This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-03-51 
entitled 'Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for 
Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses' which was released on November 25, 
2002.



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Report to the Secretary of Defense:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



ELECTRONIC WARFARE: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for Suppressing 

Enemy Air Defenses:



Highlights of GAO-03-51, a report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, 

Secretary of Defense:



Why GAO Did This Study:

U.S. military aircraft are often at great risk from enemy air defenses, 

and the services use specialized aircraft to neutralize or destroy 
them. 

In January 2001, GAO reported that a gap existed between the services’ 

suppression capabilities and their needs and recommended that a 
comprehensive 

strategy was needed to fix the situation. In response to GAO’s report, 
DOD 

emphasized that a major study underway at the time would provide the 
basis 

for a Department-wide strategy and lead to a balanced set of 
acquisition 

programs between the services.  This report updates our previous work 
and 

assesses actions that DOD has taken to improve its suppression 
capabilities.    



What GAO Found:

The Department of Defense continues to face a gap between its need to 

suppress enemy air defenses and its capabilities to do so, despite some 

progress in upgrading its capabilities.  There are not enough existing 

suppression aircraft to meet overall requirements, some aircraft are 

experiencing wing and engine problems, and improvements are needed to 
counter 

evolving threats.  DOD’s primary suppression aircraft, the EA-6B, is 
also 

reaching the end of its life cycle and a replacement is needed as early 
as 

2009. Furthermore, some aircraft self-protection equipment, which 
provide 

additional suppression capabilities, have also been found to be 
unreliable.  



DOD has not yet developed an integrated, comprehensive approach to the 
U.S. 

air defense suppression mission but has recently completed an Analysis 
of 

Alternatives that presented the services with 27 options for replacing 
the 

aging EA-6B.  The services formed a coordinating group to assess the 
options, 

and in June 2002 presented service-specific proposals to the Office of 
the 

Secretary of Defense for analysis and consideration in the 2004 budget.  

However, the Analysis of Alternatives did not provide the basis for a 

comprehensive strategy to address the department’s overall suppression 

needs. It only analyzed the airborne electronic attack portion of the 

mission and did not address needed improvements in aircraft self-
protection 

systems or the technical and funding challenges of other service 
programs 

such as the Navy’s and Air Force’s air-launched decoy programs.



[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]



What GAO Recommends:

GAO continues to recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a 

comprehensive, cross-service strategy to close the gap between DOD’s 

suppression capabilities and needs.  In addition, an effective 
coordinating

 entity is needed to develop and monitor implementation of the 
strategy.



In answer to a draft of GAO’s report, DOD concurred with its 
recommendations.  

Staff changes are being made to address cross-cutting issues, and an 
integrated 

product team process established to form a comprehensive approach to 
the 

electronic warfare mission.



The full report, including GAO’s objectives, scope, methodology, and 
analysis 

is available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/gerpt?GAO-03-51. For additional 
information 

about the report, call R.E. Levin on (202) 512-3519.



This is a test for developing highlights for a GAO report. The full 
report, 

including GAO’s objectives, scope, methodology, and analysis is 
available 

at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-. For additional information about 
the 

report, contact  . To provide comments on this test highlights, contact 

Keith Fultz (202-512-3200) or email HighlightsTest@gao.gov.



November 2002:



Electronic Warfare:



Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses:



GAO-03-51:



Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



Despite Some Increases in Capabilities, a Gap Remains:



DOD Has Made Little Progress in Establishing a Coordinating Entity and 

Comprehensive Strategy for the Suppression Mission:



Conclusions:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



Scope and Methodology:



Appendix I: Locations Visited during This Review:



Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:



Figures:



Figure 1: EA-6B with Jammer Pod and HARM Preparing for Launch from an 

Aircraft Carrier:



Figure 2: F-16CJ Aircraft with the HARM Targeting Pod and HARM:



United States General Accounting Office:



Washington, DC 20548:



November 25, 2002:



The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

The Secretary of Defense:



Dear Mr. Secretary:



In conducting military operations, U.S. aircraft are often at great 

risk from enemy air defenses, such as surface-to-air missiles. The 

services use specialized aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or 

temporarily degrade enemy air defense systems through either electronic 

warfare or physical attack. These aircraft use electronic warfare 

devices, called jammers, which transmit electronic signals that disrupt 

enemy radar and communications to temporarily suppress enemy air 

defenses. Other specialized aircraft use antiradiation missiles that 

home in on radars used by surface-to-air missiles or antiaircraft 

artillery systems to degrade or destroy them. Because specialized 

aircraft protect all service aircraft in hostile airspace, the 

suppression mission necessarily crosses individual service lines. In 

addition, military aircraft use on-board self-protection equipment to 

detect and suppress enemy air defenses, such as radar warning receivers 

and jammers.



In 1993 and 1996, we issued reports expressing concerns over Department 

of Defense (DOD) decisions to eliminate the F-4G and EF-111 suppression 

aircraft without first fielding comparable replacements.[Footnote 1] 

These aircraft were retired because the cost of maintaining them was 

perceived to be too great, and because the Air Force planned to field 

stealthy aircraft[Footnote 2] in the future. However, after stealth 

aircraft were revealed to be vulnerable in Kosovo, the services 

realized that the loss of suppression capability had actually increased 

U.S. aircraft vulnerability to enemy air defenses and that suppression 

assets were still needed. Because no replacements were yet available, 

the Navy’s aging EA-6B became DOD’s only standoff radar jammer 

aircraft, providing suppression support for all the services.



In January 2001, we expressed concern about the acknowledged gap 

between the services’ suppression capabilities and their needs, and 

DOD’s fragmented approach to the suppression mission. The gap is a 

consequence of the increasing modernization of enemy air defenses that 

has outpaced DOD’s effort to improve its suppression capabilities. We 

recommended that DOD designate an interservice coordinating entity to 

develop a comprehensive, cross-service strategy to close the 

gap.[Footnote 3] DOD agreed with our findings but disagreed with our 

recommendation. The Department stated that a study --the Airborne 

Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives --underway at the time, 

would provide a basis for its future strategy and lead to a balanced 

set of acquisition programs for the services. The objective of this 

report is to update our previous work and assess the actions DOD has 

taken to (1) improve its suppression capabilities and (2) develop an 

integrated, comprehensive approach for closing the gap between its 

capabilities and needs. Due to security classification, some details 

about the various suppression programs are not included in this report.



Results in Brief:



DOD has been making some progress in upgrading its capabilities, but it 

continues to face a gap between its need to suppress enemy air defenses 

and the availability of equipment to allow it to do so. There are not 

enough existing suppression aircraft to meet overall requirements, some 

aircraft are experiencing wing and engine problems, and improvements 

are needed to counter evolving threats. In addition, DOD’s primary 

suppression aircraft, the EA-6B, is reaching the end of its life cycle 

and a replacement aircraft is needed as early as 2009. Furthermore, 

some aircraft self-protection equipment, which is intended to provide 

additional suppression capabilities, has also been found to be 

unreliable. Individual service efforts to address problems by 

refurbishing aircraft, procuring and fielding more of the current 

suppression aircraft, and upgrading some electronic warfare equipment, 

while closing some of the gap, will not fill all current and future 

needs.



DOD has not yet developed an integrated, comprehensive approach to the 

U.S. air defense suppression mission. In December 2001, DOD completed 

an Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives that examined 

options for replacing the aging EA-6B. Although the analysis provided 

detailed modeling of the estimated costs and capabilities of 27 

options, it contained no recommendations on what system or systems 

should be acquired. The analysis did not provide the basis for a 

balanced, comprehensive strategy to address DOD’s overall suppression 

needs. For example, it did not address improvements in aircraft self-

protection systems or the technical and funding challenges of other 

service programs such as the Navy’s and Air Force’s air-launched decoy 

programs. The services formed a coordinating group to assess the 

options, and in June 2002 the Navy and the Air Force presented specific 

proposals to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for consideration 

in the fiscal year 2004 budget. These proposals emphasized only 

separate service-specific programs to replace EA-6B capabilities. DOD 

is currently analyzing the services’ proposals to determine what mix of 

systems to approve.



We continue to recommend that you develop a comprehensive, integrated, 

cost-effective cross-service strategy to close the gap between DOD’s 

suppression capabilities and needs. In addition, an effective 

coordinating entity is needed to develop and monitor implementation of 

the strategy.



In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

findings and recommendations.



Background:



The United States experienced heavy aircraft and aircrew losses to 

enemy air defenses during the Vietnam War. Since then, the services 

have recognized air defense suppression as a necessary component of air 

operations. Consequently, when a crisis arises, suppression aircraft 

are among the first to be called in and the last to leave. Radar is the 

primary means used by enemy forces to detect, track, and target U.S. 

aircraft with missiles and guns. Hence, U.S. suppression aircraft focus 

on trying to neutralize, degrade, or destroy the enemy’s air defense 

radar equipment. U.S. suppression aircraft, using missiles and jammers, 

generally begin suppressing enemy air defenses after they begin 

emitting radio-frequency signals. Also, in some cases, aircraft launch 

antiradiation missiles that can search for and destroy enemy radars if 

they are turned on. At some risk to the aircraft and aircrews, 

suppression aircraft must be in the vicinity of the enemy air defenses 

to complete their mission.



Enemy radars in the past were usually fixed in position, operated 

independent of each other, and turned on for lengthy periods of time--

all of which made them relatively easy to find and suppress through 

electronic warfare or physical attack. Such was the case in Operation 

Desert Storm, when suppression aircraft such as EA-6B and the 

now-retired EF-111 and F-4G played a vital role in protecting other 

U.S. aircraft from radar-guided missile systems. In fact, strike 

aircraft were normally not permitted to conduct air operations unless 

protected by these suppression aircraft. The EA-6B and EF-111 were 

equipped with transmitters to disrupt or “jam” radar equipment used by 

enemy surface-to-air missiles or antiaircraft artillery systems. The 

F-4G, F/A-18, and EA-6B used antiradiation missiles that homed in on 

enemy radar systems to destroy them. The Air Force replaced the F-4G 

with a less capable aircraft, the F-16CG, but did not upgrade or 
replace 

the EF-111.[Footnote 4]



According to DOD, countries have sought to make their air defenses more 

resistant to suppression. These efforts include increasing the mobility 

of their surface-to-air missiles and radar equipment, connecting radars 

together into integrated air defense systems, and adding sophisticated 

capabilities so that the radar can detect aircraft while turned on for 

a shorter period of time. These defenses use various means to track and 

target aircraft, including modern telecommunications equipment and 

computers to create networks of early warning radar, missile system 

radar, and passive detection systems that pick up aircraft 

communications or heat from aircraft engines. Integrated networks 

provide air defense operators with the ability to track and target 

aircraft even if individual radar elements of the network are jammed or 

destroyed.



Since the end of Desert Storm in 1991, U.S. suppression aircraft have 

been continuously deployed to protect fighter aircraft maintaining the 

no-fly zones over Iraq. More recently, these aircraft have been 

deployed to Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. In 1999, during Operation 

Allied Force in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, these aircraft were extremely 

important for protecting strike aircraft from enemy radar-guided 

missiles. However, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, these 

aircraft were unable to destroy their integrated air defense system 

because Yugoslav forces often engaged in elaborate efforts to protect 

their air defense assets. These efforts reduced Yugoslav opportunities 

to engage U.S. and coalition aircraft because their air defense assets 

could not be used and protected simultaneously. Nevertheless, in two 

separate incidents, Yugoslav forces managed to shoot down an F-117 

stealth fighter and an F-16CG. In addition to the two losses, the 

inability of the United States to counter Yugoslav air defenses that 

included radar and infrared guided missiles made it necessary for U.S. 

forces to (1) fly thousands of dedicated suppression missions, pushing 

suppression forces in Europe to their limits, and (2) raise their 
strike 

missions to higher altitudes or keep low-flying aircraft such as the 
Army’s 

Apache attack helicopters out of combat to reduce risk from infrared 

missile threats.



DOD now primarily uses Navy and Marine Corps EA-6Bs for radar jamming 

and Air Force EC-130s for communications jamming. Recently, EA-6Bs and 

EC-130s saw combat in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Air 

defenses there were relatively weak compared to those faced by U.S. 

aircraft in Yugoslavia, placing fewer demands on suppression aircraft 

to jam air defense systems. This gave the EA-6B an opportunity to 

exploit new techniques to jam ground communications by working with the 

EC-130 and other electronic intelligence gathering aircraft.



Despite Some Increases in Capabilities, a Gap Remains:



Since our January 2001 report,[Footnote 5] the services have had some 

success in improving their suppression capabilities, but they have not 

reached a level needed to counter future threats. When the Air Force 

retired the EF-111 without a replacement, the Navy’s EA-6B became DOD’s 

primary airborne radar jammer, providing suppression support for all 

the services. High demand for the aircraft has exacerbated current wing 

and engine problems, and the Navy has been unable to meet its overall 

requirements. Efforts are underway to address the EA-6B’s problems and 

improve its suppression equipment, but the Navy projects that the 

declining EA-6B inventory will be insufficient to meet DOD’s needs 

beyond 2009. The Air Force’s F-16CJ fleet has grown and the aircraft’s 

capabilities are being improved, but it still lacks some of the 

capabilities of the F-4G, the aircraft it replaced. Also, the Air Force 

and the Navy have improvements underway for other systems such as the 

EC-130 and antiradiation missiles but face funding challenges. Finally, 

to the extent there are gaps in suppression capabilities, U.S. fighter 

aircraft and helicopters must rely on self-protection equipment to 

suppress enemy air defenses, but some of this equipment has been proven 

to be unreliable. The services have some programs underway to improve 

this self-protection equipment, such as developing new towed decoys, 

but, as discussed below, these programs have been hampered by technical 

and funding issues.



Aging EA-6B Aircraft Are Unable to Meet Force Structure Objectives:



The Navy does not have enough EA-6Bs to meet DOD’s suppression needs 

due to wing fatigue and engine problems that have grounded aircraft; 

downtime required for routinely scheduled depot level maintenance; and, 

in the future, downtime to install major capability upgrades in the 

aircraft. Because of its limited numbers and high rate of use by the 

warfighting commanders, DOD designated the EA-6B as a “low density, 

high demand” asset to support worldwide joint military operations. EA-

6Bs are included in all aircraft carrier deployments and support the 

Air Force’s Aerospace Expeditionary Forces. To meet a requirement to 

field 104 aircraft out of a total inventory of 124 (with an average age 

of 19 years), the Navy refurbished 20 retired EA-6Bs. Subsequently, in 

2001, 2 EA-6Bs crashed, reducing the total inventory to 122 aircraft. 

Also in that year, the Navy planned to raise the requirement to 108 

aircraft and establish an additional EA-6B squadron, but that has been 

delayed until March 2004. In February 2002, the Navy had only 91 EA-6Bs 

available for operations instead of the 104 required. As a result, 

while the Navy has been able to meet operational commitments, it has 

been unable to meet some of its training and exercise requirements.



Figure 1: EA-6B with Jammer Pod and HARM Preparing for Launch from an 

Aircraft Carrier:



[See PDF for image]



Source: U.S. Navy.



[End of figure]



The Navy is currently taking action to remedy EA-6B wing fatigue and 

engine failures, and flight restrictions have been put in place. 

However, because wing fatigue has continued to grow, the Navy may have 

to ground additional aircraft. The Navy plans to replace a total of 67 

wing center sections to remedy the problem, and it will spend $4.4 

million each for such replacements for 17 aircraft in the fiscal year 

2002 budget. In addition, DOD’s 2002 supplemental funds covered 8 

additional wing replacements, and the Navy is programming funds for 10 

more wing replacements for each year in the Future Years Defense Plan.



In 2001, the Navy also began experiencing problems with the EA-6B’s 

engines. Premature failure of certain engine bearings caused some 

engines to fail, and it may have caused the crash of two aircraft in 

2001. The Navy grounded over 50 engines until they could be overhauled, 

but it expects to have them back in service by late this year.



The constant deployment of this “low density” EA-6B fleet for 

contingency operations has contributed to its deterioration and to 

other maintenance-related problems. For example, to maintain the 

readiness of squadrons deployed to Kosovo and other ongoing 

commitments, the Navy took spare parts and personnel from nondeployed 

squadrons and subjected the EA-6B to above average cannibalization of 

parts.[Footnote 6] This impacted the ability of nondeployed units to 

train and maintain aircrew proficiency. The constant deployments also 

added to personnel problems in terms of quality of life. EA-6B crews, 

for example, are often away from home for extended periods of time 

creating hardships for their families.



Given the EA-6B’s age and high rate of use, the Navy says that even if 

the EA-6B fleet’s problems are remedied, it will be unable to meet 

force structure requirements in 2009, and all EA-6B aircraft will be 

out of the force by 2015. Therefore, the Navy says it needs a 

replacement aircraft to begin entering the force by 2009 if 

requirements are to be met.



Navy Is Improving EA-6B Jamming Capabilities:



The Navy has been upgrading its EA-6B electronic warfare equipment over 

the years, and it is currently modifying its radar signal receiver and 

related equipment. The modification program, known as the Improved 

Capability Program (ICAP) III, provides improved radar locating and 

jamming capabilities to counter modern enemy air defense threats. As of 

January 2002, according to DOD, ICAP III engineering and manufacturing 

development was about 94 percent complete, and the modification began 

testing on the first aircraft in November 2001. The Navy expects ICAP 

III to reach initial operational capability in 2005 and to be installed 

on all EA-6Bs by 2010, about the time when the aircraft begins to reach 

the end of its service life. The Navy is considering using a modified 

version of the ICAP III equipment on whatever follow-on suppression 

aircraft are developed and fielded, and is also upgrading the EA-6B 

jammer pods to increase the number of frequencies that can be jammed.



Air Force Continues F-16CJ and EC-130 Upgrades but Has Not Fully Funded 

the Programs:



The Air Force is procuring 30 additional F-16CJ suppression aircraft to 

meet force structure requirements for the Air Force’s Aerospace 

Expeditionary Forces. In all, 219 F-16CJ aircraft will be available. To 

fully implement its concept of operations for the Expeditionary Forces, 

the Air Force also plans to increase the capability of the latest model 

F-16C/Ds (block 40) and the F-16CJs (block 50) to be used for both 

attack and suppression missions. To accomplish this, the F-16C/Ds will 

be modified to carry the HARM Targeting System, and the F-16CJs will be 

modified to carry the Advanced Target Pod. The HARM Targeting System 

will provide situational awareness to the F-16C/Ds and targeting 

information to the HARM missile to permit them to perform the 

suppression mission. The Advanced Target Pod will enable the F-16CJs to 

deliver precision-guided munitions.



Figure 2: F-16CJ Aircraft with the HARM Targeting Pod and HARM:



[See PDF for image]



Source: U.S. Air Force



[End of figure]



The Air Force recently upgraded the HARM Targeting System and is 

procuring additional systems. The upgrade (known as R-6) provides 

better and faster targeting information to the missile, but even with 

this pod the F-16CJ still lacks some of the capabilities of the retired 

F-4G. The Air Force completed the R-6 upgrade on fielded systems in 

December 2001 and systems subsequently produced will have it. Once 31 

additional systems are delivered in 2002, the F-16CJs will have a total 

inventory of 202 systems, short of the Air Force’s original goal of 

having 1.1 systems per aircraft, or about 240 systems. Also, the Air 

Force has partially funded additional upgrades (called R-7) for the 

HARM Targeting System in 2003, and plans to fully fund the upgrade in 

the 2004 budget cycle, according to Air Force operational requirements 

officials. These officials also stated that they are considering 

funding for additional R-7 HARM Targeting Systems for F-16CJs and F-

16C/Ds in the 2004 budget submission.



The Air Force is also upgrading the capabilities of the EC-130 Compass 

Call Aircraft, which perform primarily communications jamming missions. 

The upgrades are intended to improve the aircraft’s jamming 

capabilities, reliability, and maintainability. The EC-130 is another 

“low density, high demand” asset with a total of only 13 operational 

aircraft, of which 11 are being funded for upgrade.



Aircraft Self-Protection Systems Are Also Experiencing Problems:



Gaps in the services’ air defense suppression aircraft make it 

essential that other aircraft have the ability to protect themselves 

from enemy defenses. The services have already identified serious 

reliability problems with current self-protection systems on U.S. 

combat aircraft, including jammers, radar warning receivers, and 

countermeasures dispensers. Most of the current systems use older 

technology and have logistics support problems due to obsolescence. 

Also, as we reported last year,[Footnote 7] the self-protection systems 

on strike aircraft may have more problems than the services estimate. 

In reviewing test results using the new Joint Service Electronic Combat 

System Tester, we found that aircraft the services believed to be 

mission capable were not because of faults in their electronic combat 

systems that were undetected by older test equipment. The faults ranged 

from the identification of parts needing to be replaced inside the 

electronic combat systems, to the wiring, antennas, and control units 

that connect the systems to the aircraft. For example, 41 of 44 

F-15C aircraft and 10 of 10 F-18C aircraft previously believed to be 

fully mission capable were subsequently found to have one or more 

faults in their self-protection systems, and 1 F-18C had 12 such 

faults. Coupled with the problems in the suppression aircraft, these 

shortcomings could create survivability problems for the aircraft 

should they encounter significant enemy air defense capabilities in 

some future conflict.



The services have some programs underway to improve self-protection 

capabilities such as the joint Navy and Air Force Integrated Defensive 

Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) system and the Precision Location 

and Identification (PLAID) system. The IDECM system will provide the 

F-15, F/A-18E/F, and B-1B aircraft with improved self-protection 

through jammers and towed decoys. The system has experienced some 

delays in engineering and development, and the estimated procurement 

cost has doubled. The PLAID system will provide aircrews with accurate 

location and identification of enemy air defense systems. The services 

expect to field both systems in 2004.



Other Development Efforts Are Underway with Some Facing Funding 

Constraints and Technology Challenges:



The services have initiated additional research and development efforts 

to improve their ability to suppress enemy air defenses, but they face 

technology challenges and/or a lack of funding priority for many of 

these programs. The Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD), which an Air 

Force analysis has shown could make a significant contribution to 

aircraft survivability, illustrates this problem. MALD is supposed to 

mimic an aircraft and draw enemy air defenses away from the real 

aircraft. A recently completed Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration, it had been funded by the Air Force for an initial small 

procurement of 300 decoys, with potential for further procurement. 

According to the Air Force, after experiencing technical problems, MALD 

did not meet user needs, and its procurement cost estimates increased. 

Thus, the Air Force canceled the procurement and restructured MALD to 

address deficiencies highlighted in the demonstration.



The Navy has been developing its own decoy, the Improved Tactical Air 

Launched Decoy (ITALD), but it has procured only part of its inventory 

objective. Despite recurring congressional increases for the past 

several fiscal years, the Navy has not submitted budget requests for 

ITALDs or procured units to complete its inventory objective because of 

competing priorities.



Also, the Navy is upgrading the HARM missile used to attack shipborne 

and ground-based radars. The first phase of the upgrade improves 

missile accuracy by incorporating global positioning and inertial 

navigation systems into the missile. A second upgrade, the Advanced 

Anti-Radiation Guided Missile, will add millimeter wave capability to 

allow the missile to target radars that have stopped emitting. While 

the Air Force employs the HARM missile as well, it is not involved in 

the HARM upgrade program.



DOD Has Made Little Progress in Establishing a Coordinating Entity and 

Comprehensive Strategy for the Suppression Mission:



DOD has acknowledged the gap in U.S. air defense suppression 

capabilities for some time and has conducted several studies to 

identify solutions, but it has had little success in closing the gap. 

Our past work and the work of others have cited the need for DOD to 

establish some coordinating entity to develop a comprehensive strategy 

that addresses this capability gap. In response to our previous report, 

DOD stated that its Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives 

would provide the basis for such a strategy. However, the analysis was 

limited to assessing options for replacing the EA-6B rather than 

assessing the needs of the overall suppression mission. Upon completion 

of the analysis, the Navy and the Air Force proposed options for 

replacing EA-6B capabilities, and DOD is currently evaluating these 

proposals for consideration in the 2004 budget submission.



The Analysis of Alternatives Did Not Provide the Basis for a 

Comprehensive Strategy for the Suppression Mission:



In fiscal year 2000, Congress expressed concerns that DOD did not have 

a serious plan for a successor to the EA-6B aircraft and directed DOD 

to conduct the Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives for 

replacing the EA-6B.[Footnote 8] DOD indicated in its response to our 

January 2001 report that the analysis would lead to a DOD-wide strategy 

and balanced set of acquisition programs to address the overall gaps 

between suppression needs and capabilities. However, it was only 

intended to address the airborne electronic attack aspect of the 

suppression mission and therefore did not address the acknowledged 

problems with aircraft self-protection systems or the technical and 

funding challenges of other service programs such as the Navy’s ITALD 

program, the Air Force’s MALD program, and the Air Force’s EC-130 

modifications.



The Navy took the lead on the joint analysis with participation by all 

the services. The analysis, completed in December 2001, concluded that 

the services needed a standoff system or a combination of systems to 

operate at a distance from enemy targets and a stand-in system that 

would provide close-in suppression protection for attacking aircraft 

where the threat is too great for the standoff systems. The analysis 

established the capabilities of the EA-6B upgraded with ICAP III as the 

foundation for any future system. It presented the Navy and the Air 

Force with detailed models of estimated costs and capabilities of 27 

mixes of new and/or upgraded aircraft to consider for follow-on 

electronic attack capabilities but did not recommend any particular 

option. These options ranged in estimated 20-year life cycle costs from 

$20 billion to $80 billion.



In conjunction with the analysis, the services formed a Joint 

Requirements Coordination and Oversight Group to coordinate operational 

requirements for airborne electronic attack, review ongoing and planned 

production programs for the mission, and exchange information among the 

services to avoid unnecessary duplication. A key activity of the group 

is to coordinate Navy and Air Force proposals for replacing the EA-6B. 

According to group members, this mechanism will help address airborne 

electronic attack needs through the coordination of complementary 

systems agreed to by the services. In June 2002, the services presented 

their proposals for follow-on capabilities to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense. According to the services, the Navy proposed to 

replace the EA-6B with an electronic attack version of its new F/A-18E/

F fighter and attack aircraft. The Air Force proposed adapting the B-

52H bomber for standoff suppression by adding jamming pods to it, plus 

a stand-in suppression capability provided by a MALD-type decoy with 

jamming capabilities or an unmanned aerial vehicle equipped with 

jammers. The services see these proposals as a coordinated, effective 

solution to the near-and far-term needs for airborne electronic attack. 

DOD is currently conducting an additional analysis of the proposals, 

and the Secretary will decide later this year what proposals to include 

in the fiscal year 2004 budget submission.



The development of systems to replace the EA-6B will help close the gap 

between DOD’s suppression capabilities and needs. However, the service 

proposals that are currently being considered by DOD do not provide an 

integrated, comprehensive solution to the overall suppression needs. In 

addition, while the Joint Requirements Coordination and Oversight Group 

provides a mechanism to coordinate the services’ efforts, it has not 

been directed to develop a comprehensive strategy and monitor its 

implementation.



Other assessments have also pointed to the lack of a coordinated 

approach to addressing the gap in air suppression capabilities. At 

DOD’s request, the Institute for Defense Analyses studied problems in 

acquiring electronic warfare systems. The Institute found several 

causes for the problems, including uncertainties in characterizing 

rapidly changing threats and systems requirements, lack of adequate and 

stable funding, complexity of electronic warfare hardware and software, 

challenges in integrating the hardware and software on platforms, and 

difficulties in getting and keeping experienced electronic warfare 

personnel. Among other things, the Institute recommended that DOD 

establish central offices for electronic warfare matters in the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and in each service, create a senior oversight panel, 

and prepare an annual electronic warfare roadmap to help correct some 

of the problems DOD faces in electronic warfare acquisition programs.



While DOD has not established a coordinating entity to provide 

leadership for the suppression mission, it has recognized the need for 

such entities in other cross-service initiatives areas such as the 

development and fielding of unmanned aerial vehicles. In October 2001, 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics established a joint unmanned aerial vehicles planning task 

force that will develop and coordinate road maps, recommend priorities 

for development and procurement efforts, and prepare implementing 

guidance to the services on common programs and functions.



Conclusions:



The air defense suppression mission continues to be essential for 

maintaining air superiority. Over the past several years, however, the 

quantity and quality of the services’ suppression equipment have 

declined while enemy air defense tactics and equipment have improved. 

DOD has recognized a gap exists in suppression capabilities but has 

made little progress in closing it. In our view, progress in improving 

capabilities has been hampered by the lack of a comprehensive strategy, 

cross-service coordination, and funding commitments that address the 

overall suppression needs. DOD relies on individual service programs to 

fill the void, but these programs have not historically received a high 

priority, resulting in the now existing capability gap. We continue to 

believe that a formal coordinating entity needs to be established to 

bring the services together to develop an integrated, cost-effective 

strategy for addressing overall joint air defense suppression needs. A 

strategy is needed to identify mission objectives and guide efforts to 

develop effective and integrated solutions for improving suppression 

capabilities.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



To close the gap between enemy air defense suppression needs and 

capabilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a 

coordinating entity and joint comprehensive strategy to address the 

gaps that need to be filled in the enemy air defense suppression 

mission. The strategy should provide the means to identify and 

prioritize promising technologies, determine the funding, time frames, 

and responsibilities needed to develop and acquire systems, and 

establish evaluation mechanisms to track progress in achieving 

objectives.



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



In written comments to a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendations and supported the need for a mechanism to coordinate 

electronic warfare strategy and systems acquisition. DOD stated that 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics) is currently restructuring its staff to address cross-

cutting issues, including the creation of an Assistant Director of 

Systems Integration for Electronic Warfare and an Integrated Product 

Team process to formulate a comprehensive approach to the electronic 

warfare mission area, including defense suppression. We believe this is 

a good step forward.



DOD also stated that we were overly critical in our characterization of 

individual defense suppression systems and failed to acknowledge its 

full range of capabilities to suppress air defenses. We recognize that 

the services have substantial capabilities but remain concerned because 

there are insufficient aircraft to meet overall requirements and 

improvements have not kept pace with evolving threats. Several service-

specific attempts have been made to remedy the acknowledged gap in 

capabilities, but they have faltered in competition for funding. In 

some cases, Congress intervened with guidance and increases to 

services’ budget requests for defense suppression to ensure that DOD 

addresses the capabilities gap. We believe that creation of a 

comprehensive strategy and effective coordinating entity would 

strengthen DOD’s ability to compete for funding and address the gap.



DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. In addition, DOD provided 

technical comments that we incorporated into the report where 

appropriate.



Scope and Methodology:



To assess the condition of DOD’s suppression capabilities and DOD’s 

progress in developing a strategy for closing the gap in suppression 

capabilities, we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Defense Advanced Research Program Agency, Air Force, 

Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officials responsible for electronic 

warfare requirements and programs. We also interviewed service program 

managers for the EA-6B, EC-130, F-16CJ, HARM, aircraft self-protection 

systems, and programs under development. We also met with officials 

from selected EA-6B squadrons and an EA-6B maintenance depot. We 

interviewed Defense Intelligence Agency officials and reviewed related 

intelligence documents to ascertain the capabilities of current and 

future enemy air defense systems. We also discussed air defense 

suppression programs and issues with various DOD contractors, including 

RAND Corporation, Northrup-Grumman Corporation, General Atomics 

Aeronautical Systems, Incorporated, and Raytheon Systems Company. We 

reviewed pertinent DOD, service, and contractor documents addressing 

the status of suppression capabilities, plans for maintaining them, and 

potential solutions for closing the gap in capabilities. Specific 

locations we visited are listed in appendix I.



We performed our review from October 2001 through August 2002 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.



As you know, the head of a federal agency is required under 31 U.S.C. 

720 to submit a written statement of actions taken on our 

recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the 

House Committee on Government Reform not later than 60 days after the 

date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on 

Appropriations with the agency’s first request for appropriations made 

more than 60 days after the date of the report.



We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the Army, 

Air Force, and Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and interested 

congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others 

on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.



If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me on 

(202)512-4841. Major contributors to this report were Michael Aiken, 

Gaines Hensley, John Oppenheim, Terry Parker, Robert Pelletier, and 

Robert Swierczek.



Sincerely yours,



R.E. Levin

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:



[Signed by R.E. Levin]



[End of section]



Appendix I: Locations Visited during This Review:



Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.



Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.



Headquarters Elements, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, 

Washington, D.C.:



Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.:



Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia:



U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia:



RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California:



Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia:



Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland:



U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright Patterson Air Force 

Base, Ohio:



U.S Air Force Air Warfare Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada:



11th and 15th Reconnaissance Squadrons, Indian Springs Air Force Base, 

Nevada:



Headquarters, Pacific Fleet, North Island Naval Air Station, San Diego, 

California:



Naval Aviation Depot, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington:



Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station Whidbey, 

Island, Washington:



Northrop Grumman Corporation, San Diego, California:



General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Incorporated, San Diego, 

California:



Raytheon Systems Company, Goleta, California:



[End of section]



Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:



3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:



ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:



Mr. Robert Levin:



Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, U.S. General Accounting 

Office:



441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:



15 NOV 2002:



Dear Mr. Levin:



This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 

report, “ELECTRONIC WARFARE: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for 

Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses,” dated October 7, 2002 (GAO Code 

120169/GAO-03-51).



In reviewing this report, we have taken into account the complexity and 

variety of platforms and systems that the Department has developed over 

the years to address a dynamic and highly diverse threat base whose 

technologies and tactics are constantly evolving. Whereas this report 

focuses on system specific comparisons such as the individual 

capability of the F-16 CJ relative to the retired F-4G, or the limited 

numbers of remaining EA-6B aircraft, the Department has long recognized 

that the most successful strategy for suppressing and defeating 

adversary air defense systems is a full range of countermeasures aimed 

at forcing any adversary to overcome not just one but many simultaneous 

electronic and kinetic countermeasure attacks.



This variety of existing capabilities has been so successful that, as 

noted in the report, adversaries have been forced to adapt new tactics, 

frequent defensive maneuvers, and reduced periods of active radar 

operations. In view of this success, the department believes the report 

is overly critical in its characterization of individual system 

capabilities and fails to appropriately credit the substantial existing 

capability of the US to suppress air defenses.



In spite of this differing perspective, the Department supports the 

need for an enduring mechanism to coordinate strategy and systems 

acquisition. To ensure this level of coordination across vital segments 

of acquisition, we have recently implemented several organizational 

changes to address cross-cutting issues. Included among these is an 

Assistant Director of Systems Integration for Electronic Warfare who 

will oversee an Integrated Product Team process that will formulate 

comprehensive systems-of-systems architectures across all electronic 

warfare missions, including air defense suppression.



Sincerely,



Glenn F. Lamartin



Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems:



[Signed by an official for Glenn F. Lamartin]



Attachment:



GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED OCTOBER 7, 2002 GAO CODE 120169/GAO-03-51:



“ELECTRONIC WARFARE: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for 

Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses”:



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATION:



RECOMMENDATION: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 

establish a coordinating entity and joint comprehensive strategy to 

address the gaps that need to be filled in the enemy air defense 

suppression mission. The strategy should provide the means to identify 

and prioritize promising technologies, determine the funding, 

timeframes and responsibilities needed to develop and acquire systems, 

and establish evaluation mechanisms to track progress in achieving 

objectives. (p. 13/GAO Draft Report):



DOD RESPONSE: CONCUR.



The Department has long recognized that the most successful strategy 

for suppressing and defeating adversary air defense systems is a full 

range of countermeasures aimed at forcing any adversary to overcome not 

just one but many simultaneous electronic countermeasures and kinetic 

attacks. In spite of any differences in opinion with the report 

regarding individual program comparisons, the existing variety of US 

defense suppression capabilities has been so successful that, as noted 

in the report, adversaries have been forced to adapt new tactics that 

require frequent defensive movements and minimal periods of active 

radar operations to survive.



To ensure a continuing mechanism for coordinating systems acquisition 

with evolving strategies, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics) is restructuring elements of his staff which 

include an Assistant Director of Systems Integration for Electronic 

Warfare to oversee an Integrated Product Team process to formulate 

comprehensive systems-of-systems architectures across all electronic 

warfare mission areas, including the area of defense suppression. The 

Assistant Director will work closely with the Counter Air Defenses 

Joint Requirements Coordination Oversight Group, which the Services 

have already formed, to ensure effective harmonization of defense 

suppression strategies and requirements.



[End of section]



FOOTNOTES



[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses: 

Air Force Plans, GAO/NSIAD-93-221 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 1993) 

and Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air 

Defenses May Be Too Low, GAO-96-128 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.10, 1996).



[2] Aircraft are referred to as stealthy or stealth when they are 

constructed with features that make them harder to detect with radar 

and infrared systems.



[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive 

Strategy Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses, GAO-01-28 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3, 2001).



[4] The Air Force planned to replace the F-4G with an F-15 modified for 

the suppression mission with at least the same capability as the F-4G. 

The Air Force fielded the F-16CG as an interim capability while it 

planned the development of the F-15 suppression aircraft. Subsequently, 

the Air Force terminated the F-15 effort and the F-16CG and the newer 

F-16CJ became permanent replacements for the F-4G. The F-15 effort was 

terminated because of its expected high costs.



[5] See GAO-01-28.



[6] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Aircraft: Services 

Need Strategies to Reduce Cannibalizations, GAO-02-86 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 21, 2001). DOD defines cannibalization as removing 

serviceable parts for one piece of equipment and installing them in 

another.



[7] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Electronic Combat: Services 

Should Consider Greater Use of New Test Equipment for Their Aircraft, 

GAO-01-843 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 30, 2001).



[8] H.R Conf. Rep. No. 106-301 at 625 (1999). 



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