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entitled 'Military Personnel: Management and Oversight of Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus Program Needs Improvement' which was released on 
November 25, 2002.



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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of Representatives:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



November 2002: 



MILITARY PERSONNEL: 



Management and Oversight of Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Needs 

Improvement:



Reenlistment Bonus Program:



GAO-03-149:



GAO Highlights:



MILITARY PERSONNEL:

Management and Oversight of Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program 

Needs Improvement:



Why GAO Did This Study:

Because of the recent growth in DOD’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus 

Program, the House Appropriations Committee asked GAO to determine 

(1) the extent to which the services have followed their criteria 

for managing their programs and (2) whether DOD has provided adequate 

guidance for and oversight of the program.



What GAO Found:

The Navy and Air Force have not used all of the criteria they have 

established for selecting critical military specialties eligible for 

bonuses under their Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs.  The Army’s 

guidance does not include specific criteria for selecting critical 

specialties.  Since these services have not used all of their criteria, 

the number of eligible specialties and the number of enlisted personnel 

who receive bonuses have expanded.  Moreover, the services did not 

manage their programs to stay within their budgets appropriated by 

Congress.  

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) budget for the Selective Reenlistment 

Bonus Program has more than tripled in recent years—from $235 million 

in 

fiscal year 1997 to an estimated $789 million in fiscal year 2002. 

DOD has 

not provided adequate guidance for and oversight of its Selective 

Reenlistment 

Bonus Program. DOD canceled an instruction that established criteria 

for 

selecting specialties for the program. Without this instruction, DOD 

cannot 

be sure that the program is being implemented as intended.  Also, 

DOD has 

not reviewed the services’ processes for selecting critical 

specialties 

or for establishing their corresponding bonus levels, despite 

requirements 

to do so annually. Thus, DOD has not ensured that the services 

are 

implementing their programs appropriately to help improve 

short-term 

retention in critical military specialties.



Service’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Budgets, Fiscal

Years 1997-2002:



[See PDF for Image]

[End of Figure]



What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that until DOD issues required program guidance

* the services manage their programs to stay within requested 

budgets and 

* the services adhere to  their established guidance. The 

Army should 

establish specific guidance for selecting specialties for 

inclusion 

in its program.



GAO also recommends that the Secretary of Defense require the 

Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness to 

*issue an instruction that provides the services with guidance 

for 

administering and selecting specialties for inclusion in their 

Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs, and 

*conduct annual reviews of the services’ programs as required by 

DOD’s directive.



To view the full report, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Derek Stewart at (202) 512-5559 

or stewartd@gao.gov.



Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



Not Using All Criteria Expanded the Number of Specialties and 

Reenlistees:



DOD Has Not Provided Adequate Guidance and Oversight:



Conclusions:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



Appendix II: How the Selective Reenlistment Bonuses Are Paid:



Appendix III: Growth of the Services’ Selective Reenlistment Bonus 

Programs and Initial Payments:



Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:



Tables:



Table 1: Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Characteristics by 

Service, Fiscal Year 2001:



Table 2: Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Characteristics by 

Service, Fiscal Years 1997 and 2001:



Table 3: Eligibility for Zones A, B, and C under the Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus Program:



Figures:



Figure 1: Services’ Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Budgets, 

Fiscal Years 1997-2002:



Figure 2: Cost of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program in Constant 

2002 Dollars, Fiscal Years 1990-2002:



Figure 3: Army’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program’s Initial 

Payments, Budget Request, and Reported Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1997-

2002:



Figure 4: Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program’s Initial 

Payments, Budget Request, and Reported Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1997-

2002:



Figure 5: Marine Corps’ Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program’s Initial 

Payments, Budget Request, and Reported Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1997-

2002:



Figure 6: Air Force’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program’s Initial 

Payments, Budget Request, and Reported Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1997-

2002:



Abbreviations:



DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office:



United States General Accounting Office:



Washington, DC 20548:



November 25, 2002:



The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives:



Established by Congress in 1974, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program for enlisted military personnel is 

DOD’s primary tool for addressing short-term retention problems in 

critical military specialties (or skills). It allows the services to 

pay bonuses ranging from a few thousand dollars up to $60,000 to entice 

enlisted personnel in selected specialties to reenlist for another term 

in the military. The bonus amounts vary, mainly on the basis of the 

services’ needs in certain critical specialties and the length of 

reenlistment. Fifty percent of the bonuses are paid in initial bonus 

payments and the remaining 50 percent in equal anniversary payments for 

each year of reenlistment. Between fiscal years 1997 and 2002, the cost 

of this program more than tripled--from $235 million in fiscal 1997 to 

an estimated $789 million in fiscal 2002. The services’ total budget 

requests for the program have continued to increase even though the 

U.S. economy has slowed.



Concerned about the recent growth of DOD’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus 

Program, you asked us to review how the military services are 

administering this program to retain enlisted personnel in critical 

military specialties. Specifically, our objectives were to determine 

(1) the extent to which the services followed their criteria for 

managing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program and (2) whether DOD 

provided adequate guidance for and oversight of the program.



Our work was limited to the services’ Selective Reenlistment Bonus 

Programs that encompassed enlisted specialties between fiscal years 

1997 and 2002. Our report is limited to data through fiscal year 2001, 

the last year for which official program data are available. We 

conducted our review from January through August 2002 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See app. I for 

more information on our scope and methodology.):



Results in Brief:



The Navy and Air Force have not used all of the criteria established in 

their guidance for selecting critical military specialties eligible for 

bonuses under their Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs. For example, 

although the Navy’s regulations require a “balanced application” of all 

the criteria used for determining which occupations belong in the 

program, according to Navy officials, an occupation must meet only one 

of five criteria to become eligible. According to a DOD review of the 

selective reenlistment bonus program, this is not appropriate since a 

particular skill could be a good candidate on the basis of several 

criteria but inappropriate on the basis of only one. The Army’s 

guidance does not include specific criteria for selecting critical 

specialties, meaning that the Army can select any number of 

specialties. Our review found that Marine Corps managers generally used 

all of the criteria as required. Since 1997, the services have expanded 

the number of eligible specialties and the number of enlisted personnel 

who receive reenlistment bonuses. For all the services combined, the 

total number of reenlistees receiving bonuses more than doubled, from 

approximately 23,000 in fiscal year 1997 to almost 59,000 in fiscal 

2001. At the same time, average bonuses have increased. Moreover, 

during the same period, the Army, Navy, and Air Force did not manage 

their programs to stay within their budgets appropriated by Congress. 

Specifically, although Congress appropriated an additional $165 million 

above the services’ budget requests during fiscal years 1997-2001, the 

three services spent over $240 million dollars more on initial bonus 

payments than Congress had appropriated. These factors--the 

inconsistent use of criteria, increases in the number of specialties 

and reenlistees, paying higher bonuses, and not managing their programs 

to stay within appropriated budgets--have contributed to program costs 

that have more than tripled since fiscal year 1997.



DOD has not provided adequate guidance for and oversight of its 

Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program. While DOD issued a directive and 

an instruction in 1985 to provide the services with guidance for 

administering their programs, it canceled the instruction in 1996. The 

instruction established criteria that the services should apply when 

selecting specialties for inclusion in the program. Without this 

instruction, DOD cannot be sure that the program is being implemented 

as intended and that adequate internal controls are in place to govern 

the operations of the services’ programs. Also, DOD has not reviewed 

the services’ processes for selecting critical specialties, despite 

requirements in the directive to do so annually. Thus, DOD has not 

ensured that the services are implementing their programs appropriately 

to help improve short-term retention in critical military specialties. 

Although we raised similar concerns in a 1996 report, DOD has taken no 

action on our recommendation to provide more explicit guidance 

regarding the selection of critical specialties. Consequently, the 

problems we identified then remain unaddressed today. Although DOD’s 

comptroller reviews the services’ annual program budget requests, these 

budget reviews do not include a substantive review of the program. For 

example, one review failed to discover a flawed budget estimate of $34 

million in unneeded funding for anniversary payments.



We are making recommendations to improve the services’ management of 

the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program and DOD’s oversight 

responsibilities. In response to our report, DOD disagreed with our 

conclusion that it cannot be sure that the Selective Reenlistment Bonus 

Programs are being implemented as intended. DOD stated that the 

criteria that the services use to administer their programs are sound 

and that they allow the services to target their resources to meet the 

services’ unique retention needs. DOD concurred with our recommendation 

to issue an instruction that provides the services with guidance for 

administering their programs and partially concurred with our other 

recommendations. In addressing our recommendations, DOD raised concerns 

about the services’ potential loss of flexibility to respond to 

external factors and objected to an additional administrative 

requirement. Finally, DOD stated that the program is routinely reviewed 

and that each service prepares a plan for using the bonuses that is 

carefully reviewed as part of the budget process. The agency comments 

section of this report contains more details on DOD’s positions and our 

response to them.



Background:



In 1974, DOD requested congressional approval to target its 

reenlistment bonus program toward critical specialties where it was 

experiencing staffing shortfalls. Before 1974, the military had 

provided a $2,000 reenlistment bonus for all servicemembers willing to 

reenlist. During that year, DOD raised concerns that the bonus program 

was not focused enough to meet the services’ needs. In 1974, Congress 

authorized the use of selective bonuses, which gave the services 

flexibility to adjust the bonuses paid to reenlistees to aid in 

staffing the most hard-to-fill critical specialties.[Footnote 1] 

Overall, the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program is intended to 

increase reenlistments in specialties deemed critical by the Secretary 

of Defense.



To implement the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program, DOD issued a 

directive in 1985,[Footnote 2] updated in 1996, which assigns specific 

responsibilities for administering the program to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and to the services’ Secretaries. Under this 

directive, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management 

Policy, under the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness, is responsible for establishing procedures for administering 

the selective reenlistment bonus program. Specifically, the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy is responsible for 

establishing (1) criteria for designating military specialties that 

qualify for bonuses, (2) criteria for individual members’ eligibility 

for bonuses, and (3) reporting and data requirements for the annual 

review and evaluation of programs as well as individual services’ 

requests for military skill designations. In addition, according to the 

DOD directive, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management 

Policy is responsible for annually reviewing and evaluating the 

services’ enlisted personnel bonus programs in conjunction with the 

annual budget cycle. These reviews are to include an assessment of the 

criteria used for designating critical military specialties. As a 

result of these reviews, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is to 

make the revisions needed to attain specific policy objectives.



At the same time that DOD issued its 1985 directive, it issued an 

instruction providing the services with guidance for managing their 

programs. However, this instruction was canceled in 1995, and 

replacement guidance has not been issued, although the updated 

overarching directive remains in effect. DOD did not issue replacement 

guidance because of administrative and legal questions that have only 

recently been resolved, thus clearing the way for reissuance of the 

guidance. The canceled instruction was to require the services to 

provide a balanced evaluation of five factors in identifying critical 

specialties: a consideration of (1) serious understaffing in adjacent 

years, (2) persistent shortages in total career staffing, (3) high 

replacement costs, (4) the arduousness or unattractiveness of the work, 

and (5) whether the specialty is essential to the accomplishment of 

defense missions. In addition, the instruction was to require that a 

reasonable prospect must exist for enough improvement in the occupation 

to justify the cost of providing the bonus. The instruction was also to 

require the services to provide DOD with reports on the status of their 

programs and on the status of the specialties included in their 

programs.



The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program has experienced substantial 

cost growth, as shown in figure 1. DOD’s budget for the Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus Program has more than tripled in recent years--from 

$235 million in fiscal year 1997 to an estimated $789 million in fiscal 

2002. The Air Force’s reenlistment bonus budget increased 

proportionately more than the other services--from $26 million in 

fiscal year 1997 to over an estimated $258 million in fiscal 2002.



Figure 1: Services’ Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Budgets, 

Fiscal Years 1997-2002:



[See PDF for Image]

[End of Figure]



How the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Works:



DOD’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program currently allows the 

services to pay reenlistment bonuses of up to $60,000, though the 

services have set different maximums. The service secretaries designate 

which specialties are eligible to receive bonuses. (See app. II for 

more discussion of bonus determinations.) Total bonus amounts are 

determined by multiplying (1) the service member’s current monthly 

basic pay by (2) the number of additional years of obligated service 

and by (3) a bonus multiple that can range from 0.5 to 15. The bonus 

multiples are determined by each service for all specialties they deem 

critical. For example, an enlistee who earns $24,000 per year and 

reenlists for 4 years in an occupation with a multiple of 4 would 

receive a reenlistment bonus of $32,000. This amount is calculated by 

multiplying the monthly basic pay of $2,000 by the number of 

reenlistment years (4) and by the multiple (4). The bonus multiples are 

determined by each service for all eligible specialties, and the 

occupations that they deem most critical or hardest to fill would 

generally receive higher multiples. Navy officials told us that they 

also consider alternative wages that certain specialties can obtain 

outside of the military when determining the size of the bonus 

multiplier for a critical specialty.



Each of the services has established its own guidance for implementing 

its selective reenlistment bonus program. This guidance varies by 

service. Generally, the services’ guidance establishes eligibility 

criteria for servicemembers and in some cases also defines criteria for 

selecting specialties for inclusion in the program. The Navy and Marine 

Corps have adopted all the original criteria that were established by 

DOD’s 1985 program instruction. The Air Force updated its program 

guidance in 1998, which only partially reflected DOD’s original program 

instruction. This instruction includes the criteria for individual 

servicemembers’ eligibility as well as guidance for the selection of 

specialties. The Army has established guidance for individual 

servicemembers’ participation in the program but not specific guidance 

for determining which specialties should be included in the program.



In addition to establishing their own guidance for selecting 

individuals and occupations to include in the program, the services 

have also defined some other program characteristics, which also differ 

between the services as shown in table 1 for fiscal year 2001. While 

congressional authorization allows the maximum amount of a bonus to be 

$60,000 and the maximum multiple to be 15, the services determine their 

own limit. In fiscal year 2001, the maximum bonus ranged from $35,000 

to $60,000, and the services’ maximum bonus multiple ranged from 5.0 to 

8.0. The table also displays the minimum and maximum reenlistment 

periods.



Table 1: Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Characteristics by 

Service, Fiscal Year 2001:



Program characteristic: Maximum bonus; Army: $40,000[A]; Navy: $60,000; 

Marine Corps: $35,000; Air Force: $60,000.



Program characteristic: Maximum multiple; Army: 5.0; Navy: 8.0; Marine 

Corps: 5.0; Air Force: 6.0.



Program characteristic: Minimum obligation; Army: 3 years; Navy: 3 

years; Marine Corps: 4 years; Air Force: 4 years.



Program characteristic: Maximum obligation; Army: 6 years; Navy: 6 

years; Marine Corps: 6 years; Air Force: 6 years.



Source: The services’ regulations and guidance.



[A] The Army authorizes two specialties (Satellite Communication 

Systems Operator-Maintainer and Korean Voice Interceptors) to reenlist 

for as much as $40,000 if servicemembers qualify. The Army’s remaining 

occupations are limited to a maximum reenlistment bonus of $20,000.



[End of table]



The Army, Navy, and Air Force pay bonuses to reenlistees with an 

initial payment and equal annual installments over the reenlistment 

period. The initial payment is made at the time of the reenlistment or 

when the reenlistment period begins and is equal to 50 percent of the 

total bonus. The remaining 50 percent is paid in equal annual payments 

over the term of the reenlistment, and the payments are called 

“anniversary payments.” In the example above, the initial 50-percent 

payment would be $16,000, and the anniversary payments would be $4,000 

for 4 years. Starting in fiscal year 2001, the Marine Corps began 

paying the entire bonus in one lump-sum payment at the beginning of the 

reenlistment period. It is too early to determine what effect this 

change will have on the operation of the Marine Corps’ selective 

reenlistment bonus program.



Not Using All Criteria Expanded the Number of Specialties and 

Reenlistees:



For fiscal years 1997-2001, some services did not consistently apply 

all the criteria they had established to select which specialties they 

include in the reenlistment program. By not doing so, they broadened 

the number of eligible specialties and reenlistees who received 

bonuses. While achieving higher reenlistments, the services have not 

managed their programs to stay within their congressionally 

appropriated budgets. As a result, the services spent more on their 

program than was appropriated in each of fiscal years 1997-2001.



Some Services Do Not Consistently Use All of the Criteria They Have 

Established for Selecting Specialties That Receive Bonuses:



Some services are not consistently using all of the criteria they have 

established to select critical specialties for the Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus Program. The Navy and Marine Corps have adopted the 

original DOD instruction (see background, p. 6), which requires a 

balanced application of all five criteria to identify critical 

specialties. Marine Corps officials told us that they utilize all of 

these criteria in selecting specialties eligible for a bonus. However, 

the Navy uses only the following four criteria when identifying 

specialties for inclusion in the program: (1) severe undermanning, (2) 

severe career undermanning, (3) high training and replacement costs, 

and (4) skills essential to accomplishing the defense mission. 

According to Navy officials, any one of these criteria qualifies a 

specialty for inclusion in the program. According to DOD’s only review 

of the selective reenlistment bonus program, this is not appropriate, 

since a particular skill could be a good candidate on the basis of 

several criteria, but inappropriate on the basis of one.



While the Air Force considers numerous factors when making 

determinations about which occupations to include in its program, it 

does not prioritize its occupations as required by Air Force 

instructions. As a result, the bonuses paid may not reflect the 

importance of the specialty. The Air Force has adopted most of the 

original DOD criteria; however, it does not require a balanced 

application of those criteria. The Air Force’s criteria include (1) 

shortfalls in meeting current and projected reenlistment objectives 

(reenlistment rates and the size of specific-year groups, as well as 

adjacent-year groups), (2) shortages in current and projected 

noncommissioned officer manning, (3) high training investment and 

replacement cost for a skill, (4) expected improvement in retention 

resulting from designation as a selective reenlistment bonus skill, and 

(5) priority of the skill. An Air Force review board considers the 

criteria, and then a professional judgment is made on whether to 

include a skill in the program.



The Army has not adopted all of DOD’s original criteria. The Army has 

established regulations governing the eligibility of individuals for 

inclusion in the program, but it has not established regulations for 

selecting occupations to include in its program. As a result, the 

specialties that the Army selects for bonuses may not be critical. 

According to Army officials, the criteria can fluctuate depending on 

their current needs. During fiscal year 2002, the Army’s criteria for 

selection of critical specialties included (1) budget constraints, (2) 

current and projected strengths, (3) retention rates, (4) training 

constraints, (5) replacement costs, (6) priority military occupational 

specialties, and (7) shortages within mid-grade levels. The Army uses 

understaffing as the primary criterion for designating occupations as 

critical and eligible for bonuses.



Growth in the Number of Specialties and Reenlistees:



The services, with the exception of the Marine Corps, have not been 

applying all of their criteria for selecting specialties to include in 

their Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs. This has led to an 

increase in the number of specialties that the services made eligible 

for reenlistment bonuses during fiscal years 1997-2001. As the number 

of specialties eligible for bonuses grew, so did the number of 

reenlistments receiving bonuses from each service. (See table 

2.)[Footnote 3] In fiscal year 2001, the Navy awarded bonuses to the 

smallest percentage of specialties of the services, but those awards 

accounted for the largest number of bonus recipients. The Air Force 

awarded bonuses to approximately 80 percent of its specialties, which 

were paid to 42 percent of its reenlistees.



Between 1997 and 2001 all of the services increased the number of 

specialties for which they offered reenlistment bonuses. As a result, 

there was an increase in the total number of reenlistees who got 

bonuses. For all the services combined, the total number of reenlistees 

receiving bonuses more than doubled--from approximately 23,000 in 

fiscal year 1997 to almost 59,000 in fiscal 2001. Along with this 

growth in the number of specialties and reenlistees receiving bonuses 

has been an increase in the average bonus paid--from approximately 

$5,500 in fiscal year 1997 to over $8,000 in fiscal 2001. In constant 

2001 dollars, the average initial bonus payment has grown from 

approximately $5,900 in fiscal year 1997 to over $8,000 in fiscal 2001. 

The Navy had the greatest increase in average initial payments--from 

over $7,200 in fiscal year 1997 to almost $11,000 in fiscal 2001. The 

Air Force average initial payment also increased--from approximately 

$3,900 in fiscal year 1997 to $7,100 in fiscal 2001. Unlike the other 

services, the Army’s average bonus fell by $500 between fiscal years 

1997 and 2001.



Table 2: Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Characteristics by 

Service, Fiscal Years 1997 and 2001:



[See PDF for Image]



[End of table]



Services’ Programs Not Managed to Stay Within Appropriated Budgets:



From fiscal year 1998 through fiscal 2001, none of the services’ 

Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs stayed within their appropriated 

program budgets. Rather, with the exception of the Marine Corps, the 

services reprogrammed or realigned funds from other programs within the 

enlisted personnel budget to make more bonus payments than they were 

originally funded to pay. The services are able to do this under their 

budget authority. However, they are restricted from shifting funding 

amounts of over $10 million from other budget authority lines, such as 

from officer pay programs, without seeking congressional prior approval 

for reprogramming of resources.



Overall, we found that the Army, Navy, and Air Force did not manage 

their programs to stay within their budgets appropriated by Congress. 

Rather, with the exception of the Marine Corps, the services have 

allowed their program to continue running the entire fiscal year and 

have exceeded their budget appropriation during the past several years. 

(See app. III for more detail on budget requests and actual initial 

bonus payments.) Even though Congress provided $165 million in 

additional funding during fiscal years 1997-2001, the three services 

spent approximately $240 million dollars more on initial bonus payments 

than Congress had appropriated. During fiscal years 1997-2001, the Navy 

exceeded its appropriated budget by more than $121 million; the Air 

Force, by $70 million; and the Army, by about $49 million. However, 

these services pay 50 percent of their bonuses up front as initial 

payments and pay the remaining 50 percent in annual installments over 

the reenlistment period. Consequently, they have to pay an additional 

$240 million in anniversary payments in future years. This means that 

the total cost of the over expenditures on initial payments made during 

fiscal years 1997-2001 could be as much as $480 million.



Management of Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program:



Although the Army, Navy, and Air Force have periodically reviewed their 

programs during the fiscal year, they have made few adjustments to the 

program to stay within their appropriated budgets. With the exception 

of the Marine Corps, the services either do not establish goals for 

improvement in critical specialties or manage their programs to stay 

within the goals they have set. For example, while the Navy does 

establish retention goals for specialties included in the program, it 

does not prioritize its specialties and modify the bonuses, as needed, 

to stay within those goals. For example, in fiscal year 2001, the Navy 

exceeded its goals in 75 specialties by more than 110 percent. By 

exceeding its goals in some occupations, the Navy may be neglecting 

other specialties that could utilize increased bonuses to improve 

retention. For example, we found 64 specialties that were below 90 

percent of the retention goal for fiscal year 2001. In 50 cases, the 

Navy reduced the multiples (12) or made no change (38) for these 

specialties from fiscal year 2000.



During fiscal year 2002, the services experienced a strong recruiting 

and retention year, which, according to service officials, caused the 

Army and Navy to scale back or close their programs. The Army expected 

to exceed its fiscal year 2002 program budget estimates by over $45 

million and closed its program 45 days prior to the end of the fiscal 

year. These actions were taken after both services had exceeded their 

budgets for fiscal year 2002. The Navy lowered the bonus amounts paid 

during fiscal year 2002 after acknowledging that it would exceed its 

fiscal year 2002 appropriation if these actions were not taken. 

Starting in fiscal year 2001, the Marine Corps instituted a plan to 

close its program when the budget limit was met. The Marine Corps 

closed its program in July 2002, since the appropriated budget was met 

at that time.



Factors Influencing Growth:



According to some service officials, three key factors combined to 

cause the services to increasingly rely on the Selective Reenlistment 

Bonus Program to staff critical specialties during fiscal years 1997-

2001. These factors were (1) the downsizing of the U.S. military forces 

during the 1990s, (2) a decline in recruiting in the early to mid-

1990s, and (3) fewer reenlistments during the late 1990s. The 

combination of these factors, according to service officials, has 

contributed to growth in costs during fiscal years 1997-2002. According 

to the Congressional Research Service, the shortfalls in recruiting and 

retention in fiscal years 1998-1999 were the first since fiscal 1979.



Regarding downsizing, the U.S. military substantially reduced its 

number of active-duty military personnel after the end of the Cold War. 

During fiscal years 1990-1999, the number of active-duty enlisted 

personnel declined from 1.7 million to 1.2 million--approximately 34 

percent. Part of this reduction in the military force was due to a 

reduction in the services’ recruiting goals. For example, DOD’s 

recruiting goals decreased consistently from 229,172 in fiscal year 

1990 to as low as 174,806 in fiscal 1995 before increasing again in the 

years following. One of the intended purposes of reducing these goals 

was the desire to arrive at a smaller force by decreasing new 

enlistments instead of forcing more experienced personnel to leave the 

military. However, according to DOD officials, fewer new enlistments in 

the mid-1990s produced too few enlisted personnel to meet the services’ 

needs for mid-level personnel (those with 5-10 years of experience) in 

the late 1990s.



The services had varying degrees of success in achieving their higher 

recruiting goals in the late 1990s. For example, in fiscal year 1999, 

the Army failed to meet its goal--recruiting only 95 percent of its 

target. The Navy and the Army also failed to meet their recruiting 

goals in fiscal year 1998, recruiting 88 and 92 percent, respectively. 

These failures to achieve recruiting goals were perceived by the 

services as a serious problem because of its potential impact on the 

force structure.



The services also experienced retention problems that coincided with 

the recruiting shortfalls. While the Army achieved its reenlistment 

goals for first-term and mid-career enlisted personnel, shortfalls 

occurred in the career reenlistment term. For example, during fiscal 

years 1996-1998, the Army’s reenlistment rates for the eligible 

population decreased from 65.7 to 60.1 percent. First-term reenlistment 

rates for the Navy decreased consistently during 1996-1999 from a 

reenlistment rate of 32.9 percent of the eligible population to 28.2 

percent. Also, during fiscal years 1998-2000, the Air Force did not 

meet its aggregate retention goal of 55 percent for first-term 

personnel, getting 54, 49, and 52 percent, respectively.



DOD Has Not Provided Adequate Guidance and Oversight:



DOD canceled the instruction containing criteria for the Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus Program in 1995 and has not replaced it. According 

to DOD officials, there were administrative impediments that involved 

the recoupment of reenlistment bonuses from some servicemembers who 

leave the military because of disciplinary actions initiated by DOD. 

These administrative impediments were resolved in fiscal year 2002 and 

have cleared the way for issuance of a new DOD instruction. Also, DOD 

has not provided adequate oversight nor conducted the reviews over the 

program that its directive, which is still in effect, requires. In the 

absence of DOD criteria and oversight, the services have not been held 

accountable for using any criteria to designate critical specialties or 

to report to DOD how they select the specialties. As a result, the 

services have expanded their programs to include specialties that may 

not be critical to their missions. In addition, the DOD comptroller 

conducts only limited reviews of the budgets the services submit for 

the program each year. As a result, DOD has not assured that the 

increases in the services’ Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs 

budgets each year were justified.



DOD Has Not Replaced Essential Program Guidance:



The Office of the Secretary of Defense has not followed the DOD 

directive requiring it to establish guidance for the services to use in 

administering the reenlistment bonus programs. According to the 

directive, DOD is responsible for providing the services with guidance 

to ensure proper program administration through an instruction on (1) 

establishing criteria for designating the military skills eligible for 

bonuses, (2) determining individual members’ eligibility for awards, 

and (3) establishing reporting and data requirements for the review and 

evaluation of annual programs and individual requests for military 

skill designations. Without this instruction, the services have not had 

clear direction on how to manage their programs. DOD is currently 

updating the instruction, and officials stated that they intend to 

issue it sometime during 2003.



DOD Oversight Has Been Limited:



The Office of the Secretary of Defense has provided only limited 

oversight, which has resulted in little feedback to the services on the 

administration of their selective reenlistment bonus programs. DOD has 

conducted only one comprehensive review of the program (in 1991) to 

determine the best use of resources. Currently, although the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense is responsible for monitoring and conducting 

ongoing oversight, it does not conduct detailed annual reviews of the 

program as required by its directive. Furthermore, although DOD’s 

Comptroller conducts periodic program reviews, these reviews are 

limited to the services’ budget submissions and their justification. In 

addition, the comptroller’s recently initiated recruiting and retention 

hearings devote only a small part of the meetings to reviewing each 

service’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program.



DOD Has Conducted No Comprehensive Program Review Since 1991:



The Office of the Secretary of Defense has not complied with its 

directive that requires that the office conduct annual Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus Program reviews. These reviews are intended to 

assess the services’ programs in conjunction with the annual program 

budget reviews and to result in recommendations to the Secretary of 

Defense for measures required to attain the most efficient use of 

resources. DOD acknowledged that these reviews have not been conducted 

in recent years, but it is currently taking steps to restart reviews of 

the services’ programs and told us that it plans to complete these 

reviews by March 2003. In addition, DOD is required by directive to 

annually review the criteria used to designate eligible military skills 

and to make any changes needed to attain specific policy objectives. 

However, DOD has not conducted these annual reviews. Moreover, it has 

not reviewed the services’ processes for establishing their 

reenlistment bonus programs.



The last comprehensive review of the program was conducted in 1991. 

However, the services were not required to respond to the findings of 

the 1991 review and consequently did not take any action on the 

findings, and DOD has not conducted any subsequent reviews of this 

nature. The 1991 review found that the program was generally well 

managed. However, the review raised concerns about the general nature 

of the guidance provided to the services and raised questions about 34 

percent of the services’ specialties eligible for bonuses. In addition, 

the review noted that a “balanced” application of all the criteria 

contained in DOD’s instruction was needed to ensure that only critical 

specialties were selected. The report specifically noted that staffing 

shortfalls alone were not sufficient criteria to qualify an occupation 

for inclusion in the program. While chronically undermanned, the report 

noted that musicians would not be considered critical for the 

fulfillment of defense missions and thus would not receive a bonus. The 

report noted that none of the services, at that time, provided 

selective reenlistment bonuses for musicians. However, the Army is 

currently offering bonuses to some musician specialties on the basis of 

chronic understaffing in those areas.



In a 1996 report, we raised similar concerns regarding the management 

and oversight that DOD was providing the program with in, among other 

aspects, determining which skill categories should receive 

bonuses.[Footnote 4] In that report, we noted that the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense had not provided adequate guidance for and 

oversight of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program. Additionally, we 

noted that its guidance to the services for determining which 

specialties categories should receive bonuses was too general in 

nature. As a result, each service used a different procedure for 

identifying which specialty categories were to receive retention 

bonuses. With regard to oversight, while DOD guidance required detailed 

annual reviews of the specialty categories that the services planned to 

include in their programs, DOD had not conducted these reviews. Our 

report recommended that DOD (1) provide more explicit guidance 

regarding the determination of shortage categories and eligibility for 

bonuses and require the services to establish and document more 

specific criteria for determining which skills will receive bonuses and 

(2) monitor the services’ adherence to this guidance. DOD took no 

action on our recommendations, and the program has continued to grow 

unconstrained since.



Comptroller Conducts Limited Review of Program Budget Requests:



DOD’s Comptroller conducts limited annual reviews of the services’ 

program budget submissions. According to the analysts responsible for 

these reviews, they review high-level program summaries that do not 

provide insights into the details of how the program is run. They 

essentially review the services’ budget estimates and a small sampling 

of specialties that the services represent as their top retention-

critical specialties. We found that these reviews were limited because 

of the small number of skills considered by the review, and we 

questioned some specialties that the services included in their top 

retention-critical specialties. We found some specialties that had 

appeared on the services’ lists for several years were not receiving 

the highest bonuses. For example, the Navy listed the service 

occupation of Cryptologic Technician (Collection)[Footnote 5] as being 

critically undermanned during fiscal years 1997-2002. However, the 

bonus multiplier for this specialty has not been higher than 4.5 during 

this time frame and was lowered to 4.0 in fiscal year 2001. During that 

year the Navy retained only 160, or 82 percent, of the goal of 194 (out 

of 431 potential retainees) Cryptologic Technicians.



Because of the general nature of its reviews, the DOD Comptroller’s 

analysts did not identify inaccuracies in the services’ budget 

estimates because of the general nature of their reviews. For example, 

in two instances, the services overestimated the amount of their 

anniversary payments and used the additional funds to make initial 

payments. For example, in fiscal year 2001, the Army overestimated its 

anniversary payments by $9 million. In fiscal year 2002, the Air Force 

overestimated its anniversary payments by approximately $17 million. 

According to service officials, these estimates are easy to calculate; 

since they are obligations incurred from the previous years’ bonus 

programs and are known amounts. These unbudgeted initial payments also 

resulted in an additional obligation of $26 million that must be paid 

in future years, since these services pay 50 percent of their bonuses 

up front and must pay the remaining 50 percent over the reenlistment 

period (a total of $52 million).



Conclusions:



The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program was intended to help the 

services meet short-term retention problems in selected critical 

specialties. Instead, the services have broadened the number of 

specialties included in the program by not using all of their criteria 

to selectively target critical specialties. As a result, the number of 

eligible specialties and the corresponding number of enlisted personnel 

included in the program have increased significantly. The growth in the 

number of eligible specialties and enlisted personnel who receive 

reenlistment bonuses may well continue if actions are not taken to 

constrain this expansion. Actions that may constrain the program’s 

growth include requiring the services’ to adhere to criteria they have 

already established for selecting critical specialties and by DOD’s 

issuing an instruction governing the operation of the program. While 

several factors influenced the program’s growth in recent years, it is 

likely that the impact of these factors could have been mitigated if 

DOD had replaced the canceled instruction and had exercised appropriate 

oversight. Without an instruction to guide the services, DOD cannot be 

sure that the program is being implemented as intended and that 

adequate internal controls are in place to govern the operations of the 

services’ programs. Without clear DOD guidance and oversight, managing 

the program and justifying its growth are difficult. In 1996, we raised 

concerns about the lack of oversight that DOD was providing the program 

in, among other aspects, determining which skill categories should 

receive bonuses. The Office of the Secretary of Defense could have 

exercised more effective controls over the services’ management of 

their programs, had it followed our recommendations to provide 

appropriate guidance and more active oversight.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



In the absence of a DOD instruction governing the services’ 

implementation of the program, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense require the services to do the following:



* Apply all the criteria they have established for selecting critical 

specialties under their Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs. In the 

case of the Army, criteria should be established for selecting critical 

specialties.



* Manage their programs to stay within their appropriations or, if 

circumstances require, provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

with adequate justification for increased expenditures over 

appropriated amounts.



To improve DOD’s oversight and the services’ management of the 

Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Defense require that the Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness:



* issue an instruction that provides the services with guidance for 

administering and selecting specialties for inclusion in their programs 

and:



* conduct annual reviews of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program as 

required by DOD’s directive.



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



DOD provided official comments on a draft of this report. DOD did not 

agree with the report’s conclusion that the Department cannot be sure 

that the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs are being implemented as 

intended. While DOD stated that program controls are in place to ensure 

a reasonable balance between oversight and execution, we found that 

fundamental management controls were not in place. For example, DOD 

canceled the key instruction that provides the services with essential 

guidance for administering their programs 7 years ago and has not 

replaced it. Also, the comptroller’s budget reviews of the services’ 

programs were limited and, in some cases, were not effectively 

performed. Furthermore, these budget reviews were never intended to 

provide detailed programmatic oversight. Office of the Secretary of 

Defense officials told us that detailed programmatic reviews required 

by DOD’s directive had not been conducted since 1991. Consequently, 

without these essential management controls, it is not clear how the 

Department can be sure that the program is being implemented as 

intended.



DOD concurred or partially concurred with our recommendations. Our 

evaluation of DOD’s comments on these recommendations follows:



DOD concurred with our recommendation to issue an instruction that 

provides the services with guidance for administering their programs. 

The Department stated that it has drafted and is staffing a new DOD 

Instruction 1304.22 that will govern the procedures for administering 

the program.



DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense require the services to apply all the criteria they have 

established for selecting specialties under their Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus Programs. DOD stated that its criteria are sound and 

that the services’ processes are balanced. As we noted in our report, 

the Department’s instruction that was canceled required a balanced 

application of five criteria. We found that the services do not always 

apply their criteria in a balanced fashion. DOD also stated that, 

although the Army does not have a regulation governing its Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus Program, the criteria it uses are sound. However, we 

found that the Army’s criteria are not clearly defined. Therefore, it 

is difficult to determine whether the criteria are being applied in a 

balanced fashion. Not using all the criteria allows the number of 

specialties included in the program to expand with a corresponding 

increase in reenlistments. For example, the number of Army 

reenlistments with bonuses more than doubled from approximately 7,000 

in fiscal year 1997 to over 17,000 in fiscal 2001. DOD also stated that 

it does not use the program to address aggregate end-strength goals. We 

did not intend to infer that the program is being used to meet 

aggregate end-strength goals. We removed the discussion of the services 

use of the program to meet aggregate end-strength goals from the 

report.



DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the services 

manage their programs to stay within their appropriations or, if 

circumstances require, provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

with adequate justification for increased expenditures over 

appropriated amounts. DOD stated that, in general, it did not concur 

with an imposition of new centralized control over the services’ budget 

execution. Furthermore, DOD stated its concern that the services need 

to be able to respond to changes in external factors during the 2 years 

between budget submission and program execution. However, as our report 

points out, DOD has repeatedly exceeded its appropriations during the 

last 5 fiscal years. For example, during fiscal years 1997-2001, the 

services spent over $240 million above their appropriations. Better 

program oversight and management by DOD would have required the 

services to justify exceeding their appropriations during this 5-year 

period. We do not believe that more accountability for budget execution 

will diminish the services’ ability to respond to changing operational 

needs.



DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense conduct annual reviews of the Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus Program. DOD cited the annual reviews conducted by 

DOD’s Comptroller as an example of routine program reviews. However, as 

we have previously noted, these reviews are limited to the services’ 

budget submissions and justification. And, only a small sample of 

occupations are included in the budget submission. DOD also stated that 

part of the budget process includes reviews by the Office of Management 

and Budget. However, Office of Management and Budget officials told us 

that their reviews are limited and do not constitute a detailed 

assessment of the services’ programs. DOD’s response also stated that 

its annual defense report will provide a listing of DOD-critical skills 

and other pertinent information. However, this listing will not 

represent a detailed programmatic review. DOD’s Annual Defense Report 

is an overarching representation of all DOD programs and does not 

permit the level of detailed information required to fully assess the 

Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program.



We continue to believe that our recommendations have merit and have 

made no adjustments to them. During the course of our review, the House 

Appropriations Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to report on 

several aspects of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program and to 

provide the Committee with that report by March 31, 2003. It also 

directed us to review and assess that report and report back to the 

Committee by June 1, 2003.



DOD’s comments appear in their entirety in appendix IV. DOD also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as 

appropriate.



We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, Navy, and Air 

Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. We will send copies to other interested parties 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.



Please contact me at (202) 512-5559 if you or your staff have any 

questions regarding this report. Key contributors to this report were 

Donald Snyder, Kurt Burgeson, James Driggins, Marjorie Pratt, Brian 

James, Jane Hunt, Earl Williams, and Maria-Alaina Rambus.



Derek B. Stewart

Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management:

Signed By Derek B. Stewart:



[End of section]



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



To determine the extent to which the services followed their Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus Program’s management criteria, we reviewed their 

criteria and other documentation of overall program development and 

execution. We examined the retention rates as reported by the services 

as well as prepared program expenditure and growth trends. We then 

reviewed the services’ reported contributing program growth factors: 

(1) budgetary changes, (2) the effects of downsizing initiated in the 

early 1990s, and (3) changes in the recruiting and retention climate 

during the 1990s. We also attended one of the Department of Defense 

(DOD) Comptroller’s quarterly services’ recruiting and retention 

briefings in addition to reviewing materials from previous briefings.



To determine how the selective reenlistment bonus program has been used 

to address retention problems in specialties of most concern to the 

services, we reviewed the critical specialties they identified in the 

selective reenlistment bonus sections of their budget justification 

books.[Footnote 6] Since the Air Force did not report its top critical 

retention occupations in its justification books, we examined the 

critical occupations listed by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps for 

fiscal year 1998 (fiscal year 1999 for the Army) to 2003. More 

specifically, we identified specialties that appeared on the services’ 

lists for 3 or more years. We then reviewed the history of the bonus 

multiples that the services applied to these occupations to determine 

how they were used to address the retention problems in those 

occupations.



To identify trends in the programs budget, we compared the services’ 

budget requests with their actual budget expenditures for fiscal years 

1997-2002. As part of this trend analysis, we reviewed both the initial 

and anniversary payments made during each of the fiscal years and 

projected them into the future. We also reviewed congressional actions 

that took place during this time period. We also conducted trend 

analyses of the number of reenlistees receiving bonuses, changes in the 

occupations eligible for bonuses, and changes in the average bonus 

amounts. We were unable to measure the impact of pay increases on the 

average bonus amounts during this time frame because the multiples used 

to calculate the bonuses varied from year to year.



To assess whether DOD provided adequate program guidance and oversight, 

we reviewed legislation and DOD directives and instructions governing 

the program. In addition, we reviewed these materials and evaluated the 

extent to which the program was meeting its intended purpose as defined 

by Congress and DOD. We obtained and reviewed the guidance established 

by the services for implementing their programs. We reviewed the 

criteria contained within the services’ guidance and assessed their 

adherence to it.



We interviewed DOD and Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program officials 

and reviewed their program oversight and guidance policies and 

procedures. These interviews were conducted with officials in the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy); Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Personnel--Army (Professional Development); Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Personnel--Air Force (Skills Management); Deputy Chief of Naval 

Operations (Manpower and Personnel); Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower 

and Reserve Affairs--Marine Corps; and Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Programs and Resources--Marine Corps. We also met with officials from 

the Office of Management and Budget. We also reviewed our own published 

report, and data from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Congressional Research Service, and RAND. We also obtained data on 

bonus levels from DOD and the services, the numbers of personnel 

reenlisting overall and within the program, critical skills, and 

retention and recruitment data. We reviewed, but did not verify, the 

accuracy of the data provided by DOD and the services.



[End of section]



Appendix II: How the Selective Reenlistment Bonuses Are Paid:



The services use DOD’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program to help 

meet their staffing requirements. The selective reenlistment bonus is 

designed to offer an attractive reenlistment or extension incentive to 

improve staffing in critical military specialties.[Footnote 7] The 

active duty individuals in the critical military specialties who 

reenlist or extend their enlistments are to serve for the full period 

of the reenlistment or extension contract.



Under the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program, there are two methods 

of bonus payments: (1) initial and/or (2) anniversary. The initial 

payment is the first installment paid to the individual when the 

individual reenlists or begins serving the extension. The initial 

payment is either 50 percent of the total bonus or 100 percent of the 

total bonus, called the “lump-sum payment.” Any remaining bonus is paid 

in equal annual installments on the anniversary date for the remainder 

of the reenlistment contract period.



The Office of the Secretary of Defense has established three 

eligibility zones for the payment of selective reenlistment bonuses. 

These zones are defined in terms of years of active-duty service. Zone 

A includes reenlistments falling from 17 months to 6 years of active 

duty; zone B, from 6 to 10 years; and zone C, from 10 to 14 years. The 

Selected Reenlistment Bonus multiples are calculated for each of these 

three zones. (See table 3.) Service members may receive only one 

selective reenlistment bonus within any one zone and must reenlist or 

extend their reenlistments for at least 3 years if they accept a bonus.



Table 3: Eligibility for Zones A, B, and C under the Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus Program:



Calculated zone: Zone A; Eligibility characteristics: * Individual must 

have at least 17 months of continuous active duty service (other than 

active duty for training as a reservist) but not more than 6 years of 

active duty on the date of reenlistment.; * Individual must not have 

previously received a zone A selective reenlistment bonus..



Calculated zone: Zone B; Eligibility characteristics: * Individual must 

have completed at least 6 but not more than 10 years of active service 

(including active duty for training as a reservist) on the date of 

reenlistment.; * Individual must not have previously received a zone B 

selective reenlistment bonus..



Calculated zone: Zone C; Eligibility characteristics: * Individual must 

have completed at least 10 but not more than 14 years of active service 

(including active duty for training as a reservist) on the date of 

reenlistment.; * Individual must not have previously received a zone C 

selective reenlistment bonus..



Source: DOD Financial Management Regulation Volume 7A, Chapter 9, 

Section 090201.



[End of table]



[End of section]



Appendix III: Growth of the Services’ Selective Reenlistment Bonus 

Programs and Initial Payments:



This appendix describes the growth of the program in constant dollars 

and growth in the services’ initial payments during fiscal years 1997-

2002.



Program Growth:



The services’ budgets for the selective reenlistment bonus program have 

grown during fiscal years 1990-2001. During the military drawdown in 

the early to mid-1990’s, the cost of the program declined. During the 

period from fiscal year 1996-2002, the budgets of the services’ 

programs grew from $243 million to an estimated $790 million in 

constant (inflation adjusted) dollars. Figure 2 displays the cost of 

the retention bonus program in constant 2002 dollars during fiscal 

years 1990-2002.



Figure 2: Cost of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program in Constant 

2002 Dollars, Fiscal Years 1990-2002:



[See PDF for Image]

[End of Fidure}



Growth in Initial Payments by the Services:



Army:



The Army’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program budget for initial 

payments grew from $30 million to $72 million during fiscal years 1997-

2001. (See fig. 3.) During fiscal years 1997-2001, the Army exceeded 

its appropriated budget by approximately $49 million after taking into 

account an additional $64 million that Congress added to the Army’s 

initial payments budget over this period.



Figure 3: Army’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program’s Initial 

Payments, Budget Request, and Reported Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1997-

2002:



[See PDF for Image]

[End of Figure]



Navy:



The Navy, which recently has had the largest Selective Reenlistment 

Bonus Program, also experienced budget growth in its initial payments 

from $78 million to $234 million during fiscal years 1997-2001. (See 

fig. 4.) During fiscal years 1997-2001, the Navy exceeded its 

appropriated budget by more than $121 million after taking into account 

an additional $44 million that Congress added to the Navy’s initial 

payments budget over this period.



Figure 4: Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program’s Initial 

Payments, Budget Request, and Reported Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1997-

2002:



[See PDF for Image]

[End of Figure]



Marine Corps:



The Marine Corps, from fiscal year 1997 through 2002, had the smallest 

Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program. The Marine Corps’ program is also 

unique because in fiscal year 2001, it began making lump-sum bonus 

payments. This resulted in a significant increase in the program’s cost 

for that year. During fiscal years 1997-2000, the Marine Corps’ program 

budget for initial payments grew annually from $8 million to $25 

million. However, the transition to lump-sum payments in fiscal year 

2001 caused the Marine Corps’ budget for new payments to exceed $46 

million. (See fig. 5.):



Figure 5: Marine Corps’ Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program’s Initial 

Payments, Budget Request, and Reported Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1997-

2002:



[See PDF for Image]

[End of Figure]



Air Force:



During fiscal years 1997-2001, the Air Force’s reenlistment bonus 

budget for initial payments grew from $13 million to $123 million, an 

846-percent increase. (See fig. 6.) During fiscal years 1997-2001, the 

Air Force exceeded its appropriated budget by more than $70 million 

after taking into account an additional $57 million that Congress added 

to the Air Force’s initial payments budget over this period.



Figure 6: Air Force’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program’s Initial 

Payments, Budget Request, and Reported Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1997-

2002:



[See PDF for Image]

[End of Figure]



[End of section]



Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:



NOV 19 2002:



PERSONNEL AND READINESS:



Mr. Derek B. Stewart:



Director, Defense Management Issues United States General Accounting 

Office Washington, DC 20548:



Dear Mr. Stewart:



This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 

Report, GAO-03-149, “MILITARY PERSONNEL: Management and Oversight of 

Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Needs Improvement,” dated October 

17, 2002 (GAO Code 350194). We appreciate the opportunity to comment.



The Department does not agree with the report’s conclusion that DoD 

cannot be sure that Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) programs are 

being implemented as intended. Program controls, through the Planning, 

Programming, and Budgeting System, and Department policy, strike a 

reasonable balance between oversight and decentralized execution. While 

higher retention in the critical skills does impact overall retention, 

the Department does not use the SRB program to simply meet overall end 

strength goals. Rather, the SRB program is used to shape the force, 

with each participating skill evaluated on its merits, independent of 

aggregate retention outcomes. The Services continue to use the SRB 

program for critical skills where it is essential to maintain the 

health, balance, and readiness of the force. In addition, the Services 

monitor and adjust their SRB offers in response to the retention 

behavior of individual occupational specialties.



The GAO notes that DoD’s budget for SRB has nearly tripled since 1998. 

SRBs awarded relate directly to required versus actual reenlistments in 

the critical skills. This is not unexpected given that SRB expenditures 

dropped steadily in the 1990s, by a little over 40 percent from 1990 to 

1998. Subsequently, as the military emerged from the drawdown, the 

Services began experiencing substantial retention shortfalls in 

critical skills exacerbated by a strong economy that drove unemployment 

rates to their lowest levels in more than 30 years. Naturally, the SRB 

expenditures started to increase in response.



Total growth in this program over the past few years is a consequence, 

in part, of DoD’s downsizing programs in the mid-1990s. Accession 

levels were reduced to meet end strength targets. As a result, certain 

skill inventories within the Services became unbalanced, leaving 

significant experience shortfalls in critical mid-grade enlisted ranks 

--a condition that increased retention challenges and placed extra 

pressure on retention tools to achieve retention rates above the 

historical averages (to yield the same retention number from a smaller 

cohort).



The enclosure addresses each of the four recommendations identified by 

the GAO. In general, the Department does not concur with the imposition 

of new and more centralized program execution validations, which would 

serve to inhibit a Service’s speed and flexibility in responsively 

attacking emergent readiness challenges. However, the GAO review was 

constructive, and the Department will integrate appropriate adjustments 

to the management of this important program.



The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 

report.



Sincerely,

Charles S. Abell:

Principal Deputy:

Signed by Charles S. Abell:



Enclosure: As stated:



GAO-03-149/GAO CODE 350194:



“MILITARY PERSONNEL: MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT 

BONUS PROGRAM NEEDS IMPROVEMENT”:



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:



RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 

require the Services to apply all the criteria they have established 

for selecting specialties under their Selective Reenlistment Bonus 

Programs. 1n the case of the Army, criteria should be established for 

selecting critical specialties. (Page 21/Draft Report):



DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The established criteria permit the 

Services to selectively target their resources to meet service-unique 

retention needs in a judicious and cost-effective manner. The Services 

define the critical skills for their mission accomplishment and these 

may change over time. Predicting reenlistment behavior of varying 

specialties is a complex task. Thus, the criteria were written to 

provide flexibility for management of critical skills to meet 

shortfalls in their inventory. The Department’s criteria are sound, and 

the Services’ processes are balanced.



Even though the Army presently does not have a SRB regulation at this 

time, criteria it uses in its SRB program are sound. In administering 

the SRB program, standards are in place to review historical and 

projected strengths, current and historical retention data, replacement 

costs, levels of fill by skill level and readiness. These tools are 

used to determine if a specialty needs a bonus to ensure the required 

fill and experience balance across the force profile. Senior level Army 

officials review and approve awarding of bonuses.



RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 

require the Services to manage their programs to stay within their 

appropriations or, if circumstances require, provide the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense with adequate justification for increased 

expenditures over appropriated amounts. (Page 21/Draft Report):



DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The Department subscribes to the 

proposition that program execution should be consistent with the 

appropriations allocated to that purpose. The extent to which a Service 

can execute to their fiscal year budget for the SRB program depends on 

the success of retention programs achieving needed reenlistments during 

the year of execution. We are concerned with the loss of flexibility 

imposed by this recommendation. Budget submission timelines require 

reenlistment forecasts two years prior to execution. Intervening 

changes in the economy and labor market drive changes to actual 

reenlistment rates, which can vary significantly from forecasted rates. 

To maintain a competitive edge over the external labor market, the 

Services need the flexibility to adjust SRB execution to meet 

operational needs.



Management of the program during the year of execution requires 

periodic reviews of the skills and real time opening and closing of SRB 

offerings based on the Service projection to meet annual retention 

goals. The decision to open or close skills for SRB have a profound 

effect on the funds available and year of execution reprogramming is 

not uncommon. Meeting the authorized end strength and maintaining a 

high personnel readiness posture requires careful:



management and decisive actions - we are confident that the system and 

processes are in place to meet these objectives.



With respect to expenditures above amounts budgeted for a given fiscal 

year, the Services are already required to submit for pre-approval any 

reprogramming above $10 million between budget authority lines. We do 

not see that any value would be added by adding a new administrative 

requirement for the Services to seek OSD approval for moving amounts 

below that amount. We are committed to managing these programs in such 

a way as to provide the greatest return to the Department and remain 

within our funding obligations.



RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 

require that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

issue an instruction that provides the Services with guidance for 

administering and selecting specialties for inclusion in their 

programs. (Page 21/Draft Report):



DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Department has drafted and is staffing a new 

DoD Instruction 1304.22 that will govern procedures for administration 

of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus program, which will facilitate the 

more efficient administration of the Service bonus programs. While 

there is no current instruction, the bonus policy and program 

guidelines are already in effect either by virtue of being in the last 

issuance or having been implemented via policy and procedural 

Directive-type memoranda.



RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 

require that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

conduct annual reviews of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program as 

required by DoD’s directive. (Page 21/Draft Report):



DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The future DoD directive will not 

require a formal annual review since the SRB program execution is 

routinely reviewed each year within the context of the Planning, 

Programming, and Budgeting System, with adjustments applied up or down, 

as judged appropriate by OSD. Moreover, the Department already requires 

the Services to submit for approval any reprogramming action above $10 

million between budget authority lines needed to fund proposed 

adjustments to the bonus program. The Services’ currently manage their 

SRB programs carefully and offer bonuses sparingly. At least annually, 

the Services examine the health of individual occupational specialties 

to shape a sustainable force, which will meet readiness needs today and 

in the future. Each Service prepares a plan for use of bonuses and the 

plans are carefully reviewed in the course of the Department’s 

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting process, Congressional testimony, 

and again by the Office of Management and Budget and the Congress.



Additionally, as part of the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Defense 

Report, the Department will provide a listing of DoD critical skills, 

which includes an update on manning shortages or skill level imbalances 

in the specialty, retention objectives for the specialty, any bonuses 

paid to this skill, training investment and replacement costs for those 

qualified in the specialty, and other pertinent information. This 

process is also being reviewed within the DoD Human Resource Strategy. 

Finally, SRB program execution outcomes will be added as a review item 

during “Status of Force” reviews, presently conducted each quarter.



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FOOTNOTES



[1] The authority for the reenlistment bonus is codified at 37 U.S.C. 

308.



[2] DOD Directive Number 1304.21.



[3] DOD’s 2002 Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation stated that 

use of the program had increased substantially since 1997 as the 

services began to report recruiting and retention problems. The report 

states the increased use of selective reenlistment bonuses as a key 

factor in the services’ meeting aggregate retention objectives over the 

past 3 years.



[4] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Retention Bonuses: More 

Direction and Oversight Needed, GAO/NSIAD-96-42 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 

24, 1995).



[5] Cryptologic Technicians perform a variety of duties at numerous 

overseas and stateside shore commands; aboard surface ships; and, to a 

limited degree, aboard aircraft and submarines. Duties include 

performing the collection and analysis of state-of-the-art 

communication signals using sophisticated high-powered computers, 

specialized computer-assisted communications equipment, video display 

terminals, and electronic/magnetic recorders.



[6] Budget justification books are submitted to Congress each year in 

support of the services’ budget requests. 



[7] A military specialty is an element of the enlisted classification 

structure that identifies an individual position or a group of closely 

related positions on the basis of the duties involved. The term used to 

designate a military specialty differs according to the military 

service concerned, such as “military occupational specialty,” used by 

the Army and Marine Corps; “Air Force specialty,” used by the Air 

Force; and “Navy enlisted classification,” used by the Navy.



GAO’s Mission:



The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, 

exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 

responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 

of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 

of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 

analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 

informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to 

good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 

integrity, and reliability.



Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:



The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through the Internet. GAO’s Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 

abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 

expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 

engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 

can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 

graphics.



Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its 

Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 

files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 

www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to daily E-mail alert for newly 

released products” under the GAO Reports heading.



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each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 

of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 

Orders should be sent to:



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20548: