This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-03-431 
entitled 'Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Reconsider Decision to Increase 
F/A-22 Production Rates While Development Risks Continue' which was 
released on March 14, 2003.



This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office 

(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a 

longer term project to improve GAO products’ accessibility. Every 

attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 

the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 

descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 

end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 

but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 

version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 

replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 

your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 

document to Webmaster@gao.gov.



Report to Congressional Committees:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



March 2003:



TACTICAL AIRCRAFT:



DOD Should Reconsider Decision to Increase F/A-22 Production Rates 

While Development Risks Continue:



F/A-22 Aircraft:



GAO-03-431:



GAO Highlights:



Highlights of GAO-03-431, a report to Congressional Committees



Why GAO Did This Study:



The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to fly at higher 

speeds for longer distances, be less detectable, and improve the 

pilot’s awareness of the surrounding situation. The F/A-22 will 

replace the Air Force’s existing fleet of F-15 aircraft. Over the 

past several years the program has experienced significant cost 

overruns and schedule delays. Congress mandated that GAO assess the 

development program and determine whether the Air Force is meeting key 

performance, schedule, and cost goals. GAO also assessed the 

implications of the progress of the development program on production. 



What GAO Found:



The F/A-22 development program did not meet key performance, schedule, 

and cost goals in fiscal year 2002, and delays in the flight test 

program have led to an increase in the development cost estimate of 

$876 million. In response to this increase, DOD restructured the 

development program and reduced production aircraft by 27. If 

additional delays occur, further changes may be required. The program 

also continues to address technical problems that have limited the 

performance of test aircraft, including violent movement or “buffeting”

of the vertical fins, overheating in portions of the aircraft, 

weakening of materials in the horizontal tail, and instability of 

avionics software. Air Force officials cannot predict when they will

resolve these problems. These technical problems, along with the late 

delivery of aircraft to the flight test center, have delayed the 

development program. Based on F/A-22 flight test accomplishment data 

and current flight test plans, we believe that operational testing 

will likely be delayed several months beyond the planned August 2003 

start date. 



The F/A-22 program is in its final stages of development, and low-rate 

initial production has begun. Since fiscal year 1997, funds have been 

appropriated to acquire production aircraft, and the F/A-22 

acquisition plan calls for steadily increasing annual production 

rates. However, GAO considers the Air Force’s acquisition strategy at 

high risk for increases in production costs. In past reports, GAO has 

reported that acquiring aircraft while significant technical 

challenges remain does not allow for adequate testing of the aircraft. 

The uncertainties regarding performance capabilities of the F/A-22 

aircraft and its development schedule will persist until technical 

problems have been addressed, including testing of modifications or 

fixes necessary to potentially alleviate these problems. In light of 

those uncertainties, steadily increasing annual production rates could 

result in the Air Force having to modify a larger quantity of aircraft 

after they are built. 



What GAO Recommends:



To help minimize the risks of producing large quantities of aircraft 

that may require costly modifications, GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Defense (1) reconsider the decision to increase the 

annual  production rate beyond 16 aircraft until greater knowledge on 

any need for modifications is established through completion of 

operational testing and (2) update the 2002 risk assessment and 

certification with sufficient detail to allow verification of the 

conclusions. In comments on a draft of this report, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) stated that it agreed, for the most part, with our 

description of the current state of the F/A-22 program’s content, 

schedule and cost. However, DOD did not concur with our recommendation.



www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-431.

To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on 

the link above. For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 

512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. 



March 2003



Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



F/A-22 Technical Problems Continue to Affect Performance:



Flight Test Schedules Have Been Extended and May Slip Further:



Development and Modernization Costs Have Increased:



Risks in the F/A-22 Acquisition Plan:



Conclusions:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



Scope and Methodology:



Appendix I: Estimates of Performance for Key Parameters:



Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:



Appendix III: GAO Staff Acknowledgments:



Related GAO Products:



Table:



Table 1: Schedule Changes for Key F/A-22 Test Program Events:



Figures:



Figure 1: F/A-22 Flight Test Schedule Changes:



Figure 2: Planned Modernization Funding Increases, President’s Budgets 

for Fiscal Years 2001-2004:



Figure 3: Number of Production Aircraft on Contract Prior to Completion 

of Operational Testing:



This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright 

protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 

in its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain 

copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the 

copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce 

copyrighted materials separately from GAO’s product.



Abbreviations:



DIOT&E: Dedicated Initial Operational Test and Evaluation:



DOD: Department of Defense:



OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:



United States General Accounting Office:



Washington, DC 20548:



March 14, 2003:



Congressional Committees:



The Air Force is developing the F/A-22[Footnote 1] aircraft to replace 

its fleet of F-15 air superiority aircraft. The F/A-22 is designed to 

be superior to the F-15 because it is capable of flying at higher 

speeds for longer distances, more difficult to detect, and able to 

provide the pilot with substantially improved awareness of the 

surrounding situation. The Air Force began the F/A-22 development 

program in 1991. During the past several years, the program has 

experienced repeated and significant cost overruns and schedule delays. 

Congressional concern about the aircraft’s development program cost and 

progress is long-standing, and it continues.



The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998[Footnote 2] 

requires us to assess the Air Force’s F/A-22 development program 

annually and determine whether the Air Force is meeting key 

performance, schedule, and cost goals.[Footnote 3] This is our fifth 

report. Specifically, we determined (1) the progress of F/A-22 

development in terms of performance, schedule, and cost and 

(2) implications of this progress on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

acquisition plans.



Results in Brief:



The F/A-22 development program did not meet its key performance, 

schedule, and cost goals for fiscal year 2002. The program continues to 

address technical problems that have limited the performance of test 

aircraft. These problems include unexpected shutdowns of the aviation 

electronics (avionics) and excessive movement of the vertical tails. 

Air Force officials stated they do not yet understand the problems 

associated with the avionics instability well enough to predict when 

they would be able to resolve them. Aircraft also have been unable to 

meet maintenance requirements and are spending more time than planned 

on the ground undergoing maintenance.



In addition, the program has experienced schedule delays. These delays 

are the result of technical problems and the late delivery of 

developmental aircraft to the flight test center. Many tasks originally 

scheduled for 2002 have been rescheduled for 2003, and the Air Force 

now plans to conduct more developmental flight testing concurrent with 

operational testing.[Footnote 4] Moreover, we believe it is unlikely 

the Air Force will complete all necessary flight testing prior to the 

planned start of operational testing. Therefore, the start of 

operational testing may need to be delayed several months beyond the 

planned August 2003 start date.



Delays in the flight test program have significant consequences. Most 

recently, they have led to an increase of $876 million in the 

development cost estimate. In December 2002, in response to this 

increase, DOD restructured the program using funds from production and 

modernization upgrades to cover the cost increases. As a result, DOD 

reduced the number of production aircraft by 27, which decreased the 

total number of aircraft to be acquired from 303 to 276.[Footnote 5] If 

additional delays occur, further changes may be required.



Despite continuing development problems and challenges, the Air Force 

plans to continue to acquire aircraft during low-rate production at 

increasing yearly rates. For example, the Air Force plans to acquire 

20 aircraft in 2003, rather than the maximum of 16 Congress allowed 

without DOD submittal of a risk assessment and certification. However, 

as we have previously reported, acquiring aircraft before adequate 

testing is a high-risk strategy that could serve to further increase 

production costs. The performance capabilities of the F/A-22 and the 

aircraft’s development schedule will remain uncertain until technical 

problems have been addressed, including testing of modifications or 

fixes necessary to potentially alleviate these problems.



We are providing recommendations aimed at reducing the risk of 

increasing the production rate of F/A-22 aircraft before technical 

challenges have been addressed through operational testing. In its 

comments on a draft of this report, DOD indicated it did not concur 

with our recommendation that it not exceed an annual production rate of 

16 aircraft until operational testing is complete. DOD stated that the 

acquisition of more than 16 aircraft in fiscal year 2003 involves lower 

risk and lower total program cost than staying at 16.



Background:



The F/A-22 is to be an air superiority and ground attack aircraft with 

advanced features to make it less detectable to adversaries (stealth 

characteristics) and capable of high speeds for long ranges.[Footnote 

6] It is designed to have integrated avionics that greatly improve 

pilots’ awareness of the situation surrounding them. The objectives of 

the F/A-22 development program are to (1) design, fabricate, test, and 

deliver nine F/A-22 development test aircraft, two non-flying 

structural test aircraft, six production representative test aircraft, 

and 37 flight-qualified engines; (2) design, fabricate, integrate, 

and test the avionics; and (3) design, develop, and test the support 

and training systems. The F/A-22 is being developed under contracts 

with Lockheed Martin Corporation, the prime contractor (for the 

aircraft), and Pratt & Whitney Corporation (for the engine).



Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete the 

development phase of the F/A-22 program, the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a cost limitation 

for both the development and production.[Footnote 7] Subsequently, the 

National Defense Authorization Act of 2002 eliminated the cost 

limitation for the development, but left the cost limit for production 

cost in place.[Footnote 8] The production program is now limited to 

$36.8 billion.[Footnote 9] The current cost estimate of the development 

program is $21.9 billion.



Currently, the F/A-22 program is in both development and production. 

Development is in its final stages, and low rate initial production has 

begun. Since fiscal year 1997, funds have been appropriated to acquire 

production aircraft, and the F/A-22 acquisition plan calls for steadily 

increasing annual production rates.



The aircraft’s development problems and schedule delays have caused 

congressional concerns, particularly in light of DOD’s planned increase 

in production rates. The National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal 

Year 2003[Footnote 10] prohibited the obligation of funds for the 

acquisition of more than 16 production aircraft in fiscal year 2003, 

until the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics submits the following to the congressional defense 

committees: (1) a formal risk assessment that identifies and 

characterizes the potential cost, technical, schedule, or other 

significant risks resulting from increasing the F/A-22 production 

quantities prior to the Dedicated Initial Operational Test and 

Evaluation (DIOT&E)[Footnote 11] of the aircraft and (2) either a 

certification that increasing the F/A-22 production quantity for fiscal 

year 2003 beyond 16 aircraft involves lower risk and lower total 

program cost than staying at that quantity or implementing a revised 

production plan, funding, and test schedule. In December 2002, DOD 

submitted the risk assessment and certification to Congress.



F/A-22 Technical Problems Continue to Affect Performance:



The F/A-22 developmental program did not meet key performance goals 

established for fiscal year 2002 and continues to confront numerous 

technical challenges. Major technical problems include instability of 

the avionics software, violent movement, or “buffeting,” of vertical 

fins, overheating in portions of the aircraft, weakening of materials 

in the horizontal tail, and the inability to meet airlift support and 

maintenance requirements. Modifications are being made to some test 

aircraft to address some of these problems in preparation for 

operational testing. Nevertheless, these problems continue to restrict 

the performance and testing of the F/A-22.



Avionics Instability:



Software instability has hampered efforts to integrate advanced 

avionics capabilities into the F/A-22 system. Avionics control and 

integrated airborne electronics and sensors provide an increased 

awareness of the situation around the pilot. The Air Force told us that 

the avionics have failed or shut down during numerous tests of F/A-22 

aircraft due to software problems. The shutdowns occur when the pilot 

attempts to use the radar, communication, navigation, identification, 

and electronic warfare systems concurrently. Although the plane can 

still be flown after the avionics have failed, the pilot is unable to 

successfully demonstrate the performance of the avionics. Therefore, 

the Air Force has had to extend the test program schedule.



The Air Force recognized that the avionics problems pose a high 

technical risk to the F/A-22 program, and in June 2002 the Air Force 

convened a special team to address the problem. According to the team, 

the unpredictable nature of the shutdowns was not surprising 

considering the complexity of the avionics system. The team recommended 

that the software be stabilized in the laboratory before releasing it 

to flight testing. The team further recommended conducting a stress 

test on the software system architecture to reduce problems and ensure 

that it is operating properly. The Air Force implemented these 

recommendations. Further, the Air Force extended the avionics schedule 

to accommodate avionics stability testing and now plans to complete 

avionics testing in the first quarter of 2005. However, Air Force 

officials stated that they do not yet understand the problems 

associated with the instability of the avionics software well enough to 

predict when they will be able to resolve this problem.



Vertical Fin Buffeting:



Under some circumstances, the F/A-22 experiences violent movement, or 

buffeting, of the vertical fins in the tail section of the aircraft. 

This occurs as air, moving first over the body and the wings of the 

aircraft, places unequal pressures on the vertical fins and rudders. 

Unless the violent movement is resolved or the fins strengthened, the 

vertical fins will break over time because the pressures experienced 

exceed the strength limits of the fins. In addition, the buffeting 

problem has restricted the testing of aerial maneuvers of the aircraft.



Lockheed Martin has developed several modifications to strengthen the 

vertical fins and has performed an analysis to test the structural 

strength of the aircraft. It concluded that no flight restrictions 

above 10,000 feet are necessary as a result of buffeting. Currently, 

the Air Force has not begun testing to verify flight operations at or 

below 10,000 feet; operational limitations at altitudes below 

10,000 feet remain in effect, with testing scheduled to begin in 

June 2003.



Overheating Concerns:



Overheating in the rear portions of the aircraft has significantly 

restricted the duration of high-speed flight testing. As the F/A-22 

flies, heat builds up inside several areas in of the rear of the 

aircraft. Continued exposure to high temperatures would weaken these 

parts of the aircraft. For example, a portion of the airframe that sits 

between the engines’ exhausts[Footnote 12] experiences the highest 

temperatures. This intense heat could weaken or damage the airframe. To 

prevent this heat buildup during flight testing, the aircraft is 

restricted to flying just over 500 miles per hour, about the same speed 

as a modern jet liner, and significantly below the supercruise[Footnote 

13] requirement. Currently, the F/A-22 flies with temperature sensors 

in those areas of the aircraft, and it slows down whenever the 

temperature approaches a certain level. The Air Force may add copper 

sheets to the rear of the aircraft to alleviate the problem. The Air 

Force began these modifications in January 2003 and plans to complete 

them by July 2003.



Horizontal Tail Material Separations:



F/A-22 aircraft have experienced separations of materials in the 

horizontal tail and the shaft, which allows the tail to pivot. Because 

the separations reduce tail strength, the Air Force restricted flight 

testing of some aircraft until it determined that this problem would 

not affect flight safety during testing. The Air Force and the 

contractor initially believed that improvements to the aircraft’s 

manufacturing process would solve this problem. However, the Air Force 

has determined that it could only solve this problem by redesigning the 

tail of the aircraft. The Air Force plans to conduct flight testing of 

the redesigned tail between February 2004 and April 2004.



Meeting Airlift Support Requirements:



The Air Force estimates it will not meet the F/A-22 airlift support 

requirement despite last year’s estimate that it would meet all 

identified key performance parameters.[Footnote 14] (Appendix I 

contains a list of key performance parameters.) The airlift support 

requirement is that 8 C-141 aircraft or their equivalents would be 

sufficient to deploy a squadron of 24 F/A-22s for thirty days without 

resupply. Today the Air Force estimates that 8.8 C-141 equivalents will 

be necessary.



Impact of Maintenance Needs on Performance:



The F/A-22’s performance may also be affected by maintenance needs 

that exceed established objectives. The Air Force estimates that the F/

A-22 should, at this point in its development, be able to complete 

1.67 flying hours between maintenance actions and 1.95 flying hours by 

the end of development. However, aircraft are requiring five times the 

maintenance actions expected at this point in development. As of 

November 2002, the development test aircraft have been completing 

only .29 flying hours between maintenance actions. Therefore, the 

development test aircraft are spending more time than planned on the 

ground undergoing maintenance.



In addition, the F/A-22 program has not completed the testing required 

to prove the aircraft can be maintained worldwide without unique 

support equipment. For example, the Air Force planned to fly the F/A-22 

a minimum of 650 hours prior to the start of operational testing to 

establish that special support equipment is not necessary to maintain 

the materials on the exterior of the aircraft. These materials are 

critical to the aircraft’s low observable, or stealthy, nature. 

However, as of December 2002, the program has only accomplished 

191.6 hours. According to the Air Force, the program will not complete 

testing for this requirement until the completion of the development 

program, currently planned for July 2004.



Modifications to Improve Performance:



In 2002, the F/A-22 development program implemented several 

modifications to development aircraft to improve performance. The 

majority of modifications were related to installing the necessary 

upgrades to complete operational testing. The last three development 

test aircraft have required an average of 63 modifications. The first 

two production aircraft have required an average of 50 of 

these upgrades.



In addition, the program repaired problems in the aircraft’s arresting 

gear system that were discovered during development testing. Further, 

the Air Force has scheduled modifications to address the previously 

cited problems found with the vertical tail of the aircraft (fin-

buffeting). The Air Force included these repairs in its 2002 

modification schedule, but did not begin them in 2002. The 

modifications will begin during fiscal year 2003.



Flight Test Schedules Have Been Extended and May Slip Further:



Progress in F/A-22 flight testing was slower than expected in 2002 in 

all test areas, according to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

testing officials. Consequently, the Air Force extended flight test 

schedules and reduced the number of flight tests. Many tasks originally 

planned for 2002 were rescheduled for 2003. Further, the Air Force now 

plans to conduct more developmental flight testing concurrently with 

operational testing.



Continuing technical problems were the primary reasons for the delays 

in flight testing. In addition, late delivery of development aircraft 

to the flight test center was a contributing problem; three 

developmental aircraft were delivered from 9 to 12 months late. Late 

deliveries were due not only to technical problems, but also to 

continuing problems associated with the manufacture and assembly of 

development aircraft by the prime contractor.



With the new schedule, the Air Force delayed the beginning of 

operational testing for 4 months, until the portion of developmental 

testing required to begin operational testing could be completed. 

Operational testing is now planned to begin in August 2003. Figure 1 

and table 1 show the changes in the FA/-22 flight test schedules.



Figure 1: F/A-22 Flight Test Schedule Changes:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Table 1: Schedule Changes for Key F/A-22 Test Program Events:



Key Events: Completion of development flight testing necessary prior to 

operational testing; Prior schedule: April 2003; Revised schedule: 

August 2003; Change in months: 4.



Key Events: Start of operational testing; Prior schedule: April 2003; 

Revised schedule: August 2003; Change in months: 4.



Key Events: Completion of operational testing; Prior schedule: December 

2003; Revised schedule: July 2004; Change in months: 7.



Key Events: High-rate production decision; Prior schedule: March 2004; 

Revised schedule: March 2004; Change in months: 0.



Source: U.S. Air Force.



[End of table]



However, according to OSD officials involved in operational testing, 

there is a high risk of not completing an adequate amount of 

development flight testing before operational testing is scheduled to 

begin. Indeed, we believe that it is unlikely that the Air Force will 

be able to complete all necessary avionics flight testing prior to the 

planned start of operational testing. Based on F/A-22 flight test 

accomplishment data and current flight test plans, we project that the 

start of operational testing might be delayed until January 2004. As a 

result, operational testing could be delayed by several months beyond 

the current planned date of August 2003.



Development and Modernization Costs Have Increased:



In December 2002, the Air Force estimated that development costs had 

increased by $876 million, bringing total development costs to 

$21.9 billion. This increase was due to the technical problems and 

schedule delays discussed earlier.



In addition, since fiscal year 2001, there have been dramatic increases 

in planned funding for modernization upgrades[Footnote 15] that enhance 

the operational capabilities of the F/A-22, as shown in figure 2. 

Currently, the Air Force has almost $3.0 billion in funding for 

modernization projects, which it plans to spend through fiscal year 

2009. Most of the recent increase in modernization funding is necessary 

to provide increased ground attack capability. Other modernization 

projects include upgrading avionics software, adding an improved short-

range missile capability, upgrading instrumentation for testing, and 

incorporating a classified project.



Figure 2: Planned Modernization Funding Increases, President’s Budgets 

for Fiscal Years 2001-2004:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



In December 2002, in response to the increase in development costs, the 

Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, approved the restructuring of 

the F/A-22 program. According to the Comptroller, the cost increase 

will not require increased funds from Congress. Rather, the estimated 

$876 million increase for development will be met by a $763 million 

decrease in production funding and a transfer of $113 million from 

modernization funds. This restructure eliminates 27 aircraft from the 

current production program, reducing the total number of aircraft to be 

acquired from 303 to 276.[Footnote 16]



Risks in the F/A-22 Acquisition Plan:



Despite continuing development problems and challenges, the Air Force 

plans to continue acquiring production aircraft at increasing annual 

rates. This is a very risky strategy, because, as we have previously 

reported, the Air Force may encounter higher production costs as a 

result of acquiring significant quantities of aircraft before adequate 

testing. Late testing could identify problems that require costly 

modifications in order to achieve satisfactory performance.



For example, as shown in figure 3, the Air Force plans to acquire 

20 aircraft during 2003, rather than the maximum of 16 Congress allowed 

without DOD’s submittal of a risk assessment and certification. DOD 

justified this strategy in the December 2002 risk assessment and 

certification it submitted to Congress.[Footnote 17] In this document, 

DOD certified that acquiring more than 16 aircraft involved lower risk 

and lower total program cost than acquiring only 16. DOD identified the 

costs associated with acquiring more than 16 aircraft per year as 

between $7 million and $221 million, depending on the number of 

aircraft in excess of 16. DOD concluded that this additional cost would 

be less than the potential cost of modifying production aircraft once 

operational testing has been completed. Figure 3 shows the Air Force’s 

acquisition plan.



Figure 3: Number of Production Aircraft on Contract Prior to Completion 

of Operational Testing:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



[A] Operational testing is scheduled to be completed in July 2004.



However, DOD’s risk assessment may be overly optimistic because it 

is grounded in the conclusion that there is a low risk that remaining 

development and operational testing will identify needs for expensive 

modifications. The performance capabilities of the F/A-22 and its 

schedule will remain uncertain until technical problems have been 

addressed, including testing of modifications or fixes necessary to 

potentially alleviate these problems. Furthermore, we believe that the 

amount of development and operational testing and the remaining 

uncertainties increase the possibility that modifications considered 

unlikely in DOD’s analysis will, indeed, need to be made. For example, 

the Air Force has still not completely defined the fin-buffet problem 

described earlier in this report. The remaining 15 percent of flight 

testing to help characterize the problem is not scheduled to begin 

until June 2003. Consequently, there is still the possibility that 

additional modifications and costs may be necessary to correct this 

problem on production aircraft. DOD’s risk assessment acknowledges that 

additional fin buffet testing is needed, but concludes that 

modifications are not expected.



The optimism of DOD’s risk assessment is reflected in the Air Force’s 

general acquisition strategy. As also shown by figure 3, the Air Force 

is currently committed to acquiring 73 production aircraft 

(26 percent) before operational and development testing is complete. We 

believe that--like the fiscal year 2003 decision to acquire more than 

16 aircraft--this is an overly optimistic strategy given the remaining 

F/A-22 technical problems and the current status of testing. As we have 

noted, acquiring aircraft before completing adequate testing to resolve 

significant technical problems increases the risk of costly 

modifications later. If F/A-22 testing schedules slip further--as we 

believe is likely--even more aircraft will be acquired before 

development and operational testing is complete, and the risk of costly 

modifications will increase still more.



Conclusions:



Continuing the acquisition of aircraft in increasing quantities when 

significant development testing and technical problems remain is an 

acquisition strategy that relies on overly optimistic assumptions 

regarding the outcome and timing of the remaining testing events. By 

employing such a strategy, major problems are more likely to be 

discovered after production has begun when it is either too late or 

very costly to correct them. At the very least, key decisions are being 

made without adequate information about the weapon system’s 

demonstrated operational test results. In its certification, DOD 

quantified the estimated costs associated with a higher production 

rate. However, the potential advantage was predicated on the assumption 

that the risks of modifications are low. As we stated last year, by 

limiting F/A-22 production quantities and completing development 

testing, the Air Force could gain information that would reduce 

uncertainties and the risks of increased costs and delays before 

committing to additional production aircraft. As we discussed earlier 

in this report, DOD recently decided to reduce production quantities as 

part of a program restructure to address F/A-22 development problems 

and associated cost increases. Based on uncertainties about the 

resolution of problems found in the past year, we continue to maintain 

the position that production quantities should be limited.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



In light of continued uncertainties regarding the resolution of 

problems found in the past year and notwithstanding the 

December 2, 2002 certification provided by DOD, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense:



* reconsider the Department’s decision to increase the annual 

production rate beyond 16 aircraft until greater knowledge on any 

need for modifications is established through completion of 

operational testing, and:



* update the 2002 risk assessment and certification with sufficient 

detail to allow for verification of the conclusions following the 

completion of operational testing.



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it 

agreed, for the most part, with our description of the current state of 

the F/A-22 program’s content, schedule, and cost. However, DOD did not 

concur with our recommendation that it not increase its production rate 

beyond the maximum of 16 aircraft Congress allowed without DOD 

submitting a risk assessment and certification. DOD said that our 

recommendation does not sufficiently account for the costs of 

termination associated with the approval given to funding long-lead 

items, the manufacturing inefficiencies associated with a reduction in 

aircraft quantities, or the effects of inflation on the cost of 

acquiring aircraft at a lower rate. DOD also noted that we had not 

provided a quantitative assessment to justify limiting production, and 

it reiterated its reliance on the risk assessment and certification it 

submitted to Congress in December 2002. DOD also asserted, incorrectly, 

that our report concludes that minimal cost risk would be realized by 

slowing production.



Following review of DOD’s comments, we clarified the recommendation 

in our draft report by establishing two recommendations. These 

recommendations are based on the current state of the program--

including the challenges and risks it faces--and on our examination of 

DOD’s risk assessment and certification. DOD acknowledges the 

challenges faced by the program but believes the risk of modification 

is low. As we discussed in this report, until testing has been 

completed and technical problems have been addressed, the performance 

capabilities of the F/A-22 and its schedule will remain uncertain; 

thus, it is not possible to predict that expensive modifications will 

not be required. For example, as we stated earlier in this report, 

DOD’s risk assessment concludes that significant costs associated with 

a more extensive modification to resolve the fin buffet problem may be 

required, but the probability is low. DOD arrives at this conclusion 

even though the last phase of testing to help characterize the fin 

buffet problem has not yet begun. Furthermore, we continue to believe 

there is still significant risk that the F/A-22 program will not be 

able to begin operational testing as scheduled in August 2003. 

Subsequent to our providing the draft of this report to DOD for 

comment, OSD’s operational test and evaluation office issued a report 

stating that F/A-22 technical and schedule risk are still high, as is 

the risk that operational testing will be further delayed.



While DOD’s December 2002 risk assessment and certification did provide 

an indication that manufacturing inefficiencies and inflation as a 

result of lower production rates would increase costs, sufficient 

detail was not provided in its risk assessment for us to verify DOD’s 

conclusion. We requested additional detailed information to help us 

evaluate and verify the conclusions. However, the information provided 

to us was not adequate to verify the conclusions contained in the risk 

assessment. Regardless, even with such verification, still needing to 

be resolved are the uncertainties to date regarding when development 

problems can be fixed and the possibility of finding additional 

problems prior to the completion of operational testing. As a result, 

we have little confidence that existing problems can be quickly 

resolved and will not result in further delays. Our work has shown that 

continuing the acquisition of aircraft in increasing quantities when 

significant development testing and technical problems remain is risky. 

By employing such a strategy, major problems are more likely to be 

discovered after the program has begun production when it is either too 

late or very costly to correct them.



DOD also provided various technical comments, which we have 

incorporated as appropriate. One of these comments related to the total 

number of production aircraft to be acquired. The projected number of 

production aircraft the Air Force plans to or can actually acquire has 

historically been fluid and elusive. For example, the President’s 

budget for fiscal year 2003 reflected plans to acquire 333 production 

aircraft, even though the approved program at the time called for 

acquiring 295 production aircraft. In its technical comments, DOD 

stated that the approved program plan is to acquire 295 aircraft. As a 

result of the recent F/A-22 restructuring to cover development cost 

increases, the Air Force says that it now plans to acquire 276 

aircraft. However, DOD estimates that the cost of production to acquire 

these 276 aircraft will be $42.2 billion, which exceeds the current 

production cost limit by $5.4 billion.[Footnote 18] Consequently, 

unless the production cost limit is raised or substantial cost 

reduction plans are achieved, it appears that the number of aircraft 

that can actually be purchased will have to be lowered from the 276 

planned. This is particularly true if production or development costs-

-or both--continue to rise and no additional funds are provided by 

the Congress.



Last month, we recommended in another report that DOD provide Congress 

with documentation reflecting the quantity of aircraft that DOD 

believes can be procured within the existing production cost 

limit.[Footnote 19] DOD’s explanation in its technical comments to a 

draft of this report identifies the likelihood that F/A-22 aircraft 

quantities will continue to fluctuate. This makes our recent 

recommendation that much more compelling.



Scope and Methodology:



To determine whether the development program is likely to meet 

performance goals, we analyzed information on the status of key 

performance parameters. We compared performance goals established by 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics with the Air Force’s estimates of performance for completion 

of development made in December 2002.



To identify the status of F/A-22 modifications, we collected updated 

information on the status of existing aircraft structural problems that 

have required aircraft modifications. To determine whether the program 

is expected to meet schedule goals, we reviewed program and avionics 

schedules and discussed potential changes to these schedules with F/

A-22 program officials. We tracked progress in the flight test program 

and evaluated schedule variances in the contractors’ performance 

management system and compared planned milestone accomplishment dates 

with actual dates. We tracked technical problems in manufacturing and 

assembling the development test aircraft.



To determine whether the program is likely to meet the cost goal, we 

examined (1) the extent to which the development program is likely to 

be completed within the current cost estimate, (2) the Air Force’s 

plans to fund the program for fiscal year 2003, and (3) the program’s 

funding plan compared to the current cost estimate.



In examining DOD’s risk assessment, we discussed the various DOD 

assumptions and approaches used in the assessment with a program 

official who conducted the assessment. We then analyzed the various DOD 

assumptions and approaches used to make the assessment conclusions.



In making these determinations, assessments, and identifications, we 

required access to current information about test results, performance 

estimates, schedule achievements and revisions, costs being incurred, 

aircraft modifications, and the program’s plans for continued 

development and initial production. The Air Force and contractors gave 

us access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on the 

matters covered in this report.



In performing our work, we obtained information or interviewed 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, 

D.C., and the F/A-22 System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force 

Base, Ohio. We performed our work from September 2002 through December 

2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.



We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Air Force; 

and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make 

copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 

be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Catherine Baltzell at (202) 512-

8001 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. 

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.



Allen Li

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:



Signed by Allen Li



List of Congressional Committees:



The Honorable John Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate:



The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate:



The Honorable Duncan Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives:



The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives:



[End of section]



Appendix I: Estimates of Performance for Key Parameters:



Key performance parameter: Radar cross section; Requirement: 

Classified; Current Estimate: Favorable; Margin: Favorable.



Key performance parameter: Supercruise; Requirement: 1.5 Mach; Current 

Estimate: 1.68 Mach; Margin: 12% favorable.



Key performance parameter: Acceleration (<100% is favorable)[A]; 

Requirement: 54 seconds; Current Estimate: 52.3 seconds; Margin: 3% 

favorable.



Key performance parameter: Maneuverability; Requirement: 3.7 g; Current 

Estimate: 3.7 g; Margin: 0.



Key performance parameter: Payload (missiles); Requirement: Four 

medium-range, 

two short-range; Current Estimate: Six medium range, two short-range; 

Margin: NA.



Key performance parameter: Combat radius[B] sub + super; Requirement: 

260 + 100; Current Estimate: 315 + 100; Margin: 15% favorable.



Key performance parameter: Radar detection range; Requirement: 

Classified; Current Estimate: 105%; Margin: 5% favorable.



Key performance parameter: Independent airlift support (C-141 

equivalents); Requirement: 8; Current Estimate: 8.8; Margin: (0.8) 

unfavorable.



Key performance parameter: Sortie generation rate; Requirement: 

Classified; Current Estimate: 100%; Margin: 0.



Key performance parameter: Average flight test hours between 

maintenance; Requirement: 3.0; Current Estimate: 3.0; Margin: 0.



Key performance parameter: Interoperability; Requirement: 100% of 

IERs[C]; Current Estimate: 100% of IERs[C]; Margin: 0.



Source: U.S. Air Force.



[A] The acceleration parameter is a measure of the time it takes the 

aircraft to increase speed to a certain level. If the aircraft is able 

to increase speed to a certain level in less time than expected, 

this is considered favorable. Therefore, a measure of less than 

100 percent is favorable.



[B] Subsonic is below speed of sound, and supersonic is above speed of 

sound.



[C] IERs are information exchange requirements.



[End of table]



[End of section]



Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:



ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:



3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:



27 FEB 2003:



Mr. Allen Li:



Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management U.S. General Accounting 

Office:



441 G Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20548:



Dear Mr. Li:



This is the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) response to the GAO Draft 

Report, GAO-03-431, “TACTICAL AIRCRAFT: Continuing F/A-22 Development 

Risks Warrant Limiting Low-Rate Production to the Rate Initially 

Approved by Congress,” dated February 7, 2003 (GAO Code 120179). The 

Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report.



Delays in the delivery of development aircraft during the past two 

years, delays in flight-testing, and software stability issues, have 

contributed to cost and schedule pressures on the program. The recently 

announced increase in the estimate at completion for the Engineering 

and Manufacturing Development (EMD) program has led the Department to 

re-baseline the overall EMD and production programs for F/A-22. This 

new baseline is reflected in the FY04 President’s Budget submission.



The Department does not concur with the GAO’s recommendation that until 

operational testing is completed, the Secretary of Defense not increase 

the annual production rate beyond the 16 aircraft per year initially 

approved by Congress for fiscal year 2003. The GAO’s recommendation 

does not account sufficiently for the termination liability and 

manufacturing inefficiencies associated with the reduction of 

quantities in Lots 3 and 4, or for the effects of inflation on the cost 

to acquire aircraft at a lower rate.



Based on the cost analyses performed in support of the Department’s 

certification to the congressional defense committees, in December 

2002, we believe that the costs associated with reducing the annual 

production rate to 16 aircraft would exceed the retrofit costs for 

these aircraft. This is due, in part, to the fact that only a small 

number of additional aircraft would be subject to retrofit under DoD’s 

current program. The FY04 President’s Budget submission re-baselines 

the production program and reduces the low-rate initial production ramp 

rate. The differences between the GAO’s recommended quantities and the 

quantities in DoD’s re-baselined program are 4 aircraft in FY 2003, and 

6 aircraft in FY 2004, or delivery deltas of 4 in FY 2005, and 6 in FY 

2006. Therefore, DoD’s plan would require the retrofit of, at most, 10 

additional aircraft if problems were not found until FY 2007.



The Department continues to monitor program costs closely, and 

maintains the flexibility, under the buy-to-budget acquisition 

strategy, to adjust the production rate further if warranted. As it has 

in the past, the Department will review the program before approval of 

Lot 5 long-lead procurement and Lot 4 full funding, in October/November

 2003, and determine if any changes need to be made at that time.



Comments regarding the recommendation are enclosed. The Department also 

has provided more detailed comments on the report under separate cover.



Sincerely,



Glenn F. Lamartin



Director, Defense Systems:



Signed for Glenn F. Lamartin



Enclosure:



GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 7, 2003 (GAO-03-431/GAO Code 120179):



“TACTICAL AIRCRAFT: Continuing F/A-22 Development Risks Warrant 

Limiting Low-Rate Production to the Rate Initially Approved by 

Congress,”:



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATION:



RECOMMENDATION: To help minimize the risks of producing large 

quantities of aircraft that may require costly modifications, the GAO 

recommended that, until operational testing is completed, the Secretary 

of Defense not increase the annual production rate beyond the:



16 aircraft per year initially approved by Congress for fiscal year 

2003. (p. 19/GAO Draft Report):



DOD RESPONSE: Non-concur. While we agree, for the most part, with the 

GAO’s description of the current state of the F/A-22 program (content, 

schedule and cost), the GAO has not provided a quantitative assessment 

to justify its recommendation to limit the production rate for the F/A-

22 to 16 aircraft until operational testing is complete.



The GAO report concludes that, based on the current set of 

circumstances in the F/A-22 program, minimal cost risk would be 

realized by slowing production. This conclusion does not account 

sufficiently for the termination liability and manufacturing 

inefficiencies associated with the reduction of quantities in Lots 3 

and 4, or for the effects of inflation on the cost to acquire aircraft 

at a lower rate. The milestone decision authority approved long-lead 

procurement for Lot 4 in December 2002, and authorized bridge funding, 

beyond long-lead procurement, for Lot 3. In both cases, the Department 

funded more than 16 aircraft. If the Department were now to limit Lots 

3 and 4 to 16 aircraft apiece, the Department would incur some amount 

of termination liability for those lots. The cost of the remaining 

aircraft would increase, as a function of inefficiencies and the 

reduced benefits of learning curves. Finally, the additional cost to 

acquire those aircraft deferred, either across subsequent lots or in 

another lot at the end of production, would be substantial. The Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), in 

compliance with section 8119 of the Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2003, Public Law 107-248, has certified to the 

congressional defense committees that the acquisition of more than 16 

aircraft in fiscal year (FY) 2003 involves lower risk and lower total 

program cost than staying at that quantity.



The likely cost to retrofit aircraft is not as great as the cost to 

reduce the rate of production. This is due, in part, to the fact that 

only a small number of additional aircraft would be subject to retrofit 

under DoD’s current program. The FY 2004 President’s Budget submission 

re-baselines the production program and reduces the low-rate initial 

production ramp rate. The differences between GAO’s recommended 

quantities and those in DoD’s re-baselined program are 4 in FY 2003, 

and 6 in FY 2004, or delivery deltas of 4 in FY 2005, and 6 in FY 2006. 

Therefore, DoD’s plan would require the retrofit of, at most, 10 

additional aircraft, if problems were not found until FY 2007. Retrofit 

costs will depend on the nature of the required modifications. Most of 

the current areas of concern, such as avionics and software, are 

relatively inexpensive to address. If airframe retrofits were required,

costs would likely be much more expensive. On balance, it continues to 

be less costly to pursue the production profile in the FY04 President’s

Budget than to reduce production to 16 aircraft in FY 2003 and FY 2004.



The Department and the Air Force are committed to the “buy-to-budget” 

strategy, which requires continuous monitoring of the potential cost 

growth within the program and appropriate program adjustments when 

warranted.



[End of section]



Appendix III: GAO Staff Acknowledgments:



Acknowledgments:



Catherine Baltzell, Marvin E. Bonner, Edward Browning, Gary Middleton, 

Sameena Nooruddin, Madhav Panwar, Karen A. Richey, Don M. Springman, 

and Ralph White made key contributions to this report.



[End of section]



Related GAO Products:



Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays Indicate Initial Production Rates Should 

Be Lower to Reduce Risks. GAO-02-298. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2002.



Tactical Aircraft: Continuing Difficulty Keeping F-22 Production Costs 

Within the Congressional Limitation. GAO-01-782. Washington, D.C.: 

July 16, 2001.



Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Development and Testing Delays Indicate Need 

for Limit on Low-Rate Production. GAO-01-310. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2001.



Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates 

Exceeded Congressional Limitation. GAO/NSIAD-00-178. Washington, D.C.: 

August 15, 2000.



Defense Acquisitions: Use of Cost Reduction Plans in Estimating 

F-22 Total Production Costs. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-200. Washington, D.C.: 

June 15, 2000.



Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for 

Fiscal Year 2001. GAO/OCG-00-8. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2000.



F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are 

Avoided. GAO/NSIAD-00-68. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2000.



Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F-22 Cost and Schedule Goals. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-58. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 1999.



Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD’s Production and RDT&E Programs. GAO/

NSIAD-99-233R. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1999.



Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for 

Fiscal Year 2000. GAO/OCG-99-26. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 1999.



Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering 

and Manufacturing Development Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113. 

Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.



F-22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-55. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 1999.



F-22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: 

March 25, 1998.



F-22 Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development Goals. GAO/NSIAD-98-67. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 1998.



Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program. 

GAO/NSIAD-97-156. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 1997.



Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on 

Optimistic Budget Projections. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103. Washington, D.C.: 

March 5, 1997.



F-22 Restructuring. GAO/NSIAD-97-100BR. Washington, D.C.: 

February 28, 1997.



Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of 

F-22 Aircraft Should Be Reduced. GAO/NSIAD-95-59. Washington, D.C.: 

April 19, 1995.



Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Issues. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-176. 

Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1994.



Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned. 

GAO/NSIAD-94-118. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1994.



FOOTNOTES



[1] “F/A” stands for fighter/attack aircraft. The Air Force changed the 

designation from F-22 to F/A-22 in September 2002 to reflect the 

aircraft’s air-to-surface attack capability.



[2] P.L. 105-85, Section 217, Nov. 18, 1997.



[3] Section 217 of the act also requires us to assess whether we had 

access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on matters 

covered by our report.



[4] Short of war, operational testing is the most realistic way of 

assessing weapon system performance. It puts a weapon through the 

rigors of combat conditions to determine its operational effectiveness 

and suitability.



[5] The 27 aircraft are a reduction from the approved program quantity 

of 303 aircraft, however, the Air Force had hoped to acquire as many as 

339 aircraft by achieving cost reductions.



[6] Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the 

conduct of operations by land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive 

interference by the enemy.



[7] P.L. 105-85, Section 217, Nov. 18, 1997.



[8] P.L. 107-107, Section 213, Dec. 28, 2001.



[9] The cost limitation, before adjustment under the act’s provisions, 

was $43.4 billon.



[10] P.L. 107-248, Section 8119, Oct. 23, 2002.



[11] Short of war, operational testing is the most realistic way of 

assessing a weapon system.



[12] The technical term for this section of the airframe is called the 

“stinger.”



[13] Supercruise is the aircraft’s ability to travel at high speeds for 

long ranges. The F/A-22’s supercruise requirement is approximately 

1,000 miles per hour.



[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays 

Indicate Initial Production Rates Should Be Lower to Reduce Risks, GAO-

02-298 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2002).



[15] The Air Force considers modernizations outside the scope of the 

development and production programs.



[16] The 27 aircraft are a reduction from the approved program quantity 

of 303 aircraft; however, the Air Force had hoped to acquire as many as 

339 aircraft by achieving cost reductions.



[17] The National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 

107-248, Oct. 23, 2002) required DOD to submit a certification to 

Congress to justify the acquisition of more than 16 aircraft in fiscal 

year 2003. In December 2002, DOD submitted the certification 

to Congress.



[18] The current production cap, as adjusted, is $36.8 billion.



[19] U.S. General Accounting Office, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs to 

Better Inform Congress about Implications of Continuing F/A-22 Cost 

Growth, GAO-03-280 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2003).



GAO’s Mission:



The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, 

exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 

responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 

of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 

of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 

analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 

informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to 

good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 

integrity, and reliability.



Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:



The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through the Internet. GAO’s Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 

abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 

expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 

engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 

can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 

graphics.



Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its 

Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 

files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 

www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to daily E-mail alert for newly 

released products” under the GAO Reports heading.



Order by Mail or Phone:



The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 

each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 

of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 

Orders should be sent to:



U.S. General Accounting Office



441 G Street NW,



Room LM Washington,



D.C. 20548:



To order by Phone: 	



	Voice: (202) 512-6000:



	TDD: (202) 512-2537:



	Fax: (202) 512-6061:



To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:



Contact:



Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov



Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:



Public Affairs:



Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.



General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.



20548: