This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-03-505 
entitled 'Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues 
Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces' which was released on June 02, 
2003.

This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a 
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately.

Report to the Ranking Minority Members, Subcommittees on Total Force 
and Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

May 2003:

Military Readiness:

Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground 
Forces:

GAO-03-505:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-505, a report to the Ranking Minority Members of 
the Subcommittees on Total Force and Readiness, House Committee on 
Armed Services 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Recent operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the dangers of providing 
air support close to troops on the ground. Such close air support 
requires timely, well-practiced procedures and communication between 
ground and air elements. While most close air support operations in 
Afghanistan were successful, “friendly fire” incidents have resulted 
from mistakes made while conducting the mission.

At the request of the Ranking Minority Members of the Subcommittees on 
Total Force and Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services, GAO 
reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to provide adequate close 
air support training, as well as efforts to enhance the equipment used 
to support this mission.

What GAO Found:

The Department of Defense has had limited success in overcoming the 
barriers that prevent troops from receiving the realistic, 
standardized close air support training necessary to prepare them for 
joint operations. This is the result of four interrelated factors: (1) 
ground and air forces have limited opportunities to train together in 
a joint environment; (2) home station training is often restricted and 
thus does not always provide realistic training to prepare troops to 
perform the mission; (3) the services use different training standards 
and certification requirements for personnel responsible for 
coordinating close air support; and (4) within the individual 
services, joint close air support training is often a lower priority 
than other missions. While the department recognizes the need to 
improve the training for the mission, progress has been slow on many 
of the issues because the services have been unable to agree on joint 
solutions. In the interim, U.S. troops engaged in joint close air 
support missions are forced to conduct last-minute training or create 
ad hoc procedures on the battlefield.  

Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used to perform 
the joint close air support mission have not kept pace with precision 
weapons capabilities and as a result do not achieve DOD’s goals for 
interoperability and cost-effectiveness.  Advanced systems improve the 
accuracy of battlefield information and can speed the transmission of 
information from the troops on the ground to attacking aircraft. 
However, the services have acquired equipment that is not able to 
communicate across the services, a key requirement in joint operations. 
Moreover, the services are procuring equipment independently to meet 
individual service needs, thereby missing opportunities to achieve 
cost benefits from joint service purchases.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO is recommending several initiatives to provide the leadership and 
accountability needed to resolve the lingering close air support 
training shortfalls.  GAO is also recommending actions to achieve 
greater equipment interoperability among the services.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the 
report’s recommendations and is in the process of establishing 
specific completion dates for initiatives that will address the 
lingering training and equipment interoperability shortfalls.  

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-505.

To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Neal Curtin at (757) 552-8100 or 
curtinn@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Despite DOD's Efforts, Joint Close Air Support Training Deficiencies 
Remain:

Lack of Equipment Interoperability and Coordinated Purchases Hampers 
Effectiveness of Close Air Support Mission Programs:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Matters for Congressional Consideration:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft That Perform Close Air Support:

Appendix III: Joint Close Air Support Training and Friendly Fire 
Accidents:

Appendix IV: 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan:

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Tables:

Table 1: Number of Practices Required Annually by Ground Controllers to 
Maintain Currency:

Table 2: Air Force and Marine Corps Acquisitions Programs for Ground-
Targeting Equipment:

Table 3: Units and Locations Included on This Assignment:

Table 4: Close Air Support Aircraft:

Table 4: Continued:

Table 5: Training and Friendly Fire Incidents since the Persian Gulf 
War:

Table 6: 2001 Action Items Status:

Figures:

Figure 1: Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of a Close 
Air Support Mission:

Figure 2: Percentage of Time That Close Air Support Operations Met 
Ground Commander's Intent at Army's National Training Center (Calendar 
Years1998-2000):

Figure 3: Percentage of Correct Attack Decisions for Combined Visual 
and Digital Systems, Digital Systems Alone, and Visual and Voice 
Communication:

Figure 4: Digital Transmission Capabilities between Ground Controllers 
and Selected Aircraft:

Figure 5: Selected New Ground-Targeting Equipment Procurements:

United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

May 2, 2003:

The Honorable Vic Snyder
Ranking Minority Member 
Subcommittee on Total Force
Committee on Armed Services 
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:

The success or failure of our military forces in combat is directly 
linked to the realism and thoroughness of their training beforehand. 
This axiom is especially true when aircraft are needed to deliver bombs 
on targets close to troops on the ground. Such close air support 
requires painstaking coordination between air and ground elements. 
Timely, well-practiced procedures and communication are essential 
because close air support on the battlefield often has to happen fast 
to achieve its objective. Failure to respond to a call for air support 
can leave troops exposed to enemy fire; however, mistakes in 
communications and targeting can result in fatalities among friendly 
forces. In Afghanistan, close air support became particularly critical 
because light forces were introduced into battle without artillery, 
leaving air power as their sole means of fire support. Though we 
completed our work before hostilities began in Iraq, this operation 
also showed the increased importance of integrating air power into the 
ground fight. While most recent close air support operations have been 
successful, "friendly fire" incidents tragically illustrated the 
dangers of the mission. Even before the war in Afghanistan, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) had begun looking for solutions to long-
standing problems facing the close air support mission. Because joint 
close air support is--by its nature--a joint mission that transcends 
any single military service, DOD has formed steering groups and other 
interservice task forces to examine the mission area. The working 
groups have addressed a myriad of issues, but their primary focus has 
been on improving training and equipment interoperability[Footnote 1] 
across the services in both the active and reserve components.

Because of concerns about such unfortunate "friendly fire" occurrences, 
you requested that we review close air support training and doctrine to 
ensure that the U.S. military is prepared for future conflicts. You 
asked that we recommend any actions that DOD and the services could 
take to improve close air support effectiveness while simultaneously 
reducing risk to friendly forces. Thus, our objectives were to assess 
efforts by DOD and the military services to (1) provide adequate 
training for joint close air support missions and (2) enhance the 
capabilities of the equipment used to support this mission. A detailed 
description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.

Results in Brief:

DOD has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent 
troops from receiving the realistic, standardized training that is 
needed to prepare them for joint operations. In discussions with 
military officials and during our visits to training sites, we found 
that adequate realistic training[Footnote 2] is often not available 
because of four lingering problems: (1) Ground and air forces have 
limited opportunities to train together in a joint environment. When 
such joint training does occur, according to DOD reports and unit 
officials, it is often ineffective. Data from national training centers 
show that joint close air support training seldom meets the 
expectations and needs of the ground commander. (2) Similarly, the 
training that troops receive at their home stations is usually 
unrealistic because of range restrictions; moreover, it lacks variety-
-for example, pilots often receive rote, repetitive training because of 
limited air space and other restrictions. (3) The services train their 
aircraft controllers, who are the linchpin for close air support 
coordination, to different standards. The lack of universal standards 
hampers the ability of these controllers to perform in a joint 
operation. (4) Finally, within individual military services, the 
training for close air support missions is often given a lower 
priority--in doctrine, school curriculum, and training exercises--than 
other missions. For example, the Air Force focuses more on deep strike 
and air-to-air employment during large force exercises, while the Army 
places more emphasis on training for artillery and the use of its own 
fire support. While DOD has recognized the need to improve the 
effectiveness of training the mission,[Footnote 3] the steering 
committee tasked to implement the action plan has been unable to 
resolve most of the plan's 15 action items because of the time and 
effort required to solve the issues and the services' inability to 
reach agreement on them. DOD changed the responsibility for chairing 
the executive steering committee to Joint Forces Command in hopes of 
resolving the lingering interservice issues. Until these problems are 
resolved, U.S. troops engaged in joint close air support missions will 
be forced to conduct last-minute training or create ad hoc procedures 
on the battlefield--practices that reduce the effectiveness of the 
mission and increase the risk of injury or death to friendly forces.

Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used in joint 
close air support have not kept pace with precision weapons 
capabilities and, as a result, do not achieve DOD's goals for ensuring 
interoperability and cost-effectiveness. The services have acquired 
digital transmission systems that are used to share information 
instantly between airborne and ground personnel. However, these systems 
are not yet interoperable across the services, potentially hampering 
their effectiveness in joint operations. While the services have 
recognized the need for such a system and have plans to field one by 
2007, the absence of an interoperable system in the near term limits 
the ability of air and ground forces to coordinate air attacks 
efficiently and under all conditions. Moreover, the services have 
acquired a variety of ground-targeting systems, which allow ground 
controllers to accurately locate targets for attacking aircraft, but 
they are not purchasing these systems cost-effectively. Although DOD 
has tasked the services to develop joint requirements for ground-
targeting equipment, they have not yet completed them. As a result, the 
services are procuring a variety of systems independently and may be 
missing opportunities to achieve cost benefits from joint purchases.

We are making several recommendations to help resolve DOD's lingering 
close air support training shortcomings and ensure that equipment 
procured for this mission is interoperable and meets interservice 
requirements. In written comments on a draft of this report, the 
Department of Defense stated that it concurred with our recommendations 
and is in the process of establishing specific completion dates for 
each of the issues identified in the 2003 Joint Close Air Support 
Action Plan.

Background:

Close air support is an air action by either fixed and rotary wing 
aircraft against hostile targets which are near friendly forces and 
which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire 
and maneuver of those forces. Several different types of aircraft are 
assigned the close air support mission; examples are described in 
appendix II. To be successful, this type of combat mission requires 
detailed integration and close coordination between air and ground 
forces.[Footnote 4] Air is only one type of fire support available to 
ground forces--other forms include artillery, mortars, and naval 
surface fires. Ideally, these fires will be integrated to achieve the 
intended effect on the target. The controller plays the key role in 
coordinating the close air support mission. The controller is often 
located on the ground alongside maneuver forces; however, airborne 
controllers may also control attacks. The controller is responsible for 
ensuring that aircraft strike the target accurately while avoiding 
hitting friendly troops. During battle, when a ground commander needs 
air support, this specially trained controller initiates a call, using 
voice or digital communications, to the aircraft. The controller 
provides the attacking aircraft with the location of the target as well 
as the position of any friendly troops in the area. Based on this 
information, the aircraft's crew directs the plane's bombs to the 
target. Figure 1 depicts a typical mission.

Figure 1. Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of 
a Close Air Support Mission:

[See PDF for image]

Note: GAO analysis of DOD documents.

[End of figure]

DOD is in the process of developing technologically advanced equipment 
to improve the military's ability to conduct close air support missions 
under all types of conditions. Historically, such missions were 
conducted during the day under favorable weather conditions. This 
allowed both aircrews and ground controllers to visually acquire and 
attack ground targets. Today, these missions are typically undertaken 
at night or under poor visibility conditions. In addition, because the 
rules of engagement have placed strict limits on collateral damage, the 
aircraft need to deliver munitions precisely. For example, the use of 
bombers flying at high altitudes to perform close air support in recent 
operations in Afghanistan shows how the mission has evolved. Bombers 
carried out missions using precision weapons from altitudes that 
prevented aircrews from visually acquiring targets. The use of these 
weapons required controllers to provide more accurate target 
information to the attacking aircraft. In addition, technological 
advancements in equipment continue to improve the accuracy by which 
aircraft can strike their targets. For example, equipment such as laser 
rangefinders and systems that allow controllers to transmit information 
digitally improve accuracy and help mitigate the risk of human error.

Significant differences exist in the services' approaches to close air 
support. Controllers from the Air Force, Marine Corps, and special 
operations forces attend different schools to learn the basics of 
controlling attack aircraft. To support Army ground units, the Air 
Force incorporates officers and enlisted controllers into Army units. 
These Air Force personnel live and work with the Army and are intended 
to become an integral part of the unit's fire support staff. The Army 
must rely on aircraft from other services during training or combat. In 
contrast, the Marine Corps uses its own aviators--on a rotational 
assignment with ground forces--to control aircraft. The Marine Corps' 
attack aircraft squadrons are attached to Marine expeditionary forces, 
and their primary mission is to support ground forces. Day to day, this 
means that Marine Corps ground commanders have attack aircraft at their 
disposal, allowing them to more easily incorporate close air support 
into their training events. The inherently joint nature of the mission 
requires that all the services train together to be adequately 
prepared. Training is fundamental, according to a DOD assessment of the 
mission area, because technological advancements are "meaningless if 
not supported by training.":

Despite DOD's Efforts, Joint Close Air Support Training Deficiencies 
Remain:

DOD has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent 
troops from receiving the realistic, standardized training that is 
needed to prepare them for joint operations. These lingering problems 
include few opportunities for ground and air forces to train together 
in a joint environment, a lack of realistic training opportunities at 
troops' home stations, differences in the training standards for 
aircraft controllers, and the low priority placed on joint close air 
support training in the services' school curriculum and exercises. 
While DOD has acknowledged the need for more effective training in its 
2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan, it has been unable to resolve 
most of the plan's action items because of the time and effort required 
to resolve the issues and disagreement among the services.

Close Air Support Training Barriers Continue to Linger:

According to joint doctrine, training must be habitually emphasized in 
a joint training environment, and proficiency can only be obtained 
though dedicated, realistic joint training.[Footnote 5] Historical 
experience shows that realistic training is critical to success in 
combat. Realistic training is particularly important in the close air 
support mission where detailed coordination is required to effectively 
deliver bombs close to friendly forces. However, DOD has acknowledged 
that joint close air support mission deficiencies have existed for many 
years. We reviewed documents from the mid-1990s that showed that 
shortfalls in close air support procedures have led to decreased 
mission effectiveness and a greater chance of fratricide. Recent 
operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated that the military is 
placing an increased emphasis on joint close air support, but some 
serious challenges remain. Many of the soldiers, pilots, and aircraft 
controllers who are asked to perform this mission in combat told us 
that they feel ill prepared to do so. Service personnel told us that it 
was common for both pilots and ground controllers to be forced to learn 
new procedures "on the fly" during actual combat operations. During our 
unit visits, personnel from all services expressed concerns over their 
ability to perform the joint close air support mission. These concerns 
revolve around four interrelated factors, discussed below, which 
adversely affect training.

Joint Training Opportunities Are Infrequent and Ineffective:

Pilots, controllers, and ground commanders from the services that are 
involved in joint close air support need to train together frequently 
in order to develop confidence in one another and become familiar with 
one another's procedures. Without such regular exercises, pilots are 
not willing to fully trust the instructions they receive from 
controllers, and ground commanders are not confident that the air 
support will be timely and accurate.

However, opportunities for the services to train together to prepare 
for the joint close air support mission are infrequent. Within the 
United States, there are primarily three training facilities that have 
the necessary maneuver and air space to adequately train close air 
support with both ground forces and attacking aircraft. These are the 
Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the Army's 
Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the Marine 
Corps' Air Ground Combat Center at Twenty-nine Palms, California. These 
training centers provide the maneuver space, airspace, and live 
ordnance delivery freedom to train for this mission under simulated 
combat conditions that are not available at home station training 
ranges. The centers are designed to offer the most realistic and 
challenging battlefield experiences available; however, units normally 
train at one of these locations only once every 12 to 18 months and for 
only 3 weeks at a time.

Information collected from training exercises at the Army's National 
Training Center has pointed to the need for more training in joint 
close air support procedures. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, 
which collects and consolidates data from operations and training 
events, identified several long-standing problems associated with the 
execution of close air support during these exercises. For example, in 
1995 it reported that the full effects of the mission are rarely 
achieved during training, and in 1998 it found that integration issues 
between Army and Air Force personnel continued to hamper the execution 
of the mission and may contribute to fratricides.

Observations made by the Secretary of Defense's Joint Close Air Support 
Joint Test and Evaluation task force further confirmed that significant 
problems exist. Chartered in 1998, the task force has collected and 
analyzed a large quantity of data from the Army's National Training 
Center. By early 2001, it had observed 22 simulated battles that 
included more than 200 close air support sorties. One of the key 
conclusions from its study is that close air support seldom achieved 
the outcome sought by the ground commander during such training 
exercises. As figure 2 shows, close air support operations met the 
ground commander's intent--that is, they destroyed or otherwise 
disrupted enemy troops--less than one-third of the time. More often 
than not, close air support failed to meet the ground commander's 
needs.

Figure 2: Figure 2. Percentage of Time That Close Air Support 
Operations Met Ground Commander's Intent at Army's National Training 
Center (Calendar Years1998-2000):

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]


The task force attributed this low success rate to several factors, in 
particular the lack of integration between the Air Force controllers 
and Army fire support teams, whose mission is to coordinate different 
types of firepower. Ideally, air power would be employed seamlessly 
along with artillery and other fire support. We heard frequently about 
this issue from the commanders of Army units we visited in the United 
States, Germany, and Korea. They told us that Army teams did not view 
assigned aircraft controllers as a part of their teams and, thus, were 
not as comfortable relying on the controllers to provide support as 
they were with their own unit personnel. Army unit personnel work with 
the controllers only a few times a month or during field training 
exercises. Consequently, a deployed Army team may have to rely on 
controllers with whom they have not worked during training and in whom 
they have not developed confidence. On the other hand, Air Force 
controllers who are trying to integrate themselves into the Army 
structure must still report to Air Force leadership, and thus they have 
to satisfy the needs of two different commanders. Perhaps most telling, 
the task force observers also noted that integrating close air support 
was often an "afterthought" during ground maneuver exercises. Some 
participants they interviewed expressed concerns about how well they 
were prepared for the mission. Air Force participants, for example, 
noted they did not get enough practice with the Army's teams, and Army 
participants pointed out that training for this mission was often 
overlooked and underemphasized.

In addition to infrequent training opportunities, many of the unit 
leaders and soldiers we interviewed expressed disappointment with the 
effectiveness of the close air support training they received at the 
Army's training centers. Pilots told us that because training scenarios 
at the centers are scripted to maximize training benefits for maneuver 
forces, ground commanders fail to use aircrews effectively. In short, 
available aircraft are underutilized, thus limiting the training pilots 
receive. In the United States, personnel from the 18th Air Support 
Operations Group told us that because the Army runs the training 
events, nearly all of the training time at the centers is devoted to 
Army maneuver tasks rather than to joint close air support. As a 
result, ground controllers are often not included in the planning and 
execution of missions. In Europe, personnel from the 4th Air Support 
Operations Group told us that the Army limits their controller training 
to an hour a day at the Army's Combined Training Center at Grafenwoehr, 
Germany. On the other hand, aircraft availability is sometimes a 
problem. According to military officials, joint close air support is 
planned into all exercises, but in many cases the aircraft do not 
arrive for a variety of reasons, such as weather conditions and 
mechanical problems. One brigade official told us that during his 
unit's last training center rotation in Germany, 12 sorties were 
planned, but none was actually undertaken.

While the Marines are widely considered to be proficient at integrated 
close air support training, the training they provide at the Twenty-
nine Palms training center, for example, is typically not joint. 
Marines supply their own attack aircraft and ground controller assets 
to train for close air support missions. Overall, the task force 
concluded that Marine Corps ground controllers figure prominently in 
the development of offensive and defensive operational plans and that 
the mission was generally well planned and executed. However, the 
training center presents its own challenges. The aircraft maneuver 
space is restrictive, a simulated enemy rather than a well-trained 
opposing force is used, and the exercises focus more on training than 
on evaluating capabilities.

Combined training events between U.S. and coalition forces are also 
infrequent. For example, U.S. officials in Korea told us that Army and 
Air Force personnel rarely practice close air support with South Korean 
ground controllers or aircrews. In addition, U.S. ground controllers 
and pilots stationed in Korea and Germany said that barriers such as 
accents and the use of nonstandard phraseology by foreign aircrews 
impact the effectiveness of combined training. Dutch military officials 
told us that it is difficult to train with U.S. personnel. While two 
combined training exercises promote close air support training--Clean 
Hunter and Flying Rhino--Dutch officials stated that U.S. ground 
controllers have not participated. Furthermore, these officials said 
that while A-10s from the 81st Fighter Squadron support Dutch ground 
controller training, this relationship is informal and they cannot rely 
on U.S. support. U.S. officials stated there are opportunities to train 
with coalition military personnel. For example, Navy officials said 
that they schedule combined training with British forces as part of 
their Joint Maritime Course. Moreover, they told us that because the 
Navy does not own training ranges in the European theater, it schedules 
training events with host nations to gain access to live-fire ranges. 
In addition, U.S. Air Force officials in Korea told us that they are 
planning to combine ground controller training for both U.S. and South 
Korean personnel.

Range Restrictions Limit Home Station Training:

Air Force and Navy units also have limited opportunities for realistic 
joint training for air support missions at their home stations, 
primarily because of various air space and range restrictions.[Footnote 
6] For example, Air Force officials in South Korea said that their 
pilots experience numerous airspace restrictions near the demilitarized 
zone separating North and South Korea. Because of such restrictions, 
the Air Force rarely synchronizes its training with the U.S. Army or 
South Korean forces. This impedes the Air Force's ability to train all 
the integrated elements they would need to have in combat. Moreover, 
Air Force officials told us that because of live ordnance limitations 
during training, fighter pilots may employ live munitions for the first 
time in combat, under hostile conditions, and close to friendly forces. 
Because range limitations often force units to perform air attacks from 
the same direction and oriented on the same targets, training officials 
frequently refer to this limited training as "range close air support," 
which means that it is done in a specific way because of range 
restrictions rather than as it would be carried out in actual combat. 
In short, the training is not realistic, and its value is diminished 
because trainees become familiar with the terrain and target. The 
following are other additional examples of restricted training 
environments:

* The Fort Bragg, North Carolina, range used by the 23rd Fighter Group 
has altitude and laser restrictions and prohibits the use of tactical 
rockets. As a result, close air support cannot be realistically 
practiced.

* The ground controllers from the 25th Air Support Operations Squadron 
in Hawaii are not able to maintain their currency requirements[Footnote 
7] at their home stations because there are no close air support 
aircraft available to train them; thus, they must return to the 
mainland periodically to train.

* Airspace restrictions in Germany force A-10 pilots from the 81st 
Fighter Squadron to train at altitudes of 17,000 to 20,000 feet rather 
than 5,000 feet, where the A-10was designed to operate.

* About 10 percent of last year's planned close air support missions 
for the 31st Fighter Wing in Italy were executed. In addition, the 
squadron does not have a range where close air support can be 
undertaken with a ground controller or where units can train at night.

Likewise, home station training for Navy pilots is limited not only 
because of range restrictions but also because of the Navy's 18-month 
deployment cycles. Before they are deployed, Navy pilots are sent to 
the Naval Strike Air Warfare Center at Fallon Naval Air Station, 
Nevada, for 4 weeks of training. The proficiency pilots gain at Fallon, 
however, erodes during their 18-month deployment cycle because they 
have access to few ranges, many of which may be inadequate. A second 
challenge comes after deployment, when the pilots return to their home 
stations. According to Navy personnel, the pilots' mission skills 
continue to erode because they have limited access to aircraft and 
equipment, and they are restricted to using only local ranges for 
training that they feel is inadequate. Marine 
Corps pilots at units we visited echoed the concerns voiced about range 
restrictions and the lack of varied training opportunities. For 
example:

* Dare County Bomb Range, North Carolina, has only a 7-mile range when 
30 miles is necessary for the F/A-18 to effectively employ air-to-
ground weapons for close air support training.[Footnote 8]

* One range attached to the Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, 
North Carolina, is not much larger than the Dare County range and is 
considered inadequate for effective close air support training. Another 
range near the air station prohibits the use of live ordnance.

While range restrictions curtail realistic home station training 
opportunities, Air Force and Marine Corps personnel told us that a 
close air support simulator device could provide a mechanism to augment 
live training opportunities. For example, officials said that the 
development of a ground controller simulated training device, linked to 
an attack aircraft simulator, would provide valuable training for both 
controllers and pilots. DOD recognizes that simulators can enhance the 
planning, preparation, and training for close air support. According to 
its capstone requirements document, simulators enable units to practice 
the communication and coordination procedures associated with the close 
air support mission when constraints prohibit live-fire training. 
However, the United States does not currently own any close air support 
simulated training devices.[Footnote 9] In Europe, the Air Force has 
arranged to lease simulator time from the Dutch military. We visited 
the training facility in the Netherlands and observed controllers using 
the device to practice simulated close air support missions. Both Dutch 
and U.S. officials believe such a simulator provides the capability to 
train close air support effectively in a safe environment.

Inconsistent Controller Training Hampers Joint Operations:

The individual services and the special operations communities do not 
use common certification or currency requirements to train their 
aircraft controllers. For initial certification, the Air Force, Navy, 
and Marine Corps operate formal schools that have curriculums based on 
the individual services' interpretation of DOD's Joint Publication 3-
09.3, Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support 
(1995). Overall, this initial instruction is fairly common among the 
schools, and the Navy and Marine Corps schools have the same 
requirements. The Air Force and the Navy/Marine Corps curriculums cover 
such topics as intelligence, equipment operation, integration of close 
air support with other fires, and battle damage assessments. However, 
the time devoted to each topic, as well as the specific instructional 
material presented, varies among the services. Two notable differences 
exist in initial certification requirements between the Navy/Marine 
Corps and the Air Force programs. The Navy/Marine Corps program 
requires its controllers to practice close air support with a variety 
of aircraft, including helicopters. The Air Force does not require 
helicopter practice because it does not have combat helicopters in its 
conventional force, and the Army does not use its helicopters in a 
close air support role. A second difference is that the Navy/Marine 
Corps requires its controllers to practice coordinating live indirect 
fire support, such as artillery. The Air Force does not require 
practice with live artillery for its initial certification. Usually, 
the Army coordinates the use of indirect fires on the battlefield. The 
controller certification debate is further complicated by the fact that 
NATO certification requirements are more demanding and comprehensive in 
some areas than those for U.S. personnel. For example, NATO standards 
require controllers to have 12 successful low-level controls, 
controlling close air support attacking aircraft at altitudes below 500 
feet, to be qualified. No such standard exists for U.S. controllers.

Once schooling is complete and controllers are sent back to their 
units, they are required to maintain a level of proficiency throughout 
the year. These annual currency requirements vary by service. (See 
table 1.) For example, the Marine Corps and Air Force require 
controllers to practice 12 times a year to remain current, while NATO 
controllers need 24 practices.

Table 1: Number of Practices Required Annually by Ground Controllers to 
Maintain Currency:

Marine Corps; Total number of practices: 12; Number of daylight 
practices: 8; Number of nighttime practices: 4.

Air Force; Total number of practices: 12; Number of daylight 
practices: 10; Number of nighttime practices: 2.

NATO; Total number of practices: 24; Number of daylight practices: 
20; Number of nighttime practices: 4.

Source: DOD and NATO.

Note: GAO analysis of DOD and NATO training publications.[Footnote 10]

[End of table]

Likewise, currency requirements for controllers in the special 
operations community differ among the Air Force, Navy, and Army because 
they are required to meet their service-directed requirements. Special 
operations controllers receive their initial certification by attending 
one of the service schools. However, the services have different 
requirements for maintaining their controllers' status. In fact, only 
Air Force special operations controllers have a specific annual 
currency requirement to maintain. Because of this situation, some 
personnel we interviewed told us that during operations in Afghanistan, 
ground commanders were hesitant to have non-Air Force personnel 
directing close air support missions, and, in most cases, asked to have 
Air Force ground controllers attached to their special operations 
teams. In addition, it was not clear how recently non-Air Force special 
operations controllers had practiced this skill, adding to the ground 
commanders' reluctance to use them.

In interviews, controllers from conventional forces told us that while 
they have currency standards to maintain, it is difficult to meet them. 
According to Air Force officials, 50 percent of the assigned Air Force 
ground controllers in Europe are not current in nighttime or live 
ordnance controls. One contributing factor is that Air Force pilots can 
meet all of their close air support training requirements using an 
airborne controller, thus negating the need to provide air support for 
ground controller training. For example, according to personnel from 
the 81st Fighter Squadron in Germany, less than 20 percent of their 
close air support training sorties involve the use of a ground 
controller. Recognizing this shortage, Air Force officials have 
requested funding for a simulator to help train their ground 
controllers stationed in Europe.

Beyond certification and currency standards, some stark differences 
exist in the procedures that U.S. and NATO forces use to pass target 
information from ground controllers to attacking aircraft. U.S. 
controllers are trained to use a standardized 9-linebriefing format, 
while NATO troops use a 15-line briefing. This lack of commonality 
creates a potentially hazardous battlefield situation in operations 
involving U.S. military allies.

Some Services Give Low Priority to Joint Close Air Support Training:

One of the primary reasons the services do not provide the training 
needed to adequately prepare U.S. forces to plan and execute the joint 
close air support missions is the low priority they give to this 
mission in comparison with other training requirements. This lack of 
emphasis is apparent in operational doctrine, school instruction, and 
the number of pilot sorties devoted to close air support, all of which 
prevent aircrews and controllers from developing their mission skills.

The Air Force has historically not placed a high priority on close air 
support in its doctrine. Service officials we interviewed stated that 
the Air Force tends to emphasize air-to-air and deep attack missions 
over close air support. In our review of Air Force doctrine, we found 
that the Air Force prioritizes air superiority, strategic attack, and 
air interdiction missions because it views such missions as a more 
effective and efficient use of its resources. While officials indicated 
that the Air Force would provide joint close air support when it was 
needed to support ground troops, they said that it is more efficient to 
use the aircraft to attack enemies before they come in contact with 
friendly forces.

Key Air Force and Navy pilot training schools also give a low priority 
to close air support training in their curriculums. At the Air Force 
weapons school, for example, only 13 percent of the F-16's flight 
syllabus is devoted to this mission. Moreover, for pilots of the A-10-
-an aircraft primarily designed to perform close air support--only 31 
percent of Weapons School training sorties were for the mission. At the 
Navy's air warfare center, pilots receive 8 days of close air support 
training during their 4-week course. However, because of the number of 
pilots attending the course, the 8 days devoted to close air support 
only allow aircrews to fly two close air support missions.

Furthermore, some Air Force unit training programs place low emphasis 
on this mission. According to the Air Force, active duty F-16 squadrons 
stationed in the United States devote only about 5 percent of their 
training sorties to close air support. In addition, an Air Force 
official in Europe stated that less than 10 percent of his F-16 
squadron's training program is devoted to close air support, while 50 
percent is for air-to-air missions. Given the difficult nature of the 
mission, many pilots believe that this level of training is not 
sufficient to develop adequate mission skills.

According to DOD's task force, the lack of integration between the 
Army's fire support elements and the Air Force's ground controller 
personnel is the top problem facing joint close air support training. 
Such poor integration is primarily the result of the services' low 
emphasis on joint training for this mission. We confirmed this 
conclusion during our visits to various units. For example, Army 
commanders have been trained to use direct and indirect fire, with 
joint close air support being used as a last resort. Joint close air 
support is only one of a myriad of support options available to ground 
force commanders that must be trained. Army units rarely integrate 
close air support into training exercises outside the training centers 
and, as a result, joint close air support integration training is often 
unrealistic. In addition, the Air Force's selection of air liaison 
officers, who provide ground commanders with expertise on the 
employment of joint close air support, shows a lack of Air Force 
commitment and has added to the lack of confidence on the part of the 
Army and the ground controllers. Both Army and Air Force personnel at 
several locations we visited raised concerns that this position has not 
been considered a career-enhancing position. These officers not only do 
not get a chance to fly but they also have to live in the "dirt" with 
Army forces during various maneuvers. According to personnel, the best 
personnel, or even those with extensive close air support training, 
have not filled this position. However, according to Air Force 
officials in Europe, beginning in 2000 the service implemented a change 
that elevates the selection of candidates for this position to the same 
level as picking candidates for flying and operational squadron support 
commands for their theater. This should produce higher-quality 
candidates for the position.

The Marine Corps emphasizes close air support in its training and 
considers integrating aviation with other supporting fires as a 
critical element because it lacks the amount of artillery available to 
Army commanders. However, Marine Corps training is usually limited to 
practicing close air support with its own air assets supporting its own 
ground forces. The Marines do not emphasize training these skills with 
other services. We found that the Marines rarely conduct joint training 
for this mission, which limits their ability to integrate on the 
battlefield when they are called upon to perform this mission with 
others. According to an internal Operation Enduring Freedom after-
action report, investigators found that Marine Corps ground controllers 
require more extensive joint training opportunities, particularly for 
controlling air support in joint operations.

DOD is Making Efforts to Resolve Training Deficiencies:

Even before the extensive use of close air support in Afghanistan 
highlighted the potential dangers inherent in this mission, DOD had 
acknowledged that action was needed to improve its effectiveness. In an 
internal assessment, DOD concluded that current capabilities do not 
meet all present or projected needs and that the joint community faces 
a substantial challenge in attaining the new levels of capabilities 
required to support emerging war fighting concepts.[Footnote 11]

In January 2000, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council chartered an 
executive steering committee to identify shortfalls across the mission 
area. The steering committee developed a Joint Close Air Support action 
plan to address a number of training and equipment interoperability 
issues. The training issues include such items as increasing joint 
training exercises; establishing joint integrated training plans; and 
creating a "joint terminal attack controller" with standardized 
certifications, which DOD says will improve joint operations and reduce 
the potential for accidents and fratricides. However, none of the 
action item target dates for completion were met on time. In fact, only 
3 of the 15 action items have been completed to date, and the remaining 
12 issues have rolled over into the updated 2003 plan. The complete 
list of issues contained in the action plan is included in appendix IV.

According to service personnel we interviewed, progress on resolving 
the training issues has been slow because of the joint nature of the 
mission. Getting agreement across the services is difficult because 
there are fundamental differences in how the individual services employ 
close air support. Moreover, no joint organization is responsible for 
overseeing the training and equipping of the mission. Individual 
service and joint staff representatives expressed frustration with the 
executive steering committee's inability to resolve the action items. 
The services have not been able to agree on several of them. For 
example, the services disagree on what to include in the joint terminal 
attack controller certification. The committee does not have the 
authority to require individual services to train jointly or to 
compromise by developing common training standards for their 
controllers. In October 2002, DOD changed the responsibility for 
chairing the Joint Close Air Support Executive Steering Committee to 
Joint Forces Command. Previously, the committee had been cochaired by 
the Air Force and the Marine Corps. According to DOD officials, this 
action was undertaken, at least in part, in hopes of resolving the 
interservice issues. At Joint Forces Command, the Joint Requirements 
and Integration Directorate (J8) serves as the lead joint integration 
expert, ensuring that the various services and defense agencies combine 
their capabilities into a single successful effort.

DOD has acknowledged that such deficiencies in joint training are not 
limited to the close air support mission. In March 2002, DOD announced 
a plan for transforming all of its training programs. This plan 
emphasizes the need to provide comprehensive and systematic joint 
training focused on the operational requirements of the combatant 
commanders. Furthermore, it acknowledges a need for increasing the use 
of live and virtual training in its training environment. According to 
DOD, a Joint National Training Capability would be established to 
provide training that is less service-focused and more reflective of 
how U.S. forces actually fight today. The first training event is 
scheduled for May 2003 and will focus on Army maneuver forces at Fort 
Irwin, California; however, the event will also include supporting 
forces at several locations across the United States.

Lack of Equipment Interoperability and Coordinated Purchases Hampers 
Effectiveness of Close Air Support Mission Programs:

The military services have not yet achieved DOD's goals for ensuring 
that equipment acquired for close air support missions is interoperable 
and cost-effective. The digital transmission systems that the services 
procured to transmit information instantly between airborne and ground 
personnel are not interoperable across the services, and a common 
capability is not expected to be fielded until 2007. The lack of 
interoperability does not allow participants to take advantage of the 
increased effectiveness that digital transmissions add to the mission. 
In addition, the services' independent purchases of different kinds of 
ground-targeting equipment have precluded them from achieving potential 
cost savings from joint purchases.

Current Digital Transmission Systems Are Not Interoperable across the 
Services:

Advanced technological systems that allow ground and air forces to 
transmit battlefield information digitally can greatly improve the 
effectiveness and timeliness of close air support missions. These 
systems are designed to allow a ground controller to input the 
information needed for a ground attack into a computer and transmit 
this information instantly to a computer on board an aircraft. The use 
of digital communication has a number of advantages over visual or 
voice communication. Digital transmissions speed up the execution of a 
mission and can reduce transcription errors between the controllers and 
the pilots of attack aircraft. For example, Marine Corps officials told 
us that the amount of time required for transmitting and verifying 
coordinates could be reduced from about 7 minutes (the time needed for 
voice communication) to less than 1 minute for digital communication. 
Digital transmissions can also enhance the effectiveness of a mission 
during darkness, in inclement weather, or under other conditions when 
the ground controller may not be in position to observe the aircraft. 
In addition, digital transmission systems can transmit more detailed 
information, thereby improving the "situational awareness" of both 
ground and air forces. For example, digital systems can provide the 
ground controller's mission computer with detailed and constantly 
updated battlefield information, including the position of the attack 
aircraft, verification of target acquisition, and the location of 
friendly forces. According to tests performed at the Army's National 
Training Center during February 2002, the use of digitally transmitted 
communication significantly improved mission performance. As figure 3 
shows, this equipment allowed ground controllers to provide the correct 
attack decision more often (89 to 93 percent of the time) than when 
they relied on only what they could see and communicate by voice to the 
attack aircraft (correct 67 percent of the time).

Figure 3. Percentage of Correct Attack Decisions for Combined 
Visual and Digital Systems, Digital Systems Alone, and Visual and Voice 
Communication:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Digital transmission systems are currently available on only four types 
of aircraft. The Air Force has installed this equipment on less than 
three-quarters of its active-duty F-16 fighter aircraft[Footnote 12] 
and has procured a limited number of portable systems for its B-52 
bombers. The Marine Corps has installed similar equipment on roughly 95 
percent of its AV-8Bs and on about 20 percent of its F/A-18s. Because 
of the limited number of aircraft with this equipment, ground 
controllers told us that they have had few opportunities to transmit 
information digitally to attack aircraft. Even when digital 
transmission equipment is available on board an aircraft, it may be 
incompatible with the equipment that is on the ground because the 
services use different systems. This lack of interoperability across 
the services reduces the equipment's effectiveness and limits its 
usefulness. Some ground controllers told us that they would hesitate to 
bring this equipment to the battlefield because they would not be able 
to control attack aircraft from another service. Figure 4 shows that 
only one (the AV-8B) of six aircraft that currently perform the close 
air support mission is fully capable of receiving digital transmissions 
from its own service controllers. However, none is capable of receiving 
such transmissions across service lines.

Figure 4: Digital Transmission Capabilities between Ground Controllers 
and Selected Aircraft:

[See PDF for image]

Note: GAO analysis of DOD data.

[End of figure]

Given the uncertainties surrounding equipment interoperability, ground 
troops and aircrews may have to resort to using multiple means of 
communication. In Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, for 
example, the primary means of passing targeting information from 
controllers to attack aircraft was by voice communication. Service 
personnel who took part in these operations stated that the use of 
multiple modes of communication was a cause of confusion on the 
battlefield.

Recognizing that it needs to improve the interoperability of digital 
transmission systems, DOD has developed a plan for the services to 
field an interoperable system by 2007. This system, commonly called 
"Link 16," would provide an integrated air and ground display of 
friendly and enemy battlefield positions. Link 16, as it is currently 
fielded, is limited to air-to-air missions, but DOD plans to expand its 
capabilities to include the air-to-ground mission. In the interim, the 
Air Force and Marine Corps are seeking ways to improve the 
interoperability of their current systems by developing common software 
applications. However, these efforts are in a preliminary stage and, 
according to DOD officials, it will be at least 2004 before the interim 
solutions are in place.

Services' Fielding of Multiple Ground-Targeting Systems Do Not Take 
Advantage of Possible Cost Savings:

The services are independently procuring a wide variety of different 
ground-targeting systems to improve their execution of close air 
support missions. However, these service-specific purchases have not 
taken advantage of the benefits of buying common equipment that could 
reduce overall program costs.

The services are procuring new ground-targeting equipment to improve 
their ability to undertake close air support missions during night 
operations, in adverse weather conditions, and from increasingly higher 
altitudes. In Afghanistan, for example, U.S. forces delivered precision 
weapons from medium to high altitudes; this meant that ground 
controllers had to determine target coordinates with precision in order 
to maximize mission effectiveness and avoid fratricides. According to 
DOD officials, recent technological advancements in ground-targeting 
equipment are providing this needed precision. Figure 5 shows examples 
of the equipment the services are procuring to enhance ground-targeting 
capabilities.

Figure 5: Selected New Ground-Targeting Equipment Procurements:

[See PDF for image]

Note: GAO generated based on DOD documents.

[End of figure]

Each service has established its own program to acquire more advanced 
systems to enhance the capabilities of its ground-targeting equipment. 
The Air Force and Marine Corps, for example, have initiated acquisition 
programs to buy equipment that will more precisely locate targets at 
all levels of visibility, mark targets for attack by precision weapons, 
and increase communication connectivity with all battlefield 
participants. Table 2 provides an overview of the Marine Corps and Air 
Force programs, which were initiated in 1997 and 1999, respectively.

Table 2: Air Force and Marine Corps Acquisitions Programs for Ground-
Targeting Equipment:

Dollars in millions.

Marine Corps; Total
program cost: $79.6; Fiscal year 2004 budget 
request: $29.8; Examples of ground-targeting 
equipment: * Laser rangefinder; * GPS receiver; * Laser target 
designator; * Multiband radio; * Mission computer; 
Program fielding completion date: 2005.

Air Force; Total
program cost: $344; Fiscal year 2004 budget 
request: $15.1; Examples of ground-targeting 
equipment: * Laser rangefinder; * GPS receiver; * Multiband radio; * 
Mission computer; * Infrared laser; Program 
fielding completion date: 2011.

Source: GAO.

Note: GAO analysis of DOD data.

[End of table]

In addition, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and U.S. Special Operations 
Command have procured technologically advanced ground-targeting 
equipment for their special operations forces. This equipment was used 
during Operation Enduring Freedom and, according to after-action 
reports, it significantly enhanced the ground controllers' ability to 
identify ground targets for attack aircraft, thereby improving mission 
effectiveness.

Although this equipment can improve mission effectiveness, because of 
the lack of joint requirements, the services have fielded multiple 
types of equipment with similar capabilities. For example, Special 
Operations Command officials told us that U.S. forces used four 
different ground-targeting systems in Operation Enduring Freedom. An 
analysis of the services' procurement plans shows that a variety of 
similar ground targeting equipment will be fielded. For example, the 
services have programmed funding to procure at least six different 
laser rangefinders and four different laser target designators.

DOD has determined that equipment commonality for the mission could 
reduce overall program costs for the services. The Joint Close Air 
Support Executive Steering Committee, for example, recommended that the 
Air Force and Marine Corps identify opportunities for multiservice 
procurement of ground-targeting equipment to meet joint requirements. 
U.S. Central Command officials echoed the recommendation that U.S. 
forces should acquire a common set of ground-targeting equipment and 
further emphasized that all forces should be trained in its use and 
characteristics. However, with the services continuing to pursue 
individual programs based on service-specific requirements, DOD cannot 
provide assurances that the services are acquiring the most cost-
effective systems.

GAO has previously reported that DOD fails to consider joint solutions 
and broader mission requirements when proposing systems.[Footnote 13] 
While the services conduct considerable analyses in justifying major 
acquisitions, these analyses can be narrowly focused and may not fully 
consider alternative solutions, such as joint acquisition of a system 
with other services. As a result, there is no assurance that DOD and 
the services are avoiding costly duplication of systems, investing in 
the most cost-effective and affordable solutions, and optimizing 
mission performance. Furthermore, because the services plan, acquire, 
and operate systems to meet their own operational concepts, not 
necessarily the requirements of joint operations, there is no guarantee 
that fielded systems will operate together effectively. A joint 
acquisition strategy, based on broader mission requirements, would 
provide assurances that the services are acquiring systems that are 
cost-effective and function together during joint operations.

Conclusions:

DOD needs to provide better and more realistic training to prepare U.S. 
forces for joint close air support operations. With forces growing 
lighter, ground commanders may need to rely more heavily on close air 
support. Even a small mistake in conducting this mission can be deadly 
to friendly forces, a tragedy we witnessed in Afghanistan. While 
ineffective training is the fundamental problem facing close air 
support, technological advancements hold promise for enhancing 
battlefield information. However, the services have pursued solutions 
to meet their individual needs, and it will be years before DOD takes 
advantage of the enhancements on a wide scale. As a result, the 
services are spending millions of dollars on uncoordinated efforts to 
obtain equipment, and different types of systems are proliferating in 
the field.

DOD's efforts to improve close air support training have met with 
limited success. DOD's Joint Close Air Support action plan has hit 
several roadblocks--primarily because the services have been unable to 
agree on joint solutions. Thus, the solutions to long-standing problems 
will likely have to come from an organization such as the Joint Forces 
Command. DOD and the services understand the issues, but a strong 
commitment from senior leadership may help to implement pending action 
items and address lingering problems. Such problems may also be 
indicative of larger-scale training concerns in the department. DOD 
recognizes that significant challenges exist in delivering realistic 
joint training to prepare forces for a wide range of missions, not just 
close air support. DOD's plans to create a Joint National Training 
Capability could ultimately provide a venue for better joint training. 
Such training is certainly needed to prepare U.S. troops to conduct 
close air support missions.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To resolve the lingering training and equipment close air support 
issues, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense give close air 
support priority when implementing the department's training 
transformation initiatives. Specifically, we recommend that the 
Secretary provide the Commander of the Joint Forces Command with the 
authority and resources, if necessary, to resolve the issues identified 
in the joint close air support action plan. The Command's actions 
should include:

* emphasizing close air support as part of the department's new Joint 
National Training Capability to ensure that units receive realistic 
joint training;

* seeking ways to mitigate home station training limitations, including 
the use of simulation to augment live training; and:

* preparing aircraft controllers to perform in a joint environment by 
standardizing training and certifications.

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint 
Forces Command or other appropriate organizational entity, review the 
services' plans for procuring advanced close air support equipment to 
ensure that it is interoperable and meets valid joint requirements.

Matters for Congressional Consideration:

Because of the long-standing nature of training and equipment issues 
associated with the joint close air support mission, Congress may wish 
to consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on the 
progress the department has made toward resolving the identified 
issues. Congress needs this information to ensure that U.S. forces are 
adequately prepared to perform the mission and that the department is 
making cost-effective decisions in procuring equipment to enhance joint 
performance on the battlefield.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it 
concurred with our recommendations and has tasked the U.S. Joint Forces 
Command with establishing specific completion dates for each of the 
issues identified in the 2003 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan and 
to fully implement them in a timely manner. DOD further stated that it 
would provide a copy of the timetable to GAO by May 30, 2003. DOD's 
comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air force, the Secretary of 
the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director, Office 
of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others 
upon request.

If you have any questions, please call me on (757) 552-8100. Key 
contributors to this report were John Pendleton, Laura Durland, Vincent 
Balloon, Nancy Benco, Ray Carroll, Matthew Ullengren, and Lester Ward.

Neal P. Curtin
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:

Signed by Neal P. Curtin:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

To determine what efforts the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 
services have made in providing adequate training for the joint close 
air support mission, we interviewed officials at all levels of DOD from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, and 
unit-level service representatives both within the United States and 
overseas. Specifically, we met with members of the Joint Close Air 
Support Executive Steering Committee to document the actions they had 
been able to accomplish in resolving the training shortcomings listed 
in their 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan and to identify the 
reasons for their lack of progress. In addition, we gathered data from 
each service to determine, from the user's perspective, what barriers 
were preventing adequate training in close air support. We also 
obtained the training curriculum from each service's ground controller 
schools and analyzed these documents, looking for commonalities and 
inconsistencies. Table 3 lists all of the major units, commands, and 
training facilities that we visited or contacted to obtain our data.

To determine what efforts DOD has made to enhance the capabilities of 
the equipment used to support the joint close air support mission, we 
obtained the services' acquisition strategies for the specific 
equipment they were procuring to enhance mission effectiveness. We 
interviewed service personnel and obtained documentation to verify the 
value these procurements added and to determine any barriers that would 
limit their effectiveness. Once we determined that no joint requirement 
existed and that the services were procuring interoperable digital 
transmission devices and multiple variants of ground-targeting 
equipment, we obtained documentation on the potential solutions for 
obtaining interoperable common equipment.

Table 3: Units and Locations Included on This Assignment:

Army:

U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Ala.

U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Ala.

Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

101st Air Mobile Division, Fort Campbell, Ky.

U.S. Army Artillery Training Command, Fort Sill, Okla.

U.S. Army Headquarters Europe, Heidelberg, Germany.

Eighth U.S. Army, Yongsan Post, Republic of Korea.

2nd Infantry Division, Camp Casey, Republic of Korea.

2nd Infantry Division, 1st Brigade, Camp Casey, Republic of Korea.

25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

Air Force:

Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va.

U.S. Air Force Reserve Command, Warner-Robbins Air Force Base, Ga.

U.S. Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

Detachment 1, 334th Training Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

23rd Fighter Group, Pope Air Force Base, N.C.

18th Air Support Operations Group, Pope Air Force Base, N.C.

19th Air Support Operations Center, Fort Campbell, Ky.

U.S. Air Force Air Ground Operations School, Nellis Air Force Base, 
Nev.

U.S. Air Force Weapons School, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

6th Combat Training Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

Detachment 1, 28th Test Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

2nd Operations Support Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La.

20th Bomber Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La.

93rd Bomber Squadron (AF Reserve), Barksdale Air Force Base, La.

96th Bomber Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La.

548th Combat Training Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La.

303rd Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.

457th Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Naval Air Station Joint Reserve 
Base, Fort Worth, Tex.

706th Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Joint Reserve Base, New Orleans, 
La.

U.S. Air Force Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

81st Fighter Squadron, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany.

555th Fighter Squadron, Aviano Air Base, Italy.

32nd Air Ground Operations School, Germany.

4th Air Support Operations Group, Germany.

1st Air Support Operations Squadron, Germany.

2nd Air Support Operations Squadron, Germany.

Headquarter Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.

7th Air Force, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea.

51st Operations Support Squadron, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea.

51st Fighter Wing, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea.

25th Air Support Operations Squadron, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.

Navy:

Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Naval Air Station Fallon, 
Nev.

U.S. Naval Safety Center, Naval Air Reserve, Norfolk, Va.

Naval Air Forces-Atlantic Fleet, Naval Air Station Norfolk, Va.

Strike Fighter Wings Atlantic, Oceana Naval Air Station, Va.

VFA-136, Naval Air Station Oceana, Va.

VF-211, Naval Air Station Oceana, Va.

Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Pacific, Naval Amphibious Base, 
Coronado, Calif.

U.S. Navy Europe, London, England.

Marine Corps:

Marine Corps, Aviation Plans, Policy, and Budget Branch, 
Washington, D.C.

Marine Corps, Plans, Policy, and Operations Department, Washington, 
D.C.

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va.

Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va.

Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Quantico, Va.

Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command, Twenty-nine Palms, 
Calif.

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One, Yuma Marine Corps 
Air Station, Ariz.

2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

Marine Air Group 14, Cherry Point Marine Corps Air 
Station, N.C.

Marine Air Group 29, New River Marine Corps Air Station, N.C.

Marine Air Group 31, Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station, S.C.

Marine Forces Pacific Command, Hawaii.

Special Operations:

U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

3rd Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, N.C.

5th Special Forces Group, Fort Campbell, Ky.

720th Special Tactics Group, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

19th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

Joint Organizations:

Joint Combat Identification Evaluation Team, Eglin 
Air Force Base, Fla.

Joint Close Air Support Joint Test & Evaluation Task Force, Eglin Air 
Force Base, Fla.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Readiness and Training, 
Washington, D.C.

The Joint Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments, 
Washington, D.C.

U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

U.S. Forces Korea, Seoul, Korea.

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.

U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii.

Netherlands:

Royal Netherlands Army Combat Maneuver Training Center, 
Netherlands.

Source: DOD.

[End of table]

We conducted our review from April 2002 through March 2003 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft that Perform Close Air Support:

The services use many different aircraft to deliver close air support. 
Table 4 provides pictures and brief descriptions of these aircraft.

Table 4: Close Air Support Aircraft:

[See PDF for image]

Source: DOD.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Joint Close Air Support Training and Friendly Fire 
Accidents:

DOD and the services identified three close air support training 
mishaps that resulted in fatalities since the Persian Gulf War and 
three official joint close air support friendly fire events. Friendly 
fire is a circumstance in which members of a U.S. or friendly military 
force are mistakenly or accidentally killed or injured in action taken 
by U.S. or friendly forces actively engaged with an enemy or who are 
directing fire at a hostile force or what is thought to be a hostile 
force. According to DOD personnel and the conclusions reached in the 
investigations, these incidents have been caused by human error, by not 
following established standardized procedures, and by lack of 
experience and training. Two well-known events did not meet our 
criteria and are thus excluded. The April 17, 2002, incident where an 
Air National Guard F-16 bombed Canadian troops did not involve air 
support of ground forces, so it was not close air support. Secondly, 
the July 1, 2002, "wedding party" incident in which civilians were 
killed and injured is not by definition a friendly fire incident. Table 
5 contains a description of the close air support friendly fire and 
training incidents and the status of the investigations.

Table 5: Training and Friendly Fire Incidents since the Persian Gulf 
War:

Training Incidents:

Date: July 18, 1995; Location: Fort Sill, Oklahoma; 
Description of incident: An Air Force Reserve A-10 
aircraft dropped a 500-pound bomb on a 
forward observation post; Who was hurt: One person 
was killed and 13 others injured; Status of 
incident report: Complete.

Date: April 19, 1999; Location: Atlantic Fleet 
Weapons Training Facility, Vieques Island, Puerto Rico; Description of 
incident: A Marine FA-18C dropped two 500-pound 
bombs that impacted outside the live impact area but within the 
confines of the range; Who was hurt: One person 
was killed and 4 others injured; Status of 
incident report: Complete.

Date: March 12, 2001; Location: Udairi Range, 
Kuwait; Description of incident: A Navy F/A-18C 
dropped three 500-pound bombs on an observation post during a night 
exercise; Who was hurt: Six people were killed and 
11 others injured; Status of 
incident report: Complete.

Date: Friendly Fire Incidents.

Date: November 26, 2001; Location: Mazar-e Sharif, 
Afghanistan; Description of incident: A Navy F/A-18 
aircraft dropped a joint direct attack munition that exploded near 
friendly forces; Who was hurt: No fatalities and 5 
others injured; Status of 
incident report: Ongoing.

Date: December 5, 2001; Location: Afghanistan; 
Description of incident: A B-52 bomber dropped a 
joint direct attack munition that exploded near friendly forces; Who 
was hurt: Three people were killed and 19 others 
injured; Status of 
incident report: Complete.

Date: March 2, 2002; Location: Terghul Ghar, 
Afghanistan; Description of incident: During 
Operation Anaconda, an AC-130 engaged coalition forces, mistaking them 
for the enemy; Who was hurt: One person was killed 
and 3 others injured; Status of 
incident report: Complete.

[End of table]

Source: DOD.

[End of section]

Appendix IV: 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan:

The 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan contained 15 action items. 
All of the items originally had completion dates tasked within fiscal 
year 2002. However, 12 of them have not yet been completed, and the 
executive steering committee has recommended that they transition into 
the updated 2003 action plan. Table 6 lists the action items for 2001, 
their original estimated completion dates, and whether the action item 
has been completed.

Table 6: Status of Fiscal Year 2001 Action Items:

Action items: Standardize ground controller training; Original date 
for completion: Jan. 2002; Completed: [Empty].

Action items: Standardize airborne controller training; Original date 
for completion: Mar. 2002; Completed: [Empty].

Action items: Expand air liaison officer course; Original date 
for completion: Dec. 2001; Completed: [Empty].

Action items: Expand fire support element curriculum; Original date 
for completion: Jan. 2002; Completed: [Empty].

Action items: Produce joint mission essential task lists; Original 
date 
for completion: Feb. 2002; Completed: [Empty].

Action items: Establish joint integrated training plans; Original date 
for completion: Jan. 2002; Completed: [Empty].

Action items: Increase use of simulated training; Original date 
for completion: Jan. 2002; Completed: [Empty].

Action items: Increase joint exercises; Original date 
for completion: Feb. 2002; Completed: [Empty].

Action items: Include new concepts in joint publication 3-09.3; 
Original date 
for completion: Periodic; Completed: Yes.

Action items: Update service tactic techniques and procedures 
to reflect joint publication 3-09.3 revisions; Original date 
for completion: Sep. 2002; Completed: [Empty].

Action items: Develop new concepts experiments to validate systems and 
procedures; Original date 
for completion: Feb. 2002; Completed: [Empty].

Action items: Publish a capstone requirements document; Original date 
for completion: Aug. 2002; Completed: Yes.

Action items: Explore joint Air Force-Marine Corps ground controller 
equipment procurement; Original date 
for completion: May. 2002; Completed: [Empty].

Action items: Standardize symbols and graphics; Original date 
for completion: Apr. 2002; Completed: [Empty].

Action items: Coordinate with Combat Identification action plan team on 
overlapping issues; Original date 
for completion: Apr. 2002; Completed: Yes.

Source: GAO.

Note: GAO analysis of DOD data.

[End of table]

In addition to the 12 remaining items, of which 2 have been combined, 
the executive steering committee has proposed adding 3 new items to the 
updated plan. These are the inclusion of unmanned aerial vehicles in 
joint close air support operations, an increased emphasis on precision 
targeting, and an increase in live sortie and artillery resources.

[End of section]

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:

PERSONNEL AND READINESS:

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:

March 31, 2003:

Mr. Neal P. Curtin Director:

Defense Capabilities and Management U.S. General Accounting Office 
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Curtin,

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-03-505, `MILITARY READINESS: Lingering Training and 
Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces', dated March 10, 
2003 (GAO Code 350192). The Department appreciates the opportunity to 
comment on the recommendations contained in the report.

The Department concurs with the recommendations and is in the process 
of establishing specific completion dates for each of the issues 
identified in the 2003 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan. We will 
provide a copy of this timetable by May 30, 2003.

Paul W. Mayberry:

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Readiness:

Signed by Paul W. Mayberry:

Enclosures: a/s:

GAO CODE 350192/GAO-03-505:

"MILITARY READINESS: LINGERING TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT ISSUES HAMPER AIR 
SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES":

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
give close air support priority when implementing the Department's 
training transformation initiatives. (Page 26/Draft Report).

DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will work 
closely with U.S. Joint Forces Command to fully implement the JCAS 
Action Plan in a timely manner and ensure that JCAS will be a priority 
joint tactical task in JNTC events.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
provide the Commander of the Joint Forces Command with the authority 
and resources, if necessary to resolve the issues identified in the 
joint close air support action plan. (Page 26/Draft Report).

DoD RESPONSE: Concur. As the lead agent for the JCAS Action Plan, U.S. 
Joint Force Command makes recommendations to the Services regarding 
JCAS and facilitates issue resolution. The Department is exploring 
alternatives to provide the necessary authority to direct the 
Department's efforts to improve joint close air support.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Commander of the Joint 
Forces Command take action to resolve the issues identified in the 
joint close air support action plan that includes emphasizing close air 
support as part of the Department's new Joint National Training 
Capability to ensure that units receive realistic joint training. (Page 
26/Draft Report).

DoD RESPONSE: Concur. U.S. Joint Forces Command, as the Chair of the 
JCAS Executive Steering Committee, will develop an implementation 
schedule for all issues detailed in the JCAS Action Plan to ensure 
timely completion of those issues.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Commander of the Joint 
Forces Command take action to resolve the issues identified in the 
joint close air support action plan that includes seeking ways to 
mitigate home station training limitations, including the use of 
simulation to augment live training. (Page 26/Draft Report).

DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The JCAS Action Plan includes issues on training 
plans, live sortie/artillery resource plans, joint CAS exercises, and 
training simulation support, all of which specifically address ways to 
mitigate home station training limitations. These issues, as all the 
issues in the Action Plan, will be assigned completion dates in order 
to ensure timely implementation.

RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommended that the Commander of the Joint 
Forces Command take action to resolve the issues identified in the 
joint close air support action plan that includes preparing aircraft 
controllers to perform in a joint environment by standardizing training 
and certifications. (Page 26/Draft Report).

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. Standardized procedures for Joint Terminal Attack 
Controller (JTAC), will be established in the soon to be published 
Joint Publication 3-09.3 (Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
(JTTP) for Close Air Support). The 2003 JCAS Action Plan specifically 
addresses JTAC standardization of training and certification. A JTAC 
Working Group has developed recommendations for JTAC certification and 
currency requirements for the JTAC.

RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, 
through the Joint forces Command or other appropriate organizational 
entity, review the Services' plans for procuring advanced close air 
support equipment to ensure that it is interoperable and meets valid 
joint requirements. (Page 26/Draft Report).

DoD RESPONSE: Concur. U.S. Joint Forces Command is the lead 
organization for the Close Air Support Capstone Requirements Document 
(CAS CRD). USJFCOM will conduct a gap analysis between the JCAS 
Integrated Architecture, Service CAS Operational Requirements 
Documents, and the CAS CRD. This gap analysis will identify equipment 
capability and interoperability issues along with an investment 
strategy to ensure Service CAS equipment is interoperable and meets 
valid joint requirements.

GAO CODE 350192/GAO-03-505:

"MILITARY READINESS: LINGERING TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT ISSUES HAMPER AIR 
SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES":

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS ON THE MATTERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL 
CONSIDERATION:

SUGGESTION 1: The GAO suggested that the Congress may wish to consider 
requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on the progress the 
Department has made toward resolving the identified issues. The GAO 
noted that Congress needs this information to ensure that U.S. Forces 
are adequately prepared to perform the mission and that the Department 
is making cost-effective decisions in procuring equipment to enhance 
joint performance on the battlefield. (Page 27/Draft Report):

DOD RESPONSE: To ensure the Action Plan issues are addressed in a 
timely manner, the Department is in the process of establishing 
specific completion dates for each of the issues identified in the 2003 
JCAS Action Plan. Once these dates are established, U.S. Joint Forces 
Command will report to the Department their status on a periodic basis.

[End of section]


FOOTNOTES

[1] Interoperability refers to the ability of one system to provide and 
accept information from another system.

[2] Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Close Air Support, December 1995 (currently being revised).

[3] Joint Close Air Support Action Plan, November 2001.

[4] Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Close Air Support, December 1995 (currently being revised).

[5] Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Close Air Support, December 1995 (currently being revised).

[6] Such range limitations have been the subject of related GAO work, 
including, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not 
Reflected in Readiness Reporting, GAO-02-525 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 
30, 2002) and Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to 
Manage Encroachment on Training Ranges, GAO-02-614 (Washington, D.C.: 
June 11, 2002).

[7] A currency requirement is the frequency with which a skill needs to 
be practiced during a given period of time. 

[8] The 30-mile standard is documented in the Navy's Top Gun manual, 
Volume IV - Employment/Tactics, May 2002.

[9] After completion of our audit work, Air Force officials indicated 
that they have incorporated extremely limited simulated close air 
support training devices in their Joint Firepower Course.

[10] The publications are as follows: Marine Corps order P3500.37, 
Aviation Training and Readiness Manual vol. 9 Tactical Air Control 
Party Officer, dated May 8, 2001; Air Force Instruction 13-102, Air 
Support Operations Center and Tactical Air Control Party Training and 
Evaluation Procedures, dated September 1, 1996; Minimum Qualifications 
for Forward Air Controllers, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Standardization Agreement #3797, dated February 26, 1979.

[11] Capstone Requirements Document for Close Air Support, JROCM 067-
02, May 6, 2002.

[12] In addition to the active duty Air Force effort to enhance digital 
transmission capabilities, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard 
have developed the Situational Awareness Data Link. However, primarily 
only Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard F-16s are equipped with 
this system.

[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and 
Program Risks, Department of Defense. GAO-03-98 (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2003).

GAO's Mission:

The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, 
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to 
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 
integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 
graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its 
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to daily E-mail alert for newly 
released products" under the GAO Reports heading.

Order by Mail or Phone:

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to:

U.S. General Accounting Office

441 G Street NW,

Room LM Washington,

D.C. 20548:

To order by Phone: 	

	Voice: (202) 512-6000:

	TDD: (202) 512-2537:

	Fax: (202) 512-6061:

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:

Public Affairs:

Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.

General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.

20548: