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entitled 'Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges Related to Building 
Runways and Actions to Address Them' which was released on January 31, 
2003.



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Report to the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure:



January 2003:



Aviation Infrastructure:



Challenges Related to Building Runways and Actions to Address Them:



GAO-03-164:



GAO Highlights: 



Highlights of GAO-03-164, a report to the Aviation Subcommittee, House 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:



January 2003:



Aviation Infrastructure:



Challenges Related to Building Runways and Actions to Address Them:



Why GAO Did This Study:



Aviation experts believe that building runways is one key way to 
address 

airport capacity issues and prevent delays that can affect the entire 
U.S. 

economy, but runway projects are often controversial and time-
consuming. 

GAO was asked to examine how much time airports spend completing 
runways, 

what challenges airports and other stakeholders experience during this 

process, and what airports and other stakeholders have done to address 

challenges related to runway projects.



GAO analyzed the results of surveys from 30 airports on 32 runway 
projects 

and visited 5 airports in order to interview numerous runway project 

stakeholders. 



The Department of Transportation agreed with GAO’s characterization of 
the 

challenges associated with building runways and some of the initiatives 
taken 

to address these challenges. They did express some concerns related to 
GAO’s 

analysis of the time airports spent or estimated spending in developing 

runways, and suggested that GAO acknowledge additional FAA efforts to 
improve 

the runway process. We believe that our approach was a reasonable 
assessment 

of the amount of time taken to build runways; however, we clarified our 

discussion about the length of time. We also added information 
regarding 

initiatives undertaken by FAA.

 

What GAO Found: 



The amount of time airports spend planning and building their runways 
can 

vary because of numerous factors. In light of this variation, for the 
32 

runway projects we analyzed, we used median rather than average time. 
The 

median time was about 10 years for runways that had been completed and 
was 

estimated to be about 14 years for those not completed. Most airports 
and 

stakeholders we visited and surveyed said they faced a variety of 
challenges 

that had delayed their runway projects. While the level of challenges 
that 

airports faced varied in part depending on the proximity of the airport 
to a 

major city and the amount of community opposition to the runway, some 
common 

themes emerged, including challenges related to the following:



* Reaching stakeholder agreement on purpose and need for the runway;



* Completing the environmental review process; 



* Reaching agreement on noise mitigation and other issues; and



* Designing and constructing the runway.



Although there may be no single solution to the challenges involved in 

developing runways, the federal government and airport authorities have 

undertaken a number of initiatives in this area. Recently, the 
President 

issued an Executive Order that is directed at streamlining the 
environmental 

review of transportation infrastructure projects, including runways. In 

addition, two federal legislative initiatives designed to streamline 
the 

runway process were considered in the 107th Congress. In addition, FAA 
has 

undertaken a number of initiatives directed at streamlining parts of 
the 

process.  Airports have also undertaken initiatives in this area, 
including 

involving stakeholders such as community groups early in the process, 
and 

reaching early agreement on how best to mitigate noise and other runway 

impacts. These initiatives may be a step in the right direction, but it 
is 

too early to assess their impact on the runway process. 



Figure: Amount of Time Airports Spent or Estimated Spending to Complete 
Runways 

Varied:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-164



To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the 

link above. For more information, contact Gerald Dillingham, Ph.D., at 

(202) 512-3650 or via E-mail at dillinghamg@gao.gov.



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



Some Airports Have Spent Many Years Building Runways and Have Faced a 

Variety of Challenges:



A Number of Initiatives Are Underway to Address Challenges Related to 

Building Runways:



Agency Comments:



Appendixes:



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



Appendix II: Airport Site Visits:



General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport - East Boston, MA:



Current Status of the Runway Project:



Stakeholders Cite Community Opposition as a Major Challenge and Say 

Efforts to Address This Issue Were Unsuccessful:



Stakeholders Say Meeting Extensive Environmental Requirements Has Been 

Challenging Because of Community Opposition:



Litigation Added Time to Process:



Appendix III: Dalls-Fort Worth International Airport-DFW, TX:



Current Status of the Two Runway Projects:



Airport Officials Described Extensive Environmental Review Process as 

Challenging:



The Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport Used Some Unique Approaches 

to Mitigate Runway Impacts:



Stakeholder Experiences, from Start to Finish, Were Many and Varied:



Litigation Delayed Process:



Appendix IV: Memphis International Airport:



Status of the Runway project:



Airport Officials Stated That They Faced Challenges Reaching Consensus 

among Stakeholders on Project Funding Issues and Decisionmaking:



Extensive Requirements Raised Challenges Regarding Wetlands Mitigation 

and Land Acquisition during Construction of 

Runway:



Site-Specific Challenges Involved Relocating Other

Infrastructure:



Appendix V: Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport:



Current Status of the Runway Project:



Stakeholders Agree That Comprehensive Mitigation Plans Are Essential 

but Difficult to Develop:



Stakeholders Believe That Mitigation Funding Should Be More Flexible to 

Include More Communities:



A Nationwide Low Frequency Noise Policy Is Not in Place:



Some Communities Question Justification of State Zoning Laws:



Appendix VI: Seattle-Tacoma International Airport:



Status of the Runway project:



Simplifying Purpose and Need May Help Reduce the Circuitous Nature of 

the Review Process:



A Compatible Land Use Program May Help to Reduce 

Opposition:



New Mitigation Approaches and Increased Community Interaction Could 

Help Foster Community Support:



Extensive Regulatory and Legal Requirements Posed Resource Challenges:



Site-Specific Issues Involve Safety and Environmental 

Challenges:



Appendix VII: Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada:



Status of Runway Projects:



Airport Development Process in Canada Differs from U.S. 

Process:



Canadian Airports Face Many of the Same Challenges as U.S. Airports:



Appendix VIII: Survey of Airports:



Appendix IX: Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects:



Tables Tables :



Table 1: Summary of Provisions in H.R. 4481 and S. 633, and the 

Challenges Each Seeks to Address:



Table 2: Airports Selected for Site Visit and their Runway Projects:



Table 3: History of the Boston Logan Runway Project:



Table 4: History of Dallas-Fort Worth Runway Project:



Table 5: History of Memphis Runway Project:



Table 6: History of Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport Runway 

Project:



Table 7: History of Sea-Tac Runway Project:



Table 8: Airports Surveyed:



Figures:



Figure 1: Runway Development Process:



Figure 2: Amount of Time Airports Have Spent or Planned to Spend on 

Runway Projects Varied:



Figure 3: Median Time Spent on Runway Projects Overall and on Each 
Phase:



Figure 4: Airport Diagram--Boston’s Logan International Airport:



Figure 5: Airport Diagram--Dalls-Fort Worth International Airport:



Figure 6: Airport Diagram--Memphis International Airport:



Figure 7: Airport Diagram--Sea-Tac International Airport:



Figure 8: Airport Diagram--Lester B. Pearson International Airport:



Letter:



January 30, 2003:



The Honorable John L. Mica

Chairman

The Honorable William O. Lipinski

Ranking Democratic Member

Subcommittee on Aviation 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives:



Although the events of September 11, 2001, diverted the aviation 

industry’s attention from airport flight capacity to security issues, 

aviation experts believe that addressing capacity issues must be 

brought back to the forefront to prevent costly flight delays and their 

negative effect on the U.S. economy. According to a recent report on 

the impact on civil aviation,[Footnote 1] the flight congestion and 

delay problems that were experienced in 2000 had a significant effect 

on the entire U.S. economy and were felt not only in the commercial 

aviation industry but also in the tourism and related supplier 

industries. The report found that in 2000, commercial aviation delays 

resulted in over $9 billion in negative economic effects on the entire 

U.S. economy and cost commercial airlines over $3 billion. In addition, 

the report stated that if there were no new investments in airport 

construction (including new runways) or in the air traffic system 

beyond 2000, delays could potentially cost the U.S. economy $13.5 

billion in 2007 and $17.2 billion in 2012.



Building runways can involve years of planning, an extensive 

environmental review phase, and the design and construction of the 

actual runway. Airport authorities who want to build a runway must also 

coordinate with numerous stakeholders, including airlines, federal and 

state officials, and community groups. In addition, they may face legal 

challenges from opponents of the runway that can take years to resolve. 

Nonetheless, according to FAA, despite these challenges, building new 

runways is widely regarded as the most effective way to increase 

capacity in the national airspace system and is critical to the entire 
U.S. 

economy.[Footnote 2] This report provides information on the process 

for building runways, taking into consideration the needs of the system 

and the concerns of the various stakeholders. Specifically, as agreed 

with your offices, we address the following questions:



1.	 How much time do airports spend building their runway projects, and 

what challenges do airports and other stakeholders experience during 

this process?



2.	 What have airports and other stakeholders done or proposed to do to 

address the challenges they experienced in building runways?



To determine the amount of time that airports spent to complete runway 

projects, along with challenges that airports and other stakeholders 

faced during this process and initiatives to address these challenges, 

we surveyed 30 airports that had built or planned to build a total of 

32 runways between 1991 and 2010. Based on survey responses, we 

selected 5 airports that were diverse in size, location, and challenges 

at which we conducted in-depth site visits in order to understand the 

perspectives of numerous stakeholders. At these locations, we 

interviewed airport, airline, federal and state, and community 

officials about their experiences. We also visited the Lester B. 

Pearson International Airport in Toronto, Canada, to gain a perspective 

on the Canadian runway development process. A more detailed explanation 

of the scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.



Results in Brief:



The amount of time that airports spend planning and building their 

runways can vary because of a number of factors. For example, although 

it is relatively straightforward to determine the beginning and ending 

of the environmental and the design and construction phases of the 

runway development process, there is no consensus among stakeholders 

about what constitutes the beginning of the planning phase of the 

process. Consequently, the length of time and the number of activities 

considered by some airports to be part of the planning phase vary. In 

light of these circumstances, we decided to use a median time rather 

than the average time because it would minimize the impact of outlying 

airports that may have taken a very long or very short time. For the 

airports we surveyed, the median time spent from planning to completion 

of their runway projects was about 10 years, and the median time that 

airports estimated they would spend on projects not yet completed was 

about 14 years. Several of the airports with unfinished runway projects 

stated that significant challenges had delayed their projects’ 

completion. Although the level of challenges faced by airports varied 

depending on such factors as proximity of the airport to a major city, 

amount of community opposition to the runway, and specific 

environmental issues, some common themes emerged. For example, several 

airports described challenges related to reaching stakeholder agreement 

on the purpose and need for the new runway. Another theme was the 

challenge of completing required environmental reviews; specifically, 

airports described challenges related to complying with extensive and 

duplicative federal and state requirements and obtaining the necessary 

permits. Some airports also described challenges related to reaching 

agreement on how to mitigate the impact of noise and other issues. 

Several airports commented that they faced challenges during the design 

and construction of their runways such as dealing with weather and site 

preparation issues.



Although there may be no single solution that addresses all the issues 

involved in planning and building runways, the federal government and 

airport authorities have undertaken a number of initiatives in this 

area. Most recently, the President issued an Executive Order that is 

directed at streamlining the environmental review of transportation 

infrastructure projects by requiring federal agencies that conduct 

environmental reviews to develop procedures that will allow the reviews 

to be completed in a timely and responsible manner. In addition, to 

address challenges associated with the many regulatory requirements of 

the runway development process, two legislative initiatives designed to 

streamline the runway development process have been under consideration 

at the federal level. FAA has also undertaken several initiatives 

directed at increasing communication and coordination, and at 

streamlining the planning and environmental review of runway projects. 

FAA officials expect these initiatives to produce measurable 

improvements in the runway development process. Although some airports 

stated that the federal initiatives held promise for helping airports 

to resolve challenges more quickly, it is too early to assess their 

impact on the runway development process. Airports have also undertaken 

initiatives to address challenges related to building runways, 

including getting local stakeholders such as community groups involved 

at the very beginning of the process and reaching early agreement on 

how to mitigate the impacts of the runway. Airports described these 

initiatives as helpful to facilitating the completion of their runway 

projects, and their efforts may be useful for other airports involved 

in runway projects to consider, but the variety of situations that 

airports described and the different levels of challenges they faced 

make it difficult to generalize from one airport’s experience to 

another.



We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this 

report for their review and comment. FAA officials agreed with our 

characterization of the challenges associated with building runways and 

our identification of some of the initiatives to address these 

challenges. However, they did express some concerns related to our 

analysis of the time that airports spent developing their runways, and 

suggested that GAO include more acknowledgment of FAA’s efforts to 

improve the process. In response to FAA’s comments, we believe our 

approach was a reasonable assessment of the amount of time it takes 

airports to build runways; however, we clarified our discussion about 

the length of time. We also added information regarding several 

initiatives that FAA has undertaken to streamline the runway 

development process, and we made technical changes where appropriate.



Background:



The decision to build runways has traditionally elicited strong and 

often emotional reactions among stakeholders, both negative and 

positive. Generally, these reactions are directed at the decision to 

build a runway--usually in response to the perceived environmental or 

economic impacts that the proposed project will have on the surrounding 

communities. Often, opponents to a runway project base their opposition 

on the belief that the negative impact of the runway on their quality 

of life will outweigh the projected benefits of the project. At other 

times, opponents contend that alternatives such as high-speed rail, 

regional airports, or demand management are better alternatives to 

resolving delay issues than building new runways. In contrast, 

proponents of new runway projects generally contend that building new 

runways can increase the level of service and reduce delay at the 

airport, can result in a positive economic impact to the region served 

by the airport, and in some cases can reduce noise pollution by 

distributing flights over a larger geographical area.



Airports that plan to build runways must comply with what can become a 

complex process involving three general phases that often overlap: 

planning, environmental review, and design and construction. In 

addition, airports can be involved in legal actions that can occur in 

any or all of the three phases.



The first phase in the runway development process is planning. 

According to FAA guidance, airports should begin planning for a new 

runway when the airport has reached 60 to 75 percent of total annual 

flight capacity. During the planning phase, airport authorities and 

local officials begin by identifying the type of development needed at 

a specific airport and the proposed project’s estimated cost and 

benefits, in both political and economic terms. Some of the planning 

tasks include establishing the purpose and need for the runway (for 

example, assessing the capability of current facilities, reviewing and 

refining aviation demand forecasts, and evaluating options to 

accommodate forecast demands), coordinating land use issues with 

community planning boards, and preparing capacity enhancement plans, 

master plans, airspace reviews, cost benefit analyses, and airport 

layout plans.[Footnote 3] Further, most airports consider numerous 

alternatives for increasing capacity or reducing delay before deciding 

on a project to pursue. During this phase, airports will begin 

addressing how to fund the proposed project.



The environmental review phase, which often overlaps with planning, is 

the second phase in the runway development process. This phase 

typically begins with a determination by FAA of the extent to which a 

proposed project will affect the quality of the environment.[Footnote 

4] To make this determination, FAA examines the proposed project and 

its possible environmental impacts on air and water quality, on noise, 

and on historical lands. FAA will make one of three determinations. If 

the agency determines that the scope of the project is such that it 

will not directly affect the environment, it will issue a categorical 

exclusion.[Footnote 5] If FAA determines that a project will have a 

measurable effect on the environment, but that its impact will not 

exceed guidelines established in the agency’s Environmental Handbook, 

it will issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). After 

issuance of a FONSI, runway projects can begin applying for necessary 

permits, such as those that may be required under the Clean Air Act or 

the Clean Water Act. Where potentially significant impacts are obvious, 

FAA will proceed directly to the preparation of an environmental impact 

statement (EIS) rather than start with the airport sponsors’ 

environmental assessment.[Footnote 6]



If FAA determines that a proposed project will have significant 

environmental effects, it will issue a notice of intent to prepare an 

EIS. An EIS includes an analysis of the potential environmental effects 

of a proposed project and how to mitigate significant impacts. Council 

on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations do not require that all 

impacts be mitigated; agencies are required to disclose impacts that 

will not be mitigated, and the reason. After the draft EIS is 

completed, FAA provides it to the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA), which publishes a notice of its availability in the Federal 

Register, where it is made available for review and comment to federal, 

state, and local agencies and the public for at least 45 days. Public 

hearings, if necessary, usually occur during the review and comment 

period. At the end of the public comment period, FAA responds to 

comments received on the draft and prepares the final EIS. Once FAA 

approves the final EIS, the document is printed, distributed, and once 

again filed with EPA. EPA subsequently publishes notice of the 

availability of the final EIS in the Federal Register. According to CEQ 

regulations, FAA can not issue a Record of Decision (ROD) for at least 

30 days after the publication of the final EIS. Once the final EIS has 

been issued, it takes FAA an average of about 3 months to issue a ROD. 

The ROD, which is the final step of the environmental review process, 

summarizes the administrative record of the agency’s proposals, 

alternatives, analysis, findings/ determinations, decisions, actions, 

and mitigation measures that were made a condition of approval of the 

EIS. If, however, FAA finds that the revised draft differs 

significantly from the initial draft, the agency may issue a 

supplemental draft EIS and release this document for further review and 

comment. In addition, other factors that may lead to a supplemental EIS 

include a change in the proposed action, a change in the agency’s 

decision, or new reasonable alternatives not previously evaluated. A 

supplemental draft EIS can occur anywhere in the environmental process.



In addition to the requirements above, airport sponsors may be required 

to obtain environmental permits/approvals from other state, local, and 

federal agencies before they can begin construction of the proposed 

project. These permits/approvals cover various federal and state 

requirements related to wetlands, water and air quality, coastal zone 

management, and endangered species, among others. These requirements 

arise from various regulations, including the federal Clean Water Act 

and Clean Air Act. For example, the Army Corp of Engineers requires 

permits when proposed projects have an impact on wetlands under the 

Clean Water Act. State and local agencies may also be responsible for 

requiring permits dealing with air and water quality. Similar to the 

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, the permitting 

process may include a public review and comment period. Project 

opponents may initiate litigation once the final EIS has been approved 

and the FAA has issued a favorable ROD. However, a lawsuit can be filed 

at any time during the planning, environmental, and design and 

construction phases.



Following the completion of the permit process, project sponsors 

generally begin the final phase of the runway development process--the 

design and construction phase. This phase includes a myriad of tasks, 

such as project engineering, financing, contracting, land acquisition, 

site preparation, and actual project construction. This phase also 

includes construction tasks related to mitigating noise, wetland, and 

other environmental impacts. According to FAA, it is common for airport 

sponsors to begin runway design while the environmental process is 

underway in the interest of saving time by undertaking these actions 

concurrently. Once construction of the runway has been completed, FAA 

certifies the runway for operation and commissions it for service. 

Figure 1 illustrates the main steps involved in the runway development 

process.



Figure 1: Runway Development Process:



[See PDF for image]



Note: GAO analysis of FAA and other documents.



[End of figure] 



Some Airports Have Spent Many Years Building Runways and Have Faced a 

Variety of Challenges:



The amount of time that airports spend planning and building their 

runways can vary because of a number of factors. For example, although 

it is relatively straightforward to determine the beginning and ending 

of the environmental and the design and construction phases of the 

process, there is no consensus about what constitutes the beginning of 

the planning phase. Consequently, the length of time and the number of 

activities considered by some airports to be part of the planning phase 

vary. Airports also described a variety of challenges that they said 

delayed their projects. Many of these challenges related to reaching 

stakeholder agreement, completing the environmental review phase, 

mitigating the impact of noise, or designing and constructing the 

actual runway.



Completed Runways Took a Median of 10 Years to Build, and Unfinished 

Runways May Take Even Longer:



As shown in figure 2, airports we surveyed reported spending a wide 

range of time in completing runway projects. In general, airports 

reported spending less time on completed projects than they estimate 

they will spend on those projects not yet completed; for example, 

airports reported that about half of the completed runways took 10 

years or less but estimated that almost all the projects that were not 

yet completed (16 out of 17) would take 10 years or more. According to 

the airports with uncompleted projects, a number of factors contributed 

to the time spent, such as community opposition and difficulties in 

dealing with environmental requirements.



Figure 2: Amount of Time Airports Have Spent or Planned to Spend on 

Runway Projects Varied:



[See PDF for image] 



Note: GAO analysis of airport survey data.



[End of figure] 



Figure 3 shows that the median time spent on completed runway projects 

was about 10 years, while the median time airports estimated they would 

spend on runway projects not yet completed was about 14 years. 

Similarly, the median time spent on the planning and environmental 

phases for airports that had completed these phases was significantly 

shorter than the median time airports estimated would be spent on those 

phases for projects that they had not yet completed. This may have been 

because the three projects in the planning phase and the five projects 

in the environmental phase were experiencing challenges that the 

airports believed would delay the completion of the respective phases. 

Moreover, the median time spent on the environmental phase of projects 

that had completed their environmental requirements under a FONSI was 

about 2.7 years, while the median time spent on the environmental phase 

of projects that had completed their environmental requirements with an 

EIS was about 3.7 years. This difference is likely attributable to the 

greater number of requirements that accompany an EIS as compared with a 

FONSI.



Figure 3: Median Time Spent on Runway Projects Overall and on Each 

Phase Varied:



[See PDF for image] 



Note 1: GAO analysis of airport survey data.



Note 2: Airports used different milestones to indicate the start and 

end dates for each phase. Given this difference, we used median time 

rather than average time.



Note 3: Although we received 32 responses regarding the amount of time 

taken or estimated to complete the overall process, the number of 

responses regarding the amount of time taken or estimated to complete 

each phase varied.



[End of figure] 



In May 2001, the Department of Transportation issued a report to the 

Congress on an environmental review of airport improvement projects 

that reported results similar to our analysis.[Footnote 7] As a part of 

its analysis, FAA measured the average time that elapsed between the 

start of planning and the start of construction for 10 airports that 

received approval for a new runway between 1996 and 2000. FAA found 

that the average time from the start of planning until the start of 

construction was about 10 years.[Footnote 8] The report also stated 

that the average time to complete an EIS for a new runway was 3.25 
years 

from the beginning of the EIS process to the issuance of the Record of 

Decision--or about one-third of the 10-year time. According to FAA, 

there can be a considerable lag from the inception of the runway 
process 

until the runway is completed and in operation. FAA added that these 

delays occur as part of the process that airports sometimes go through 

in seeking to achieve consensus and the political will to move forward 

while contending with local public and political opposition to runway 

development. According to FAA, numerous examples can be found where 

runway development has been delayed 5, 10, or more years while plans 

are revised, discarded, or shelved until political and/or economic 

factors can be satisfied. FAA stated that these actions make it 

difficult to determine how long it takes to build a runway.



Several Themes Emerged among the Challenges That Airports Described:



Most airports that we surveyed and visited described significant 

factors that delayed their runway projects. In many cases, the 

challenges they described were interrelated. For example, several 

airports said they faced significant community opposition, which 

affected their ability to reach stakeholder agreement and to complete 

the environmental review phase. Although many of the airports we 

surveyed experienced similar types of challenges, some airports, such 

as those in Boston, Atlanta, and Seattle, faced a heightened level of 

challenges because of their locations in urban areas with a large 

number of residences very close by. Some of the specific challenges 

identified by airports and other stakeholders we visited include the 

following:



Reaching stakeholder agreement. Reaching consensus on the purpose and 

need for a runway was described by several airports as being 

particularly challenging. In order to reach this consensus, airports 

generally must meet numerous times with stakeholders who may have 

differing opinions about the runway project or uses of land surrounding 

the airport. For example, airport officials in Los Angeles and Boston 

described challenges related to working with community interest groups 

and local metropolitan planning organizations that opposed the runway 

projects and advocated using means other than building a new runway to 

address capacity issues, such as developing regional airports, building 

new airports, or pursuing alternative transportation modes like high-

speed rail.



Some airports described challenges related to reaching agreement with 

stakeholders other than community groups. For example, stakeholders in 

Seattle said that reaching agreement was challenging on issues such as 

where the runway should be located or the coordination of sometimes 

inconsistent land use plans among various planning groups. Officials at 

Boston’s Logan Airport said they could not reach agreement with FAA, a 

key stakeholder on all runway projects, regarding what was needed to 

satisfy the environmental review process. Specifically, Logan Airport 

officials disagreed with FAA’s decision to extend its environmental 

process by requiring a supplemental EIS because they believed that 

environmental issues had been settled during the initial analysis. They 

believed that FAA’s decision to require the supplemental draft stemmed 

from significant public and political pressure from those opposed to 

the project.



Completing the environmental review phase. Of the 30 airports we 

surveyed, 13 stated that one of their most significant challenges in 

planning and building their runways was complying with environmental 

requirements. Under the current process, airports must comply with over 

40 federal laws, executive orders, and regulations that often overlap 

with the environmental requirements mandated by some states. For 

example, federal law requires the governor of each state to certify 

that federally funded runways conform to local air quality standards, a 

requirement known as the Governor’s certification. In addition, the 

Clean Air Act requires FAA to determine whether emissions from each 

airport project conform to its state’s plan for implementing national 

air quality standards. According to officials from the American 

Association of Airport Executives and Airports Council International, 

many state air quality plans contain unrealistically low airport 

emissions budgets, and few realistically anticipate reasonable airport 

growth. They believe that coordinating airport development activity 

with the state air quality plans causes a major source of delay and 

risk to airport projects. The officials also noted that the Governor’s 

Certificate requirement duplicates requirements found in the Clean Air 

Act and Clean Water Act.



Moreover, several airports, including those in Boston, Atlanta, 

Houston, and Minneapolis-St. Paul, commented that obtaining the permits 

necessary to complete the environmental review was a challenge that 

delayed their projects, because permitting agencies often took much 

longer than expected. Boston Logan officials stated that they 

experienced delays because the permitting agencies did not agree on the 

order in which the permits should be issued. For example, the coastal 

zone management agency was unwilling to issue its permit until FAA 

issued the ROD; however, FAA was unwilling to issue the ROD until the 

coastal permit was issued. According to FAA officials, the agency was 

able to obtain a satisfactory assurance from the state permitting 

agency that allowed FAA to move forward with the issuance of the ROD. 

As a result, according to FAA officials, they were able to avoid a 

significant delay.



Mitigating the impact of noise and other issues. As we reported in 

October 2000,[Footnote 9] mitigating the potential impact of aircraft 

noise on the surrounding community continues to be a significant 

challenge for airports that are building new runways. One of the 

reasons is that community concerns with aircraft noise are generally 

already high around many airports, and adding new runways adds to the 

already heightened concern. Another reason, according to some 

stakeholders, why mitigating noise is particularly challenging for 

several of the airports is because they do not participate in FAA’s 

voluntary Part 150 Noise Compatibility Program, which provides funding 

to airports to help mitigate the impact of noise on the communities. 

Several other airports also told us that their noise problems are the 

result of incompatible land uses (existing or planned) around the 

airports.



In addition to mitigating the impact of noise on the surrounding 

community, officials at Sea-Tac Airport said that they were equally 

challenged to mitigate the impact of the project on wetlands, 

particularly because two key stakeholders had conflicting views on how 

this should be done. According to Sea-Tac officials, the state of 

Washington has a strong preference that mitigation measures for wetland 

and stream impacts be located in the same water basin where the impacts 

occur. However, because of concerns about attracting wildlife, and the 

danger to aircraft of bird strikes, FAA strongly advises that airports 

avoid locating wetlands within 10,000 feet of runways.



Design and construction of the runway. Several airports commented that 

they also faced some challenges during the design and construction 

phase of their runways. For example, Dallas-Fort Worth officials stated 

that adverse weather conditions created construction problems for them, 

as the region’s high temperatures made it difficult to ensure that 

concrete poured for the runway would cure properly. Airport officials 

at Sea-Tac also described challenges related to the design and 

construction phase. For example, before Sea-Tac can build its runway it 

has to import 17 million cubic yards of dirt to the airport to extend a 

plateau for a foundation. Thus, the airport authority has to find 

suitable, nonpolluted fill dirt to use for the foundation. Once the 

dirt is located, it must be transported to the airport over an indirect 

route using trucks that the airport is required to clean before they 

leave the airport. Finally, the airport authority is to use extensive 

mitigation measures to ensure that moving the dirt will not adversely 

affect the surrounding communities and wetlands.



Appendixes II through VI provide a detailed description of how various 

challenges have affected runway projects at the Boston, Dallas, 

Memphis, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Seattle airports, according to 

airport authorities and other stakeholders.



A Number of Initiatives Are Underway to Address Challenges Related to 

Building Runways:



While there may be no single solution to all the challenges associated 

with planning and building runways, the federal government and airports 

have undertaken a number of initiatives to address the challenges 

related to such issues as duplicative environmental requirements, 

stakeholder differences, and noise mitigation. Primarily, these 

initiatives focused on streamlining the environmental review process 

and improving cooperation, communication, and coordination among major 

stakeholders.



Federal Initiatives Focus on Streamlining the Environmental Review 

Process to Reduce Duplication:



One initiative designed to address a significant issue identified by 

airports and other stakeholders--the extensive and often duplicative 

environmental review requirements--is Executive Order 13274, entitled 

Environmental Stewardship and Transportation Infrastructure Project 

Reviews, which was signed by the President on September 18, 

2002.[Footnote 10] The order directs agencies that conduct required 

environmental reviews with respect to transportation infrastructure 

projects, including runways, to formulate and implement administrative, 

policy, and procedural mechanisms that enable the agencies to ensure 

completion of such reviews in a timely and environmentally responsible 

manner. The order also states that the Secretary of Transportation 

shall:



* designate a list of high-priority transportation infrastructure 

projects to receive expedited agency reviews;[Footnote 11]



* chair an inter-agency task force to monitor and expedite 

environmental reviews of high-priority transportation infrastructure 

projects, and identify and promote policies that can effectively 

streamline the environmental review process; and:



* prepare an annual report to the President describing the results of 

the expedited reviews, and provide recommendations.



Executive departments and agencies shall take appropriate actions, to 

the extent consistent with applicable law and available resources, to 

promote environmental stewardship in the nation’s transportation system 

and to expedite environmental reviews of high-priority transportation 

infrastructure projects. The Secretary has stated that the Department 

of Transportation will work with federal and state agencies to reduce 

duplicative and overlapping requirements and promote effective 

strategies for enhancing the timeliness of the decisionmaking process.



Proposed legislation was introduced in the 107th Congress to address 

several of the concerns raised by a number of airports and other 

stakeholders we surveyed and visited--H. R. 4481, the Airport 

Streamlining Approval Process Act of 2002, and S. 633, the Aviation 

Delay Prevention Act. H.R. 4481, the House bill, focused on capacity-

enhancement projects and was generally directed at streamlining the 

runway development process, while the Senate bill was directed at 

reducing aviation delays. Table 1 summarizes some of the key provisions 

in H.R. 4481 and S. 633 that sought to address the challenges the 

airports identified.



Table 1: Summary of Provisions in H.R. 4481 and S. 633, and the 

Challenges Each Seeks to Address:



H.R. 4481, Airport Streamlining Approval Process Act of 2002: Directs 

FAA to take action to encourage the construction of airport capacity-

enhancement projects at congested airports.; S. 633, Aviation Delay 

Prevention Act: Requires DOT to designate certain airport projects as 

national capacity projects. The airports where these national capacity 

projects are designated would be required to complete the planning and 

environmental review process within 5 years, or else lose access to 

certain federal funds.; Challenge addressed: Reaching stakeholder 

agreement..



H.R. 4481, Airport Streamlining Approval Process Act of 2002: 

Authorizes DOT to develop interagency cooperative agreements with other 

federal and state stakeholders in the environmental review process.; S. 

633, Aviation Delay Prevention Act: Requires DOT to implement an 

expedited coordinated environmental review process for national 

capacity projects that provides for better coordination among federal, 

regional, state, and local agencies.; Challenge addressed: Completing 

the environmental review phase..



H.R. 4481, Airport Streamlining Approval Process Act of 2002: Allows 

airports to reimburse FAA for the additional staff necessary to review 

and approve project construction requests.; S. 633, Aviation Delay 

Prevention Act: Authorizes DOT to develop a 5-year pilot program funded 

by airport sponsors to hire additional FAA environmental specialists 

and attorneys.; Challenge addressed: Completing the environmental 

review phase..



H.R. 4481, Airport Streamlining Approval Process Act of 2002: Makes DOT 

the lead agency for all capacity-enhancement project environmental 

reviews, with responsibility for setting time frames for all relevant 

agency reviews. All federal agency reviews would be required to occur 

concurrently.; S. 633, Aviation Delay Prevention Act: Requires DOT to 

implement an expedited environmental review process that provides a 

“date certain” process deadline for environmental reviews.; Challenge 

addressed: Completing the environmental review phase..



H.R. 4481, Airport Streamlining Approval Process Act of 2002: Allows 

DOT to define the purpose and need for any airport capacity-enhancement 

project for any federal or state review that requires the establishment 

of a purpose and need.; S. 633, Aviation Delay Prevention Act: Not 

addressed.; Challenge addressed: Reaching stakeholder agreement..



H.R. 4481, Airport Streamlining Approval Process Act of 2002: 

Eliminates the required Governor’s certification, which states that an 

airport will meet state and local environmental standards.; S. 633, 

Aviation Delay Prevention Act: Eliminates the required Governor’s 

certification, which states that an airport will meet state and local 

environmental standards.; Challenge addressed: Completing the 

environmental review phase..



Source: U.S. General Accounting Office.



[End of table]



In responding to our survey, seven airports stated that eliminating the 

governor’s certificate requirement would reduce duplicative 

environmental requirements. In an August 2000 report to the Congress on 

aviation and the environment, we suggested that Congress may wish to 

consider eliminating the state air quality certification requirements 

in airport legislation becauseit is duplicative of protections offered 

under the Clean Air Act.[Footnote 12] FAA officials stated that they 

agreed with our suggestion and believed that a parallel situation 

exists with respect to state water quality certification, which is 

largely duplicative of protections under the Clean Water Act. Both the 

House and the Senate bills would have eliminated the Governor’s 

Certificate requirement.



FAA Initiatives Focus on Streamlining the Planning and Environmental 

Review Processes:



FAA has identified and undertaken several initiatives directed at 

streamlining the planning and environmental review processes and 

improving cooperation, communication, and coordination among major 

stakeholders. Some of the initiatives have been implemented, and others 

are currently underway. FAA officials believe that the initiatives, if 

successful, will provide measurable improvements in the amount of time 

and resources spent in the planning and environmental review phases of 

the process.



FAA has undertaken several initiatives to improve the planning and 

environmental processes that the agency believes will help ensure that 

runway projects are completed in a timely manner. With respect to 

planning, FAA prepared an internal Memorandum of Agreement in September 

2002 to standardize the procedures for establishing multidisciplinary 

teams to participate in major airport planning studies. The agency has 

plans to update its guidance on airport master plans and to upgrade an 

airspace and ground capacity simulation model in fiscal year 2003, and 

to update its guidance on airport terminal planning and design by the 

end of fiscal year 2004. With respect to streamlining the environmental 

review process, FAA began implementing several initiatives in January 

2001 that are designed to produce measurable improvements. FAA began 

establishing multidisciplinary EIS teams for new EISs at large hub 

primary airports, reallocating staff resources and seeking airport 

reimbursable agreements to support environmental work, and increasing 

the use of consultants to assist FAA with coordination and 

administration of EISs.



To increase coordination and assign accountability for runway 

development tasks to key stakeholders, FAA began another initiative in 

August 2001 as a part of its Operational Evolution Plan--a 10-year plan 

to expand and modernize the nation’s airport system. FAA developed 

detailed plans called Runway Template Action Plans to provide a 

standard set of tasks that must be considered when developing new 

runways. FAA has completed Runway Template Action Plans for 12 airports 

that are expected to complete new runways by 2008. According to FAA 

officials, the agency has met the deadlines for its commitments at all 

of the airports, and no runway completion date has changed as a result 

of FAA actions since the program began.



While the Executive Order and the proposed legislation were designed to 

address challenges some of the airports experienced, it is too early to 

assess their impact; the Executive Order was only recently signed, and 

the legislation did not pass in the 107th session of Congress. 

Nonetheless, several stakeholders, including airports we surveyed and 

visited, supported efforts consistent with these initiatives. Further, 

FAA officials believe that the initiatives FAA has taken and proposed 

will yield measurable improvements in the runway development process--

particularly with respect to the planning and environmental review 

phases of the process.



Airports Have Undertaken Some Initiatives to Address Challenges:



Airports we visited and surveyed described a number of actions they 

have taken to address the challenges they faced in building their 

runways. These actions included proactive approaches to working with 

stakeholders to plan for and mitigate various impacts of the runway 

projects on neighboring communities. For example, the Louisville 

airport used an unusual approach to deal with the needs of neighboring 

homeowners who would be required to move in order to be outside the 

noise parameter levels posed by the new runway. After reaching 

agreement on the market value that the airport would pay for each home, 

the airport offered these residents a choice: residents either could 

move to a new home of equal value in a new community development being 

built by the airport, or they could participate in the traditional 

relocation program, where the airport purchases the home and the family 

relocates to a home and location of its choosing. Airport officials 

stated that this approach worked well for both the airport and the 

displaced residents. According to airport officials, the residents 

benefited because those who wished to stay together as a community 

(which was the preference of many) were able to do so, and the airport 

saved approximately $17,000 per home on those homes built in the new 

community development.



A Washington State Department of Transportation official stated that 

minimizing controversy over the uses of land needed for expanding 

runway capacity could be important in avoiding lengthy project delays. 

The department developed an Airport Land Use Compatibility Program, 

implementing a 1996 amendment of the Washington State Growth Management 

Act--the state’s land-use planning law. The law requires cities and 

counties to identify, site, and protect essential public facilities 

(including airports) from incompatible land use, such as encroaching 

development. In other words, when developing local land-use plans, 

cities and counties must ensure that their plans do not adversely 

affect these facilities. As part of the land-use compatibility program, 

certain state transportation officials provide consultations, 

including mediation, between airport sponsors and community 

representatives (often municipal or county planning staff) to balance 

the state’s dual interest of promoting aviation and ensuring the 

health, safety, and welfare of its residents. The approach to 

facilitating airports’ future expansion includes several steps, 

including the development of planning-based solutions and the 

integration of those solutions into a legally enforceable document, 

such as a comprehensive development plan--rather than the Airport 

Master Plan, which is not binding on land-use authority--in order to 

increase the probability that the solutions will succeed.



In Minneapolis, the airport attempted to build consensus throughout the 

project by considering mitigation agreements that were more liberal 

than those required by FAA. For example, the airport has been pursuing 

a liberal noise-mitigation strategy in order to better address 

community concerns about noise impacts. The airport chose to keep 

residential blocks together for noise-mitigation measures, whether or 

not the entire block fell within the same noise contour. In other 

words, if one residence in a block lay within the 65-decibel Day Night 

Average Sound Level (DNL) noise contour, every residence on the block 

received similar mediation measures.[Footnote 13] Another challenge for 

which the airport had to develop a solution was mitigating the noise 

impacts on a National Wildlife Refuge located within the flight path of 

the new runway. The refuge contains an educational center and is a 

popular location for bird watching. The refuge contended that the 

usefulness of the center and bird watching activities would be severely 

impacted by noise from the runway. The airport and the refuge were 

ultimately able to negotiate an agreement whereby the airport authority 

would pay the organization $26 million for the right to conduct flight 

operations over the refuge.



In Dallas-Fort Worth, the airport chose to implement a four-stage 

approach to mitigating the noise impacts of the runway project: 1) 

direct land acquisition for properties located in the runway protection 

zone, 2) direct land acquisition of certain properties for noise 

mitigation, 3) sound proofing structures for noise mitigation, and 4) 

acquisition of aviation easements. Airport officials noted that the 

first three stages of the mitigation plan are standard among most 

runway projects and, in the case of acquiring properties in the runway 

protection zone, required of all airports. However, with respect to 

aviation easements, the airport undertook an approach that it 

considered to be extraordinary at the time. The airport offered 

residents 25 percent of the fair market value of their property to 

acquire easements for noise impacts. The easements are attached to the 

property deed, affecting the current property owner and all future 

owners of that property.



Overall, the airports that described these initiatives believed they 

had a positive impact on their runway projects. Other airports 

described similar initiatives that they believed were helpful in 

facilitating the completion of the various phases of their projects. It 

may be helpful for other airports to consider these initiatives when 

faced with similar challenges; however, the wide variety of situations 

faced by airports and the differing levels of community opposition or 

environmental issues each airport faces make it difficult to determine 

whether an effort undertaken successfully by one airport will have the 

same positive results at another airport.



Agency Comments:



We provided the Secretary of Transportation with a copy of a draft of 

this report. FAA officials agreed with our characterization of the 

challenges associated with building runways and our identification of 

some of the initiatives to address these challenges. However, they did 

express some concerns related to our analysis of the amount of time 

airports spent or estimated spending in developing their runways, as 

compared with the results of FAA’s 2001 study. They also suggested that 

GAO include more acknowledgment of their efforts in trying to improve 

the runway development process. Regarding FAA’s concerns, we believe 

our approach was a reasonable assessment of the amount of time it takes 

airports to build runways. However, we clarified our discussion on the 

length of time by focusing on the median time rather than the average 

time because this approach minimizes the impact of outlying airports 

that may have taken a very long or a very short time to build their 

runways. We also compared our analysis of the time taken by airports to 

build runways with FAA’s study. See appendix I for a more detailed 

discussion of the comparative analysis. Finally, we included 

information regarding several initiatives that FAA has undertaken to 

streamline and improve the planning and environmental processes. We 

also made technical changes throughout the report as appropriate.



We performed our work from April 2001 through December 2002 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.



As agreed with your office, unless you release its contents earlier, we 

plan no further distribution of this report until 10 days after the 

date of its issuance. At that time, we will send copies of this report 

to congressional committees with responsibilities for the activities 

discussed in this report; to the Secretary of Transportation; and to 

the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. We will make 

copies available to others upon request. This report is also available 

at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.



If you or your staff have any questions regarding the contents of this 

report, please call me or Tammy Conquest at (202) 512-2834. Other key 

contributors to this report were Ruthann Balciunas, William Chatlos, 

David Hooper, Gary Lawson, David Lehrer, and Alwynne Wilbur.



Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:



Signed by Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D:



[End of section]



Appendixes:



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



Our primary methods for addressing our two research questions--first, 

how much time do airports spend building their runway projects and what 

challenges do airports and other stakeholders experience during this 

process, and second, what have airports and other stakeholders done or 

proposed to do to address the challenges they experienced in building 

runways---were to conduct a nationwide survey of airports that built 

new runways between 1991 and 2000 or planned to build new runways by 

2010, and to perform site visits at five airports. The survey 

population included 30 airports, 16 of which had built their airports 

between 1991 and 2000, and 14 of which had planned to build new runways 

by 2010. The survey, conducted in February 2002, provided data on the 

amount of time that 30 airports spent in planning and building 32 

runway projects; on key factors that accelerated or delayed the 

projects; and on initiatives that airports have taken to address the 

challenges they faced during the process.[Footnote 14]



Based on our analysis of the survey responses, we judgmentally selected 

five airports at which to conduct site visits, to develop a more in-

depth understanding of the experiences and challenges they faced. We 

subsequently visited Boston Logan, Dallas-Fort Worth, Memphis Shelby 

County, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Seattle-Tacoma Airports, where we 

interviewed the airport authority, FAA, hub airlines, state agencies, 

metropolitan planning organizations, and local community and 

environmental groups about their experiences with the runway projects. 

In addition, we also interviewed officials from Lester B. Pearson 

International Airport in Toronto, Canada, and Transport Canada to gain 

an understanding of the Canadian runway development process.



We also compared our analysis with FAA’s May 2001 report. While the 

results of the two studies are similar, there are some methodological 

differences between the two studies. First, our measurement begins at 

the start of planning and ends with the completion of the runway. In 

contrast, FAA’s measurement begins with planning but ends with the 

beginning of the design and construction phase. Second, GAO’s analysis 

is based on the median time, which minimizes the impact of runways that 

take a very long or a very short time to complete; FAA’s estimate, 

however, is based on the average time, which does not account for the 

impact of outliers. Based on our survey responses, when considering the 

average time, we found that airports that had completed their projects 

took 12.25 years and airports that had not yet completed their projects 

estimated that their projects would take about 16 years. Third, our 

survey allowed the airports to determine the beginning and end of each 

of the process phases, whereas FAA selected specific events for 

analysis. For example, FAA’s analysis based the end of the 

environmental review phase on the issuance of the ROD. Certain airports 

responding to GAO’s survey included federal and state permits as part 

of the environmental process. FAA’s May 2001 report found that federal 

and state permits can take 6 to 12 months or more to complete after the 

ROD. Finally, each of the two analyses examined a different universe of 

airports. FAA analyzed data on 10 airports that had projects approved 

between 1996 and 2000. GAO analyzed data on over 30 runway projects 

that were completed, or expected to be completed, between 1991 and 

2010. GAO’s analysis included 6 of the 10 airports that FAA analyzed.



We also interviewed officials from FAA, Airports Council International, 

the Airline Transport Association, and the National Association of 

State Aviation Officials to obtain information on the process for 

building runways and to identify what actions have been taken to 

address challenges related to planning and building runways.



We conducted our work from April 2001 through December 2002 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.



[End of section]



Appendix II: Airport Site Visits:



To gain additional perspective on the runway development process, we 

visited five airports that had significant positive or negative 

experiences in going through the runway development process; some of 

the airports identified initiatives to overcome these 

challenges.[Footnote 15] We also included airports that were in various 

stages of completing their runway projects, and in various parts of the 

country. We asked the airports to share their experiences in the 

process of building new runways, as well as those events that either 

significantly delayed or accelerated the completion of the runway 

projects. We identified several key factors--the amount of time that 

transpired, how this time compared with the airports’ expectations of 

the process timeline, how key stakeholders’ timeliness compared with 

the airports’ expectations, and the significant events that either 

delayed or accelerated the completion of the runways. In addition, we 

considered the airports’ responses to other questions, as warranted. We 

also visited the Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto, 

Canada, to gain an understanding of the Canadian runway development 

process and of the airport’s experiences in building runways. The 

overarching factor leading to selection was the airports’ experiences 

that appeared appropriate for other airports to draw upon. These 

experiences, both positive and negative, are intended to yield lessons 

that other airports can emulate or avoid. Table 2 shows the airports we 

selected and the phase of each project as of December 2002.



Table 2: Airports Selected for Site Visit and their Runway Projects:



Airport: Gen. Edward Lawrence Logan International; Location: East 

Boston, MA; Size: Large; Phase[A]: Environmental.



Airport: Dallas-Fort Worth International; Location: DFW, TX; Size: 

Large; Phase[A]: Completed.



Airport: Dallas-Fort Worth International; Location: DFW, TX; Size: 

Large; Phase[A]: Suspended[B].



Airport: Memphis International; Location: Memphis, TN; Size: Medium; 

Phase[A]: Completed.



Airport: Minneapolis-St. Paul International; Location: Minneapolis, 

MN; Size: Large; Phase[A]: Construction.



Airport: Seattle-Tacoma International; Location: Seattle, WA; Size: 

Large; Phase[A]: Environmental.



Airport: Lester B. Pearson International; Location: Toronto, Ontario; 

Size: Large; Phase[A]: Completed.



Airport: Lester B. Pearson International; Location: Toronto, Ontario; 

Size: Large; Phase[A]: Completed.



Airport: Lester B. Pearson International; Location: Toronto, Ontario; 

Size: Large; Phase[A]: Planning.



Source: U. S. General Accounting Office.



[A] Runway development phases often overlap. The phase shown is the 

phase with the predominant activity as of December 2002. :



[B] The airport suspended development of this runway to explore 

implications of recent economic and industry events.



[End of table]



Appendixes II through VII contain a summary of the results of our visit 

to each airport, including background information and status of the 

runway project. The summaries also highlight significant events and 

experiences for each specific location, based on our discussions with 

the airport authorities and key stakeholders. While each of the 

airports we visited experienced challenges within several broad themes 

noted earlier (resolving stakeholder differences, completing extensive 

environmental requirements, and addressing issues related to runway 

design and construction), those broad themes were not necessarily the 

most important at that specific site. Consequently, we highlight 

different experiences at each site. For example, the Boston airport’s 

legal challenges were much more extensive than were those at the 

Minneapolis-St. Paul airport. We discuss Boston’s legal challenges at 

length, while we mention those at Minneapolis-St. Paul as they applied 

to other experiences.



General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport - East Boston, MA:



Boston’s Logan International Airport is operated by the Massachusetts 

Port Authority (Massport). According to FAA, airport, state, and 

airline officials, Logan plays a critical role in the New England 

economy, and it serves as the region’s long-haul and international 

gateway airport. According to Massport officials, in 2000, the airport 

handled 27.4 million passengers and contributed about $6.6 billion to 

the regional economy, supporting about 100,000 jobs. It was North 

America’s nineteenth-busiest in terms of passenger traffic. Logan is 

consistently ranked as one of the nation’s most delayed airports. In 

2000, Logan was the sixth-most delayed airport overall and second-most 

delayed for arrivals. Logan is served by all the major U.S. carriers. 

The top carriers are U.S. Airways, American, and Delta, with roughly 

equal shares of passenger traffic. The airport is primarily an origin 

and destination point, with about 90 percent of the passengers 

beginning or ending their trips at Logan.



In good weather, Logan generally operates on a north-south, three-

runway configuration with a capacity of about 120 flight operations per 

hour. However, during adverse weather conditions (such as northwest or 

southeast winds in excess of 10 knots per hour, which occur about one-

third of the year), the airport can be reduced to as few as 60 to 90 

operations per hour on an east-west, one-or two-runway operation. 

Massport believes that its proposed 5,000-foot, unidirectional runway 

will avoid the significant reduction in efficiency during adverse 

weather conditions and help mitigate weather-related delays.[Footnote 

16] Massport views the runway as a capacity-neutral airfield 

enhancement, which means that the proposed runway will decrease delays 

without increasing the airport’s top capacity of about 120 flights per 

hour. The Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs 

administers the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, the state’s 

environmental protection act. In its Final Environmental Impact Report 

certificate, the Secretary, Massachusetts Executive Office of 

Environmental Affairs, stated that the central environmental question 

is not whether the project is accommodating or generating demand per 

se, but rather whether Massport is operating the airport in a manner 

that avoids, minimizes, or mitigates environmental impacts in light of 

its obligations under MEPA. An official from the environmental office 

stated that the project might increase airfield capacity, but that an 

airport capacity determination was beyond the scope of its review. 

Figure 4 shows the existing Logan runway configuration, including the 

proposed runway project.



Figure 4: Airport Diagram--Boston’s Logan International Airport:



[See PDF for image] 



[End of figure] 



We selected Logan Airport as a site-visit location, in part, because 

its runway project has been in the planning phase since 1969.[Footnote 

17] Further, a state court injunction against building new runways at 

the airport has been in place since the mid-1970s (FAA approved an EIS 

for a runway in the same general location on the airfield in the late 

1960s). Further, because of the injunction, Massport decided not to 

actively pursue the project until the project was reinstituted in 1995, 

based on an FAA Capacity Enhancement Study. Logan is an example of an 

airport that has spent a long time in the process, and it has gone 

through several iterations of the EIS review process.



We interviewed officials at Massport, who were the main sponsors of the 

new, sixth runway at Logan. We also interviewed officials at FAA’s New 

England Region, American Eagle Airlines, Massachusetts Executive Office 

of Environmental Affairs, and the Massachusetts High Technology 

Council. We also gathered information from Communities Against Runway 

Expansion, the primary community interest group.[Footnote 18]



Current Status of the Runway Project:



FAA issued its ROD indicating that the project had satisfied all 

federal environmental requirements on August 2, 2002. However, the 

airport can not yet begin constructing the runway because of an 

existing state court injunction. Moreover, opposition groups appealed 

the ROD in August 2002 in the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, 

D.C., arguing, among other things, that FAA did not adequately analyze 

the noise and air quality impacts on neighboring communities.



Stakeholders Cite Community Opposition as a Major Challenge and Say 

Efforts to Address This Issue Were Unsuccessful:



Massport and other stakeholders we interviewed (American Eagle 

Airlines, Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, FAA, 

and the High Technology Council) said that the lack of agreement among 

stakeholders--particularly with regard to responding to the strong 

ongoing community opposition to the runway project--has presented a 

major challenge. Communities Against Runway Expansion and other local 

community groups surrounding the airport opposed the project because of 

a number of issues, including the impact of the runway on noise, 

emissions, economic growth, and endangered species. Opponents to the 

project also question the intended use of the runway (for example, 

delay reduction versus capacity enhancement). According to FAA, 

Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, American Eagle 

Airlines, the High Technology Council, and Massport officials 

themselves, the public appears to distrust Massport. These stakeholders 

added that much of the opposition stems from the fact that the airport 

is located in downtown Boston rather than from plans for a new runway, 

and that community groups opposed to the project are not likely to 

change their position. According to an American Eagle Airlines 

official, FAA should help community groups understand the economic 

benefits of the project on their communities.



Massport said it has attempted to address this challenge through 

extensive public participation and review efforts, but that these have 

not been successful. FAA, Massachusetts Executive Office of 

Environmental Affairs, and the airlines have agreed that Massport 

involved the public throughout most of the lengthy process, and that 

the public was able to express its concerns to Massport through the 

public meetings and the required public comment periods on FAA’s 

decisions. According to Massport, in response to public pressure, FAA 

created a special review panel and required Massport to undertake a 

supplemental Draft EIS as a means to further expand public 

participation. As part of the public outreach process, Massport 

provided $350,000 for technical assistance to the Community Advisory 

Council. Communities Against Runway Expansion, on the other hand, 

stated that Massport’s efforts toward communication were for appearance 

only--that the airport authority spoke to them but did not listen to 

their concerns. All agreed that extensive communication did not lead to 

cooperation and consensus.



Stakeholders Say Meeting Extensive Environmental Requirements Has Been 

Challenging Because of Community Opposition:



Massport and FAA prepared a joint Draft Environmental Impact Report and 

Draft EIS to meet state and federal requirements. According to 

Massport, this joint effort is a common approach for streamlining the 

environmental review process. The joint state and federal permit 

process lasted over 7 years. Stakeholders said this is partly 

attributable to community opposition and to the effect of this 

opposition on the process.



In 1995, in what it described as an effort to conduct the environmental 

analysis with input from all concerned parties, Massport established 

the Airside Review Committee, which included representatives from the 

24 communities surrounding the airport and from 11 business and 

industry organizations. However, according to both FAA and Massport, 

this effort was suspended for about 18 months between 1996 and 1998, 

when the entire runway project stalled because of a change in Massport 

leadership and priorities. In 1998, according to Massport officials, 

the airport attempted to pick up the environmental review process where 

it had been suspended. Community groups complained that they had not 

been part of the recent process and appealed to FAA that the Draft EIS 

was no longer accurate, complete, or up-to-date. Massport believes it 

did try numerous times to meet with the Airside Review Committee, but 

to no avail.



The state approved the Draft Environmental Impact Review in May 1999 

and the final Environmental Impact Review in June 2001. However, FAA 

requested a Supplemental Draft EIS rather than approving the Draft EIS. 

FAA officials stated that the agency did so because it needed to 

address several issues, including changing technology and the high 

level of concerns expressed by project opponents in public comments to 

the Draft EIS. Massport, the Massachusetts High Technology Council, and 

American Eagle Airlines all believe that FAA’s decision was 

unreasonable. Massport officials contended that the project had already 

undergone 5 years of public process, that continuation was unlikely to 

help achieve local consensus, and that they believed it had not. FAA 

officials, however, believe that it did result in a better, more 

informative EIS document.



Individuals, communities, action groups, and business groups submitted 

comments during public information meetings and hearings and in 

response to the Draft EIS and Final EIR documents that were extensive. 

For example, about 800 people attended the two April 2001 public 

hearings for the Supplemental Draft EIS document and about 850 comment 

letters were received during the 75-day comment period.



The Supplemental Draft EIS took about 1 year to complete, and it 

delayed the filing of the Final EIS by about 1.5 years, according to 

Massport. During this time, in another attempt to develop agreement 

among stakeholders, FAA chaired a city and commonwealth Task Force to 

request further comments to the Draft EIS for incorporation into the 

Supplemental Draft EIS. Although this group met, analyzed, and 

discussed many runway issues, not all stakeholders were pleased with 

its outcome. For example, Communities Against Runway Expansion stated 

that the products of the panel’s work, the Supplemental Draft EIS and 

the Final Environmental Impact Review, were inaccurate and 

inconclusive, and they justified the runway without proposing a viable 

alternative.



In late June 2002, FAA issued the Final EIS for public comment, as 

required by the NEPA process. FAA received approximately 100 comment 

letters raising 42 main issues, ranging from general opposition to a 

concern about the adequacy of technical analyses. FAA said that it 

responded to the comments as required and issued its final approval, 

the ROD, in August 2002. In both the Final EIS and the ROD, FAA 

included a restriction (which Massport officials said was 

unprecedented) that the proposed runway be used only when winds create 

conditions in which the usefulness of other current runways is 

limited.[Footnote 19] FAA considers this wind restriction a mitigation 

measure, as it would ensure that the runway was not used to increase 

capacity during good weather. Many stakeholders--including proponents 

and opponents--view this restriction as a compromise designed to 

achieve consensus, but others, such as community groups, maintain that 

the wind restriction does not go far enough to mitigate the 

environmental effects of this project. Communities Against Runway 

Expansion continued to contest FAA’s approval in the press and in 

federal court and, through an urgent message on its Web page, urged 

others to respond to the Final EIS. Moreover, Massport and 

Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs officials said 

that, by issuing the ROD with wind restrictions, FAA could reactivate 

the state environmental review process because the approved project 

differs significantly from what Massachusetts Executive Office of 

Environmental Affairs approved in 2001. Subsequently, the Executive 

Office of Environmental Affairs chose not to reexamine the 

environmental document because it did not believe that the wind 

restriction significantly changed the environmental impacts of the 

runway.



FAA, Massport, and American Eagle Airlines said that, during the length 

of time spent attempting to get all of the environmental approvals 

needed, some assumptions made early on in the process have been called 

into question. For example, concerns have been raised that traffic 

forecasts may not materialize, that the increasing use of Regional Jets 

may change the equipment mix more than planned, and that the 5,000 foot 

runway may not be long enough to be as useful as hoped. They believe 

that these issues played a part in triggering FAA’s Supplemental Draft 

EIS process. However, a Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental 

Affairs official stated that it is not possible to “freeze” the process 

to figure out all the answers before making a decision. According to 

many stakeholders, the environmental review process is a continuous 

cycle in which comments require additional study, which leads to 

revisions, which lead to more comments, which lead to additional study. 

They contend that the circuitous nature of the process is the primary 

source of delay. The Massachusetts environmental permit process has 

important time triggers that allow for the process to come to an end. 

Massport believes that if similar triggers were in place at the federal 

level, many of the delays encountered during the EIS process could have 

been avoided.



Litigation Added Time to Process:



Massport first suggested, and actually began construction on, a new 

3,830 foot runway in the same general location on the airfield almost 

30 years ago (May 1974). Massport took the position that the 1974 

runway project did not require a state environmental review because 1) 

both the Massport Board and the Commonwealth Office of Transportation 

and Construction determined it had no environmental impact and 2) the 

project commenced before July 1, 1973, the effective date of the 

Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act. The City of Boston and the 

Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Affairs both disagreed and 

sued Massport. The Suffolk Superior Court enjoined Massport from 

proceeding with the 1974 Runways Project, pending the preparation, 

filing, and review of a final EIR as directed by the Secretary of 

Environmental Affairs.



On June 15, 2001, the Secretary of Environmental Affairs determined 

that Massport’s Final EIR submitted in March 2001 adequately and 

properly complied with the Massachusetts Executive Office of 

Environmental Affairs. Massport went to court to get the injunction 

lifted. The court began considering this injunction in late January 

2003. Groups opposing the project declared victory because the motion 

to lift the injunction went to trial. A second lawsuit, regarding 

runway development in Plymouth County, located southeast of the 

airport, resulted in a summary judgment in favor of Massport. This 

matter is now under appeal. Plymouth County includes the cities of 

Hull, Hingham, and Cohasset, all in the flight path of the over-the-

water operations. These local municipalities alleged that the state 

environmental permit was invalid because Massport misled the 

Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs about the 

project’s impact by providing incomplete and inaccurate technical data. 

Table 3 summarizes the history of the Boston Logan runway project.



Table 3: History of the Boston Logan Runway Project:



Date: Late 1960s; Event: FAA approves new runway..



Date: August 1974; Event: State court injunction against building new 

runways at airport..



Date: June 1976; Event: State court injunction against building new 

runways at airport amended..



Date: November 1995; Event: Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental 

Affairs defines Draft EIR scope..



Date: November 1995; Event: Massport establishes Airside Review 

Committee..



Date: January 1996; Event: FAA defines Draft EIS scope..



Date: February 1999; Event: Massport files Draft EIS/Draft EIR with 

state and FAA..



Date: April 1999; Event: FAA and Massport hold public meetings on Draft 

EIS/Draft EIR..



Date: May 1999; Event: State approves Draft EIR..



Date: January 2000; Event: FAA orders supplemental Draft EIS..



Date: March 2001; Event: Massport submits supplemental Draft EIS/Final 

EIR to state and FAA..



Date: April 2001; Event: FAA and Massport hold public hearings on 

supplemental Draft EIS/Final EIR..



Date: June 2001; Event: State approves Final EIR..



Date: June 2002; Event: FAA publishes Final EIS for public comment..



Date: August 2002; Event: FAA issues ROD..



Date: August 2002; Event: FAA approves Airport Layout Plan..



Date: August 2002; Event: Community groups appeal ROD in U.S. Court of 

Appeals..



Date: September 2002; Event: Massachusetts MEPA decides not to reopen 

state process..



Date: October 2002; Event: Community challenge of state environmental 

approval trial dismissed..



Date: January 2003; Event: Massport challenge of injunction trial date 

(Suffolk Superior Court)..



Date: Spring 2006; Event: Projected completion date..



Source: U.S. General Accounting Office.



[End of section]



Appendix III: Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport - DFW, TX:



In 2001, the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport was the fourth-

busiest North American airport in terms of passengers. Both American 

Airlines and Delta Airlines run hub operations at the airport, with 

about 70 percent and 19 percent of the airport’s annual operations, 

respectively. According to the airport’s Chief Executive Officer, the 

airport provides $12 billion in annual economic activity for North 

Texas.



The Dallas-Fort Worth Airport Board (the Board) governs the airport. 

The Board is composed of 12 members, 11 of whom are appointed by the 

councils of the airport’s owner cities in accordance with each city’s 

ownership interest in the airport; 7 represent the city of Dallas, and 

4 represent the city of Fort Worth. The 12th member is a nonvoting 

member representing the neighboring host cities of Coppell, Euless, 

Grapevine, and Irving on a rotating annual basis (the member is from a 

particular city every fourth year). The Board may enter into contracts 

without approval of the City Councils, but its annual operating budget 

requires City Council approval of the owner cities.



The airport lies within the city limits of the four host cities. It 

obtained the freedom to pursue independent development through state 

legislation known as the Texas Municipal Airports Act. It covers over 

29 square miles, and its real property consists of over 18,000 acres. 

The current configuration is seven runways--five north-south parallel, 

two diagonal. Four of these runways are over 11,000 feet in length. 

This configuration allows the airport to land four planes 

simultaneously. In good weather, the airport generally operates with a 

capacity of about 260 to 270 operations per hour. Airport revenue is 

shared with the surrounding cities based upon the location of the 

enterprise. For example, the rental car franchises are located in 

Euless, so that city receives a portion of the car rental tax revenues.



The seventh runway was designed to reduce delays as well as to increase 

overall aircraft operations capacity. Airport officials developed the 

1991 DFW Airport Development Plan, which included two new runways in 

response to market demand, to maintain the highest level of service for 

their customers. Figure 5 shows the existing Dallas-Fort Worth 

International Airport configuration, including the proposed eighth 

runway and several proposed extensions.



Figure 5: Airport Diagram--Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport:



[See PDF for image] 



[End of figure] 



We selected the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport for a site 

visit because the airport, which was completed in February 1974, is one 

of the most recently constructed airports in the United States (only 

Denver is a more recently constructed large hub airport). The airport 

completed its seventh runway in 1996, and had planned to complete an 

additional eighth runway before more sophisticated demand-delay studies 

were completed. Furthermore, the airport reported in our survey that 

many elements of the runway development process took less time than 

expected.



We interviewed officials at the following: Dallas-Fort Worth 

International Airport, the sponsor of the new runway projects; the four 

host cities surrounding the airport--Coppell, Euless, Grapevine, and 

Irving; FAA Southwest Regional Office and Airports District Office; 

North Central Texas Council of Governments; and the Texas Commission on 

Environmental Quality. We attempted to contact American Airlines, but 

airline officials said that too much time had passed since the early 

phases of the project for its response to be meaningful.



Current Status of the Two Runway Projects:



The seventh runway was commissioned in October 1996. All activities for 

the proposed eighth runway have been temporarily suspended while 

airport officials explore the implications that recent economic and 

industry events will have for runway need.



Airport Officials Described Extensive Environmental Review Process as 

Challenging:



According to the airport Chief Executive Officer, the environmental 

review process for the seventh runway required the airport to 

coordinate the activities of 19 federal agencies and 15 state agencies, 

and this process was further complicated by the lack of prime contacts 

and personnel changes at reviewing agencies. Public controversy and 

public demands for information exceeded the airport’s expectations and 

necessitated a highly detailed environmental review. According to 

airport officials, this review included an analysis of 12 project 

alternatives, although many were not equally viable or would not 

survive the review process. According to these officials, the airport 

will probably include two alternatives in future reviews--build/no 

build--and then add specific alternatives for study if reviewers 

request that additional alternatives be examined. Officials felt that 

preparing an analysis of alternatives in this way will likely be less 

costly and time-consuming than would preparing alternatives that, in 

their opinion, clearly have no relevance.



The Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport Used Some Unique Approaches 

to Mitigate Runway Impacts:



The Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport chose to implement a four-

stage approach to mitigating the off-airport noise impacts of the 

runway project: 1) direct land acquisition for properties located in 

the runway safety area; 2) direct land acquisition of certain 

properties for noise mitigation; 3) sound-proofing structures for noise 

mitigation; and 4) acquisition of aviation easements.[Footnote 20] The 

airport offered 25 percent of the fair market value of the property to 

acquire aviation easements. According to airport officials, the 

easements were written so that residents who accepted them still have 

legal standing to take the airport to court over noise impacts. Airport 

officials estimated that final mitigation costs would be about $176 

million. The last of the real estate settlements were paid out in 2002. 

The final cost of the mitigation program exceeded the runway cost by a 

wide margin.



The airport created an independent agency, the Action Desk, before 

beginning the mitigation plan implementation. The Action Desk was the 

main point of contact for property owners to provide and obtain 

information and to file concerns and complaints. This office developed 

a database of property-owner information and disseminated a newsletter. 

According to airport officials, this approach was highly effective in 

providing property-specific information to property owners that 

countered misinformation about the project and allayed fears. The 

airport also hired a consultant to manage the mitigation process, and 

it established an appeals process by which property owners could 

contest the acquisition process. The appeals council was composed of 

airline employees, local residents, a local clergy member, and airport 

board members. The airport Chief Executive Officer had final approval 

of any appeals.



Stakeholder Experiences, from Start to Finish, Were Many and Varied:



The Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport still maintains its 

Capacity Enhancement Team, first established in the 1970s, composed of 

officials from FAA, the airport, and the airlines. The airport refers 

to the team as a “three-legged stool.” Each of the groups is equally 

important to supporting this stool. If one of the “legs” doesn’t 

provide support, the stool falls over. Airport officials, FAA, and even 

local governments made reference to this team during our visit. The 

team’s responsibility is to recommend how the airport should address 

increases in airfield efficiency, safety, and capacity.



According to airport officials, one of the biggest factors contributing 

to the successful completion of the seventh runway project was the 

staff dedicated to the project from FAA, the Department of Justice, and 

various consultant teams. These stakeholders were assigned to the 

project. The dedicated team provided the airport with single points of 

contact and reduced the potential for misinterpretation or ambiguity, 

as well as continually reeducated the participants. This experience was 

in contrast to the difficulties the airport experienced in coordinating 

the input from over 30 agencies in the environmental review process. 

Airport officials wished that they had kept the Environmental 

Protection Agency involved throughout the process, rather than only at 

the beginning and at the end. They also suggested that FAA limit the 

time frame for agency comments, and thereby eliminate lengthy comment 

periods. The Environmental Protection Agency took 260 days to review 

the EIS, which is considerably longer than the 60 to 90 days that the 

airport expected.



FAA officials thought that holding many more public information 

meetings than required also contributed to the success of the project, 

especially during the environmental review process. This way, FAA and 

others answered questions or comments and addressed concerns before the 

official comment period began. FAA also repeated the airport’s 

suggestion that FAA should adhere to the comment deadlines.



The four communities surrounding the airport had both positive and 

negative experiences while working with the airport. Three cities 

challenged the ROD on the basis that its noise analysis and mitigation 

plan were insufficient. (The ROD was upheld 23 months later.) Grapevine 

felt that the airport broke long-standing promises. According to 

Grapevine representatives, the plan that the airport originally 

presented would have placed the area subsequently developed by 

Grapevine outside projected flight patterns. Currently, if the airport 

continues with its plan for the eighth runway, flights will go directly 

over the city of Grapevine. Irving realized that asking for no airport 

expansion was probably unreasonable, and “you really have to cut the 

best deal you can.” The best possible runway development process should 

make the city whole. Euless will be more affected by the eighth runway. 

While Euless initially joined forces with two cities to contest the 

ROD, it withdrew its challenge. The Euless City Manager stated that he 

appreciated the positive economic impact of the airport on the North 

Central Texas economy and believed the airport needs additional 

capacity to support that economic impact. If the eighth runway does 

become a reality, the City Manager expects the same mitigation plan 

that Irving received for the seventh runway, which he considered fair. 

The fourth community, Coppell, did not challenge the ROD. According to 

the Coppell City Manager, Coppell realized that it had to do its part 

to approve the runway somehow, because the airport is seen as vital to 

the economies of Coppell as well as to the region. The manager felt 

that airport staff were professional, knowledgeable, and helpful and 

never held things out to be different from reality. For example, the 

airport put together a task force to work with the communities affected 

by overflights.



Litigation Delayed Process:



The surrounding communities of Irving, Grapevine, Euless, and Coppell 

challenged the airport, asserting that the cities had the rights to 

control zoning on the airport property that fell within their municipal 

boundaries. The municipalities wanted to zone the land for “government 

use.” Such zoning would require that the airport obtain the approval of 

the city boards prior to doing any construction on airport property. 

The airport objected, and took the cities to court. The cities won the 

case, and also won the subsequent appeal. The Texas State Legislature 

ultimately passed the Texas Municipal Airports Act, which stated that 

the airport sponsors and not the municipalities control zoning on 

airport property. According to the Chief Executive Officer, while the 

act can apply to any Texas municipal airport, the wording of the act 

leaves little doubt that it applies specifically to the Dallas-Fort 

Worth International Airport. The Chief Executive Officer also felt that 

the support of the local business community was crucial in the 

development and implementation of the project. For example, the 

business community provided support to the airport in the state 

legislature. This case resulted in nearly 7 years of litigation in 

state courts and ended when the Texas Supreme Court denied hearing the 

complaint.



In addition to the zoning suit, the surrounding municipalities filed 

suit contending that the FAA ROD was based on an inadequate 

environmental impact study. According to the airport’s General Counsel, 

the cities surrounding the airport alleged that FAA and airport 

officials did not properly follow the environmental review process, 

primarily because the airport did not use a proper methodology in 

determining single-event noise impacts. The U.S. Court of Appeals of 

the District of Columbia upheld the ROD after 23 months of argument, 

and the U.S. Supreme Court denied hearing the case. The runway 

construction was delayed 23 months pending the resolution of the case.



Table 4: History of Dallas-Fort Worth Runway Project:



Date: February 1974; Event: Airport opens..



Date: September 1986; Event: FAA Task Force forms to explore means of 

expanding air space capacity..



Date: January 1987; Event: FAA Task Force initiates Metroplex Air 

Traffic System Plan Studies..



Date: September 1987; Event: DFW begins runway planning..



Date: February 1989; Event: DFW begins EIS Scoping..



Date: April 1990; Event: Neighboring cities challenge DFW on zoning 

issues..



Date: August 1990; Event: FAA releases Draft EIS..



Date: March 1991; Event: DFW completes runway planning, publishes 

Airport Development Plan..



Date: December 1991; Event: FAA issues Final EIS..



Date: April 1992; Event: FAA issues ROD..



Date: April 1992; Event: Three cities challenge ROD..



Date: 1993; Event: DFW seeks legislative solution to zoning issues from 

the 73rd Texas Legislature..



Date: May 1993; Event: Texas Municipal Airports Act, reaffirming DFW as 

exempt from local zoning ordinances, takes effect..



Date: March 1994; Event: U.S. Court of Appeals for D.C. Circuit upholds 

ROD..



Date: April 1996; Event: Texas Supreme Court denies hearing appeal on 

zoning case from Fort Worth Court of Appeals..



Date: October 1996; Event: DFW completes construction of 7th runway..



Date: February 1998; Event: Texas Supreme Court denies appeal on zoning 

case from Dallas Court of Appeals..



Date: May 1998; Event: DFW publishes 1997 Airport Development Plan 

Update..



Date: October 2001; Event: DFW suspends activities for 8th runway, 

while DFW Capacity Design Team explores implications of recent economic 

and industry events for runway need..



Date: Spring 2002; Event: DFW pays final real estate settlements..



Source: U.S. General Accounting Office.



[End of section]



Appendix IV: Memphis International Airport:



The Memphis International Airport is a medium-size hub airport that has 

significant levels of both commercial passenger traffic and cargo 

traffic. According to FAA data, this airport was among the 31 busiest 

U.S. airports in 2001. Memphis is one of three major hubs operated by 

Northwest Airlines. Federal Express is based in Memphis, and along with 

other cargo airlines operating there, Memphis has served as the busiest 

cargo airport in the world for the past several years. Additionally, 

Memphis has claimed the distinction of being the number one hub airport 

in the United States for on-time flights. The Memphis-Shelby County 

Airport Authority operates the Memphis and two general aviation 

airports. The authority is managed by a seven-member county board 

composed of commissioners who must be qualified community leaders in 

the fields of aviation, engineering, or finance. Of the airlines 

operating at Memphis, three account for about 60 percent of the 

operations. Northwest and Federal Express each accounts for slightly 

more than 20 percent of the operations, while Northwest Airlink--a 

commuter airline--accounts for slightly less than 20 percent.



Memphis currently has four runways, three of which are parallel and run 

north and south, including the new runway on the east side of the 

airport, developed between 1984 and 1997, which was the focus of our 

study. The fourth runway runs east and west and is located north of the 

other runways. The addition in 1997 of the new 9,000 foot runway (18L/

36R) raised the airport’s maximum capacity in good weather from 131 to 

145 operations per hour (about 11 percent) and in bad weather from 84 

to 99 operations per hour (about 18 percent). However, the runway was 

constructed mainly to counteract the capacity reduction incurred by the 

reconstruction and extension of an existing runway, and to help the 

combination of commercial and cargo air service work at the airport. 

Figure 6 shows the existing Memphis airport configuration.



Figure 6: Airport Diagram --Memphis International Airport:



[See PDF for image] 



Note: According to Memphis airport officials, the center runway has 

been completed, and changes to the remaining runways are no longer 

planned.



[End of figure] 



We selected the Memphis Airport for study because it had quite recently 

experienced all phases of the runway development process--planning, 

environmental, and design and construction. In addition, unlike most 

other airports in our study, it had a significant proportion of its 

operations devoted to cargo, and it was the only medium-size hub 

airport we visited.



We interviewed airport officials from the Memphis-Shelby County Airport 

Authority who were the sponsors of the runway project. We also 

interviewed officials at FAA Memphis Airport District Office; Federal 

Express Airlines, which accounted for about 20 percent of the airport’s 

operation but about 50 percent of its landed weight; Northwest 

Airlines, Memphis’s leading commercial airline; neighboring business 

community and residential representatives; Tennessee Department of 

Transportation, Aeronautics Division and Highway Division; and 

Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation.



Status of the Runway project:



FAA commissioned the runway in 1997.



Airport Officials Stated That They Faced Challenges Reaching Consensus 

among Stakeholders on Project Funding Issues and Decisionmaking:



A Memphis Shelby County Airport Authority official stated that the 

airport faced challenges reaching agreement among airlines regarding 

project funding during the development of their runway project. 

Specifically, during the planning phase, a funding disagreement arose 

between the two airlines that were the biggest airport users--one a 

passenger airline and one a cargo airline. The passenger airline 

objected to the airport’s initial proposal to fund a major portion of 

the project using passenger facility charges, which are collected only 

by commercial passenger airlines and not by cargo airlines, as it 

believed that this approach would disproportionately benefit the cargo 

airlines. Ultimately, the airport authority was able to negotiate an 

agreement with the airlines in which project funding was based on 

landing fees, which are proportionate to the gross landed weight at the 

airport and therefore apply to both passenger and cargo aircraft.



The disagreement among airlines regarding project funding highlighted a 

broader issue regarding the establishment of the overall decisionmaking 

process at the airport, according to an airport official. The Memphis 

airport uses a Majority-in-Interest Agreement that stipulates how the 

airlines (and other airport tenants) are involved in the airport’s 

decisionmaking process. As some airline fees are based on landed 

weight, some airports’ agreements base each airline’s vote on its 

proportion of landed weight, giving more power to those airlines with 

the greatest landed weight and highest fees. However, the Memphis 

airport chose to structure its voting process to prevent any one 

airline from dominating the decisionmaking process. According to its 

Majority-in-Interest Agreement, a vote to approve or reject a proposal, 

such as any that addressed the runway completed in 1997, must have 

represented more than 51 percent of signatory airlines’ landed weight 

and more than 51 percent of the number of signatory airlines serving 

the airport. This approach allowed all airlines to participate in 

runway project decisions affecting them. Additionally, after 1996, the 

airport started using an “inverted” Majority-in-Interest Agreement, 

whereby the airport may proceed with projects unless an airline 

requests a formal vote and the majority of airlines vote to disapprove 

the project. This approach--supported by the two hub airlines at the 

airport--gives the airport more flexibility in project development than 

would an approach requiring airlines to affirmatively approve every 

significant project step.



Extensive Requirements Raised Challenges Regarding Wetlands Mitigation 

and Land Acquisition during Construction of Runway:



Airport officials said that extensive environmental and land 

acquisition requirements presented challenges during the construction 

of the runway project. The airport was required to mitigate a wetland 

area called Hurricane Creek and a series of small, adjacent marshy 

areas on its property that needed to be relocated because of impacts 

associated with the construction of the runway and adjacent developable 

land.[Footnote 21] Airport officials said wetlands attract birds that 

must be “harvested” through periodic hunting because of the danger that 

birds represent to jet airplanes, and that airport workers do not like 

being exposed to the poisonous snakes in the creek as they work to 

maintain the relocated wetlands. According to airport officials, it was 

necessary to relocate a portion of the existing creek to construct the 

new runway, and to straighten the remainder of the creek to maximize 

the use of remaining developable airport property. The airport proposed 

a concrete-lined channel for the relocated creek based on a City of 

Memphis standard. However, state governmental authorities required the 

airport to obtain an aquatic alteration permit from the state and 

requested that it relocate the creek in its natural state so that 

animals such as frogs and poisonous snakes in the creek bed would still 

have their habitat. According to an official from the Tennessee 

Department of Environment and Conservation, this type of requirement is 

fairly typical for airports that are expanding into areas containing 

water. Another state environmental official said that the airport’s 

concrete lined-channel approach had no habitat for living species and 

would be a direct conduit for pollutants. Ultimately, large wire 

baskets filled with medium-sized rocks were used along the new stream 

alignment, and four artificially constructed habitat structures were 

added in the channel bottom to support fish that had been in the stream 

before it was altered.



Airport officials stated that acquiring land for the runway project 

took longer than they expected because of litigation and requirements 

associated with acquiring the land. According to airport officials, for 

the new runway, the airport acquired a road and adjacent property next 

to the airport that previously contained gas stations and industrial 

property. Some of the acquired properties contained underground tanks 

that had previously leaked chemicals into the ground. The state 

environmental agency required the airport to clean up the polluted 

properties prior to constructing the project, although the airport did 

not cause the residue problems.



Site-Specific Challenges Involved Relocating Other Infrastructure:



During the construction phase, the Memphis airport faced a challenge in 

attempting to relocate a road that lay adjacent to the airport and in 

the path of the new runway. According to airport officials, the City of 

Memphis preferred that the airport be responsible for relocating the 

road to ensure that the work was done in a timely manner. After the new 

runway project was completed in 1997, the airport had a subsequent 

project to reconstruct and extend an existing runway by 2,700 feet to 

permit use by larger planes used for international flights. An airport 

boundary road had to be lowered to allow for the proper clearance of 

the flight path for the extended runway over the boundary road. 

According to airport officials, the City of Memphis owned the road and 

had widened it about 15 years earlier; the road could have been lowered 

for an additional $250,000. However, the city refused to fund the 

additional project cost at that time. When the airport asked for 

funding from the Federal Highway Administration to assist in lowering 

the highway, the agency determined that no funds were available to meet 

the airport’s required time schedule, and it could not fulfill the 

request. Ultimately, the airport accomplished the project with FAA and 

bond funds.



On another roadway project through the center of the airfield, the 

airport worked with the Tennessee Department of Transportation to widen 

and lower a portion of an existing road passing under an existing 

taxiway, the original center runway, and two additional taxiways. The 

state transportation agency chose to be responsible for the design and 

construction of a new roadway to match the city’s current road plan. 

The airport notified the city that the taxiway and runway would be 

closed to air traffic because of airport reconstruction, and it offered 

the opportunity to accomplish the needed street improvements at the 

least cost. The airport funded and constructed two taxiway crossings 

over the existing road in the same general time period, and it 

contributed funds toward the cost of a replacement tunnel and a portion 

of the lowered and widened roadway needed to accommodate the eastern 

taxiway. According to airport officials, the airport was responsible 

for these improvements at a cost of $17 million. They said that the 

airport complied with state requests at a cost and time greater than 

was planned for by the airport because of the state transportation 

agency’s jurisdiction and power over factors that can slow down or stop 

an airport’s project.



Table 5: History of Memphis Runway Project:



Date: June 1984; Event: Airport initiates Master Plan for new runway..



Date: March 1987; Event: Airport initiated Environmental Assessment and 

noise study..



Date: June 1989; Event: Airport’s noise study report issued. Litigation 

began..



Date: June 1991; Event: First Majority in Interest Agreement between 

airport and airlines to build a new runway is reached..



Date: December 1991; Event: Airport completes Environmental 

Assessment..



Date: December 1991; Event: FAA begins EIS process..



Date: April 1992; Event: Airport initiates first of eight runway design 

projects..



Date: May 1992; Event: FAA publishes Draft EIS..



Date: November 1992; Event: FAA issues Supplemental Draft EIS to 

address EPA noise comments..



Date: April 1993; Event: FAA issues Final EIS..



Date: May 1993; Event: FAA issues ROD..



Date: July 1996; Event: Airlines’ disagreement about prorated funding 

for runway project resolved..



Date: September 1997; Event: Airport opens runway..



Date: October 2000; Event: Litigation ended..



Source: U.S. General Accounting Office.



[End of section]



Appendix V: Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport:



The Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (Minneapolis-St. Paul) 

ranked as North America’s tenth-busiest airport in terms of passenger 

traffic during 2001. The Metropolitan Airports Commission (Commission) 

broke ground in May 1999 for the new north-south runway. This runway, 

the airport’s fourth, is expected to add about 25 percent additional 

capacity. According to the Commission Chairman at the groundbreaking, 

the new runway is vital to the economic growth of Minnesota and the 

region.



The Commission owns and operates the Minneapolis-St. Paul International 

Airport and six reliever airports. The Commission reports directly to 

the Minnesota legislature and governor. Northwest Airlines, the major 

hub carrier serving Minneapolis, accounts for nearly 80 percent of 

annual operations. Several other airlines account for the remaining 

traffic. Northwest is headquartered in the neighboring community of 

Eagan, Minn.



The configuration is two parallel northwest-southeast runways, one 

crosswind runway, and the new north-south runway. In good weather, the 

airport operates with a capacity of 115 to 120 operations per hour. The 

runway was originally scheduled for completion in December 2003, but 

the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, forced the airport to delay 

completion until November 2004--an 11 month delay. Airport officials 

cited reduced cash flow as the primary reason for this delay. They also 

said that the new runway would accommodate future demand, increase 

runway capacity, relieve congestion, and reduce delays. Figure 7 shows 

the existing airport configuration, including the new runway.



Figure 7: Airport Diagram--Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport:



[See PDF for image] 



[End of figure] 



We selected Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport as a site-visit 

location because it is one of the nation’s busiest airports with an 

active runway project; its project was in the construction phase; it 

had detailed and comprehensive planning and environmental phases; and 

its Executive Director has been a prominent speaker regarding airport 

issues.



We interviewed Commission officials who were the main sponsors of a new 

fourth runway at the airport. We also interviewed officials at FAA’s 

Minneapolis Airport District Office; Northwest Airlines, which had a 

majority of the air operations at the airport; Minnesota Department of 

Transportation Office of Aeronautics, which is responsible for 

promoting safety zones around the airport; and the Metropolitan 

Council, which had a key role in the planning process. Additionally, we 

interviewed representatives of the cities of Eagan, Richfield, and 

Bloomington, which surround the airport and are impacted by the runway 

project.



Current Status of the Runway Project:



The Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport is in the construction 

phase for its fourth runway (Runway 17/35).



Stakeholders Agree That Comprehensive Mitigation Plans Are Essential 

but Difficult to Develop:



According to both FAA District Office and airport officials, the 

Commission worked hard at building consensus throughout the project and 

entered into numerous mitigation agreements to resolve issues. The 

prevailing philosophy was to do whatever was necessary to make the 

project successful. Commission officials, communities, airlines, and 

other stakeholders worked together to achieve this. For example, when 

developing noise contour maps, the Commission chose to include an 

entire city block if the noise contour intersected any part of the 

block. If one residence received sound insulation measures because it 

lay within the Day Night Noise Level (DNL) 65 contour, every house on 

the block received identical remediation measures. According to 

Minneapolis-St. Paul airport officials, the effort represented good 

comprehensive community involvement. The Commission spent considerable 

resources trying to keep all stakeholders satisfied. According to 

airport officials, the Commission and FAA also tried to avoid having 

the project go into litigation, viewed as an unproductive use of time 

and resources and the worst scenario in the process. In the long run, 

the FAA District Office, the state Department of Transportation, and 

Commission officials agreed that consensus building, while taking 

longer than expected in the project’s early stages, saved time in the 

long run.



However, often what was good for one community was bad for another 

community. At least one community accused the Commission of buying 

communities off, neighborhood by neighborhood. For example, Minneapolis 

was “made happy” by eliminating the north parallel runway from 

consideration. A National Wildlife Refuge located near the airport was 

“made whole” through the payment of over $26 million;[Footnote 22] 

however, the noise will continue over the refuge. According to FAA 

officials, this cost was required to mitigate the impact on refuge 

property protected under 49 U.S.C. 303(c), formerly known as section 

4(F) of the DOT Act. The opposition viewed the process as achieving 

“traveling” consensus--just moving the problem around. Opposition 

groups described the process as one seeking cooperation for appearances 

only--a “divide and conquer” approach.



Stakeholders Believe That Mitigation Funding Should Be More Flexible to 

Include More Communities:



Stakeholders impacted by the runway said that they would be more 

supportive of the project if the airport authority would increase the 

level of noise mitigation on the surrounding community. The FAA 

concluded, as indicated in its Minneapolis-St. Paul ROD, that federal-

funds eligibility for future residential sound insulation measures is 

generally limited to the DNL 65+ contour. However, it said that FAA 

might extend federal-funds eligibility for the residential insulation 

program to include the area out to the DNL 60 contour if there are 

applicable local standards. For the Minneapolis airport, FAA plans to 

evaluate this extension through a future Commission-initiated Federal 

Aviation Regulations Part 150 Noise Compatibility Plan. The Commission 

submitted an updated noise compatibility plan to FAA in November 2001 

and withdrew it in May 2002, prior to an FAA decision. Mitigation 

efforts continue in the DNL 65+ contour area; time frames released to 

the public called for the extended (DNL 60-64) program to be completed 

in phases between 2005 and 2012. A major factor in Northwest Airlines’ 

objection to paying for the additional mitigation measures was that the 

future had changed significantly enough since September 11, 2001, to 

reevaluate these additional measures.[Footnote 23]



A Nationwide Low Frequency Noise Policy Is Not in Place:



The impact of low frequency noise on the surrounding community is an 

issue for the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport, which is close to 

neighborhoods, according to the Federal Interagency Committee on 

Aviation Noise: (FICAN).[Footnote 24] According to the City of 
Richfield 

official, the Commission received $10 million in FAA Airport 
Improvement 

Program funds for noise mitigation activities for the west side of the 

new runway (the City of Richfield lies west of the new runway), pending 

FAA’s review of the noise impacts of the project. The $10 million was 

earmarked in the 2001 Department of Transportation Appropriations Act 

conference report.[Footnote 25]



In December 1998, the City of Richfield and the Commission agreed to 

undertake a detailed study of existing and potential impacts of low 

frequency aircraft noise in communities around the airport. In order to 

develop a consistent low frequency noise policy, FAA turned to FICAN 

for input on the review of this study and technical aspects of the 

issue--particularly for an assessment of the problem and metrics to 

evaluate it. Low frequency noise was discussed at the committee meeting 

held in June 2001. Commission and Richfield experts attended. The 

Committee released its findings in August 2002 and basically said that 

additional data are needed to determine whether any relationship exists 

between low frequency noise and human annoyance.[Footnote 26] According 

to FAA officials, FAA is reluctant to fund low frequency noise 

mitigation until the alleged adverse impacts are conclusively validated 

and national standards established.



Some Communities Question Justification of State Zoning Laws:



According to the Minnesota Department of Transportation, FAA, the 

Commission, and community officials, Minnesota has state safety zones 

that go beyond the federal Runway Protection Zone limits.[Footnote 27] 

Within these safety zones, certain types of development are prohibited. 

The establishment of safety zones involves issues of safety, land use, 

and encroachment that can impact not only the development of an airport 

runway but also the development of land surrounding the airport. Some 

communities around the airport question whether the safety zones are 

beneficial for them. Although not all stakeholders oppose Minnesota’s 

strict zoning, The Commission authorized and funded a consultant study 

to research the need for the state safety zones as well as the 

approaches that the other 49 states have taken. The consultant’s April 

2002 report, sent to the Joint Zoning Board, found no justification for 

the strict zoning.



The application of a grandfather clause in the use of state-created 

safety zones presents an additional challenge to the communities 

surrounding the airport. Under the terms of the grandfather clause, if 

a residential area existed in the state zones in 1978 or earlier, it 

was allowed to remain in place and not be removed by the airport. 

However, business expansion in the general area around the airport is 

subjected to state safety zone restrictions. Communities are unhappy 

because it makes no sense to the community leaders to leave residences 

closer to the runway itself but not permit businesses to expand in an 

area further away from the airport. Businesses feel that, although 

their property was not acquired, the impact is the same, since 

expansion is forbidden.



Table 6: History of Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport Runway 

Project:



Date: October 1988; Event: Metropolitan Airports Commission 

(Commission) and Metropolitan Council issue Airport Adequacy Study..



Date: May 1989; Event: Minnesota legislature establishes Dual Track 

Airport Planning Process..



Date: April 1992; Event: Scoping meetings held. FAA, in cooperation 

with Commission, publishes Notice of Intent to prepare EIS. FAA and 

Commission issue First Phase Scoping Report..



Date: March 1993; Event: FAA and MAC publish responses to First Phase 

Scoping Report..



Date: December 1993; Event: Airport Capacity Team completes Capacity 

Enhancement Plan..



Date: December 1994; Event: State Department of Transportation 

completes Terminal Airspace Study for relocated airport..



Date: May 1995; Event: FAA issues Second Phase Scoping report, holds 

public meetings..



Date: July 1995; Event: FAA issues EIS Scoping Decision..



Date: December 1995; Event: FAA and Commission publish Draft EIS..



Date: March 1996; Event: Commission and Metropolitan Council issue Dual 

Track Planning Study..



Date: April 1996; Event: Minnesota legislature decides to expand 

existing airport..



Date: August 1996; Event: FAA issues Airport Capacity Enhancement 

Terminal Airspace Study..



Date: May 1998; Event: FAA issues Final EIS..



Date: September 1998; Event: FAA issues ROD..



Date: December 1998; Event: Richfield individual files suit against 

Commission and state Environmental Quality Board..



Date: May 1999; Event: Commission commences runway construction..



Date: June 2000; Event: State Court of Appeals upholds Summary judgment 

regarding Richfield individual’s lawsuit..



Date: October 2000; Event: $10 million earmarked for noise mitigation 

activities for the west side of the new runway..



Date: June 2001; Event: Federal Interagency Committee on Aviation Noise 

begins discussing low frequency noise standards..



Date: November 2001; Event: Commission submits Part 150 Noise 

Compatibility Plan..



Date: March 2002; Event: FAA clarifies airport zoning standards..



Date: April 2002; Event: Study authorized by Commission results in 

consultant report that finds no need for state safety zones..



Date: May 2002; Event: Commission withdraws Part 150 Noise 

Compatibility Plan..



Date: November 2004; Event: Planned runway completion..



Source: U.S. General Accounting Office.



[End of section]



Appendix VI: Seattle-Tacoma International Airport:



The Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (Sea-Tac) is the primary air 

transportation hub of Washington State and the northwestern United 

States. It is the 17th-busiest passenger airport, the 20th-busiest 

cargo airport, and among the 31 busiest hub airports in the United 

States. Located 12 miles south of downtown Seattle and 20 miles north 

of Tacoma, it is the primary provider of international and domestic air 

carrier service in the region surrounding the Seattle/Tacoma area. Its 

primary service market is the Puget Sound region, composed of four 

counties and approximately 3.5 million people. About three-fourths of 

the air travelers using Sea-Tac Airport are origin and destination 

passengers who begin or end their trip at the airport. The remaining 

flights are connecting flights. The airport is a significant employer 

in the region, with 20,000 airport employees.



Sea-Tac currently has two parallel runways. Our primary focus was on a 

runway development project for a new third parallel runway first 

considered in Sea-Tac’s plans in 1989, and which the Port of Seattle 

approved in 1992. The project has proceeded through several steps of 

the environmental review process, and it is currently scheduled for 

completion in 2006. Sea-Tac’s sole purpose for adding this 8,500 foot 

parallel runway, which would be separated by 2,500 feet from the 

furthest parallel runway, is to address constraints attributable to 

Seattle’s poor weather, and although the new runway would increase 

capacity, airport officials do not consider the runway project to be a 

capacity-enhancing project. During periods of reduced weather 

conditions, which occur about 44 percent of the time, Sea-Tac can use 

only one of the two existing runways for arrivals because of the narrow 

spacing between them, thereby causing delays. The number of flights 

that can be accommodated drops from about 60 arrivals per hour in good 

weather to 48 or fewer in poor weather. The new runway, which is 

planned to have much greater separation from other runways, would allow 

independent landings on two runways at the same time, which reduces 

delays. Figure 8 shows the existing Sea-Tac airport configuration, 

including the proposed runway.



Figure 7: Airport Diagram--Sea-Tac International Airport:



[See PDF for image] 



[End of figure] 



We selected Sea-Tac Airport for study because it was an airport with a 

significant amount of both passenger and cargo operations and it had 

experienced significant planning and environmental issues during the 

development of its runway project. Additionally, in constructing the 

planned runway, Sea-Tac is expanding the plateau where the airport is 

located--undertaking one of the most significant landfill and 

embankment projects in the United States (about 17 million cubic 

yards). According to Sea-Tac officials, this earth-moving project is 

producing several accompanying environmental considerations.



We interviewed officials from Sea-Tac, who were the sponsors of the 

runway project. We also interviewed officials at the FAA Seattle 

Airports District Office; Alaska Airlines; Puget Sound Regional 

Council; Airport Community Coalition; Regional Commission on Airport 

Affairs; Washington State Department of Transportation Aviation 

Division; Washington State Department of Ecology; the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers; and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.



Status of the Runway Project:



As indicated above, the runway project for the new third parallel 

runway at Sea-Tac has completed environmental review and has received 

state and Corps wetland fill permits. However, according to Sea-Tac 

officials, both permits are currently in litigation and under appeal. 

Sea-Tac has begun constructing the foundation that will be required to 

support the third runway.



Simplifying Purpose and Need May Help Reduce the Circuitous Nature of 

the Review Process:



Sea-Tac officials stated that continual review of the purpose of and 

need for their runway project, as well as alternatives to it, presented 

a significant challenge to moving forward in the process. They stated 

that reducing the number of reviews could reduce the amount of 

potential delay in the process. The purpose and need was established 

and reviewed by the airport, FAA, consultants, and the local 

Metropolitan Planning Organization during the planning and 

environmental process; it was then re-reviewed by the Corps of 

Engineers (Corps) during the permitting process under Section 404 of 

the Clean Water Act.[Footnote 28] FAA officials questioned the 

usefulness of the Corps’ review of the project’s purpose and need, 

stating that the extra review created frustrations for other 

stakeholders and added time to the process when the purpose and need 

had already been established. Additionally, FAA officials said that 

aviation expertise is needed to analyze the alternatives, and the Corps 

has no such expertise. According to Corps officials, the Corps is 

required to ensure that alternatives have been adequately 

considered.[Footnote 29] Corps officials said that their review of the 

alternatives was justified because it had been a considerable time 

since the EIS had been developed, and it wanted to determine if the 

events of September 11, 2001, had changed the relative benefits of the 

alternatives. Officials from the Puget Sound Regional Council, the 

metropolitan planning organization in the Seattle area, suggested that 

the Corps could have been included more in the early consideration of 

alternatives, but acknowledged that the Corps’ limited resources made 

early participation difficult. FAA officials, however, believe that the 

Corps did participate in the development of alternatives in its role as 

a cooperating agency during the development of the EIS.



Sea-Tac Airport, while not specifically citing purpose and need, said 

that a clear federal policy of encouraging runway development and 

moving projects through the regulatory process would help ensure that 

adequate airport capacity is in place to reduce growing air traffic 

delays. It suggested that such a commitment could be similar to the one 

the federal government took in developing the interstate highway system 

and national railroads. A task force could be created to identify 

runway projects that are critical to the national air transportation 

system. Such an approach could help expedite implementation of 

decisions already made at the local level. Additionally, they suggested 

that Congress could adopt a policy of directing all organizations to 

achieve a balance between environmental, economic, and social goals, 

coupled with statutory deadlines for decisionmaking. They contend that 

such an approach, now used by other countries, would help agencies make 

difficult decisions and get needed runways built.



A Compatible Land Use Program May Help to Reduce Opposition:



A Washington State Department of Transportation official stated that 

minimizing controversy over the uses of land needed for expanding 

runway capacity could be important in avoiding lengthy project delays. 

The department developed an Airport Land Use Compatibility Program, 

implementing a 1996 amendment of the Washington State Growth Management 

Act--the state’s land use planning law. The law requires cities and 

counties to identify, site, and protect essential public facilities 

(including airports) from incompatible land use, such as encroaching 

development. In other words, when developing local land use plans, 

cities and counties must ensure that their plans do not adversely 

affect these facilities.



As part of the land use compatibility program, certain state 

transportation officials provide consultations, including mediation, 

between airport sponsors and community representatives (often municipal 

or county planning staff) to balance the state’s dual interest of 

promoting aviation and ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of its 

residents. The approach to facilitating airports’ future expansion 

includes several steps, including the development of planning-based 

solutions and the integration of those solutions into a legally 

enforceable document such as a comprehensive development plan (rather 

than the Airport Master Plan, which is not binding on a land use 

authority).



New Mitigation Approaches and Increased Community Interaction Could 

Help Foster Community Support:



In Seattle, the Airport Communities Coalition, representing several 

communities near Sea-Tac Airport but not the city of SeaTac, said that 

expanding the scope of mitigation beyond direct environmental 

applications would go far in building community support for runway 

projects. They said that the airport’s use of heavy trucks over local 

roads to haul dirt for its landfill project for the runway caused 

significant deterioration of the community’s roads, for which it has 

not been reimbursed.[Footnote 30] Similarly, when the airport acquires 

residence and business locations in order to mitigate noise or wetland 

impacts, these buyouts deplete the tax base in the community where the 

properties are based, resulting in negative economic impacts for which 

the community is not reimbursed. Therefore, the community has no reason 

to support the runway project. However, they said that the community 

would have reasons to support the project if some funding were provided 

to mitigate the economic damage to the community. An organization 

official said that the Department of Defense reimburses communities for 

economic loss when it acquires property within the community to build 

military bases. Officials at the Regional Commission on Airport 

Affairs, a citizens’ group in the greater Seattle metropolitan area, 

stated that that the airport could do more to mitigate economic 

impacts. However, they also said that expanding the scope of mitigation 

would not diminish their opposition to the runway project.



According to the Airport Communities Coalition, communities seek to 

contribute meaningful input into the airport expansion process; 

however, when they are not allowed to do so, they are forced to file 

lawsuits against airports and other stakeholders over decisions that 

have been made. Officials at both the Coalition and the Regional 

Commission believed that the planning process used by the airport and 

the Puget Sound Regional Council needed to include meaningful input 

from the communities near the airport. An official at the Regional 

Commission stated that there should be a citizen’s advisory committee 

with genuine input into the airport’s expansion projects early in the 

planning process. The official suggested that the federal government 

should provide the incentive for the establishment of such a committee 

by providing federal funds only when such a committee was established. 

In the official’s view, the success of such an approach would be 

contingent on the airport’s taking the committee’s views into account 

and substantively addressing them. These community organizations have 

filed several lawsuits against the airport, the Puget Sound Regional 

Council, and FAA, based on objections to their approach for addressing 

environmental issues. An Airport Communities Coalition official said 

that the community filed lawsuits in part, to get the airport to listen 

to the needs of the community and to negotiate solutions. The official 

noted that communities near other airports had successfully used such 

an approach. Sea-Tac and FAA officials stated that there was extensive 

community involvement beyond that required by law.



An official at the Airport Communities Coalition said that the public 

hearing process on environmental matters gives stakeholders the ability 

to voice concerns but, because of the limited time allocated to each 

person, does not give those convening the hearing an ability to 

understand the concerns or allow citizens to have an impact on the 

project. The thrust of FAA’s 2001 best practices guide seems to agree 

with the coalition official; the guide states that periodic informal 

workshops during the planning and environmental processes tend to 

provide better forums for community consultation than do formal public 

hearings. Understandable information on the project and its 

environmental impacts should be made available at the workshop, and 

knowledgeable stakeholders such as the airport, FAA, and EIS 

consultants should be present to answer questions. In the guide, FAA 

notes that strong local opposition tends to slow down the environmental 

process and that a citizens’ advisory committee in some locations has 

been useful in improving working relationships and communication 

between the airport and the community. FAA said that such a committee 

may be established on either a permanent basis or for the duration of a 

specific project’s planning and environmental review. FAA added that 

factors that help build local consensus and address opposition include, 

among others: 1) open and frank dialogue on the aviation need and the 

airport proprietor’s initial planning, including possible 

alternatives; 2) an effective forum for constructive exchanges on 

expected benefits, impacts, alternatives, and mitigation prospects; and 

3) serious consideration of community concerns and views, including 

project adjustments that have merit and are possible, as well as 

responses to community proposals that cannot be accommodated, and the 

reasons why. A SeaTac official emphasized that the airport did include 

public outreach beyond that required by environmental regulations. For 

example, such efforts included public information sessions and 

community open houses, among others.



Extensive Regulatory and Legal Requirements Posed Resource Challenges:



Stakeholders may have limited staff and resources to address the 

extensive regulatory and legal requirements of the process, leading to 

delays. For example, officials from FAA’s Seattle office said that when 

an endangered species of fish was identified at Sea-Tac Airport, 20 

months elapsed before officials from the federal Fish and Wildlife 

Service and the state Department of Marine Fisheries approved actions 

to address the conditions of endangered species. Both agencies had 

limited staff to review and analyze the discovery and the approach for 

addressing it. FAA officials said that they understood that the Corps 

had only six staff members to review about 1,000 water quality permits, 

and according to state aviation department officials, the Corps had a 

significant backlog in processing permit applications.



Additionally, an official from the state Department of Ecology said 

that the Sea-Tac runway project had been a significant drain on 

resources at the agency. The agency has had difficulty finding 

sufficient resources to complete environmental reviews and must 

redirect personnel from other functions. The official said that, 

because of the shortage of state funds, applicants wanting reviews to 

proceed quickly will have to bear the burden of funding water quality 

reviews. Sea-Tac officials noted that additional staff resources are 

needed in regulatory agencies in order to process environmental permits 

in a timely manner and, aside from adding federal funding, funding 

could be provided by project proponents. The airport acknowledged that 

agencies were reluctant to accept funding because of a concern with 

potential conflicts of interest. The airport suggested that Congress 

could make guidelines under which the agencies could remain impartial. 

The purpose of allowing such funding would not be to curry favor but to 

work efficiently with the federal government to get runways built. They 

asserted that these staff would work exclusively under FAA’s 

supervision and would be under no obligation to the airport. They 

contended that this proposal would provide a mechanism for airports to 

bear the financial cost of accelerated project reviews.



Site-Specific Issues Involve Safety and Environmental Challenges:



A major site-specific challenge involves the construction of a large 

plateau to enable the airport to construct the new runway. According to 

Sea-Tac officials, in order to bring the new runway site up to the 

elevation of its other two runways, a 17-million cubic yard landfill 

and embankment is being built. The embankment will require three 

retaining walls to reduce impacts on a nearby creek and wetlands and to 

accommodate safety areas at the ends of the runway. The walls are 

mechanically stabilized, using concrete panels and layers of galvanized 

reinforced strips that bind to and reinforce the embankment material in 

a coherent way. According to the Port, this type of wall is highly 

earthquake resistant, and it has been used successfully elsewhere in 

the United States. In April 2002, Sea-Tac Airport officials said that 

the communities surrounding the airport were concerned that the wall 

will collapse or will be unable to withstand an earthquake. However, 

according to airport officials, the airport used the services of 

consulting engineers, geotechnical consultants, and earthquake 

engineers from companies and the University of Washington, and sought 

advice from a technical review board in developing the wall design to 

ensure that it is safe. The airport has also held public hearings in an 

attempt to enlighten the public about the durability and safety of the 

wall project.



Table 7: History of Sea-Tac Runway Project:



Date: June 1992; Event: Puget Sound Regional Council completes 2.5 year 

study of air capacity needs that included possible third runway at 

SeaTac..



Date: April 1993; Event: Metropolitan Planning Organization approves 

Regional Airport System Plan..



Date: November 1993; Event: Initial design contracts awarded..



Date: October 1994; Event: Metropolitan Planning Organization concludes 

no sites suitable for new airport..



Date: February 1996; Event: Final EIS completed..



Date: July 1996; Event: Metropolitan Planning Organization amends 

metropolitan transportation plan to include new runway..



Date: August 1996; Event: Airport authority adopts revised Master Plan 

that includes new runway..



Date: December 1996; Event: Supplemental EIS begun..



Date: May 1997; Event: Final Supplemental EIS issued..



Date: July 1997; Event: ROD issued..



Date: August 1997; Event: ROD challenged..



Date: December 1997; Event: Airport submits permit applications to 

state and Corps of Engineers..



Date: March 1998; Event: Construction begins on the first phase of the 

landfill project..



Date: September 1998; Event: New wetlands discovered in project area..



Date: January 1999; Event: Circuit court affirms ROD..



Date: September 1999; Event: Airport submits revised permit 

applications..



Date: November 1999; Event: Public comment hearings held on permit 

applications..



Date: September 2000; Event: Airport withdraws permit application 

before expiration deadline to address remaining issues and provide 

agency additional time to process application..



Date: October 2000; Event: Airport resubmits permit applications..



Date: January 2001; Event: Public comment hearings held on permit 

applications..



Date: August 2001; Event: State issues water quality certification..



Date: December 2001; Event: State water quality certification suspended 

pending community appeal to Pollution Control Hearings Board..



Date: July 2002; Event: FAA approves Part 150 noise study..



Date: August 2002; Event: Pollution Control Hearings Board upholds 

water quality certification, subject to additional conditions..



Date: September 2002; Event: Airport appeals Pollution Control Hearings 

Board’s conditional approval of water quality certification..



Date: December 2002; Event: Corps issues wetland permits; permits 

challenged..



Date: 2006; Event: Planned completion of runway construction..



Source: U.S. General Accounting Office.



[End of section]



Appendix VII: Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada:



The Lester B. Pearson International Airport (Pearson) is the primary 

commercial airport serving the Toronto area. The Greater Toronto 

Airports Authority manages the day-to-day operations of the Pearson 

airport, as well as managing its capital infrastructure projects. The 

Greater Toronto Airports Authority was established in March 1993 as a 

community initiative, was reconstituted in accordance with Canadian 

Airport Authority guidelines, and was recognized by the Minister of 

Transport in November 1994 as the airport authority responsible for 

Pearson airport. The airport authority is a private, not-for-profit 

corporation. Its 15-member Board of Directors is composed of nominees 

from the City of Toronto, the Province of Ontario, the Government of 

Canada, and four regional municipalities. The airport authority assumed 

control of the management, operation, and maintenance of Pearson on 

December 2, 1996.



Pearson Airport is the busiest airport in Canada and the 16th-busiest 

in North America, having served 28 million passengers in 2001. With 

regard to international passengers, Pearson was ranked as the 2nd-

busiest in North America and 17th-busiest in the world in 2001. To 

handle the projected demand for air travel through the airport, the 

airport authority developed a $4.4 billion (Canadian) development plan 

for the improvement of the airport’s infrastructure--the Airport 

Development Program (ADP), which includes new runway projects, among 

other infrastructure projects. Figure 9 shows the existing Pearson 

airport configuration.



Figure 8: Airport Diagram--Lester B. Pearson International Airport:



[See PDF for image] 



[End of figure] 



We chose Pearson Airport as a site visit to learn about the runway 

development process used in Canada, and because the airport had three 

runway projects that met the criteria we used to select airports in the 

United States--one runway completed in 1997, one completed in October 

2002, and one planned for future implementation.[Footnote 31] The three 

additional runways were approved for development as warranted by demand 

in 1993 by Transport Canada after a lengthy Environmental Assessment 

Review process in 1990-1992.



Status of Runway Projects:



As noted above, Pearson Airport completed the construction of a new 

runway in 1997, completed the construction of a second new runway in 

2002, and has a third runway in the planning stages, to be constructed 

when capacity demands warrant another runway.



Airport Development Process in Canada Differs from U.S. Process:



The airport development process in Canada differs from the U.S. process 

in several distinct ways. Pearson Airport was one of the first airports 

in Canada to attempt to build additional runways since the airports 

were first constructed to serve the Canadian military during World War 

II. As a result, there was no established runway development process in 

place--Transport Canada officials had to learn about the process as 

they progressed through it. In the broadest sense, there are three 

pieces of legislation that affect the process--the Aeronautics Act, the 

Fisheries Act, and the Environmental Act.



The environmental phase differs greatly from that employed in the 

United States. Prior to the development of the EIS, the airport 

authority begins the process with scoping. The scoping process is a 

public process. According to airport officials, every project goes 

through environmental screening (equivalent to an Environmental 

Assessment) as a part of the planning process. When the Pearson project 

went through the screening process, the airport authority was 

responsible for conducting environmental screening. However, current 

legislation requires that the screening results be available to the 

public.



The Minister of Transport and the Minister of the Environment 

cooperatively choose an Environmental Review Panel consisting of 

government officials and knowledgeable local residents (that is, 

academics.) The panel begins by developing a list of issues that it 

believes the EIS must identify. The issues and, therefore, the 

requirements of the EIS will vary from airport to airport. Airport 

officials referred to the process as “organic”--changing from airport 

to airport, project to project. The airport authority is responsible 

for preparing the EIS documents, and it submits them to the panel for 

review. The panel reviews the environmental impact documents and 

convenes hearings to hear testimony in order to formulate its opinions 

regarding the environmental impacts of the project and accompanying 

mitigation measures. The hearings are judicial in nature, and attendees 

have never resorted to shouting or histrionics. According to airport 

officials, the hearings were well balanced between opponents and 

proponents of the projects. With respect to the EIS, the focus of the 

environmental hearings was medium-term capacity enhancement projects--

the three runways at Pearson. The issues that the panel considered 

depended greatly on their perception of the issues raised during the 

hearings. The members of the panel did not work on the EIS full-time, 

and did not have the requisite expertise to conduct their reviews--the 

panel either hires knowledgeable consultants or develops the necessary 

knowledge. This process takes a long time.



Once the EIS is completed, the panel reviews the document, develops a 

series of recommendations, and submits them to the Minister of 

Environment. The Minister of Environment then makes a final 

determination and submits recommendations to the Minister of Transport. 

The Minister of Transport has sole discretion as to whether to 

implement the recommendations of the Minister of Environment. The 

Minister of Transport makes the final determination, and it is 

incumbent upon the airport authority to respond to the final 

recommendations.



The design and construction process in Canada does not differ 

substantially from that in the United States. The airport must prepare 

preliminary engineering and final design, and then construct the runway 

infrastructure. Finally, in summary, airport officials believed that 

the process went very well and did not believe that they would proceed 

dramatically differently if they were to go through the process again. 

However, both airport and Transport Canada officials noted that the 

recently passed Canadian Environmental Assessment Act will result in 

changes to the existing process.



Canadian Airports Face Many of the Same Challenges as U.S. Airports:



Airports in Canada seeking to add capacity by constructing new runways 

face many of the same challenges that airports in the United States 

face, including environmental issues, wetlands mitigation issues, and 

the impacts of noise on the surrounding communities. These impacts 

generally lead to some community opposition to the proposed project. 

Canadian airports are also subject to site-specific constraints 

attributable primarily to the northern climate.



Because of the northern climate, airport operations in Toronto require 

extensive ice removal in the winter months, resulting in the use of a 

large quantity of Glycol that can cause an environmental impact on 

surrounding wetlands. The airport straddles both the Etobicoke and 

Mimico Creek watersheds, covering 1,640 hectares of land. Most of the 

airport, including runways, cargo areas, Terminal Three, Terminal One 

aprons, and infield areas, drains to Etobicoke Creek. According to the 

Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, although runoff 

contamination from these sources is a concern, significant progress has 

recently been made to mitigate the airport’s impact on water quality 

through the expanded use of wastewater and storm water recovery and 

containment systems. Airport officials cited their wastewater treatment 

facility as contributing greatly to allaying the concerns of residents 

over ground and surface water contamination, and they stated that the 

airport has never exceeded contaminant limits.



The Council of Concerned Residents, a coalition of three residents’ 

associations near the airport, opposed the expansion of the airport 

fundamentally on the premise that the projects would increase the noise 

impacts on their communities. In 1993, the group filed a lawsuit 

against the airport claiming that the proposed project was illegal for 

three reasons: 1) a 1973 order precluded the Toronto airport from 

expanding beyond its borders; 2) a federally approved airport master 

plan and the local municipality’s land use plan stipulated that they 

were based on the assumption that the airport would have no more than 

three runways; and 3) the Environmental Review Panel stated that the 

project should not be pursued because the adverse social impacts of the 

project outweighed the capacity gains at the airport. According to 

Transport Canada officials, Canada’s noise mitigation standards are 

very similar to FAA’s Federal Aviation Regulations Part 150 programs in 

the United States. According to airport officials, neither Transport 

Canada nor the airport authorities are required to acquire noise-

sensitive properties surrounding the airport.



According to airport authority officials, airports in Canada face a 

shortened construction season because of the sometimes severe winter 

weather associated with the northern climate. Therefore, airports 

seeking to construct runways must take the climate into account when 

entering into the construction phase of the runway development process. 

Airports must schedule construction tasks such that weather-dependent 

tasks such as concrete construction are scheduled during the warmer 

months, and reserve climate-independent tasks for the winter months.



[End of section]



Appendix VIII: Survey of Airports:



The following section provides a copy of the survey that we sent to 

airports that have built a runway between 1991 and 2000 or planned to 

do so by 2010. Where appropriate, we have summarized their responses to 

each question. In instances where summarized answers are not possible-

-such as dates--we have listed the number of airports that answered the 

question.



In total, we sent 39 surveys to 34 airports--Dallas-Fort Worth, 

Detroit, Indianapolis, Louisville, and Washington Dulles received more 

than one survey, because each had more than one runway that met our 

criteria. We excluded five surveys because the airports reported that 

their projects did not meet our selection criteria. For our statistical 

analysis, we excluded responses from five airports--Kailua-Kona, Little 

Rock, Reno, Sacramento, and one of the two surveys sent to Washington 

Dulles--because their responses indicated that their projects did not 

meet our criteria. The primary reason why their responses were dropped 

from our statistical analysis was that they planned only runway 

extensions or no new runways during our time frame. We did, however, 

rely on their responses during the remainder of our review. In total, 

we received 32 out of a potential 34 responses from 30 airports--a 

response rate of 94 percent. Table 8 lists the airports we surveyed.



Table 8: Airports Surveyed:



1. Atlanta Hartsfield.



2. Baltimore; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



3. Boston Logan; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



4. Charlotte; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



5. Cincinnati; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



6. Colorado Springs; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



7. Dallas-Fort Worth (2); [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



8. Denver; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



9. Detroit Wayne County (2); [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



10. Grand Rapids; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



11. Houston; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



12. Indianapolis (2); [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



13. Kansas City; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



14. Las Vegas; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



15. Los Angeles; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



16. Louisville (2); [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



17. Madison; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



18. Memphis Shelby County; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



19. Miami; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



20. Minneapolis; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



21. Nashville; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



22. Orlando; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



23. Philadelphia; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



24. Phoenix; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



25. Salt Lake City; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



26. San Francisco; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



27. Seattle; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



28. St. Louis Lambert; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



29. Tampa; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



30. Washington-Dulles; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty]; [Empty].



Source: U.S. General Accounting Office.



[End of table]



[End of section]



Appendix IX: Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



FOOTNOTES



[1] The National Economic Impact of Civil Aviation, DRI-WEFA, Inc., 

July 2002.



[2] Some in the aviation industry believe that demand management and 

peak pricing are also feasible alternatives to reducing congestion and 

delays.



[3] Airports and other stakeholders develop these plans to help them 

identify potential ways to increase airfield capacity at major airports 

and to coordinate major infrastructure projects at the airports.



[4] Some states have environmental review requirements in addition to 

federal requirements.



[5] Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, a categorical 

exclusion exempts the project from the requirements of the federal 

environmental review process. However, according to FAA, categorical 

exclusions are not an option for a new runway or major runway 

extension. A categorical exclusion does not necessarily relieve the 

project from state and local environmental review requirements.



[6] An EIS is a document required of federal agencies by the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and its implementing regulations as 

formulated by the Council on Environmental Quality for major projects 

or legislative proposals that significantly affect the environment. It 

describes the environmental effects of the undertaking and lists 

alternative actions. In principle, it is a basis for deciding whether 

to approve the project. FAA is responsible for preparing an EIS for a 

major airport project or selecting a contractor (that is, consultant) 

to assist FAA in preparing the EIS. Typically, FAA coordinates with the 

airport authority when it selects an EIS consultant.



[7] Report to the U. S. Congress on Environmental Review of Airport 

Improvement Projects, U.S. Department of Transportation, May 2001.



[8] FAA officials said that if they added 3 to 5 years for design and 

construction, then FAA’s determination of average time to complete a 

runway would become about the same as that reported by GAO for projects 

not yet completed.



[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges 

Associated with Building and Maintaining Runways, GAO-01-90T 

(Washington, D.C., Oct. 5, 2000).



[10] The order does not supersede the requirements of the National 

Environmental Policy Act or other environmental laws.



[11] On October 31, 2002, the Secretary of Transportation selected 

seven high-priority transportation projects. One airport project was 

selected--a runway construction project at the Philadelphia 

International Airport. The Secretary is currently considering 

additional transportation projects, including airport projects, to add 

to the initial list.



[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation and the Environment: 

Airport Operations and Future Growth Present Environmental Challenges, 

GAO/RCED-00-153 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 30, 2000).



[13] The Day Night Average Sound Level is a measurement of the average 

noise impacts of the airport on the surrounding community.



[14] Information on the time airports spent in various parts of the 

process is based, in part, on estimates provided by some airports that 

have not yet completed their projects.



[15] See appendix I for the methodology we used to select the airports 

we visited.



[16] All flights using this runway would arrive from the southeast or 

depart from the northwest, over Boston Harbor.



[17] Logan Airport was not the only airport that spent a long time in 

the planning phase. Of the 30 airports we surveyed, two others--Phoenix 

and Indianapolis--also reported spending a long time (about 20 years or 

more) in the planning phase.



[18] The Communities Against Runway Expansion Vice President is also 

the Chair of the Community Advisory Council, a group representing 

various communities around Logan.



[19] The ROD limits the use of the proposed 14/32 runway to those times 

when wind conditions equal or exceed 10 knots, either northwest or 

southeast. FAA Air Traffic Control is responsible for runway 

assignments and will base its use of 14/32 on forecasted wind 

conditions. The Record of Decision also includes a 2-hour window to 

adjust to changing conditions.



[20] Aviation Easements (also referred to as Avigation Easements) are 

rights given to the airport to fly aircraft over property; they 

indicate that property owners acknowledge and accept the noise impacts 

of the aircraft.



[21] According to FAA officials, the EIS addressed all major 

development in the Memphis Airport Master Plan, including the new 

runway. FAA officials contend that if the EIS had included only the new 

runway, no appreciable wetland impacts would have occurred.



[22] According to an airport official, the amount was determined by an 

independent professional appraiser and includes costs to relocate 

significant educational activities.



[23] MAC intends to update the noise contours to reflect a 2002 base 

year and the 2007 forecast, incorporating the 2007 fleet mix plans. As 

a result, noise contours could shrink because of quieter aircraft. MAC 

adopted a noise-mitigation plan for single-family homes in the DNL 

60-64 contours in April 2002. Implementation of this plan is contingent 

upon resubmission of the Part 150 Update and its FAA approval.



[24] Low frequency noise is aircraft-generated noise that is likely to 

induce audible rattles in residences, most likely below 100 hertz.



[25] House Conference Report 106-940, October 5, 2000.



[26] Federal Interagency Committee on Aviation Noise on the Findings of 

the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport Low Frequency Expert 

Panel, August 2002.



[27] FAA requirements cover both the primary runway surface and runway 

protection zone limits. The length and width of the zones depend upon 

the aircraft operating on the particular runway and the visibility 

minimums. Minnesota state requirements include 1) Zone A--begins 200 

feet from the runway end and extends for a distance two-thirds the 

runway length; 2) Zone B--begins at the end of Zone A and extends for a 

distance of one-third the runway length; and 3) Zone C--the required 

horizontal clearance.



[28] According to Sea-Tac and FAA, the Corps was involved as a 

cooperating agency during Master Plan updates and participated in an 

early EIS draft.



[29] 33 CFR part 323.



[30] An airport official stated that most of the impacts have been to 

roads in the city of SeaTac, and that mitigation costs pertaining to 

the impacts have been addressed.



[31] When we visited the airport, the runway project completed in 

October 2002 was still under construction.



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