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Performance and Accountability Series:



January 2003:



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:



Department of Homeland Security:



GAO-03-102:



A Glance at the Agency Covered in This Report:



The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established on January 

24, 2003. This new cabinet department’s primary mission is to prevent 

terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability 

of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage and 

assist in the recovery from attacks that do occur. The new 

department combines 22 federal agencies specializing in various 

disciplines, such as law enforcement, border 

security, biological research, computer security, and disaster

 mitigation. With an anticipated budget of almost $40 billion and 

an estimated 170,000 employees, DHS is expected to be the third 

largest government agency. DHS will be organized into four 

divisions: Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness 

and Response; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Countermeasures; and Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection. 

The Coast Guard and Secret Service will report directly to the 
Secretary 

for Homeland Security. The new department also will be responsible for 

the non-homeland security functions of the agencies being merged into 

DHS, including the Customs Service’s trade enforcement mission, the 

Coast Guard’s marine safety responsibilities, and the Federal Emergency

Management Agency’s natural disaster recovery efforts.



This Series:



This report is part of a special GAO series, first issued in 1999 

and updated in 2001, entitled the Performance and Accountability 

Series: Major Management Challenges and Program Risks. The 2003 

Performance and Accountability Series contains separate reports 

covering each cabinet department, most major independent agencies, 

and the U.S. Postal Service. The series also includes a 

governmentwide perspective on transforming the way the government 

does business in order to meet 21st century challenges and address 

long-term fiscal needs. The companion 2003 High-Risk Series: An 

Update identifies areas at high risk due to either their greater 

vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement or 

major challenges associated with their economy, efficiency, or 

effectiveness. A list of all of the reports in this series is included 

at the end of this report.



GAO Highlights:



Highlights of GAO-03-102, a report to Congress included as part of 
GAO’s 

Performance and Accountability Series





Why GAO Did This Report:



The new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces unique 
opportunities 

and risks for ensuring the nation’s homeland security.  The 

implementation and transformation of DHS will be complex, and the 

components being merged into the new department already face a wide 

array of existing challenges.  The information GAO presents in this 

report is intended to sustain congressional attention and a 
departmental 

focus on addressing these challenges.  This report is part of a special 

series of reports on governmentwide and agency-specific issues.



What GAO Found:



DHS faces enormous challenges to protect the nation from terrorism.  

DHS must effectively combine 22 agencies with an estimated 170,000 

employees specializing in various disciplines, including law 

enforcement, border security, biological research, computer security, 

and disaster mitigation.  Further, DHS will oversee a number of 

non-homeland security activities.  



GAO has designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as 

a high risk for three reasons.  First, the size and complexity of 

the effort make the challenge especially daunting, requiring 

sustained attention and time to achieve the department’s mission 

in an effective and efficient manner. Second, components being 

merged into DHS already face a wide array of existing challenges 

that must be addressed.  Finally, DHS’s failure to effectively 

carry out its mission exposes the nation to potentially very serious 

consequences.    



Building an effective department will require sustained leadership 

from top management to ensure the transformation of disparate agencies, 

programs, and missions into an integrated organization.  DHS leadership 

can learn from the best practices of the private and public sectors to 

become a high-performance organization.  Achieving the national 

homeland security strategy will require the current transition plan 

to be more comprehensive by addressing the full transition period 

and by identifying key activities and milestones.  Critical aspects 

of DHS’s success will depend on well-functioning relationships with 

third parties that will take time to establish and maintain, including 

those with states and local governments, the private sector, and other 

federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities.  DHS’s 

leadership will also need to focus on certain critical success factors, 

including human capital, information technology management, 
acquisition 

management, and financial management to create a results-oriented 

and accountable department for the long term.           



The new department is being formed from components with a wide array 

of existing major management challenges and program risks.  In fact, 

many of the major components merging into the new department, 

including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 
Transportation 

Security Administration, Customs Service, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, and the Coast Guard, face at least one major problem such as 

strategic human capital risks, information technology management 

challenges, or financial management vulnerabilities; they also confront 

an array of program operations challenges and risks.  



In the final analysis, the success of DHS’s implementation and 

transformation will depend largely on its ability to attract and 

retain the right people; set the appropriate priorities for the 

department; and build effective partnerships with the appropriate 

public, private, and not-for-profit sector entities.



What Needs to Be Done:



DHS must effectively integrate disparate agencies and activities 

into a cohesive organization to achieve the synergy for providing 

better homeland security against terrorism.  DHS should adopt public 

and private sector best practices, and build necessary management 

capacity and oversight mechanisms to implement and transform the new 

department.  DHS also must create and maintain a structure that can 

leverage partners and stakeholders to effectively implement the 
national 

homeland security strategy.  Finally, DHS must confront a wide array of 

existing major management challenges and program risks in its incoming 

agencies.



www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-102.



To view the full report, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Randall Yim at (202) 512-3580 or 

yimr@gao.gov or Patricia Dalton at (202) 512-6806 or daltonp@gao.gov.



Transmittal Letter:



Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:



GAO Contacts:



Related GAO Products:



Performance and Accountability and High-Risk Series:



This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright 

protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 

in its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain 

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copyrighted materials separately from GAO’s product.



Transmittal Letter January 2003:



The President of the Senate

The Speaker of the House of Representatives:



This report addresses the major management challenges and program risks 

facing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as it is formed 

through one of the largest, most complex mergers ever undertaken. The 

government has a unique opportunity to transform a disparate group of 

agencies into a strong and effective cabinet department.



The implementation and transformation of this new department is an 

enormous undertaking that comes with significant risk. GAO has 

designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as a high-risk 

area for three reasons. First, the size and complexity of the effort 

make the challenge especially daunting. Second, the components being 

merged into DHS already face a wide array of existing challenges that 

must be addressed. Finally, DHS’s failure to effectively carry out its 

mission exposes the nation to potentially very serious consequences.



This report provides an overview of the new department’s challenges and 

program risks as it seeks to simultaneously establish itself and 

protect the nation from terrorism. This analysis should help the new 

Congress and the administration carry out their responsibility and 

improve government for the benefit of the American people. For 

additional information about this report, please contact Randall Yim, 

Managing Director, National Preparedness Team at (202) 512-3580, or at 

yimr@gao.gov, or Patricia A. Dalton, Director, Strategic Issues, at 

(202) 512-6806, or at daltonp@gao.gov.



David M. Walker

Comptroller General 

of the United States:



Signed by David M. Walker



[End of section]



Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:



The November 2002 enactment of legislation creating the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) represents a historic moment of almost 

unprecedented action by the federal government to fundamentally 

transform how the nation will protect itself from terrorism.[Footnote 

1] Rarely in the country’s past has such a large and complex 

reorganization of government occurred or been developed with such a 

singular and urgent purpose. The government now has a unique 

opportunity to transform a disparate group of agencies with multiple 

missions, values, and cultures into a strong and effective cabinet 

department whose goal will be to, among other things, protect U.S. 

borders, improve intelligence-and information-sharing activities, and 

prevent and respond to potential terrorists acts. Together with this 

unique opportunity, however, also comes significant risk to the nation 

that could occur if this implementation and transformation is not 

successful. A DHS that does not swiftly meet expectations for 

protecting America could increase the vulnerability of our borders, 

citizens, and economy, and not achieve anticipated effectiveness in 

operations.



This Performance and Accountability Series report on DHS provides an 

overview of the new department’s challenges as it seeks to 

simultaneously establish itself and protect the nation from terrorism. 

This report is being issued as part of a special series of reports that 

discuss major management challenges and program risks across the 

government, including other reports highlighting issues affecting 

homeland security. This report raises issues that deal with both the 

broad transition and transformation concerns the department faces, and 

also the many specific program operational and management challenges 

that DHS will inherit from its component parts in such areas as border 

security and disaster mitigation.



Implementing and Transforming the New Department of Homeland Security 

Is High Risk:



We believe that the implementation and transformation of DHS is a high 

risk, and we have added it to our 2003 High Risk List. This designation 

is based on three factors. First, the implementation and transformation 

of DHS is an enormous undertaking that will take time to achieve in an 

effective and efficient manner. Second, DHS’ prospective components 

already face a wide array of existing management and operational 

challenges. Finally, failure to effectively carry out its mission 

exposes the nation to potentially very serious consequences.



In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, invigorating the nation’s 

homeland security missions has become one of the federal government’s 

most significant challenges. DHS, with an anticipated budget of almost 

$40 billion and over 170,000 employees, will be the third largest 

government agency; not since the creation of the Defense Department 

more than 50 years ago has the government sought to integrate and 

transform something of this magnitude. In the Defense Department’s 

case, the effective transformation took many years to achieve and, even 

today, the department continues to face enduring management challenges 

and high risk areas that are, in part, legacies to its unfinished 

integration.



Effectively implementing and transforming DHS may be an even more 

daunting challenge. The Defense Department, at least, was formed almost 

entirely from agencies whose principal mission was national defense. 

DHS will combine 22 agencies specializing in various disciplines, 

including law enforcement, border security, biological research, 

computer security, and disaster mitigation, for instance. Further, DHS 

will take on some non-homeland security activities, such as the Coast 

Guard’s marine safety responsibilities and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency’s (FEMA) natural disaster response functions. Yet, 

only in the effective integration and collaboration of these entities 

will the nation achieve the synergy that can help provide better 

security against terrorism. The magnitude of the responsibilities, 

combined with the challenge and complexity of the transformation, 

underscore the perseverance and dedication that will be required of all 

of DHS’ leaders, employees, and stakeholders to achieve success.



Further, it is well recognized that mergers of this magnitude in the 

public and private sector carry significant risks, including lost 

productivity and inefficiencies. Generally, successful transformations 

of large organizations, even those undertaking less strenuous 

reorganizations and with less pressure for immediate results, can take 

from 5 to 7 years to achieve. Necessary management capacity, 

communication and information systems, as well as oversight mechanisms 

must be established. Moreover, critical aspects of DHS’ success will 

depend on well-functioning relationships with third parties that will 

take time to establish and maintain, including those with other federal 

agencies with homeland security responsibilities, such as the State 

Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Department, and the Departments 

of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Transportation (DOT); state and 

local government; and the private sector. Creating and maintaining a 

structure that can leverage partners and stakeholders will be necessary 

to effectively implement the national homeland security strategy.



The new department also is being formed from components with a wide 

array of existing major management challenges and program risks. For 

instance, one DHS directorate’s responsibility includes the protection 

of critical information systems--an area that GAO already considers a 

high risk. In fact, many of the major components merging into the new 

department, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 

the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Customs Service, 

FEMA, and the U.S. Coast Guard, face at least one major management 

problem such as strategic human capital risks, information technology 

management challenges, or financial management vulnerabilities. They 

also confront an array of program operations challenges and risks. For 

example, TSA has had considerable challenges in meeting deadlines for 

screening baggage, and the agency has focused most of its initial 

security efforts primarily on aviation security and is working with 

other agencies towards defining the roles and responsibilities for 

surface transportation security. INS has had difficulty tracking aliens 

due to unreliable address information. Customs must meet challenges 

from the potential threats of weapons of mass destruction smuggled in 

cargo arriving at U.S. ports, and the Coast Guard faces the challenges 

inherent in a massive fleet modernization.



DHS’s national security mission is of such importance that the failure 

to address its management challenges and programs risks could have 

serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, our citizens’ 

health and safety, and our economy. Overall, our designation of DHS as 

a high risk area and its inclusion on the 2003 High Risk List stems 

from the importance of its mission and the nation’s reliance on the 

department’s effectiveness in meeting its challenges for protecting the 

country against terrorism.



Implementation and Transformation Challenges:



The creation of DHS is an enormous management challenge. The size, 

complexity, and importance of the effort make the challenge especially 

daunting and incomparably critical to the nation’s security. Building 

an effective department will require consistent and sustained 

leadership from top management to ensure the needed transformation of 

disparate agencies, programs, and missions into an integrated 

organization. To achieve success, the end result should not simply be a 

collection of components in a new department, but the transformation of 

the various programs and missions into a high performance, focused 

organization. The new department will need to build a successful 

transformation that instills the organization with important management 

principles, rapidly implements a phased-in transition plan, leverages 

the new department and other agencies in executing the national 

homeland security strategy, and builds collaborative partnerships with 

federal, state and local, and private sector organizations. Management 

capacity and an accountability structure should be built to ensure 

continuity and achieve goals. Actions that must be taken to ensure the 

success of DHS over the long term include:



* 	a comprehensive transformation process,



* 	strong partnerships,



* 	management capacity, and:



* 	performance, objectives, key milestones and an oversight structure.



Comprehensive Transformation Process:



The creation of DHS represents one of the largest and most complex 

restructurings in the federal government. To improve opportunities for 

success, DHS’s leadership can gain important perspectives from the 

lessons learned and best practices of other organizations that have 

been involved in significant mergers and transformations. Indeed, major 

mergers and acquisitions in the private sector often do not live up to 

their expectations or potential. Moreover, in the short term, the 

experience of major private sector mergers and acquisitions is that 

productivity and effectiveness actually decline. This happens for a 

number of reasons. For example, attention is concentrated on critical 

and immediate integration issues and diverted from longer-term mission 

issues. In addition, employees and managers inevitably worry about 

their place in the new organization. The key is to adopt practices that 

minimize the duration and the significance of factors that reduce 

productivity and effectiveness and ultimately to create an organization 

that is more than the “sum of its parts.”:



On September 24, 2002, GAO convened a forum of public and private 

sector leaders to discuss useful practices from major private and 

public sector organizational mergers, acquisitions, and 

transformations that federal agencies could learn from to successfully 

transform their cultures and DHS could use to merge its various 

originating components.[Footnote 2] The results of this forum provide 

insights into the challenges facing the federal government in forming a 

new cabinet department and in building a high performance organization.



Figure 1 below and the following sections outline key practices 

identified in the forum that can serve as a guide to DHS as it seeks to 

transform and meld disparate cultures in response to governance 

challenges.



Figure 1: Lessons Learned Regarding Mergers and Transformations for 

DHS:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO.



[End of figure]



Leadership, mission and goals, and priorities: Leadership is critical. 

By its very nature, the transformation process entails fundamental 

change. Consistent leadership helps the transformation process stay on 

course and can help bridge the differences in leadership and management 

styles among the originating components. Top leadership must set 

priorities and focus on the most critical issues. While top leadership 

is indispensable, it also will be important to have a management team 

dedicated to the transformation process to ensure changes are 

thoroughly implemented and sustained over time.



The mission and strategic goals of an organization must become the 

focus of the transformation, define the culture, and serve as a vehicle 

to build employee and organizational identity and support. Mission 

clarity and a clear articulation of priorities will be critical, and 

strategic goals must align with and support the mission and serve as 

the continuing, visible guideposts for decision making. The Homeland 

Security Act of 2002[Footnote 3] states that the DHS mission includes 

preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing 

America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and 

assisting in the recovery from attacks that do occur. In addition, DHS 

will assume many non-homeland security responsibilities, making it 

important for the department to clearly articulate short-and long-term 

goals and integrate these diverse missions into a strategic goal 

framework. Top leaders have a critical role in setting policy and 

goals, but management and employees must also be involved and support 

the strategic goals in order to effectively understand and work to 

achieve the department’s mission.



In establishing DHS’ strategic goals, the new department’s leadership 

also needs to address the National Strategy for Homeland Security, 

which articulates the administration’s plans for preventing and 

responding to terrorism. DHS has a key role to play in implementing the 

national strategy, which provides a definition of homeland security and 

sets forth overarching goals. Although the strategy is an important 

contribution to homeland security efforts, many of the implementation 

plans and activities for achieving these goals are not yet developed, 

such as establishing meaningful performance measures and articulating 

clear roles and responsibilities. Through its own goal and priority 

setting, DHS can make the national strategy much more robust and 

comprehensive.



In bringing together various programs and missions, the new 

organization must have a clear set of principles and priorities that 

serve as a framework to help the organization create a common culture 

and establish organizational and individual expectations. Principles 

are the core values of an organization--they can help DHS to define the 

attributes that are intrinsically important to what the new 

organization does and how it will do it. Additionally, priorities 

related to both the mission and the transition must be developed, to 

ensure appropriate sequencing of activities and alignments. These 

priorities provide the direction for implementing the new organization 

and for DHS’ initial mission accomplishments.



Implementation goals, timeline, and resources: Since a successful 

transformation process often takes 5 or more years to complete, it is 

essential to establish action-oriented implementation goals and a 

timeline with milestone dates to track the organization’s progress 

towards its intermediate and long-term transformation goals. By 

demonstrating progress towards these transformation goals, the 

organization builds momentum and demonstrates that real progress is 

being made. In addition, having implementation goals and milestone 

dates helps pinpoint performance shortfalls and gaps and suggests 

midcourse corrections, including any needed adjustments to the 

organization’s future goals and milestones.



Dedicated resources are critical to the successful management of the 

transformation process. A strong and stable implementation team that 

will be responsible for the transformation’s day-to-day management can 

be an important vehicle to ensuring that the implementation and 

transformation of the new department receive the focused, full-time 

attention needed to sustain a successful effort. The implementation 

team can ensure that the various change initiatives are sequenced and 

implemented in a coherent and integrated way and that employees and 

other stakeholders are kept informed. Such a team must have direct 

access and be accountable to top leadership. At the same time, the team 

must be given the necessary authority and resources to carry out its 

responsibilities.



Transition planning efforts for DHS have been started, but more 

sustained efforts will be necessary. In November 2002, the 

administration, as required by law, submitted a Department of Homeland 

Security Reorganization Plan to the Congress.[Footnote 4] The plan 

provides information on the transfer of agencies, personnel, assets, 

and obligations to DHS and any consolidation, reorganization, and 

streamlining of agencies transferred to DHS as a result of the 

legislation. In complying with the legislation requiring the 

reorganization plan, the administration has identified the basic 

functions that will be transferred to DHS and provided some initial 

dates for transferring the incoming organizational entities. However, 

the transition plan is limited in its description of actions and 

activities that will be necessary, and it does not reflect the full 

range of actions that must occur in order to achieve an effective 

integration of agencies, programs, and missions into the new 

department. More comprehensive planning is needed that addresses the 

specifics of melding the new department’s people, strategies, systems, 

and processes in a smooth and integrated manner. Issues that need to be 

addressed range from how the department will move to a single payroll 

system and what that system will be; to how border entry points should 

function--who operates the entry points, what do they do, what are 

their support systems. We believe that a more comprehensive transition 

plan will be necessary, one that addresses the full transition period 

and includes the identification of key activities and milestones to 

transform DHS into a fully integrated, high performance organization, 

and establishes accountability for achieving results.[Footnote 5]



Employee involvement, communication, and performance: People will 

determine the success of DHS and the transformation that must be 

achieved. A change of culture is at the heart of a successful 

transformation--and DHS is no exception. The importance of redefining 

the organizational culture should not be avoided, but rather must be 

aggressively addressed at the outset and throughout the transformation 

process. Employee involvement, communication, and performance 

management will be critical to this process.



Employee involvement is critical from the beginning of the 

transformation process in order to achieve employee ownership of the 

changes. Further, it strengthens the transformation process by 

including frontline perspectives and experiences. However, 

organizations and their employees must guard against being so involved 

in implementing their transformation initiatives that they lose sight 

of the fundamental reason for the transformation--improved results.



An effective and ongoing internal and external communication strategy 

is essential to making the transformation occur. Communication is not 

just about “pushing the message out,” but it should facilitate a two-

way honest exchange with and allow for feedback from employees, 

customers, and stakeholders. This communication is central to forming 

the effective internal and external partnerships that are vital to the 

success of any organization.



A communication strategy is especially crucial in the public sector, 

where policymaking and program management demand transparency and a 

full range of stakeholders and interested parties are concerned not 

only with what results are to be achieved, but also what processes are 

to be used to achieve those results. This demand for transparency is a 

fact that needs to be accepted in any public sector transformation.



Finally, a performance management system can help manage and direct the 

transformation process. The performance management system must create a 

“line of sight” showing how team, unit, and individual performance can 

contribute to overall organization results. The system serves as the 

basis for setting expectations for employees’ roles in the 

transformation process. It also evaluates individual performance and 

contributions to the success of the transformation process and 

ultimately, organizational results.



Building a world-class organization: The formation of DHS is an 

important step in the federal government’s effort to improve homeland 

security. In establishing a results-oriented culture that can reach its 

full potential, the organization and its leaders should carefully 

select the best solution for the new organization. It will be important 

to have key positions filled with people who possess the critical 

competencies needed by the organization. Further, systems and processes 

need to be tailored to the organization. Best practices in systems and 

processes should be sought wherever they may be found. The best 

solution may not be to adopt the approaches or systems used by the 

largest component.



Building Strong Partnerships:



The consolidation of many agencies, programs, and missions into DHS is 

designed, in part, to improve coordination and collaboration of 

organizations with homeland security missions. DHS must establish 

effective mechanisms to strengthen the ability of its many entities to 

share information and build partnerships that yield results and help 

meet national homeland security objectives.



Even with the consolidation of many entities into DHS, there still 

remain a significant number of federal agencies or mission areas that 

are not being incorporated into the new department but which still need 

to be integrated into the overall homeland security strategy. Agencies 

such as the FBI, CIA, and the U.S. Marshals Service, for example, have 

important roles to play--especially in information sharing and 

intelligence activities--and their efforts must be coordinated with DHS 

to ensure effective and efficient action. DHS must effectively 

coordinate with the State Department on visa processing, with HHS on 

smallpox vaccination preparations and public health preparedness, and 

with many other agencies that are not being incorporated into the new 

organization.



Likewise, DHS will need to establish effective collaboration with the 

Defense Department, which also has a growing role to play in homeland 

security. In 2002, the President approved the latest Defense Department 

Unified Command Plan intended to realign and streamline the U.S. 

military structure to better address 21st century threats. 

Characterized as the most significant reform of the nation’s military 

command structure since the first command plan was issued shortly after 

World War II, the plan, among other things, establishes the U.S. 

Northern Command (NORTHCOM), responsible for land, aerospace, and sea 

defenses of the United States. Its geographic area includes the 

continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, portions of the 

Caribbean, and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific 

oceans.



Achieving national preparedness and response goals hinges on the 

federal government’s ability to form effective partnerships with 

nonfederal entities. Although collaboration with state and local 

governments and the private sector is increasing, more needs to be done 

in order to enhance its effectiveness. DHS has a strong role to play in 

achieving this objective. Prior to September 11, 2001, the public and 

private sectors collaborated on homeland security activities, but the 

catastrophic events heightened the recognition that more concrete and 

long-term approaches were necessary. The new department needs to gain 

the full participation and buy-in of partners in both policy 

formulation and implementation to develop effective partnerships.



The new DHS legislation contains provisions that should help maintain 

coordination among public sector entities by establishing within the 

DHS’ Office of the Secretary an Office for State and Local Coordination 

that will coordinate DHS activities relating to state and local 

government. In addition, this office is tasked with developing a 

process for receiving meaningful input from state and local governments 

on furthering the national strategy for combating terrorism and other 

homeland security activities. DHS also includes an Information Analysis 

and Infrastructure Protection Directorate that will have responsibility 

for assessments and protection plans for key resources and critical 

infrastructure. Part of that effort will include consultation and 

cooperation with state and local governments and the private sector. 

For example, the directorate will recommend protection measures in 

cooperation with state and local government agencies and authorities 

and the private sector.



The DHS legislation and existing coordinating mechanisms provide a base 

for fully developing a partnership structure that provides maximum 

leverage of resources and information. Effectively implementing a 

strong partnership network is critical to accomplishing DHS’ homeland 

security mission.



Building Management Capacity:



The multiple mission responsibilities of the new department will 

require significant management capacity to ensure that DHS can 

successfully transform the various agencies, programs, and missions 

into a strong and effective organization. The new department must 

grapple not only with operational issues that will require immediate 

attention to better secure our borders or to enhance information 

sharing, but to also create a well run, sustainable department for the 

long term.



In our July 17, 2002, testimony entitled Homeland Security: Critical 

Design and Implementation Issues (GAO-02-957T), we identified certain 

critical success factors a new organization such as DHS should 

emphasize in its initial implementation phase. Over the years GAO has 

made observations and recommendations about many of these success 

factors, including human capital, information technology management, 

acquisition management, financial management, and several other 

important tools critical to building and sustaining effective 

organizations. The full list of success factors is described on page 

32.



The DHS legislation created an Under Secretary for Management, who will 

be responsible for the management and administration of the department. 

The effectiveness of this position will be critical to the department’s 

performance. Essentially, the person should function as a chief 

operating officer (COO). A COO can provide the sustained management 

attention essential for addressing key infrastructure and stewardship 

issues, while helping to facilitate the transition and transformation 

process. This position can be the focal point for building and 

sustaining management capacity. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary can 

then focus their efforts on policy and strategic issues. To be 

successful, the Under Secretary must be given the necessary authority 

to successfully lead departmentwide initiatives. Further, the person 

filling this position should have the demonstrated leadership skills in 

managing large and complex organizations and experience achieving 

results in connection with “good government” responsibilities and 

initiatives.



With respect to human capital, DHS will face significant challenges 

that will require a comprehensive strategy capable of ensuring the new 

department can acquire, develop, and retain the skills and talents 

needed to prevent and protect against terrorism. This will require 

identifying skill needs; attracting people with scarce skills, such as 

language proficiency, into government jobs; melding diverse 

compensation systems that can support the new department’s many needs; 

and establishing a results-oriented, accountable culture that can meet 

national goals and priorities. An environment that promotes employee 

involvement and empowerment, as well as constructive and cooperative 

labor-management relations, will be critically important. The various 

unions whose members are slated to become employees of DHS will, 

together with the department’s leadership, need to work in unity of 

purpose to achieve the goals of transforming DHS and strengthening 

national security.



Moreover, agencies slated to move into DHS have long-standing human 

capital problems that will need to be addressed. One of these 

challenges has been the ability to hire and retain a talented and 

motivated staff. For example, We have reported that INS has been unable 

to reach its program goals in large part because of such staffing 

problems as hiring shortfalls and agent attrition.[Footnote 6] Several 

INS functions have been impacted by the lack of a staff resource 

allocation model to identify staffing needs.[Footnote 7] Therefore, it 

is likely that increased attention to the enforcement of immigration 

laws and border control will test the capacity of DHS to hire large 

numbers of inspectors for work at our nation’s border entry points. 

Other agencies being integrated into DHS are also expected to 

experience challenges in hiring security workers and inspectors. For 

example, the Agriculture Department’s Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service (APHIS) has been seeking to increase the size of its 

inspection force by 50 percent at the same time that the Customs 

Service, INS, and other agencies are increasing the size of their 

inspection staffs.[Footnote 8]



The DHS legislation provided certain human capital flexibilities in 

order to establish a contemporary human capital system to better meet 

the needs of the new department. These flexibilities can be important 

tools in addressing the department’s pressing human capital needs, 

including recruiting, retaining, and aligning staff. DHS should 

consider the six key practices for the effective use of human capital 

flexibilities that we identified as part of a recent review.[Footnote 

9] In addition, DHS should look to other agencies that have been given 

flexibilities in the past--the Defense Department, the Internal Revenue 

Service, TSA--to learn and build on their experiences to achieve the 

maximum benefit. As required by the legislation, there also needs to be 

transparency and accountability in designing the system, involving 

stakeholders--particularly employees--and keeping the Congress 

informed. These human capital flexibilities can greatly benefit the 

department, but only if properly used.



Improving information technology management will also be critical to 

transforming the new department. Not only will DHS face considerable 

challenges in integrating the many systems and processes that provide 

management with decision information, but it must sufficiently identify 

its future needs in order to build effective systems that can support 

the national homeland security strategy in the coming years. The Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB), in its current reexamination of ongoing 

technology and management information systems, has taken an initial 

first step to evaluate the new department’s component systems. Much 

more needs to be done, however, before DHS can achieve the needed 

systems integration, including the development and implementation of an 

enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, to guide its 

information technology investments. Other key information technology 

management capacities that DHS will need to establish include effective 

computer security, investment management processes, and system and 

service acquisition management practices.



Several of the agencies being incorporated into DHS will bring the new 

department inherited information technology problems. For instance, INS 

has had long-standing difficulty developing and fielding information 

systems to support its program operations. Since 1990, we have reported 

that INS managers and field officials did not have adequate, reliable, 

and timely information to effectively carry out the agency’s mission. 

For example, INS’ benefit fraud investigations have been hampered by a 

lack of integrated information systems.[Footnote 10] Because INS’ four 

service centers investigating benefit fraud operate different 

information systems that do not interface with each other, INS officers 

may be making decisions without routine access to significant 

information, resulting in benefits being granted to individuals not 

entitled to receive them. More recently, INS’s alien address 

information could not be fully relied on to locate many aliens who were 

believed to be in the country and who might have knowledge that would 

assist the nation in its antiterrorism efforts.[Footnote 11] 

Contributing to this situation was INS’ lack of written procedures and 

automated controls to help ensure that reported changes of address by 

aliens are recorded in all of INS’ automated databases. Our work has 

identified weaknesses in INS’ information technology management 

capacities as the root cause of its system problems, and we have made 

recommendations to correct the weaknesses. INS has made progress in 

addressing our recommendations.



Much also remains to be done to strengthen the government’s ability to 

leverage information sharing between and among important government and 

private sector stakeholders. The success of the national homeland 

security strategy relies on the ability of all levels of government and 

the private sector to communicate effectively with one another. 

Activities that are hampered by organizational fragmentation, 

technological impediments, or ineffective collaboration blunt the 

nation’s collective efforts to prevent or minimize terrorist acts.



DHS will be faced with the challenge of integrating the procurement 

functions of many of its constituent programs and missions. Early 

attention to strong systems and controls for acquisition and related 

business processes will be critical both to ensuring success and 

maintaining integrity and accountability. Several of the incoming 

agencies, such as Customs and the Coast Guard, have major procurement 

programs under way that must be closely managed to ensure they achieve 

expectations. Inherited challenges exist in several agencies. Despite 

some progress, Customs still lacks important acquisition management 

controls.[Footnote 12] For its new import processing system, Customs 

has not begun to establish process controls for determining whether 

acquired software products and services satisfy contract requirements 

before acceptance, nor to establish related controls for effective and 

efficient transfer of acquired software products to the support 

organization responsible for software maintenance. Agreeing with one of 

our recommendations, Customs continues to make progress and plans to 

establish effective acquisition process controls.



With respect to financial management, the new department has a 

stewardship obligation to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, to use tax 

dollars appropriately, and to ensure financial accountability to the 

President, the Congress, and the American people. DHS can only meet 

these goals if it establishes systems, processes, and controls that 

help to ensure effective financial management. DHS must also insist on 

the adherence of strong financial principles for its incoming agencies, 

many of which have ongoing challenges in their systems, processes, or 

internal controls over financial information. For instance, FEMA 

received a qualified opinion on its financial statements following its 

fiscal year 2001 financial audit, and it has a number of material 

internal control weaknesses.[Footnote 13] For fiscal year 2001, INS 

received its first unqualified opinion on its financial statements. 

However, it took significant effort to achieve this opinion and the 

auditors reported several material internal control weaknesses. DOT, 

from which several DHS agencies are coming, has financial management 

deficiencies, including with its accounting system. In addition to 

addressing the many ongoing challenges existing in the programs of 

incoming agencies, DHS will need to focus on building future systems as 

part of its enterprise architecture approach to ensure an overarching 

framework for the agency’s integrated financial management processes. 

Plans must be developed and implemented to bridge the many financial 

environments in which incoming agencies currently operate to an 

integrated DHS system.



Successful financial management of homeland security will also be 

dependent on greater budgetary transparency and a level of detail that 

provides useful information for congressional budget deliberations and 

executive decision making. Collaboration and coordination will be 

critical to avoiding duplicative or wasteful spending on homeland 

security, both within DHS as well as among other agencies that have 

homeland security missions. DHS will need to work with OMB and the 

Congress to achieve the needed level of transparency as funding is 

transferred or merged to ensure that intended results are achieved and 

funds are effectively leveraged.



DHS is also expected to extensively utilize third parties, including 

state and local governments and the private sector, to meet national 

homeland security goals. Through a variety of important tools, 

including grants and regulations, tax incentives, and other activities, 

as well as the purchase of goods and services, the new department must 

not only ensure that the tools it uses are the most appropriate for the 

situation but that it also receives the intended benefit. Through 

effective program and financial management, DHS will need to build 

strong oversight mechanisms to ensure that third party obligations are 

met.



Establishing Performance Milestones and Oversight for DHS:



The new department, in fulfilling its broad mandate, has the challenge 

of developing a national homeland security performance focus, which 

relies on related national and agency strategic and performance 

planning efforts of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS), OMB, and 

other departments and agencies. Indeed, the planning activities of the 

various departments and agencies represent a good start in the 

development of this focus; however, our past work on implementation of 

the Government Performance and Results Act has highlighted ongoing 

difficulty with many federal departments and agencies setting adequate 

performance goals, objectives, and targets. Accordingly, attention is 

needed to developing and achieving appropriate homeland security 

performance expectations and measures and in ensuring that there is 

linkage between DHS, other agency plans, and the national strategy. 

Ensuring these capabilities and linkages will be vital in establishing 

a comprehensive homeland security planning and accountability framework 

that will not only guide the nation’s homeland security efforts but 

also help assess how well they are really working.



The new DHS legislation does require some specific planning efforts 

that include goals and measures. For example, the Directorate of 

Science and Technology is to develop a national policy and strategic 

plan for developing countermeasures to weapons of mass destruction. The 

directorate must develop comprehensive, research-based definable goals 

and annual measurable objectives and specific targets to evaluate the 

goals.



Accountability is also a critical factor in ensuring the success of the 

new department. The oversight entities of the executive branch, 

including OMB and OHS, will have a vital role to play in ensuring 

expected performance and accountability. As stated in the President’s 

June 2002 DHS proposal, OHS is seen as continuing to play a key role in 

advising the President and coordinating a simplified interagency 

process. Likewise, congressional committees, with their long-term and 

broad institutional roles, will also play a role in overseeing the 

transformation of the federal government as it meets the demands of its 

homeland security mission. The creation of DHS has raised questions 

regarding how the Congress can best meet its oversight, authorization, 

and appropriations responsibilities for the new department. DHS will be 

comprised of some 22 federal agencies or their components overseen by 

numerous congressional committees of jurisdiction. In recognizing this 

complexity, the DHS legislation instructs both Houses of Congress to 

review their committee structures in light of the reorganization of 

homeland security responsibilities within the executive branch. As a 

result, the Congress has begun to explore ways to facilitate conducting 

its responsibilities in a more consolidated and integrated manner. 

During this period of transformation, the Congress may need to 

periodically reassess its structure to maximize the effectiveness of 

its DHS oversight.



Addressing Significant Program Operational and Management Challenges:



In addition to the high risk associated with implementing and 

transforming a new department from the multitude of agencies and 

activities, DHS’ leadership will be confronted with a number of 

operational and management challenges emanating from the functions and 

organizations being transferred to it. We have identified a number of 

major operational and management challenges in the programs and 

missions being transferred into the department. These challenges are 

discussed in depth in our Performance and Accountability reports on 

their current departments and in other GAO work on homeland security. 

However, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the new department, 

summaries of these risks and challenges follow.



Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection:



Within DHS, a new directorate is responsible for accessing, receiving, 

and analyzing law enforcement information, intelligence information, 

and other information from agencies of federal, state, and local 

governments and the private sector, and to integrate such information 

to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats. The 

new directorate’s role also includes the protection of the nation’s 

critical information systems. In a separate report, we have designated 

protecting information systems supporting the federal government and 

the nation’s critical infrastructures as a governmentwide high risk. 

Because of the new department’s central role in this issue, resolution 

of this high risk will, in part, be a responsibility and significant 

challenge for DHS.



Since 1997, we have designated information security as a governmentwide 

high-risk issue. This year, we have expanded the high-risk issue to 

emphasize the increased importance of protecting the information 

systems that support critical computer infrastructure such as national 

defense, power distribution, and water supply.[Footnote 14] Terrorist 

attacks and threats have further underscored the need to manage 

critical infrastructure protection (CIP) activities that enhance the 

security of the cyber and physical public and private infrastructures 

that are essential to national security, national economic security, 

and/or national public health and safety.



At the federal level, cyber CIP activities are perhaps the most 

critical component of a department or agency’s overall information 

security program. In addition, although the government has made steady 

progress in working with the private sector to better secure critical 

infrastructures, this issue is also designated as part of our 

information security high-risk issue because:



* the failure to adequately protect these infrastructures could have 

consequences for national and economic security and /or national public 

health and safety,



* terrorist groups and others have stated their intentions of attacking 

our critical infrastructures,



* federal influence over the private sector’s management of our 

nation’s critical infrastructure poses unique challenges, and:



* further actions on GAO’s CIP recommendations are needed.



A number of significant actions have taken place to better position the 

nation to protect our critical infrastructures, including issuance of

(1) Presidential Decision Directive 63, which described a strategy for 

cooperative efforts by government and the private sector and 

established organizations to provide central coordination and support, 

(2) Executive Order 13231, which established the President’s Critical 

Infrastructure Protection Board, and (3) a comment draft of a National 

Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.[Footnote 15]



Although the actions taken to date are major steps to more effectively 

protect our nation’s critical infrastructures, we have identified and 

made numerous recommendations over the last several years concerning 

CIP challenges that still need to be addressed. For each of these 

challenges, improvements have been made and continuing efforts are in 

progress. However, much more needs to be done. These challenges include 

developing a national CIP strategy, improving analysis and warning 

capabilities, and improving information sharing on threats and 

vulnerabilities.



Moreover, the transformation of the FBI at the same time as the 

formation of DHS will add an additional level of complexity to the 

challenge of ensuring effective coordination, communication, and 

sharing of information. In previous work, we have noted that changes in 

the FBI must be part of, and consistent with, broader governmentwide 

transformations that are taking place.[Footnote 16] As a result, the 

FBI needs to develop a comprehensive transformation plan with key 

milestones and assessment points to guide its overall transformation 

efforts. With the FBI as a key partner, it will be important for DHS to 

be aware of ongoing changes at the FBI and assess their impact on its 

operations and the integration of activities between the two agencies.



Border and Transportation Security:



The new Border and Transportation Security Directorate faces 

considerable challenges and its success will require sustained 

attention from the new department’s leadership. The operational and 

management challenges include:



* Customs Service: As a result of the homeland security legislation, 

the Customs Service will be transferred to DHS from the Treasury 

Department. However, the Secretary of the Treasury will retain 

authority over customs revenue functions. The splitting of revenue 

functions from other authorities will initially pose a challenge to 

developing clarity in roles and responsibilities and effective, 

efficient, and seamless operations. Further, in our report on the 

Treasury Department, we have identified improving Customs’ management 

of multiple missions as a performance and accountability challenge. 

Customs has the dual missions of enforcing laws to safeguard borders 

against illegal entry of goods and of regulating legitimate commercial 

activity. While September 11has focused Customs on keeping out of the 

country any “implements of terrorism,” such as chemical, biological, or 

nuclear materials that could be used as weapons, the agency still faces 

challenges associated with trade compliance and overall border 

security.



* Our recently completed and ongoing work has identified additional 

challenges that directly or indirectly affect Customs’ efforts to 

improve security at U.S. borders to safeguard against the illegal entry 

of goods, including potentially harmful, hazardous, or otherwise 

illegal commodities. These challenges include improving different 

international mail and package inspections processes, ensuring that 

various illegal items, including weapons of mass destruction, do not 

enter the country in cargo containers at seaports, and acquiring a new 

import processing system. According to Customs, the inspection of 

incoming foreign mail remains largely a manual process that relies 

primarily on physical examination. One courier is working with Customs 

to pilot test an advance manifest system, a computerized database that 

receives cargo manifest information. The database will allow Customs to 

analyze incoming package information and make more informed decisions 

about what packages to inspect. Since our work on international mail 

and containerized cargo processing[Footnote 17] involves information 

that Customs considers to be law enforcement sensitive, we are 

precluded from further discussing the challenges posed by mail and 

cargo processing in this unclassified report. Whatever their nature, 

Customs’ challenges could likely be complicated during its proposed 

transition to the new Department of Homeland Security.



* Transportation Security Administration: We have identified 

transportation security as a performance and accountability challenge 

for the Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation. As 

discussed in our DOT report, the transformation of transportation 

security in order to reduce the vulnerability of the nation’s surface 

and air transportation systems to terrorism and other disruptions 

represents a significant challenge to the new department.[Footnote 18] 

On November 19, 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security 

Act[Footnote 19] was enacted, which created TSA and defined its primary 

responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. DOT 

has worked to make urgent security improvements throughout its modal 

administrations while simultaneously organizing TSA to meet the longer-

term challenge of implementing security improvements that will not 

excessively inhibit commerce and travel or interfere with other 

critical missions. Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has focused 

primarily on aviation security challenges and is working towards 

defining the roles and responsibilities for surface transportation 

security. Specifically, TSA is developing memoranda of understanding 

with the other modal administrations within DOT that are expected to 

delineate the lines of authority between the parties and establish the 

specific responsibilities of various parties for transportation 

security. TSA plans to complete the memoranda by March 1, 2003.



There are also continuing challenges for aviation security. Despite an 

impressive start in building the infrastructure of a large 

organization, TSA still faces formidable short-and long-term challenges 

in aviation security. According to TSA, it met the November 2002 

deadline by hiring and deploying over 40,000 passenger screeners to 

screen passengers at 429 commercial airports. In addition, TSA reports 

that it met the December 31, 2002, deadline to screen all checked 

baggage. TSA reports that it hired and deployed more than 20,000 of an 

estimated 22,000 baggage screeners as of mid-December 2002 to screen 

all checked baggage and that as of December 31, 2002, about 90 percent 

of all checked baggage will be screened using explosive detection 

systems or explosive trace detection equipment, and the remaining 

checked baggage will be screened using alternative means such as canine 

teams, hand searches, and passenger-bag matching. Nevertheless, 

significant challenges remain. As of mid-December 2002, TSA has 

installed only 239 of the estimated 1,100 explosive detection machines 

and 1,951 of the estimated 6,000 trace detection machines needed to 

screen baggage to meet baggage screening requirements in the Aviation 

and Transportation Security Act. 



In addition to securing passenger carry-on luggage and checked luggage 

TSA faces other immediate challenges in securing cargo aboard 

commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. To address these 

challenges, we recommended that TSA develop a comprehensive plan for 

air cargo security that incorporates a risk management approach, 

includes a list of security priorities, and sets deadlines for 

completing actions. TSA agreed with this recommendation.[Footnote 20]



TSA faces numerous transportation security challenges over the long 

term. The agency must ensure that transportation security funding needs 

are identified and prioritized and costs are controlled. Moreover, TSA 

believes its current funding levels are inadequate. The agency 

estimates that it will need about $4.8 billion in fiscal year 2003, but 

that revenues from the new passenger security fee will pay for only 

about one third ($1.7 billion) of that amount. As a result, TSA will 

need a major cash infusion at a time when federal budget deficits are 

growing. TSA needs to establish effective coordination among the many 

public and private entities responsible for transportation security. 

The agency must also ensure adequate workforce competence and staffing 

levels. TSA has experienced difficulty in hiring and training its 

screening workforce and continues to face issues with its compensation 

and performance management systems. Finally, standards define the level 

of security that is needed and the safeguards that should be in place 

to meet the identified needs. New standards are being developed in some 

modes and are being considered in other modes. In addition to 

continuing challenges in standard development, there also are 

challenges in standards’ implementation.



* Visa processing: Another important element in border and 

transportation security is the improvement of the nation’s visa 

processing system. In our report on the Department of State, we 

identify strengthening the visa process to help prevent terrorism as a 

performance and accountability challenge.[Footnote 21] Since the 

September 11 attacks, some changes have been introduced to strengthen 

visa processing. For example, State has, with the help of other 

agencies, almost doubled the names and information on persons in the 

lookout system. Although these actions have strengthened the visa 

process, opinions and practices among overseas posts continue to 

diverge regarding the authority of consular officers to deny 

questionable applicants a visa and the role of the visa process in 

ensuring national security. Opinions and practices also differ 

regarding the appropriate changes to individual posts’ visa policies 

and procedures that need to be made given the need for heightened 

border security. We have made a number of recommendations to State to 

address urgent and fundamental operational and coordination issues, and 

the department has indicated that it has taken steps to implement a 

number of our recommendations. However, more needs to be done. In the 

creation of DHS, the Secretary for DHS has been given certain visa 

policy-making responsibilities. It will be critical for DHS and State 

to work together to address the underlying challenge in visa 

processing, ensure a smooth transfer of certain responsibilities, and 

integrate visa processing activities to maximize effectiveness as an 

antiterrorism tool.



* Immigration: Numerous challenges also face INS, which is being 

integrated into the new department. The Congress has continued to 

express concern about INS’ ability to carry out its enforcement and 

service functions. Over the last several years the Congress has 

significantly increased budget and staffing at INS to help the agency 

deal with its considerable workload. In creating DHS, the Congress 

established within DHS the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 

Services to help improve the performance of these activities. Further, 

the Bureau of Border Security has responsibility for enforcement 

functions. 



These actions have resulted in a significant change in responsibilities 

for carrying out immigration functions. However, additional challenges 

remain, and will have to be addressed by DHS. In a memorandum dated 

November 8, 2002, the DOJ Inspector General enumerated the top 

management challenges for INS. Many of these challenges parallel our 

reporting. In our performance and accountability report on DOJ, we 

identify the following challenges:



* effective use of INS resources is necessary to fully implement a 

border control strategy,



* fragmented and unfocused INS efforts must be improved to combat 

immigration benefit fraud,



* impediments to reducing unauthorized employment need to be overcome,



* improvements are needed in identifying and removing criminal aliens,



* shortcomings in alien anti-smuggling efforts need to be eliminated,



* problems managing INS’s application workload must be corrected,



* problems coordinating with State Department’s visa operations need 

attention, and:



* weaknesses in information technology management must be corrected.



Our report on DOJ contains an extensive discussion of these issues and 

our related recommendations. However, several are highlighted here.



The Border Patrol has been responsible for preventing and deterring 

aliens from illegally entering the United States between ports of 

entry. We reported in August 2001 that INS’s preliminary estimates 

indicated that gaining control of the southwest border could take at 

least 5 more years and between 11,700 and 14,000 Border Patrol agents, 

additional support personnel, and hundreds of millions of dollars in 

technology and infrastructure.[Footnote 22] Further, the Justice 

Department’s Inspector General reported in 2002 that INS developed a 

northern border strategy in 2000, but implementation was initially 

delayed because of changes in administration and in INS leadership, and 

then overwhelmed by the events of September 11.[Footnote 23] In 

response to September 11, INS accelerated deployment of personnel and 

resources to the northern border, including increasing the number of 

Border Patrol agents from 24 to 245 in fiscal year 2001.



Despite years of increasing budgets and staff, INS has continued to 

experience significant problems managing its workload of processing 

applications. As of October 2002, INS had an application backlog of 5.2 

million applications, an almost five-fold increase since October 1994. 

We reported in May 2001 that better automation capability and a more 

streamlined application process would enable INS to provide improved 

levels of service.[Footnote 24] In 2002, the President announced a $50 

million initiative to eliminate backlogs. It should be noted that 

despite the importance and prevalence of information technology (IT) 

systems in accomplishing organizational core missions, INS has not yet 

fully implemented effective controls for managing its IT resources, 

although it is working to do so. This will provide an added level of 

difficulty in addressing other management problems.



Emergency Preparedness and Response:



The new department will include a directorate for emergency 

preparedness and response and will inherit challenges from FEMA and 

HHS. FEMA will be transferred to DHS, thus the department will have 

responsibility for both FEMA’s homeland security and non-homeland 

security responsibilities. Currently a stand-alone agency, we have 

issued a separate report on FEMA in which four mission and management 

challenges are identified. These challenges are: (1) ensuring effective 

coordination of preparedness and response efforts, (2) enhancing 

provision and management of disaster assistance for efficient and 

effective response, 

(3) reducing the impact of natural hazards by improving the efficiency 

of mitigation and flood programs, and (4) resolving financial 

management weaknesses to ensure fiscal accountability.



The first challenge deals with preparing for and responding to 

terrorism and nonterrorism-related disasters. Although FEMA and its 

missions will be transferred to DHS, its homeland security and 

nonhomeland security missions will be under separate DHS directorates. 

Specifically, preparedness for terrorism disasters will be placed in 

the Border and Transportation Security Directorate and other 

preparedness and response efforts will be located in the Emergency 

Preparedness and Response Directorate. This divisional separation could 

complicate FEMA’s historical all-hazards approach--a comprehensive 

approach focused on preparing for and responding to all types of 

disasters, either natural or manmade. Separation of preparedness and 

response activities among differing federal entities has been a 

recurring problem in the past, and while consolidation of these 

activities within DHS does achieve a measure of consolidation, the 

separation of disaster and emergency responsibilities across two 

directorates of the new department will present coordination challenges 

for the appropriate DHS undersecretaries.



With respect to enhancing the provision and management of disaster 

assistance for efficient and effective response, FEMA will be 

challenged to:



* improve its criteria for determining state and local eligibility to 

receive federal disaster assistance;



* assess whether broadened determinations of federal disaster 

assistance in response to the terrorist attacks may establish precedent 

for future disasters;



* build on lessons learned from charities’ response to September 11, 

and enhance disaster assistance training and resource planning;



* enhance oversight of disaster assistance; and:



* improve an existing information system before it is used as a 

building block for a multiagency disaster management web site.



With respect to natural hazards, two of FEMA’s major efforts have been 

its mitigation programs and the National Flood Insurance Program. 

Concerns have been raised regarding the demonstration of cost 

effectiveness of some mitigation projects in these programs. For the 

National Flood Insurance Program, cumulative program costs exceeded 

income by about $1.3 billion during fiscal years 1993 through 2001 

because the program is not actuarially sound.



Finally, FEMA faces challenges in resolving financial management 

weaknesses. FEMA’s financial management effectiveness has become a 

concern because it received a qualified audit opinion on its most 

recent financial statements due to inadequate accounting for property 

and unliquidated obligations. Additionally, auditors identified 

material internal control weaknesses and compliance issues requiring 

correction.



In addition to FEMA, HHS’ Office of Emergency Response will be 

transferred to DHS. In our report on HHS, we identify strengthening 

preparedness for public health emergencies, including bioterrorism, as 

a performance and accountability challenge.[Footnote 25] Ensuring that 

every community and each of the approximately 3,000 local health 

departments across the nation meets a basic standard of preparedness is 

a significant challenge. Our reports have found significant weaknesses 

in key elements of the public health infrastructure that are critical 

to emergency response at the state and local level. In addition, we 

have noted a lack of coordination among programs with responsibility 

for public health emergency preparedness at the local, state, and 

federal levels. The creation of DHS has the potential to streamline 

overall funding and oversight responsibilities for preparedness and 

response. However, key public health preparedness functions will remain 

with HHS, and will present coordination challenges to DHS.



Further, we note that HHS faces challenges in strengthening the public 

health infrastructure, as well as related aspects of the private-sector 

health care system. Areas requiring strengthening include laboratory 

capacity, infectious disease surveillance, hospital surge capacity, 

blood supply, communications, human capital, and research and 

development. Clearly, addressing these challenges will impact the 

success of DHS in achieving its mission. Coordination between the two 

departments will be critical.



Science and Technology:



The new department’s Directorate of Science and Technology will have a 

diverse set of responsibilities and its effectiveness will depend upon 

strong relationships with other federal departments. Several components 

of the Department of Energy will be transferred to the new directorate, 

as will the Department of Agriculture’s Plum Island Animal Disease 

Center and the Defense Department’s National Bio-Weapons Defense 

Analysis Center. In addition to its own research activities, DHS will 

have to collaborate with HHS, the Department of Energy, and others to 

ensure essential research is accomplished for homeland security 

activities. Achieving balance among competing priorities will present 

unique challenges. Science and technology activities often serve 

multiple purposes and, as we have indicated in recent testimony before 

the Congress,[Footnote 26] collaboration between and among federal 

agencies will be important to the success of missions that serve dual 

purposes.



The integration of these components will present unique challenges, 

particularly as DHS moves to address important needs of homeland 

security. For instance, one potential area where the new department 

will play a role is biometric technology, which can be used in 

associating a person with travel documents such as visas and passports. 

When used at a border inspection, the biometric comparison can be used 

to help decide whether to admit a traveler into the United States. 

Before any decision is made to implement biometrics in a border control 

system, the benefits of the system must be weighed against its costs. 

The purpose of any biometrics initiative is to prevent the entry of 

travelers who are inadmissible to the United States. The costs of a 

biometric border control system will not be trivial. Important policy 

implications must be addressed in trade-offs between increasing 

security and the impact on areas such as privacy, economy, traveler 

convenience, and international relations.



Coast Guard:



The Coast Guard will also be transferred to DHS, but it will remain as 

an independent unit and will not be incorporated into any of the new 

directorates. In recent reports and testimonies, we raise issues 

regarding the need for the Coast Guard to balance multiple 

missions.[Footnote 27] Additionally, in our report on DOT, we identify 

a performance and accountability challenge of enhancing aviation and 

Coast Guard acquisition management to maximize returns from investment 

of public funds in large, complex, high-cost procurements.[Footnote 28] 

Our report noted that aging and obsolete equipment has limited the 

Coast Guard’s ability to achieve its safety and security missions, and 

that the agency is undertaking a costly, complex, and long-term 

program, called the Deepwater Capability Replacement Project, to 

modernize and replace its aging ships and aircraft. In 2002, the Coast 

Guard awarded a $17 billion contract and projected sustained funding 

needs of $500 million a year (in 1998 dollars) over the next 2 to 3 

decades to develop the Integrated Deepwater System. The Coast Guard is 

addressing many of the concerns we reported in our 2001 Performance and 

Accountability Series[Footnote 29] report, but uncertainties still 

exist in key areas such as attaining stable, sustained funding over a 

20-to 30-year period, and controlling costs, especially in the 

contract’s later years.



Critical Success Factors for New Organizations:



In our July 17, 2002, report entitled Homeland Security: Critical 

Design and Implementation Issues9 (GAO-02-957T), we identified certain 

critical success factors a new organization such as DHS should 

emphasize in its initial implementation phase. These factors are:



* 	Strategic planning: Leading results-oriented organizations focus on 

the process of strategic planning that includes involvement of 

stakeholders, assessment of internal and external environments, and an 

alignment of activities, core processes, and resources to support 

mission-related outcomes.



* 	Organizational alignment: The organization of a new department should 

be aligned to be consistent with the goals and objectives established 

in the strategic plan.



* 	Communications: Effective communication strategies are key to any 

major consolidation or transformation effort.



* 	Building partnerships: One of the key challenges of this new 

department will be the development and maintenance of homeland security 

partners at all levels of the government and the private sector, both 

in the United States and overseas.



* 	Performance management: An effective performance management system 

fosters institutional, unit, and individual accountability.



* 	Human capital strategy: A new department must ensure that its 

missions are not adversely impacted by the government’s pending human 

capital crisis, and that it can recruit, retain, and reward a talented 

and motivated workforce, which has required core competencies, to 

achieve its mission and objectives. The people factor is a critical 

element in any major consolidation or transformation.



* 	Information technology management: A new department should leverage 

enabling technology to enhance its ability to transform capabilities 

and capacities to share and act upon timely, quality information about 

terrorist threats.



* 	Knowledge management: A new department must ensure it makes maximum 

use of the collective body of knowledge that will be brought together 

in the consolidation.



* 	Financial management: A new department has a stewardship obligation 

to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; to use tax dollars appropriately; 

and to ensure financial accountability to the President, the Congress, 

and the American people.



* 	Acquisition management: Early attention to strong systems and 

controls for acquisition and related business processes will be 

critical both to ensuring success and maintaining integrity and 

accountability. As one of the largest federal departments, DHS will 

potentially have some of the most extensive acquisition requirements in 

government.



* 	Risk management: In setting goals, priorities, and implementation 

plans, risks must be understood and managed. The new department must be 

able to maintain and enhance current states of homeland security 

readiness while transitioning and transforming itself into a more 

effective and efficient structural unit. DHS will also need to 

immediately improve the government’s overall ability to perform risk 

management activities that can help to prevent, defend against, and 

respond to terrorist acts.



* 	Change management: Assembling a new organization out of separate 

pieces and reorienting all of its processes and assets to deliver the 

desired results while managing related risks will take an organized, 

systematic approach to change. A new department will both require an 

executive and operational capability to encourage and manage change.



[End of section]



GAO Contacts:



Subjects covered in this report: National preparedness; Contact person: 

Randall Yim, Managing Director; National Preparedness; (202) 512-3580; 

yimr@gao.gov.



Subjects covered in this report: Management challenges for homeland 

security; Contact person: Patricia A. Dalton, Director; Strategic 

Issues; (202) 512-6806; daltonp@gao.gov.



Subjects covered in this report: Transforming transportation security; 

Contact person: John H. Anderson, Jr. Managing Director; Physical 

Infrastructure Issues; (202) 512-2834; andersonj@gao.gov.



Subjects covered in this report: Information security issues and 

critical infrastructure protection; Contact person: Robert F. Dacey, 

Director; Information Technology; (202) 512-3317; daceyr@gao.gov.



Subjects covered in this report: Better manage programs designed to 

support state and local efforts to reduce crime; Contact person: Laurie 

E. Ekstrand, Director; Justice Issues; (202) 512-8777; 

ekstrandl@gao,gov.



Subjects covered in this report: Strengthen the visa process of as an 

antiterrorism tool; Contact person: Jess T. Ford, Director; 

International Affairs and Trade; (202) 512-4268; fordj@gao.gov.



Subjects covered in this report: Coordination of preparedness and 

response efforts; ; Enhancing the management of the U.S. Coast Guard 

acquisitions; Contact person: JayEtta Hecker, Director; Physical 

Infrastructure; (202) 512-2834; heckerj@gao.gov.



Subjects covered in this report: Public health emergency preparedness; 

Contact person: Janet Heinrich, Director; Health Care--Public Health 

Issues; (202) 512-7119; henrichj@gao.gov.



Subjects covered in this report: INS’ information technology management 

weaknesses; Contact person: Randolph C. Hite, Director; Information 

Technology Architecture and Systems Issues; (202) 512-6204; 

hiter@gao.gov.



Subjects covered in this report: Building human capital strategies; 

Contact person: J.C. Mihm, Director; Strategic Issues; (202) 512-3236; 

mihmj@gao.gov.



Subjects covered in this report: Efforts to combat immigration benefit 

fraud; Contact person: Richard M. Stana, Director; Tax Administration; 

(202) 512-8777; stanar@gao.gov.



[End of table]



[End of section]



Related GAO Products:



Homeland Security:



Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership. 

GAO-03-260. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.



Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned 

for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies. GAO-

03-293SP. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2002.



Building Security: Security Responsibilities for Federally Owned and 

Leased Facilities. GAO-03-8. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2002.



Homeland Security: Department of Justice’s Response to Its 

Congressional Mandate to Assess and Report on Chemical Industry 

Vulnerabilities. GAO-03-24R. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2002. :



Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued 

Management Challenges. GAO-02-1122T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2002.



Homeland Security: OMB’s Temporary Cessation of Information Technology 

Funding for New Investments. GAO-03-186T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 

2002.



Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems. GAO-02-1075T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002.



Building Security: Interagency Security Committee Has Had Limited 

Success in Fulfilling Its Responsibilities. GAO-02-1004. Washington, 

D.C.: September 17, 2002. :



 September 11: Interim Report on the Response of Charities. GAO-02-

1037. Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2002.



National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing 

Challenges. GAO-02-1048R. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002.



Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to 

Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002. :



Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to 

Success. GAO-02-1012T. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2002.



Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to 

Success. GAO-02-1011T. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2002.



Chemical Safety: Emergency Response Community Views on the Adequacy of 

Federally Required Chemical Information. GAO-02-799. Washington, D.C.: 

July 31, 2002. :



Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO-02-

957T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.



Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. GAO-

02-927T. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002.



Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will 

Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-901T. Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002.



Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships 

Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 

2002.



Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May 

Complicate Priority Setting. GAO-02-893T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 

2002.



Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But 

Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. Washington, 

D.C.: June 25, 2002.



Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but 

Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.



National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and 

Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy. GAO-

02-811T. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.



Review of Studies of the Economic Impact of the September 11, 2001, 

Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center. GAO-02-700R. Washington, 

D.C.: May 29, 2002. :



Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving 

National Goals. GAO-02-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002. :



National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and 

Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy 

for Homeland Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.



Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership 

Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002.



Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-and 

Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 

2001.



Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness 

Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.



Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA’s Role in Strengthening Federal 

Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.



Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. GAO-02-

150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.



Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues.

GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.



Combating Terrorism:



Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services’ Antiterrorism 

Efforts at Installations. GAO-03-14. Washington, D.C.: November 1, 

2002.



Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export 

Control Regimes. GAO-03-43. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2002.



Chemical Weapons: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 

Needs Comprehensive Plan to Correct Budgeting Weaknesses. GAO-03-5. 

Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2002.   :



Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for DOD 

Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO-03-15. Washington, D.C.: 

October 22, 2002.



Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD’s Risk Assessment 

of Defense Capabilities. GAO-03-137T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 

2002.



Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned Program Generally Effective but Could 

Be Improved and Expanded. GAO-02-890. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 

2002. :



Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat Terrorism 

Abroad. GAO-02-1021. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002.



Export Controls: Department of Commerce Controls over Transfers of 

Technology to Foreign Nationals Need Improvement. GAO-02-972. 

Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002. :



Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA’s Program Develops Successful Technologies, 

but Project Management Can Be Strengthened. GAO-02-904. Washington, 

D.C.: August 23, 2002. :



Diffuse Security Threats: USPS Air Filtration Systems Need More Testing 

and Cost Benefit Analysis before Implementation. GAO-02-838. 

Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2002.



Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear 

Smuggling. GAO-02-989T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.



Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force 

Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-

955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002. :



Diffuse Security Threats: Technologies for Mail Sanitization Exist, but 

Challenges Remain. GAO-02-365. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2002. :



Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development 

of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-

550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002.



Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National 

Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.



Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to 

Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 25, 2002.



Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National 

Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002.



Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance 

State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 

2002.



Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical 

and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 

2001.



Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. 

GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.



Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Antiterrorism 

Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington, D.C.: 

September 19, 2001.



Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s 

Council on Domestic Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 

2001.



Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal 

Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001.



Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and 

National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.



Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating 

Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2001.



Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied 

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. 

GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.



Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist 

Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000. :



Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.: March 21, 

2000.



Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and 

Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 

1999.



Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments 

of Chemical and Biological Attack. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.: 

September 7, 1999.



Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs.

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.



Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment 

and Sustainment Costs. GAO/NSIAD-99-151. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 

1999.



Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear. 

GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999.



Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism 

Operations. GAO/NSIAD-99-135. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 1999. :



Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat 

Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.



Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness 

Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.: 

November 12, 1998.



Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic 

Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 

1998.



Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize 

and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.: 

April 9, 1998.



Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires 

Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. Washington, D.C.: 

December 1, 1997.



Border Security and Immigration:



Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program. 

GAO-03-38. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002.



Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks 

Reliable Address Information. GAO-03-188, November 21, 2002.



Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New 

Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November 

18, 2002.



Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security. GAO-03-

174. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2002. :



Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of 

Effort for All Missions. GAO-03-155. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 

2002.



Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an 

Antiterrorism Tool. GAO-03-132NI. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 

2002. :



Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New 

Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.



Immigration Enforcement: Challenges to Implementing the INS Interior 

Enforcement Strategy. GAO-02-861T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2002.



Customs Service Modernization: Management Improvements Needed on High-

Risk Automated Commercial Environment Project. GAO-02-545. Washington, 

D.C.: May 13, 2002.



Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is Needed to Address 

Problems. GAO-02-66. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2002.



Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Recurring 

Management Challenges. GAO-02-168T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2001.



INS’ Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After 

Seven Years. GAO-01-842. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2001.



Immigration Benefits: Several Factors Impede the Timeliness of 

Application Processing. GAO-01-488. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001.



Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks. GAO-

01-659T. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001.



Public Health:



Homeland Security: CDC’s Oversight of Select Agent Programs. GAO-03-

315R. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002.



Public Health: Maintaining an Adequate Blood Supply Is Key to Emergency 

Preparedness. GAO-02-1095T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2002. :



Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but 

Transferring Control of Certain Public Health Programs Raises Concerns. 

GAO-02-954T. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2002.



Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Biomedical R&D 

Coordination but May Disrupt Dual-Purpose Efforts. GAO-02-924T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002.



Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May 

Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO-02-883T. Washington, 

D.C.: June 25, 2002.



Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in 

Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 

2001.



Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness.

GAO-02-149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.



Food Safety and Security: Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure Safe 

Food. GAO-02-47T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.



Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2001.



Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T. Washington, 

D.C.: October 5, 2001.



Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities. GAO-01-

915. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.



Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and 

Inventory Management Are Needed. GAO-01-667. Washington, D.C.: 

September 28, 2001.



West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness. GAO/

HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000.



Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and 

Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 

1999.



Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should 

Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. Washington, D.C.: 

August 16, 1999.



Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public 

Health Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 

1999.



Aviation Security:



Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a 

Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 

2003.



Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 

Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.



Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces 

Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 25, 2002. :



Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 

Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 25, 2001.



Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 

Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 21, 2001.



Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 

Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.



Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 

Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 2001.



Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ 

Performance. GAO/RCED-00-75. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000.



Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener 

Performance Problems. GAO/T-RCED-00-125. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 

2000.



Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-term Attention Is 

Needed. GAO/T-RCED-98-190. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 1998.



Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices. 

GAO/RCED-97-111R. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997.



Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives 

Detection Devices. GAO/RCED-97-119R. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 1997.



Aviation Security: Technology’s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities.

GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 1996.



Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed. 

GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 1996.



Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security. 

GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 1996.



Critical Infrastructure Protection:



Computer Security: Progress Made, But Critical Federal Operations and 

Assets Remain at Risk. GAO-03-303T. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 

2002.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial Satellite Security 

Should Be More Fully Addressed. GAO-02-781. Washington, D.C.: August 

30, 2002.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be 

Addressed. GAO-02-961T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More 

Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Information 

Systems. GAO-02-474. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security 

Challenges Need to Be Addressed. GAO-02-918T. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 

2002.



Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure 

Protection. GAO-02-24. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001. :



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 

Safeguarding Government and Privately Controlled Systems from Computer-

Based Attacks. GAO-01-1168T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2001.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 

Protecting Federal Systems and Developing Analysis and Warning 

Capabilities. GAO-01-1132T. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2001.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 

Developing Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities. GAO-01-1005T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2001.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 

Developing Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities. GAO-01-769T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2001.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 

Developing National Capabilities. GAO-01-323. Washington, D.C.: April 

25, 2001.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a 

Comprehensive Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination. GAO/T-

AIMD-00-268. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the Proposed Cyber 

Security Information Act of 2000. GAO/T-AIMD-00-229. Washington, D.C.: 

June 22, 2000.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: National Plan for Information 

Systems Protection. GAO/AIMD-00-90R. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 

2000.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for 

Information Systems Protection. GAO/T-AIMD-00-72. Washington, D.C.: 

February 1, 2000.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed to 

Assure Security of Federal Operations. GAO/T-AIMD-00-7. Washington, 

D.C.: October 6, 1999.



Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on 

Year 2000 Experiences. GAO/AIMD-00-1. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 

1999.



Disaster Assistance:



September 11: Small Business Assistance Provided in Lower Manhattan in 

Response to the Terrorist Attacks. GAO-03-88. Washington, D.C.: 

November 1, 2002. :



Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration 

Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837. Washington, 

D.C.: August 31, 2001.



Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States 

for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.



Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes 

and Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832. Washington, 

D.C.: July 9, 2001.



Budget and Management:



Human Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in 

Managing Their Workforces. GAO-03-2. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 

2002.



Highlights of a GAO Roundtable: The Chief Operating Officer Concept: A 

Potential Strategy to Address Federal Governance Challenges. GAO-03-

192SP. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2002.



Program Evaluation: Strategies for Assessing How Information 

Dissemination Contributes to Agency Goals. GAO-02-923. Washington, 

D.C.: September 30, 2002.



Results-Oriented Cultures: Using Balanced Expectations to Manage Senior 

Executive Performance. GAO-02-966. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 

2002.



Performance Budgeting: Opportunities and Challenges. GAO-02-1106T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2002. :



Electronic Government: Proposal Addresses Critical Challenges. 

GAO-02-1083T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002. :



Results-Oriented Cultures: Insights for U.S. Agencies from Other 

Countries’ Performance Management Initiatives. GAO-02-862. Washington, 

D.C.: August 2, 2002. :



Acquisition Workforce: Agencies Need to Better Define and Track the 

Training of Their Employees. GAO-02-737. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 

2002. :



Managing for Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management to Drive 

Transformational Change. GAO-02-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 

2002. :



U.S. Government Financial Statements: FY 2001 Results Highlight the 

Continuing Need to Accelerate Federal Financial Management Reform. GAO-

02-599T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2002.



Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond. 

GAO-02-538T. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2002. :



Managing for Results: Building on the Momentum for Strategic Human 

Capital Reform. GAO-02-528T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2002.



A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-02-373SP. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002. :



Budget Issues: Long-Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO-02-467T. Washington, 

D.C.:  February 27, 2002. :



Managing for Results: Agency Progress in Linking Performance Plans with 

Budgets and Financial Statements. GAO-02-236. Washington, D.C.: January 

4, 2002.



Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-1084SP. 

Washington, D.C.: August 2001.



Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views on Key Management Issues 

Vary Widely Across Agencies. GAO-01-592. Washington, D.C.: May 2001.



High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-01-263. Washington, D.C.: January 

2001.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide 

Perspective. GAO-01-241. Washington, D.C.: January 2001.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Transportation. GAO-01-253. Washington, D.C.: January 2001.



Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks. 

GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000.



Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission 

Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO/AIMD-97-156. Washington, D.C.: 

August 29, 1997.



Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal 

Missions and Approaches. GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 

1995.



Reorganization:



FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps Encouraging but Broad Transformation 

Needed. GAO-02-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2002.



Environmental Protection: Observations on Elevating the Environmental 

Protection Agency to Cabinet Status. GAO-02-552T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 21, 2002.



Implementation: The Missing Link in Planning Reorganizations. GAO/GGD-

81-75. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 1981.



Grant Design:



Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and 

Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 

1998.



Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go 

Further. GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996.



Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions. GAO/AIMD-

95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995.



[End of section]



Performance and Accountability and High-Risk Series:



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide 

Perspective. GAO-03-95.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Agriculture. GAO-03-96.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Commerce. 

GAO-03-97.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense. 

GAO-03-98.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Education. 

GAO-03-99.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Energy. 

GAO-03-100.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and 

Human Services. GAO-03-101.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland 

Security. GAO-03-102.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Housing 

and Urban Development. GAO-03-103.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the 

Interior. GAO-03-104.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice. 

GAO-03-105.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Labor. 

GAO-03-106.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State. 

GAO-03-107.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Transportation. GAO-03-108.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the 

Treasury. GAO-03-109.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans 

Affairs. GAO-03-110.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Agency for 

International Development. GAO-03-111.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Environmental Protection 

Agency. GAO-03-112.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal Emergency 

Management Agency. GAO-03-113.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration. GAO-03-114.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Office of Personnel 

Management. GAO-03-115.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Small Business 

Administration. GAO-03-116.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security 

Administration. GAO-03-117.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Postal Service. 

GAO-03-118.



High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119.



High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120.



High-Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal 

Government and the Nation’s Critical Infrastructures. 

GAO-03-121.



High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property. GAO-03-122.



FOOTNOTES



[1] Pub. L. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002.



[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers 

and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland 

Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 14, 2002).



[3] Pub. L. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002.



[4] Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan (The White 

House, Washington, D.C.: Nov. 25, 2002).



[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Management 

Challenges Facing Federal Leadership, GAO-03-260 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 20, 2002).



[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Enforcement: Challenges 

to Implementing the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO-02-861T 

(Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2002).



[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration and Naturalization 

Service: Overview of Recurring Management Challenges, GAO-02-168T 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2001).



[8] GAO-03-260. 



[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: Effective Use of 

Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in Managing Their Workforces, GAO-03-

2 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2002).



[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused 

Approach Is Needed to Address Problems, GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 31, 2002).



[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: INS Cannot 

Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks Reliable Address Information, GAO-

03-188 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2002).



[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Customs Service Modernization: 

Management Improvements Needed on High-Risk Automated Commercial 

Environment Project, GAO-02-545 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2002).



[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Government Financial 

Statements: FY 2001 Results Highlight the Continuing Need to Accelerate 

Federal Financial Management Reform, GAO-02-599T (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 9, 2002).



[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-

03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).



[15] The President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, The 

National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace--For Comment Draft, September 

2002.



[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps 

Encouraging but Broad Transformation Needed, GAO-02-865T (Washington, 

D.C.: June 21, 2002).



[17] The Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives 

requested this work.



[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and 

Program Risks: Department of Transportation, GAO-03-108 (Washington, 

D.C.: January 2003).



[19] Pub. L. 107-71.



[20] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities 

and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002).



[21] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and 

Program Risks: Department of State, GAO-03-107 (Washington, D.C.: 

January 2003).



[22] U.S. General Accounting Office, INS’ Southwest Border Strategy: 

Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, GAO-01-842 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2001).



[23] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 

Follow-up Report on Border Patrol’s Efforts to Improve Northern Border 

Security (Redacted Version). Report No. I-2002-004 (Washington, D.C.: 

February 2002).



[24] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several 

Factors Impede Timeliness of Application Processing, GAO-01-488 

(Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001).



[25] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and 

Program Risks: Department of Health and Human Services, GAO-03-101 

(Washington, D.C.: January 2003).



[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Critical Design 

and Implementation Issues, GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 

2002).



[27] U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for 

Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions, GAO-03-155 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2002); U.S. General Accounting Office, 

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But 

Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success, GAO-02-886T (Washington, 

D.C. 

June 25, 2002); U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Budget and 

Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond, GAO-02-538T (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 19, 2002); U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: 

Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks, GAO-01-659T 

(Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001).



[28] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and 

Program Risks: Department of Transportation, GAO-03-108 (Washington, 

D.C.: January 2003).



[29] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and 

Program Risks: Department of Transportation, GAO-01-253 (Washington, 

D.C.: January 2001).



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