DOD
and service levels. According to DOD officials, DOD is in the initial
phase of developing a directive that will establish DOD policy with
regard to managing contractors in deployed locations as well as a
handbook providing greater detail. The officials expect this guidance
to be issued by the end of 2003. DOD officials involved stated this
guidance would bring together all DOD policies that apply to
contractors who support deployed forces and clarify DOD policy on
issues such as force protection and training. These officials indicated
that the DOD directive and handbook would be based on the Army guidance
on the use of contractors to support deployed forces.
Contracts for Support of Deployed Forces Often Do Not Include the
Language to Ensure Efficient Deployments or Implement Policy:
There is no standard contract language applicable DOD-wide (such as in
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement) related to the
deployment and support of contractors that support deployed forces.
Contracting officers therefore may not address potential requirements
related to deployments or may use whatever deployment language they
believe to be appropriate, which may not address the necessary
deployment requirements. The Defense Acquisition Deskbook Supplement
entitled Contractor Support in the Theater of Operations includes
suggested clauses for contracts in support of deployed forces. However,
these clauses are not mandatory and did not appear to be widely known
by contracting officers. As a result, there is no common baseline of
contract language specifically addressing deployment that is required
for contracts that may support deployed forces and no assurance that
all of these contracts will properly address deployment requirements.
The degree to which individual contracts adequately address deployment
requirements varies widely. System support contracts are often written
before the need to deploy is identified, and the contracting officer
may not have considered the possibility of deployment. Also, some
weapons systems are being deployed before they are fully developed, and
deployment language was not included in the development contracts. Some
of the system support contracts we looked at did not include language
clearly specifying that contractors may need to deploy to hostile and
austere locations to provide support to deployed forces, as in the
following examples:
* The contract for an Army communications system needed to be modified
when the system was relocated from Saudi Arabia to Kuwait (and would
need to be modified again if the system were brought into Iraq) because
the contract did not contain provisions for deployment to other
locations.
* The Air Force Predator unmanned aerial vehicle contract did not
envision deployment since the Predator was developed as an advanced
technology concept demonstration project.
* An engineering support contract for the Navy did not contain a
specific deployment clause but only stated that the contractor must
support the Navy ashore or afloat.
The Army's Combined Arms Support Command found a similar situation when
it reviewed system support contracts for the 4th Infantry Division. The
4th Infantry Division is the Army's first digitized division and serves
as the test bed for the latest command and control systems, many of
which are still under development. The Combined Arms Support Command
study[Footnote 38] reviewed 89 contracts that supported the division.
The command determined that 44 of the 89 contracts would likely require
that contractor personnel be deployed and found that 21 of the 44
either had no deployment language or vague deployment language.
However, this did not impede the division's deployment for Operation
Iraqi Freedom. According to Army officials, 183 contractor employees
prepared to deploy in support of the 4th Infantry Division's
deployment, including some whose contracts were noted in the 4th
Infantry Division study as having had either no deployment language or
vague deployment language. To ensure that problems do not arise when
units deploy, the Army has taken steps to address some of the issues
identified in the study. Specifically, in 2002, the Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology issued the
following memorandums:
* A January 2002 memorandum[Footnote 39] stating that development
contracts providing support contractor personnel shall contain
appropriate deployment guidance if they have any likelihood of being
deployed outside of the United States.
* A June 2002 memorandum[Footnote 40] stating that Program Executive
Officers and Program Managers should strive to develop systems that do
not require contractor support in forward deployed locations.
Military officials we spoke with told us that the lack of specific
deployment language in contracts could increase the time it would take
to get contractor support to deployed forces as well as the cost of
that support. For example, the contract for support of the Army's
prepositioned equipment in Qatar did not include language that provided
for a potential deployment to Kuwait. As a result, when the need arose
to move the equipment to Kuwait, the contract needed to be modified.
(The cost of the modification was $53 million although it is not clear
what amount, if any, the government could have saved had deployment
language already been included in the contract.):
Contacts may also lack language to enforce policies pertaining to
contractors in deployed locations. For example, Army policy requires
that contractors follow all general orders[Footnote 41] and force
protection policies of the local commander. However, these requirements
were not always written into the contract documents and thus may not be
enforceable. In such situations, commanders may not have the ability to
control contractor activities in accordance with general orders. For
example, judge advocate officials in Bosnia expressed their concern
that the base commander was not authorized to prevent contractor
personnel from entering a local mosque in a high threat environment.
These officials suggested that commanders should always be able to
control contractor activities where matters of force protection are
concerned. Several officials indicated that many of these issues could
be addressed if DOD implemented a policy that required all contracts
that support deployed forces to include language that applies the
general orders and force protection policies of the local commanders to
contractor employees.
Oversight of Individual Contracts at the Deployed Locations We Visited
Appeared to Be Generally Sufficient:
DOD has established specific policies on how contracts, including those
that support deployed forces, should be administered and managed.
Oversight of contracts ultimately rests with the contracting officer
who has the responsibility for ensuring that contractors meet the
requirements set forth in the contract. However, most contracting
officers are not located at the deployed locations. As a result,
contracting officers appoint monitors who represent the contracting
officer at the deployed location and are responsible for monitoring
contractor performance. How contracts and contractors are monitored at
a deployed location is largely a function of the size and scope of the
contract. Contracting officers for large scale and high value contracts
such as the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, the Army's
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, and the Balkan Support Contract
have opted to have personnel from the Defense Contract Management
Agency oversee contractor performance. These onsite teams include
administrative contracting officers who direct the contractor to
perform work and quality assurance specialists who ensure that the
contractors perform work to the standards written in the contracts. For
smaller contracts, contracting officers usually appoint contracting
officer's representatives or contracting officer's technical
representatives to monitor contractor performance at deployed
locations. These individuals are not normally contracting specialists
and serve as contracting officer's representatives as an additional
duty. They cannot direct the contractor by making commitments or
changes that affect price, quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms
and conditions of the contract. Instead, they act as the eyes and ears
of the contracting officer and serve as the liaison between the
contractor and the contracting officer.
At the locations we visited, we found that oversight personnel were
generally in place and procedures had been established to monitor
contractor performance, but some issues were identified. The officials
we spoke with expressed their satisfaction with contractor performance
and with the level of oversight provided for the contracts under their
purview. However, officials mentioned several areas where improvements
to the oversight process could be made. One area involved training of
contracting officer's representatives. While the contracting officer's
representatives we spoke with appeared to be providing appropriate
contract oversight, some stated that training before they assumed these
positions would have better prepared them to effectively oversee
contractor performance. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement requires that they be qualified by training and experience
commensurate with the responsibilities to be delegated to them.
However, not all contracting officer's representatives were receiving
this training. For example, most of the contracting officer's
representatives we met with in Southwest Asia did not receive prior
training. As a result, they had to learn on the job, taking several
weeks before they could efficiently execute their responsibilities,
which could lead to gaps in contractor oversight.
Another area for improvement involved familiarization of commanders
with using contractors. Several of the contracting officials we met
with in the Balkans and Southwest Asia stated there was a lack of
training or education for commanders and senior personnel on the use of
contractors; particularly with regards to the directing of contractor
activities and the roles of the contract monitors such as the Defense
Contract Management Agency and contracting officer's representatives,
as illustrated in the following examples:
* An Air Force commander sent a contractor from Kuwait to Afghanistan
without going through the appropriate contracting officer. The
contractor was ultimately recalled to Kuwait because the contract
contained no provision for support in Afghanistan.
* A Special Operations Command official told us commanders were
unfamiliar with the Defense Contract Management Agency and believed
that the agency represented the contractor and not the military.
* An Army official told us that commanders sometimes do not know that
they are responsible for requesting and nominating a contracting
officer's representative for contracts supporting their command.
Some efforts are being made to address this issue. For example, U.S.
Army, Europe includes contract familiarization during mission rehearsal
exercises for Balkan deployments.
We also found that the frequent rotation of personnel into and out of a
theater of operation (particularly in Southwest Asia) resulted in a
loss of continuity in the oversight process as incoming oversight
personnel had to familiarize themselves with their new
responsibilities. We previously reported on the impact of frequent
rotations in and out of the theater.[Footnote 42] In response to a
recommendation made in our 2000 report, the Defense Contract Management
Agency changed its rotation policy. According to officials whom we met
with in the Balkans and Southwest Asia, the Defense Contract Management
Agency now staggers the rotation of its contract administration
officials at deployed locations such as the Balkans and Southwest Asia
to improve continuity and oversight. However, the issue of personnel
rotation and the impact on contractor oversight remains for other
officials. For example, the program manager of a major Army contract in
Qatar indicated that it would be beneficial if Army personnel
overseeing the contract were deployed for a longer period of time in
order to develop a more durable relationship. In addition, Air Force
officials in Qatar indicated they were planning on increasing the
number of longer-term deployments for key leadership positions,
including contracting positions, to help alleviate some of their
continuity issues.
Some commands have established policies and procedures to provide
additional tools to help manage contractors more efficiently, as in the
following example:
* U.S. Army, Europe established a joint acquisition review board during
contingency operations. This board validates requirements for all
proposed expenditures over $2,500. The board also determines if the
requirement is best met using contractor support, host nation support,
or troop labor. The policy stipulates that U.S. Army, Europe
headquarters must review expenditures over $50,000.
* U.S. Army, Europe has established standards for facilities and
support to soldiers in contingency operations. These standards specify
the level of quality of life support (i.e. type of housing, size of
chapels, provision of recreational facilities, and other amenities)
based on the number of U.S. troops at the deployed location. Variations
from these standards have to be approved by the U.S. Army, Europe
deputy commanding general. Officials told us these standards helped to
limit the growth of contractor services.
Lack of Visibility Overall Contractor Support Hampers Broader
Oversight:
Limited awareness by service and combatant command officials of all
contractor activity supporting their operations can hamper their
oversight and management responsibilities with regards to contractors
supporting deployed forces. This limited awareness is due to the fact
that the decision to use contractors to provide support to a deployed
location can be made by any number of requiring activities both within
and outside of the area of operations. As discussed earlier, contracts
to support deployed forces can be awarded by many organizations within
DOD or by other federal agencies. Figure 3 illustrates the broad array
of contractor services being provided in Bosnia and the government
agency that awarded each contract. Bosnia is one of the few places we
visited where contract information is collected centrally, giving the
commander visibility over much of the contracting activity. Commanders
at other locations we visited did not have this information readily
available to them.
Figure 3: Contracts for Selected Services in Bosnia Are Awarded by Many
Different Agencies:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Because the decision to use contractors is not coordinated at the
regional combatant commands or the component commands other than in
Bosnia, no one knows the totality of contractor support being provided
to deployed forces in an area of operation.
Despite the lack of visibility and involvement in decisions to use
contractors, commanders are responsible for all the people in their
area of responsibility, including contractor personnel. This lack of
visibility over contractor personnel inhibits their ability to resolve
issues associated with contractor support. Contractor visibility is
needed to ensure that the overall contractor presence in a theater is
synchronized with the combat forces being supported and that
adjustments can be made to contractor support when necessary.
Additionally, in order to provide operational support and force
protection to participating contractors, DOD needs to maintain
visibility of all contracts and contractor employees. When commanders
lack visibility, problems can arise. For example, one contractor told
us when his employees arrived in Afghanistan, shortly after the
beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the base commander had not
been informed that they were arriving and could not provide the
facilities they needed to maintain the biological identification
equipment that they were contracted to maintain. Also, the lack of
visibility may inhibit a commander's understanding of the impact of
certain force protection decisions. For example, if there is an
increased threat at a base and security is increased, third country
nationals may be barred from entering the base. Third country nationals
often provide services important to the quality of life of deployed
soldiers, such as preparing and serving food and providing sanitation
services. Without visibility over the totality of contractor support to
his command, the commander may not know which support services rely
heavily on third country nationals and is therefore less able to
identify and mitigate the effects of losing that support.
Limited visibility of all contractor activity can create a variety of
problems for ground commanders. Commanders may not be aware of the
total number of contractor personnel on their installations at any
point in time or what they are doing there. In Southwest Asia this
situation is further complicated by the fact that many of the
contractor employees are third country nationals, which can increase
security concerns. While many officials at sites we visited indicated
that they maintain accountability for their contractors by tightly
controlling the process by which contractors receive their
identification badges, we found problems remained. As illustrated in
the following examples:
* In Kosovo, we found that badges were issued at multiple locations and
provided access to multiple bases. This situation means a contractor
employee could receive a badge at one site and come onto a different
base without the base commander knowing who they were or why they were
there.
* Temporary badges (for visits of 30 days or less) at Eagle base in
Bosnia have no pictures. The lack of photos means that anyone could use
the badge to gain access to the base.
* The contracting officer's representative for a forward base in Kuwait
told us that contractor personnel have simply shown up without any
advance notification and that he had to track down other officials to
determine why the contractors were there.
Commanders may also be responsible for providing contractor employees
with certain benefits and entitlements included in their contracts. The
commanders' ability to meet these requirements (including providing
chemical and biological protective gear, military escorts, billeting,
and medical support) is hindered by their lack of visibility over the
totality of contractor presence on their base. In addition, commanders
may not be able to account for all their contractor personnel in the
event of an attack on a base. Similarly, should issues such as those
concerning "Gulf War Syndrome"[Footnote 43] arise, DOD may be unable to
determine if contractor personnel were in a location where they might
have been exposed to potentially harmful substances. As a result, DOD
may have no way to verify the claims of contractor personnel of health
effects resulting from such exposure.
We also found that, at some bases, commanders do not have copies of all
the contracts in effect on their base, as the following examples
illustrate:
* U.S. Army Pacific Command officials told us it took several weeks for
them to obtain the applicable contract terms to resolve questions
regarding medical care for contractor employees in the Philippines
because no one in the command had a copy of the contract.
* In the Balkans, some contractors and federal agencies refused to
provide copies of their contracts to the task force officials.
We first reported this problem in May 2002.[Footnote 44] At that time
we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct all components to
forward to the executive agent for operations in a geographical area,
such as the Balkans, a copy of all existing and future contracts and
contract modifications. DOD concurred with this recommendation and
agreed to modify its Financial Management Regulation to require that a
biannual report outlining the contracts be provided to the area
executive agent.[Footnote 45] The biannual report was limited, however,
to contracts that used contingency appropriations for funding and did
not include contracts that use a service's base program funds. However,
Balkans operations are no longer being funded using contingency funds
and would therefore not be included under the new financial management
regulation. As of April 15, 2003, the change to the Financial
Management Regulation had not been implemented. In addition, as we
reported in May 2002, lack of visibility over contracts hinders DOD's
ability to compare contracts and identify potential duplication of
services or ensure that contractors are only receiving those services
to which they are entitled.
Conclusions:
Risk is inherent when relying on contractors to support deployed
forces. DOD recognized this risk when it issued DOD Instruction
3020.37, which requires the services to determine which contracts
provide essential services and either develop plans for continued
provision of those services during crises or assume the risk of not
having the essential service. However, neither DOD nor the services
have taken steps to ensure compliance with this instruction. While most
contractors would likely deploy or remain in a deployed location if
needed, there are many other reasons contractors may not be available
to provide essential services. Without a clear understanding of the
potential consequences of not having the essential service available,
the risks associated with the mission increase.
There are no DOD-wide policies on the use of contractors to support
deployed forces. As a result there is little common understanding among
the services as to the government's responsibility to contractors and
contractor personnel in the event of hostilities. This lack of
understanding can cause confusion at the deployed location and makes
managing contractors more difficult because commanders often have
contractors from several services at their location with different
requirements, understandings, and obligations.
No standard contract language exists for inclusion in contracts that
may involve contractors deploying to support the force. Therefore, we
found that contracts have varying and sometimes inconsistent language
addressing deployment requirements. For example, some contracts do not
contain any language related to the potential requirement to deploy
while others include only vague references to deployment. The lack of
specific language can require adjustments to the contract when
deployment requirements are identified. The need to negotiate contract
adjustments in the face of an immediate deployment can result in
increased costs to the government and may delay contractor support.
The lack of contract training for commanders, senior personnel, and
some contracting officer's representatives can adversely affect the
effectiveness of the use of contractors in deployed locations. Without
training, many commanders, senior military personnel, and contracting
officer's representatives are not aware of their roles and
responsibilities in dealing with contractors.
Most commanders at the locations we visited had only limited visibility
and limited understanding of the extent and types of services being
provided by contractors. The lack of visibility over the types and
numbers of contractors limits the contract oversight that can be
provided and hampers the commander's ability to maintain accountability
of contractors. Without this visibility there is no assurance that
commanders understand the full extent of their operational support,
life support, and force protection responsibilities to contractors, and
there is no way to assure that contractors do not receive services they
are not entitled to receive. Additionally, without this visibility
commanders cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which
they are reliant on contractors to perform their missions and build
this reliance into their risk assessments. Moreover, while DOD agreed
to provide executive agents with a biannual report outlining the
contracts in use in a geographical location, it is not clear that these
reports, which are required for contracts funded with contingency funds
only, will provide sufficient information regarding the services that
contractors are providing to deployed forces and the support and force
protection obligations of the government to those contractors to
improve commanders' visibility and understanding of contractor services
at their locations.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To promote better planning, guidance, and oversight regarding the use
of contractors to support deployed forces, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense take the following actions:
* Direct the heads of DOD components to comply with DOD instruction
3020.37 by completing the first review of contracts to identify those
providing mission essential services. This review should be completed
by the end of calendar year 2004.
* Direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
develop procedures to monitor the implementation of DOD Instruction
3020.37.
* Develop DOD-wide guidance and doctrine on how to manage contractors
that support deployed forces. The guidance should (a) establish
baseline policies for the use of contractors to support deployed
forces, (b) delineate the roles and responsibilities of commanders
regarding the management and oversight of contractors that support
deployed forces, and (c) integrate other guidance and doctrine that may
affect DOD responsibilities to contractors in deployed locations into a
single document to assure that commanders are aware of all applicable
policies. Additionally, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the service secretaries to develop procedures to assure
implementation of the DOD guidance.
* Develop and require the use of standardized deployment language in
contracts that support or may support deployed forces. The Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement should be amended to require
standard clauses in such contracts that are awarded by DOD and to
address deployment in orders placed by DOD under other agencies'
contracts. This language should address the need to deploy into and
around the theater, required training, entitlements, force protection,
and other deployment related issues.
* Develop training courses for commanding officers and other senior
leaders who are deploying to locations with contractor support. Such
training could provide information on the roles and responsibilities of
the Defense Contract Management Agency and the contracting officer's
representative and the role of the commander in the contracting process
and the limits of the commanders' authority. Also, contracting officers
should ensure that those individuals selected as contracting officer's
representatives complete one of the established contracting officer's
representative training courses before they assume their duties.
* To improve the commander's visibility over, and understanding of, the
extent and types of services being provided by contractors, the
Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) to implement the changes to the department's Financial
Management Regulations previously agreed to with these modifications:
(a) the Financial Management Regulations should specify that the
biannual report include a synopsis of the services being provided and a
list of contractor entitlements; (b) the report should include all
contracts that directly support U.S. contingency operations including
those funded by the services base program accounts; and (c) the changes
should be finalized by January 1, 2004.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed fully with
three of our recommendations and agreed in part with three others. The
department's comments are reprinted in appendix II.
DOD agreed with our recommendations that it develop (1) procedures to
monitor the implementation of DOD Instruction 3020.37, (2) DOD-wide
guidance and doctrine on how to manage contractors that support
deployed forces, and (3) standardized deployment language for contracts
that support or may support deployed forces.
Although DOD agreed with our recommendation regarding the need for the
heads of DOD components to complete the first review of contracts to
identify those providing mission essential services, it expressed
concerns that the components might not be able to complete this review
by the end of calendar year 2003. We amended out recommendation to
incorporate this concern by extending the recommended completion date
to the end of calendar year 2004. We believe a completion date is
important to provide some sense of urgency. DOD also stated that the
effort needed to obtain information on contracts currently in place may
outweigh possible benefits and suggested alternative methods for
conducting this review, including the possibility of only reviewing new
contracts. However, DOD Instruction 3020.37 requires a review of all
contracts, and we continue to believe that a review that fails to
include all contracts would not adequately address the issues that the
instruction was designed to resolve--identifying essential services
provided by contractors to deployed forces and ensuring the
continuation of those services should contractors not be available.
DOD also agreed with our recommendation that appropriate training
should be developed for commanding officers and other senior leaders
who are deploying to locations with contractor support. However, DOD
stated that while Web-based training may be the appropriate medium for
such training, in some cases, alternative methods could be more
beneficial. We accepted DOD's suggestion and amended the recommendation
accordingly.
DOD agreed with our recommendation concerning changes to the
department's Financial Management Regulations. However, DOD questioned
the utility of a part of this recommendation that called for the
biannual report to include a list of contractor entitlements as well as
all contracts that directly support U.S. contingency operations,
including those funded by the services' base program accounts. DOD
stated that the costs of making these changes to the system and
collecting additional information could outweigh the perceived
benefits. Further, DOD stated that the lack of collecting this
information has not jeopardized the operation of any DOD mission in
recent memory. DOD stated that other, less burdensome ways to ensure
combatant commanders have all the necessary information for contractors
that are supporting them need to be fully explored before pursuing more
burdensome means, such as a costly centralized database. DOD said it
would review this issue with the military departments to determine if
obtaining the recommended information would be cost effective.
We do not believe this recommendation would be costly or burdensome to
implement. As noted in the report, the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) has already agreed to amend DOD's Financial Management
Regulations to require that the components provide a biannual report
outlining the existing and future contracts and contract modifications
to the executive agent for operations in a geographic area, including a
synopsis of services being provided. We believe that since the
components will already be asked to provide the biannual reports,
asking them to provide additional information summarizing contractor
entitlements specified under those contracts would not substantially
increase the effort required to generate these reports. This additional
information would facilitate DOD's efforts to ensure that contractors
receive only the services from the government to which they are
contractually entitled. While DOD expressed concern about developing a
costly centralized database to generate these reports, our
recommendation contained no guidance on how the reports should be
generated and makes no mention of a centralized database. We agree that
DOD should look for the most cost-effective way to implement the
recommendation. We also continue to believe that the biannual report
should include information from contracts that directly support U.S.
contingency operations but are funded from the services' base program
accounts. As noted in the report, this would include contracts
supporting operations in the Balkans. We do not believe that these
contracts should be excluded from the report. While we did not find
evidence that any DOD missions were jeopardized by not having
information summarizing contractor services and entitlements, our
recommendation was based on concerns raised by field commanders about
oversight of contractors and the appropriate provisioning of support to
contractors. As noted in the report, several commanders in the field
told us their limited visibility of the extent and types of services
being provided by contractors created challenges for them. We continue
to believe that without a more thorough understanding of contractor
support, commanders will continue to face difficulties in identifying
potential duplication of services or ensuring that contractors are only
receiving those services to which they are entitled. Therefore, we
still believe the recommendation in its entirety has merit.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman and the Ranking
Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed
Services; other interested congressional committees; the Secretary of
Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will
also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov:
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me on (757)
552-8111 or by E-mail at curtinn@gao.gov. Major contributors to this
report were Steven Sternlieb, Carole Coffey, James Reid, James
Reynolds, and Adam Vodraska.
Neal P. Curtin
Director,
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Neal P. Curtin:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To identify the types of services contractors provide to deployed U.S.
forces we met with officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) who
have responsibility for identifying contractor needs, issuing
contracts, managing contracts once they are executed, and utilizing
contractors to fulfill their missions. Because there was no
consolidated list of contractors supporting deployed forces we asked
DOD officials at the commands and installations we visited to identify
their contractor support. These commands included the Central,
European, and Pacific Commands and most of their service components and
major installations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. We
focused our efforts in the Balkans and Southwest Asia because they
provide a broad range of contractor support activities. We were
completing our work as the 2003 war with Iraq began and so were unable
to fully ascertain the extent of contractor support to U.S. forces
inside Iraq. The scope of our review included system and theater
support contracts. We also met with officials of selected contracting
commands in the Air Force, Army, and Navy and at defense agencies
including the Defense Logistics Agency. These officials included
contracting officers and, where applicable, their representatives at
deployed locations. We examined a wide range of contracts in order to
assess the diversity of contractor support. While visiting deployed
locations we met with representatives of the different DOD components
and contractors stationed there to determine what contractor services
are used to accomplish their missions.
To assess why DOD uses contractors to support deployed forces, we
reviewed DOD studies and publications and interviewed DOD and
contractor officials. We met with unit commanders during our visits to
deployed locations to discuss the effects using contractors had on
military training. We did not, however, compare the cost of contractors
versus military personnel; make policy judgments as to whether the use
of contractors is desirable; or look at issues related to government
liability to contractors.
To assess DOD's efforts to identify those contractors that provide
mission essential services and to maintain essential services if
contractors are unable to do so, we reviewed applicable DOD Inspector
General reports as well as DOD and its components' policies,
regulations, and instructions for ensuring the continuation of
essential services. In particular, we reviewed DOD Instruction 3020.37,
which sets forth the policies and procedures for identifying mission
essential services and the steps necessary to assure the continuation
of such services. We held discussions with command, service, and
installation officials on the extent to which the required review of
contracts to identify mission essential services had been conducted and
on their backup planning should contractors not be able to perform such
services for any reason. We also met with officials of the office
responsible for monitoring implementation to ascertain what efforts
they have undertaken. We reviewed the pertinent unclassified sections,
related to contractor support, of operations plans for Iraq and the
Balkans. We also discussed with deployed contractor employees their
opinions of the extent of their responsibilities to continue to support
military forces in crisis situations.
To assess the adequacy of guidance and oversight mechanisms in place to
effectively manage contractors who support deployed forces we reviewed
DOD's and its components' policies, regulations, and instructions that
relate to the use of contractors that support deployed forces. We met
with officials at all levels of command to gain an understanding of
contracting and the contract management and oversight processes. At the
locations we visited, we asked officials their opinions of the
effectiveness of existing policy in helping them manage their
contractor force and asked them for suggested areas of improvement. We
also reviewed and discussed with them local policies and procedures for
managing their contractors. We met with DOD's contract management
officials as well as other military members to obtain their opinions of
the quality of contractor-provided services and the quality of contract
oversight. We also met with contractor representatives to discuss
contract oversight and contract management from their perspective.
Finally, we reviewed contracts that support deployed forces to assess
the existence and adequacy of deployment language.
The DOD organizations we visited or contacted in the United States
were:
Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Washington, D.C.
* Civilian Personnel Management Service, Arlington, Va.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:
* J-4 Logistics, Washington, D.C.
Department of the Army:
* Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
* Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology), Falls Church, Va.
* Office of the Judge Advocate General, Rosslyn, Va.
* Army Contracting Agency, Falls Church, Va.
* U.S. Army Forces Command, Headquarters, Ft McPherson, Ga.
* 3rd Army Headquarters, Ft McPherson, Ga.
* 4th Infantry Division, Ft. Hood Tex.
* Corps of Engineers, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
* Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Programs Center, Winchester, Va.
* Combined Arms Support Command, Ft. Lee, Va.
* Communications-Electronics Command, Ft. Monmouth, N.J.
* Training and Doctrine Command, Ft, Monroe, Va.
* Operations Support Command, Rock Island, Ill.
* Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, Program Office, Rock Island,
Ill.
* Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Va.
* Network Enterprise Technology Command, Ft. Huachuca, Ariz.
Department of the Navy:
* Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
* Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md.
* Naval Air Technical Data and Engineering Service Command, San Diego,
Calif.
* Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.
* Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, San Diego, Calif.
Department of the Air Force:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition,
Rosslyn, Va.
* Air Force Materiel Command, Dayton, Ohio:
* F-117 Special Projects Office, Dayton, Ohio:
* Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, Tilden Air Force Base, Fla.
Defense Agencies:
* Defense Logistics Agency, Ft. Belvoir, Va.
* Defense Energy Support Center, Ft. Belvoir, Va.
* Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria, Va.
* Defense Contract Audit Agency, Ft. Belvoir, Va.
The geographic combatant commands and component commands we visited or
contacted were:
* U.S. Central Command,
* U.S. Army Forces Central Command:
* U.S. Naval Forces Central Command:
* U.S. Central Command Air Forces:
* U.S. Marine Forces Central Command:
* U.S. European Command,
* U.S. Army, Europe:
* U.S. Air Forces in Europe:
* U.S. Pacific Command:
* U.S. Army Pacific:
* Pacific Air Forces:
* Special Operations Command Pacific:
* U.S. Marine Forces Pacific:
* U.S. Pacific Fleet:
* Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet:
* Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet:
* Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet:
The overseas activities and contractors we visited, by country, were:
Bahrain:
* Naval Support Activity:
* Naval Regional Contracting Center:
* USS Cardinal, MHC 60:
Bosnia-Herzegovina:
* Eagle Base, U.S. Army:
* Task Force Eagle, Area Support Group Eagle:
* Defense Contract Management Agency:
* Eagle Base, Contractors:
* Mantech:
* Sprint:
* ITT:
Germany:
* Defense Contract Audit Agency, Wiesbaden:
* Defense Contract Management Agency, Stuttgart:
* Defense Energy Support Center, Wiesbaden:
* Defense Logistics Agency, Wiesbaden:
* Army Materiel Command Europe, Heidelberg:
Serbia and Montenegro Province of Kosovo:
* Camp Bondsteel, U.S. Army:
* Task Force Falcon, Area Support Group Falcon:
* Defense Contract Management Agency:
* Army Materiel Command:
* Camp Bondsteel, Contractors:
* TRW:
* Kellogg, Brown & Root Services:
* Premiere Technology Group:
* Engineering and Professional Services, Incorporated:
* Camp Monteith, U.S. Army:
* 1st Infantry Division:
Kuwait:
* Camp Doha, U.S. Army:
* U.S. Army Kuwait:
* Army Corps of Engineers:
* Army Materiel Command:
* Defense Contract Management Agency:
* Coalition Forces Land Component Command:
* Camp Doha, Contractors:
* KGL:
* Raytheon Aerospace:
* British Link Kuwait:
* CSA:
* Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base, U.S Air Force:
* 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing:
* Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base, Contractors:
* RMS:
* Dyncorp:
* Vinnell:
* ITT:
* Mutual Telecommunications Services:
* Ali Al Salem Air Base, U.S. Air Force:
* 386th Air Expeditionary Wing:
* Ali Al Salem Air Base, Contractors:
* Dyncorp:
* L3 Communications:
* TRW:
* General Atomics:
* Litton Integrated Systems:
* Anteon:
* RMS:
Qatar:
* U.S. Embassy, Doha, Qatar:
* Camp As Sayliyah, U.S. Army:
* U.S. Army Forces Central Command-Qatar:
* U.S. Army Materiel Command:
* Defense Contracting Audit Agency:
* Camp As Sayliyah, Contractors:
* ITT:
* Dyncorp:
* Stanley Associates:
* LESCO:
* Al Udeid Air Base, U.S. Air Force:
* 379th Air Expeditionary Wing:
* Air Force Civil Augmentation Program, Program Office:
* Al Udeid Air Base, Contractors:
* Dyncorp:
We conducted our review between August 2002 and April 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
Mr. Steve Sternlieb Assistant Director Defense Capabilities and
Management U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548:
JUN 16 2003:
Dear Mr. Sternlieb:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-03-695, "MILITARY OPERATIONS: Contractors Provide Vital
Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD
Plans", dated May 7, 2003, (GAO Code 350239).
While in general better Department-wide guidance needs to be provided
addressing various issues related to contractor employees on the
battlefield, I note that the lack of such guidance has not jeopardized
the operation of any DoD mission in recent memory. In fact the draft
report even notes that the shortcomings have not impeded DoD missions.
For example, on pages 30-31, the report notes that many contracts did
not include language clearly specifying that contractors may need to be
deployed to hostile and austere locations to provide support to
deployed forces, including support contracts for the 4THInfantry
Division. Nevertheless, as the report notes, "this did not impede the
division's deployment for Operation Iraqi Freedom" and that contractor
employees prepared to deploy in support of the 4tTHnfantry Division's
deployment, including some whose contracts had either no deployment
language or vague deployment language." Therefore, the benefits of any
steps that provide greater guidance and obtain more information to
ensure combatant commanders have a better picture of contractors on the
battlefield must be weighed against the burdens and costs of such
measures.
Please see the enclosed for more detailed comments. If you have any
questions concerning this matter please contact Mr. William C.
Timperley at 703-697-8336 or via e-mail at william.timperley@osd.mil.
Attachment: As stated:
Deidre A. Lee:
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy:
Signed for Deidre A. Lee:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED MAY 7, 2003 GAO CODE 350239/GAO-03-695:
"MILITARY OPERATIONS: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed
Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION l: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the heads of DoD components to complete the first review of
contracts to identify those providing mission essential services by the
end of calendar year 2003. (Page 42/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. While such a review needs to be
accomplished as required by DoD Instruction 3020.37, there may be
problems that preclude completing such a review by the end of calendar
year 2003, for several reasons. First, it is up to the Military
Components to determine what services, equipment, or weapon systems are
essential for the wartime mission. The Components define mission
essential services, and these requirements may change with the crisis/
war DoD is engaging. Part of the definition of essential contractor
services includes when "DoD Components may not have military or DoD
civilian employees to perform these services immediately." This may be
an ephemeral definition that can change in a relatively short period of
time. Second, in numerous instances there are no electronic records of
the contracts written for these services. These contracts are written
by Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) in forward operating
locations. Obtaining a listing of mission essential contracts will
entail physically searching through manual records that may be stored
in various locations. Finally, the problem is compounded when you
address contracts written in CONUS, but supporting contingencies
overseas. The majority of the CONUS-written contracts contain minimal
language on deployments, and there may not be any record detailing
whether or not the deployment occurred. A manual review of existing
contracts will have to be completed, requirements validated, data
manually gathered, and reported. Because the effort needed to obtain
this information on contracts currently in place may outweigh the
possible benefits, DoD will explore how best to conduct a review of
contractor services supporting deployed forces, which may exclude some
existing contracts. This flexibility is justified considering that the
lack of the type of review recommended has not impeded military
operations.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) to
develop procedures to monitor the implementation of DoD Directive
3020.37. (Page 42/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. However, OUSD(P&R/CPP) notes that reference is
made to pages 2, 3, 11, 12, 19, and 21 regarding strategic planning and
integrating the contractor workforce in the total workforce. This issue
was a subject of review in GAO Report 03-475 (and follow-up report 03-
690R) in February and March 2003. Our response remains as follows:
"Non-concur.
The use of contractors is just another tool to accomplish the mission,
not a separate workforce, with separate needs, to manage.":
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
develop DoD-wide guidance and doctrine on how to manage contractors who
support deployed forces. The guidance should: (a) establish baseline
policies for the use of contractors to support deployed forces, (b)
delineate the roles and responsibilities of commanders regarding the
management and oversight of contractors who support deployed forces,
and (c) integrate other guidance and doctrine that may affect DoD
responsibilities to contractors in deployed locations into a single
document to assure that commanders are aware of all applicable
policies. Additionally, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Service Secretaries to develop procedures to assure
implementation of the DoD guidance. (Page 43/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
develop and require the use of standardized deployment language in
contracts that support or may support deployed forces. The Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement should be amended to require
standard clauses in such contracts that are awarded by DoD and to
address deployment in orders placed by DoD under other agencies'
contracts. This language should address the need to deploy into and
around the theater, required training, entitlements, force protection,
and other deployment related issues. (Page 43/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
develop a web-based training course for commanding officers and other
senior leaders who are deploying to locations with contractor support.
This website could provide information on the roles and
responsibilities of the Defense Contract Management Agency and the
contracting officer's representative and the role of the commander in
the contracting process and the limits of his/her authority. In
addition, this website could provide answers to frequently asked
questions and provide links to DoD and service policy and guidance and
other on-line training courses. Also, contracting officers should
ensure that those individuals selected as contracting officer's
representatives complete one of the established contracting officer's
representative training courses before they assume their duties. (Pages
43-44/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. DoD agrees that appropriate training
will need to be developed as DoD develops Department-wide guidance. We
will examine alternative training methods on how best to ensure
commanding officers, senior leaders, and acquisition professionals are
aware of DoD policies and guidance regarding the use of contractor
employees that accompany deployed forces. Although web-based training
may be an appropriate medium for such training, in some cases it may be
more beneficial to incorporate training into already existing courses,
including classroom courses for commanding officers.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to implement the
changes to the Department Financial Management Regulations previously
agreed to with these modifications: (1) the financial management
regulations should specify that the biannual report include a synopsis
of the services being provided and a list of contractor entitlements;
(2) the report should include all contracts that directly support U.S.
contingency operations including those funded by the Services base
program accounts; and (3) the changes should be finalized by January 1,
2004. (Page 44/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The "DoD Financial Management
Regulation" ("DoDFMR") will be updated to address the GAO
recommendation. A draft of the proposed "DoDFMR" change is provided
below:
230106. Elimination of Potential Duplicative Efforts. DoD Components
utilizing funding provided from a transfer account like the Overseas
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) and the Defense Emergency
Response Fund (DERF) appropriations are to forward to the executive
agent for operations in the geographical area in which the contingency
is being executed a biannual report outlining all existing and
anticipated contracts and modifications to those contracts that
directly support U.S. contingency operations. The biannual report shall
include a synopsis of the services being provided. Furthermore, the
executive agent for that area is to review all contracts to: (1)
identify possible duplication of services, and (2) ensure that
contractors receive only those services from the government to which
they are contractually entitled. The executive agent is to take
administrative action to ensure that duplicative services are not being
purchased.
The portion of the recommendation requesting that the biannual report
include a list of contractor entitlements and all contracts that
directly support U.S. contingency operations, including those funded by
the Services base program accounts, will be reviewed with the military
departments to determine whether obtaining such information is cost-
effective. The lack of collecting such information has not jeopardized
the operation of any DoD mission in recent memory. Therefore, the
benefits of any steps that will be taken to obtain more information to
ensure that combatant commanders have a more complete picture of
contractors on the battlefield must be weighed against the burdens and
costs of such measures. Other, less burdensome ways to ensure combatant
commanders have all the necessary information for contractors that are
supporting them need to be fully explored before pursuing more
burdensome means, such as a costly centralized database.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Neither DOD nor the services have a single point that collects
information on contracts to support deployed forces. As a result, DOD
could provide us no information on the total cost of contractor support
to deployed forces. However, based on the information and contracts we
obtained during our review, we estimate that the costs of contractor
support to deployed forces will exceed $4.5 billion for the period
fiscal years 2000 through 2005.
[2] The Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract was
established by the Army in 1985 as a means to (1) preplan for the use
of contractor support in contingencies or crises and (2) take advantage
of existing civilian resources in the United States and overseas to
augment active and reserve forces.
[3] A host country national is an employee of a contractor who is a
citizen of the country where the work is being preformed.
[4] A third country national is an employee of a contractor who is
neither a citizen of the United States nor the host country.
[5] As of October 2002, the Army estimated that contractors outnumbered
military members 2 to 1 in the Balkans.
[6] In the active Army both contactors and soldiers maintain Apache and
Blackhawk helicopters.
[7] Intermediate level maintenance is generally responsible for repairs
to aircraft components such as engines, avionics, and armaments as well
as the helicopter airframe. In addition, intermediate level maintenance
may also undertake some of the tasks the helicopter unit is normally
responsible for such as major inspections.
[8] These are military units that are in high demand since their unique
capabilities make them essential for a wide range of military
operations. However, there are relatively few of these units. Hence,
both their rate and length of deployment tends to be longer than for
other military units.
[9] According to DOD Instruction 3020.37, contractor services are
considered essential when (1) DOD components may not have military or
civilian employees to perform these services immediately or (2) the
effectiveness of defense systems or operations may be seriously
impaired and interruption is unacceptable when those services are not
available immediately.
[10] DOD components include the Military departments, the Joint Staff,
the Combatant Commands, and the Defense agencies.
[11] Audit Report, Office of the Inspector General, Department of
Defense, Retention of Emergency-Essential Civilians Overseas During
Hostilities, Report Number 89-026 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7, 1988).
[12] Department of Defense Instruction 3020.37, Continuation of
Essential DOD Contractor Services during Crises, Nov. 6, 1990 (Change
1, Jan. 26, 1996).
[13] Audit Report, Office of the Inspector General, Department of
Defense, Civilian Contractor Overseas Support During Hostilities,
Report Number 91-105 (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 1991).
[14] The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides guidance to the
combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks
and missions based on current capabilities.
[15] At the time of our review these aircraft were located at Ramstein
Air Base in Germany but could be deployed to the Balkans or Southwest
Asia. During the 1991 Gulf War, these aircraft were deployed to Saudi
Arabia.
[16] We were able to review sections of a limited number of operations
plans. Our review was restricted to those portions that address
logistics support, including support by contractors.
[17] It is DOD policy that contractors providing essential services are
expected to use all means at their disposal to continue to provide such
services, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract
during periods of crisis, until appropriately released or evacuated by
military authority.
[18] The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Mobilization
Planning, Joint Publication 4-05 (Washington, D.C.: June 1995).
[19] Department of Defense Instruction 3020.37.
[20] U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel: DOD Actions Needed
to Strengthen Civilian Human Capital Strategic Planning and Integration
with Military Personnel and Sourcing Decisions,
GAO-03-475 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003).
[21] DOD's overall human capital strategy consists of three separate
plans: one for civilians, one for military personnel, and one for
quality of life issues for service members and their families.
[22] The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy,
February 2000.
[23] The 2000 National Academy of Public Administration, Civilian
Workforce 2020: Strategies for Modernizing Human Resources Management
in the Department of the Navy (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 18, 2000).
[24] U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel: DOD Comments on
GAO's Report on DOD's Civilian Human Capital Strategic Planning,
GAO-03-690R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2003).
[25] Department of Defense Directive 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism/Force
Protection Program, Apr. 13, 1999.
[26] Department of Defense Instruction 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism
Standards, June 14, 2001.
[27] DOD Instruction 3020.37 does not provide guidance on the use of
contractors to support deployed forces or the government's obligations
to deployed contractors. Rather, it focuses on essential services and
how to ensure that these services will be available in a crisis.
[28] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Logistics Planning of Joint
Operations, Joint Publication 4-0 (Washington D.C.: June 1995).
[29] The Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data describes force
requirements, how and when those forces are to be deployed, and the
transportation assets needed to deploy them.
[30] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, Joint Publication 3-11
(Washington, D.C: July 2000).
[31] DOD Directive 4500.54, Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad, May
1991.
[32] Department of the Army Regulation 715.9, Contractors Accompanying
the Force, October 1999.
[33] Department of the Army Field Manual 3-100.21, Contractors on the
Battlefield, November 2002.
[34] Department of the Army Pamphlet 715-16, Contractor Deployment
Guide, February 1998.
[35] http://www.amc.army.mil/amc/rda/default.htm.
[36] Air Force memorandum, USAF Guidance on Contractors in the Theater,
(Unpublished: Feb. 8, 2001).
[37] Marine Corps Order 4200.32, Contractor Logistics Support for
Ground Equipment, Ground Weapons Systems, Munitions, and Information
Systems, December 2000.
[38] U.S. Army, Combined Arms Support Command, Acquisition Liaison
Office, Systems Contractor Support of 4th Infantry Division. (Ft. Lee,
Va.: Aug. 2001).
[39] Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology), Contractor Systems Support During
Contingency Operations, (Unpublished: Jan. 28, 2002).
[40] Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology), Contractor Support Restrictions,
(Unpublished: June 11, 2002).
[41] General Orders are permanent instructions, usually concerned with
matters of policy or administration and issued in order form, that
apply to all members of a command. Examples include orders restricting
travel to or from a base and prohibitions on the use of alcohol.
[42] U.S. General Accounting Office, Contingency Operations:
Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, GAO/
NSIAD-97-63, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 1997) and U.S. General
Accounting Office, Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to
Control Contract Costs in the Balkans ,GAO/NSIAD-00-225 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 29, 2000).
[43] "Gulf War Syndrome" is a non-scientific label that has frequently
been used to describe those veterans who fought in the 1991 Persian
Gulf War who later developed unexplained illnesses often characterized
by fatigue, joint pain, skin rash, memory loss, and/or diarrhea.
[44] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Budget: Need to Strengthen
Guidance and Oversight of Contingency Operations Costs, GAO-02-450
(Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2002).
[45] The executive agent is the service designated by the regional
combatant commander to provide life support to the forces in an area of
operation.
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