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entitled 'Environmental Protection: Issues Raised by the Reorganization 
of EPA's Ombudsman Function' which was released on November 14, 2002.



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Report to the Honorable

Diana DeGette, 

House of Representatives:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



October 2002:



ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:



Issued Raised by the Reorganization of EPA’s Ombudsman Function:



Reorganization of EPA’s Ombudsman:



GAO-03-92:



GAO Highlights:



ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AADMINISTRATION

Issues Raised by the Reorganization of EPA’s Ombudsman Function:



Why GAO Did This Study:



Federal ombudsmen help their agencies be more responsive to the public 

through the impartial investigation of citizens’ complaints.  

Professional 

standards for ombudsmen incorporate certain core principles, such as 

independence and impartiality.  In July 2001, GAO reported that key 

aspects of EPA’s hazardous waste ombudsman were not consistent with 

professional standards, particularly with regard to independence. 

(See GAO-01-813.) Partly in response to GAO’s recommendations, EPA 

reorganized its ombudsman function and removed the national ombudsman 

from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response.  GAO made 

preliminary observations on these changes in testimony in June and 

July 2002. (See GAO-02-859T and GAO-02-947T).  This report provides 

information

on (1) the current status of EPA’s reorganization of the ombudsman 

function 

and (2) issues identified in our prior report and testimonies that 

have not 

yet been addressed.



What GAO Found:



EPA’s national ombudsman now reports to a newly created Assistant 

Inspector General for 

Congressional and Public Liaison within the Office of Inspector 

General (OIG), unlike 

other federal agencies whose ombudsmen report to the highest levels

of the agency.  

Control over the budget and staff resources for EPA’s ombudsman is 

held by the Assistant 

Inspector General and not the ombudsman.  Similarly, overall 

responsibility for the work 

performed by the OIG rests with the Inspector General; the ombudsman 

no longer has the 

authority to decide which complaints warrant further review, as 

was 

the case prior to the 

reorganization.  Regarding the recordkeeping and accountability 

aspects of the ombudsman 

function, OIG officials say that they will likely adopt many of 

the office’s existing 

procedures for tracking, documenting, and reporting the results 

of investigations. 

While EPA’s reorganization addresses some of the concerns raised 

in GAO’s July 2001 report 

and subsequent testimonies, other issues remain.  For example, 

EPA removed the national 

ombudsman from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, 

whose decisions the ombudsman 

was responsible for investigating.  However, the ombudsman still 

will not be able to exercise 

independent control over budget and staff resources as called for 

by relevant professional 

standards. Relocating the ombudsman to the OIG also raises some 

new issues regarding (1) the 

extent to which the position will function as a “true” ombudsman 

in interactions with the public

and (2) the potential impact of the reorganization on the OIG’s 

role.  Although the role of an 

ombudsman typically includes program operating responsibilities, 

such as helping to informally 

resolve disagreements between the agency and the public, for 

legal reasons such responsibilities 

have been omitted from the ombudsman’s role within the OIG.  In 

addition, with the ombudsman 

function a part of the OIG, the Inspector General can no longer 

independently audit and investigate 

that function, as is the case at other federal agencies where the 

ombudsman and the OIG are 

separate entities.



[See PDF for Image]



[End of Figure]



What GAO Recommends:



GAO recommends that EPA reconsider placement of the national 

ombudsman in the OIG.  

EPA and the OIG disagreed with GAO’s conclusion that the ombudsman 

function still is not 

consistent with the position’s typical definition, which includes 

informally resolving 

disagreements.  GAO continues to believe that the ombudsman and 

OIG functions are fundamentally 

different and should not be housed together.



The full report, including GAO’s objectives, scope, methodology, 

and analysis is available at 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-92. For additional information 

about the report, contact 

John B. Stephenson (202) 512-3841. 

 

Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



The Status of EPA’s Reorganization of Its Ombudsman Function:



Issues Raised by EPA’s Reorganization of the Ombudsman Function:



Conclusions:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Agency Comments:



Scope and Methodology:



Appendix I: Comments from the Environmental Protection 

Agency:



Appendix II: Comments from the Environmental Protection 

Agency:



Abbreviations:



ABA American Bar Association:



EPA Environmental Protection Agency:



GAO General Accounting Office:



OIG Office of Inspector General:



United States General Accounting Office:



Washington, DC 20548:



October 31, 2002:



The Honorable Diana DeGette

House of Representatives:



Dear Ms. DeGette:



The Congress is currently considering legislation to reauthorize the 

Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) hazardous waste ombudsman and 

strengthen the ombudsman’s authority. EPA’s ombudsman was first 

established in 1984 to assist the public and the regulated community by 

providing information, responding to concerns, and investigating the 

merits of complaints relating to the implementation of waste management 

programs under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.[Footnote 1] 

Over time, EPA expanded the ombudsman’s jurisdiction to include 

Superfund[Footnote 2] and other hazardous waste programs managed by the 

Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. Although legislative 

authorization for the ombudsman function expired in 1988, EPA 

recognizes that the ombudsman provides a valuable service to the public 

and has retained the function as a matter of policy. In addition to 

having a national hazardous waste ombudsman, as of 1996, EPA had 

installed ombudsmen in each of its 10 regional offices, where the 

function is generally seen as a collateral duty.



Through the impartial and independent investigation of citizens’ 

complaints, federal ombudsmen help agencies be more responsive to the 

public and, in particular, people who believe that their concerns have 

not been dealt with fully or fairly through normal channels. As the 

ombudsman function is typically defined within the ombudsman community, 

ombudsmen recommend ways to resolve individual complaints or more 

systemic problems and help to informally resolve disagreements between 

agencies and the public. In 1990, the Administrative Conference of the 

United States recommended that the President and the Congress support 

initiatives to create and fund “external” ombudsmen[Footnote 3]--

ombudsmen who handle concerns and inquiries from the public--in federal 

agencies with significant public interaction.[Footnote 4] In addition 

to EPA, a number of other federal agencies have established an 

ombudsman function, including the Agency for Toxic Substances and 

Disease Registry of the Department of Health and Human Services, the 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Food and Drug 

Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service.



In a July 2001 report,[Footnote 5] we compared the hazardous waste 

ombudsman function at EPA with relevant professional standards for 

ombudsmen, including those developed by the American Bar Association, 

and found that it was not consistent with the standards in several 

areas, particularly with regard to independence. For example, we found 

that EPA’s national ombudsman was located within the Office of Solid 

Waste and Emergency Response, the organizational unit whose decisions 

the ombudsman was responsible for investigating, and that his budget 

and staff resources were controlled by unit managers. We also raised 

concerns about the extent to which other aspects of the ombudsman’s 

operations, such as procedures for documenting and reporting on the 

results of investigations, were consistent with standards for 

impartiality and accountability. Finally, we found that the part-time 

status and other duties assigned to EPA’s regional ombudsmen 

compromised their independence. We made a number of recommendations to 

strengthen the independence, impartiality, and accountability of the 

national ombudsman and to address impairments to the independence of 

the regional ombudsmen.



Partly in response to our recommendations, EPA, in November 2001, 

reorganized its ombudsman function and relocated the national ombudsman 

to the Office of Inspector General (OIG). As you know, we provided some 

preliminary observations on EPA’s reorganization in testimony before 

the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the House 

Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and 

Hazardous Materials and Subcommittee on Health, in June 2002 and July 

2002, respectively.[Footnote 6] While EPA is still finalizing the 

detailed operating policies and procedures to implement its 

reorganization, the agency has made some decisions about the overall 

operating framework for the ombudsman function. This report provides 

information on (1) the current status of EPA’s reorganization of its 

ombudsman function and (2) issues identified in our prior report and 

testimonies that have not yet been addressed.



Results in Brief:



EPA has moved its national ombudsman from the Office of Solid Waste and 

Emergency Response to the OIG under a newly created Assistant Inspector 

General for Congressional and Public Liaison. As the reorganization 

takes effect, detailed policies and operating procedures for the 

ombudsman function have been drafted, but have not yet been finalized. 

However, control over the budget and staff resources for the ombudsman 

function is exercised by the Assistant Inspector General for 

Congressional and Public Liaison and not the ombudsman. Similarly, the 

ombudsman no longer has the authority to decide which complaints 

warrant further investigation, as was the case prior to the 

reorganization. Overall responsibility for the work performed by the 

OIG rests with the Inspector General, and no single staff member--

including the national ombudsman--has the authority to select and 

prioritize his or her own caseload independent of all other needs. 

Regarding recordkeeping and accountability, the OIG’s draft operating 

procedures for the ombudsman indicate that the office’s existing 

procedures for tracking, documenting, and reporting on individual 

investigations and overall caseload will be used by the ombudsman. EPA 

did not include the 10 regional ombudsmen in the transfer of the 

function to the OIG, but retained them in the positions they held prior 

to the reorganization. EPA and OIG officials are still working out how 

the regional ombudsmen will be utilized and how they will interact with 

the national ombudsman. For now, the regional ombudsmen will continue 

to have a dual role in fulfilling some ombudsman responsibilities while 

also serving in line management positions, primarily within the 

Superfund program.



While EPA’s decision to remove the national ombudsman from the Office 

of Solid Waste and Emergency Response is consistent with our earlier 

recommendations, placement of the ombudsman in the OIG does not fully 

address the concerns we identified in July 2001 and, as noted in our 

subsequent testimonies, raises issues that have not yet been addressed. 

EPA’s reorganization does not provide the degree of structural or 

functional independence that is (1) typical of ombudsmen in other 

federal agencies or (2) consistent with the relevant professional 

standards for ombudsmen, as shown in the following examples:



* Ombudsmen at other federal agencies report to the highest levels of 

the agency, such as the Office of the Commissioner in case of the Food 

and Drug Administration and the Internal Revenue Service, and can 

decide how their funds will be spent.



* EPA’s national ombudsman, as the position is currently envisioned, 

still will not be able to exercise independent control over the budget 

and staff resources needed to implement the function and can no longer 

independently determine which cases to pursue, as he was able to do 

prior to the reorganization.



* In addition, EPA’s reorganization does not address concerns we raised 

in our 2001 report about the independence of the regional ombudsmen, 

whose position is generally seen as a collateral duty within EPA. In 

other agencies, the staff assigned to the regional ombudsman function 

devote 100 percent of their time to that responsibility and report 

directly to the national ombudsman.



Further, the ombudsman function as typically defined within the 

ombudsman community includes program operating responsibilities, such 

as informally resolving disagreements between the agency and the 

public, but EPA has chosen to omit these responsibilities from the 

national ombudsman’s role. Including them would have conflicted with 

the Inspector General Act, as amended, which prohibits the transfer of 

program operating responsibilities to the Inspector General. As a 

result, however, the agency has established an “ombudsman” that is not 

fully consistent with the typical definition. In addition, placing the 

ombudsman in the OIG could affect the activities of the Inspector 

General. For example, the OIG could no longer independently audit or 

investigate the ombudsman, as the OIG can at other federal agencies 

where the ombudsman function and the OIG are separate entities.



This report includes a recommendation that EPA reconsider placement of 

the national ombudsman in the OIG. In commenting on a draft of this 

report, EPA and OIG officials disagreed with our conclusions that, 

under EPA’s reorganization, the ombudsman function is not consistent 

with the position as typically defined within the ombudsman community 

and lacks sufficient independence. We continue to believe that 

ombudsman and OIG functions are fundamentally different and should not 

be housed together.



Background:



While there are no federal requirements or standards specific to the 

operation of federal ombudsman offices, several professional 

organizations have published relevant standards of practice for 

ombudsmen, such as those published by the American Bar Association 

(ABA), The Ombudsman Association, and the U.S. Ombudsman Association. 

For example, the ABA’s standards[Footnote 7] define the core 

characteristics as follows:



* Independence--An ombudsman must be and appear to be free from 

interference in the legitimate performance of duties and independent 

from control, limitation, or penalty by an officer of the appointing 

entity or a person who may be the subject of a complaint or inquiry.



* Impartiality--An ombudsman must conduct inquiries and investigations 

in an impartial manner, free from initial bias and conflicts of 

interest.



* Confidentiality--An ombudsman must not disclose and must not be 

required to disclose any information provided in confidence, except to 

address an imminent risk of serious harm. Records pertaining to a 

complaint, inquiry, or investigation must be confidential and not 

subject to disclosure outside the ombudsman’s office.



In addition to the core principles, some associations also stress the 

need for accountability and a credible review process. Accountability 

is generally defined in terms of the publication of periodic reports 

that summarize the ombudsman’s findings and activities. Having a 

credible review process generally entails having the authority and the 

means, such as access to agency officials and records, to conduct an 

effective investigation. The ABA recommends that an ombudsman issue and 

publish periodic reports summarizing the findings and activities of the 

office to ensure its accountability to the public.



Our July 2001 report made a number of recommendations to strengthen the 

independence, impartiality, and accountability of the national 

hazardous waste ombudsman and to address impairments to the 

independence of the regional ombudsmen. Specifically, we recommended 

that EPA (1) modify its organizational structure so that the ombudsman 

is located outside of the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response 

and (2) provide the ombudsman with a separate budget and, subject to 

applicable civil service requirements, the authority to hire, fire, and 

supervise his own staff. To ensure the adequacy of the ombudsman’s 

resources and provide greater accountability, we recommended that EPA 

require the ombudsman to (1) develop written criteria for selecting and 

prioritizing cases for investigation; (2) maintain records on his 

investigations and other activities sufficient to serve as a basis for 

a reasonable estimate of resource needs; (3) establish a consistent 

policy for preparing written reports on investigations, consulting with 

agency officials and other affected parties to obtain their comments 

before findings are made public, and including written agency comments 

when reports are published; and (4) file an annual report summarizing 

his activities and make it available to the public. With regard to the 

regional ombudsmen, we recommended that EPA (1) assess the demand for 

ombudsman services nationwide to determine where these resources are 

needed and, (2) in those locations where regional ombudsmen are 

warranted, ensure that their operations are consistent with the 

relevant professional standards for independence.



The Status of EPA’s Reorganization of Its Ombudsman Function:



In general, EPA is implementing its reorganization of the ombudsman 

function by adapting the OIG’s organizational framework to include the 

national ombudsman and applying the OIG’s existing policies and 

procedures to the ombudsman’s operations. EPA is still considering how 

the national ombudsman will interact with the ombudsmen located in the 

agency’s 10 regional offices. While EPA’s reorganization is still in 

its early stages, discussions with OIG officials, their recent 

testimony, and other documents provided the following insights on key 

aspects of the ombudsman function:



* Organizational location. Within the OIG, the national ombudsman will 

report to a newly created Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

and Public Liaison. In addition to the ombudsman function, the new 

Assistant Inspector General has responsibility for the OIG hotline and 

congressional and media relations. According to EPA, the national 

ombudsman was moved from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency 

Response to the OIG to strengthen the ombudsman’s independence. EPA 

officials believe that certain characteristics of the OIG--

independence, credibility, experience, and freedom from political 

influence--are also important elements of an effective ombudsman 

function. While EPA officials acknowledge that the ombudsman is not an 

independent entity within the OIG, they maintain that the position is 

independent by virtue of the OIG’s independence. EPA did not include 

the regional ombudsmen in the transfer of the ombudsman function to the 

OIG, but retained them in the positions they were in prior to the 

reorganization.



* Scope of responsibilities. Prior to the reorganization, the national 

ombudsman’s jurisdiction was limited to the hazardous waste programs 

managed by EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. When the 

ombudsman was relocated to the OIG, EPA decided to expand the scope of 

the ombudsman’s responsibilities across the spectrum of EPA-

administered programs, including those related to air pollution, water 

pollution, safe drinking water, and others. EPA and the OIG have not 

explicitly clarified the programmatic jurisdiction of regional 

ombudsmen, but their position is referred to as “regional Superfund 

ombudsman” and most of them are located within units responsible for 

Superfund and other waste management programs.



* Authority over budget resources. According to OIG officials, the 

national ombudsman will not have a separate budget allocation. Rather, 

the Office of Congressional and Public Liaison will have a specific 

allocation within the OIG budget, consistent with budget operations for 

similar OIG offices. The ombudsman’s resource needs will be determined 

in conjunction with the needs of the new Office of Congressional and 

Public Liaison--and the OIG as a whole--in the context of the 

priorities identified in the OIG’s annual work planning process. EPA 

officials noted that in a broader sense, relocating the ombudsman to 

the OIG increases the function’s financial independence; in effect, the 

ombudsman’s budget is outside EPA’s control because the OIG’s budget 

appropriation is separate from EPA’s.



* Authority over staff resources. Within the OIG, each Assistant 

Inspector General is responsible for assigning staff resources, 

including hiring.[Footnote 8] According to OIG officials, decisions on 

staff resources are largely based on the advice and recommendations of 

senior staff or project leads, such as the national ombudsman. 

Initially, the OIG assigned eight full-time staff to inventory and 

organize the case files transferred from the former ombudsman’s office-

-more than double the staff that had been assigned to the ombudsman 

function when it was located within the Office of Solid Waste and 

Emergency Response. In part, this exercise will help determine the 

ombudsman’s caseload and an appropriate allocation of resources. OIG 

officials noted that the ombudsman now has access to other OIG 

resources as needed, including scientists, auditors, attorneys, 

engineers, and investigators as well as staff with expertise in 

specific subject matters, such as hazardous waste and water pollution. 

At the time of our review, OIG officials were still finalizing 

operating policies and procedures for the ombudsman function in a 

number of areas, including the assignment of other OIG resources to 

ombudsman cases. However, in testimony before the Senate Committee on 

Environment and Public Works, the Inspector General stated that the OIG 

is a matrix organization in which staff and other resources are 

assigned to projects on a priority basis, drawing from the pool of OIG 

resources.[Footnote 9] In addition, according to draft operating 

procedures for the ombudsman, staff will be temporarily assigned from 

OIG Resource Centers (field offices) to perform detailed field work on 

ombudsman assignments under the technical direction of the ombudsman or 

a designee.



* Case selection and prioritization. In general, OIG officials told us 

that the Inspector General has the overall responsibility for the work 

performed by the OIG, and no single staff member--including the 

national ombudsman--has the authority to select and prioritize his or 

her own caseload independent of all other needs. Prior to the 

reorganization, the ombudsman had authority to determine which cases 

warrant further investigation. According to the OIG’s draft operating 

procedures for the ombudsman, all complaints, allegations, concerns, 

and inquiries submitted to the ombudsman will be logged into a tracking 

system, subject to initial screening, and, ultimately, assessed against 

the OIG’s priorities, as established in its annual work planning 

process. Informational inquiries will be referred to the appropriate 

EPA office or to other federal or state agencies if the inquiries are 

not related to EPA programs or operations. Decisions on which matters 

warrant a more detailed review will be made by the Assistant Inspector 

General for Congressional and Public Liaison in consultation with the 

national ombudsman and other OIG staff. Complaints, allegations, and 

concerns deemed to warrant further investigation will be assessed to 

determine if they can be incorporated into ongoing or planned OIG 

assignments. Otherwise, the cases will be proposed as new work, 

evaluated, and prioritized for staffing according to the OIG’s work 

planning evaluation criteria to ensure that staff are assigned to the 

highest priority work. The criteria include potential environmental 

risk; fraud, waste, or abuse risk; the potential for increasing EPA’s 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and the extent of interest by 

external stakeholders, among other things.



* Recordkeeping and accountability. In testimony before the Senate 

Committee on Environment and Public Works, the Inspector General agreed 

that public reporting on the ombudsman’s caseload, activities, and 

accomplishments is a vital and important responsibility.[Footnote 10] 

She also endorsed public accountability as a means of strengthening the 

credibility of a reviewer’s findings and stated that the OIG would 

publish, at least annually, a report summarizing the ombudsman’s work, 

including a status report on cases opened and recommendations or 

findings made to the agency. The OIG’s draft operating procedures for 

the ombudsman indicate that they incorporate existing OIG operating 

policy and procedures, including those for tracking, documenting, and 

reporting the results of investigations. For example, the current 

tracking system will be used to separately track the status of 

ombudsman cases and provide annual or semiannual activity reports on 

the ombudsman’s activities. With regard to reporting on individual 

cases, OIG officials indicated that rather than issue reports to 

complainants, the national ombudsman’s reports will be addressed to the 

EPA Administrator, consistent with the reporting procedures for other 

OIG offices.



* Status of the regional ombudsman. EPA has also not yet fully defined 

the role of its regional ombudsmen or the nature of their relationship 

with the national ombudsman in the OIG. According to officials from the 

Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response and the OIG and draft 

operating procedures for the ombudsman, the investigative aspects of 

the ombudsman function will be assigned to the OIG and the regional 

ombudsmen will respond to inquiries and have a role in informally 

resolving issues between the agency and the public before they escalate 

into complaints about how EPA operates. For the time being, EPA 

officials expect the regional ombudsmen to retain their line management 

positions.[Footnote 11] EPA officials told us that the relationship 

between the national ombudsman and regional ombudsmen is a “work in 

progress” and that EPA and the OIG will be developing procedures for 

when and how interactions will occur. 



Issues Raised by EPA’s Reorganization of the Ombudsman Function:



EPA’s reorganization of the ombudsman function does not fully address 

the issues we raised in our July 2001 report and, as noted in our 

subsequent testimonies, raises some new concerns as well. First, 

several aspects of EPA’s reorganized ombudsman function are not 

consistent with existing professional standards for ombudsmen. For 

example, among the key indicators of independence identified in the ABA 

standards are a budget funded at a level sufficient to carry out the 

ombudsman’s responsibilities; the ability to spend funds independent of 

any approving authority; and the power to appoint, supervise, and 

remove staff. However, under EPA’s reorganization, the national 

ombudsman will not be able to exercise independent control over budget 

and staff resources, even within the general constraints that are faced 

by federal agencies. While the national ombudsman will be consulted 

about the hiring, assignment, and supervision of staff, overall 

authority for staff resources and the budget allocation rests with the 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional and Public Liaison, to 

whom the ombudsman reports.



OIG officials pointed out that the concern our July 2001 report raised 

about control over budget and staff resources was closely linked to the 

ombudsman’s placement within the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency 

Response. The officials believe that once the national ombudsman 

function was relocated to the OIG, the ombudsman’s inability to control 

resources became much less significant as an obstacle to operational 

independence. They maintain that although the ombudsman is not an 

independent entity within the OIG, the position is independent by 

virtue of the OIG’s independence. Nonetheless, we note that the 

national ombudsman will also lack authority to independently select and 

prioritize cases that warrant investigation. If both the ombudsman’s 

budget and workload are outside his or her control, then the ombudsman 

will be unable to ensure that the resources for implementing the 

function are adequate.



As we noted in our July 2001 report, the ombudsmen in the other federal 

agencies we looked at--including the Agency for Toxic Substances and 

Disease Registry, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Food 

and Drug Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service--report to 

the highest levels of the agency.[Footnote 12] In addition, although 

ombudsmen at other federal agencies must live within a budget and are 

subject to the same spending constraints as other offices within their 

agencies, they can set their own priorities and decide how their funds 

will be spent.



Depending on how EPA ultimately defines the role of its regional 

ombudsmen, concerns about their independence could remain. In our July 

2001 report, we concluded that the other duties assigned to the 

regional ombudsmen--primarily line management positions within the 

Superfund program--hamper their independence. Among other things, we 

cited guidance from The Ombudsman Association, which states that an 

ombudsman should serve “no additional role within an organization” 

because holding another position would compromise the ombudsman’s 

neutrality. Although it appears that EPA’s regional ombudsmen will not 

participate in investigations, perceptions about their lack of 

independence could affect their ability to play a role in informally 

mediating disagreements between the agency and the public.



When we looked at how other federal agencies dealt with regional 

ombudsmen as part of our July 2001 report, we found that the ombudsmen 

in two of the other four federal agencies we examined, the Federal 

Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Internal Revenue Service, had 

staff located in regional offices. In both instances, the regional 

staffs devote 100 percent of their time to the ombudsman function; they 

are considered part of the national ombudsman’s office for budget 

purposes and report directly to the national ombudsman.



From a broader perspective, EPA’s reorganization of the ombudsman 

function also raises issues about consistency with the way the role is 

typically defined within the ombudsman community. Specifically, the 

role of an ombudsman typically includes program operating 

responsibilities, such as helping to informally resolve program-related 

issues and mediating disagreements between the agency and the public. 

However, EPA has chosen to omit such responsibilities from the national 

ombudsman’s role within the OIG. Including them would have conflicted 

with the Inspector General Act, as amended, which prohibits an agency 

from transferring any function, power, or duty involving program 

responsibilities to its OIG.[Footnote 13] According to OIG officials, 

the national ombudsman’s role will be limited to reviewing complaints 

about EPA’s programs and operations; the ombudsman will not be 

disseminating basic information about the agency’s programs and 

operations or become an advocate for individuals or groups. OIG 

officials acknowledge that the reorganized ombudsman function differs 

from the accepted definition in some respects, but say that they do not 

intend to have a “traditional” ombudsman function. Under similar 

circumstances, having an ombudsman function that is not consistent with 

the way the position is typically defined has raised concerns within 

ombudsman community. In an April 2001 report on the role of ombudsmen 

in dispute resolution,[Footnote 14] we noted that some federal experts 

in the field were concerned that among the growing number of federal 

“ombuds” or “ombuds offices,” there are some individuals or activities 

that do not generally conform to the standards of practice for 

ombudsmen.



A related issue is that ombudsmen generally serve as a key focal point 

for interaction between the government, or a particular government 

agency, and the general public. By placing the national ombudsman 

function within its OIG, EPA appears to be altering the relationship 

between the function and the persons who make inquiries or complaints. 

Ombudsmen typically see their role as being responsive to the public 

without being an advocate. However, EPA’s reorganization signals a 

subtle change in emphasis: OIG officials see the ombudsman function as 

a source of information regarding the types of issues that the OIG 

should be investigating. In addition, where possible, the OIG plans to 

incorporate complaints made to the ombudsman into ongoing or planned 

OIG investigations. Finally, as noted earlier, OIG officials expect 

that the national ombudsman’s reports will be addressed to the EPA 

Administrator rather than to complainants, consistent with the 

reporting procedures for the OIG. However, the officials told us that 

their procedures for the national ombudsman function, which are still 

being developed, could provide for sending a copy of the final report 

or a summary of the investigation to the original complainant along 

with a separate cover letter when the report is issued to the 

Administrator.



Finally, EPA’s reorganization of the ombudsman function raises issues 

about consistency with the role of the OIG. In reorganizing the 

ombudsman function, EPA had to consider statutory restrictions on the 

Inspector General’s activities. However, although it appears that EPA 

has successfully defined the ombudsman’s role in a way that avoids 

conflict with the Inspector General Act, the reorganization raises 

concerns about the effect on the OIG. With the ombudsman function a 

part of the OIG, the Inspector General can no longer independently 

audit and investigate that function, as is the case at other federal 

agencies where the ombudsman function and the OIG are separate 

entities. As we noted in a June 2001 report on certain activities of 

the OIG at the Department of Housing and Urban Development, under 

applicable government auditing standards the OIG cannot independently 

and impartially audit and investigate activities in which it is 

directly involved.[Footnote 15] Also of potential concern are 

situations in which the national ombudsman receives an inquiry or 

complaint about a matter that has already been investigated by the OIG. 

For example, OIG reports are typically transmitted to the EPA 

Administrator after a review by the Inspector General. A process that 

requires the Inspector General to review an ombudsman-prepared report 

that is critical of, or could be construed as reflecting negatively on, 

previous OIG work could pose a conflict for the Inspector General.



Conclusions:



EPA’s reorganization of its ombudsman function has addressed some of 

the recommendations contained in our July 2001 report. For example, the 

agency modified its organizational structure so that the national 

ombudsman is located outside of the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency 

Response. In addition, as we recommended, EPA’s ombudsman function now 

has written criteria for selecting and prioritizing cases for 

investigation and, by virtue of its relocation to the OIG, will be 

adopting many of that office’s existing procedures for tracking, 

documenting, and reporting the results of investigations and 

summarizing annual activities in a public report.



Notwithstanding the positive aspects of EPA’s reorganization, other 

concerns remain. While the move to the OIG provides a measure of 

budgetary independence, the national ombudsman will continue to lack 

independent control over budget and staff resources. In addition, EPA 

has not yet resolved concerns about the independence of its regional 

ombudsmen. Moreover, in relocating the national ombudsman to the OIG, 

EPA has created a position that will not function as a “true” ombudsman 

in interactions with the public and may adversely affect the 

independence of the OIG.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



To ensure that EPA’s national ombudsman (1) is consistent with what the 

ombudsman community and the public have come to expect from that 

position and (2) does not adversely affect the independence of the 

agency’s OIG, we recommend that the Administrator, EPA, reconsider 

placement of the national ombudsman in the OIG.



Agency Comments:



EPA and the OIG commented on a draft of this report. Specifically, we 

received comments from the Assistant Administrator of the Office of 

Solid Waste and Emergency Response and the Inspector General. These 

comments are contained in appendix I and appendix II, respectively. In 

addition, we incorporated technical comments from the OIG as 

appropriate throughout the report.



EPA commented that its reorganization of the ombudsman function 

achieves the “spirit” of the ABA standards for ombudsmen and cited the 

OIG’s independence, objectivity, and quality of work as reasons why the 

relocation of the national ombudsman to the OIG was a sound and correct 

decision. More specifically, EPA said that locating the ombudsman in 

the OIG ensures that the function operates within ABA’s standards of 

practice for ombudsmen: independence, impartiality, and 

confidentiality. Similarly, the comments from the OIG raised a number 

of points relating to the appropriateness of housing the ombudsman in 

the OIG. Among other things, the OIG said that it intends to perform 

the ombudsman function in the same manner in which the office performs 

its audit, program evaluation, and investigative functions. The OIG 

also maintained that its independence--in terms of controlling budget 

and staff resources, selecting and prioritizing cases, and reporting--

are characteristics that also surround the ombudsman function by virtue 

of the function’s location within the OIG. In response to our concerns 

about the reorganization’s impact on the role of the OIG, the office 

commented that its framework of internal and external checks and 

balances is adequate to ensure that OIG officials can objectively 

monitor the quality of internal work processes, including those of the 

ombudsman, and address problems if necessary. These checks and balances 

would also ensure objectivity in the OIG’s review of any ombudsman 

reports critical of OIG work, according to the Inspector General.



We disagree with the premise underlying the comments by EPA and the 

OIG--that there is little or no distinction between the functions 

performed by ombudsmen and the OIG. We believe that these functions are 

fundamentally different and, as such, should not be housed together. 

[Footnote 16] The OIG intends to perform its ombudsman function in the 

same manner in which the office performs its audit, program evaluation, 

and investigative functions, but doing so means that EPA will have an 

ombudsman in name only. ABA’s standards clearly define the ombudsman’s 

role as including certain responsibilities that have been omitted from 

the OIG’s conception of the ombudsman function. Specifically, according 

to ABA, ombudsmen “work for the resolution of particular issues” and, 

among other things, are engaged in “developing, evaluating, and 

discussing options available to affected individuals” and 

“facilitating, negotiating, and mediating.” If EPA and the OIG are 

intent on maintaining their reorganization, we concur with ABA’s 

position that “those who are now called ombudsmen but do not meet these 

Standards may provide important or valuable services. But, it would be 

far better if entities that established these positions were to call 

them a term more fitting of the function they provide and to reserve 

the term ‘ombudsman’ for those who do in fact meet certain basic 

authorities and essential characteristics.”:



EPA also commented that based on its preliminary research, some of the 

ombudsmen in other federal agencies we contacted may not have as much 

independence as our report suggests. Specifically, EPA stated that the 

ombudsmen at the Food and Drug Administration and the Internal Revenue 

Service (1) do not have independence from agency decision-making 

processes and (2) do not have independent budgets because their budgets 

are allocated according to decisions by their respective commissioners 

and subject to competing demands from other priorities. We disagree. 

Both the Food and Drug Administration and the Internal Revenue Service, 

whose ombudsmen report to their respective commissioners, have adopted 

measures to help ensure that the ombudsmen are isolated from agency 

decision-making processes likely to be the subject of investigations. 

Consistent with the ABA standards, these ombudsmen have both 

“sufficient stature in the organization to be taken seriously by senior 

officials” and “placement in an organization at the highest possible 

level and at least above the heads of units likely to generate the most 

complaints.” Regarding budgetary independence, our report acknowledges 

that ombudsmen at other federal agencies must live within a budget and 

are subject to the same spending constraints as other offices within 

their agencies. In contrast to EPA’s national ombudsman, however, the 

other federal ombudsmen have a specifically allocated budget, can set 

their own priorities, and can decide how their funds will be spent.



Finally, EPA commented that its Community Involvement and Outreach 

Center provides “an avenue for active community involvement and 

participation in Superfund issues” and is specifically charged with 

responding to community concerns. However, we believe that the center 

serves a different purpose than an ombudsman. While the center may help 

alleviate community concerns, its focus is limited to Superfund issues 

and providing greater community access and participation, not 

fulfilling an ombudsman role, particularly with respect to the 

independent investigation and resolution of individual complaints.



Scope and Methodology:



To determine how EPA is implementing its reorganization of the 

ombudsman function, we met with key officials from EPA’s Office of 

Inspector General and Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. We 

also reviewed relevant testimony by EPA and OIG officials and other 

pertinent documents, such as the OIG’s new case selection criteria for 

the ombudsman and EPA’s response to congressional inquiries about the 

reorganization.



To identify issues raised by the reorganization, we followed up on 

preliminary observations provided in our testimony of June 2002 and 

July 2002.[Footnote 17] As part of this effort, we used information 

developed for our July 2001 report, including information on relevant 

professional standards for ombudsmen, such as those published by ABA, 

The Ombudsman Association, and the U.S. Ombudsman Association. We also 

reviewed legislation applicable to Inspector General offices and other 

relevant GAO reports.



We conducted our review from June 2002 through September 2002 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.



As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 

of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 

from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 

to the Administrator, EPA, and other interested parties. We will also 

make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report 

will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have questions about this report, please call me 

at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this assignment were Ellen 

Crocker, Les Mahagan, Richard Johnson, and Cynthia Norris.



Sincerely yours,



John B. Stephenson

Director, Natural Resources and Environment:

Signed by John B. Stephenson:



[End of section]



Appendix I: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency:



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460:



Mr. John B. Stephenson Director:



Natural Resources and Environment U.S. General Accounting Office 

Washington, D.C. 20548:



OCT 28 2002:



OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE:



Dear Mr. Stephenson:



I am responding to your request that the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA or Agency) review the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft 

report on the organizational placement of the ombudsman. EPA 

appreciates the opportunity to respond to the draft report.



We continue to believe that the transfer of the National Solid and 

Hazardous Waste Ombudsman function to the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) was a correct and sound decision, and that it addresses those 

concerns that were raised in GAO’s July 2001 report. When Administrator 

Whitman authorized the transfer in her November 27, 2001 memorandum, 

she believed then - and continues to believe now - that the OIG is the 

logical home for the function, with its newly expanded role to 

investigate complaints about all Agency environmental programs. Within 

the EPA organization, locating the ombudsman in the OIG ensures 

that.the function operates with independence, impartiality, and 

confidentiality, which are standards of practice for ombudsmen, 

according to the American Bar Association (ABA). The OIG has an 

excellent track record of objectively evaluating interests and has 

extensively trained technical staff that will support the ombudsman’s 

expanded scope of work. There is no other office within the Agency 

which, by statute, provides for this level of independence.



The independence of the OIG is ensured through its separate budget 

authority, hiring and contracting authority, and distinct reporting 

responsibilities to Congress that is independent from the Agency. In 

addition, internal and external controls monitor the OIG’s quality of 

work, identify areas for improvements, and ensure that the ombudsman 

operates with the highest level of integrity and efficiency.



While the draft report provides analysis of ombudsmen in other Federal 

organizations, our preliminary research suggests that some of the 

Federal ombudsmen may not have the degree of independence the draft 

report suggests. For example, neither the Food and Drug Administration 

(FDA) nor the Internal Revenue Service (TRS) ombudsman functions have 

independence from:



*Printed Whh Vegetable ON Based inks on 100% Recycled:



Agency decision making processes, which is suggested in the ABA 

standards. In contrast, the EPA ombudsman is independent from the 

Agency decision making processes, since the OIG is an independent 

organization within EPA,



Our preliminary research also finds that the ombudsmen at FDA and IRS 

do not have independent budgets, as inferred in the draft report. 

According to our colleagues at FDA and IRS, the ombudsmens’ budgets are 

reviewed along with others in their respective Commissioner’s office, 

and resources are allocated according to their decisions.	In addition, 

FDA and IRS ombudsmens’ budgets are subject to the resource demands of 

other priorities when additional funds are required to supplement 

programs. Therefore, we believe that the funding processes for the OIG 

ombudsman function at EPA compare favorably to those at FDA and IRS, 

both of which require management review and approval.



As the GAO draft report indicates, the ombudsman in OIG does not retain 

program operating responsibilities, such as resolving disagreements 

between the Agency and the public. However, EPA continues to maintain a 

Community Involvement and Outreach Center to provide an avenue for 

active community involvement and participation in Superfund issues. The 

Center is specifically charged with responding to community concerns.



Many of the issues that are identified in the draft report have been 

and continue to be addressed during a transition period. One issue 

concerns the independence of regional ombudsmen and their relationships 

with the national ombudsman function. The OIG is reviewing this and 

other issues, as stated in the Inspector General’s letter to you dated 

October 11, 2002.



We believe that the placement of the ombudsman function in the OIG 

achieves the spirit of the ABA standards and that of the ombudsman 

community in the Federal context. ‘We expect that the OIG will continue 

to provide the Agency and the American public with quality and 

objective evaluations:



Thank you for this opportunity to review the draft report. I appreciate 

GAO’s consideration of these comments and their incorporation in the 

final report. I am available to discuss them with you, and your staff 

may contact Steve Tiber at 202/564-5184 for additional clarifications.



Sincerely,



Marianne Lamont Horinko:

Assistant Administrator:

Signed by MArianne Lamont Horinko:



[End of section]



Appendix II: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency:



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460:



OCT 11 2002:



THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:



Mr. John B. Stephenson:



Director, Natural Resources and Environment U.S. General Accounting 

Office:



441 G Street, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20548:



Dear Mr. Stephenson:



Thank you for the opportunity to review your recently issued draft 

report, “Issues Raised by the Reorganization of EPA’s Ombudsman 

Function.” We offer the following comments.



The draft report questions whether the Office of Inspector General’s 

(OIG’s) Ombudsman function is inconsistent “with the way the position 

is typically defined . . . “ We believe there is no question that the 

OIG Ombudsman function is fully consistent with a typical Ombudsman 

definition. On July 2, 2002, the American Bar Association (ABA) 

submitted comments to the Honorable James M. Jeffords, Chairman of the 

Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, regarding S. 606, the 

“Ombudsman Reauthorization Act of 2002.” In suggesting that S. 606 

“clearly set forth the role and jurisdiction of the ombudsman,” the 

ABA’ recommended that the bill:



. . . state whether the EPA Ombudsman is a ‘classical’ or ‘advocate’ 

ombuds. A classical ombuds operates in the public sector addressing 

issues raised by the general public or internally, usually concerning 

the actions or policies of government entities or individuals. An 

advocate ombuds, like a classical, evaluates claims objectively but 

is authorized or required to advocate on behalf of individuals or 

groups found to be aggrieved.. . .	(Emphasis added):



We have clearly stated in congressional testimony that we intend to 

operate in the “classical,” versus the “advocate” Ombudsman role. It is 

no less of an Ombudsman role. Furthermore, we have stated often that we 

intend to perform this function in the same manner which we perform our 

audit, program evaluation, and investigative functions. That is, the 

OIG will not become an “advocate” for the specialized interests of 

individuals or groups. We review and analyze problems in the EPA 
programs 

and operations and recommend solutions. That is what Inspectors General 
do. 

We believe other Federal agency Ombudsman, such as the Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corporation, also operate in that manner.



The report challenges the degree of Ombudsman independence and the 

application of Ombudsman professional standards subsequent to the 

placement of the Ombudsman in the OIG. We disagree with these 

characterizations. As we have publicly stated in congressional:



testimony, we believe the IG Act provides complete independence for the 

OIG as an organization as well as for all of its employees. We select, 

prioritize and carry out all of our work assignments independent of EPA 

oversight. We have separate budget authority, separate hiring and 

contracting authority, and independent reporting responsibilities to 

Congress. These are some of the key characteristics that enable us to 

effectively review Agency programs and assure our structural 

independence. These characteristics surround the Ombudsman and, thus, 

provide the requisite “independence” from the government entity being 

reviewed - the EPA. It is difficult to conceive how any further 

positional independence can or needs to be achieved. We do not believe 

that an individual must be free from basic managerial oversight to have 

the structural independence to carry out the work of an Ombudsman, or 

any other activity.



Regarding Ombudsman professional standards, the OIG has not 

specifically adopted such standards. We note, however, that the 

American Bar Association standards mirror professional standards found 

in GAO’s Government Auditing Standards and are already fully 

incorporated in OIG operations. These include standards such as 

independence, impartiality, and confidentiality. Again, it is difficult 

to conceive how the application of these standards can be further 

enhanced.



The draft report states that OIG Ombudsman detailed policies and 

operating procedures are still under development. Since the time of 

your fieldwork, we drafted Ombudsman operating procedures to guide our 

work. These procedures address many of the recommendations made in your 

July 2001 report, “EPA’s National and Regional Ombudsmen Do Not Have 

Sufficient Independence,” such as developing case selection and 

prioritization criteria, maintaining case file records, establishing a 

case reporting policy that include an agency comment process, and 

preparing an annual report of activities. These operating procedures 

appear at Enclosure I for your consideration as you prepare your final 

report.



The draft report also states EPA is still considering how the OIG 

Ombudsman will interact with EPA regional Ombudsmen. There have been 

several developments since the time of your fieldwork. First, in June 

2002, we issued a memorandum jointly signed by the OIG and the Office 

of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER) that defines general 

roles and responsibilities for each office as well as coordination 

expectations. This memorandum appears at Enclosure 2 for your 

consideration. Second, our operating procedures provide further 

guidance on coordination and communication to include regular meetings 

and case referral procedures. Third, the OIG recently initiated a 

review to assess OSWER’s Regional Ombudsman Program. A copy of our 

engagement letter appears at Enclosure 3.



The draft report discusses whether OIG’s assumption of the Ombudsman 

function raises concerns because “the Inspector General can no longer 

independently audit and investigate that function.” We believe these 

concerns are misplaced.



OIGs have “checks and balances” (both internal and external), enabling 

them to monitor the quality of their work processes and, if need be, 

address problems or make improvements. These mechanisms apply to all of 

our activities, including our Ombudsman activities. First, we have 

Quality Assurance Reviews (QAR), Annual Self-Assessments (ASA), and 

Administrative Program Reviews (APR) of our program activities. A copy 

of the IG Policy describing these mechanisms appears as Enclosure 4. 

Second, each OIG employee is required to annually sign an impairments 

Statement, a sample of which appears at Enclosure 5. Third, we have 

peer reviews conducted every 3 years by another OIG organization. 

Fourth, if we determined that a matter arose which we could not 

adequately address ourselves (e.g., due to the seriousness of an . 

allegation of wrongdoing by an OIG employee or the senior position of 

an OIG employee), we would refer the matter to the President’s Council 

on Integrity and Efficiency, to another Federal agency with 

jurisdiction over the matter, or to another law enforcement authority 

(including another O1G).



Finally, the draft report states, “[a]lso of potential concern are 

situations in which the national ornbudsman receives an inquiry or 

complaint about a matter that has already been investigated by the OIG. 

. . . A process that requires the Inspector General to review an 

Ombudsman-prepared report that is critical of, or could be construed as 

reflecting negatively on, previous OIG work could pose a conflict for 

the Inspector General.” If I review an Ombudsman-prepared report 

critical of earlier OIG work, it would be incumbent on me to correct 

any deficiencies. This is the case whether I receive such a report from 

the Ombudsman, a QAR, an ASA, an APR, the peer review process, or the 

results from an outside referral. If need be, I will recuse myself from 

any matter in which I had prior personal involvement that might impact 

my objectivity. Again, that is standard practice in the IG community.



If you have any questions, or need additional information, do not 

hesitate to contact me at . (202) 566-0847.



Sincerely,



Nikki L.Tinsley:

Signed By Nikki L. Tinsley:



Enclosures:



Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 

end of this appendix.



See comment 1.



The following are GAO’s comment on the Office of Inspector General’s 

letter dated October 11, 2002.



GAO Comment:



1. The enclosures provided by the OIG indicate that EPA and the OIG are 

still developing policies and procedures for the regional ombudsmen and 

how they will interact with the national ombudsman within the OIG. For 

example, the enclosure concerning the OIG’s review of the regional 

ombudsman program states that the review, which was scheduled to begin 

in September 2002, includes questions on the roles and responsibilities 

of the regional ombudsmen and actions taken by EPA to address GAO’s 

recommendations regarding the regional ombudsmen:



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FOOTNOTES



[1] The Congress established the ombudsman function in 1984 amendments 

to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which governs the 

management of solid and hazardous waste.



[2] The Superfund program was established under the Comprehensive 

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 to 

clean up highly contaminated hazardous waste sites.



[3] In contrast, internal or “workplace” ombudsmen provide an 

alternative to more formal processes to deal with conflicts and other 

issues that arise in the workplace. See U.S. General Accounting Office, 

Human Capital: The Role of Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution, GAO-01-466 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2001) for information on the role of 

ombudsmen in resolving workplace issues.



[4] The Administrative Conference of the United States was an 

independent advisory agency in the executive branch that issued 

recommendations and statements on the improvement of the federal 

administrative process. The agency was terminated in fiscal year 1996. 



[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Hazardous Waste: EPA’s National and 

Regional Ombudsmen Do Not Have Sufficient Independence, GAO-01-813 

(Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2001).



[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Environmental Protection: Issues 

for Consideration in the Reorganization of EPA’s Ombudsman Function, 

GAO-02-859T and GAO-02-947T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002, and July 

16, 2002, respectively).



[7] American Bar Association, Standards for the Establishment and 

Operation of Ombudsman Offices, (Aug. 2001) http://www.abanet.org/

adminlaw/ombuds/ostdsfinal.doc (downloaded October 21, 2002). To help 

develop the standards, ABA’s Sections of Administrative Law and 

Regulatory Practice and Dispute Resolution appointed a steering 

committee, which included representatives from several ombudsman 

associations: the Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen, The Ombudsman 

Association, the U.S. Ombudsman Association, and the University and 

College Ombuds Association. 



[8] In April 2002, the OIG appointed an acting ombudsman; OIG officials 

said that once an official position description has been prepared, they 

will issue a vacancy announcement to fill the position permanently.



[9] Testimony of Nikki L. Tinsley, Inspector General, U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, before the Senate Committee on 

Environment and Public Works, June 25, 2002.



[10] Testimony of Nikki L. Tinsley, June 25, 2002.



[11] EPA officials told us that they are piloting a new approach in 

three regional offices in which the ombudsmen will be increasing their 

level of involvement in the ombudsman role, although the individuals 

will continue to have other responsibilities.



[12] For example, the ombudsmen from the Food and Drug Administration 

and the Internal Revenue Service each report to the Office of the 

Commissioner in their respective agencies.



[13] See 5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 9(a)(2).



[14] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: The Role of 

Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution, GAO-01-466 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 

2001).



[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, HUD Inspector General: Actions 

Needed to Strengthen Management and Oversight of Operation Safe Home, 

GAO-01-794 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2001).



[16] Similarly, in comments on S. 606, the Ombudsman Reauthorization 

Act of 2001, The Ombudsman Association cited concerns about the 

placement of the ombudsman function within the OIG, saying that the 

tenets of the inspector general and ombudsman professions are not 

compatible. For example, the association pointed out that inspectors 

general serve a compliance function while the ombudsman function is 

specifically designated as an alternative to formal compliance 

channels.



[17] GAO-02-859T and GAO-02-947T.



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