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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans 

Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, 

House of Representatives:



November 2002:



BORDER SECURITY:



GAO HIGHLIGHTS:

Highlights of GAO-03-38, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 

National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives.



BORDER SECURITY

Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program:



Why GAO did this Study:



Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress, 

the administration, law enforcement officials, and the public have 

questioned the effectiveness of U.S. visa programs in protecting 

national security.  Some have voiced concern that terrorists or other 

criminals may exploit one of these programs—the Visa Waiver Program—to 

enter the United States. The program enables citizens of 28 
participating 

countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 

90 days or less without first obtaining a visa. It was created, in 
part, 

to promote the effective use of government resources and to facilitate 

international travel without threatening U.S. security.  GAO was asked 
to 

review the Visa Waiver Program, including the process for assessing 
countries’ 

eligibility to participate in the program. GAO was also asked to 
determine 

the implications—specifically those affecting national security, 
foreign 

relations, tourism, and State Department resources—of eliminating the 
program. 

GAO analysts traveled to several visa waiver countries, including 
Belgium, 

Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay, as well as to Argentina, whose 
participation 

in the program was recently revoked.



What GAO Found:



To ensure that countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program pose 
a low risk 

to U.S. national interests, the Departments of Justice and State verify 
each 

country’s political and economic stability and the security of its 
passport 

issuance process. However, laws passed since the terrorist attacks of 
September 

11, 2001, affect the processes for determining eligibility for the 
program. 

The new laws  expand passport requirements for visa waiver countries 
and call 

for a system to monitor visitors’ movement into and out of the United 
States. 

Whether these requirements will be implemented by the specified 
deadlines 

remains uncertain. The implications for U.S. national security of 
eliminating 

the Visa Waiver Program are difficult to determine. It is clear, 
however, that 

eliminating the program could affect U.S. relations with other 
countries, U.S. 

tourism, and State Department resources abroad.  Although the 
Departments of Justice 

and State generally agreed with our report, Justice was concerned that 
GAO did not 

fully take into account its progress in meeting certain requirements. 
State 

questioned whether GAO considered the border inspection process when 
discussing 

the national security implications of eliminating the Visa Waiver 
Program.



[See PDF for Image]

[End of Figure]



To view the full report, including the scopeand methodology, click on 
the 

link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford (202) 512-4128 or 

fordj@gao.gov



Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program:



GAO-03-38:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



Recent Legislative Requirements Could Affect Countries’ Participation 

in the Visa Waiver Program:



Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program Are Uncertain:



Eliminating the Program Would Increase the Need for State Department 

Resources:



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



Appendixes:



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Justice:



GAO Comments:



Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:



GAO Comments:



Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:



GAO Contacts:



Acknowledgments:



Table:



Table 1: Visa Waiver Countries, by Year of Admission and Number of 

Arrivals in 2000:



Figures:



Figure 1: Visa Waiver Program Nomination Process:



Figure 2: U.S. Arrivals from Visa Waiver Countries as Share of Total 

International Arrivals, 1992-2000:



Figure 3: Estimates of State Department’s Initial Costs if the Visa 

Waiver Program Were Eliminated:



Figure 4: Estimates of State Department’s Annual Recurring Costs if the 

Visa Waiver Program Were Eliminated:



Abbreviations:



DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:



EU: European Union :



FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation :



INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service :



Letter November 22, 2002:



The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 Veterans Affairs, and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives:



Dear Mr. Chairman:



Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress, 

the administration, law enforcement officials, and the public have 

questioned the effectiveness of U.S. visa programs in protecting 

national security. Some have voiced concern that terrorists or other 

criminals may exploit one of these programs--the Visa Waiver Program--

to enter the United States.



The Visa Waiver Program, established in 1986, enables citizens of 28 

participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or 

business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a visa from U.S. 

embassies and consulates abroad.[Footnote 1] Persons traveling to the 

United States under the program must have a valid passport issued by 

the participating country and be a citizen of that country. According 

to the program’s legislative history, Congress created the program, in 

part, to promote the effective use of government resources and to 

facilitate international travel without threatening U.S. security. 

Immigration and Naturalization Service data show more than 16 million 

admissions into the United States under the Visa Waiver Program for 

each of the past 3 years.



To assist in the subcommittee’s oversight of U.S. visa policies and 

practices, you asked us to review the Visa Waiver Program. In this 

report we describe (1) the process that the Departments of Justice and 

State established to assess countries’ eligibility to participate in 

the program, including the implications of changes in the law since 

September 11, 2001, that affect the process and (2) the major 

implications of eliminating the program, specifically implications 

affecting national security, foreign relations, tourism, and State 

Department resources. You also asked us to assess how the visa process 

operated prior to September 11, 2001, and what changes have occurred 

since then to strengthen the process as a screen against terrorists. 

That assessment is contained in our report Border Security: Visa 

Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool.[Footnote 2]



To describe the process for assessing countries’ eligibility to 

participate in the Visa Waiver Program, we examined laws establishing 

the program, relevant congressional reports, regulations and agency 

protocols governing the program, Department of Justice Office of 

Inspector General reports, and other relevant documents. To assess the 

implications of eliminating the program as regards U.S. national 

security and U.S. foreign relations, we visited U.S. embassies in 

Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay, and we met 

with officials of the Departments of State and Justice, including the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI). We selected five of these countries because they 

were the first countries whose participation in the program was being 

evaluated by the Departments of Justice and State. We selected the 

sixth country, Spain, to provide a perspective on countries that had 

not been evaluated. To assess the economic importance and implications 

of international tourism, we reviewed official travel data for 1991-

2001 and a 2002 report commissioned by the Department of Commerce. To 

estimate the costs that the Department of State would incur if the Visa 

Waiver Program were eliminated, we developed a model using Department 

of State workload and staffing data and information on 

biometrics.[Footnote 3] (See app. I for a more detailed description of 

our scope and methodology.):



The President has proposed and the Congress has passed legislation to 

establish a Department of Homeland Security and has called for visa 

policy-making authority to be transferred to this new department, while 

the administration of visas is retained by the Department of State. 

Some of the issues addressed in this report may become the 

responsibility of the new department.



Results in Brief:



The Departments of Justice and State have established processes for 

determining, on the basis of the Visa Waiver Program’s statutory 

criteria, whether a country is eligible to participate in the program. 

These processes are intended to ensure that countries meet certain 

criteria for nomination for, and continued participation in, the 

program. These criteria include a low refusal rate for a country’s 

citizens who apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visitor visas. In assessing a 

country, the Departments of Justice and State also look at its 

political and economic stability and the security of its process for 

issuing passports. The Immigration and Naturalization Service recently 

assessed five countries and submitted its reports to the Attorney 

General, who will decide whether the countries will continue to 

participate in the program. The Attorney General can immediately 

terminate a country’s participation in the program if an emergency 

occurs that threatens U.S. interests. The Attorney General removed 

Argentina from the program in February 2002 because of concerns that 

the economic crisis in that country could lead to increased illegal 

immigration into the United States. Laws passed since the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001, affect a country’s qualifications for 

participating in the Visa Waiver Program; for example, one of the new 

laws requires participating countries to issue passports that contain 

biometric identifiers, such as fingerprints. However, it is unclear 

whether these requirements will be fully implemented by the deadlines 

called for in the law.



The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the Visa 

Waiver Program are difficult to determine, but eliminating the program 

could affect U.S. relations with other countries, U.S. tourism, and 

State Department resources abroad. The U.S. government has not 

systematically collected data on how frequently potential terrorists 

and other criminals have entered the United States under the program. 

Anecdotal information indicates that such persons have entered the 

United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with valid U.S. 

visas. As a result, U.S. government officials expressed different 

opinions about the effect of the program on U.S. national security. 

They agreed that the visa screening process could serve as an 

additional tool to screen out terrorists but only to the extent that 

State had the necessary overseas resources, including relevant timely 

information on potential terrorists and sufficient staff and facilities 

to interview all or most visa applicants. They said that if current 

visa waiver travelers were required to apply for visas and State’s 

current resource levels were not increased, consular officers would be 

inundated with paperwork for routine and low-risk cases and would 

become less effective and alert in dealing with cases needing 

additional scrutiny. The decision to eliminate the program could 

negatively affect U.S. relations with participating countries, could 

discourage some business and tourism in the United States, and would 

increase the need for State Department resources. For example, if the 

program were eliminated, we estimated that the department’s initial 

costs to process the additional workload would likely range between 

$739 million and $1.28 billion and that annual recurring costs would 

likely range between $522 million and $810 million. It could take 2 to 

4 years or longer to put the necessary people and facilities in place 

to handle the increased workload, according to State officials.



The Justice and State Departments provided written comments on a draft 

of this report. The Justice Department expressed concern that we had 

underestimated its ability to meet certain requirements of recent 

border security laws. For example, it does not anticipate significant 

delays in the incorporation of standardized, machine-verifiable 

biometrics in the national passports of Visa Waiver Program countries. 

However, information from the State Department as of October 2002 shows 

that only three Visa Waiver Program countries stated that they would 

have a biometrics passport program by October 2004. Therefore, we 

remain concerned that the requirements will not be implemented in the 

time frame that the law defines. The State Department wrote that in 

general it agreed with our findings. However, it raised some concerns 

about whether we had considered the U.S. border inspection process when 

discussing the implications of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program on 

U.S. national security. We acknowledge the importance of the inspection 

process for aliens seeking to enter the United States under the Visa 

Waiver Program as well as with visas. We have added a discussion of the 

inspection process to the report. In addition, both we and the Justice 

Department Inspector General have work under way that will provide a 

more thorough assessment of the border inspection process.



Background:



According to the program’s legislative history,[Footnote 4] the Visa 

Waiver Pilot Program was created, in part, to improve U.S. foreign 

relations and to promote effective use of State Department’s resources. 

It was also intended to facilitate international travel, without posing 

a threat to the welfare or security of the United States, and thereby 

to increase the number of foreign travelers to the United States. In 

addition, according to a statement by President Clinton,[Footnote 5] 

the program allowed the State Department to reallocate scarce 

department resources from the issuing of visas in low-risk countries to 

higher priority needs such as visa screening in high-fraud areas. The 

law that created the Visa Waiver Pilot Program required that before 

implementing the program, the Attorney General establish an automated 

arrival and departure tracking system (see page 15 for a discussion of 

this system). The law also required that the Attorney General produce a 

special arrival and departure form for travelers seeking to enter the 

United States under the program, which was made permanent in 2000. 

Persons traveling to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program 

must:



* have a valid passport issued by the participating country and be a 

national of that country;



* be seeking entry for 90 days or less as a temporary visitor;



* have their identity checked at the U.S. port of entry against an 

automated electronic database containing information about the 

inadmissibility of aliens, to uncover any grounds on which the alien 

may be inadmissible to the United States, with no such ground found;



* have been determined by the Immigration and Naturalization Service 

(INS) at the U.S. port of entry to represent no threat to the welfare, 

health, safety, or security of the United States;



* have complied with conditions of any previous admission under the 

program (e.g., stayed in the United States for 90 days or less);



* if entering by air or sea, possess a round-trip transportation ticket 

issued by a carrier that has signed an agreement with the U.S. 

government to participate in the program and must have arrived in the 

United States aboard such a carrier; and:



* if entering by land, have proof of financial solvency and a domicile 

abroad to which he or she intends to return.



In addition, the applicant must present a completed and signed visa 

waiver arrival and departure form on which he or she waives the right 

to a hearing, other than on the basis of an application for asylum, if 

INS denies the applicant entry into the United States. All foreign 

visitors, whether they have visas[Footnote 6] or are seeking to enter 

the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, undergo inspections 

conducted by INS inspectors at U.S. airports and seaports. These 

inspections are intended to ensure that only admissible persons enter 

the United States. The INS inspectors observe the applicant, examine 

his or her passport, and check his or her name against an automated 

database that contains information regarding the admissibility of 

aliens.



Table 1 lists the visa waiver countries, the year each country entered 

the program, and the numbers of arrivals to the United States under the 

program in 2000.



Table 1: Visa Waiver Countries, by Year of Admission and Number of 

Arrivals in 2000:



Country: Japan; Year of admission: 1988; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

5,061,377.



Country: United Kingdom; Year of admission: 1988; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 4,703,008.



Country: France; Year of admission: 1989; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

1,087,087.



Country: Germany; Year of admission: 1989; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

1,786,045.



Country: Italy; Year of admission: 1989; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

612,357.



Country: Netherlands; Year of admission: 1989; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 553,297.



Country: Sweden; Year of admission: 1989; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

321,881.



Country: Switzerland; Year of admission: 1989; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 395,031.



Country: Andorra; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

1,235.



Country: Austria; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

175,533.



Country: Belgium; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

249,957.



Country: Denmark; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

149,211.



Country: Finland; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

93,649.



Country: Iceland; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

27,682.



Country: Liechtenstein; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 2,011.



Country: Luxembourg; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 16,385.



Country: Monaco; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

5,622.



Country: New Zealand; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 172,012.



Country: Norway; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

147,540.



Country: San Marino; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 0.



Country: Spain; Year of admission: 1991; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

361,177.



Country: Brunei; Year of admission: 1993; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

1,230.



Country: Ireland; Year of admission: 1995; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

285,697.



Country: Argentina[A]; Year of admission: 1996; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 533,936.



Country: Australia; Year of admission: 1996; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 539,559.



Country: Slovenia; Year of admission: 1997; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 14,886.



Country: Portugal; Year of admission: 1999; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 86,333.



Country: Singapore; Year of admission: 1999; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 136,439.



Country: Uruguay; Year of admission: 1999; [Empty]; Number of arrivals: 

69,607.



Country: Total; Year of admission: [Empty]; [Empty]; Number of 

arrivals: 17,589,784.



[A] The U.S. Attorney General removed Argentina from the program in 

February 2002.



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.



[End of table]



Recent Legislative Requirements Could Affect Countries’ Participation 

in the Visa Waiver Program:



The Visa Waiver Program Act includes criteria that a country must 

fulfill to be eligible for nomination for, and continued participation 

in, the program. Justice and State have established a draft protocol 

based on these criteria that spells out the procedures that the 

agencies must follow in nominating a country and for assessing 

participating countries to ensure that they continue to pose a low risk 

to U.S. security. The Attorney General, in consultation with the 

Secretary of State, may also immediately terminate a country’s 

participation in the Visa Waiver Program in the event of an emergency 

that threatens U.S. law enforcement or security interests. Legislation 

enacted after September 11, 2001, added more requirements for countries 

to remain eligible to participate in the program, but full, timely 

implementation of these requirements is uncertain.



Nomination Process Assesses Countries’ Eligibility to Join the Program:



To comply with laws intended to ensure that countries’ participation in 

the Visa Waiver Program does not threaten U.S. security and interests, 

the Departments of State and Justice have established a draft protocol 

that spells out procedures to assess countries’ eligibility to be 

admitted to the program. The procedures are comprehensive and cover a 

variety of security concerns, including patterns of passport and visa 

fraud, assessments of terrorism within the country, and assessments of 

law enforcement practices. An Interagency Working Group comprising 

representatives from Justice, including the INS, and from State, 

including the Bureau of Consular Affairs, developed the protocol. 

Although the protocol is in draft, the agencies have used it to assess 

some countries’ eligibility. (See fig. 1.):



Figure 1: Visa Waiver Program Nomination Process:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



As shown in figure 1, State initiates the process of adding countries 

to the program by advising Justice of its intent to nominate a country 

for inclusion in the program. State may nominate a country only after 

it has determined that the country:



* has a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate for its citizens who apply 

for U.S. nonimmigrant visitor visas (ranging from less than 2 percent 

to less than 3 percent depending on the years assessed),



* has the ability to supply machine-readable passports to its citizens 

or is in the process of developing such passports,[Footnote 7] and:



* offers visa-free travel for U.S. citizens and nationals.[Footnote 8]



The protocol requires State to provide Justice with information on the 

nominated country, including:



* patterns of passport fraud, visa fraud, and visa abuse over the past 

5 years;



* assessments of terrorism within or outside the country by the 

country’s nationals; and:



* evaluations of the impact of the country’s participation on U.S. 

national security and law enforcement.



Various Justice components--including the law enforcement agencies (for 

example, INS and the FBI), Criminal Division, and Office of 

Intelligence Policy and Review--review the nomination, focusing on the 

effect that the country’s inclusion would have on U.S. law enforcement 

and national security. If no clearly disqualifying objections are 

raised during this review, the Secretary of State submits a formal 

written nomination to the Attorney General. After a country’s formal 

nomination, INS leads a team of representatives from interested 

agencies to visit the nominated country. The team reviews the 

country’s:



* political, social, and economic conditions;



* security over its passport and national identity documents;



* border controls; and:



* immigration and nationality laws, law enforcement policies and 

practices, and other matters relevant to law enforcement, immigration, 

and national security.



On the basis of the review and site visit, the Interagency Working 

Group submits a recommendation to the Attorney General, who, in 

consultation with the Secretary of State, then decides whether to admit 

the country to the program.



Evaluation Process Assesses Country’s Continued Participation:



The protocol includes an evaluation process, similar to the nomination 

process, for periodically assessing the effect on U.S. law enforcement 

and security interests of each country’s continued participation in the 

Visa Waiver Program.[Footnote 9] INS is primarily responsible for these 

evaluations. It obtains information from a number of other agencies, 

including State and intelligence agencies, and other components of 

Justice. These evaluations assess the status of factors reviewed during 

the nomination process, including:



* whether the rate at which visa waiver applicants are refused entry at 

U.S. ports of entry exceeds specific numerical targets;



* demographic, economic, political, and social trends in the program 

countries;



* the security of the country’s procedures for issuing passports; and:



* legal issues, including how foreign nationals acquire citizenship, 

law enforcement considerations, national security (including 

information on terrorism), and other matters.



The areas evaluated involve more qualitative than quantitative 

assessments. For example, INS examines the security of processes for 

issuing passports but uses no quantitative criteria in assessing the 

process. However, the protocol does allow the Attorney General, in 

determining a country’s risk level, to consider quantifiable data. Such 

data may include comparisons between the denial rates of persons 

presenting passports purported to have been lawfully issued by a 

particular visa waiver country and the denial rates of individuals 

traveling from the same country with nonimmigrant visas.



INS has completed the assessments of five countries: Argentina, 

Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Slovenia. The assessment of Uruguay is 

still pending. INS selected the countries for assessment on the basis 

of specific security concerns. For example, INS selected Argentina 

because of the economic crisis and political instability in the 

country; the Attorney General subsequently removed Argentina from the 

program because of those problems. INS selected Belgium because of 

repeated thefts of blank Belgian passports. INS accelerated the 

scheduling of the evaluations after the terrorist attacks on September 

11, 2001. However, although INS completed the field visits to the 

countries in December 2001, it did not send the finalized reports with 

recommendations to Justice until September 2002. The next step in the 

evaluation process is for the Attorney General, in consultation with 

the Secretary of State, to decide whether each country should remain in 

the program or its participation should be terminated.



Attorney General May Immediately Terminate a Country’s Participation:



The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may 

also immediately terminate a country’s participation in the Visa Waiver 

Program in the event of an emergency that threatens U.S. law 

enforcement or security interests. The law defines emergencies as:



* the overthrow of a democratically elected government;



* war (including undeclared war, civil war, or other military activity) 

in the program country;



* a severe breakdown in law and order affecting a significant portion 

of the program country’s territory;



* a severe economic collapse in the program country; or:



* any other extraordinary event in the program country that threatens 

the law enforcement or security interests of the United States.



On February 20, 2002, the Attorney General used this emergency 

provision to remove Argentina from the Visa Waiver Program because of 

the country’s economic crisis, which had raised concerns that the 

number of Argentines illegally immigrating to the United States would 

increase. INS had reported an increase in the number of Argentine 

nationals attempting to remain illegally in the United States after 

their 90-day period of admission had expired.



Recent Laws Affect Process for Assessing Eligibility, but Full, Timely 

Implementation Uncertain:



Laws passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, affect 

the process for determining countries’ eligibility to participate in 

the Visa Waiver Program. These laws cover passport requirements for 

visa waiver countries and reemphasize the requirement for the Attorney 

General to establish a system to monitor peoples’ entry into and exit 

from the United States. However, it is unclear whether Justice and 

State will fully implement these requirements by the deadlines called 

for under U.S. law.



First, regarding passports, the October 2001 USA PATRIOT Act advanced 

to October 1, 2003,[Footnote 10] the deadline for the requirement that 

travelers from participating countries wishing to enter the United 

States under the Visa Waiver Program must submit a machine-readable 

passport.[Footnote 11] Subsequently, the May 2002 Enhanced Border 

Security Act stated that to remain in the program, a visa waiver 

country must certify, by October 26, 2004, that it has a program to 

issue tamper-resistant, machine-readable passports that contain 

biometric and document authentication identifiers. With the exception 

of Switzerland and San Marino,[Footnote 12] all participating countries 

are issuing machine-readable passports, but none issue passports that 

have biometric identifiers, according to State. Some State and law 

enforcement officials in Europe and the United States questioned 

whether countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program would be 

able to certify by October 2004 that they can issue passports with 

acceptable biometric identifiers--particularly since there is not yet 

an international standard for biometric identifiers. The Act required 

that the biometric identifiers comply with standards established by the 

International Civil Aviation Organization. Representatives of several 

countries, including the United States, Visa Waiver Program 

participating countries, and members of the European Union (EU), have 

met to work toward developing recommendations on minimum standards for 

the application of biometrics in procedures and documents by the spring 

of 2003. However, responding to a State inquiry to visa waiver 

countries about their plans to issue passports with biometric 

identifiers, only 3 of 17 countries had said as of October 2002 that 

they would meet the deadline. State plans to incorporate this 

information into a report to the Congress on the status of countries’ 

efforts to include biometric identifiers in their passports. State 

officials also told us that in response to the U.S. requirement, 

European countries might require U.S. passports to have biometric 

identifiers. For the system to be effective in increasing U.S. national 

security, INS will need to install machines capable of reading the 

biometric identifiers at each U.S. port of entry, of which there are 

about 390. However, until countries decide which biometrics they will 

include in their passport, INS may have a difficult time ensuring that 

all ports will have machines that can read the various biometric 

identifiers by October 2004.



Additionally, the Enhanced Border Security Act conditioned 

participation in the Visa Waiver Program on a country’s timely 

reporting of its stolen blank passports to the United States. INS has 

described problems with countries’ timely reporting of stolen blank 

passports, and the Justice Inspector General concluded that INS does 

not have a mechanism to provide systematic, consistent, and timely 

information about missing passports to its inspectors.[Footnote 13] A 

State official testified that although this requirement probably will 

not apply to countries until they are certified for:



continued participation in the program, State is discussing this 

requirement with all countries.[Footnote 14]



Finally, INS has not yet developed an automated nonimmigrant entry-exit 

control system to screen and monitor the arrival and departure of 

foreign visitors entering the United States as temporary visitors. 

Congress has passed several laws requiring the Attorney General to 

implement such a system and has extended the implementation deadline 

several times. For example, the 1986 law creating the Visa Waiver Pilot 

Program required, as a condition of implementing the program, that an 

automated nonimmigrant entry-exit control system to monitor aliens 

using the program be established.[Footnote 15] The Visa Waiver 

Permanent Program Act reiterated the requirement, directing that the 

system be implemented no later than 2001.[Footnote 16] INS decided to 

use an existing automated border inspections system in conjunction with 

its arrival-departure system to meet this requirement. The arrival-

departure system includes passenger information electronically 

transmitted by air and sea carriers that have an agreement with INS to 

transport aliens to the United States. INS began using this system on 

October 1, 2002. An INS official recently testified that this new 

initiative implements the requirements that had been set forth in the 

Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000.[Footnote 17]



Also, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 

of 1996 required an entry-exit system that covered all nonimmigrant 

visitors, not solely those traveling under the Visa Waiver 

Program.[Footnote 18] This act required the Attorney General to develop 

an automated entry-exit system within 2 years of the law’s enactment to 

collect a record of departure for every alien departing the United 

States and match the record of departure with the record of the alien’s 

arrival in the United States. Subsequently, Congress extended the 

deadline to implement the system at all U.S. ports of entry to December 

31, 2005. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 

effectiveness of monitoring nonimmigrant visitors came under additional 

scrutiny, as authorities considered how to identify and locate 

terrorists who might be in the United States. As a result, new laws 

have again directed the Attorney General to establish an integrated 

entry-exit system.[Footnote 19] INS and other agencies, including the 

U.S. Customs Service, State, and the Transportation Security Agency, 

are working together to develop the system. According to Justice, INS 

has established a multiagency task force to coordinate all activity 

associated with the establishment of the entry-exit system. The systems 

established as part of the Visa Waiver Program, as well as a system 

launched on September 11, 2002, to collect fingerprints and a 

photograph from a specific population, are the first step in the 

development of the entry-exit system.



Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program Are Uncertain:



The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the program 

are uncertain; however, eliminating the program could negatively affect 

U.S. relations with participating country governments, impede tourism 

to the United States, and increase the need for State personnel and 

facilities overseas. According to the program’s legislative history, 

Congress established the program, in part, to facilitate travel by 

citizens from countries that the Attorney General and Secretary of 

State determined to pose low risk to U.S. national security. Data 

showing the extent to which the program has been exploited are limited, 

and U.S. government officials expressed differing opinions about the 

effect of the program on U.S. national security.



Implications for National Security Are Unclear:



The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the Visa 

Waiver Program are not clear. While Justice has not systematically 

collected data on how frequently potential terrorists and other 

criminals have entered the United States, anecdotal information 

indicates that such individuals have entered the United States under 

the Visa Waiver Program as well as with valid U.S. visas. State 

Department and U.S. law enforcement officials’ opinions varied on the 

effect of the Visa Waiver Program on U.S. national security. Some law 

enforcement agency officials said that the Visa Waiver Program 

negatively affects U.S. national security and that eliminating the 

program and requiring visas from current visa waiver travelers would 

increase national security. Other officials from Justice and State 

asserted that unless the current visa-screening process is improved, 

for example, by increased information sharing among U.S. agencies, the 

effect of the program on U.S. national security is not certain.



Limited Data Available to Show Extent to Which the Program Is 

Exploited:



Justice has not systematically collected data on the extent to which 

terrorists and other criminals have entered the United States under the 

Visa Waiver Program or committed crimes while in the country. The FBI 

operates a nationwide information system dedicated to serving and 

supporting local, state, and federal criminal justice agencies. This 

system contains 17 databases with information on, among other things, 

stolen articles, foreign fugitives, gangs and terrorist members, and 

wanted persons. However, crime statistics collected by the FBI do not 

capture the criminals’ immigration status. Also, the data that INS 

collects on aliens it has removed from the United States for committing 

crimes include some information on aliens’ immigration status. 

According to INS data, 204 (about 0.3 percent) of the 69,580 criminals 

removed from the United States during fiscal year 2002 entered under 

the Visa Waiver Program. The Drug Enforcement Agency maintains 

information on domestic drug arrests by country that shows the 

arrestees’ country of nationality but not their immigration status.



While Justice has not systematically collected data on how frequently 

potential terrorists and other criminals have entered the United 

States, anecdotal information indicates that such persons have entered 

the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with a valid 

U.S. visa. For example, Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national whom the 

United States indicted as a co-conspirator in the attacks of September 

11, 2001, entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, and 

the 19 individuals who carried out the attacks entered with valid U.S. 

visas.



U.S. law enforcement and State officials in Washington, D.C., and at 

posts overseas expressed different opinions about the effect of the 

Visa Waiver Program on U.S. national security. Some INS and other law 

enforcement agency officials said that the Visa Waiver Program can 

facilitate illegal entry into the United States by inadmissible aliens, 

including terrorists and other criminals, because under the program 

such individuals avoid the screening that consular officers usually 

perform on visa applicants abroad. The lack of consular screening makes 

the program attractive to inadmissible aliens, according to INS 

officials. Aliens traveling to the United States under the Visa Waiver 

Program are first screened when INS inspectors interview them for 

admission at the U.S. port of entry. These inspectors have little time 

to screen each person entering the United States, according to a report 

by the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General. INS inspectors 

reported that terrorists and criminals who were intercepted had 

attempted to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program--

rather than applying for a U.S. visa abroad--because they believed it 

would give them a greater chance of entering the country.[Footnote 20] 

Some officials in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. embassies in 

Argentina and Uruguay said that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program 

would increase national security, because the visa-screening process is 

an additional tool to deter terrorists from entering the United States. 

One Justice official stated that the Visa Waiver Program is clearly a 

vulnerability and that eliminating the program would increase national 

security, but at a high cost in terms of the effect on State resources 

and U.S. tourism.



Other law enforcement and State officials in Washington, D.C., and at 

the U.S. embassies in Belgium, Italy, and Spain questioned whether 

eliminating the Visa Waiver Program and requiring visas would increase 

national security. They agreed that the visa-screening process could 

serve as an additional tool to screen out terrorists but only to the 

extent that State had the necessary overseas resources, including 

relevant information on potential terrorists and sufficient staff and 

facilities to interview all or most visa applicants. They said that if 

current visa waiver travelers were required to apply for visas and 

State’s current resource levels were not increased, consular officers 

would be inundated with paperwork for routine and low-risk cases and 

would become less effective and alert in dealing with cases needing 

additional scrutiny. The officials emphasized that better, timely 

information and improved data sharing on inadmissible aliens among U.S. 

law enforcement, border control, and intelligence agencies are 

essential to improving U.S. national security.



Eliminating the Program Could Affect U.S. Relations with Participating 

Country Governments:



U.S. officials, including those from State as well as from some law 

enforcement agencies, said that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program 

could have negative implications for U.S. relations with governments of 

participating countries and could impair their cooperation in efforts 

to combat terrorism.



Some allies are cooperating significantly in matters ranging from 

providing military personnel and access to air bases to support 

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to freezing terrorists’ 

financial assets. Examples are as follows:



* Visa waiver countries have provided political and military support to 

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and to the International 

Security Assistance Force, which is to help the new Afghan Interim 

Authority provide security and stability in Kabul. The United Kingdom, 

France, Italy, Germany, Australia, Japan, and other visa waiver 

countries partnered with the United States in military operations to 

expel the Taliban and al Qaeda from Afghanistan, according to 

government reports.[Footnote 21]



* EU member states vigorously supported U.S. efforts in the United 

Nations to adopt strong resolutions against terrorism and U.S. efforts 

to persuade third countries to resist terrorism.[Footnote 22]



* Visa waiver countries have also increased their law enforcement 

efforts. The EU strengthened member states’ ability to take action 

against terrorists and their supporters--including freezing their 

assets.[Footnote 23] The EU reported that between September 11, 2001, 

and June 3, 2002, about $100 million of assets belonging to persons and 

entities sponsoring terrorist



actions was frozen throughout the EU.[Footnote 24] Since September 11, 

2001, authorities in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the 

United Kingdom have arrested supporters of al Qaeda and other extremist 

groups. Also, according to State, Italian authorities arrested the 

leader of the group suspected of plotting to bomb the U.S. embassy in 

Rome. The government of Singapore detained 13 members of a terrorist 

group in December 2001, thereby disrupting a plot to bomb the U.S. 

embassy there.



Some U.S. embassy and law enforcement agency officials expressed 

concern that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program could lessen 

countries’ cooperation in military and law enforcement operations 

related to the global coalition against terrorism. Participating 

countries may see their loss of visa waiver status as a sign that the 

United States views them as untrustworthy--more as security risks than 

as allies.



If the United States decides to eliminate visa waiver status for 

participating countries, those countries’ governments could begin 

requiring Americans to obtain visas before visiting their countries. 

For example, if the United States requires a national from an EU member 

country to obtain a visa before entering the United States for 90 days 

or less, the EU may institute a provisional requirement that U.S. 

citizens obtain a visa before entering any of the EU member 

countries.[Footnote 25] Thereafter, if the U.S. visa policy continues, 

the EU Council may amend regulations to make the visa requirement 

permanent.



Eliminating the Program Could Affect U.S. Tourism:



As previously mentioned, Congress created the Visa Waiver Program, in 

part, to facilitate international travel and thereby increase the 

number of foreign travelers to the United States. A large proportion of 

international tourists to the United States comes from Visa Waiver 

Program countries. From 1991 to 2000, in terms of both the number of 

travelers and dollars spent, tourism from visa waiver 

countries[Footnote 26] accounted for more than half of the overseas 

visitor market. Visa waiver travelers generally spend more than other 

international travelers, and their spending helps to balance the U.S. 

trade accounts. Because of direct and indirect economic contributions 

from visa waiver travel, elimination of the Visa Waiver Program is a 

concern for the travel and tourism industry. One study commissioned by 

the Department of Commerce in 2002 estimated that discontinuation of 

the Visa Waiver Program will cost the U.S. economy more than $28 

billion in tourism exports from 2003 to 2007.



Travelers from visa waiver countries to the United States totaled 

approximately 17.6 million in 2000 and 14.7 million in 2001, according 

to the Commerce Department.[Footnote 27] As a share of total 

international arrivals,[Footnote 28] travelers from visa waiver 

countries grew from 25 percent in 1992 to 35 percent in 2000 (see fig. 

2).[Footnote 29] Excluding arrivals from Canada and Mexico, the share 

of overseas arrivals from visa waiver countries has averaged 68 percent 

in the last 5 years.



Figure 2: U.S. Arrivals from Visa Waiver Countries as Share of Total 

International Arrivals, 1992-2000:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Using data from Commerce and the Travel Industry Association of 

America, we calculated that in 2000, travelers from visa waiver 

countries spent an estimated $39.6 billion in the United States, 

accounting for 57 percent of overseas tourist spending. Average 

spending per traveler from visa waiver countries in 2000 was $2,253, 

compared with $1,274 per traveler for other international tourists to 

the United States. A range of estimates from Commerce, the Travel 

Industry Association of America, and the World Travel and Tourism 

Council indicate that visa waiver travelers’ direct and indirect 

spending within the United States added between $75 billion and $102 

billion to the U.S. gross domestic product in 2000.[Footnote 30] 

According to the Travel Industry Association of America, international 

tourism provides more than one million U.S. jobs, of which more than 60 

percent are located in Florida, California, New York, and Hawaii. The 

association also estimates that in 2001, U.S. spending generated from 

international tourism contributed $16 billion in tax revenues.



The Department of Commerce commissioned a study in 2002 on the economic 

effect of the Visa Waiver Program and estimated that, over a

5-year period, eliminating the program could result in a loss of 3 

million visitors, $28 billion in tourism exports, and 475,000 

jobs.[Footnote 31] The estimates of this study, together with anecdotal 

information, support the likelihood of a negative effect on tourism. 

According to the Travel Industry Association of America, the Visa 

Waiver Program enhances the competitiveness of the U.S. market as an 

international destination and elimination of the program could divert 

tourists to other destinations that do not require a visa for entry. 

Foreign Commercial Service Officers in Belgium and Spain reported visas 

to be a significant impediment to travel demand. State officials agreed 

that visas are an impediment to both tourist and business travel and 

added that any additional requirements, such as the collection of 

biometric indicators, could further discourage travel to the United 

States. The World Travel and Tourism Council and the World Tourism 

Organization also view visa requirements as an important factor in 

determining levels of tourism.



Eliminating the Program Would Increase the Need for State Department 

Resources:



Should the Congress decide to require visas from current visa waiver 

travelers, State would require more resources, such as personnel and 

facilities overseas, to handle the resulting increased visa processing 

and biometric collection workload. State estimates that if the 

individuals now traveling under the Visa Waiver Program were required 

to obtain visas, the number of applications would rise by 14 million. 

We estimated that State’s initial costs to process the additional 

workload would likely range between $739 million and $1.28 billion, and 

annual recurring costs would likely range between $522 million and $810 

million.[Footnote 32] The ranges of our cost estimates are large 

because they reflect the uncertainty of key variables in our cost 

estimating model, such as costs for consular personnel, space, and:



supplies;[Footnote 33] the percentage of visa applicants that State 

interviews; and the method by which State collects biometrics. Given 

this uncertainty, actual costs could vary significantly.



To estimate the costs of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program, we 

created a cost model that included information on a number of variables 

such as workload and staffing data (e.g., personnel and facility costs) 

from State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs and the time and costs involved 

in collecting biometrics. We used our model to forecast a range for 

both additional initial and recurring costs. Consistent with State 

assumptions, we assumed a “low” interview rate of 10 percent (about 1.4 

million applicants) and a “high” interview rate of 95 percent (about 

13.3 million applicants). (See app. I for more details of our 

methodology and assumptions.):



Figure 3 shows estimated initial costs to State if the Visa Waiver 

Program were eliminated. These costs include elements such as hiring, 

training, and moving new consular personnel; installing additional 

equipment to collect and store biometrics; and building or renovating 

facilities in all visa waiver posts.



Figure 3: Estimates of State Department’s Initial Costs if the Visa 

Waiver Program Were Eliminated:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



We estimated that if State were to interview 10 percent of all visa 

applicants, initial costs would likely range from $739 million to $821 

million. If State were to interview 95 percent of all visa applicants, 

initial costs would likely range from $1.12 billion to $1.28 billion.



Figure 4 shows annual recurring costs, which include elements such as 

consular personnel salaries, biometric hardware and software 

maintenance, facility leasing and maintenance, and supplies.



Figure 4: Estimates of State Department’s Annual Recurring Costs if the 

Visa Waiver Program Were Eliminated:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



If State were to interview 10 percent of all visa applicants, recurring 

costs would likely range from $522 million to $587 million. If State 

were to interview 95 percent of all visa applicants, recurring costs 

would likely range from $723 million to $810 million. For fiscal year 

2003, State requested $3.36 billion for ongoing operations related to 

diplomatic and consular programs, including the operation of all 

overseas facilities.



It could take at least 2 to 4 years to put the necessary people and 

facilities in place to handle the increased workload, according to 

State officials. Using State’s staffing and workload assumptions, we 

estimated that the department would need, in addition to the 

approximately 840 Foreign Service officers who are currently overseas, 

more than 350 additional Foreign Service officers to handle the extra 

nonimmigrant visa workload if required to interview 10 percent of all 

applicants and more than 800 additional officers if required to 

interview 95 percent of all applicants. According to consular 

officials, hiring Foreign Service officers and training them for 

general Foreign Service and languages could take a year or more. It 

could take several months to hire Foreign Service nationals, depending 

on the availability of qualified candidates and their ability to pass 

the security background check. In cases where a significant number of 

new consular staff were added and new facilities were acquired, posts 

might also need to employ administrative staff such as human resource 

managers, post security guards, and additional facilities management 

and maintenance staff.[Footnote 34]



A portion of the initial and recurring costs shown in figures 3 and 4 

would be used for new or renovated facilities that the post would need 

in order to process an increased number of nonimmigrant visa 

applications. In some countries, including but not limited to Belgium, 

France, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom, State would 

need additional work and waiting room space to process applications; 

this could involve acquiring new facilities or reopening and renovating 

additional posts for the nonimmigrant visa workload.[Footnote 35] For 

example, in Italy, State officials said that they would need to 

renovate or reopen facilities in Naples, Sicily, Rome, Milan, and 

Florence. In some U.S. embassies, such as those in Slovenia and 

Uruguay, available space would have to be adapted for processing the 

additional workload. Identifying, procuring, and fitting out lease 

space can take 24 to 48 months, on average, according to State 

officials.



State officials in most countries we visited and analysts in Washington 

said that until they acquired additional space for handling 

nonimmigrant visas, there would be long lines of visa applicants 

waiting outside the current posts, posing a potential security threat 

for both the applicants and U.S. embassy officials. Also, if additional 

space was acquired in unsecured buildings separate from the embassy, 

personnel working in such buildings would be put at risk until the 

space was upgraded for security. A U.S. ambassador pointed out that 

acquiring additional space for visas would conflict with the 

department’s efforts to consolidate Americans into joint space to 

improve their security and protect them.



Although revenues from the surcharge for machine-readable visas would 

not cover the additional initial costs related to the elimination of 

the Visa Waiver Program, State could cover additional recurring costs 

over time.[Footnote 36] To pay for the costs associated with the 

processing and issuing of machine-readable visas and with State’s 

Border Security Program, State currently charges applicants a $65 fee 

each time they apply for a machine-readable visa.[Footnote 37] On 

November 1, 2002, State increased the fee to $100 to compensate for 

increases in the actual cost of providing visa service. State officials 

have not determined how they will fund the costs of collecting 

biometrics. The options they have discussed include requesting an 

appropriation from the Congress, passing the cost to the visa 

applicant, or a combination of the two.



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



The Justice Department and the State Department provided written 

comments on a draft of our report. These comments, along with our 

responses to specific points, are reprinted in appendixes II and III.



Justice expressed optimism that the requirements of recent border 

security laws will be met. Specifically, Justice stated that it does 

not anticipate significant delays in the incorporation of standardized, 

machine-verifiable biometrics in the national passports of most Visa 

Waiver Program countries. We continue to believe, however, that some 

countries may be unable to add biometrics to their passports by the 

2004 deadline. Our assessment is based on the statements of U.S. State 

Department and law enforcement officials as well as the responses from 

several Visa Waiver Program countries concerning their ability to issue 

passports with biometrics.



Justice also stated that our discussion of the entry-exit system leaves 

the impression that implementation of the system is not moving forward. 

We acknowledge that INS is taking steps to implement the system, and we 

have added information on INS’s progress to the report. However, the 

report points also out that an entry-exit system covering all 

nonimmigrant travelers to the United States has been required since 

1996.



State generally concurred with the report and stated that our comments 

on the Visa Waiver Program are in keeping with its assessment of the 

implications and costs resulting from a blanket suspension of the 

program. However, State expressed concern that the report did not 

discuss the border inspection process at the U.S. port of entry as an 

alternative solution to the visa application process to address 

perceived weaknesses in the program. We acknowledge the importance of 

the inspection process for aliens seeking to enter the United States 

under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with visas. We have added a 

discussion of the inspection process to the report. The Justice 

Department Inspector General and GAO have work under way that will 

provide a more thorough assessment of the border inspection process.



We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the 

Commissioner of the INS, and the Assistant to the President for 

Homeland Security. We will make copies available to others on request. 

In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web 

site at http://www.gao.gov.



If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4128. Additional GAO contacts and staff 

acknowledgments are listed in appendix IV.



Sincerely yours,



Jess Ford

Director, International Affairs and Trade:

Signed by Jess Ford:



[End of section]



Appendixes:



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



To describe the process for assessing countries’ eligibility to 

participate in the Visa Waiver Program, we examined laws establishing 

the program, relevant congressional reports, regulations and agency 

protocols governing the program, Department of Justice Office of 

Inspector General reports, and other relevant documents. To assess 

steps being taken to increase the requirements for the program and 

enhance U.S. border security, we reviewed recent laws such as the USA 

PATRIOT Act and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 

of 2002, Departments of State and Justice reports, and recent GAO 

reports.



To describe U.S. national security issues related to the Visa Waiver 

Program, we reviewed Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) data 

on terrorists who entered the United States under the Visa Waiver 

Program as well as with valid visas. We reviewed State, INS, Federal 

Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) data 

and databases on inadmissible aliens, the immigration status of 

criminals, the number of aliens refused entry to the United States, and 

the reasons aliens were refused entry. We also examined Justice 

officials’ testimony before Congress, the President’s National Strategy 

for Homeland Security, and GAO’s report Border Security: Visa Process 

Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool. Given the limited 

amount of data addressing this issue, we interviewed officials from 

State, including the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic 

Security, and Justice, including the INS, FBI, and DEA in the United 

States and in Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay. 

We selected five of these countries because they were the first 

countries whose participation in the program was being evaluated by the 

Departments of Justice and State. We selected the sixth country, Spain, 

to provide a perspective on countries that had not been evaluated. We 

discussed with U.S. officials their views about whether eliminating the 

Visa Waiver Program would increase U.S. national security.



To describe the importance of the Visa Waiver Program to U.S. relations 

with other countries, we reviewed government reports, including the 

U.S. Department of Defense’s Fact Sheet: International Contributions to 

the War Against Terrorism, the State Department’s Patterns of Global 

Terrorism--2001, and the U.K. Coalition Information Centre’s Campaign 

Against Terrorism: A Coalition Update. We reviewed European Union 

documents, including European Council positions and regulations. We 

also interviewed officials from the Departments of State, including the 

Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security, and Justice, 

including the INS, FBI, and DEA in the United States and in Argentina, 

Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay. We discussed with them 

whether eliminating countries’ participation in the Visa Waiver Program 

could affect U.S. relations with those countries and, if so, what the 

effects might be. Because of the sensitivity of the issues, in four of 

the six countries, the State Department requested that we not meet with 

representatives from other countries’ governments or chambers of 

commerce. We met with the governments of Argentina and Uruguay and with 

the American Chamber of Commerce in Argentina.



To determine whether requiring citizens of visa waiver countries to 

obtain visas would affect their decision to travel to the United 

States, we examined the existing economic literature on tourism and 

interviewed industry experts. We interviewed officials from State, 

Foreign Commercial Service Officers in overseas posts, the Department 

of Commerce’s Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, the Travel 

Industry Association of America, the World Travel and Tourism Council, 

and the World Tourism Organization. To determine the contribution of 

travel from visa waiver countries to the U.S. economy, we reviewed 

official travel data for 1991-2001 from Commerce, a 2002 study from 

Commerce, and data from the Travel Industry Association of America and 

the World Travel and Tourism Council.



To determine the potential effects that requiring visas and biometrics 

from current visa waiver travelers would have on State’s resources, we 

created a cost estimating model using workload and staffing data from 

State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs and information on the time and 

costs involved in collecting biometrics. Such information included 

analogies to the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 

System, averages of biometric vendor costs, expert opinions from the 

field of biometrics, and cost estimates developed by the International 

Biometrics Group. We conducted a simulation that varied the cost 

estimating model approximately 1,000 times with information on 

variables such as personnel and facility costs to forecast a range for 

both initial and recurring costs. During our simulation, costs fell 

below the top of the shaded areas in Figures 3 and 4 in the report 90 

percent of the time, while costs fell below the bottom of the shaded 

areas only 10 percent of the time. In other words, 80 percent of the 

times we varied our simulation, costs fell within our reported ranges. 

We chose to report large ranges of cost estimates to reflect the 

uncertainty of key variables in our cost estimating model, such as 

costs for consular personnel, space, and supplies; the percentage of 

visa applicants that State interviews; and the method by which State 

collects:



biometrics.[Footnote 38]We based our estimates on the following 

assumptions:



* All costs were expressed in constant fiscal 2002 dollars.



* The amount of additional visa applications for current visa waiver 

travelers would remain about 14 million per year.[Footnote 39]



* Cost estimates provided to us by State, such as Foreign Service 

national salaries and leasing and maintenance fees, could vary by about 

10 percent, barring unforeseen circumstances.



* The ratio of Foreign Service nationals needed to assist each Foreign 

Service officer with nonimmigrant visa processing is 2.5 to 1 but can 

vary between 2 and 4 to 1.



* Under a “low interview” scenario, State would interview 10 percent of 

all visa applicants and, under a “high interview” scenario, State would 

interview 95 percent of all visa applicants. Estimates are based on a 

4-minute interview.[Footnote 40]



* Consular officers would capture four flat fingerprints from each visa 

applicant at the embassy or consulate and would store the biometric 

data in a separate memory storage card from the visa.[Footnote 41]



* Resources would be in place at all visa-issuing posts to collect 

biometrics for the current 10.3 million visa applications.



* Some Foreign Service nationals would spend time both processing visa 

applications and collecting biometrics.



* Visa applicants whom State must interview would visit the embassy to 

be interviewed and have their biometrics collected on the same day.



We also met with consular officials at the U.S. consulate in Buenos 

Aires, Argentina, to determine the effect that the elimination of the 

Visa Waiver Program had on their staff and facility levels. Similarly, 

we met with consular officials in U.S. consulates in Brussels, Belgium; 

Rome, Italy; Ljubljana, Slovenia; Madrid, Spain; and Montevideo, 

Uruguay, to determine how the elimination of the Visa Waiver Program 

would affect their resources.



We performed our work from February 2002 through August 2002, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.



[End of section]



Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Justice:



U.S. Department of Justice:



Washington, D.C 20530:



November 4, 2002:



Cheryl Goodman Assistant Director International Affairs and Trade Team 

U.S. General Accounting Office:



441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548:



Dear Ms. Goodman:



On October 10, 2002, the General Accounting Office (GAO) provided the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) copies of its draft report entitled. 

“BORDER SECURITY: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program,” 

with a request for comment. The DOJ has reviewed the report and would 

like to respond to the concerns that the GAO has raised in this report 

regarding its ability to meet certain requirements of the law.	We 

believe there are factors that suggest greater optimism for achieving 

these requirements.



The GAO reports that recent legislation has resulted in stricter 

requirements for country participation in the Visa Waiver Program (V 

WP) including requirements to. 1) improve the tamper resistance of 

foreign passports:, and 2) hold partnering governments responsible for 

reporting thefts of stolen blank passports to the United States. The 

GAO expresses concern regarding the ability of the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (INS), the Department of State, and the 

governments of VWP participating countries to implement these 

requirements by the specific deadlines called for under U.S. law. The 

GAO suggests that the current lack of a single international standard 

for biometric identifiers may preclude participating countries from 

certifying by October 26, 2004, that they are issuing machine-readable 

passports with internationally acceptable biometric identifiers. 

However, we note that the current standards for machine-readable 

passports endorsed by the International Civil Aviation Organization 

(ICAO) already include the use of some form of biometrics. Moreover, 

the ICAO technical advisory group on machine-readable travel documents 

is substantially involved in ensuring the global interoperability of 

different biometric technologies in the issuance and inspection of 

machine-readable passports. Further we note that over half the 

countries currently participating in the VWP are or will soon be 

members of the European Union. These countries have been issuing a 

uniform passport meeting ICAO specifications since 1985.	Thus, we do not 

believe there will be significant delays in the incorporation of 

standardized, machine-verifiable biometrics in the national passports 

of most VWP participating countries.



Moreover, the Administration has been studying the biometrics issue for 

some time. In fact, the United States government is working through the 

G-8 to coordinate biometric standards. On:



October 22, 2002, experts from the G-8 countries (Canada, France, 

Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States) 

and the European Union met in Montreal to discuss various issues 

related to migration, including biometrics. The U. S. delegation was 

tasked with providing a draft report on biometric requirements by 

December for review at the next G-8 Migration meeting. The group agreed 

to work towards developing recommendations on minimum standards for the 

application of biometrics in procedures and documents by the spring of 

2003, with a view to forwarding them to standards organizations. In 

addition, the Administration is currently drafting a report to Congress 

required by Section 303 of the Enhanced Border Security Act of 2002, 

Pub. L. 107-173:



(May 14, 2002). This report will address issues related to “machine-

readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry documents 

that use biometric identifiers.” Section 303(b)(1) of the Enhanced 

Border Security Act of 2002. We would suggest that you include the 

above information on the report at page 17.



The GAO report also expresses concern over the INS’s ability to 

implement the automated entry-exit system mandated under section 110 of 

the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 

and subsequently amended. The GAO reports that the Visa Waiver 

Permanent Program Act (VWPPA) directs that an automated system to 

monitor the entry-exit of aliens under the visa waiver program be 

implemented by October 2001 and that this system, has not been 

implemented as of October 1, 2002. It should be noted that after the 

amendment creating the VWPPA passed on October 30, 2000, the INS began 

to use the Interagency Border Inspections System in conjunction with 

the Arrival Departure Information System. The paired use of these two 

systems allows the Attorney General to fulfill his reporting 

requirements under the Act. This automated control system was to be 

based, to the maximum extent practicable, on passenger data collected 

and electronically transmitted by each carrier that has an agreement 

with the INS to transport aliens to the United States. As of October 1, 

2002, the system became operational and began receiving arrival and 

departure data on all passengers entering and leaving through air and 

sea ports of entry, and on October 11, 2002, the INS promulgated an 

interim rule to this effect. See 67 FR 63246-63250. Currently, over 140 

carriers submit electronic arrival passenger information. Moreover, the 

VWPPA also specifies that, as of October 1, 2002, no alien may be 

admitted under the VWP if the carrier is not electronically 

transmitting passenger manifest data as required by the Attorney 

General. On October 1, 2002, the INS began collecting the arrival and 

departure data for VWP countries at air and seaports and on October 11, 

2002, the INS promulgated an interim rule to this effect-See 67 FR 

63246-63250. Currently, inspectors at only 3 ports of entry are able to 

annotate the passengers’ records differentiating the Visa Waiver 

passengers from all others. However, the INS expects to make this 

necessary feature available nation-wide before the end of November 

2002.



Further, the discussion in the report on entry-exit leaves the 

impression that this is not moving forward, but for the statement that 

“INS and other agencies are working together to develop the system.” 

The INS has established a multi-agency Project Management Office to 

coordinate all activity associated with the establishment of an Entry-
Exit 

program, to include a fully integrated automated system of systems to 
be 

deployed at over 300 ports of entry, and infrastructure enhancements. 

In addition to several components within the INS, the Project Office 
has 

membership from other Department of Justice components, the United 
States 

Customs Service, the Department of State’s Visa and Passport Offices 
and 

the Department of Transportation. In addition, the INS is working with 
the 

Department of State and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology to 

develop a technology standard that would allow for the use of 

biometrics in the Entry-Exit system. The first phase of the program was 

launched on September 11, 2002, with the National Security Entry Exit 

Registration System (NSEERS). The NSEERS focuses on a specific 

population and requires additional information including two live-scan 

fingerprints and a photograph. The NSEERS is deployed to all major 

airports and land border ports of entry. Both NSEERS and the systems 

established as part of the Visa Waiver Permanent Program will be 

integrated into the larger Entry-Exit System.



I hope you will consider our concerns in preparing the final GAO report 

on this subject. If you have any questions regarding the Department’s 

comments, you may contact Vickie L. Sloan, Director, Audit Liaison 

Office, on (202) 514-0469.



Sincerely,



Robert F. Diegelman Acting Assistant Attorney General for 

Administration:

Signed by Robert F. Diegelman:



The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Justice’s letter 

dated November 4, 2002.



GAO Comments:



1. Justice stated that it does not anticipate significant delays in the 

incorporation of standardized, machine-verifiable biometrics in the 

national passports of most Visa Waiver Program countries. We believe 

that some countries may not be able to establish programs to issue the 

passports by the 2004 deadline. Our assessment is based on the 

statements of U.S. State Department and law enforcement officials in 

Europe and the United States. Moreover, our concern is supported by 

additional information that we subsequently obtained from the State 

Department. As of October 2002, State found that only 3 of the 17 

countries discussing their plans for issuing biometric passports would 

meet the deadline. Most of the respondents stated that they did not 

know if they would meet the deadline. Some of these respondents cited 

the lack of an international standard as a reason for the uncertainty.



2. Justice also commented that our discussion of the entry-exit system 

leaves the impression that implementation of the system is not moving 

forward. We acknowledge that INS has implemented systems, as of October 

1, 2002, to fulfill the requirement for an automated system to monitor 

the entry and exit of aliens under the Visa Waiver Program. We have 

added this information to the report. However, we note that there have 

been delays in implementing the entry-exit system for Visa Waiver 

Program travelers. Implementation of such a system has been required 

since 1986. However, the report also points out that an entry-exit 

system covering all nonimmigrant travelers to the United States has 

been required since 1996. Moreover, the Justice Inspector General has 

reported that completion of the entire entry-exit system will take 

several years.[Footnote 42]



[End of section]



Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:



United States Department of State Washington, D. C.	20520:



NOV 7 2002:



Dear Ms. Westin:



We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, “BORDER 

SECURITY: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program,” GAO-03-

38, GAO Job Code 320101.



The Department’s comments are enclosed for incorporation, along with 

this letter, as an appendix to the GAO final report. Please find 

technical comments also attached.



If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact 

Colombia Barrosse, Office of Executive Director, Bureau of Consular 

Affairs on (202) 663-2504.



Sincerely,



Christopher B. Burnham Assistant Secretary of Resource Management and 

Chief Financial Officer:

Signed by Christopher B. Burnham:



Enclosure:



As stated.



cc:



GAO/IAT - Mr. Brummet State/OIG - Mr. Berman State/CA - Mr. Moss:



Ms. Susan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and 
Trade, 

U.S. General Accounting Office.



Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:



BORDER SECURITY: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program 

(GAO-03-38, GAO Code 320101):



The Department appreciates the balanced approach taken by GAO in its 

evaluation of how the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) functions, and its 

contributions to our economy and to our relations with participating 

countries. In general, we find the comments about the VWP to be in 

keeping with our own views as well as with our assessment of the 

implications and costs resulting from a blanket suspension of the 

Program. As the GAO report makes clear, the VWP has been effective in 

achieving its original goals - promoting the effective use of scarce 

government resources by focusing them away from lower risk countries, 

and facilitating international travel between the United States and 

countries that grant reciprocal privileges to U.S. travelers. The VWP 

has also contributed significantly to the U.S. economy, particularly 

the tourism industry. The Department is pleased that the GAO report 

also highlights the effectiveness of the VWP’s formal review mechanisms 

in ensuring that individual member countries adhere to membership 

criteria in order to remain in the program. The removal of Argentina 

from the program in early 2002 is a demonstration of the VWP’s self-

regulating capacity.



What is still in question, therefore, is whether the VWP can continue 

to function “without unduly threatening national security”, 

particularly in the post-9/11 world. It is the exploration of this 

issue in the GAO report that raises some concerns for the Department. 

The GAO points out, for example, that it is not clear how many 

individuals with terrorist or criminal backgrounds have entered the 

United States under the Visa Waiver Program. It names Zacarias 

Moussaoui as one of those individuals, but does not describe the 

circumstances surrounding his port of entry processing prior to 

admission into the United States. The report does not explain whether 

there was a flaw in the processing of that particular case or a 

systemic flaw in the screening of VWP travelers. Thus, the report does 

not address whether the INS inspector conducted an interview or, 

indeed, whether Moussaoui’s name was run through the name-check system. 

It does not inform the reader that INS:



computers at port of entry contained no derogatory information about 

Moussaoui that would have lead the INS inspector to deny him entry. It 

does not mention that Moussaoui had been in federal (FBI) custody 

undergoing professional interrogation prior to 9/11 and that only after 

the attacks did any information linking him to terrorist activities 

become available to border security agencies, or, indeed, to the 

Department of State.



The report then refers to the visa process but does not provide the 

type of detailed information that would permit the reader to adequately 

compare the two processes, that is, a process of port-of-entry 

inspections each time a person seeks to enter the United States, with 

no prior visa issuance (visa waiver), and a process of port-of-entry 

inspections each time a person seeks to enter the United States, with a 

visa having been issued to the alien some time in the past.	(In the case 

of a visa waiver country national, the relevant visa would generally be 

a multiple entry visa valid for up to ten years.) Given the time lag 

between visa issuance and actual travel, it should be clear that the 

visa cannot substitute for INS inspection at port of entry, including a 

check against the INS lookout system for information about the alien 

available at that time. In this regard, it is important for the report 

to also make clear that the visa application process does not guarantee 

admission into the U.S. The visa application process can only result in 

permission to “apply” to enter the United States. As with VWP 

travelers, the ultimate authority to admit or deny entry rests with the 

INS inspector. Visa issuance cannot eliminate the need for a 

comprehensive and thorough screening at port of entry, and INS is free 

to deny entry to persons who hold valid visas. INS screening (which 
also 

relies on the law enforcement database for national security 

information) of both visa holders and visa waiver program participants 

can, and does, result in denial of admission into the U.S. In fact, 

since the inception of the VWP, approximately 150 individuals have been 

turned away at port of entry on terrorism-related grounds - information 

contained in the law-enforcement database. If the report discussed 

these separate processes more clearly, the reader would better 

understand that whether an individual with terrorist links enters the 

United States or not has less to do with the method of entry (with or 

without a visa) than with the information contained in the name-check 

database at the time of entry.



Thus, while the GAO report is not intended (and does not) provide 

formal recommendations regarding the future of the VWP, it cuts off a 

line of reasoning for decision-makers by focusing on the visa 

application process as the single alternative solution to the Program’s 

perceived weaknesses. It overlooks the possibility that these 

weaknesses could be resolved through changes in border inspection 

procedures (or by other means, such as pre-inspection programs). It 

does not address the possibility that if additional resources are 

needed to ensure the VWP meets our national security needs, while 

maintaining its economic and political benefits, these resources might 

be more appropriately dedicated to port of entry processing of VWP 

travelers and/or to other immigration-related homeland security 

programs. These alternatives need to be discussed.



The Department stresses the importance it affixes to the protection of 

the United States’ national security. Its comments regarding the future 

of the VWP are intended to ensure that a final decision on the Program 

is made with all relevant information and all possible alternatives 
available 

to decision; makers. The Department is most appreciative of GAO’s 
efforts to 

bring this information and alternatives to light through this report.



The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter 

dated November 7, 2002.



GAO Comments:



1. State commented that the discussion of Zacarias Moussaoui should 

include more details. We do not believe additional details are 

necessary. We discussed Moussaoui and the 19 individuals who carried 

out the attacks of September 11, 2001, merely as examples of anecdotal 

evidence about terrorists entering the United States under the Visa 

Waiver Program and with visas.



2. State commented that the draft report did not provide detailed 

information on the border inspection process. State also commented that 

the draft report overemphasizes the visa application as a solution to 

perceived weaknesses of the Visa Waver Program and overlooks the 

possibility that these weaknesses could be resolved through changes in 

border inspection procedures or other means. We acknowledge the 

importance of the inspection process for aliens seeking to enter the 

United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with visas. We 

have added a discussion of the inspection process to the report. The 

Justice Department Inspector General and GAO are conducting more 

thorough assessments of the border inspection process.



[End of section]



Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:



GAO Contacts:



Cheryl Goodman (202) 512-6571

La Verne Tharpes (202) 512-5961:



Acknowledgments:



In addition to the persons named above, Lyric Clark, Kendall Schafer, 

Bruce Kutnick, Mary Moutsos, and Reid Lowe made key contributions to 

this report.



FOOTNOTES



[1] The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-603) 

created the Visa Waiver Program as a pilot in 1986. It became a 

permanent program in 2000 under the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act 

(P.L. 106-396, Oct. 30, 2000). The program applies only to temporary 

visitors traveling to the United States for business or pleasure for 90 

days or less. Persons traveling to the United States for other 

purposes, for example, to study or to work, are required to have a 

visa.



[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process 

Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).



[3] Biometrics can be used to verify identity by measuring and 

analyzing physical characteristics such as fingerprints, irises and 

retinas, and facial geometry.



[4] Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Report of the Committee 

on the Judiciary, Senate Report No. 99-132 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 28, 

1985); Report of House Judiciary Committee, Report No. 99-682(I) 

(Washington, D.C.: August 1986).



[5] Statement by the President: Signing of the Visa Waiver Permanent 

Program Act (The White House, Oct. 30, 2000).



[6] The visa application process does not guarantee admission into the 

United States. Rather, it can result in permission to apply to enter 

the United States. The ultimate authority to admit or deny a person 

permission to enter the United States rests with the INS inspector.



[7] A machine-readable travel document is one that contains mandatory 

visual data and a separate mandatory data summary in a format that can 

be read by a machine.



[8] The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 as amended, (P.L. 

99-603).



[9] The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (P.L. 106-396) required the 

evaluations every 5 years. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry 

Reform Act (P.L 107-173, May 14, 2002) increased the frequency of the 

evaluations to every 2 years.



[10] See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 

Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 

2001 (P.L. 107-56). The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act originally 

stated that on or after October 1, 2007, an alien applying for 

admission under the Visa Waiver Program must have a valid machine-

readable passport that satisfies the internationally accepted standard 

for machine-readability.



[11] The Secretary of State may waive this requirement if the country 

is making a good-faith effort to issue machine-readable passports to 

its citizens and has taken appropriate measures to protect against 

misuse of its passports that are not machine-readable.



[12] Switzerland and San Marino plan to begin issuing machine-readable 

passports in 2003.



[13] U.S. Department of Justice, Follow-up Report on the Visa Waiver 

Program (Washington, D.C.: December 2001).



[14] See Statement of Steven Edson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for Visas, Oct. 9, 2002.



[15] P.L. 99-603.



[16] P.L. 106-396.



[17] The next step involving electronic manifests will occur on January 

1, 2003, when air and sea carriers will be required to transmit 

electronic arrival and departure data for all arriving and departing 

passengers, including new data elements, which will aid in the 

identification of mala fide travelers. See Statement of Michael Cronin, 

Assistant Commissioner for Inspections, INS, Oct. 9, 2002.



[18] P.L. 104-208.



[19] The USA PATRIOT Act directed the Attorney General, in consultation 

with the Secretary of State, to fully implement such a system as 

expeditiously as possible. More recently, the Enhanced Border Security 

Act set forth technology standards to be used in the development and 

implementation of the system.



[20] U.S. Department of Justice, The Potential for Fraud and INS’s 

Efforts to Reduce the Risks of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program 

(Washington, D.C.: March 1999).



[21] See U.S. Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: Coalition 

Contributions to the War on Terrorism (Arlington, Virginia: 2002); U.S. 

Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism-2001 (Washington, 

D.C.: 2002); and U.K. Coalition Information Centre, Campaign Against 

Terrorism: A Coalition Update (London, England: 2002).



[22] The 15 member states of the European Union are Austria, Belgium, 

Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 

the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.



[23] See European Union Common Positions 2001/930/CFSP (Dec. 27, 2001) 

on combating terrorism, 2001/931/CFSP (Dec. 27, 2001) on the 

application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and 2002/462/CFSP 

(June 17, 2002) updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.



[24] See European Union, EU Response to 11 September: European 

Commission Action (Brussels, Belgium: June 2002). Also, on May 3, 2002, 

the EU and the United States took coordinated actions against the 

assets of several terrorist groups and individuals, according to a U.S. 

Treasury official. See statement of Jimmy Gurulé, Under Secretary for 

Enforcement, U.S. Department of the Treasury, before the Commission on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe, May 8, 2002.



[25] Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001, Council of the European 

Union, Mar. 15, 2001. The United States requires Greek nationals to 

obtain visas when visiting the United States for 90 days or less. 

However, the EU has not required U.S. citizens to have visas to visit 

EU countries, because Greece has not contested or notified the EU of 

the requirement, according to a U.S. government official.



[26] Excluding Canada and Mexico.



[27] Not all arrivals from visa waiver countries enter the United 

States under the program. According to the Department of Commerce, 

however, 97 percent of all international arrivals are for stays of 90 

days or less for vacation or business purposes, both of which qualify 

under the Visa Waiver Program.



[28] The INS estimated that there were more than 500 million border 

crossings into the United States in fiscal year 2001, the majority 

originating from Mexico or Canada. Data on international arrivals in 

this report exclude entries of same-day travelers as defined by the 

Department of Transportation, such as those from Mexico or Canada.



[29] However, the number of arrivals in 2001 was lower than in 2000 

owing to the events of September 11.



[30] These agencies estimate that every dollar spent directly by a 

traveler in the United States translates into $1.89 to $2.33 for the 

U.S. economy.



[31] These results are based on a limited econometric estimation and a 

comparison of simulated effects from elimination of the Visa Waiver 

Program with their baseline tourism forecast, which we have not 

verified.



[32] Any initial and recurring costs estimated for an increased 

workload of 14 million applications are in addition to State’s costs 

for the estimated visa and biometric processing workload for the 

current 10.3 million applications, including student visa applications. 

We estimated that additional initial and recurring costs for consular 

operating personnel and space to collect a single type of biometric, 

such as fingerprints, would be approximately $412 million and $201 

million, respectively, for the current 10.3 million applications. See 

U.S. General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics 

for Border Security, GAO-03-174. (Washington, D.C.:Nov. 15, 2002).



[33] For example, additional security procedures, such as restrictions 

on the role of Foreign Service national employees, and further 

increases in management oversight could increase the number of Foreign 

Service officers needed to adjudicate visas.



[34] Costs to employ additional administrative staff were not included 

in our cost estimates.



[35] State consolidated some of its posts in visa waiver countries in 

the 1990s in response to budget constraints and shifting objectives in 

the post-Cold War era. For example, in Italy, State closed consulates 

in Palermo in January 1994 and Genoa in June 1993.



[36] The additional machine-readable visa fees collected for 14 million 

applicants at the current rate of $65 would be $910 million. According 

to State, the fee will increase to $100 beginning November 1, 2002, 

resulting in total estimated collections of $1.4 billion.



[37] The machine-readable visa and border crossing card application 

fees pay for all costs associated with processing and issuing the visas 

and the cards. See Federal Register, Vol. 67, No. 60, March 28, 2002.



[38] See GAO-03-174 for a detailed description on different scenarios 

in which biometrics could be collected and the costs that each scenario 

would entail; also see that report for the assumptions used in 

estimating the initial and annual recurring costs of each scenario. We 

chose to use the scenario for fingerprint recognition. Finally, see the 

report for more specific details of the assumptions used to estimate 

costs involved with collecting fingerprints.



[39] The number of visa waiver travelers who would apply for visas is 

highly variable and is based on many factors, including the economy and 

personal preferences. We did not vary this number in our analysis.



[40] Interview length could vary with new security screening parameters 

in place, which could require interviews of 15 minutes or longer. We 

did not vary interview length in our analysis.



[41] This assumption is not the recommendation of the State Department 

for implementation of biometrics in the visa process.



[42] U.S. Department of Justice, Follow-up Report on INS Efforts to 

Improve the Control of Nonimmigrant Overstays (Washington, D.C.: April 

2002).



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