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Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on 

Armed Services, U.S. Senate:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



November 2002:



Quadrennial Defense Review:



Future Reviews Can Benefit from Better Analysis and Changes in Timing 

and Scope:



GAO-03-13:



Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



QDR Process, Analysis, and Reporting Are Marked by Strengths and 

Weaknesses:



Legislative Options Are Available to Improve Usefulness of QDR:



Conclusions:



Recommendations:



Matters for Congressional Consideration:



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



Appendix II: Quadrennial Defense Review Legislation in Effect as 

of September 30, 2001:



Appendix III: QDR Follow-On Studies, Plans, Reviews, and Concept 

Development Taskings:



Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:



Figures:



Figure 1: Organizational Structure for the Development of the 2001 QDR:



Figure 2: Timeline of Strategic Reviews and 2001 QDR Activities:



Figure 3: Confirmation Dates of Department of Defense Leadership in 

2001:



Figure 4: Timing Options for Conducting the 2005 QDR:



Abbreviations:



DOD: Department of Defense:



OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:



QDR: Quadrennial Defense Review:



November 4, 2002:



The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John W. Warner

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate:



To ensure that the country’s defense needs are reviewed periodically, 

Congress directed the Department of Defense to conduct comprehensive 

Quadrennial Defense Reviews to examine the national defense strategy, 

force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and the budget. In 

response to this mandate, the department submitted on 

September 30, 2001, its second quadrennial report to 

Congress.[Footnote 1] This was the first quadrennial report submitted 

by the new administration that took office in January 2001. Moreover, 

it established a new defense strategy, which revolves around four 

critical goals: to assure allies and friends that the United States is 

capable of fulfilling its commitments; to dissuade adversaries from 

undertaking activities that could threaten U.S. or allied interests; to 

deter aggression and coercion; and to decisively defeat any adversary 

if deterrence fails. Moreover, the review shifted the basis of defense 

planning from the long-standing “threat-based” model, which focuses on 

specific adversaries and geographic locations (e.g., two-major-

theater-war scenario), to a “capabilities-based” construct that 

emphasizes the need to prepare for a range of potential military 

operations against unknown enemies. The report concluded that the 

current force structure generally can implement the new defense 

strategy goals with moderate operational risk,[Footnote 2] although the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned that additional war-

fighting analyses are needed to confirm this initial assessment.



Because the 2001 review will have a significant impact on the 

department’s defense planning and budgetary decisions over the next 

several years, you asked us to evaluate the review and the process that 

the Department of Defense used to conduct it. In this report, we assess 

(1) the strengths and weaknesses of the department’s conduct and 

reporting of the 2001 review, and (2) the legislative options that are 

available to Congress to improve the usefulness of future quadrennial 

reviews. In addition to this report, we plan to issue a separate 

classified report that discusses the thoroughness of the department’s 

analysis of force structure alternatives to determine the one best 

suited to carry out the new defense strategy.



To evaluate the conduct and reporting of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 

Review, we documented and analyzed the department’s timetable and 

management structure for conducting the review, compared the 

department’s guidance for the review with the legislative reporting 

requirements, and assessed the thoroughness of key analyses, such as 

the department’s examination of force structure requirements. Although 

the department provided us with access to analyses completed between 

June and September 2001, the period of time that the department defines 

as comprising its quadrennial review, department officials did not 

provide us with access to documentation on preparatory activities and 

analyses that occurred prior to June 2001. As a result, we were not 

able to fully assess the department’s efforts to prepare for the review 

or the extent to which analyses conducted during this time frame may 

have influenced the review’s key conclusions. To examine legislative 

options that might enhance the usefulness of future reviews, we 

identified potential options from our analyses of the 1997 and 2001 

quadrennial defense reviews and obtained the views of defense 

department civilian leaders, military leaders, and nongovernment 

defense analysts who played a key role in the 2001 quadrennial review 

or in prior defense strategy reviews. The scope and methodology we used 

in our review are described in further detail in appendix I.



Results in Brief:



The Department of Defense’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review was marked 

by both strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side, the review was 

enhanced by the sustained involvement of the Secretary of Defense and 

other senior department officials who provided top-down leadership for 

the process. In addition, it led to the adoption of a new defense 

strategy that underscores the need to transform the force to meet 

future military threats and adopt more efficient business practices. 

However, several weaknesses in the department’s process, analysis, and 

reporting limited the review’s overall usefulness as a means for 

fundamentally reassessing U.S. defense plans and programs. 

Specifically, the Secretary of Defense’s decision to delay the review’s 

start until late spring 2001, when the department completed a series of 

strategic reviews led by outside defense experts, imposed additional 

time constraints on the quadrennial review’s already tight schedule. In 

addition, because the study’s principal guidance document was designed 

to emphasize the Secretary’s priorities, there was not always a clear 

link between the specific reporting requirements in the legislation and 

the issues assigned to study teams for analysis. Moreover, the 

thoroughness of the department’s analysis and reporting on issues 

mandated by legislation varied considerably, and some significant 

issues, such as the role of the reserves, were deferred to follow-on 

studies. Finally, the department’s assessment of force structure 

requirements had some significant limitations--such as its lack of 

focus on longer-term threats and requirements for critical support 

capabilities--and the department’s report provided little information 

on some required issues, such as the specific assumptions used in the 

analysis. As a result of these shortcomings, Congress did not receive 

comprehensive information on all of the legislatively mandated issues, 

the department lacks assurance that it has optimized its force 

structure to balance short-and long-term risks, and the review resulted 

in few specific decisions on how existing military forces and weapons 

modernization programs may need to be changed in response to emerging 

threats.



Several options exist for changing the timing and refocusing the scope 

of the quadrennial defense review to improve its usefulness both to the 

Department of Defense and Congress. These options would address 

concerns identified by department officials, defense analysts, and our 

analysis that the current deadline--September 30--does not provide a 

new administration with adequate time to analyze a range of complex 

defense issues (particularly when it is considering making significant 

changes to the nation’s defense strategy) and integrate the review’s 

findings with the department’s planning and budgeting process. Each 

option, however, could have some positive as well as negative effects. 

One option is to extend the review’s deadline by 4 months, from 

September 30 to early February; while this option would allow the 

review to coincide with an administration’s first budget submission, it 

would only provide a few more months for analysis. A second option is 

to extend the deadline by 12 to 16 months; this would allow 

considerably more time for analysis, but it would delay the impact of 

the quadrennial review until an administration’s second full budget 

cycle. A third option is to divide the review into two phases, with an 

initial report on broad security and strategy issues due on September 

30 and a final report on the remaining issues, including force 

structure, to be submitted the following year. Several options also 

exist to respond to concerns that the legislative requirements are 

currently too numerous and detailed and should be better focused on a 

few high-priority issues. Many defense officials believe that some 

requirements, such as the one to examine the extent to which military 

forces would need to be shifted from one theater of operations to 

another, are no longer as relevant given the defense strategy’s 

decreased emphasis on planning for two-major theater wars. In addition, 

some legislative requirements that ask DOD to address important issues 

such as mobility needs and the alignment of military commands may not 

have to be included in future quadrennial reviews because they require 

significant time for analysis and DOD has separate processes to review 

these issues. Finally, most department officials and defense analysts 

we spoke to believe that a congressionally mandated advisory panel of 

outside defense experts should precede the next quadrennial defense 

review to identify the key issues and alternatives that the department 

needs to examine as part of its review.



To enhance the usefulness of future quadrennial defense reviews, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Defense clearly assign 

responsibility for addressing all legislative requirements and provide 

Congress with more complete information on the department’s analyses to 

meet the legislative reporting requirements, particularly its 

examination of force structure requirements. In addition, Congress may 

wish to consider extending the time frame for the review, reassessing 

the legislative requirements and focusing them on a clear set of high-

priority issues, and establishing an advisory panel to identify the 

critical issues the next review should address. In its written comments 

to our report, the Department of Defense partially agreed with our 

first recommendation and noted that the clear assignment of 

responsibilities is important to the success of the review. The 

department did not take a position on our second recommendation but 

noted that it had provided Congress information on the Quadrennial 

Defense Review decisions and the basis for them. The department also 

stated that it supports, and has proposed, changes in the timing of 

future reviews. See the “Agency Comments and Our Evaluation” section 

for our detailed response to DOD’s comments.



Background:



The idea of a comprehensive quadrennial review by the Department of 

Defense (DOD) of the country’s defense strategy and force structure was 

initially proposed in May 1995 by the Commission on Roles and Missions 

of the Armed Forces. In August 1995, the Secretary of Defense endorsed 

the idea, and the following year Congress mandated that DOD conduct the 

1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).[Footnote 3] Congress also 

authorized establishing a National Defense Panel, composed of national 

security experts from the private sector, to review the results of the 

QDR and conduct a subsequent study to identify and assess force 

structure alternatives. After DOD completed its first QDR in May 1997, 

the National Defense Panel concluded that (1) DOD had focused its 

resources on the unlikely contingency that two major theater wars would 

occur at the same time, and (2) DOD should begin vigorously 

transforming the military so that it would be capable, for example, of 

quickly moving to and conducting military operations in overseas 

locations that may lack permanent U.S. bases.



Our review of the 1997 QDR highlighted several opportunities for 

improving subsequent reviews.[Footnote 4] Specifically, we noted that 

the 1997 QDR, although broader in scope and more rigorous in some 

aspects than prior reviews of defense requirements, did not examine 

enough alternatives to the current force and that DOD’s modernization 

assessment did not reflect an integrated, mission-focused approach. We 

also recommended that DOD take a number of steps, such as considering 

the need for changing the structure and timing of the QDR process, to 

prepare for the next review.



Purpose of QDR:



With the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2000 in 1999, Congress created a permanent requirement for DOD to 

conduct a QDR every 4 years and specified that the next report was due 

no later than September 30, 2001.[Footnote 5] According to this 

legislation, DOD is to conduct a comprehensive examination of the 

national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, 

infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the country’s 

defense program and policies with a view toward determining and 

expressing the nation’s defense strategy and establishing a defense 

program for the next 20 years. (See app. II for the text of the 

legislation governing the 2001 QDR.) The legislation also identifies 13 

specific issues that DOD is to address, such as the extent to which 

resources would have to be shifted among two or more geographic regions 

in the event of conflict in these regions and the effect on force 

structure of new technologies anticipated to be available in the next 

20 years. Moreover, it allows the Secretary of Defense to review any 

other issues he considers appropriate. Finally, it directs the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the QDR report and include an 

assessment of the risk associated with implementing the defense 

strategy.



The QDR is a key component of national security planning. Other 

legislation requires the President to submit to Congress a national 

security strategy along with budgets for each fiscal year.[Footnote 6] 

(The current administration issued its National Security Strategy on 

Sept. 17, 2002.) The national security strategy is intended in part to 

(1) identify U.S. interests, goals and objectives vital to U.S. 

national security and achieving security, and (2) explain how the 

United States uses its political, economic, military, and other 

elements of the national power of the United States to protect or 

promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives as 

identified above. The QDR, in turn, is intended to outline a national 

defense strategy that supports the national security strategy.



2001 QDR Process:



Some preliminary planning for the 2001 QDR began in February 2000 when 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organized eight panels within 

the Joint Staff to conduct preparatory work for the review. Although 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has the lead role in 

conducting the QDR, the Joint Staff plays a supporting role in the 

process and has primary responsibility for leading the analytical work 

to support the Chairman’s risk assessment. Each Joint Staff panel was 

assigned to address specific topics, such as strategy and operational 

risk assessment, modernization, and readiness. At the same time, the 

military services set up separate QDR offices, which were composed of 

panels that paralleled those of the Joint Staff, and assigned 

representatives to the Joint Staff panels. These panels continued to 

operate throughout 2000, but they were put on hold in early 2001 when 

the newly confirmed Secretary of Defense decided to undertake a series 

of strategic reviews led by defense experts from the private sector. 

The strategic reviews covered a wide spectrum of subjects, including 

missile defense, conventional forces, and transformation, and, 

according to DOD officials, were designed to stimulate the Secretary’s 

thinking about the critical issues that faced the department. However, 

these reviews were not completed as part of the QDR, according to OSD 

officials. The strategic reviews culminated in a series of briefings to 

the Secretary of Defense in the spring of 2001.



OSD began its work on the QDR in May 2001 when it established a 

structure and process for the review. It set up seven integrated 

project teams to undertake the analysis for various issues such as 

strategy and force planning; personnel and readiness; infrastructure; 

and space, information, and intelligence.[Footnote 7] These study teams 

were generally led by OSD staff and included service and other DOD 

analysts. On June 22, the Secretary of Defense approved the Terms of 

Reference, which outlined the policy guidance and specific tasks that 

the study teams were to follow during the review. The study teams were 

to undertake initial analyses in their subject areas and develop 

options and alternatives for the executive working group to consider. 

The executive working group was led by a special assistant to the 

Secretary of Defense and included the head of each of the study teams. 

The executive working group was responsible for ensuring that the teams 

coordinated their work and for determining what information each study 

team would provide to the senior-level review group, which consisted of 

the Secretary of Defense, the services secretaries, the Joint Chiefs, 

the under secretaries of defense, and the special assistant to the 

secretary. According to OSD officials, the senior level review group 

issued guidance to the study teams and made all decisions that were 

included in the QDR report. Figure 1 shows the structure that OSD 

established to conduct the QDR.



Figure 1: Organizational Structure for the Development of the 2001 QDR:



[See PDF for image]



Source: DOD.



[End of figure]



The Secretary of Defense issued the QDR report on September 30, 2001, 

as required by law, despite the September 11 attacks on New York City 

and the Pentagon. At the time of the attacks, OSD officials had 

developed a draft of the report. Although final preparation and 

approval of the report were made more difficult by the immediate issues 

confronting senior OSD officials and the physical condition of the 

Pentagon following the attacks, OSD officials obtained and responded to 

comments from numerous DOD offices during September and issued the 

report as planned. According to OSD officials, although the draft 

report was modified to include references to the attacks and noted the 

need for more study of the implications of the attacks on future DOD 

requirements, the initial draft recognized the need for more attention 

to homeland defense.



QDR Process, Analysis, and Reporting Are Marked by Strengths and 

Weaknesses:



DOD’s 2001 QDR had several strengths; however, its usefulness in 

stimulating a fundamental reexamination of U.S. defense plans and 

programs was limited by some significant weaknesses in its process, 

analysis, and reporting. The review benefited from the sustained 

involvement of the Secretary of Defense and other senior officials who 

provided critical management direction and oversight. It also led to 

the adoption of a new defense strategy that extends defense planning 

beyond a two-major-theater-war scenario and underscores the need to 

transform the services’ military capabilities and business processes to 

meet future threats and to use defense resources more efficiently. 

However, the Secretary of Defense’s decision to delay the start of the 

QDR until late spring 2001, when DOD had largely completed a series of 

strategic studies led by outside experts, further compressed an already 

tight schedule. In addition, the QDR’s terms of reference did not 

clearly assign responsibility to project teams for studying some issues 

that were specified in the legislative mandate, and the thoroughness 

and reporting on study issues mandated by the legislation varied 

significantly. Moreover, DOD did not provide Congress with detailed 

information on its force structure analysis, such as the key 

assumptions used, because much of this information is classified and 

DOD chose not to report any classified information. As a result, 

although the review established a vision for change in the department, 

the 2001 QDR did not result in many decisions on how DOD’s force 

structure, acquisition programs, and infrastructure should be adjusted 

and realigned to implement this vision. Moreover, Congress did not 

receive comprehensive information to help them assess the basis for 

DOD’s conclusions or the need for changes in DOD’s programs.



Senior Leadership Provided Direction and Oversight to QDR:



One of the strengths of the 2001 QDR was the sustained involvement of 

the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and other 

DOD senior leaders who provided the direction and oversight that the 

QDR process needed to initiate the development of a new defense 

strategy. According to current management studies, such top-level 

leadership is crucial for engineering major changes in an organization. 

Top leaders establish the framework for change and provide guidance and 

direction to others to achieve that change. According to this research, 

senior leadership involvement is needed because middle managers often 

are reluctant to promote and foster new ideas and concepts through fear 

of reducing their opportunities for advancement. As such, best 

practices clearly indicate that top-level management involvement is 

needed to effect major institutional changes.



In assessing past defense reviews, defense analysts have also noted the 

need for more guidance and involvement by senior leaders in 

facilitating change within DOD. For example, an assessment of the 

lessons learned from the 1997 QDR by the Rand Corporation cited the 

absence of OSD leadership, control, and integration of the study groups 

as contributing to the lack of fundamental changes proposed in DOD’s 

force structure, infrastructure, and modernization programs.[Footnote 

8] Moreover, the report of the U.S. Commission on National Security in 

the 21st Century noted that strategic planning in the department 

suffers because senior defense leadership has spent a disproportionate 

amount of time on budgeting rather than on strategic planning. To 

address this concern, the commission recommended that the Secretary of 

Defense develop defense policy and planning guidance that defines 

specific goals and establishes relative priorities. This guidance would 

provide the basis for defining the national military strategy and 

conducting the QDR and for supporting other DOD planning efforts.



According to OSD and service officials, the Secretary of Defense, other 

key OSD officials, and senior military leaders from each of the 

services actively participated in planning and implementing the 2001 

QDR. DOD officials characterized the process as a top-down effort where 

the leadership provided direction and the staff responded to the 

priorities the leadership established. According to one service 

official, the Secretary of Defense and the service chiefs attended a 5-

day meeting to discuss issues related to threats, capabilities, and 

force structure. These discussions ultimately culminated in the Terms 

of Reference, which provided guidance on what issues should be assigned 

high priority during the QDR, how the process would be structured, and 

what issues the study teams would tackle. Each of the study teams also 

presented one or more briefings on their analyses and options between 

June and August 2001 to the Secretary of Defense and other members of 

the senior-level review group. Moreover, according to service officials 

and the OSD official who had primary responsibility for drafting the 

QDR report, the Secretary was directly involved in reviewing and 

revising drafts of the QDR report. One high-ranking OSD official stated 

that he had not seen as much interaction among the senior leadership in 

any of the three prior defense planning studies he had participated in. 

The broad consensus of officials we spoke with across DOD is that the 

QDR report represents the Secretary’s thinking and vision.



QDR Sets Framework for New Defense Strategy and Emphasis on Military 

Transformation:



DOD and other defense analysts we met with generally agree that the 

2001 QDR successfully laid out a new defense strategy--a broad 

framework that can guide planning for a range of military operations 

and that places less emphasis on planning for specific military 

scenarios, such as two major theater wars. As noted earlier, the 

strategy is focused on four key tenets: (1) assuring allies and friends 

that the United States is capable of meeting its commitments; (2) 

dissuading adversaries from undertaking activities that could threaten 

U.S. or allied interests; (3) deterring aggression or coercion; and (4) 

decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails. In addition to 

adopting a new strategy, the QDR concluded that force structure 

planning should be based on a capabilities-based approach that focuses 

more on how a range of potential enemies might fight rather than on 

defining who the adversary might be and where a war might occur.



During the last few years, a number of military commissions and panels 

have concluded that DOD needed to shift its defense planning paradigm-

-and restructure its military forces--to meet the changing threats of a 

new security environment. Beginning in the mid-1990s and including the 

report of the 2000 U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st 

Century, military analysts have called for the replacement of the two-

major-theater-war model with a broader and more flexible model to serve 

as the basis for force planning. The commission noted that DOD’s 

dependency on the two-war model has failed to produce the capabilities 

that the military needs to confront the various and complex military 

contingencies that occur today and are likely to increase in the years 

ahead. DOD officials and outside defense analysts we spoke to see DOD’s 

adoption of a new strategy and a “capabilities-based” approach to force 

planning as significant steps that should better enable defense 

planning to focus on future, rather than near-term, threats.



The QDR report also identifies a number of steps that DOD must take to 

advance military transformation to achieve the objectives of the 

defense strategy, which can range from exploiting new approaches and 

operational concepts to a fundamental change in the way war is waged. 

The QDR report concluded that the needed transformation of the armed 

forces can be achieved by exploiting new approaches, technologies, and 

new organization. It also unveiled six critical goals that will provide 

the focus for DOD’s transformation efforts. For example, three of the 

goals are to (1) protect critical bases of operations; (2) project U.S. 

forces in distant locations against enemies who seek to deny the U.S. 

access; and (3) enhance the capabilities and survivability of space 

systems. To support the transformation effort, DOD’s senior leadership 

agreed to establish a new transformation office reporting directly to 

the Secretary of Defense and develop transformation roadmaps for the 

services and defense agencies. To improve the services’ ability to 

operate together in situations that require a rapid response, the 

Secretary directed the department to develop a prototype for a Standing 

Joint Task Force Headquarters--a headquarters with representatives from 

each of the services and other DOD organizations to provide uniform 

standard operating procedures, tactics, and techniques.



The QDR also recognizes that DOD has lacked an overarching strategy to 

improve its business practices to free up resources to support 

transformation efforts. Although the QDR legislation does not 

specifically require DOD to report on its business practices, the 2001 

QDR report outlines the Secretary of Defense’s vision for making DOD 

more efficient by reforming its financial systems, reducing the size of 

headquarters staffs, and consolidating DOD’s facilities and supply 

chain. Although the report does not include many specific decisions on 

how these goals will be accomplished, it highlights them as issues that 

are important to the Secretary and identifies several specific 

councils, boards, and follow-on studies to develop plans in these 

areas.



Decision to Delay Start of QDR Further Compressed Time Available for 

QDR Analysis:



The Secretary of Defense’s decision in early 2001 to delay the start of 

the QDR until late spring 2001, following a series of strategic reviews 

by military experts in the private sector, compressed the already-tight 

time frame available to conduct the QDR. As a result, many QDR study 

teams had little time available to conduct original analysis of issues 

required by the QDR legislation. Instead, they relied heavily on 

previous analytical work that was often based on the former defense 

strategy or had only enough time to identify significant issues 

requiring further analysis.



The QDR timetable is short under normal circumstances: the report is 

due to Congress no later than September 30 of the first year of an 

administration. Anticipating these time constraints for the 2001 QDR, 

the Joint Staff and the services began informal preparations (without 

direction from OSD) nearly 1 year ahead of time by establishing panels 

or offices to study a number of issues, such as defining the force 

needed to meet the defense strategy, and developing core themes to 

study, such as the mismatch between the defense strategy and force 

structure. According to service and DOD officials, these efforts slowed 

down considerably or stopped completely early in 2001 at OSD’s 

direction when the newly confirmed Secretary of Defense initiated a 

series of outside strategic reviews. Service and Joint Staff officials 

told us that they had only limited involvement in the strategic 

reviews. Some service officials also said that at the time they were 

unclear if the strategic reviews were part of the QDR process.



Led by military experts from outside DOD, the strategic reviews 

addressed a wide spectrum of topics, including missile defense, 

conventional forces, and transformation. According to DOD officials, 

these outside reviews resulted in numerous briefings to the Secretary 

of Defense during the spring of 2001 and were designed to stimulate the 

Secretary’s thinking about the major issues that the department faced. 

Moreover, some OSD officials informed us that the results of the 

strategic reviews were considered by some of the QDR study teams. 

However, we could not assess the extent to which they were used during 

the QDR process because OSD officials consider the strategic reviews to 

be separate from the QDR, and they did not provide us with access to 

briefings and other documents that the strategic review teams produced.



Rather than conducting the QDR concurrent with the strategic reviews 

(or making the strategic reviews an official part of the QDR process), 

OSD waited until May 2001 to establish the organizational structure and 

process for the QDR. Also, OSD did not finalize and issue the terms of 

reference until June 22. (See fig. 2 for a detailed timeline of the 

strategic reviews and QDR process.) After the terms of reference were 

issued, most study teams had only until mid-July at the latest to study 

issues, identify options, and develop briefings for the executive 

working group and senior-level review group. In some cases, study teams 

were required to begin briefing DOD management before their specific 

taskings had been finalized. For example, the strategy and force 

planning team was required to provide an interim briefing on June 12 

even though the terms of reference detailing its responsibilities were 

not finalized until June 22. Although all of the teams were supposed to 

submit their final results to senior leadership by July 11, at least 

one provided briefings after this date.



Figure 2: Timeline of Strategic Reviews and 2001 QDR Activities:



[See PDF for image]



Source: DOD.



[End of figure]



According to several study team officials who met with us, some teams 

had insufficient time to conduct comprehensive analyses of some issues 

specified in the QDR legislation. They pointed out that the limited 

time available was particularly difficult because the new defense 

strategy required new analyses. To meet their deadlines, some study 

teams relied on previous work or reached conclusions based on informed 

opinion rather than on detailed analysis. For example, the 

infrastructure team was tasked with finding the most efficient way to 

align infrastructure with force and mission requirements, work that was 

heavily dependent on the findings of the force structure team. However, 

the force structure team performed its work concurrently with the 

infrastructure team. Although the infrastructure team developed a plan 

called Installations 2020 to guide the transformation of DOD’s 

infrastructure, it is limited in part because the team did not receive 

any information from the force structure team on how force structure is 

likely to change in the future due to changes in the threat and 

technologies. Moreover, infrastructure team officials said that they 

would have required more time (at least 6 months) to conduct in-depth 

analysis even if it had had data on likely force structure changes. 

Instead, the infrastructure team relied on earlier analytical work that 

had a short-term focus and was based on the previous defense strategy 

and current force structure. The team concluded that installations 

should prepare and implement 20-year strategic plans and that these 

plans must support changing force structures and new mission 

requirements.



Study Guidance Did Not Clearly Assign Responsibilities for Addressing 

All Elements of the Legislative Mandate:



Our analysis of the terms of reference that DOD provided to study teams 

demonstrates that there was not always a clear link between the 

specific reporting requirements in the QDR legislation and the issues 

that the teams were directed to study. According to OSD officials, this 

discrepancy stems from the Secretary of Defense’s decision to place 

more emphasis on some requirements and less on others within the 

context of a tight QDR timetable.



The QDR legislation requires DOD to address several broad policy 

issues, including delineating the national defense strategy; defining 

the force, infrastructure, and budget needed to carry out the strategy; 

and assessing the magnitude of risk associated with carrying out the 

missions expressed in the strategy. The legislation also identifies 13 

specific issues that need to be addressed, such as the forward presence 

necessary under the national defense strategy and the strategic and 

tactical airlift, sealift, and ground transportation capabilities 

required to support the strategy.



Although OSD and service officials agreed that it would have been 

reasonable to expect the department to ensure that all of the specific 

legislative requirements were assigned to a study team, OSD officials 

stated that, in developing the guidance, they followed the Secretary’s 

desire to place more emphasis on some issues and less on others, given 

the limited time frame. According to OSD officials, the Secretary’s 

priorities were to: (1) define the security environment, (2) present 

the defense strategy, and (3) discuss the capabilities required to meet 

the strategy.



As a result, several critical issues were among the requirements that 

were not specifically tasked to a study team. For example, DOD is 

required to examine the manpower and sustainment policies needed under 

the national defense strategy to support any engagements in conflicts 

lasting longer than 120 days. However, the only assignment related to 

manpower in the guidance directs the personnel and readiness team to 

develop policy alternatives for strengthening the recruitment and 

retention of military and civilian personnel, with attention to such 

issues as career paths and mandatory retirement extensions. The 

legislation also requires that the QDR assess the advisability of 

changes to the Unified Command Plan and the effect that participation 

in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies will have 

on readiness for high-intensity combat. However, the study guidance did 

not task any of the study groups with addressing these issues.



The quadrennial review legislation also requires DOD to identify a 

budget plan to successfully execute the full range of missions called 

for in the defense strategy at a low to moderate level of operational 

risk, and to identify any resources beyond those programmed in the 

current years’ defense program to achieve such a level of operational 

risk. Although some study teams were tasked with addressing budget 

issues in their limited area of research, we did not find any 

requirement for a team to address this issue from a departmentwide 

perspective.



Thoroughness of QDR Analysis and Reporting on Key Issues Varied 

Considerably:



The thoroughness of DOD’s analysis and reporting on the issues it was 

required to address as part of the QDR varied considerably. Overall, 

DOD undertook substantial analysis and reporting on the security 

environment and defense strategy, but it conducted limited analysis and 

reporting on several other issues required by the legislation. In 

addition, DOD’s analysis and reporting on force structure--an essential 

component of the review--was marked by several limitations, such as its 

near-term focus. As a result, while the QDR report provides broad 

direction in many areas, its limited analysis of some issues meant that 

DOD did not obtain sufficient information to make many specific 

decisions on the need for changes to existing modernization, 

infrastructure, and force structure plans.



As noted earlier, many DOD officials and analysts we spoke with cited 

the QDR’s emphasis on assessing the future security environment and 

evaluating alternative defense strategies as examples of sound, well-

focused analysis. According to OSD officials, OSD’s Office of the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy drew on a wide 

variety of sources, from the strategic reviews to intelligence reports, 

to develop an initial paper discussing these issues. The Secretary then 

held meetings with his top military and civilian staff to discuss and 

decide on a defense strategy. As such, the QDR report includes 

considerable discussion about broad geopolitical trends, regional 

security developments, the increased number of weak and failing states, 

and the diffusion of power to nongovernment actors such as terrorist 

groups. Moreover, this discussion sets the stage for the QDR’s 

conclusion that a broader defense strategy is needed to focus on 

threats from other than traditional regional powers.



In contrast, DOD’s analysis and reporting on some legislatively 

mandated issues, such as the role of the reserves, the need for changes 

in the defense agencies, and the Unified Command Plan, were limited. 

The QDR report identifies over 30 issues that will be the focus of 

follow-on studies. (See app. III for a listing of all QDR follow-on 

studies.) Although not all of these studies correlate directly to 

specific legislative requirements, a number of them do. For example, 

the legislation asks DOD to examine the role and missions of the 

reserve forces in the national defense strategy and identify what 

resources they need to discharge those duties. However, OSD officials 

decided to defer the study of this issue due to its complexity and the 

limited time available, effectively limiting the amount of information 

on this topic in the report. The QDR report notes that DOD will 

undertake a comprehensive review of the active and reserve mix, 

organization, priority missions, and associated resources at a later 

time. According to a November 27, 2001, memo, the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense directed OSD, with support from the Joint Staff and the 

services, to conduct this review. OSD officials informed us in late 

August 2002 that the results of this review and other follow-on studies 

will be communicated to Congress in a variety of ways, including the 

administration’s next budget submission, once they are completed.



Likewise, there was limited discussion in the QDR report on the 

appropriate number and size of defense agencies[Footnote 9] needed to 

support combat operations, because the infrastructure study team did 

not have time to conduct a detailed analysis. The report indicated that 

DOD would begin a review of the defense agencies to improve their 

business practices, and, in a November 2001 memo, it instructed the 

defense agencies to develop transformation roadmaps for the Secretary 

of Defense’s review that outlined their planned contributions toward 

helping DOD meet its critical operational goals. In addition, while the 

study teams did address the need for changes in overseas presence, 

neither they nor the QDR report specifically addressed changes to the 

Unified Command Plan. However, DOD subsequently announced changes to 

the Unified Command Plan that took effect on October 1, 2002. These 

include establishing the U.S. Northern Command to defend the United 

States and to support military assistance to civil authorities and 

focusing the efforts of the U.S. Joint Forces Command toward 

transforming the U.S. military.



In addition, DOD’s analysis and reporting on force structure issues had 

several limitations. The QDR legislation asks DOD to define the size 

and composition of the force that it needs to successfully execute the 

full range of missions called for in the national defense strategy. It 

also specifically asks DOD to identify “the force structure best suited 

to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk.” 

However, the force analysis had a near-term focus that provided few 

insights into how future threats and planned technological advances in 

U.S. capabilities may affect future force structure requirements. 

Moreover, in assessing the numbers and types of forces required to 

achieve U.S. objectives in the specific scenarios examined, DOD relied 

primarily on existing military war plans and military judgment; it used 

analytical tools such as computer modeling and simulation only to a 

limited extent. Such tools can provide a significant amount of 

additional data and insights to help decision makers assess operational 

risk and evaluate force structure requirements for a range of scenarios 

and time frames. Additionally, the analysis only examined requirements 

for major combat forces and did not address the types of critical 

support forces that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

identified as presenting the highest risk in carrying out the new 

strategy. As a result, DOD currently lacks assurance that it has 

optimized its force to effectively balance short-term and long-term 

risks.[Footnote 10] DOD officials cited the lack of time as the primary 

reason its analysis was not more comprehensive and detailed. However, 

some officials also pointed to the inherent difficulty of examining 

future force structure requirements given uncertainties in future 

threats.



The QDR report also provided little explanation of how DOD reached its 

conclusion that the current force structure is generally capable of 

executing the defense strategy at moderate operational risk, and it 

contained little information on the specific assumptions that DOD made 

concerning warning time and the intensity and duration of conflicts 

examined, although these are specific items that the report is intended 

to address. A DOD official stated that it did not provide a more 

complete explanation of the analysis done and key assumptions used 

because it would have required discussing classified information. 

However, DOD could have chosen to provide Congress with information on 

some legislative requirements in a classified format, in addition to 

issuing an overall unclassified report. By not providing this 

information, DOD limited Congress’s ability to assess the 

reasonableness of DOD’s assumptions and better understand the 

methodology used to arrive at key conclusions regarding force 

structure.



Legislative Options Are Available to Improve Usefulness of QDR:



A number of legislative options are available for improving the QDR’s 

usefulness to both DOD and Congress. These options would ameliorate 

some of the concerns that we and many defense experts have expressed as 

a result of examining DOD’s process and analysis for the 2001 QDR and 

prior defense reviews--namely, that the QDR is required too soon after 

a new administration assumes office, that its timetable does not 

coincide with DOD’s planning and budget process, and that its scope is 

not adequately focused on high-priority issues. Several options exist 

for extending the QDR deadline to provide DOD with more time to conduct 

the comprehensive analysis required to reassess force structure, 

infrastructure, and acquisition decisions and better link the QDR to 

DOD’s budget and planning process. Moreover, DOD officials and defense 

experts we spoke to agree that options exist to better focus the 

legislative requirements on critical issues required for congressional 

oversight and internal DOD planning. Specifically, this could be 

accomplished by eliminating issues that have become less relevant given 

the changing security environment or that may not be needed as part of 

the QDR because DOD has other studies in place to periodically review 

them. Finally, a congressionally mandated advisory panel could be 

convened prior to the next QDR to help identify the critical issues and 

alternatives that DOD should examine in its review.



Changing QDR Deadline Would Give DOD More Time to Examine Complex 

Issues:



One of the main concerns with the QDR process has been its short time 

frame (approximately Feb. to Sept.). In our report on the 1997 QDR, we 

noted that the 6-month time period available for the QDR was extremely 

tight, given the complex nature and large number of issues, even for 

second-term administrations that may have relatively little turnover 

among DOD’s senior personnel. We found that the short time frame was a 

key factor in limiting the thoroughness of DOD’s analyses. We also 

noted that the conduct of the 2001 QDR could be further complicated 

because it would take place just after a new administration assumed 

office and at the same time that DOD was experiencing a large turnover 

in senior officials. For example, during the first 5 months of 

President Clinton’s first administration, the Secretary of Defense had 

less than half of his top managers in place.



These concerns again materialized during the 2001 QDR when, except for 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Defense had no top 

management officials in place until May 1, 2001, when the Comptroller 

was confirmed. (See fig. 3.) Many senior officials were not confirmed 

until sometime during the May to August time frame.



Figure 3: Confirmation Dates of Department of Defense Leadership in 

2001:



[See PDF for image]



Source: DOD.



[End of figure]



DOD officials informed us that they found it extremely difficult to 

conduct the type of work the legislation required without these 

officials in place. Moreover, several DOD officials noted that 

conducting thorough analyses within the current time frame is a major 

challenge when an administration makes significant changes in the 

defense strategy and can no longer rely on prior department analyses. 

The Secretary reiterated these concerns about the challenges posed by 

the QDR-reporting deadline in news conferences. A few defense analysts 

we spoke to did not agree that the difficulty in getting appointees 

confirmed is a justification in and of itself to change the date of the 

QDR. One official noted, for example, that unconfirmed appointees could 

advise and consult with the Secretary. Moreover, we noted that one OSD 

official who played a key role in the review, the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Strategy, had worked on the 1997 QDR and the 

service chiefs and many of the members of QDR study teams were 

comprised of military officers and civil servants whose tenure is not 

affected by the change in administrations. Nevertheless, defense 

analysts who have studied the QDR process generally agreed that the 

timing is not practical from other standpoints. For example, two 

defense researchers concluded that the tight timetable inhibits the 

Secretary’s ability to perform the in-depth analysis necessary. This is 

especially troublesome since the QDR should form the basis for the 

defense agenda and major changes to future budgets.



Additionally, some defense analysts have noted that the QDR was not 

synchronized with DOD’s long-term planning and budgeting process even 

though the QDR should set the framework for budgetary decisions. For 

example, on September 30 when the QDR is due, DOD is still in the 

process of reviewing the services’ budget proposals and analyzing 

whether changes are needed. DOD does not finalize its budget request 

until late January or early February when the President submits the 

budget to Congress.



In our own work and in our discussions with defense experts, we 

identified three options that have the potential for alleviating some 

of the QDR’s timing problems. However, each option could have some 

positive as well as negative effects. Figure 4 illustrates the 

differences in timing for the three options.



Figure 4: Timing Options for Conducting the 2005 QDR:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO analysis.



[End of figure]



Option 1 would extend the QDR process by about 4 months and change the 

report submission deadline from September 30 to the following February. 

This would give DOD a few extra months to complete the review. More 

importantly, it would allow DOD to develop both the QDR and the 

administration’s first full budget (which is submitted during the 

second year of a President’s term) in tandem. Ideally, this would allow 

decisions made as part of the QDR process, such as defense strategy and 

force structure, to be reflected in the budget plan. Both the QDR and 

budget would be submitted to Congress at the same time. A shortcoming 

of this option is that DOD and the services would have to work quickly 

to translate QDR force-related decisions into budgetary projections. 

Moreover, 4 months of additional time may not be sufficient to complete 

detailed analysis on all the required issues, particularly if DOD makes 

a major change in the defense strategy.



Option 2 would extend the QDR process by 12 to 16 months. The report 

submission deadline would change from September 30 of the first year to 

September 30 of the second year of a President’s term at the earliest. 

As we noted in our report on the 1997 QDR, this option would give a new 

administration substantially more time to put its key officials in 

place, develop a defense strategy, make preparations for the QDR, and 

conduct the necessary analyses. Moreover, it would provide time for a 

new administration to first develop a national security strategy, which 

many defense analysts believe should precede the development of a 

defense strategy. A disadvantage of this option is that it would 

postpone a President’s impact on the defense budget until his or her 

third year in office. To illustrate, the Secretary of Defense stated 

that the fiscal year 2003 budget they presented to Congress reflected 

the transformation goals they reached in the 2001 QDR. If the QDR had 

been delayed by 1 year--to 2002--these decisions would not have been 

reflected until the fiscal year 2004 budget request.



Option 3 would establish a two-phase QDR process. A study by the 

National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

as well as a number of analysts and DOD officials with whom we met, 

recommended this approach. During the first phase, the QDR would focus 

on broad policy issues, such as the security environment and defense 

strategy. The first report would be due on September 30. During the 

second phase, DOD would conduct comprehensive and in-depth analysis of 

force structure, force modernization, and other legislatively required 

issues. The final report would be due sometime during the second year. 

The strengths of this option are that it would produce a defense 

strategy during the first year of a President’s term that could be used 

to lay out DOD’s strategic plan and prepare the Secretary’s budget 

guidance to the services. Congress could use the new defense strategy 

as a framework to evaluate the defense budget that it receives a few 

months later. Moreover, according to the National Defense University 

review, DOD could take this opportunity to set broad priorities and 

decide on major program issues. At the same time, this option would 

give DOD up to an additional year to complete its detailed analyses of 

force structure and new capabilities, which are needed to support the 

defense strategy and provide support for its long-term budget and 

program development. However, for this approach to be successful DOD 

would have to ensure that each phase receives equal priority and that 

the results of both are well integrated. Moreover, this option would 

delay major decisions on force structure and major weapon systems until 

the latter part of an administration’s second year in office.



As part of its deliberation on the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense 

Authorization bill, Congress is considering changing the timing for 

future QDRs. In mid-2002, the Secretary of Defense requested that 

Congress consider delaying the QDR until the second year of an 

administration’s 4-year term. A House version of the bill includes a 

provision to allow DOD to submit the QDR in the second year of a 

President’s term of office rather than on September 30 of the first 

year as currently required. The House Armed Services Committee’s report 

noted that the complexity of preparing the report could be compounded 

by the lengthy confirmation process for presidential appointees and it 

concluded that moving the submission of the report back a year would 

provide more time to conduct the type of critical review of all aspects 

of the department’s operations envisioned by the statute.[Footnote 11] 

The Senate has proposed a shorter extension of the QDR deadline. The 

Senate proposal would permit the department to provide the QDR report 

in the second year of a President’s term of office, but not later than 

the date on which the President’s budget submission is due.[Footnote 

12] Because the President is required to submit the budget no later 

than the first Monday in February, the entire QDR would be pushed back 

4 months.[Footnote 13] The differences between the two bills are 

expected to be resolved when representatives from the House and Senate 

Armed Services committees meet in conference.



Narrowing Scope of Review Could Provide Better Focus:



A second concern with the QDR centers on the broad spectrum of issues 

that the legislation requires DOD to address. Our assessment of the 

2001 QDR process and our discussions with defense analysts who worked 

on prior QDRs and defense reviews indicate that DOD may be able to 

provide more useful analysis and reporting to Congress if the specific 

legislative requirements are reexamined and adjusted to focus DOD’s 

efforts on a more manageable set of high-priority issues. On the basis 

of our assessment of the 1997 and 2001 QDRs and discussions with 

defense analysts and DOD officials, we identified a number of study 

issues in the current legislation that appear critical to meeting the 

QDR’s purpose of encouraging a fundamental reassessment of the nation’s 

defense strategy and needs. However, some of the required study issues 

may be less relevant to DOD and Congress in the future because of 

changes in the security environment and the resulting impact on the 

defense strategy. In addition, other required issues could be 

reassessed and potentially dropped because they are already addressed 

by other routine DOD studies that are accessible to Congress.



DOD officials and defense analysts we spoke to agreed that the most 

important aspects of the QDR are the legislative requirements that ask 

the Secretary of Defense to delineate a defense strategy and define 

sufficient force structure, force modernization, and other elements of 

a defense program that could successfully execute the full range of 

missions called for by the defense strategy. Analyses have determined 

that DOD’s current planning and budget process does not serve as a good 

tool for making broad reassessments of defense programs because it has 

a near-term focus and is based on a more stovepiped decision-making 

process. For example, the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 

21st Century concluded that that biggest problem with DOD’s budgeting 

process is that it focuses on minor programmatic details rather than on 

significant alternatives to the status quo. As a result, the QDR is 

needed to prompt broader thinking on these issues and serve as a 

catalyst for change. Many officials we spoke to also noted that in 

requiring DOD to analyze the need for changes and report its findings 

and rationale to Congress, the QDR should serve as the critical 

document that links DOD’s strategy, force structure, and modernization 

priorities and provides Congress with a blueprint for evaluating DOD’s 

budget requests.



On the other hand, our assessment of the QDR and discussions with 

defense analysts and DOD officials suggest that the following 

legislative requirements could be modified or eliminated because they 

no longer adequately reflect the changing nature of warfighting and the 

changing security environment.



* A discussion of the “appropriate ratio of combat forces to support 

forces (commonly referred to as the ‘tooth-to-tail ratio’) under the 

national defense strategy.” DOD’s goal has been to reduce the number of 

personnel and costs associated with the support forces, or “tail.” 

However, service officials told us that there is no consensus on which 

units should be considered support and which should be considered 

combat. This has occurred because many support forces that do not 

deploy overseas (and therefore have traditionally been considered as 

part of DOD’s “tail”) have become critical to the success of combat 

operations on the modern battlefield. For example, given the 

significant improvements in communications, headquarters units located 

in the United States, which include intelligence officers and targeting 

experts, can play a key role in planning and directing combat 

operations. Moreover, DOD officials cautioned that rapidly changing 

technologies will make the concept of differentiating between support 

and combat troops increasingly irrelevant and difficult to measure. For 

example, as the United States moves toward acquiring greater numbers of 

unmanned aircraft piloted from remote computer terminals and relies 

increasingly on space-based assets operated by personnel in the United 

States, it will be more difficult to distinguish between combat and 

support personnel.



* Assessments of “the extent to which resources must be shifted among 

two or more theaters under the national defense strategy in the event 

of conflict in such theaters,” and the assumptions used regarding 

“warning time.” A DOD official and defense analysts who addressed this 

issue with us stated that both of these requirements should be 

eliminated because they are related to the allocation of forces under 

the old two-major-theater-war construct. Under this construct, the 

amount of time that was assumed available for warning and the 

separation time between major theater wars were critical factors in 

planning the size and composition of U.S. forces and assessing 

operational risk, particularly for assets that might need to be shifted 

between theaters. However, the new defense strategy, along with DOD’s 

new “capabilities-based” planning construct, recognizes that DOD has 

been involved in a wide range of military operations and faces a more 

uncertain and unpredictable future, meaning that DOD’s force structure 

assessments should be much less focused on requirements to conduct two 

major theater wars in specific geographic locations.



Our review of the QDR process also indicated that the following issues, 

while critical, may not need to be addressed as part of the QDR because 

(1) they require more time for detailed analysis than is currently 

available given the September 30 deadline, and (2) they are examined in 

routine DOD studies that are or can be easily provided to Congress.



* An evaluation of “the strategic and tactical airlift, sealift, and 

ground transportation capabilities required to support the national 

defense strategy.” DOD officials and defense analysts believe that the 

QDR is not the most appropriate venue for addressing this mobility 

issue because it requires detailed and time-consuming analysis that can 

best be conducted after DOD decides on a defense strategy, identifies a 

range of planning scenarios consistent with the new strategy, and 

completes its detailed analysis of requirements for combat forces. 

Furthermore, they noted that DOD routinely conducts comprehensive 

analyses of its mobility requirements outside of the QDR process. To 

illustrate, since 1992 the Joint Staff has coordinated three major 

analyses of the U.S. military strategic lift requirements: the 1992 

Mobility Requirements Study, Bottom Up Review; the 1995 Bottom Up 

Review Update; and the 2001 Mobility Requirements Study, 2005. All of 

these studies focused on the requirements needed to support two nearly 

simultaneous major theater wars. Recognizing that the 1998 study, which 

took 2 years to complete, was based on the previous two-major-theater-

war, force-sizing construct, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a 

November 7, 2001, memo, initiated a follow-on study, to be completed by 

March 2004, to examine mobility requirements within the context of the 

new defense strategy and force-sizing construct. Overall, analysts 

believe that DOD’s ongoing process works well.



* An assessment of the “advisability of revisions to the Unified 

Command Plan as a result of the national defense strategy.” Defense 

officials as well as outside analysts believe that this requirement is 

not needed as part of the QDR because DOD has an ongoing process to 

reassess the Unified Command Plan, the assessment is already required 

under other legislation, and the timing of the assessment does not need 

to coincide with that of the QDR. Specifically, the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to review periodically, and not less 

than every 2 years, the missions, responsibilities, and force structure 

of each combatant command and recommend any changes to the President, 

through the Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 14] This legislation also 

requires that, except during times of hostilities, the President notify 

Congress not more than 60 days after either establishing a new 

combatant command or significantly revising the missions, 

responsibilities, or force structure of an existing command. As such, a 

major event or change in the political or security landscape could 

trigger the need for a change in the plan outside or after the QDR 

process. Moreover, officials pointed out that such a reevaluation is 

time-consuming and may not fit in with the current QDR timetable as the 

process is politically sensitive and requires consultation with U.S. 

allies. Although the 2001 QDR report did not address the need for 

changes in the Unified Command Plan, the Secretary of Defense recently 

determined that the changed security environment and change in U.S. 

defense strategy required some adjustments to the commands. On April 

17, 2002, some 7 months after the QDR was completed, the Secretary of 

Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented the 

2002 Unified Command Plan, which realigned and streamlined the U.S. 

military to better address their assessments of 21st century threats 

and reflect the new defense strategy outlined in the QDR. The new plan 

led to the creation of a new command, known as the Northern Command, 

which is responsible for homeland defense.



Reinstituting an Advisory Panel Could Help Set Agenda:



The 1996 legislation that guided the development of the 1997 QDR 

included a requirement for a National Defense Panel. The panel was 

composed of national security experts from the private sector and was 

tasked to review the results of the QDR and conduct subsequent work on 

force alternatives. The panel completed its report in December 1997, 7 

months after the QDR report was submitted. Among its conclusions was 

that DOD’s continued emphasis on the two-major-theater-war, force-

sizing construct inhibited its ability to develop the capabilities it 

needed to address future threats, and it served to justify DOD’s 

current force structure. The legislation mandating the 2001 QDR and 

future reviews, however, did not include a requirement for a similar 

panel.



As part of our assessment of the 1997 QDR, we suggested that a 

congressionally mandated panel such as the 1997 National Defense Panel 

could be used to encourage DOD to consider a wider range of strategy, 

force structure, and modernization options. Specifically, we noted that 

such a review panel, if it preceded the QDR, may be important because 

it is extremely challenging for DOD to conduct a fundamental 

reexamination of defense needs, given that its culture rewards 

consensus-building and often makes it difficult to gain support for 

alternatives that challenge the status quo. Moreover, most DOD 

officials and defense analysts who provided us with their views on this 

issue believe that an advisory panel could be useful in setting the 

agenda for the next QDR and enhancing the potential for the QDR to 

tackle difficult issues. Defense analysts generally noted, however, 

that the panel’s structure and timing would affect its usefulness to 

DOD and Congress. Based on these views, it appears that a future panel 

would need the following ingredients to be successful.



* A clear mandate of expectations. Some analysts suggested that there 

would be neither the time nor the need for the panel to look at the 

entire defense program or all of the issues included in the QDR 

legislation. Rather, the panel should concentrate on those broad but 

vital issues that defense and Congress need to consider and that the 

QDR should address. The panel would recommend issues for the QDR study 

team to review. Such issues could range from the potential need for 

changes in the defense strategy to specifying the types of force 

structure and modernization alternatives and investment trade-offs that 

DOD should analyze as part of the QDR.



* A balanced membership. Analysts and DOD officials who told us they 

support an outside panel highlighted the need to obtain a diverse panel 

membership to better ensure its objectivity and usefulness. Moreover, 

one study found that the 1997 National Defense Panel was not as useful 

as it could have been because almost every member of the panel had a 

link to a particular service, thereby limiting the flow of independent 

ideas. Most analysts we spoke to concluded that a future panel should 

draw upon experts in a wide variety of disciplines, including some 

beyond the defense community, to stimulate innovative thinking. One 

defense analyst also suggested that if the panel begins its work during 

an election year, representatives from each presidential candidate’s 

team should be invited to participate in the panel to enhance the 

potential that a new administration would use its findings.



* A workable timetable. Most defense analysts we spoke with emphasized 

that timing was a critical element for a panel’s success. They agreed 

that the panel’s report should be completed before DOD starts the 

formal QDR process so that it can help stimulate debate and set the 

agenda. However, one analyst also suggested that the panel could 

conduct its work in two phases: an initial phase to help set the agenda 

for DOD’s review and a second report after the QDR is completed to lay 

out programmatic options, trade-offs, and recommendations.



Despite general consensus for advisory panels, two defense analysts we 

spoke to did not see much value in establishing an outside panel, 

citing the significant problems the 1997 panel faced in arriving at its 

conclusions or the limited usefulness of its work. Although we agree 

that an outside panel could face significant challenges if required to 

recommend specific decisions on force structure and modernization, such 

a panel may be more effective if its role were limited to identifying 

the types of force structure alternatives and investment trade-offs 

that DOD should analyze as part of the QDR.



Conclusions:



Quadrennial Defense Reviews provide DOD with the opportunity to conduct 

analysis that can stimulate broad changes in its defense strategy and 

programs in response to a changing security environment, guide its 

long-term planning, and assist congressional oversight. Such reviews 

should be able to link defense strategy to major DOD programs and 

initiatives, set clear priorities for change, and establish the 

analytical basis for major decisions affecting DOD’s force structure 

and investment needs. Although the 2001 QDR had some strengths, it did 

not fully meet these goals because of weaknesses in DOD’s approach to 

conducting the review and the challenges posed by the timing and scope 

of the legislative requirements. By not clearly assigning 

responsibility for examining all of the required study issues, DOD 

focused the 2001 QDR on issues that were important to the Secretary of 

Defense but made it less clear to what extent DOD would examine other 

issues included in the legislation. Moreover, while the 2001 QDR 

established a new defense strategy and force planning construct, some 

important issues mandated by the legislation--such as force structure 

and the role of the reserves--were not thoroughly addressed or were 

largely deferred to follow-on studies. As a result, the review was not 

as useful a planning or oversight tool as it could have been, and many 

difficult decisions on how the department should change its forces and 

programs to address emerging security challenges were postponed. Even 

if DOD more clearly assigns responsibilities in the future, Congress 

could still have difficulty assessing the reasonableness of DOD’s 

conclusions on key issues such as force structure unless DOD provides 

more complete information on its methodology, the types of alternatives 

it examined, and its key assumptions. This may require the department 

to provide Congress with some information in a classified format.



Changes in the QDR legislation, along with improvements in the way 

DOD assigns and reports on QDR issues, could significantly enhance the 

usefulness of future reviews. The tight time frame established by 

Congress for submitting the QDR report had a significant impact on 

DOD’s ability to conduct in-depth analysis during the 2001 QDR. 

Moreover, the broad scope and large number of legislative requirements 

provided DOD with a further challenge in conducting meaningful analysis 

within the time frame and focusing its attention on high priority 

issues. Unless the legislatively mandated issues are reexamined, DOD 

may spend considerable effort during the next review assessing some 

issues that many defense officials believe are less relevant to the 

ongoing debate on force transformation and investment priorities. A 

concurrent reassessment of both the QDR’s scope and time frame could 

provide greater assurances that DOD will thoroughly address and report 

on the most critical defense issues that both DOD and Congress will 

face in the future.



Recommendations:



To enhance the usefulness of future QDRs and assist congressional 

oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) clearly 

assign responsibility for assessing all review issues required by 

legislation, and (2) provide Congress with more complete information 

describing the department’s analysis to meet the legislative 

requirements, particularly those related to force structure 

requirements. If necessary, DOD should provide certain information, 

such as the key assumptions, scenarios, and alternatives it used in 

assessing its force structure requirements, in a classified format.



Matters for Congressional Consideration:



Congress may want to consider (1) extending the time frame of the 

QDR to allow more time for DOD to conduct comprehensive analyses and to 

create a better link with DOD’s planning and budget process, and (2) 

revising the specific requirements of the QDR to clarify what is 

expected and set clear priorities for DOD’s work. Congress may also 

wish to consider establishing an advisory panel prior to the next 

review to identify the critical issues and programs that the QDR should 

address.



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed that we 

fairly characterized the strengths of the 2001 and agreed that Congress 

should consider revising the QDR’s scope and timeframe. However, DOD 

took exception to our conclusion that its force structure assessment 

had significant limitations. DOD stated that, given the scope and 

timing of the review, it effectively used a combination of analytical 

tools and professional judgment to reach its conclusions on force 

structure. DOD also stated that our report appears to advocate a 

“threat-based” planning approach for assessing force structure 

requirements. Our report recognizes that the QDR was conducted within a 

short time frame (June-Sept. 2001) and notes that DOD used a variety of 

data sources and analytical methods in reaching its conclusions. 

However, we disagree that our report advocates a “threat-based” 

planning approach. Rather, as the scope and methodology makes clear, we 

based our evaluation on the specific threats and scenarios that DOD 

used to assess force structure requirements for the 2001 QDR. Our 

review identified that many of the specific threats and scenarios DOD 

examined had a near-term focus and that DOD, in estimating the numbers 

and types of forces required for major combat operations, relied to a 

significant extent on existing war plans that have been at the center 

of U.S. military planning for a number of years. As a result, we 

believe that more extensive use of analytical tools such as modeling 

and simulation, along with analysis of a broad range of longer-term 

scenarios and threats, would have enhanced the QDR’s usefulness in 

fundamentally reassessing force structure requirements.



DOD stated that it partially agreed with our recommendation that the 

Secretary clearly assign responsibility for assessing all review issues 

required by legislation. However, it noted that the Secretary must be 

allowed to manage the QDR in a manner that focuses on issues of primary 

importance. While we agree that the Secretary needs to have some 

flexibility in conducting the QDR, we continue to believe that the 

legislative requirements should guide DOD’s review and that the 

Secretary of Defense should clearly assign all legislative requirements 

to study teams in future reviews.



DOD did not take a position on our recommendation that the Secretary 

provide Congress with more complete information describing DOD’s 

analyses, particularly those related to force structure requirements, 

and consider providing certain information in a classified format, if 

needed. However, DOD noted that it provided information to Congress 

through briefings, written reports, budget justification materials and 

testimonies to support its QDR decisions. We recognize that DOD often 

provides some members of Congress and their staffs with briefings and 

other materials on a wide variety of topics and that such exchanges are 

useful. However, this approach cannot guarantee that all members and 

their staff receive sufficient information to evaluate the QDR’s 

conclusions. Therefore, we are retaining our recommendation that DOD 

include more complete information on its analysis of key issues in 

subsequent QDR reports and, if necessary, consider issuing a classified 

supplement to the QDR report.



DOD’s comments are presented in their entirety in appendix IV.



We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. We will make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.



If you or your staff have any questions about this report please call 

me at (202) 512-4300 or e-mail me at hintonh@gao.gov. Key staff who 

contributed to this report were Janet St. Laurent, Tim Stone, Tina 

Morgan, Albert Abuliak, Nancy Benco, and Joan Slowitsky.



Signed by Henry L. Hinton, Jr.



Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Managing Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management:



[End of section]



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



To determine the strengths and weaknesses of Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) conduct of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), we examined the 

process, schedule, analysis and reporting that DOD undertook to meet 

the legislative requirements. To evaluate the process and scheduling, 

we obtained and analyzed Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 

Joint Staff, and service directives, briefings, and documents that 

described the organizational structure and procedures developed for 

conducting the review. We also interviewed OSD, Joint Staff, and 

service officials about their roles in the process and tasks they were 

assigned. Moreover, we compared the QDR guidance, known as the Terms of 

Reference, with the legislative requirements to determine whether all 

of the legislatively mandated study issues were assigned to study 

teams. To assess DOD’s schedule for conducting the review, we 

documented and developed a timeline showing important QDR-related 

events, such as confirmation dates for key DOD officials and study team 

briefings. We also obtained testimonial evidence from OSD, the Joint 

Staff, and service officials on the time frame and nature of work 

completed prior to June 22, 2001, the date DOD finalized its QDR 

guidance, so that we would have a better understanding of the 

preparatory work that DOD conducted and the role of the strategic 

reviews that were undertaken by outside defense experts for the 

Secretary of Defense.



To assess the thoroughness of the analytical work conducted for the 

QDR, we interviewed and received briefings from DOD officials who 

participated in all seven of the department’s QDR study teams. We held 

follow-up meetings with members of several teams including the strategy 

and force planning team, the capabilities and systems team, the forces 

team, and the infrastructure team, and we obtained and analyzed 

briefings and other documentation that supported these teams’ 

presentations to the senior-level review group. After reviewing this 

material, we met with study team members to discuss in more detail 

their analytical work, including methods and sources of information 

they relied on, the key assumptions they made, and the range of 

alternatives they considered. For example, to assess DOD’s analysis to 

determine the force best suited to implement the national security 

strategy, we obtained and analyzed documentation on the scenarios and 

the time frames that DOD used to evaluate force structure alternatives, 

the key assumptions made about warning times and other factors, the 

methods used for estimating the numbers and types of forces required to 

conduct various types of military operations that could occur in the 

future, the number of alternative force structures evaluated, and the 

extent to which DOD used analytical tools such as computer warfighting 

models to assess the operational risks associated with alternative 

force structures. We also received and analyzed briefings and 

documentation on the methodology the Joint Staff used to develop the 

chairman’s operational risk assessment. Finally, we obtained 

documentation identifying the study issues that DOD determined would 

require follow-on studies. To evaluate DOD’s reporting on QDR issues, 

we compared the QDR report with legislative reporting requirements to 

assess the extent of information DOD provided for Congress on each 

requirement.



Although we obtained a significant amount of documentation on the 

analysis that study teams conducted after the terms of reference were 

issued on June 22, 2001, DOD would not provide access to analyses 

conducted by the Joint Staff and the services prior to that time or to 

the analyses conducted by the strategic review teams. DOD’s rationale 

was that these analyses were not part of the formal QDR process. As a 

result, we were not able to assess the extent to which preparatory work 

by the services and the Joint Staff, or the analyses conducted as part 

of the strategic reviews, were considered by the study teams or were 

used to reach conclusions in the QDR report.



To identify options for changing the timing, scope, and oversight of 

the QDR, we examined a wide variety of studies and articles that 

discussed the strengths and weaknesses of past reviews and assessed 

whether similar issues were likely to affect the 2001 QDR. 

Specifically, we reviewed studies on the QDR and other planning 

processes from the Rand Corporation, the National Defense University, 

the Army War College, the Naval War College, the Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments, the U.S. Commission on National Security in 

the 21st Century, and our report on the 1997 QDR. To obtain expert 

opinions and develop options for changing the timing and scope of the 

QDR, we interviewed OSD officials who led the 2001 QDR and at least one 

high-ranking officer from each of the services. We also met with 10 

non-DOD defense analysts, who had served in various positions within 

and outside DOD, including the 1997 National Defense Panel, the 1997 or 

2001 QDR, and the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st 

Century. Based on this information, we developed a matrix summarizing 

these individuals’ concerns regarding the QDR requirements and their 

views on the options to address them.



We conducted our review from November 2001 through August 2002 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.



[End of section]



Appendix II: Quadrennial Defense Review Legislation in Effect as of 

September 30, 2001:



TITLE 10 U.S.C. Sec. 118. Quadrennial Defense Review:



(a) Review Required. - The Secretary of Defense shall every four years, 

during a year following a year evenly divisible by four, conduct a 

comprehensive examination (to be known as a “quadrennial defense 

review”) of the national defense strategy, force structure, force 

modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of 

the defense program and policies of the United States with a view 

toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United 

States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. Each 

such quadrennial defense review shall be conducted in consultation with 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



(b) Conduct of Review. - Each quadrennial defense review shall be 

conducted so as -:



(1) To delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most 

recent National Security Strategy prescribed by the President pursuant 

to section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a);



(2) To define sufficient force structure, force modernization plans, 

infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program 

of the United States associated with that national defense strategy 

that would be required to execute successfully the full range of 

missions called for in that national defense strategy; and:



(3) To identify (A) the budget plan that would be required to provide 

sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions 

called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level 

of risk, and (B) any additional resources (beyond those programmed in 

the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a 

level of risk.



(c) Assessment of Risk. - The assessment of risk for the purposes of 

subsection (b) shall be undertaken by the Secretary of Defense in 

consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That 

assessment shall define the nature and magnitude of the political, 

strategic, and military risks associated with executing the missions 

called for under the national defense strategy.



(d) Submission of QDR to Congressional Committees. - The Secretary 

shall submit a report on each quadrennial defense review to the 

Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of 

Representatives. The report shall be submitted not later than September 

30 of the year in which the review is conducted. The report shall 

include the following:



(1) The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of

the national defense strategy of the United States and the force

structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate

level of risk.



(2) The assumed or defined national security interests of the United

States that inform the national defense strategy defined in the review.



(3) The threats to the assumed or defined national security interests 
of

the United States that were examined for the purposes of the review

and the scenarios developed in the examination of those threats.



(4) The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating

to - (A) the status of readiness of United States forces; (B) the

cooperation of allies, mission-sharing and additional benefits to and

burdens on United States forces resulting from coalition operations; 
(C)

warning times; (D) levels of engagement in operations other than war

and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations

and contingencies; and (E) the intensity, duration, and military and

political end-states of conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies.



(5) The effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-
intensity

combat of preparations for and participation in operations other than

war and smaller-scale contingencies.



(6) The manpower and sustainment policies required under the national

defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting longer than

120 days.



(7) The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the

national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment

necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably discharge

those roles and missions.



(8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces

(commonly referred to as the “tooth-to-tail” ratio) under the national

defense strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and

size of headquarters units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.



(9) The strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground 
transportation

capabilities required to support the national defense strategy.



(10) The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory

deployments necessary under the national defense strategy for conflict

deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.



(11) The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more

theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict 
in

such theaters.



(12) The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a

result of the national defense strategy.



(13) The effect on force structure of the use by the armed forces of

technologies anticipated to be available for the ensuing 20 years.



(14) Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.



(e) CJCS Review. - Upon the completion of each review under subsection

(a), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall prepare and submit 
to

the Secretary of Defense the Chairman’s assessment of the review,

including the Chairman’s assessment of risk. The Chairman’s assessment

shall be submitted to the Secretary in time for the inclusion of the

assessment in the report. The Secretary shall include the Chairman’s

assessment, together with the Secretary’s comments, in the report in 
its

entirety.



[End of section]



Appendix III: QDR Follow-On Studies, Plans, Reviews, and Concept 

Development Taskings:



The 2001 QDR report identified more than 30 issues that DOD planned to 

focus on in follow-on studies, plans, reviews and other taskings. 

Although not all of the studies correlate directly to specific QDR 

legislative taskings, a number of them do. DOD provided us with the 

following list.



* DOD will institutionalize definitions of homeland security, homeland 

defense, and civil support and address command relationships and 

responsibilities within the Department.



* DOD will review the establishment of a new unified combatant 

commander to help address complex inter-agency issues and provide a 

single military commander to focus military support.



* DOD will undertake a comprehensive review of the active and reserve 

mix, organization, priority missions, and associate resources.



* The Secretary of the Army will explore options for enhancing ground 

force capabilities in the Arabian Gulf.



* The Secretary of the Navy will explore options for homeporting an 

additional three to four surface combatants and guided cruise missile 

submarines (SSGNs) in that area.



* The Secretary of the Air Force will develop plans to increase 

contingency basing in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as in the 

Arabian Gulf.



* The Secretary of the Navy will develop new concepts of maritime 

prepositioning, high-speed sealift, and new amphibious capabilities for 

the Marine Corps.



* The Secretary of the Navy will develop options to shift some of the 

Marine Corps’ afloat prepositioned equipment from the Mediterranean 

toward the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf to be more responsive to 

contingencies in the Middle East.



* The Secretary of the Navy, in consultation with U.S. allies and 

friends, will explore the feasibility of conducting Marine Corps 

training for littoral warfare in the Western Pacific.



* To support the transformation effort and to foster innovation and 

experimentation, the DOD will establish a new office reporting directly 

to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Director, 

Force Transformation will evaluate the transformation efforts of the 

military departments and promote synergy by recommending steps to 

integrate ongoing transformation activities.



* To facilitate transformation, the military departments and defense 

agencies will develop transformation roadmaps that specify timelines to 

develop Service-unique capabilities necessary to meet the DOD’s six 

operational goals.



* To strengthen joint operations, DOD will develop over the next 

several months proposals to establish a prototype for Standing Joint 

Task Force (SJTF) Headquarters.



* In addition, the Department will examine options for establishing 

Standing Joint Task Forces (SJTFs)... that will seek to develop new 

concepts to exploit U.S. asymmetric military advantages and joint force 

synergies.



* DOD will establish a joint presence policy to strengthen the 

Secretary of Defense’s management of the allocation of joint deterrent 

and warfighting assets from all military departments.



* To ensure effective sustainment, DOD will conduct industrial 

vulnerability assessments and develop sustainment plans for the most 

critical weapons systems and preferred munitions.



* DOD will explore the need to establish a joint and interoperability 

training capability, including a Joint National Training Center as well 

as opportunities to build on existing capabilities at Service training 

centers and ranges to enable joint transformation field exercises and 

experiments and to inform the Services’ exercises and experiments.



* Combatant Commanders (CINCs) should develop a plan to rotate assigned 

forces through a joint training event for regular exercises and 

evaluations.



* To support the CINCs effort [to rotate assigned forces through a 

joint training event, DOD will consider the establishment of a Joint 

Opposing Force and increasing the Joint Forces Command exercise budget.



* DOD is committed to identifying efficiencies and reductions in less 

relevant capabilities that can free resources to be reinvested to 

accelerate DOD’s transformation efforts. In support of this goal, the 

military departments and defense agencies will identify significant, 

auditable savings to be reinvested in high-priority transformation 

initiatives.



* DOD will develop a strategic human resources plan for military and 

civilian personnel. The plan will identify the tools necessary to size 

and shape the military and civilian force to provide adequate numbers 

of high-quality, skilled and professionally developed people.



* DOD will review existing quality of life services and policies to 

guarantee that they have kept pace with modem requirements.



* DOD has initiated a comprehensive review of all defense and service 

health agencies, management activities, and programs.



* DOD will develop recommendations to eliminate redundancy among 

functions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services, and 

the Joint Staff.



* The military departments also are evaluating changes in their 

headquarters structures to improve their ability to perform executive 

functions at lower staffing levels.



* DOD will explore options to fully redesign the way it plans, 

programs, and budgets.



* DOD will assess all its functions to separate core and non-core 

function.



* DOD will create a small team to develop alternatives to the agency or 

field activity model that permits DOD to produce cross-DOD outputs at a 

significantly lower cost.



* To improve the business practices of the defense agencies, DOD will 

begin a review of the agencies to seek efficiencies.



* DOD will develop a plan for improving the effectiveness of the 

Defense Working Capital Fund.



* DOD will create a department-wide blueprint (enterprise architecture) 

that will prescribe how DOD’s financial and non-financial feeder 

systems and management processes will interact.



* The mix of new threats and missions that DOD will consider in the 

near-to mid-term requires that the Department reevaluate and adjust the 

recommendations of its Mobility Requirements Study completed in FY 

2000.



[End of section]



Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000:



October 18, 2002:



Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Managing Director Defense Capabilities and 

Management:



U.S. General Accounting Office

441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548:



Dear Mr. Hinton:



Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the GAO draft report, 

“Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Can Benefit from Better 

Analysis and Changes in Timing and Scope,” dated September 18, 2002 

(GAO Code 350043/GAO-03-13).



We appreciate the report’s clear statements about the strengths of the 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), particularly the attention given to 

the development of a new defense strategy and the emphasis on 

transforming military capabilities and business processes to meet 

21st-century challenges. We also appreciate the recognition that the 
QDR 

benefited greatly from the sustained involvement of the Secretary of 

Defense and his senior advisors.



Still, we take exception with the finding that the QDR force structure 

assessment had “significant limitations” and the suggestion that the 

focus of DoD’s force analysis was misplaced. To the contrary, given the 

scope and timing of the review, we effectively employed a combination 

of analytical tools (including computer simulations) and professional 

judgment to support senior-level deliberations. The “capabilities-

based” planning approach that DoD adopted in the QDR requires a 

different set of force planning tools than the “threat-based” approach 

that GAO appears to advocate in the report.



With respect to GAO’s two recommendations: We partially concur with the 

recommendation that “the Secretary clearly assign responsibility for 

assessing all review issues required by legislation.” The clear 

assignment of such responsibilities is important to the success of the 

review.



We believe that the QDR covered all issues required by the legislation, 

though we recognize that the QDR report addressed some issues in more 

detail than others. This is because the Secretary of Defense and the 

department’s senior civilian and uniformed leadership must be allowed 

to manage the QDR in a manner that focuses on issues of primary 

importance. Throughout the QDR report, we described how we met the 

legislative requirements and how subsequent analytic efforts would 

devote additional attention to more complex planning matters. The GAO 

is correct in stating that “some of the required study issues may be 

less relevant to DoD and Congress in the future because of changes 

in the security environment and the resulting impact on strategy.” 

We also support GAO’s acknowledgment that the statutorily-required 

timing of the QDR needs revision. Indeed, the department has proposed 

language regarding the timing of the QDR in both the House (H.R. 4546) 

and Senate (S. 2514) versions of the Defense Authorization Bill.



Regarding GAO’s recommendation that the Secretary “provide Congress 

with more complete information describing the department’s analysis to 

meet the legislative requirements, particularly those related to force 

structure requirements,” we briefed members of Congress and staff, 

provided written reports and subsequent budget justification material, 

and offered additional information that gave significant visibility 

into the decisions we made and the basis on which we made them. 

Moreover, the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior officials gave 

hours of testimony on the processes and the substance of the QDR.



Again, we are grateful for the opportunity to review the GAO’s draft 

report on this important matter.



Sincerely,



Signed by Andrew R. Hoehn:



Andrew R. Hoehn

Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Strategy:



[End of section]



FOOTNOTES



[1] The first Quadrennial Defense Review was submitted to Congress in 

May 1997. 



[2] The Department of Defense defines operational risk as the ability 

to achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or other 

contingency.



[3] P.L. 104-201 § 923.



[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Quadrennial Defense Review: 

Opportunities to Improve the Next Review, GAO/NSIAD-98-155 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 25, 1998).



[5] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, P.L. 106-

65 § 901, 113 Stat. 512, 715 (1999) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 118 

(2001)).



[6] 50 U.S.C. § 404a (a) also requires a new President to submit a 

national security report no later than 150 days after assuming office. 

This report is in addition to the report submitted by the outgoing 

administration for that year. 



[7] We refer to the integrated project teams as study teams throughout 

this report.



[8] Schrader, John, Roger Allen Brown, and Leslie Lewis, Managing 

Quadrennial Defense Review Integration: An Overview (Rand Corporation, 

2001).



[9] The term “defense agencies” refers to 15 diverse organizations, 

including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense 

Commissary Agency, and the Defense Information Systems Agency.



[10] DOD’s 2001 QDR report identifies a risk management framework for 

balancing short-and long-term risks that includes four components: (1) 

force management risk (the ability to recruit, train, and equip 

sufficient numbers of personnel), (2) operational risk (the ability to 

achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or contingency), 

(3) future challenges risk (the ability to invest in new capabilities 

needed to defeat longer-term challenges), and (4) institutional risk 

(the ability to develop efficient and effective management practices).



[11] H.R. Rep. No. 107-436 (2002).



[12] S. Rep. No. 107-151, (2002) § 901.



[13] 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a).



[14] 10 U.S.C. § 161(b). Periodic Review.



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