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entitled 'Defense Trade: Report and Recommendations of the Defense 
Offsets Commission Still Pending' which was released on May 30, 2003.

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Report to Congressional Committees:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

May 2003:

Defense Trade:

Report and Recommendations of the Defense Offsets Commission Still 
Pending:

GAO-03-649:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-649, a report to Congressional Committees 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Export sales of defense-related products often include “offsets”—
industrial and commercial benefits, such as technology transfer, which 
U.S. companies provide to foreign governments as incentives or 
conditions for purchasing military goods and services.

Over the past decade, offsets have increased and in 1998, they totaled 
about $3 billion per year. In December 2000, GAO reported that 
countries are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their use of 
offsets to achieve regional industrial and employment goals.

In 1999, Congress established a National Commission to report on the 
extent and nature of offsets in international defense trade by October 
2001. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was 
designated chair of the Commission. Congress also required the 
President to report, within 90 days after the Commission’s final 
report, on the feasibility and desirability of seeking a multilateral 
treaty with international trading partners on standards for use of 
defense offsets.

GAO’s report responds to the congressional mandate for GAO to monitor 
and periodically report on the President’s progress in reaching a 
multilateral treaty.

What GAO Found:

In February 2001, the National Commission on the Use of Offsets in 
Defense Trade issued an interim report, Status Report of the 
Presidential Commission on Offsets in International Trade. However, 
the Commission’s final report and recommendations are still pending—a 
year and a half after its mandated reporting date. The last 
Commission meeting was held on December 4, 2000, and no further 
activity is apparent. The 2001 change in presidential administrations 
resulted in vacancies in the five executive branch positions on the 
Commission, which have yet to be filled. 

The interim report describes the extent and nature of defense-related 
offsets in both defense and commercial trade. For example:

* The cost to U.S. exporters of implementing defense offset 
transactions is a fraction of the transactions’ value.
* The extent of defense offsets relative to defense exports has 
remained stable over time; however, offset demands may have grown 
qualitatively.
* Most defense offset transactions are with developed nations and are 
associated with the export of aerospace products.
* Because U.S. policy considers offsets “market distorting,” it places 
no international restrictions on defense offsets and leaves 
responsibility for their negotiation and implementation with U.S. 
exporters.

The report also describes the effect that defense offsets transactions 
and agreements may have on the U.S. defense supplier base. For 
example, the Commission reported that while offsets may facilitate 
defense export sales—which can help maintain the economic viability of 
certain U.S. firms—offsets can also supplant a significant amount of 
work and jobs that would go to U.S. firms if export sales occurred 
without offsets. The Commission also reported that U.S. technology 
transfers through offsets often improved foreign firms’ 
competitiveness but rarely resulted in technology transfer back to the 
United States. And while it found that technology transferred through 
offsets did not appear to create a security risk beyond that posed by 
other transfers by U.S. firms, it cautioned that offsets could 
exacerbate any existing weaknesses in U.S. export control processes. 

While the National Commission’s report remains pending and the 
President has not decided on a defense offsets multilateral treaty, 
Congress required GAO to monitor and periodically report to it on the 
progress in reaching a multilateral treaty. The Commission on the 
Future of the United States Aerospace Industry called for the pursuit 
of a multilateral solution to curtail offset demands in defense 
trade. It suggested that reactivating the National Commission may be 
the best alternative for developing recommendations on negotiating a 
multilateral agreement.

In commenting on a draft of this report, OMB officials provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-649.

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Katherine V. Schinasi at (202) 512-4841 
or schinasik@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Commission's Findings on Extent and Nature of Defense-Related Offsets:

Status of the Commission's Work:

Conclusions:

Agency Comments:

Scope and Methodology:

Table:

Table 1: Commission's Potential Policy Recommendations, with Advantages 
and Disadvantages:

Abbreviation:

OMB: Office of Management and Budget:

United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

May 30, 2003:

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Chairman
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate:

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives:

Export sales of defense-related products often include "offsets"--
industrial and commercial benefits, such as technology transfer, which 
U.S. companies provide to foreign governments as incentives or 
conditions for purchasing military goods and services. They include, 
for example, coproduction arrangements and subcontracting, technology 
transfers, in-country procurements, marketing and financial 
assistance, and joint ventures. In December 2000, we reported that 
countries are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their use of 
offsets to achieve regional industrial and employment goals.[Footnote 
1] Since 1993, when the Department of Commerce began collecting data on 
these transactions, defense offsets have increased. In 1998, defense 
offsets totaled approximately $3 billion. The increasing use of offsets 
in defense trade has generated congressional concern because offsets 
can distort the price of defense contracts and undermine 
competitiveness.

In an effort to identify current offset practices, the impacts of 
offsets on the U.S. economy, and their role in increasing dependence on 
foreign sources for defense goods, in 1999, Congress established a 
Commission[Footnote 2] to report to it on the extent and nature of 
offsets in international defense trade. Congress also required the 
President to review and report, within 
90 days after the Commission's final report to Congress, the 
feasibility and desirability of seeking a multilateral treaty on 
standards for use of offsets in defense trade. Congress further 
required us to monitor and periodically report to it on the progress in 
reaching a multilateral treaty.

Results in Brief:

A final report and recommendations from the National Commission on the 
Use of Offsets in Defense Trade are still pending, although under the 
Defense Offsets Disclosure Act of 1999 the report was required to be 
issued by October 2001. However, the 2001 change in presidential 
administrations resulted in vacancies in the five executive branch 
positions on the Commission, which have yet to be filled. The 
Commission's interim report--Status Report of the Presidential 
Commission on Offsets in International Trade, issued February 2001--
describes the extent and impact of offsets in both defense and 
commercial trade.[Footnote 3] The report also describes the effect of 
defense offset transactions and agreements entered into by U.S. firms 
over a 6-year period. For example, the Commission reported that while 
industry estimates and other evidence indicate that offsets facilitate 
exports, they also supplant a significant amount of work and jobs that 
would go to U.S. firms if export sales occurred without offsets. The 
Commission also reported that in a number of cases, U.S. technology 
transfers improved foreign firms' competitiveness but rarely resulted 
in technology transfer back to the United States.

The interim report includes potential policy recommendations that, 
according to the Commission, require additional deliberation of the 
possible advantages and disadvantages of each. However, the Commission 
has not met since December 4, 2000. Since the President's report on the 
feasibility and desirability of a multilateral offsets treaty is not 
required until 90 days after the Commission's final report is submitted 
to Congress, the President has not reported. Subsequent to the 
Commission's last meeting, another commission, set up to evaluate the 
health of the aerospace industry, recommended that the United States 
pursue a multilateral solution to curtail offset demands. That 
commission also suggested that reactivating the National Commission on 
the Use of Offsets in Defense Trade may be the best alternative for 
developing policy recommendations on this issue.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Office of Management and 
Budget agreed with our report; however, they provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

Background:

Foreign governments often seek defense offsets to reduce the financial 
impact of their purchases, obtain valuable technology and manufacturing 
know-how, enhance domestic employment, create or expand their defense 
industries, and make the use of their national funds for foreign 
purchases more politically palatable. However, Congress has expressed 
concern about the use of offsets in defense trade because they can 
undermine fairness and competitiveness and distort the price of 
contracts. Offsets are frequently negotiated in connection with the 
purchase of U.S. aerospace systems, such as military or commercial 
aircraft, and sometimes in connection with the purchase of U.S. goods 
and services in other high-tech industries, such as power generation or 
telecommunications.

The Defense Offsets Disclosure Act of 1999[Footnote 4] established, as 
the sense of Congress, the need to:

* pursue efforts to address trade fairness by establishing reasonable, 
business-friendly standards for the use of offsets in international 
trade between the Unites States and its trading partners and 
competitors;

* require the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative, or 
their designees, to discuss with industrialized nations the need for 
reasonable standards to govern the role of offsets in international 
trade;

* enter into discussions regarding the establishment of multilateral 
standards for the use of offsets in international defense trade through 
the appropriate multilateral forum; and:

* include in those discussions the distortions produced by other 
benefits and subsidies provided by various countries, such as export 
financing.

The act also established a National Commission on the Use of Offsets in 
Defense Trade, requiring the President, with the concurrence of 
congressional leaders, to appoint 11 members to the Commission. The act 
required the Commission to submit a report to Congress addressing all 
aspects of the use of offsets in international defense trade within a 
year of its establishment. It also specified that the Commission 
include 5 members from the executive branch, 3 from industry, 1 from 
labor, and 2 members from academia. In October 2000, the President 
appointed the 11 members. The act designated the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) member as the chair of the Commission. Since the 
change of administrations in 2001, the President has not appointed new 
executive branch members. Consequently, the Commission has ceased 
activity and has not issued its final report.

Commission's Findings on Extent and Nature of Defense-Related Offsets:

The Commission released its interim report in February 2001. The report 
described the following extent and nature of defense-related offsets.

* The cost to U.S. exporters of implementing defense offset 
transactions is a fraction of the transaction value.

* The extent of defense offset agreements relative to defense exports 
has remained stable over time; however, offset demands may have grown 
qualitatively.

* Most defense offset transactions are with developed nations.

* Most defense offsets are associated with the export of aerospace 
products.

* The most common types of defense offset transactions are 
counterpurchases, subcontracts, and technology transfers.

* There are no international restrictions on defense offsets. U.S. 
policy considers offsets "market distorting" and leaves responsibility 
for their negotiation and implementation with U.S. exporters.

The Commission also found the following on the impacts of defense 
offsets:

* Offsets have a direct effect on U.S. jobs by facilitating exports, 
but they also supplant a significant amount of work and jobs that would 
go to U.S. firms if export sales occurred without offsets.

* In some cases, offsets hurt the U.S. defense supplier base by 
transferring work to foreign firms, but the erosion has yet to show up 
in overall trade statistics.

* At the same time, defense export sales may be important to the 
economic viability of aerospace firms and may provide an incentive for 
their development of new defense products and technologies.

* In a number of cases, U.S. technology transfers improved foreign 
firms' competitiveness but rarely resulted in technology transfer back 
to the United States.

* Technology transferred to foreign firms through offsets does not 
appear to pose a special security risk above and beyond that posed by 
other technology transfers by U.S. firms.

* However, recent examples show that U.S. export control processes are 
not flawless in preventing the transfer of sensitive technology abroad 
and that offsets could exacerbate any leakages.

Status of the Commission's Work:

The Commission's interim report outlines areas for future Commission 
study and several potential recommendations. However, the Commission 
has yet to determine whether these potential policy recommendations are 
feasible or desirable.

Table 1: Commission's Potential Policy Recommendations, with Advantages 
and Disadvantages:

Potential Commission recommendation: The U.S. government could seek a 
multilateral agreement with its trading partners to reduce or prohibit 
the use of offsets in defense trade; Possible advantages: * Could 
diminish adverse effects on U.S. jobs, economic competitiveness, and 
national security; * Could attract support from labor and industry 
groups; Possible disadvantages: * Would likely reduce U.S. export 
sales; * May be difficult to monitor and enforce; * The United States 
may be asked to provide concessions, such as greater access to the U.S. 
defense procurement market..

Potential Commission recommendation: The U.S. government could work 
cooperatively with other countries to shift the type of offsets they 
request away from defense subcontracting or production; Possible 
advantages: * Could help reduce adverse effects of offsets on U.S. 
economy and national security; * Could provide foreign governments 
with needed political support to import major U.S. defense systems; * 
Could be tried bilaterally as well as multilaterally, and on a pilot 
basis; * Could yield technological and economic benefits to U.S. 
exporters and other U.S. firms; Possible disadvantages: * Some foreign 
governments may not be willing to shift their offset demands; * A 
shift in the types of offsets currently sought by foreign nations could 
alter the competitive playing field; * Does not focus on reducing or 
eliminating defense offsets; * Could undermine the competitiveness of 
non-defense industries..

Potential Commission recommendation: The U.S government could increase 
foreign firms' involvement in the research and development stages of 
new defense systems to reduce their governments' subsequent demand for 
offsets; Possible advantages: * Could help reduce offset demands; * 
Could facilitate reciprocal technology transfer; * Foreign firms' 
participation in subsequent production of the defense system--a natural 
extension of their initial involvement--would result in few adjustment 
costs relative to offsets; Possible disadvantages: * No assurance that 
participating nations would reduce offset demands; * Participating 
nations may demand work guarantees, which are similar in effect to 
offsets..

Source: Status Report of the Presidential Commission on Offsets in 
International Trade.

[End of table]

According to the interim report, the Commission was to continue its 
deliberations and prepare a final report and recommendations by October 
2001. The final report is still pending. Further, according to OMB 
officials, the President has not determined the feasibility and 
desirability of seeking a multilateral treaty on standards for use of 
offsets in defense trade. However, the issue of defense offsets has 
continued to raise concerns. The Commission on the Future of the United 
States Aerospace Industry recommended that the United States pursue a 
multilateral solution to curtail offset demands and suggested that 
reactivating the Commission may be the best alternative for developing 
policy recommendations on this issue.

Conclusions:

As a major factor in the competitiveness of a company's offer to sell 
goods and services, offsets are an accepted feature of defense trade. 
However, their use has been shown to distort markets. Recognition that 
unilateral U.S. government constraints could limit U.S. company 
competitiveness has led Congress to establish a commission to address 
the use of offsets in defense trade. It also led Congress to require 
the President to determine the feasibility of a multilateral treaty on 
standards for the use of offsets. While the Commission has taken 
concrete steps toward fulfilling its mandate, it has not completed its 
work in that it has not issued a final report. In addition, the 
President has not reported on the feasibility and desirability of a 
multilateral treaty. However, the President's report is not due until 
90 days after the Commission's final report to Congress under the 
Defense Offsets Disclosure Act of 1999.

Agency Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this report, OMB officials provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and Methodology:

To determine the progress in reaching a multilateral treaty, we 
reviewed legislation pertaining to offsets to determine the roles and 
responsibilities of the presidential Commission. In addition, we 
reviewed the Commission's interim report to identify its potential 
recommendations to the President. We also interviewed several officials 
from the Department of Commerce, the Office of Management and Budget, 
and the Office of the United States Trade Representative who had 
knowledge of the Commission's deliberations.

We conducted our work from January through May 2003 in accordance with 
generally accepted government standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Commerce, 
Defense, and State, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. 
Copies will be made available to others on request. In addition, this 
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov. If you have questions, please contact me at (202) 512-
4841. Major contributors to this report were Thomas J. Denomme, Gregory 
K. Harmon, John Neumann, Karen M. Sloan, Robert L. Ackley, and Marie P. 
Ahearn.

Katherine V. Schinasi
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:

FOOTNOTES

[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Trade: Observations on 
Issues Concerning Offsets, GAO-01-278T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 
2000).

[2] Defense Offsets Disclosure Act of 1999, Public Law 106-133, section 
1247. 

[3] To address the use of offsets in commercial trade, the President 
established the Presidential Council on the Use of Offsets in 
Commercial Trade. Membership of the Council was identical to the 
Commission. 

[4] Defense Offsets Disclosure Act of 1999, Public Law 106-133, section 
1244.

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