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entitled 'International Trade: Advisory Committee System Should Be 
Updated to Better Serve U.S. Policy Needs' which was released on 
October 23, 2002.



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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, U.S. 

Senate:



September 2002:



INTERNATIONAL TRADE:



Advisory Committee System Should Be Updated to Better Serve U.S. Policy 

Needs:



GAO-02-876:



Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



Negotiators and Agency Officials Believe the Advisory Committee System 

Provides Value in U.S. Trade Policy:



Most Members Generally Satisfied with Their Committees, but Cite 

Problems with the Consultation Process that Are Hindering the System’s 

Effectiveness:



Advisory Committee System’s Structure and Composition Do Not Fully 

Reflect U.S. Economy and Trade Policy Needs:



System Lacks Sufficient Leadership, Administrative Support to Reliably 

Meet Mandated Responsibilities:



Conclusions:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Matters for Congressional Consideration:



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



Appendixes:



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



Scope:



Methodology:



Appendix II: Applying Fair Balance Requirement to Trade Advisory 
Committees:



FACA Requires Fair Balance on Federal Advisory Committees:



FACA’s Fair Balance Requirement Applies to Trade Advisory Committees:



Trade Act Not Clear on What Fair Balance Means within Trade Advisory 

Committee Structure:



Appendix III: Nomination and Security Clearance Process for Trade 
Advisory

Committees:



Appendix IV: Results of GAO’s Survey of Trade Advisory Committee 
Members:



Appendix V: Comparisons of Committee Structure with Trade Indicators:



Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative:



Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:



GAO Comment:



Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Commerce:



GAO Comments:



Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:



GAO Contact:



Staff Acknowledgments:



Tables:



Table 1: Percentage of Survey Respondents Who Were Very Satisfied or 

Generally Satisfied with Committee Operations:



Table 2: Respondents’ Opinions about the Amount of Time Devoted to 

Various Activities at Committee Meetings:



Table 3: Satisfaction with the Extent to which the Executive Branch 

Sought the Committees’ Advice:



Table 4: Differences among Committee Tiers in Satisfaction with 

Committee Operations:



Table 5: Shares of Total U.S. Exports and Imports and Percentage of 

Membership by Committee, 2000:



Figures:



Figure 1: Players Involved in U.S. Trade Policy Development:



Figure 2: Trade Advisory Committee Structure:



Figure 3: Formal and Informal Consultation Process for Advisory 

Committees:



Figure 4: Industry Share of GDP, 1974-1999:



Figure 5: Major Industry Shares of Membership and Trade, 2000:



Figure 6: Manufacturing Committees with Membership Shares above or 
below 

Shares of Exports and Imports, 2000:



Figure 7: Committee Membership Levels as a Percentage of Authorized 

Membership Levels, Fiscal Year 2001:



Figure 8: Timeline for Authorization of Existing Trade Advisory 

Committees:



Figure 9: Average Number of Meetings Per Committee by Tier, Per Year, 

Fiscal Years 1999-2001:



Figure 10: Absolute Number of Meetings by Tier, Fiscal Years 1999-2001:



Figure 11: Advisory Committee Appointment Process and Timetable for 

USTR, USDA, and Commerce:



Abbreviations:



ACTPN: Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations:



ATAC: Agriculture Technical Advisory Committee:



DFO: Designated Federal Official:



FACA: Federal Advisory Committee Act:



IFAC: Industry Functional Advisory Committee:



ISAC: Industry Sector Advisory Committee:



NGO: Nongovernmental organization:



OIAPL: Office of Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Liaison:



USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:



USTR: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative:



WTO: World Trade Organization:



Letter September 24, 2002:



The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance

United States Senate:



Dear Senator Grassley:



In 1974, Congress mandated creation of a private sector advisory system 

to ensure that representatives from private business and other groups 

with a stake in trade policy could provide input as negotiations 

unfolded. The hope was that such involvement would result in trade 

agreements that Congress could approve with confidence. The law, as 

amended, established a three-tier structure of committees to advise the 

President on overall U.S. trade policy, general policy areas, and 

technical aspects of trade agreements. Among other things, the law 

requires the President to consult with these committees on a continuing 

and timely basis. Four agencies, led by the Office of the U.S. Trade 

Representative, currently administer the committee system. Legislation 

recently passed by Congress granted the President trade promotion 

authority to negotiate trade agreements--previously known as “fast 

track” negotiating authority--and renewed lapsed portions of the 

advisory committee system’s mandate.[Footnote 1] However, committee 

members and executive branch officials participating in the system have 

voiced concerns about the current system’s operation and readiness to 

support trade policy.



In light of these concerns, as well as the launch of a major round of 

trade talks at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and accelerating 

negotiations for regional free trade, you asked us to examine the role, 

structure, and operations of the trade advisory committee system to 

ensure that it is still poised to meet the objectives set by Congress. 

In this report, we examine (1) the system’s value to U.S. trade policy, 

(2) participants’ level of satisfaction with specific aspects of the 

consultation process as well as aspects that participants said could be 

improved, (3) the degree to which the system matches the current U.S. 

economy and supports U.S. trade policy needs, and (4) the Office of the 

U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) and the other agencies’ management 

of the system.



To address these issues, we surveyed 720 of the 735 committee members 

about their experiences in the system;[Footnote 2] conducted 168 

interviews with every type of participant in the committee process, 

including selected committee chairs, members, U.S. negotiators involved 

in key trade initiatives, other executive branch officials, 

nongovernmental interest groups, and trade experts; and analyzed data 

and documents relevant to committee mandates, procedures, activities, 

membership, economic size, and trade flows. (For a full description of 

our scope and methodology, see app. I.):



Results in Brief:



According to many negotiators, agency officials, and committee members, 

the trade policy advisory committee system plays an important role in 

U.S. trade policy and has made valuable contributions to U.S. trade 

agreements. Officials with whom we met said that the committees are a 

unique forum for candid discussion of sensitive trade negotiating 

topics and help U.S. trade officials readily tap a wide range of 

private sector expertise. U.S. negotiators cited numerous specific 

cases of input from advisory committees that helped them secure more 

beneficial trade agreements. Our analysis of committee documents found 

ample evidence that the U.S. Trade Representative and other executive 

branch agencies are informing advisers about developments in U.S. trade 

policy and seeking their input, formally and informally, on key trade 

initiatives.



While our survey of committee members found high levels of satisfaction 

with many aspects of committee operations and effectiveness, more than 

a quarter of respondents indicated that the system has not realized its 

potential to contribute to U.S. trade policy. We identified three 

aspects of the consultation process that could be improved. First, 

consultations were not always timely enough to have an impact on U.S. 

policy, in part because certain committees have not met at all or meet 

irregularly. Second, members and negotiators believed that the 

consultations were not always meaningful or useful. In some cases, 

tight meeting agendas were not conducive to fully vetting views and 

formulating committee advice. In other cases, committees were asked to 

comment on complex initiatives but were given little time to review the 

initiatives and limited access to key documents. Third, members believe 

that the system’s consultation process needs greater accountability to 

ensure that advice is considered. An 8-year lapse of trade negotiating 

authority had eliminated the committees’ channel for reporting to 

Congress, and more than a third of the respondents to our survey stated 

that executive branch officials are not informing them when there are 

“significant departures from advice,” as the law requires. In addition 

to these member concerns, some negotiators believe the committees 

cannot provide the type or quality of advice they need.



The structure and composition of the committee system have not been 

fully updated to reflect changes in the U.S. economy and U.S. trade 

policy. Representation of the services sector has not kept pace with 

its growing importance to U.S. output and trade. Certain manufacturing 

sectors, such as electronics, have fewer members than their sizable 

trade would indicate. In general, the system’s committee structure is 

largely the same as it was in 1980, even though the focus of U.S. trade 

policy has shifted from border taxes (tariffs) toward other complex 

trade issues, such as protection of intellectual property rights and 

food safety requirements. As a result, the system has gaps in its 

coverage of industry sectors, trade issues, and stakeholders. On the 

industry side, committee rosters are only about 50 percent of their 

authorized levels, and some large companies do not participate. On the 

policy side, negotiators report that some key issues in negotiations, 

such as investment, are not adequately covered. Although nonbusiness 

stakeholders such as labor and environmental groups have membership on 

certain committees, they report feeling marginalized in the system as a 

whole because they are permitted membership on relatively few 

committees and perceive difficulty ensuring that their views get 

serious consideration. Furthermore, applicable legislation and court 

cases do not provide clear guidance about how nonbusiness interests 

should participate in the system.



Leadership direction and administrative support by USTR and the other 

managing agencies have not been sufficient to ensure that the advisory 

committee system works reliably. We found that negotiators have used 

inconsistent approaches to solicit committee member views, with some 

negotiators not consulting with committees at all. In addition, the 

nomination and appointment process is time consuming, making it hard to 

replace members or fill representation needs. Committee operations have 

been interrupted for 6 months or longer because some agencies failed to 

renew committee charters. The result has been to temporarily deny 

certain committees input into key negotiations. The burden of 

administrative tasks on agencies’ resources has limited their capacity 

to pursue steps that would strengthen the system’s performance.



Given Congress’ desire for a standing system to provide the President 

with confidential and representative private sector advice, we are 

recommending that responsible agencies make changes to strengthen the 

advisory committee system’s capacity to contribute to U.S. trade 

policy. Specifically, we recommend that agencies improve the 

consultation process, update the system’s structure and membership, and 

upgrade system management. In addition, we suggest that Congress may 

wish to consider providing guidance on achieving balance among various 

interests in the system and easing certain administrative requirements.



In responding to our draft report, the U.S. Trade Representative and 

the Department of Agriculture agreed with our overall findings and 

outlined initial steps they are taking to implement our 

recommendations. Commerce characterized the report as thorough and 

fair, but urged us to make a number of modifications. For example, 

Commerce argued that in some cases we underplayed member satisfaction 

with the system and it took issue with our conclusions on apparent 

mismatches between the committee structure and the current U.S. economy 

and agencies’ administrative capacity. In most cases, we disagreed and 

declined to modify this report accordingly.



Background:



As part of its constitutional authority to regulate commerce with 

foreign nations, Congress has long delegated to the President authority 

to proclaim reciprocal tariff reductions with U.S. trading partners and 

has encouraged the President to enter into certain trade agreements 

that meet congressionally mandated objectives. Congress established the 

trade advisory committee system in Section 135 of the Trade Act of 

1974[Footnote 3] as a way to institutionalize domestic input into such 

U.S. trade negotiations from interested parties outside the federal 

government. This system was considered necessary because of complaints 

from some in the business community about their limited and ad hoc role 

in previous negotiations. The 1974 law created a system of committees 

through which such advice, along with advice from labor and consumer 

groups, was to be sought.



In practice, USTR has primary responsibility within the executive 

branch for developing U.S. trade policy, and the President has 

delegated to USTR the role of leading the trade advisory committee 

process. Additional players in developing U.S. trade policy include 

other executive branch agencies, particularly the departments of 

Commerce and Agriculture; the private sector, including business and 

nonbusiness groups; and state and local governments. USTR also 

maintains close consultation with Congress.[Footnote 4] The advisory 

committee system is one of several ways that USTR obtains input from 

the private sector (see fig. 1). In fact, Section 135 of the Trade Act 

also requires USTR to provide an opportunity to private organizations 

or groups outside the advisory committee system to present their views 

on trade issues.[Footnote 5]



Figure 1: Players Involved in U.S. Trade Policy Development:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO.



[End of figure]



The system, created in 1974, was originally intended to provide private 

sector input to global trade negotiations occurring at that time (the 

Tokyo Round). Since then, the original legislation has been amended to 

expand the scope of topics on which the President is required to seek 

information and advice from “negotiating objectives and bargaining 

positions before entering into a trade agreement” to the “operation of 

any trade agreement, once entered into,” and on other matters regarding 

administration of U.S. trade policy.[Footnote 6] The legislation has 

also been amended to include additional interests within the advisory 

committee structure, such as those represented by the services sector 

and state and local governments. Finally, the amended legislation 

requires the executive branch to inform the committees of “significant 

departures” from their advice.[Footnote 7]



The trade advisory committees are subject to the requirements of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),[Footnote 8] with limited 

exceptions pertaining to holding public meetings and public 

availability of documents.[Footnote 9] One of FACA’s requirements is 

that advisory committees be fairly balanced in terms of points of view 

represented and the functions the committees perform.[Footnote 10] FACA 

covers most federal advisory committees and includes a number of 

administrative requirements, such as requiring rechartering of 

committees if they are to continue for more than 2 years.



The structure of the trade advisory committee system consists of three 

tiers, with the top tier directed by law to provide “overall policy 

advice,” the second tier to provide “general policy advice,” and the 

third tier to provide “technical advice and information.” However, 

Section 135 of the Trade Act does not establish any formal relationship 

among these tiers, nor does it authorize the first tier to exercise any 

control over the other two. USTR, working jointly with the other 

relevant executive departments, has the discretion to create, change, 

and terminate committees in the second and third tiers.



The system comprises about 735 advisers spread across 34 

committees,[Footnote 11] with the bulk of the advisers and committees 

in the third, technical tier. This tier consists of 17 industry sector 

advisory committees (ISACs), 4 industry functional advisory committees 

(IFACs), a committee of ISAC and IFAC chairpersons, and 5 agricultural 

technical advisory committees (ATACs). The second tier currently 

consists of five policy advisory committees. The first tier consists of 

just one committee, the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and 

Negotiations (ACTPN), whose members are appointed by the President. 

Figure 2 illustrates the committee structure.



Figure 2: Trade Advisory Committee Structure:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO.



[End of figure]



The advisory committees are administered by USTR, which assumes a 

leadership role, along with the departments of Agriculture, Commerce, 

and Labor. USTR is responsible for administering ACTPN and three of the 

tier-2 Policy Advisory Committees, and shares responsibility with the 

other agencies for administering the rest of the committees. The 

Department of Commerce co-administers the majority of these committees-

-the ISACs, IFACs, and the Committee of Chairs.[Footnote 12] The 

Department of Agriculture (Agriculture) coadministers six others--the 

ATACs and the tier-2 Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee. The 

Department of Labor (Labor) is responsible for coadministering a tier-

2 Policy Advisory Committee. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

plays a supportive role in the activities of the tier-2 Trade and 

Environment Policy Committee (TEPAC) but does not administer it 

directly.



Negotiators and Agency Officials Believe the Advisory Committee System 

Provides Value in U.S. Trade Policy:



The advisory committee system’s unique features give it an important 

role in U.S. trade policy. Many negotiators use the system and report 

that the committees have made important contributions to successful 

U.S. trade agreements. Our analysis of documents indicates that 

committees have been given numerous opportunities to provide formal 

advice at committee meetings and through informal channels.



Committee System Has Unique Features and Makes Important Contributions:



The advisory committee system is unique in U.S. trade policy because it 

provides a forum in which business and other interested groups can 

consult confidentially with and provide advice to the executive branch 

on trade negotiations, U.S. trade policy, and implementation of trade 

agreements. The formal nature of advisory meetings helps ensure that 

representatives of the private sector and other groups have regular 

access to officials engaged in U.S. trade policy. Further, the system 

provides government officials with a body of private sector experts 

with whom they can develop an ongoing dialogue. Since USTR’s 

administrative procedures for the advisory committees require advisers 

to obtain security clearances before participating, the committees 

offer an environment conducive to discussing sensitive negotiating 

information.



Many participants said the advisory committee system serves an 

important role in U.S. trade policy. A former USTR official and current 

committee member termed the advisory committee system “one of the great 

strengths of U.S. trade policy.” Among the comments made by negotiators 

whom we interviewed and members responding to our survey were that the 

formal advisory committee system is often preferable to more ad hoc 

means of obtaining input because it is institutionalized and seeks to 

be representative. Moreover, they said, the system provides assurance 

to Congress that domestic interests with a stake in trade matters have 

a voice when trade policy is formulated and will support the final 

agreements. It thus helps make the executive branch accountable to 

Congress and, ultimately, to the American public. According to multiple 

responses, the system strengthens the U.S. bargaining position by 

bringing to bear on-the-ground perspective and information from the 

private sector that the U.S. government lacks; establishing a clear set 

of U.S. priorities and fuller appreciation of various American 

interests; and enabling the United States to present a unified front 

when it faces foreign nations at the negotiating table. Without the 

system, some participants commented, U.S. negotiators would be 

operating in a vacuum and businesses would be unable to effectively 

resolve with foreign governments issues that only the U.S. government 

can pursue. The bottom line, negotiators and members agree, is that 

when it works properly, the system results in better trade agreements. 

Not only does it help the United States achieve commercial benefits, it 

can help keep the trading system vital and responsive to actual needs.



Agency officials also cited the system’s value and contributions to 

U.S. trade policy. According to USTR, the advisory committee process 

was extremely successful during negotiations (1) on China’s accession 

to the WTO; (2) multilateral agreements on information technology, 

financial services, and basic telecommunications; (3) the Uruguay Round 

of negotiations that led to establishment of the WTO; (4) as well as 

regional initiatives such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, 

the Summit of the Americas, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

forum. Of the 27 USTR trade negotiators whom we interviewed, 18 

indicated that they had obtained useful advice from the system, as did 

most of the 12 Commerce officials we interviewed. They cited numerous 

specific situations where advisory committee input had been helpful to 

negotiations. For example, an Assistant U.S. Trade Representative 

indicated that the advisory committees are playing a vital role in 

identifying market-opening priorities for the more than 140 nations 

currently involved in WTO negotiations. A Department of Commerce 

official described a committee as instrumental in helping monitor 

implementation of China’s accession commitments to the WTO. A USDA 

negotiator said a committee was helpful in setting the tone regarding 

the language on tariff reductions in the comprehensive U.S. agriculture 

proposal to the WTO. A USTR negotiator reported that a committee helped 

develop a position on defining “international standards” in the WTO’s 

Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and helped gain the international 

community’s support for the U.S. proposal, expediting acceptance of 

U.S. goods in foreign markets.



Committee members also value the advisory committee system and devote 

considerable resources to participating in it on a voluntary basis. 

Just over one-half of committee members live outside of Washington, 

D.C., and pay their own travel expenses to attend committee 

meetings.[Footnote 13] Further, when the Department of Commerce renewed 

the charter for the ISACs and IFACs in March 2002, more than 80 percent 

of those members continued.[Footnote 14] Members whom we surveyed 

highlighted numerous benefits of committee membership, including access 

to USTR and other agency officials, insights into other members’ views, 

and face-to-face dialogue with all members. Parties outside the system, 

such as U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-owned businesses and 

nongovernmental organizations (NGO), have sought representation on the 

committees, arguing that they should not be excluded from such an 

influential system.[Footnote 15]



The Executive Branch Consults with Advisory Committees through Formal 

and Informal Channels:



Our analysis of committee documents found ample evidence that USTR and 

other executive branch agencies are consulting committees on a wide 

range of trade initiatives at formal committee meetings. For example, 

agendas for the committee meetings during the 3 years leading up to the 

4TH WTO Ministerial, held in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, listed the 

ministerial 60 times. Twenty of the advisory committees discussed U.S. 

preparations for the ministerial. Also, during fiscal years 1999 

through 2001, different elements of the Free Trade Area of the Americas 

agreement were listed as items on more than 190 meeting agendas, at 

meetings of almost every committee.



Such scheduled advisory committee meetings, usually held in Washington, 

D.C., are the formal channels for the executive branch to consult with 

the private sector advisory committees. In fiscal year 2001 there were 

approximately 110 formal meetings across the committee system.[Footnote 

16] The number of meetings varied considerably by committee. The 

meetings generally lasted 3 to 5 hours. According to our analysis, 

about 80 percent of the meetings for fiscal years 1999 to 2001 were 

closed to the public.[Footnote 17] Negotiators and other trade 

officials attend portions of the meetings, each in turn briefing, 

discussing, and consulting with the committee. The private sector 

committee chair and the managing agency’s designated federal official 

(DFO)[Footnote 18] generally schedule meetings and select the agenda 

topics, although occasionally negotiators seek out specific committees 

to consult on a particular topic. Consultation during meetings is oral, 

but some committees send their positions in writing to USTR and the 

corresponding secretary or head of the agency. Many committee chairmen 

said their committees seek to provide consensus advice, which may 

include dissenting opinions. For the first-and second-tier committees, 

only classified transcripts were kept until recently.[Footnote 19] For 

the third-tier committees, DFOs prepare classified minutes of closed 

meetings for internal committee use only, as well as unclassified 

public summaries.



In addition to formal meetings, USTR, Commerce, USDA, and others 

informally request advice from committee members through faxes, E-

mails, ad hoc meetings, and teleconferences when they need a rapid 

response. However, committee members consulted at ad hoc meetings or 

through other means may provide advice only as personal opinions 

because, in keeping with FACA rules, formal committee advice generally 

can only be provided through formal committee meetings. In some cases, 

this informal advice is solicited by a request from a negotiator to the 

coordinating offices at USTR and other agencies, which then transmit 

the request to all advisers. In other cases, direct contact between 

negotiators and selected committee members occurs. Regardless of how 

contact is initiated, members typically provide advice directly to the 

relevant official and no central record is kept.



Nevertheless, our review of existing agency records indicates that such 

informal consultation is active. In fiscal year 2001, USTR scheduled at 

least nine ad hoc meetings, mostly teleconferences or in-person 

meetings, to which trade advisers were invited an average of 2 to 3 

days in advance.[Footnote 20] During this same period, USTR and 

Commerce faxed or E-mailed approximately 63 requests for 

advice,[Footnote 21] usually addressed to the entire advisory system 

membership or all of the industry sector and functional committees; 

according to our analysis of available data, the advisers had an 

average of 7.5 days to respond. Figure 3 shows the different processes 

for obtaining formal and informal advice from the committees.



Figure 3: Formal and Informal Consultation Process for Advisory 

Committees:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO.



[End of figure]



Most Members Generally Satisfied with Their Committees, but Cite 

Problems with the Consultation Process That Are Hindering the System’s 

Effectiveness:



Most advisory committee members are satisfied with key aspects of the 

advisory process. However, some would prefer to be included more fully 

in the deliberations before actual trade policies are made, and many 

cited several problems with the consultation process that have hindered 

the system’s effectiveness. In addition, accountability for the use or 

consideration of advice could be improved.



Members Reported Varying Levels of Satisfaction with Their Advisory 

Committee:



More than 60 percent of the members who responded to our survey 

reported that they were very satisfied or generally satisfied[Footnote 

22] with 11 of the 16 areas of committee composition, operations, and 

effectiveness listed in table 1. In addition, about half of the 

committee members responding to our survey indicated that the system is 

fulfilling its statutory mandate to a “very great extent” or “a great 

extent.” The areas with the greatest levels of satisfaction (very or 

generally satisfied) were the knowledge of government speakers (85 

percent), the committee’s opportunity to ask questions of government 

officials (84 percent), and the opportunity for members with dissenting 

views to provide input at meetings (79 percent). The areas with the 

lowest levels of satisfaction (very or generally satisfied) were the 

executive branch’s response to committee advice (39 percent), the use 

of technology to facilitate meetings (39 percent), and the time it 

takes to appoint new committee members (16 percent), which had by far 

the lowest level of satisfaction.



Table 1: Percentage of Survey Respondents Who Were Very Satisfied or 

Generally Satisfied with Committee Operations:



1) The knowledge of the government speakers who brief your committee; 

Percentage of all responses marked “very satisfied” or “generally 

satisfied”: ; 85%.



2) Your committee’s opportunity to ask questions of government 

officials at meetings; Percentage of all responses marked “very 

satisfied” or “generally satisfied”: ; 84.



3) The opportunity for committee members with dissenting views to 

provide input at meetings; Percentage of all responses marked “very 

satisfied” or “generally satisfied”: ; 79.



4) The support provided by your Designated Federal Officer (DFO); 

Percentage of all responses marked “very satisfied” or “generally 

satisfied”: 75.



5) The topics on which your committee is briefed by government 

speakers; Percentage of all responses marked “very satisfied” or 

“generally satisfied”: ; 75.



6) Amount of notice your committee receives for meetings; Percentage of 

all responses marked “very satisfied” or “generally satisfied”: 72.



7) Representation of your business sector in the overall committee 

structure; Percentage of all responses marked “very satisfied” or 

“generally satisfied”: ; 72.



8) Your committee’s opportunity to provide advice at meetings; 

Percentage of all responses marked “very satisfied” or “generally 

satisfied”: 70.



9) The clarity of your committee’s operating rules and procedures; 

Percentage of all responses marked “very satisfied” or “generally 

satisfied”: 65.



10) The support provided by USTR; Percentage of all responses marked 

“very satisfied” or “generally satisfied”: 64.



11) The balance of business representation in your committee (e.g., by 

region, type of company, and company size); Percentage of all responses 

marked “very satisfied” or “generally satisfied”: ; 63.



12) Your committee’s opportunity to provide formal advice outside of 

meetings; Percentage of all responses marked “very satisfied” or 

“generally satisfied”: ; 54.



13) The degree of attention the executive branch pays to your 

committee’s trade issues; Percentage of all responses marked “very 

satisfied” or “generally satisfied”: ; 45.



14) The executive branch’s response to the advice your committee 

provided; Percentage of all responses marked “very satisfied” or 

“generally satisfied”: ; 39.



15) The use of technology to facilitate meetings; Percentage of all 

responses marked “very satisfied” or “generally satisfied”: 39.



16) The time it takes to appoint new members to your committee; 

Percentage of all responses marked “very satisfied” or “generally 

satisfied”: 16.



Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.



[End of table]



Despite reporting general satisfaction with many aspects of the system, 

more than a quarter of survey respondents felt that the system has not 

realized its potential contribution to U.S. trade policy (see app. IV, 

question 23). Many members responding to our survey supported actions 

to improve committee operations. Through our survey, member interviews, 

and document analysis, we identified several problems with the (1) 

timeliness, (2) quality, and (3) accountability of consultations 

between the executive branch and the committees. These problems have, 

at times, limited member input into and influence over trade policy. 

Some of these problems were particularly acute for specific issues or 

committees.



Consultations Are Not Always Timely because They Occur after Decisions 

Are Made:



The timeliness of consultations was a concern to many advisers, who 

stated that consultations sometimes occur too late to affect policy. 

Overall, 30 percent of respondents felt that the executive branch 

scheduled its consultations so that the committees’ advice could be 

used in trade negotiations to “some or little extent” or “no extent,” 

while only 25 percent of the respondents believed the consultations 

were scheduled appropriately to a “very great extent” or “great 
extent.” 

[Footnote 23] Members whom we surveyed as well as interviewees reported 

that advice is often sought after the executive’s policy direction is 

already set. Several members reported that, in the past 5 years, the 

tendency has been for negotiators to come to committee meetings and 
say, 

“Here is the agreement, what do you think?” In one case that we 
documented, 

the administration did not consult with the President’s overall policy 

advisory committee--ACTPN--before submitting its proposed 

international trade agenda to Congress, including the principles to be 

included in Trade Promotion Authority legislation. The staff liaisons 

for ACTPN and TEPAC were only briefed on the matter the day after the 

agenda was submitted. Furthermore, the advisory committees were not 

consulted before the Clinton administration announced its decision to 

pursue a Free Trade Agreement with Singapore. The announcement provoked 

considerable concern across the private sector for a variety of 

reasons, not least because the original proposed time frame of 

completing the negotiations within 6 weeks would have allowed little 

time for advisers to provide input.



Another problem with timeliness cited by members is that certain 

committees meet infrequently. USTR, Commerce, and USDA procedures 

generally indicate that agency officials are responsible for calling 

meetings. The problem of meeting frequency is particularly acute for 

the first-and second-tier committees, which averaged 1.7 and 2.5 

meetings each year, compared with the third-tier committees, which met 

an average of 3.7 times each year. The ACTPN, which consists of CEO-

level advisers and is designed to provide overall policy advice, met 

twice in fiscal years 2000 and 2001. It did not meet for more than 16 

months between March 2000 and July 2001. During that period, the Jordan 

Free Trade Agreement--which broke new ground by including labor and 

environmental provisions in the text of a U.S. trade agreement for the 

first time--was finalized without formal executive branch consultation 

with the ACTPN.[Footnote 24] Members and negotiators reported that the 

lack of regular meetings was a barrier to the effective functioning of 

the committees.



Although Section 135 of the Trade Act requires the executive branch to 

consult with the committees “on a continuing and timely basis” and “to 

the maximum extent feasible . . . before the commencement of 

negotiations,” the agencies involved have not adopted guidelines to 

implement these directives. For example, Commerce’s and USTR’s 

procedures and rules for managing these committees do not address the 

principle of timeliness or consulting to the maximum extent feasible. 

USDA’s procedures also do not refer to these issues, but in practice, 

the agency has developed a calendar of key negotiation events to use in 

scheduling advisory committee meetings in an effort to ensure that 

consultations are timely.



Participants Believe the Quality of Consultations Is Not Always 

Meaningful:



Committee members, agency officials, and negotiators reported several 

problems that sometimes affect the quality and meaningfulness of 

consultations. These problems included too little time for discussion 

at meetings, limited access to background documents, insufficient 

consultation on certain issues, and poor participation by some 

negotiators.



Insufficient Time for Consultations at Meetings:



In survey responses and interviews, many committee members said that 

they did not have enough time to discuss issues or provide advice at 

committee meetings. While respondents to our survey were broadly 

satisfied with the amount of time spent on presentations by USTR and 

the committees’ principal agencies, 42 percent of the respondents 

reported that not enough time was devoted to providing advice, 43 

percent reported that not enough time was spent on members’ discussing 

trade issues, and 39 percent said that not enough time was devoted to 

presentations by other executive branch agencies (see table 2). 

Commerce officials confirmed that they were aware that the amount of 

time available for discussion is an issue, but explained in agency 

comments that, because of the costs and travel time associated with 

ISAC and IFAC meetings and the number of issues to be discussed, 

meeting agendas are often packed. Negotiators stated that this imposes 

practical constraints on the time devoted to each agenda item. 

According to a USDA official, the agency is carefully reviewing the 

number of items on committee agendas and scheduling full-day meetings 

for its ATACs to ensure that there is sufficient time for member 

discussion.



Table 2: Respondents’ Opinions about the Amount of Time Devoted to 

Various Activities at Committee Meetings:



a) Presentations by USTR; Too much: 6.8%; About the right amount: 

71.0%; Too: 19.8%; No basis to judge/ no answer: 2.3%.



b) Presentations by your committee’s principal agency; Too much: ; 8.5; 

About the right amount: ; 70.4; Too: ; 14.5; No basis to judge/ no 

answer: ; 6.5.



c) Presentations by other executive branch agencies; Too much: ; 3.5; 

About the right amount: ; 41.3; Too: ; 39.4; No basis to judge/ no 

answer: ; 15.8.



d) Committee providing advice to all executive branch agencies; Too 

much: ; 1.0; About the right amount: ; 33.8; Too: ; 41.9; No basis to 

judge/ no answer: ; 23.3.



e) Committee member discussion of trade issues; Too much: ; 1.9; About 

the right amount: ; 51.3; Too: ; 42.6; No basis to judge/ no answer: ; 

4.4.



Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. Also see appendix IV, 

question 2.



[End of table]



Limited Access to Documents:



Limited access to certain background documents also affects the quality 

of consultations. USTR often provides national security classified and 

trade sensitive documents, such as proposed negotiating objectives or 

text of draft agreements, to committee members for comment. However, 

access to these documents--which are kept in Washington, D.C., in 

secured reading rooms--is often not feasible for advisers who live 

outside of the Washington, D.C., area, and not always convenient for 

advisers who work in Washington. Numerous survey respondents complained 

that current arrangements for reviewing such documents are 

inadequate.[Footnote 25] Officials and members said that being able to 

access documents electronically, such as through an encoded Internet 

site, would improve the quality of committee advice. In agency 

comments, USTR, Commerce, and USDA indicated they are exploring options 

for electronic access, but stressed that safeguarding sensitive or 

classified negotiating material must remain paramount.



Taking a detailed look at these documents is important to members 

because it can materially affect negotiating outcomes. A Commerce 

official related an example pertaining to the Chile FTA, when ISAC 

members felt they had not had an opportunity to look at the negotiating 

text because it was put into the reading room at the last minute before 

a holiday. A subcommittee of the ISAC (8 to 10 people, mostly lawyers) 

reviewed the text line by line at the Commerce reading room and 

provided numerous changes to USTR, which were presented to the 

Chileans. The Commerce official noted that what happens with the Chile 

negotiations is considered extremely important because it will set a 

precedent for future trade agreements.



Consultation on Certain Issues Is Insufficient, According to Some 

Members:



Consultation on certain issues appears to be particularly problematic. 

First, although Section 135 of the Trade Act requires consultation 

regarding “the development, implementation, and administration” of U.S. 

trade policy, 30 percent of respondents reported that they were 

dissatisfied (“very dissatisfied” or “generally dissatisfied”) with the 

extent of consultation on implementation of trade agreements, 26 

percent were dissatisfied with consultation on bilateral trade 

negotiations, 25 percent were dissatisfied with consultation on general 

trade policy issues, and 23 percent were dissatisfied with consultation 

on multilateral trade negotiations (see table 3). In one case, the 

administration prepared and issued, without first consulting the top-

tier committees, a comprehensive report reviewing the WTO’s operation 

during its first 5 years, advocating that the United States should 

continue participation in the WTO. Advisers were only briefed on the 

126-page report’s contents 5 days after the date it was signed by the 

USTR.[Footnote 26]



Table 3: Satisfaction with the Extent to which the Executive Branch 

Sought the Committees’ Advice:



a) General trade policy issues; Satisfied: 51.3%; Neither satisfied nor 

dissatisfied: 18.4%; Dissatisfied: 24.7%; No opinion/: 5.7%.



b) Multilateral trade negotiations (World Trade Organization - WTO); 

Satisfied: ; ; 54.3; Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied: ; ; 16.5; 

Dissatisfied: ; ; 23.1; No opinion/: ; ; 6.1.



c) Bilateral trade negotiations; Satisfied: 49.1; Neither satisfied nor 

dissatisfied: 18.6; Dissatisfied: 25.8; No opinion/: 6.5.



d) Implementation of trade agreements; Satisfied: ; 34.6; Neither 

satisfied nor dissatisfied: ; 26.8; Dissatisfied: ; 30.1; No opinion/: 

; 8.5.



e) Other (please specify); Satisfied: 6.0; Neither satisfied nor 

dissatisfied: 6.4; Dissatisfied: 5.0; No opinion/: 82.5.



Note: Satisfied included responses marked “very satisfied” or 

“generally satisfied.” Dissatisfied included responses marked “very 

dissatisfied” or “generally dissatisfied.” :



Source: GAO analysis of survey responses. Also see appendix IV, 

question 3.



[End of table]



Second, consultations with the tier-1 and tier-2 policy committees have 

not been satisfactory, some respondents said.[Footnote 27]Table 4 

illustrates differences in tiers’ satisfaction rates for selected 

aspects of committee operations for those who responded to our survey.



Table 4: Differences among Committee Tiers in Satisfaction with 

Committee Operations:



1) The knowledge of the government speakers who brief your committee; 

Tier 3: ; 87%; Tier 2: ; 80%; Tier 1: ; 84%.



2) Your committee’s opportunity to ask questions of government 

officials at meetings; Tier 3: ; 86; Tier 2: ; 77; Tier 1: ; 71.



3) The opportunity for committee members with dissenting views to 

provide input at meetings; Tier 3: ; 82; Tier 2: ; 71; Tier 1: ; 68.



4) The support provided by your Designated Federal Officer (DFO); Tier 

3: ; 78; Tier 2: ; 64; Tier 1: ; 58.



5) The topics on which your committee is briefed by government 

speakers; Tier 3: ; 84; Tier 2: ; 49; Tier 1: ; 36.



6) Amount of notice your committee receives for meetings; Tier 3: ; 78; 

Tier 2: ; 52; Tier 1: ; 52.



7) Representation of your business sector in the overall committee 

structure; Tier 3: ; 78; Tier 2: ; 49; Tier 1: ; 52.



8) Your committee’s opportunity to provide advice at meetings; Tier 3: 

; 72; Tier 2: ; 63; Tier 1: ; 61.



9) The clarity of your committee’s operating rules and procedures; Tier 

3: ; 71; Tier 2: ; 49; Tier 1: ; 36.



10) The support provided by USTR; Tier 3: 68; Tier 2: 50; Tier 1: 58.



11) The balance of business representation in your committee (e.g., by 

region, type of company, and company size); Tier 3: ; ; 68; Tier 2: ; ; 

45; Tier 1: ; ; 45.



12) Your committee’s opportunity to provide formal advice outside of 

meetings; Tier 3: ; 57; Tier 2: ; 38; Tier 1: ; 48.



13) The degree of attention the executive branch pays to your 

committee’s trade issues; Tier 3: ; 47; Tier 2: ; 36; Tier 1: ; 39.



14) The executive branch’s response to the advice your committee 

provided; Tier 3: ; 42; Tier 2: ; 29; Tier 1: ; 38.



15) The use of technology to facilitate meetings; Tier 3: 40; Tier 2: 

33; Tier 1: 36.



16) The time it takes to appoint new members to your committee; Tier 3: 

; 18; Tier 2: ; 10; Tier 1: ; 10.



Source: GAO analysis of survey results.



[End of table]



At the tier 1 ACTPN, as discussed above, lack of meetings and timely 

consultation were additional concerns. Although the tier-2 Labor 

Advisory Committee’s (LAC) formal steering committee met six times in 

1999, six times in 2000, and three times in 2001, the full committee 

did not meet at all between 1994 and 2002. Steering Committee Members 

whom we interviewed felt that USTR consulted them more out of 

obligation rather than to obtain advice. One member added that USTR has 

treated the committee like a “dissent group” and did not provide the 

same level of briefings as it did to other advisory committees. 

Although members singled out a few USTR negotiators for their 

willingness to listen to the committee’s views, USTR acknowledges that 

it did not even have an official liaison to the LAC between 1993 and 

2001. None of the labor respondents to our survey reported that they 

were satisfied with the degree of attention the executive branch paid 

to their committee’s issues or the executive branch’s response to the 

committee’s advice.[Footnote 28] Further, members of the tier-2 Trade 

and Environment Policy Advisory Committee, comprising business and 

environmental interests, generally agreed that the committee had not 

been a successful vehicle for addressing environmental aspects of trade 

policy. While members and negotiators said that the committee made 

significant contributions to the development and implementation of 

President Clinton’s executive order regarding the review of 

environmental implications of trade agreements, many members cited 

frustrations over the committee’s inability to provide advice on other 

environmental policy issues. Few recognized environmental 

organizations still participate in the committee, and some members 

reported that the diverse interests represented in the group meant they 

had difficulty reaching agreement and providing clear advice.[Footnote 

29] Finally, despite USTR’s efforts to convene meetings of the tier-2 

committee designed to address the trade issues of concern to state and 

local governments, the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee met 

only once in fiscal year 2000 and once in fiscal year 2001, both via 

telephone conference calls. Both members and negotiators reported that 

the lack of regular meetings was a barrier to the optimal functioning 

of the committees.



Third, members and negotiators believe the system’s capacity for cross-

fertilization among committees should be strengthened. Although 

functional committees on issues such as customs and standards have been 

established and are supposed to include representatives from industry 

committees, participation by such representatives is reported to be 

limited. Many issues--such as antidumping, biotechnology, and 

transparency in trade regulation--cut across several committees, but 

the system’s capacity to handle them is limited. A negotiator for 

antidumping, for example, generally consults only with the ferrous ores 

and metals committee (ISAC 7), which includes steel, on such matters. 

Although FACA and Section 135 of the Trade Act do not preclude agencies 

from consulting with a cross-section of members on such issues, USTR 

and Commerce have not generally taken advantage of this opportunity. 

Consulting with members from different committees on an ad hoc basis 

also would not produce the formal committee advice negotiators prefer. 

Some mechanisms for cross-fertilization already exist. A Committee of 

Chairs of the ISACs and IFACs is empowered to provide collective advice 

and provide a cross-section of views. Joint meetings of committees have 

also been convened. For example, members of the labor committee reacted 

favorably to an initiative by the USTR services negotiator to conduct a 

joint meeting of the services and labor committees to discuss the issue 

of temporary entry of foreign workers into the United States. Survey 

respondents supported additional steps to better address cross-cutting 

issues, such as sharing meeting agendas and recommendations--an idea 

that USDA is exploring.



Officials and Members Indicate Limited Involvement by Some Negotiators:



Some agency officials and committee members believe that the quality of 

consultations suffers because USTR is not as engaged as it should be 

with the advisory process. While 88 percent of the members responding 

to our survey supported (“strongly support” or “generally support”) 

actions to ensure that USTR officials attend committee meetings on a 

regular basis (see app. IV, question 18), we found that some committees 

have had little or no contact with USTR. For example, although the head 

of the USTR office that manages the advisory committee system said the 

office works actively to ensure that USTR’s negotiators consult with 

the advisory committees, several DFOs told us that arranging for USTR 

negotiators to meet with their committees is one of their most 

difficult tasks. In one example, two DFOs said they had never met their 

USTR liaison, nor had they been able to arrange for the liaison to 

attend their committees’ meetings. One of these DFOs added that, 

despite attempts, they have not been able to identify anyone at USTR 

who covers their issues, and, consequently, no one from USTR has 

attended the last five committee meetings. Even obtaining negotiating 

calendars is difficult, another official reported, making it hard to 

ensure that committee meetings are scheduled to support trade policy 

demands.



Our analysis of documents provided by USTR revealed that USTR 

negotiators have not been actively working with some committees. 

Attendance records do not indicate who was present for what portions of 

committee meetings. As a proxy for this data, we reviewed scheduled 

speakers at tier-3 committee meetings in fiscal years 1999 to 2001. We 

found that, on average, USTR negotiators were scheduled to brief 

committees on 42 percent of the topics raised at the meetings. However, 

for 10 of the tier-3 committees, the USTR negotiators were scheduled to 

brief on 32 percent or fewer of the topics discussed.[Footnote 30] USTR 

argues that at tier-3 committee meetings the most knowledgeable speaker 

is often an employee of another agency, not a USTR official, because 

that agency works most closely with the technical information that is 

important to the committees. However, a perceived lack of attention by 

USTR was a source of concern to some members, who believe that the 

committee system was intended as a mechanism for negotiators to obtain 

advice on trade policy and agreements. For example, a committee 

chairman told us that a USTR negotiator had not been meeting with its 

committee and put forward a tariff proposal in ongoing FTA negotiations 

that placed the committee’s product in the longest phase-out category. 

However, because many U.S. producers now import, the committee actually 

favors lowering tariffs more rapidly.



Seven of the 27 USTR negotiators with whom we met stated that they 

prefer to obtain advice outside the system because advisory committees 

cannot provide the type or quality of advice that they need. For 

example, three of the seven negotiators handle bilateral issues with 

key trading partners and shared this view. One negotiator said that the 

committees could not provide guidance on cross-cutting regulatory 

issues, so he speaks to associations or key companies that can provide 

the necessary advice. The negotiator also said that the committees 

generally do not provide timely, targeted responses orally or on paper. 

The second negotiator does not work with the ISACs or IFACs at all and, 

instead, uses informal contacts to obtain industry input. She explained 

that the ISACs are too broad to assist with the detailed issues she 

handles in bilateral trade negotiations. The third negotiator agreed 

that the ISACs were most useful when dealing with major, comprehensive 

negotiations like the Uruguay trade round. She had not used the system 

very much in the past 4 years and stated that, in her opinion, the 

system was not designed to handle the specific disputes, often 

involving litigation, that dominate bilateral trade relations. One of 

the two USTR agriculture negotiators we interviewed said the committees 

these negotiators work with often fail to advance policy because they 

do not narrow differences among members’ competing interests. A senior 

industry negotiator, meanwhile, indicated that the wealth of 

information she obtains through informal channels is more helpful than 

advisory committee input.



Consultation Process Provides Limited Accountability and Means to 

Ensure Consideration and Use of Advice:



The committee system provides limited accountability to ensure that 

committee positions on trade negotiating objectives are considered, as 

called for in Section 135 of the Trade Act. Prior to January 15, 1994, 

trade advisory committees affected by certain bilateral or multilateral 

trade negotiations were required to report to the President, Congress, 

and USTR at the conclusion of negotiations.[Footnote 31] This 

requirement was linked to legislation that gave the President the 

authority to negotiate certain trade agreements and submit them for 

congressional approval under expedited legislative procedures. The 

reporting requirement lapsed when the negotiating authority expired in 

1994 and was not renewed until the recent passage of the Trade Act of 

2002, which granted the President Trade Promotion Authority.[Footnote 

32] According to a former USTR official, this lapsed requirement was an 

essential element in the trade advisory committee process because it 

assured Congress that the executive branch had sought and considered 

private sector advice. Without this reporting requirement, there was 

limited accountability in the advisory committee system.



Moreover, mechanisms for tracking and distributing committee advice to 

senior agency officials are not routine or reliable. Instead, agency 

officials report that advice is transmitted through diffuse channels 

that range from formal to informal. At the formal end of the spectrum, 

there is no requirement that advisory committee input be sought before 

USTR officials submit documents on U.S. trade policy for interagency 

clearance by the Trade Policy Staff Committee. Although such documents 

sometimes include a section on private sector views, our examination of 

selected documents drafted by USTR in 2000 to 2002 revealed that many 

did not acknowledge solicitation or use of advisory committee input. 

The problems of tracking and distributing committee advice are 

aggravated bathe predominance of oral, nonconsensus committee advice 

offered during discussions at meetings. While oral advice from a range 

of perspectives can be valuable, it does not provide as clear guidance 

as written, consensus advice, which is easier to track and respond to. 

Commerce’s training manual for DFOs notes that “advisors should be 

encouraged to provide advice in writing, as advice imparted at meetings 

is often not captured for follow-up and is difficult to document. 

Members often incorrectly assume that resolutions made at meetings are 

passed to action officials by the DFO or that minutes are widely 

circulated in a timely manner.”:



Questions have been raised about how responsive agencies are to written 

committee advice. A number of chairmen felt such advice received more 

serious consideration, but several chairmen expressed frustration to us 

about nonsubstantive or untimely replies to their committees’ letters. 

One Commerce DFO stated that, at Commerce, committee letters are not 

always sent to officials responsible for the issues involved and 

instead go up the administrative chain and end up in a bureaucratic 

“black hole”; another DFO reported that the letters from the committee 

on which he serves have not been answered. Commerce denies that this is 

typical, indicating that committee letters are considered controlled 

correspondence that involves distribution of the incoming letter and 

review of the draft reply by responsible officials. Although officials 

at Commerce told us that it is common to send pro forma, rather than 

substantive, responses to committee letters, they noted in agency 

comments that this is generally because final U.S. policy has not been 

decided. USDA recently initiated a practice of summarizing resolutions 

made and sensitive issues raised at advisory committee meetings for 

senior USDA and USTR officials in an effort to improve agency awareness 

of and accountability for committee advice.



Finally, Section 135(i) of the Trade Act requires the executive branch 

to inform committees of “significant departures” from committee advice. 

However, 41 percent of survey respondents reported that agency 

officials informed committees less than half of the time when their 

agencies pursued strategies that differed from committee input; only 22 

percent reported that they were always or almost always informed of 

significant departures from committee advice (see app. IV, questions 8 

and 9). About 86 percent of the respondents reported that they would 

support obtaining more feedback from USTR (see app. IV, question 18).



Advisory Committee System’s Structure and Composition Do Not Fully 

Reflect U.S. Economy and Trade Policy Needs:



Mismatches between the advisory committee system and the U.S. economy 

and trade policy issues suggest that the system is not positioned to 

provide the executive branch with all the advice it needs or to assure 

Congress that negotiated agreements are fully in U.S. interests. While 

most U.S. agricultural and industry sectors are represented in the 

committee structure, the composition of the system does not 

proportionally match each sector’s economic significance. Also, some 

specific industry committees have gaps in coverage. The structure of 

the system has not evolved fully to address new trade policy issues and 

stakeholders, and incorporating nonbusiness groups has been difficult.



Major Industry Sectors Represented but Membership Composition Not in 

Balance with Economy:



In the 28 years since the advisory system’s creation, the U.S. economy 

and trade have shifted toward services and high-technology industries 

(see fig. 4). However, membership composition and the number of 

committees that comprise the system’s structure are still heavily 

weighted toward the agriculture and manufacturing sectors (see fig. 5). 

In 1974, the committee structure was largely designed to enable the 

private sector to provide input on tariff negotiations, the principal 

issue in multilateral trade negotiations at that time.



Figure 4: Industry Share of GDP, 1974-1999:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO analysis.



[End of figure]



Figure 5: Major Industry Shares of Membership and Trade, 2000:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO analysis.



[End of figure]



To determine whether the advisory committee system’s structure and 

composition reflect the current U.S. economy, we examined calendar year 

2000 U.S. industry sector trade and output data and compared these with 

the corresponding membership data from the tier-3 industry sector 

advisory committees and agricultural technical advisory 

committees.[Footnote 33] We found the following:



* The services sector accounts for the largest share of U.S. output 

(more than 50 percent) and a sizable share of U.S. exports (almost 30 

percent); these shares both increased sharply since 1974. Yet the 

committee system’s structure has only two services sector committees 

(the same number it had 20 years ago), and its composition includes 

fewer than 50 members from services.



* The number of committees in the system’s structure is heavily 

weighted toward manufacturing, which has 15 of the 33 committees. This 

appears to be consistent with manufacturing’s large share of U.S. goods 

exports. However, within manufacturing, some sectors such as textiles 

and apparel, nonferrous ores, and lumber and wood appear to be 

overrepresented in the committee system’s membership compared with 

their shares of U.S. trade, while large, exporting sectors such as 

electronics (18.3 percent of U.S. exports) are underrepresented

(see fig. 6).



* Committee member composition is heavily focused on agriculture, even 

though agriculture accounts for less than 1.5 percent of U.S. output 

and 2.7 percent of exports. In 2001, USDA boosted the number of 

agricultural technical advisory committee members from 111 to 180. As a 

result, 222 of the 745 members in the entire system during fiscal year 

2001 represented agricultural interests.



Figure 6: Manufacturing Committees with Membership Shares above or 

below Shares of Exports and Imports, 2000:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO analysis of Commerce and GSA data.



[End of figure]



This is not to suggest that there should be an automatic and linear 

relationship between trade levels and committee membership. In a few 

cases, other factors, such as policy considerations, might justify the 

imbalances between economic importance and committee representation.



For example, sizable agriculture committees may be appropriate, since 

exports represent 40 percent of agricultural output and trade barriers 

are high. In services, the main services committee has been meeting 

monthly to keep up with comprehensive negotiations to improve the WTO 

General Agreement on Trade in Services. The government services 

negotiators we spoke with believed that the committee represents the 

sector well, and 70 percent of services committee respondents to our 

survey reported satisfaction with their sector’s representation in the 

system. Certain manufacturing sectors such as textiles are recognized 

as import sensitive. Nevertheless, such reasons may not apply to the 

remaining committees. Indeed, according to Commerce and USDA officials, 

in most cases, current committee membership levels are functions of 

private sector interest in participating, rather than a deliberate 

effort by the agencies to determine appropriate levels of 

representation.[Footnote 34]



Gaps in Industry Representation on Committees:



Membership in the system is also not fully aligned with the economy 

because of gaps in industry representation that occur for at least two 

reasons. First, there are gaps based on whether companies choose to 

join the system or not, resulting in a lack of balance needed by 

negotiators to cover all the industry-specific issues they must address 

in trade negotiations. For example, according to one USTR negotiator, a 

major telecommunications services provider opted not to participate 

because it had access to USTR through other venues. The electronics 

committee does not yet have a representative from the software 

industry, and the intellectual property rights committee does not have 

a representative from the generic drug or noncontent producing 

copyright industry.[Footnote 35] Second, major foreign companies, such 

as DaimlerChrysler, cannot participate because foreign-owned companies 

are generally prohibited from membership on committees under USTR and 

Commerce procedures and rules.[Footnote 36] In commenting on a draft of 

this report, Commerce stated that the rationale for this long-standing 

policy is the sensitivity of the subject matter considered by the 
committees 

and possible conflicts that might be experienced by U.S. firms that 
have 

foreign owners. U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-owned firms accounted for 

more than 5 percent of U.S. employment and more than 20 percent of U.S. 

goods exports in 1999; such foreign ownership has grown with 

globalization and is particularly high in certain manufacturing 

sectors, such as transportation equipment and chemicals. These gaps in 

industry representation have encouraged negotiators to seek advice 

outside the advisory committee system, including from foreign-owned 

firms or trade associations that include such firms.



Need for More Outreach to Fill Gaps on Committees:



Committee membership is significantly below the levels authorized in 

committee charters, averaging 49 percent of authorized capacity (see 

fig. 7) in 2001 and 48 percent of authorized capacity as of August 

2002. The low membership rates can at times severely limit the 

availability of advice for negotiators from certain committees, 

particularly since just over half of the members attend meetings, on 

average, according to the attendance records made available to us. One 

negotiator with overall responsibility for a major bilateral FTA said 

he had hoped to rely on the committee system exclusively for advice, 

but had concerns that certain committees were not sufficiently filled 

to provide a meaningful cross-section of industry views. In addition, 

some meeting records we reviewed indicated that more government 

officials were in attendance than committee members. On the other hand, 

the fact that some committees are far below authorized membership 

levels means agencies have opportunities to fill gaps in industry 

representation.



Figure 7: Committee Membership Levels as a Percentage of Authorized 

Membership Levels, Fiscal Year 2001:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO analysis of committee charters and membership rosters.



[End of figure]



Officials at USTR, Commerce, and USDA acknowledge the need for 

increased outreach to fill gaps in membership and have recently taken 

steps toward this end. In the past, agencies primarily relied on 

recruitment through Federal Register notices to attract new members, 

rather than targeting specific needs or groups. Furthermore, 

negotiators were not always actively involved in identifying candidates 

to fill gaps in composition or representation. However, Commerce has 

stepped up its outreach by encouraging current members to recruit 

applicants, directly soliciting applicants at trade shows, holding 

meetings outside of Washington, and speaking before trade associations 

and outside groups. In addition, USDA solicited applications through 

different means, including widely disseminating notices to state 

departments of agriculture and other farm groups. Some USTR negotiators 

reported urging industry contacts and experts to become involved, but 

USTR reports that a key obstacle to filling vacancies is the difficulty 

in identifying qualified individuals in the private sector who are 

willing to join the advisory committees, due to the significant amount 

of time and resources required to serve.



Committee System Generally Does Not Reflect Changes in Trade Policy 

Issues and Stakeholders:



With little restructuring to mirror emerging trade policy issues and 

new stakeholders, the committee system is unable to provide some 

negotiators with all of the advice necessary to support trade policy 

development. New trade issues and stakeholders have emerged since 1974, 

as trade negotiations expanded beyond tariffs to include nontariff 

barriers to trade and other complex trade-related issues, such as 

intellectual property rights and health and safety. Moreover, the WTO 

negotiations launched in November 2001 cover topics such as the 

relationship between WTO rules and multilateral environmental 

agreements, and negotiations on a free trade agreement with Chile cover 

investment and competition (antitrust) policy. These issues require 

functional expertise and expand the number of U.S. interests concerned 

with and affected by trade agreements. Trade negotiators with whom we 

spoke stated that there are gaps in the committee system structure 

regarding functional issues such as investment and government 

procurement and in representation of stakeholders in such areas as 

public health.



There have been few changes in the committee system’s structure to 

address these new issues and avoid gaps in coverage. Section 135 of the 

Trade Act gives USTR flexibility to restructure the committee system to 

reflect changes in U.S. international trade interests. However, in the 

past decade, only 3 committees--the Trade and Environmental Policy 

Advisory Committee, the Trade Advisory Committee for Africa, and the 

Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Electronic Commerce--have 

been added to the 34-committee structure.[Footnote 37] Most of the 
remaining 

committees have existed for more than 20 years (see fig. 8).[Footnote 

38] USTR officials acknowledge the need to update the committee system 

to reflect the current economy and new trade issues, but add that the 

agency would need external guidance to support any sensitive decisions 

affecting existing committees.



Figure 8: Timeline for Authorization of Existing Trade Advisory 

Committees:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO summary of GSA committee data.



[End of figure]



Note: The Trade Advisory Committee for Africa, first chartered in 1995 

and still technically in existence, is not pictured in figure 8 because 

it has never been constituted or met.



According to a former USTR official, a USTR effort to review the 

committee system in 2000 did not even address the question of how well 

the system was meeting USTR needs, because the agency did not have the 

time to ask negotiators what they wanted from industry advisers. In 

some cases, agencies forego addressing some recognized needs for advice 

on new issues because of the time and effort required to create and 

amend committees. For example, two USTR and Commerce negotiators, who 

are in charge of their offices and oversee other negotiators, told us 

that current ad hoc methods for obtaining advice on investment policy 

are inadequate and that they believe a separate committee on investment 

would be desirable. However, they expressed reservations about 

undertaking the considerable effort involved to form one. (Commerce 

spent more than a year establishing the E-commerce advisory 

committee.):



Difficulties Incorporating Nonbusiness Stakeholders as Committee 

Members:



Although many new trade issues impinge upon domestic regulatory areas 

that are of concern to nonbusiness groups, USTR and the other managing 

agencies have had difficulty incorporating nonbusiness stakeholders 

into the committees. Some nonbusiness interests from the labor, 

environment, and consumer communities participate in the committee 

system but stated that they feel marginalized within it. Most 

nonbusiness members currently participating in the system are placed on 

a few committees in the second tier, where committees are less active 

and productive than in the third tier, as shown in figures 9 and 10. 

New stakeholders in the trade process, such as public health, 

development, and gender advocates, have limited or no participation in 

the formal committee system, even though topics such as intellectual 

property are of interest to them. Some negotiators on this topic and on 

services believe that nonbusiness stakeholders’ perspective is useful 

and necessary in formulating U.S. trade policy. However, the extent of 

participation by nonbusiness members on tier-3 committees is still an 

unresolved legal issue.



Figure 9: Average Number of Meetings Per Committee by Tier, Per Year, 

Fiscal Years 1999-2001:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO analysis of advisory committee meeting records and annual 

reports.



[End of figure]



Figure 10: Absolute Number of Meetings by Tier, Fiscal Years 1999-2001:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO analysis of meeting data.



[End of figure]



Nonbusiness participants with whom we spoke also feel marginalized 

because they have difficulty ensuring their views get serious 

consideration. For example, the ACTPN is meant to provide overall 

policy advice and is required to be broadly representative of key 

sectors and groups affected by trade. Six of the 33 current members 

represent nonbusiness interests. In 2000, the three labor 

representatives temporarily resigned from this presidential committee 

because the chair said the committee would only meet once and its sole 

focus would be the granting of Permanent Normal Trade Relations to 

China. The labor representatives felt that their issues were not being 

addressed and in their resignation letter said that the advisory 

process “relegates minority views to a marginalized dissent.”:



Key Representation Issues Have Not Been Resolved, Despite Legal 

Challenges:



Most of the 22 committees administered by Commerce do not routinely 

allow representation from nonbusiness interests. As a result of legal 

challenges to the business-only composition of several of the Commerce 

committees,[Footnote 39] two of these committees (lumber and paper 

products) now have environmental representatives and are reported to be 

functioning productively. A third committee, chemicals, represents the 

second-leading manufacturing export sector but still lacks a permanent 

environmental representative as called for by a settlement order, 

resulting in the committee’s operations being interrupted for the 

second time in 2 years.



Outside of these three committees, the extent to which nonbusiness 

interests, including environmental interests, can be represented on 

tier-2 and tier-3 committees has not been completely resolved. Neither 

Section 135 of the Trade Act nor its legislative history is clear about 

how that statute relates to the Federal Advisory Committee Act’s “fair 

balance” requirement[Footnote 40] or about how to apply “fair balance” 

in the context of a trade advisory committee system largely composed of 

discrete interests (see app. II). Recently, the Commerce Department 

published a notice indicating that except for environmental 

representation in the three committees where representation has been 

successfully challenged, “non-government organizations and academic 

institutions do not qualify for representation on a 

committee.”[Footnote 41] Nevertheless, without further clarification 

by U.S. appellate courts or amendments to the current legislation about 

what fair balance means for trade advisory committees, some ambiguity 

about this issue will remain. Negotiators, agency officials, and 

committee members have suggested the need for Congress to clarify its 

intent for representation in the committee system.



The current legal uncertainty also raises several practical issues. 

First, the lack of clarity in what fair balance means for these 

committees makes the system more vulnerable to court challenges. 

Second, our interviews with agency officials suggest that these 

uncertainties may make it difficult for agencies to consider revisions 

in the committee structure to better address functional issues such as 

investment and public health, which are of interest to business and 

nonbusiness groups.



Other Issues Related to Nonbusiness Stakeholders:



The appointment of environmental representatives to tier-3 committees 

has generated concerns among some current committee members. For 

example, the committee of ISAC/IFAC chairmen wrote to USTR expressing 

concern that having nontraditional members on their industry sector and 

functional committees would make the committees less productive in 

performing their primary mission of ensuring that U.S. negotiators were 

aware of industry interests and positions. One committee chair said 

that business members would be less forthcoming about discussing trade 

issues because of concern that nonbusiness representatives might 

release sensitive information to the public, thus undermining candor 

and confidence. More than 60 percent of respondents to our survey 

opposed adding more nonbusiness interests to their committees (see app. 

IV, question 18). These concerns were echoed many times in our 

interviews with members who feared they would lose their voice in trade 

policy or said that they would be unwilling to participate if the 

committees become unproductive “debating clubs.” As an alternative, the 

ISAC/IFAC chairmen recommended “the establishment of a functional 

committee or committees to serve as parallel and equal fora for 

involvement by non-traditional groups.”:



Our interviews and review of agency documents found that USTR has been 

making efforts to provide information to, and obtain input from, 

various nongovernmental organizations outside the formal advisory 

committee process. We contacted several such organizations that had 

demonstrated an interest in U.S. trade policy by submitting formal 

comments in response to USTR Federal Register notices or attending USTR 

public briefings. While these groups welcomed increased outreach by 

USTR, most felt that having a role in the formal advisory committee 

system was still desirable, saying it would enhance accountability and 

add balance to U.S. trade policy. However, several feared that creating 

NGO-only committees would “ghettoize” them within the system and fail 

to ensure equal access to information and decision makers. These NGOs 

favor a broader overhaul of the system but acknowledge that NGOs often 

do not have the requisite resources or desire to participate.



System Lacks Sufficient Leadership, Administrative Support to Reliably 

Meet Mandated Responsibilities:



Despite relatively high rates of member satisfaction with the support 

by USTR and other agencies such as Commerce and USDA, we found in our 

review that lack of policy direction and weak system administration at 

executive branch agencies are limiting the advisory committee system’s 

capacity to accomplish its statutory mission and contribute to U.S. 

trade policy. USTR, as the lead agency, has not provided clear policy 

direction. Execution of administrative tasks needed to keep advisory 

committees operating and relevant has been slow. The limited resources 

USTR and the other key agencies devote to managing the advisory 

committee system have not been sufficient to position them to maximize 

input from the committees.



Clear Policy Direction and Commitment to Advisory Committee System 

Lacking:



Several experts and committee members stressed the importance of 

organizational leadership from the top in creating an environment for 

vital and effective advisory committee input into U.S. trade policy. 

However, USTR has taken a decentralized and delegated approach to 

obtaining private sector advice and has not demonstrated a commitment 

to assume a leadership role in the advisory committee system. Through 

interviews with USTR negotiators and other officials, we learned that 

the agency’s overall policy of consulting with the private sector 

generally has not ensured that the formal statutory advisory committees 

are systematically consulted. Agency officials explained that 

negotiators are encouraged to consult with the private sector but that 

they exercise individual discretion over whether to consult with the 

advisory committees. As noted earlier, some negotiators whom we 

interviewed reported using the committee system to obtain advice, while 

others consult the committees only on a pro forma basis or do not 

consult them at all. This unevenness has economic consequences: In one 

example, USTR did not inform a committee that a general effort to 

reduce discriminatory tariffs against U.S. goods in central and eastern 

Europe was under way, and as a result, its industry sector was not 

included in the final package of agreed tariff cuts.



Our examination of USTR and Commerce procedures found that they do not 

provide broad guidance to USTR officials and other negotiators on their 

obligation to consult with advisory committees or on when, how, and 

with whom to consult. Instead, they are largely aimed at committee 

members and agency administrators and focus on committee operations. A 

USTR negotiator and committee members have suggested that clearer 

expectations for the consultation process need to be developed for both 

negotiators and advisers. Without them, misunderstandings do occur. For 

example, one committee chairman, who is generally satisfied with USTR’s 

use of advisory committees, was outraged when USTR neglected to consult 

his committee on an issue of long-standing interest and, instead, sent 

a position paper in a broadcast E-mail to all advisers in the system 

with a 2-day deadline and then presented the proposal to other nations. 

Although, at the time, a USTR administering official said the broadcast 

E-mail was typical, the negotiator responsible later acknowledged that 

USTR mishandled the process for seek advice in this instance.



Slow Administrative and Security Procedures Disrupt Committee 

Operations:



Slow and cumbersome administrative and security processes have also 

hindered committee operations. Under FACA, Section 135 of the Trade Act 

and implementing guidance and procedures, USTR and other federal 

agencies are responsible for placing new members on committees, 

rechartering committees, and creating new committees. These are 

important functions that keep the advisory committee system operating 

and relevant. However, our work at three key administering agencies--

USTR, Commerce, and USDA--suggests that present methods for 

accomplishing these responsibilities do not ensure that the system 

functions reliably.



Turnover of membership occurs regularly given the pace of global 

business, industry consolidation, and distress in certain segments of 

the U.S. economy. Yet, applications for prospective members spend 

months in the approval pipeline before the members can participate (see 

app. III). For example, USTR submitted a list of candidates for 

appointment to the White House for a presidential appointment to the 

Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations in mid-February 

2002, which, as of early September 2002 had not yet been cleared by the 

White House.[Footnote 42] Agency officials acknowledged that these 

delays are frustrating for potential members and can be a disincentive 

to joining the system. Indeed, 40 percent of our survey respondents 

were dissatisfied with the time it takes to appoint new members to 

committees and 35 percent said the time to appoint new members has 

deteriorated (see app. IV, questions 17 and 22).



Our analysis of agency documents indicates that the full appointment 

process, which includes the time for members to complete the 

application materials and the time for a required security clearance, 

regularly takes 6 months or longer. Some time-consuming elements of the 

clearance process are beyond the trade agencies’ control.[Footnote 43] 

However, all three agencies now pay for the expedited security 

investigation offered by the Office of Personnel Management. Some 

agencies have taken other streamlining steps, such as providing interim 

security clearances.[Footnote 44] According to DFOs and other agency 

officials, applying these reforms more widely could alleviate this 

major irritant.



FACA’s requirement that committees continued beyond 2 years must be 

rechartered has been disruptive for the trade advisory committee 

system, posing a particular burden for new administrations until their 

key policymaking vacancies are filled. In several cases during our 

audit period, committees ceased to meet and thus could not provide 

advice, because the agencies had not adopted new charters and appointed 

members. For example, the agriculture advisory committees did not meet 

between April and October 2001 while USDA went through the process of 

appointing members for its six committees.[Footnote 45] The committee 

charters and rosters expired before the United States was able to vet 

its market access proposal for the Chile FTA negotiations, and as a 

result, a lead USDA negotiator reported that he was not able to use the 

committees to obtain input on the proposal. The Labor Advisory 

Committee’s charter expired in July 2001 and was not renewed until 

February 2002. As a result, the LAC Steering Committee could no longer 

meet or provide formal committee advice as efforts to launch new WTO 

negotiations at the Doha Ministerial in Qatar were under way. (Only one 

of the LAC respondents to our survey reported that the system was 

fulfilling its statutory role in U.S. trade policy.) Commerce 

successfully avoided disruptions in its most recent rechartering by 

starting the process for the 22 committees it manages well before their 

charters expired. However, the effort to appoint new members and obtain 

security clearances required the full-time attention of two of the 

three Commerce employees responsible for managing the committees and 

took 7 months to complete. Commerce, USDA, and USTR officials said the 

tasks associated with the rechartering process--such as preparing new 

charters, analyzing the attendance records of members up for 

reappointment, and reviewing member application information--places a 

significant burden on their ability to manage the committee system and 

detracts from their ability to support committee operations.



Resources Devoted to Committee Management Out of Step with Required 

Tasks:



The resources USTR and the other agencies devote to managing the 

advisory committee system do not match the tasks that must be 

accomplished to keep the system running reliably and well. (We recently 

testified on human capital shortages at trade agencies, including USTR 

and Commerce.[Footnote 46]) According to annual reports that the 

agencies prepare for the General Services Administration, federal staff 

time allocated to managing all the committees totaled 15.60 full-time 

equivalent (FTE) positions[Footnote 47] in fiscal year 2001 and 

averaged 0.47 FTEs per committee.[Footnote 48] USTR officials said the 

current staffing levels in the office responsible--three positions with 

multiple responsibilities besides the committee system--do not allow 

them time to proactively manage committee operations. The recent head 

of the office said that simply restarting all the lapsed committees and 

keeping the rest of the system operating were occupying much of the 

time she could devote to the system.



Commerce and USDA manage more committees and face similar challenges. 

Commerce officials responsible for managing the Commerce committees 

reported that they must focus their limited staff on the rechartering 

and appointment processes, which has not allowed them to meet their 

responsibilities to attend all the committee meetings. However, some 

improvement may be forthcoming: In its official comments on our draft 

report, Commerce stated that it will shortly hire two new full-time 

staff to support administration of the committee system. Meanwhile, a 

USDA official in the office responsible for managing Agriculture’s 

committees--which has one professional position devoted to advisory 

committee work and two other positions with multiple responsibilities 

in addition to managing the committees--said the reappointment process 

in 2001 took more than 85 percent of her time and prevented her from 

fulfilling other key job responsibilities, such as legislative liaison.



Resource limitations also affect the use of technology. Although 

committee members supported the use of technology to improve committee 

operations (79 percent strongly or generally supported increased 

technology to inform members and 60 percent supported the use of 

videoconferencing technology to enable greater participation in 

meetings), the cost of new technology is a significant determining 

factor in its adoption and use. Commerce is examining options to expand 

the use of its Web site for committee members, but the cost of options 

at the high end of estimates ($200,000)--which include the security 

safeguards needed for improved member access to sensitive documents--

far exceeds available funding. Finally, a USTR official reported that 

the agency’s live Web casts from the WTO Doha Ministerial were very 

costly (estimated at $50,000) and cannot be done on a routine basis. 

However, USTR plans to examine less expensive technological options, 

such as taped presentations through its Web site.



Conclusions:



Despite several weaknesses we identified, negotiators, agency 

officials, and members told us that the advisory committee system 

Congress created 28 years ago still provides value to U.S. trade 

policy. Many negotiators report that input from the system has helped 

the United States achieve more beneficial trade agreements. Members 

devote time and contribute much to the process and report generally 

high satisfaction with many aspects of committee operations and 

effectiveness. Nevertheless, our work suggests that the committee 

system is not being used to full advantage and has lost some of its 

vitality in providing useful advice on trade policy matters. 

Consultations are not always timely or meaningful, and when advice is 

provided, there is little assurance that executive branch officials are 

held accountable for considering it. Furthermore, the committee 

structure has not evolved fully to reflect today’s economy. Some key 

trade interests that have recently surfaced--industries, issues, and 

stakeholders--are missing or poorly represented in the system. 

Conflicts over interpreting how FACA’s fair balance requirement applies 

to the advisory committees have complicated the task of incorporating 

nonbusiness stakeholders. Low membership rosters for most existing 

committees further reduce the opportunity for negotiators to obtain a 

full range of private sector views. Finally, USTR’s decentralized 

management of the committees has left the system without sufficient 

direction or support. With limited resources devoted to the system’s 

functioning, agencies are struggling with administrative tasks such as 

security clearances associated with appointments and 2-year 

rechartering requirements. To perform the unique role in U.S. trade 

policy Congress has given it, the advisory committee system’s capacity 

to provide frank and representative advice needs strengthening.



Because important multilateral, regional, and bilateral negotiations 

are currently under way for which ongoing advisory committee input is 

expected and desirable, improvements should be made to the existing 

system, particularly with regard to the timeliness and quality of 

consultations, gaps in representation, and committee administration. 

However, given the issues we identify, improving the system’s readiness 

to play its envisaged role in U.S. trade policy will also require more 

fundamental reform.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



As Congress seeks to provide new direction to the President on U.S. 

trade policy, we recommend that the U.S. Trade Representative, as the 

lead agency for the committee system, work with the Secretaries of 

Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor and the EPA Administrator to make the 

existing system’s consultation process more meaningful and reliable.



1. Specifically, we recommend that the agencies

adopt or amend guidelines and procedures to ensure that:



* advisory committee input is sought on a continual and timely basis,



* consultations are meaningful,



* committee advice is considered and committees receive substantive 

feedback on how agencies respond to their advice;



2. continue to increase outreach efforts to fill gaps in committee 

composition and revitalize membership;



3. streamline the nomination and appointment process for committee 

members and prevent disruptions in committee activity due to lapses in 

charters; and:



4. provide sufficient technological and human resources to support 

meaningful consultations and ensure effective functioning of the 

system.



In addition, we recommend that the U.S. Trade Representative work with 

the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor and the EPA 

Administrator to conduct an assessment of the entire system and update 

it to make it more relevant to the current U.S. economy and trade 

policy needs.



In conducting this assessment and updating the system, USTR, in 

conjunction with the other agencies, should seek to:



1. more closely align the system’s structure and composition with the 

current economy,



2. better incorporate new trade issues and interests,



3. more reliably meet negotiator needs, and:



4. better match agency resources to the tasks associated with managing 

the system.



Matters for Congressional Consideration:



To assist the U.S. Trade Representative and the other agencies in 

updating the system and improving advisory committee operations, 

Congress may wish to consider:



1. clarifying its intent regarding how to apply the FACA fair balance 

requirement to the trade policy advisory committee system, and:



2. providing an exception to FACA administrative requirements by 

extending the charter period for the trade policy advisory committees 

beyond 2 years.



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



We provided draft copies of this report to the following agencies for 

review: the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of 

Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the 

Department of Labor, and the Environmental Protection Agency. We 

received formal comments from USTR, Agriculture, and Commerce (see 

apps. VI through VIII). The three agencies, as well as Labor and EPA, 

also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report 

as appropriate. The Department of Defense reviewed the report but did 

not provide formal comments.



USTR and USDA agreed with our overall findings and reported on initial 

steps they are taking to implement our recommendations. Commerce 

characterized the report as thorough and fair, but urged us to make a 

number of modifications. In general, Commerce believes that we 

underplay member satisfaction with the system. Commerce also took issue 

with our conclusions on apparent mismatches between the committee 

structure and the current U.S. economy and agencies’ administrative 

capacity. Some of Commerce’s comments contain new information or useful 

clarifications that we have added to the reportæfor example, language 

about the agency’s concerns over security breaches and additional 

details about outreach efforts. However, as explained in appendix VIII, 

we do not agree with Commerce’s changes related to members’ concerns 

about the timeliness and quality of consultations, accountability for 

seeking and responding to committee advice, and the need to update the 

system’s structure. We believe that the recent passage of Trade 

Promotion Authority and the ambitious negotiating plans that have since 

been announced only heighten the urgency of taking steps to ensure that 

U.S. negotiators have timely, meaningful, and representative input from 

the private sector on U.S. trade policy.



As agreed with your office, we plan no further distribution of this 

report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send 

copies to appropriate congressional committees and to the U.S. Trade 

Representative, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of 

Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Labor, and the 

Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. Copies will also 

be made available to others upon request. In addition, this report is 

also available on GAO’s Web site for no charge at http://www.gao.gov.



If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please 

contact me on (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff 

acknowledgments are listed in appendix IX.



Sincerely yours,



Loren Yager

Director, International Affairs and Trade:

Signed by Loren Yager:



[End of section]



Appendixes:



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



This appendix discusses the scope and methodology for our work. We have 

included a separate segment at the end of appendix IV providing 

technical information on our methodology for the survey of committee 

members.



Scope:



The scope of our review included analysis of 34 private sector advisory 

committees on all aspects of committee activities, as well as the 4 

agencies that currently administer them: the Departments of Commerce, 

Labor, and Agriculture and the Office of the United States Trade 

Representative (USTR). The time period covered by our review was 

generally fiscal years 1999 to 2001.



At the time we initiated our review, three policy advisory committees 

in the second tier were in uncertain stages of activity. The charters 

for the Labor Advisory Committee and the Defense Policy Advisory 

Committee on Trade had expired in 2001, but Labor and Defense officials 

indicated that their agencies were rechartering the committees. A third 

policy advisory committee dealing with trade with Africa has a charter 

and seven members, but the committee had not met during our review 

period.



Our survey of members, which focused on committee operations, was under 

way when these uncertainties existed. Defense and Labor committee 

members were included in our survey, but the Africa committee’s members 

were not. Ultimately, the Department of Labor rechartered its committee 

in February 2002. However, in January 2002, Defense officials informed 

us that the Department of Defense did not intend to reconstitute its 

committee, which had 10 members on its latest roster, as part of a 

departmental effort to reduce the number of advisory committees. 

Regarding the Africa committee, USTR informed us in March 2002 that it 

had rechartered the committee and was seeking to appoint more members 

to it. As a result, the Labor and Africa committees are included in our 

discussion of the committee’s current structure and count of committees 

and members, but the Defense committee is not.



Methodology:



For our first and second objectives--determining the advisory system’s 

value to U.S. trade policy and which aspects of the consultation 

process participants indicate are and are not satisfied--we used three 

methods of inquiry: interviews, a survey, and document analysis.



Regarding interviews, in initial meetings with agency officials and 

other trade experts involved in the committee process, we were told 

that the best way to obtain information on how well the trade advisory 

committee system functions is to interview the key participants. These 

officials and experts stated that the available documentation on 

committee activities would not provide as comprehensive a picture as 

interviews. We therefore first conducted 168 interviews with every type 

of participant in the process, including 25 executive branch 

negotiators, 40 other agency officials, 30 committee chairmen, 50 

committee members, and 15 trade experts. To gain the perspectives of 

organizations that do not currently participate in the advisory 

committee system, we interviewed selected representatives of 

nonbusiness non-governmental organizations (NGOs) having a 

demonstrated interest in trade policy. Interest was evidenced by 

submitting formal comments in response to USTR Federal Register notices 

or attendance at USTR public briefings.



In addition to interviews, we conducted a Web-based survey of 720 

committee members and staff liaisons[Footnote 49] between January and 

March 2002 to obtain views on matters such as overall satisfaction with 

committee operations and effectiveness. We surveyed all the members and 

staff liaisons whose names appeared on lists obtained from the 

Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Labor, and USTR. We 

developed our questionnaire in November and December, 2001. We put the 

instrument on a special Web site on the GAO server, activated it on 

January 17, 2002, and kept it open until March 15, 2002. In all, we 

received a total of 515 usable responses to our survey, for an overall 

adjusted response rate of 72 percent. The response rate varied 

considerably by committee and by tier. For example, seventy-eight (78) 

percent of tier-3 members responded to the questionnaire, compared with 

55 percent of tier-2 members and 57 percent of tier-1 members. 

Consequently, while we present the aggregated responses for all 

committee members who responded, we are not generalizing to the 

universe of all committee members. The survey also allowed for some 

open-ended responses. Members provided considerable commentary, which 

is reflected in the body of the report but is not summarized 

statistically. The survey results and a technical description of the 

survey methodology are in appendix V.



Third, we collected and analyzed documents from four agencies that 

currently administer committees. Documentation generally covered 

fiscal years 1999 through 2001. Specifically, we collected and reviewed 

applicable laws, legislative history, and implementing rules; committee 

charters and rosters; agency operating procedures and other guidance; 

meeting notices, agendas, summaries, minutes, and transcripts; 

interagency decision memos; formal committee reports; and agency 

correspondence with advisory committees. We also reviewed written 

responses to an April 2000 Federal Register notice requesting 

suggestions to improve the advisory committee system.



To investigate whether the system matches the current U.S. economy and 

supports U.S. trade policy needs, we obtained and analyzed U.S. trade 

data and committee membership rosters, as well as information obtained 

during our interviews and Web-based survey. Specifically, we examined 

data on annual industry sector contributions to U.S. gross domestic 

product from 1974 to June 2000 and determined commodity shares of U.S. 

imports and exports using data collected by Commerce, the U.S. 

International Trade Commission, and the Department of Treasury. We 

defined commodity groups using Commerce’s 4-digit Standard Industrial 

Classification level codes,[Footnote 50] and we used Commerce’s 

determination of how best to match each advisory committee to a 

commodity group.[Footnote 51] We determined which industries are over-

and under-represented in the committee system with respect to their 

U.S. import and export contributions by comparing this data with lists 

showing annual numbers of members on each committee in fiscal years 

1999 through 2001. We also discussed the adequacy of coverage of 

industry sectors with agency and industry officials. We identified 

trade issues and associated stakeholders that have emerged since 1974 

by reviewing academic and agency literature. We discussed the system’s 

coverage of these issues and stakeholders in interviews with agency 

officials and selected business and nonbusiness organizations.



To examine how well USTR and the other agencies are managing the 

advisory committee system, we collected and examined available data 

from USTR, USDA, and Commerce about the time involved in the 

appointment process for new members. We also interviewed agency 

officials, negotiators, and committee members about agency practices 

and other factors that affect the extent of consultation with the 

advisory committees and the capability of the managing agencies to 

maintain full and active committees. Finally, for information about 

agency resources devoted to the committee system we obtained and 

reviewed the annual reports for each advisory committee for 1999 to 

2001 from the General Services Administration (GSA) and conducted 

interviews with agency officials.



We conducted our work from August 2001 through May 2002 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.



[End of section]



Appendix II: Applying Fair Balance Requirement to Trade Advisory 

Committees:



The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) includes a fair balance 

requirement that applies to each advisory committee covered by the act. 

In this regard, the legislative history of FACA shows that the focus of 

committee membership should be on the groups directly affected by the 

work of a committee, rather than whether these groups represent 

business or nonbusiness interests. The broad language of section 135 of 

the Trade Act of 1974 making FACA generally applicable to the trade 

advisory committees indicates that the fair balance requirement applies 

to them. Nevertheless, there is still some legal ambiguity about what 

this means within the context of the trade advisory committee 

structure. Aside from lack of clarity in the legislation, at this 

point, there appear to be too few decided court cases to show any trend 

in fair balance challenges by nonbusiness groups to the composition of 

trade advisory committees.



FACA Requires Fair Balance on Federal Advisory Committees:



FACA, passed in 1972, sets forth certain requirements for Congress to 

follow in creating federal advisory committees.[Footnote 52] One such 

requirement states that any legislation establishing an advisory 

committee shall require that the membership of the committee be fairly 

balanced in terms of points of view represented and the functions the 

committee performs.[Footnote 53] GSA guidelines implementing 

FACA[Footnote 54] indicate that to attain a fair balance of membership 

on an advisory committee, agencies should ensure that they consider a 

cross-section of those directly affected, interested, and qualified, as 

appropriate to the nature and functions of the committee.[Footnote 55]



The legislative history of FACA shows that the fair balance requirement 

was intended to ensure that persons or groups directly affected by the 

work of a particular advisory committee would have some representation 

on the committee.[Footnote 56] In this regard, the House Report on FACA 

criticized the composition of an advisory council for only having 

industry representatives. The report suggested that representatives of 

conservation, environment, clean water, consumer or other public 

interest groups should have been present at meetings with government 

officials to consider a proposed questionnaire regarding national 

industrial wastes inventory.[Footnote 57]



FACA’s Fair Balance Requirement Applies to Trade Advisory Committees:



The Trade Act of 1974,[Footnote 58] which mandated creation of advisory 

committees on trade policy, was enacted 2 years after FACA was passed. 

Section 135(f) of the Trade Act states that the provisions of FACA do 

apply to the trade advisory committees, with limited exceptions 

relating to open meetings and public availability of 

documents.[Footnote 59] As the fair balance requirement is not one of 

the excepted FACA provisions, the requirement and the implementing GSA 

guidance would apply to the trade advisory committees established under 

section 135 of the Trade Act. This was one of the findings made by one 

of the two United States courts that have considered application of the 

FACA fair balance requirement to section 135.[Footnote 60]



Trade Act Not Clear on What Fair Balance Means within Trade Advisory 

Committee Structure:



Although the language of FACA indicates that the fair balance 

requirement applies to each advisory committee, there is some ambiguity 

about what this means within the context of the trade advisory 

committee structure. Section 135 of the Trade Act called for formation 

of three different kinds of trade advisory committees for the purpose 

of creating an institutional framework to ensure that representative 

elements from the private sector have the opportunity to present their 

views to U.S. negotiators.[Footnote 61] The three- tier structure 

established by section 135, as amended,[Footnote 62](1) requires 
establishment 

of an Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN) 
whose 

function is to provide overall trade policy advice (tier 1); (2) 
authorizes 

establishment of general policy advisory committees whose function is 
to 

provide general policy advice (tier 2); and (3) requires establishment 
of 

industry sector and functional advisory committees, as may be 
appropriate, 

whose functions are to provide technical advice and information about 

negotiations over particular products and other factors relevant to 
positions 

of the United States in trade negotiations (tier 3).[Footnote 63]



The language of section 135(b), as amended, does show that ACTPN, the 

tier-1 committee, is to include both business and nonbusiness 

interests. Specifically, ACTPN is to be broadly representative of the 

key sectors and groups of the economy affected by trade and “shall 

include representatives of non-federal governments, labor, industry, 

agriculture, service industries, retailers, non-governmental 

environmental and conservation organizations, and consumer 

interests.”[Footnote 64] However, section 135 of the 1974 Trade Act and 

its legislative history do not specifically discuss how the fair 

balance requirement of FACA was intended to apply to the tier-2 and 

tier-3 committees. With regard to the general policy advisory 

committees of tier 2, section 135 authorizes, but does not require, the 

President to establish such committees for industry, labor, 

agriculture, services, investment, defense, and other interests, as 

appropriate. Section 135 states that these committees, to the extent 

practicable, are to be representative of all industry, labor, 

agricultural, service, investment, defense, and other interests, 

including small business interests. Regarding the industry sector and 

functional advisory committees of tier 3, the President is directed to 

establish them as appropriate, and similar to the tier-2 committees, to 

the extent practicable each tier-3 committee is to be representative of 

all industry, labor, agriculture, or service interests, including small 

business interests in the sector or functional areas 

concerned.[Footnote 65] The language of section 135 suggests that each 

of the tier-2 and tier-3 committees is to be composed of members 

involved in the particular sector, and does not indicate any intention 

to expand these committees to include other interests.



The legislative history of the 1974 act, which shows that Congress was 

concerned that in prior trade negotiations there had not been adequate 

input from U.S. producers, would appear to support this view. In this 

regard, the Senate report stated that the purpose of the procedures in 

section 135 were to “strengthen the hand of U.S. negotiators by 

improving their knowledge and familiarity with the problems domestic 

producers face in obtaining access to foreign markets.”[Footnote 66] 

Similarly, the House report stated that in past trade negotiations 

“there has not been adequate input from U.S. producers who are in the 

best position to assess the effects of removing U.S. and foreign trade 

barriers on their particular products.” Nevertheless, the legislative 

history of the 1979 amendments to section 135[Footnote 67] indicates 

congressional interest in broadening representation of the tier-2 and 

tier-3 committees to include other interests. In this regard, the 

Senate report states that in establishing the membership of the policy, 

sector, or functional advisory committees, it was expected that each of 

these committees “will fully represent the interests of the Government, 

small business, retailers, wholesalers, distributors, consumers and the 

general public, as well as labor, industry, agriculture and services, 

as the case may be.”[Footnote 68] The House report has similar language 

and also stated that “[a]ll major recognized organizations, regardless 

of their point of view, should be invited to participate in appropriate 

advisory groups.”[Footnote 69] These statements are consistent with the 

legislative history of FACA, which shows that the focus of committee 

membership was intended to be on the groups directly affected by the 

work of a committee, rather than whether those groups represent 

business or nonbusiness interests.



Court Decisions Provide Little Guidance in Applying Fair Balance:



An additional problem in applying the FACA fair balance requirement to 

the trade advisory committees concerns the relatively small number of 

court decisions that have considered the issue. Although several U.S. 

Courts of Appeal had rejected challenges under FACA to the composition 

of other federal advisory committees,[Footnote 70] until 1999 no case 

had involved a civil-society, fair-balance challenge to membership on a 

trade advisory committee.[Footnote 71] Since then, two rulings have 

been issued, and a settlement agreement has been reached in another 

case. These dispositions have affected three tier-3 advisory 

committees.



* In November 1999, several environmental organizations brought an 

action in the Federal District Court for the Western District of 

Washington, Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. USTR,[Footnote 72] 

challenging the composition of two tier-3 industry advisory committees 

that deal with forest products. The district court found that fair 

balance meant balanced representation within each trade advisory 

committee, not among all advisory committees, and ruled that the two 

committees should include environmental representatives.[Footnote 73] 

Two of the factors the court relied on in making its ruling were that 

(1) the forest product committees routinely advised the government on 

trade issues that affected the environment, both nationally and 

internationally, and (2) the positions supported by the committees were 

directly contrary to those supported by the environmental organizations 

challenging their fair balance. Importantly, the court also rejected 

USTR’s position that fair balance is fulfilled if the membership of an 

industry sector advisory committee is broadly representative of the 

industry sector for which the committee was established. The court 

found that this position contradicted one of the primary purposes of 

FACA, which was to end industry domination of advisory bodies. To 

implement its holding, the court ordered USTR to make a good faith 

effort to expedite the appointment of at least one properly qualified 

environmental representative to each of the two committees.[Footnote 

74] USTR and Commerce appealed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Ninth Circuit, and the United States filed a brief in support 

of the appeal.[Footnote 75] Nevertheless, the United States later 

dropped the appeal, and environmental representatives were appointed to 

the two forest product advisory committees.



* After the decision in Northwest Ecosystem Alliance, various public 

interest groups filed a lawsuit in the same federal district court, 

Washington Toxics Coalition v. USTR,[Footnote 76] asking the court to 

require USTR and Commerce to appoint one or more environmental 

representatives to the chemical and allied products industry sector 

advisory committee. In March 2001, the parties entered into a 

settlement agreement in which USTR and Commerce agreed to make a good 

faith effort to expedite the appointment of one or more qualified 

environmental representatives to this committee. In response to the 

Washington Toxics Coalition case, in early 2001, several members of the 

chemical and allied products advisory committee brought an action 

before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Gamble v. 

Zoellick,[Footnote 77]asking the court to preclude environmental 

representatives from becoming members of their committee. The court 

rejected this position and held that the committee members lacked 

standing to challenge the appointment of an environmental 

representative to their committee.[Footnote 78] In support of its 

ruling, the court also found that there was nothing in the Trade Act of 

1974 that prohibited USTR and Commerce from appointing an environmental 

representative. The court noted that the appointment of other members 

was not precluded by the mandatory language of section 135 requiring 

that the industry sector advisory committees be representative of all 

industry, labor, agricultural, or service interests in the sector 

concerned. In this regard, the court endorsed the U.S. government’s 

position that the language of section 135 gave the government 

considerable discretion in making appointments to the chemical and 

applied products committee beyond those required.[Footnote 79]



Current Status:



To date, there have been no further court challenges by environmental 

or other civil society groups to the composition of trade advisory 

committees. Without further clarification by U.S. appellate courts or 

the Congress about how to apply the FACA fair balance requirement to 

the trade advisory committee system, some ambiguity about this issue 

will remain.



Current executive branch policy is that tier-3 committees are generally 

not open to nonbusiness groups. A March 20, 2002, Federal Register 

notice issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce states that with the 

exception of the 3 committees affected by fair balance challenges--ISAC 

3 (chemicals), ISAC 10 (lumber and wood products) and ISAC 12 (paper 

and paper products)--”non-government organizations do not qualify for 

representation on a committee.”[Footnote 80] Regarding to the 

Washington Toxics Coalition case, the settlement agreement provided 

that until an environmental representative was appointed, USTR and 

Commerce could call meetings of the chemical and applied products 

advisory committee but had to make a good-faith effort to include an 

interim qualified environmental representative at any such meetings. An 

interim environmental representative has attended all but one of the 

nine committee meetings held since the settlement, but he declined to 

continue to serve beyond the renewal of the committee’s charter in 

March, 2002. The committee--which represents the second-leading 

manufacturing export sector--has not met since March 13, 2002. One 

potential environmental representative has applied to serve as 

environmental representative on the committee, and the application is 

being considered. To date no appointment has been made.



[End of section]



Appendix III: Nomination and Security Clearance Process for Trade 

Advisory Committees:



Commerce, USDA, and USTR follow slightly different procedures in 

screening applicants for advisory committees and in obtaining security 

clearances. Generally, the vetting process for new members includes an 

internal agency review and a security clearance investigation performed 

by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). This appendix provides 

information on the nomination and security process, based on data 

provided by the three agencies.



Agencies begin a review process after they receive a nomination or a 

letter of interest from a prospective member. Figure 11 illustrates the 

screening process by each agency and the approximate time for 

applicants to move through different stages of the process toward 

committee membership. For example, the initial review process averages 

70 days at the Department of Agriculture, while the Department of 

Commerce conducts an initial, 5-day review and then saves time by 

continuing the review concurrently with the security clearance process. 

Figure 11 does not include the time spent by committee members in 

completing the application materials and assembling the documents 

required for the security clearance because agency data on this part of 

the process is not systematic or complete. Based on our review of 

available agency data and interviews with agency officials about their 

typical experience, we found that the appointment process can regularly 

take 6 months or longer to complete, if additional time for completing 

application materials is added.



Figure 11: Advisory Committee Appointment Process and Timetable for 

USTR, USDA, and Commerce:



[See PDF for image]



[A] Tracking of the time it takes for members to return the security 

clearance paperwork varies across agencies, but according to data and 

interviews with agency officials, it can take as long for applicants to 

complete and correct paperwork as it takes for agencies to complete the 

security clearance investigation.



[B] This reflects the timeframe for the appointments made during the 

2001 rechartering process.



[C] USTR stated there was no standard duration for vetting a candidate.



Source: GAO analysis of data from USTR, USDA, and Commerce.



[End of figure]



The security clearance process can take about 3 months, according to 

agency officials and data. Although we found an average waiting time 

for clearances at USTR of 227 days for the period fiscal years 1999 to 

2001, the average wait time for a clearance fell to 84 days when USTR 

began using the OPM to perform its security clearances in 2000. 

Department of Agriculture officials said the process of obtaining a 

clearance takes about 3 months once the completed paperwork is 

submitted. Security clearance data provided by the Department of 

Commerce show that the process takes an average of approximately 105 

days. All members receive a secret-level national security clearance, 

following a background investigation from the OPM. The clearance is 

valid for 10 years.[Footnote 81]



[End of section]



Appendix IV Results of GAO’s Survey of Trade Advisory Committee 

Members:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



[End of section]



Appendix V: Comparisons of Committee Structure with Trade Indicators:



To examine how well the committee structure reflects the current 

economy, we identified the range of goods or services represented by 

individual third tier committees and the export and import shares of 

those goods and services in total U.S. exports and imports.[Footnote 

82] We then compared this data to membership data for each committee 

obtained from the GSA, which maintains annual reports covering each 

fiscal year covered by our review. Based on these calculations, table 5 

shows the export and import shares as well as the relative percentage 

of membership for each committee in 2000.



Table 5: Shares of Total U.S. Exports and Imports and Percentage of 

Membership by Committee, 2000:



Committee: ISAC-1: Aerospace Equipment; Share of total U.S. exports: 

5.2%; Share of total U.S. imports: 1.9%; Percent of membership: 4.1%.



Committee: ISAC-2: Capital Goods; Share of total U.S. exports: 8.6; 

Share of total U.S. imports: 7.1; Percent of membership: 5.1.



Committee: ISAC-3: Chemicals and Allied Products; Share of total U.S. 

exports: 9.1; Share of total U.S. imports: 6.4; Percent of membership: 

9.0.



Committee: ISAC-4: Consumer Goods; Share of total U.S. exports: 5.9; 

Share of total U.S. imports: 7.4; Percent of membership: 6.0.



Committee: ISAC-5: Electronics and Instrumentation; Share of total U.S. 

exports: 18.3; Share of total U.S. imports: 18.9; Percent of 

membership: 3.7.



Committee: ISAC-6: Energy; Share of total U.S. exports: 1.3; Share of 

total U.S. imports: 8.6; Percent of membership: 3.0.



Committee: ISAC-7: Ferrous Ores and Metals; Share of total U.S. 

exports: 0.6; Share of total U.S. imports: 1.3; Percent of membership: 

4.6.



Committee: ISAC-8: Footwear, Leather, and Leather Products; Share of 

total U.S. exports: 0.2; Share of total U.S. imports: 1.6; Percent of 

membership: 3.0.



Committee: ISAC-9: Building Products and Other Materials; Share of 

total U.S. exports: 2.0; Share of total U.S. imports: 2.2; Percent of 

membership: 2.8.



Committee: ISAC-10: Lumber and Wood Products; Share of total U.S. 

exports: 0.6; Share of total U.S. imports: 1.2; Percent of membership: 

4.6.



Committee: ISAC-11: Nonferrous Ores and Metals; Share of total U.S. 

exports: 2.0; Share of total U.S. imports: 2.1; Percent of membership: 

4.6.



Committee: ISAC-12: Paper and Paper Products; Share of total U.S. 

exports: 1.6; Share of total U.S. imports: 1.5; Percent of membership: 

2.1.



Committee: ISAC-13: Services; Share of total U.S. exports: 28.1; Share 

of total U.S. imports: 14.3; Percent of membership: 10.1.



Committee: ISAC-14: Small and Minority Business; Share of total U.S. 

exports: N/A; Share of total U.S. imports: N/A; Percent of membership: 

N/A.



Committee: ISAC-15: Textiles and Apparel; Share of total U.S. exports: 

2.0; Share of total U.S. imports: 5.5; Percent of membership: 6.2.



Committee: ISAC-16: Transportation, Construction, and Agricultural 

Equipment; Share of total U.S. exports: 8.8; Share of total U.S. 

imports: 14.2; Percent of membership: 2.1.



Committee: ISAC-17: Wholesaling and Retailing; Share of total U.S. 

exports: N/A; Share of total U.S. imports: N/A; Percent of membership: 

3.5.



Committee: ATAC: Animal and Animal Products; Share of total U.S. 

exports: 0.4; Share of total U.S. imports: 0.8; Percent of membership: 

5.3.



Committee: ATAC: Fruits and Vegetables; Share of total U.S. exports: 

0.4; Share of total U.S. imports: 0.6; Percent of membership: 5.5.



Committee: ATAC: Grains, Feed, and Oilseeds; Share of total U.S. 

exports: 1.6; Share of total U.S. imports: 0.1; Percent of membership: 

6.2.



Committee: ATAC: Sweeteners; Share of total U.S. exports: 0.0; Share of 

total U.S. imports: 0.0; Percent of membership: 3.5.



Committee: ATAC: Tobacco, Cotton, and Peanuts; Share of total U.S. 

exports: 0.3; Share of total U.S. imports: 0.0; Percent of membership: 

5.1.



Committee: Total Manufacturing; Share of total U.S. exports: 66.2; 

Share of total U.S. imports: 79.9; Percent of membership: 60.8.



Committee: Total Services; Share of total U.S. exports: 28.1; Share of 

total U.S. imports: 14.3; Percent of membership: 13.6.



Committee: Total Agriculture; Share of total U.S. exports: 2.7; Share 

of total U.S. imports: 1.5; Percent of membership: 25.6.



Committee: Other (govt, etc.); Share of total U.S. exports: 3.0; Share 

of total U.S. imports: 4.3; Percent of membership: 0.0.



N/A=Not applicable.



Note: ISAC 14 (Small and Minority Business) is not included in the 

calculations for committee shares of membership.



Source: GAO analysis of data from the Department of Commerce, Treasury 

Department, International Trade Commission, and the General Services 

Administration.



[End of section]



Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of the United States Trade 

Representative:



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 

REPRESENTATIVE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508:



August 1, 2002:



Loren Yager, Ph.D.



Director, International Affairs and Trade U.S. General Accounting 

Office Washington, D.C. 20548:



Dear Dr. Yager:



Thank you for the opportunity to submit comments on the draft General 

Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled “International Trade: Advisory 

Committee System Should Be Updated to Better Serve U.S. Policy Needs.” 

The Bush Administration considers the advisory committee system to be 

an integral part of U.S. trade policy that provides valuable input as 

we push forward with our ambitious trade agenda designed to improve 

economic opportunities for America’s farmers, workers, businesses, and 

consumers.



Your comprehensive report provides an in-depth assessment of the role, 

structure, and operation of the system, which Congress created in 1974 

to ensure that U.S. trade policy adequately reflects our commercial and 

economic interests. As your report points out, the advisory committee 

system exists to facilitate consultations between our negotiators and 

other interested groups in order to create trade agreements that 

Congress can approve with confidence.



I am pleased that your report confirms that the committee system is of 

great value to U.S. trade policy and plays a key role in helping the 

United States achieve more beneficial trade agreements. As the report 

states, a strong majority of committee members have “high levels of 

satisfaction” with the system. Furthermore, the report found “ample 

evidence” that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and other 

executive branch agencies are “informing advisers about developments in 

U.S. trade policy and seeking their input, formally and informally, on 

key initiatives.”:



Your report identifies some components of the system that could benefit 

from strengthening, including the timeliness of consultations, 

mechanisms for feedback to committees, alignment of committee structure 

with the current U.S. economy, and resources devoted to management of 

the system. The following comments address GAO’s four recommendations 

contained in the draft report:



USTR is developing internal guidelines clarifying procedures for 

consulting with trade advisory committees. The agency also is working 

with the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Environmental 

Protection Agency, and Defense to coordinate communications strategies;



USTR, working with the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, 

Environmental Protection Agency, and Defense, is continuing to seek 

qualified candidates to serve on committees as vacancies arise. USTR 

also supports GAO’s recommendation that Congress amend the Federal 

Advisory Committees Act to extend the two-year rechartering requirement 

for the trade policy advisory committees;



USTR is consulting with security agencies to identify solutions for 

streamlining the security clearance process;



USTR is exploring the feasibility of technological solutions for 

consulting with advisors, including webcast technology, which was used 

successfully at the World Trade Organization negotiations in Doha, 

Qatar, last November. USTR also hopes - pending budget approval and 

certification by security officials - to build a password-protected 

encryPted website for advisors so they can obtain information in a 

timely and convenient manner.



USTR is committed to ensuring that the advisory committee system 

continues to meet the objectives set by Congress of providing frank and 

representative advice on U.S. trade policy. Your report provides a 

valuable overview of the system, and offers ideas for improvements that 

match our own goals for strengthening the system. We appreciate the 

time and attention of your auditors, and are grateful to have had the 

opportunity to give our input during the final drafting of this report.



Josette Shiner:



Associate U.S. Trade Representative:



USDA:



United States Department of Agriculture:



Signed by Josette Shiner:EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES TRADE 

REPRESENTATIVE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508:



August 1, 2002:



Loren Yager, Ph.D.



Director, International Affairs and Trade U.S. General Accounting 

Office Washington, D.C. 20548:



Dear Dr. Yager:



Thank you for the opportunity to submit comments on the draft General 

Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled “International Trade: Advisory 

Committee System Should Be Updated to Better Serve U.S. Policy Needs.” 

The Bush Administration considers the advisory committee system to be 

an integral part of U.S. trade policy that provides valuable input as 

we push forward with our ambitious trade agenda designed to improve 

economic opportunities for America’s farmers, workers, businesses, and 

consumers.



Your comprehensive report provides an in-depth assessment of the role, 

structure, and operation of the system, which Congress created in 1974 

to ensure that U.S. trade policy adequately reflects our commercial and 

economic interests. As your report points out, the advisory committee 

system exists to facilitate consultations between our negotiators and 

other interested groups in order to create trade agreements that 

Congress can approve with confidence.



I am pleased that your report confirms that the committee system is of 

great value to U.S. trade policy and plays a key role in helping the 

United States achieve more beneficial trade agreements. As the report 

states, a strong majority of committee members have “high levels of 

satisfaction” with the system. Furthermore, the report found “ample 

evidence” that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and other 

executive branch agencies are “informing advisers about developments in 

U.S. trade policy and seeking their input, formally and informally, on 

key initiatives.”:



Your report identifies some components of the system that could benefit 

from strengthening, including the timeliness of consultations, 

mechanisms for feedback to committees, alignment of committee structure 

with the current U.S. economy, and resources devoted to management of 

the system. The following comments address GAO’s four recommendations 

contained in the draft report:



USTR is developing internal guidelines clarifying procedures for 

consulting with trade advisory committees. The agency also is working 

with the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Environmental 

Protection Agency, and Defense to coordinate communications strategies;



USTR, working with the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, 

Environmental Protection Agency, and Defense, is continuing to seek 

qualified candidates to serve on committees as vacancies arise. USTR 

also supports GAO’s recommendation that Congress amend the Federal 

Advisory Committees Act to extend the two-year rechartering requirement 

for the trade policy advisory committees;



USTR is consulting with security agencies to identify solutions for 

streamlining the security clearance process;



USTR is exploring the feasibility of technological solutions for 

consulting with advisors, including webcast technology, which was used 

successfully at the World Trade Organization negotiations in Doha, 

Qatar, last November. USTR also hopes - pending budget approval and 

certification by security officials - to build a password-protected 

encryPted website for advisors so they can obtain information in a 

timely and convenient manner.



USTR is committed to ensuring that the advisory committee system 

continues to meet the objectives set by Congress of providing frank and 

representative advice on U.S. trade policy. Your report provides a 

valuable overview of the system, and offers ideas for improvements that 

match our own goals for strengthening the system. We appreciate the 

time and attention of your auditors, and are grateful to have had the 

opportunity to give our input during the final drafting of this report.



Josette Shiner:



Associate U.S. Trade Representative:



USDA:



United States Department of Agriculture:



[End of section]



Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:



AUG - 5:



Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services:



Foreign Agricultural Service:



Mr. Loren Yager, Ph.D.



Director, International Affairs and Trade U.S. General Accounting 

Office:



441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548-0007:



1400 Independence Ave, SW:



Stop 1001 Washington, DC 20250-1001:



Dear Dr. Yager:



Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments on the General 

Accounting Office’s (GAO) draft report GAO/02-876, “INTERNATIONAL 

TRADE: Advisory Committee System Should Be Updated to Better Serve U.S. 

Policy Needs.” For this report, requested by Senator Charles E. 

Grassley, GAO examined the advisory committee system’s role, structure, 

and operations to assess if the system meets the 1974 legislative 

objectives for input by the private sector as trade negotiations 

unfold.



In particular, GAO reviewed the management of the advisory committee 

system by the lead agency, the Office of the United States Trade 

Representative (USTR), along with five other agencies, including the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). As a result of the eleven-month 

review, GAO concludes that while the advisory committee system provides 

value in U.S. trade policy and most members are satisfied with their 

committee, the responsible agencies need to strengthen the system’s 

capacity to contribute to U.S. trade policy.



We appreciate that GAO confirms that there is general member 

satisfaction with the system while substantiating what we too believe 

are areas for improvement. Recognizing the need to shore up the 

process, USDA in cooperation with USTR developed and implemented a 

communications strategy to clarify interaction between USDA and USTR 

and strengthen the interaction with the advisory committee members. The 

enclosed paper dated January 30, 2002, describes USDA and USTR’s 

leadership and management responsibilities and establishes procedures 

for formal and informal communications with committee members.



The following comments address GAO’s four recommendations contained in 

their draft report:



Recommendations 1: To adopt or amend guidelines and procedures to 

ensure those consultations are timely, continual, and_ meaningful.



USDA in cooperation with USTR will revise the January 30, 2002, 

Communications Strategy to establish a process so that members are 

notified in a timely manner.



USDA is an Equal Opportunity Employer:



A calendar of upcoming negotiations will be developed and updated on a 

continuing basis to share with the members.



USDA frequently met with the advisory committees in the past nine 

months (October 2001 and February, May, and July 2002). USDA and USTR 

carefully planned the agendas to allow sufficient time for advice and 

counsel of the members, limiting the agenda topics and presentations’ 

length. For the Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee (APAC), the top 

leadership from USDA and USTR were available for most, if not all, of 

the meeting’s agenda.



Recommendation 2: To increase outreach efforts to fill and revitalize 

membership.



For the 2002 rechartering and nomination process for the agriculture 

trade advisory committees, USDA made a concerted effort to maximize 

outreach. Contacts included: 1,062 constituents on the USDA Outreach 

List, 50 Farm Service Agency state executive directors; 16 Cooperative 

State Research, Education, & Extension Service electronic mailing 

lists; American Farm Bureau Federation state directors; Agricultural 

Research Service headquarters and regional directors; 70 Foreign 

Agricultural Service (FAS) Foreign Market Development Cooperators and 

Market Access Program participants; and 100 State Commissioners of 

Agriculture and State Agriculture Department’s Communication Officers. 

In addition, USDA published two Federal Register notices to solicit 

committee nominations.



USDA revitalized the advisory committees’ representation. For example, 

the APAC’s past membership was mostly comprised of representatives of 

commodity interests. For the 2001 nomination process, USDA sought 

people with broad experience in food and agriculture trade policy that 

were well known and widely respected throughout the domestic and 

international industry. To balance the membership, nominations were 

encouraged from all geographic regions, commodities and products, 

producer and processor organizations, and trade facilitating 

organizations.



In addition, USDA is establishing a processed foods technical advisory 

committee for trade, reflecting the importance of high-value products 

in the export market. High-value products now account for two-thirds of 

total export sales compared with only half in 1990.



Recommendation 3: To streamline the nomination and appointment process 

for committee members and prevent_ lapses in committee charters.



USDA streamlined the 2001 nomination and appointment process. 

Nominations closed at the end of June 2001, and on September 6, 2001, 

all the appointment letters were sent to the newly appointed members - 

a quick turnaround of less than 8 weeks. The documentation is enclosed.



The lapse in the agriculture advisory committee’s charter has been a 

problem and will be a challenge when the current charter expires in 

April 2003. To prevent the charter from expiring, USDA must begin the 

nomination process in January 2003 - 18 months from the last renewal. 

In the best of circumstances, processing the paperwork with over 200 

applications is a time consuming responsibility. Part of the solution 

would be to change the Federal Advisory Committees Act’s (FACA) 2-year 

rechartering requirement. We firmly support GAO’s recommendation for 

Congress to authorize exceptions to the FACA to allow exemptions to the 

2-year rechartering requirement for the trade advisory committees.



Recommendation 4: To provide sufficient technological and human 

resources to support meaningful consultations and ensure effective 

functioning of the system.



USDA agrees that we need to increase the use of technology. Efforts are 

underway to establish a secure website to communicate on a more regular 

basis with the committee members on trade sensitive information. USDA 

will explore other means to maximize computer technology for more 

efficient management of the advisory committees.



Concerning human resources, the FAS Legislative Affairs Office, 

responsible for managing the agriculture trade advisory committees, 

will be fully staffed by October 2002, providing sufficient resources 

to manage the committees.



The security clearance process continues to be a challenge. FAS is 

hiring a Security Officer who will assist in managing the security 

process. In anticipation of potential problems, FAS will also work 

closely with USTR and USDA Security Offices to expedite the security 

clearances in the next appointment process.



USDA is committed to continue working with USTR in further refining the 

trade advisory committees’ management. The ongoing efforts will be 

expanded to include GAO’s recommendations. Again, we appreciate the 

opportunity to provide comments on this important subject.



A. Ellen Terpstra Administrator:



Signed by A. Ellen Terpstra:



COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY WITH USTR AND TRADE ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS:



PURPOSE:



There is a renewed commitment by USDA and USTR to improve 

communications between the two responsible staffs concerning the 

Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee (APAC) and the Agricultural 

Technical Advisory Committees (ATAC). Similarly, both staffs are 

dedicated to strengthening the dialogue with the trade advisory 

committee members by facilitating consultations and obtaining 

information and advice from the members on a continuing and timely 

basis.



Working with the International Trade Policy program area, the FAS 

Administrator, the ATAC Executive Secretaries, the Legislative Affairs 

Office, the Under Secretary for FFAS, and USTR the following steps are 

recommended:



Communications and Coordination with USTR:



Matt O’Mara, representing the Under Secretary, will be the lead person 

coordinating with Sharon Bomer, USTR on critical and sensitive matters 

concerning the trade advisory committees, and will troubleshoot and 

facilitate communications between FAS and USTR.



Sharon McClure will manage the day-to-day matters relating to the trade 

advisory committees, and work closely with Matt O’Mara to plan and 

implement committee business. Her principle contacts in USTR will be 

Sharon Bomer and Christina Sevilla. In addition, Sharon McClure will 

coordinate trade committee activities within FAS with the International 

Trade Policy program area and the five ATAC Executive Secretaries, to 

inform, advise and clear matters with the FAS Administrator. In 

addition, she will serve as the Executive Secretary for the APAC.



Procedures:



* Setting Committee Meeting Dates: FAS in conjunction with USTR will 

recommend possible dates for upcoming meetings. Matt O’Mara will 

finalize the dates with the Under Secretary and Office of the 

Secretary, and Sharon Bomer and Christine Sevilla will confirm with 

USTR leadership.



Agenda Planning: For both APAC and ATAC agendas, Sharon Bomer and FAS, 

including ITP representative(s), appropriate Executive Secretary, Matt 

O’Mara, and Sharon McClure, will jointly develop a draft agenda to 

allow all parties to be involved from the onset. Matt O’Mara will 

ensure USDA and USTR leaderships’ approval.



Chairing Committee Meetings: APAC and ATAC members will vote on a 

Chairperson to run the meetings, respectively. Both FAS Executive 

Secretaries and USTR leadership will remain in attendance while the 

APAC and ATAC meetings are in session.



Committee Minutes: As required by the USDA Trade Advisory Committee 

Procedures and Rules, the official minutes will include:



Content:



1) Meeting time, date, and place;



2) List of attendees, including committee members, committee staff and 

Department employees;



3) Accurate description of each matter discussed and resolution, if 

any;



4) Copies of all reports or other documents received, issued, or 

approved by the committee, if appropriate; and,



5) A description of public participation in all meetings open to the 

public and a list of who attended the meetings.



Distribution:



To ensure communications of the committee members’ interests, the APAC 

and ATAC minutes will be distributed to committee members, USTR 

leadership, the FAS Administrator, Deputy Administrators, and the APAC 

Executive Secretary in the Legislative Affairs Office.



Consultations with Committee Members:



The following procedures will be followed for formal and informal 

communications:



1) Formal - Committee Resolutions and Trade Concerns:



For each committee meeting, the Executive Secretaries will draft an 

informational memorandum from the FAS Administrator to the Secretary, 

the USTR and the Under Secretary (clear through Sharon McClure and 

Sharon Bomer) that provides:



Resolutions passed by the committee deemed appropriate for action, 

recognizing resolutions do not require the full consensus of the 

membership.



If after consultation with USTR, action is recommended, also draft an 

options memo from the FAS Administrator to the Secretary, USTR if 

appropriate, and the Under Secretary outlining the recommendations.



Description of the priority/sensitive issues debated by the membership.



To clarify required Department action concerning committee advice or 

recommendations, 19 USCA Sec. 2155 states USTR/USDA. . . “shall not be 

bound by the advice or recommendations of such advisory committees, but 

shall inform the advisory committees of significant departures from 

such advice or recommendations made. . .”:



2) Informal Communications:



To encourage routine feedback, comments, questions, or other forms of 

exchange, FAS will institute procedures to communicate regularly with 

committee members. The following procedures will be followed:



“International Trade Policy Monthly”, a monthly electronic newsletter 

for APAC/ATAC members will be drafted by the International Trade Policy 

area in cooperation with the Legislative Affairs Office and the 

Commodity and Marketing Programs area, drawing from the FAS Weekly 

Report to the Under Secretary. Items in the report will be organized 

within the following categories by priority: multilateral, bilateral, 

and regional. A calendar of upcoming events also will be included. 

Example Attached.



FAS contact names and numbers will be included at the end of the 

report. The Trade Policy staff, FAS Administrator, and USTR will review 

and clear the monthly report. The APAC/ATAC Executive Secretaries will 

transmit the report to their members by the 15tH of each month.



USTR Press Releases and Memoranda: As in the past, APAC/ATAC Executive 

Secretaries will continue to forward to committee members relevant 

press releases, policy documents, and other materials that USTR 

requests to be sent.



Executive Secretaries will continue to respond to questions and e-mails 

from individual members. The Executive Secretaries will forward any of 

these communications to other USDA and USTR personnel as needed.



W:\TradeAdvisory Committees\COMMUN-1, January 24, 2002:



ACTIONS TAKEN BEGINNING MAY 19 TO AUGUST 8:



2001 TIME LINE	ACTION:



May 19:



Federal Register notice announcing USDA/USTR reestablishing the APAC 

and ATAC Committees; requesting Committee nominations:



June 6:



Memo from M. Chambliss to H. Shipman requesting guidance and providing 

draft time line:



June 15:



Under Secretary Penn’s memo to Secretary Veneman notifying her of the 

two week extension of the nominations; list of nominees received to 

date:



June 19:



Federal Register notice announces extension of the deadline by 2 weeks 

to ensure that every effort has been made to solicit broad 

representation on the Committees:



June 21 and 22:



Memos to White House Liaison and OCR providing list of all nominees for 

USDA clearances:



June 26:



Memo from M. Sharpless to Dr. Penn re applications received from June 

19 to June 26:



July 5:



Memo from M. Sharpless to Dr. Penn providing list of nominees By 

Committee, By Region-Organization, and by Organization along with the 

list of 14 APAC nominees at 6 year limit:



July 12:



Memo from M. Sharpless to Under Secretary Penn providing criteria for 

selection and list of nominees received to date:



July 16:



Preliminary list of APAC nominees from Dr. Penn with instructions to 

move other APAC members to appropriate ATAC Committees:



August 8:



Memo from M. Sharpless to Dr. Penn on procedures to finalize membership 

selection and planning for the first Committee(s) meeting (s):



s:\shared\apac\apac2001 nominations\chronology.past. future. j b. 

81601:



ACTIONS REQUIRED TO ENSURE OCTOBER 12 MEETING(S):



[Empty]; RECOMMENDED TIME LINE; ACTIONS.



*; August 13 - 17; Verify accuracy of nominees lists (completed).



[Empty]; [Empty]; Draft appointment letter (rough draft).



[Empty]; [Empty]; Verify mailing list for CCU (completed).



[Empty]; [Empty]; Draft waiver letter (completed).



[Empty]; [Empty]; Reconcile nominee clearances with White House.



[Empty]; [Empty]; Liaison (completed).



*; August 20 - 24; Forward waiver memo to Lou Gallegos, Assistant.



[Empty]; [Empty]; Secretary for Administration.



[Empty]; [Empty]; Consult Secretary’s schedule to determine 

availability.



[Empty]; [Empty]; for meeting dates.



[Empty]; [Empty]; Clear draft appointment letter up to Dr. Penn.



[Empty]; [Empty]; Provide CCU mailing list.



*; August 28 - 31; Final decision on Committees’ membership with info.



[Empty]; [Empty]; memo to Secretary Veneman for her concurrence,.



[Empty]; [Empty]; which allows only 30 days to arrange for an October.



[Empty]; [Empty]; 12 (tentative date) for first Committee meetings.



*; September 3 - 6; l. Mail out appointment letters (requires 

Secretary.



[Empty]; [Empty]; Veneman and Zoellick’s signatures). Recommend.



[Empty]; [Empty]; including date of first Committee meeting..



[Empty]; [Empty]; 2. Determine how the first meeting will be 

structured,.



[Empty]; [Empty]; i.e., plenary session (open, closed meeting and/or.



[Empty]; [Empty]; separate APAC/ATAC meetings following general.



[Empty]; [Empty]; session).



[Empty]; [Empty]; 3. Draft meeting agenda in cooperation with USTR.



[Empty]; [Empty]; 4. Arrange Committee meeting room, Jefferson.



[Empty]; [Empty]; Auditorium for Plenary meeting.



[Empty]; [Empty]; 5. Arrange court reporter.



[End of table]



‘An open meeting requires a Federal Register Notice 15 days prior to 

the meeting date. Closed meeting requires USTR approval and is based on 

agenda topics.



The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Agriculture letter 

dated August 5, 2002.



GAO Comment:



1. Regarding our findings that the nomination and appointment process 

is slow and cumbersome, USDA indicated that it took steps to streamline 

the process during the most recent rechartering period. We appreciate 

that the rechartering was completed within 4 months of being started. 

However, we note that it did not begin until May 2001---more than a 

month after the APAC and ATAC charters had expired in March 2001. As a 

result, as our report indicates, none of the six agricultural advisory 

committees met during the April to October 2001 period. Moreover, we 

note that USDA indicated in a July 2002 meeting with us that many 

advisers appointed to the current charter term have yet to receive 

final security clearances.



[End of section]



Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Commerce:



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE The Under Secretary for 

International Trade Washington, D.C. 20230:



Loren Yager:



Director, International Affairs and Trade United States General 

Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548:



Dear Loren:



Thank you for sharing with us the draft United States General 

Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled, “International Trade: Advisory 

Committee System Should Be Updated to Better Serve U.S. Policy Needs,” 

and for the opportunity to comment on the report. We believe the report 

is, in general, thorough and fair, and your investigative team deserves 

credit for a job well done.



In particular, we believe the report, as well as its conclusions and 

recommendations, affirms our view that the United States Trade Advisory 

System constitutes a highly productive partnership between the United 

States Government and the private sector in a significant policy area 

that is unique among the United States and its trading partners, and 

has made a tremendous contribution to our national economic well-being. 

Of course, every program as large, diverse, and important as this needs 

to be managed as efficiently and effectively as possible, and we will 

study the report’s recommendations carefully.



Based on our very thorough review of the draft report, we have a number 

of comments and corrections. They are enclosed for your consideration.



Again, thank you for your work in producing this report.



Sincerely,

Grant D. Aldonas:

Signed by Grant D, Aldonas:



U.S. Department of Commerce Technical Comments on Draft United States 

General Accounting Office (GAO) Report Entitled, “International Trade: 

Advisory Committee System Should Be Updated to Better Serve U.S. Policy 

Needs” (GAO-02-876):



A. Timeliness, Ouality, and Accountabilitv of Consultation Process:



The GAO has identified three aspects of the trade advisory committee 

consultation process that it believes could be improved: timeliness, 

quality, and accountability.



1) Timeliness: Consultations were not always timely enough to have an 

impact on U.S. policy, in part because certain committees have not met 

at all or meet irregularly. [Page 6, para. 1; Pages 16, 19, 20]



Comments: The Draft Report underplays the fact that, according to the 

GAO survey, 62 percent of the members responding felt that 

consultations were held on a timely basis to a moderate or great extent 

(another 8 percent did not respond to this question).



The Draft Report should make clear that with regard to the third-tier 

Industry Sector and Functional Advisory Committees (ISACs and ISACs), 

jointly administered by the United States Department of Commerce 

(Commerce) and the United States Trade Representative (USTR) through 

the Industry Consultations Program (ICP), two of the ISACs meet on a 

monthly basis and the rest typically meet four to six times a year. The 

Designated Federal Officer (DFO) of each committee schedules meetings 

in consultation with the Committee Chair, who in turn frequently 

consults with the membership regarding the need for and scheduling of 

additional meetings. Because members must pay for their own travel to 

Washington, D.C., in scheduling meetings the DFO and Chair must balance 

the need for timely consultations against the need for advance planning 

in order to permit orderly scheduling and avoid placing undue financial 

burdens on committee members and their companies.



The Draft Report should accord greater emphasis to the fact that, in 

order to ensure timely consultations on fast-moving issues and to 

reduce costs, Commerce and USTR have been using their information 

technology (IT) resources increasingly effectively over the past 

several years, particularly by releasing more information and documents 

via e-mail for review by ISAC and IFAC members. The Draft Report points 

out (page 16) that in FY01, USTR scheduled at least nine ad hoc 

meetings, mostly teleconferences or in-person meetings, and faxed at 

least 63 requests for advice, usually addressed to the entire advisory 

system membership or all of the ISACs and ISACs, with an average of 7.5 

days to respond. During the same period, the Industry Consultations 

Program, in conjunction with USTR, sent out to ISAC and IFAC members 

approximately 139 distributions of which 84 were for request for 

comments (other distributions included USTR press releases and other 

trade policy issues of interest). In FY02 to date, the ICP has sent out 

by e-mail over 135 requests for:



comments, press releases, and other information of importance to ISAC 

and IFAC members, outside of the normal committee meeting schedules.



Although USTR does often require quick turnaround times for requests 

for comments on fast-moving issues, USTR has allowed ISAC and IFAC 

members to contact the trade negotiator directly and has assured our 

ISAC and IFAC members that their comments would still be accepted 

beyond the due date. On many occasions, the ICP has requested 

extensions from USTR on request for comments so that IFACs and IFACs 

can meet on an issue and have enough time to formally respond.



The Draft Report should also mention that Commerce has also begun 

research on upgrading its technology to allow trade-sensitive documents 

to be viewed over a secure interactive website. As GAO has noted, the 

costs of such solutions are potentially very high, and will have to be 

balanced against other pressing budgetary needs.



The Draft Report states (page 19) that “members who we surveyed” 

reported instances of advice being sought after decisions are made; and 

that “several members” reported a “tendency” toward seeking views after 

the fact. Given that 62 percent of the members are reportedly satisfied 

with the timeliness of consultations, we think these assertions clearly 

do not represent the majority view; as such, they should either be more 

precisely stated or dropped.



The Draft Report states (page 20) that Commerce’s and USTR’s procedures 

and rules “do not address the principle of timeliness or consulting to 

the maximum extent feasible.” The Draft Report should make clear that 

these procedures and rules apply only to IFACs and IFACs jointly 

administered by Commerce and USTR, and not to the first-and second-tier 

committees cited as having the most acute meeting-scheduling problems. 

The procedures and rules are based upon the legal framework created by 

section 135(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, the Federal 

Advisory Committee Act (FACA), and other laws and Executive Orders 

relating to the handling of security classified information, public 

access to information, and other matters. The procedures and rules 

leave it up to the DFO, the Chair, and respective committee members to 

set their meeting schedules.



2) Quality: Members and negotiators believed that the consultations 
were 

not always meaningful or useful, and that in some cases, tight meeting 

agendas were not conducive to fully vetting issues and formulating 

committee advice. In other cases, committees were asked to comment on 

complex initiatives, but were given little time to review the 

initiatives and limited access to key documents. [Page 6, para. 1; 

Pages 21, 22, 25, 26]



Comments: The Draft Report should reflect that, because of the costs 

and travel time associated with ISAC and IFAC meetings, and the number 

of issues to be discussed, most meetings frequently include a very full 

agenda. Meetings typically feature all-day agendas in order to cover 
necessary 

topics as thoroughly as possible as well as make the best use of out-
of-town 

members’ time. Meetings typically commence at 8:45 a.m. and last until 
3:00 

p.m. or later, with members typically working through lunch. Every 
effort is 

made to schedule as much time as possible for thorough discussion and 

deliberation on each major topic.



The Draft Report notes (page 22) that “officials and members said that 

being able to access documents electronically, such as through an 

encoded internet site, would improve quality of committee advice. While 

we do not disagree, we believe the Draft Report could better reflect 

the overriding importance of adequately safeguarding classified and 

trade-sensitive materials. Commerce and USTR have continuing and 

legitimate concerns regarding their ability to safeguard classified and 

trade-sensitive information from inadvertent release. On three recent 

occasions, extracts of negotiating texts of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade 

Agreement, not publicly released, have appeared in private trade 

publications. Commerce is actively researching creating and maintaining 

a secure, interactive website for use by ISAC and IFAC members; 

however, we have determined that the cost is considerable 

(approximately $200,000 for an effective system) and our resources are 

limited. Although Commerce and USTR recognize that security leaks are 

rare among advisory committees, electronic access to documents can be 

offered only in conjunction with adequate provision for security.



The Draft Report (pages 25, 26) states that “members and negotiators 

believe the system’s capacity for cross-fertilization among committees 

should be strengthened. Although functional committees on issues such 

as customs and standards have been established and are supposed to 

include representatives from industry committees, participation by them 

is reported to be limited.” 1The Draft Report should reflect that 

Commerce and USTR established the Committee of Chairs of the ISACs and 

IFACs to bring to the table the cross-cutting issues of their 

respective committees. In addition, we note that ISAC and IFAC advice 

is considered to have been submitted in confidence and the statute 

provides that such advice may be shared with only a specified number of 

people; therefore, Commerce and USTR have provided access to committee 

advice only to those individuals provided for in the statute on a need-

to-know basis.



3) Accountability: Members were concerned that the system’s 
consultation 

process provides little accountability to ensure that advice is 

considered. The lapse of trade negotiation authority eliminated the 

committees’ channel for reporting to Congress, and many members stated 

that executive branch officials are not:



This sentence should be changed to “Although functional committees on 

issues such as customs, standards, intellectual property rights, and 

electronic commerce have been. . . “informing them of “significant 

departures from advice,” as the law requires. 

[Page 6, para. 1; Pages 28-29]



Comments: Commerce and USTR consider all advice rendered by the 

committees to be of the utmost importance, and believe that it receives 

significant weight in the formulation of trade policy and trade 

negotiating positions. Commerce believes that, overall, the GAO Survey 

supports this belief, and that the Draft Report ought to reflect more 

prominently this conclusion. We believe that “significant departures” 

from committee advice are extremely rare, and that in those infrequent 

instances committee members are appropriately informed.



The Draft Report refers to a statement by one DFO that “committee 

letters are not always sent to officials responsible for the issues 

involved. . . .” Commerce believes this reference is misleading, does 

not represent the substantial practice of the agencies or the overall 

views of committee members, and is limited to a very small number of 

isolated instances. Furthermore, it confuses the issue of with whom the 

advice is shared with the issue of whether and how it is acknowledged.



ISAC and IFAC advice is primarily rendered orally during committee 

meetings while trade negotiators are present. When formal ISAC and IFAC 

written advice is sent to the Secretary of Commerce, it is reviewed by 

his policy staff and then the appropriate ITA unit is tasked to prepare 

the draft response. Commerce internal procedures require that all 

responses for Secretarial signature go through a concurrence process 

which includes clearance on the response by the official responsible 

for the issue. Although there are several clearance levels, the 

concurrence process ensures that the appropriate level Commerce 

officials are seeing the advice and have a chance for comment. All 

responses from ITA units must be approved by the Under Secretary of 

Commerce for International Trade prior to signature by the Secretary of 

Commerce, which ensures that ISAC and IFAC advice is weighed and 

considered.



The Draft Report should recognize that in those instances where agency 

responses may be characterized as “pro forma,” this is generally 

because final decisions regarding the advice, or the underlying issue, 

have yet to be made.



B. Structure and Composition of the Trade Advisory Committee System:



The Draft Report contains a number of conclusions regarding the 

structure and composition of the Committees with which Commerce finds 

potentially misleading or inadequately supported.



1) The trade advisory committee system has not been updated to reflect 

changes in the U.S. economy and U.S. trade policy, and is largely the 

same as it was in 1980, even though the focus of U.S. trade policy has 

shifted from tariffs toward other complex trade issues such as 

protection of intellectual property rights ... and as: a result the 
system 

has gaps in its coverage of industry sectors, trade issues, and 
stakeholders. 

[Page 6, para. 2; Page 33]



Comments: Since 1980, Commerce and USTR have made changes to the 

sectoral and functional committees’ structure, including creating an 

Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights 

(IFAC-3) in 1986; abolishing the Industry Policy Advisory Committee in 

1998; and with the emergence of the electronic commerce sector, 

creating an Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Electronic 

Commerce (IFAC-4) in 1999. Commerce and USTR will continue to work 

together in re-evaluating sectoral and functional advisory committee 

alignments to ensure that the ISACs and IFACs adequately reflect the 

changing U.S. economy.



As GAO has noted, there need be no “automatic and linear relationship 

between ‘trade levels’ and committee membership.” Indeed, committee 

structure and membership are necessarily based on a number of factors, 

including industry interest, current and pending trade policy issues, 

specific issues in ongoing trade negotiations, general level of 

Washington representation, export competitiveness, import sensitivity, 

and other factors besides raw export numbers.



Commerce and USTR actively and continuously recruit nominations for 

membership from all sectors of the U.S. economy, in a wide range of 

venues, and will continue to do so. We attempt to portray active 

participation in the most favorable possible terms, while recognizing 

that it places substantial financial and programmatic demands on the 

participants. However, as GAO recognizes in the Draft Report, the 

choice whether to participate in the system ultimately lies with 

industry.



2) Representation of the Services sector has not kept pace with its 

growing importance to U.S. output and trade. [Page 6, para. 2; Pages 

29-33]



Comments: Commerce does not agree that the services sector is 

inadequately represented on the third-tier sectoral and functional 

level. The Industry Sector Advisory Committee on Services (ISAC-13) is 

one of the most active committees in the ICP and meets on a monthly 

basis. The committee currently has 32 very active members. The Draft 

Report should afford greater prominence to the fact that a majority of 

the members of the Services ISAC who responded to the GAO survey have 

expressed satisfaction with the level of sector representation on the 

Services ISAC.



3) Certain manufacturing sectors, such as electronics, have fewer 

members than their sizeable trade would indicate. [Page 6, para. 2; 

Page 32]



Comment: As the Draft Report points out (page 32), there need be no 

“automatic and linear relationship between trade levels and committee 

membership.” Committee membership can depend in part on the number and 

prominence of issues raised by pending trade negotiations, as well as 

other issues such as import sensitivities.



Commerce and USTR amended the charter of the Electronics and 

Instrumentation ISAC for the 2002-2004 charter period to allow members 

from the software industry to be included on the committee. Commerce is 

now actively recruiting new members from the software industry. 

Depending on the number of new members from the software industry, 

Commerce and USTR have already decided to re-evaluate ISAC-5 at the 

next re-chartering in 2004 to reconstitute the committee and change the 

committee’s name to reflect changes in the electronics and 

instrumentation sector.



4) Participation of Foreign-Controlled Firms. [Page 33]



The Draft Report states (page 33) that “major companies, such as 

DaimlerChrysler, cannot participate because foreign-owned companies 

are prohibited from membership on many of the committees.” Commerce 

believes the Draft Report should note and explain USTR’s longstanding 

policy against including foreign and foreign-controlled firms among 

committee membership. The policy is based on the sensitivity of the 

subject matter considered by the committees and the possible conflicts 

that would be experienced by U.S. firms that have foreign owners. We 

recognize that in today’s more globalized economy, this policy may 

occasionally appear anomalous; however, we believe it continues to be a 

sound policy and there is no current intention to revisit it.



5) Participation Levels and Outreach. [Pages 34, 35]



The Draft Report states (page 34) that Committee membership averages 

only “49 percent of authorized capacity.” This statement implies both 

that the committees are under-enrolled, and that “authorized capacity” 

of a committee represents a reasoned conclusion as to how many members 

that committee should have. In fact, neither is the case. “Authorized 

capacity” is a somewhat arbitrary figure, based principally on the FACA 

limit of 50, with enough leeway built so that reasonably anticipated 

increases in membership should not require that the charter be amended. 

Because the ceiling is arbitrary, membership “percentages” based on the 

ceiling are not particularly useful. Also, Section 135 (c)(2)(B) of the 

Trade Act, as amended, allows Commerce and USTR to take into account 

“the necessity for reasonable limits on the number of such advisory 

committees” and “the necessity that each committee be reasonably 

limited in size.”:



For the record, corrections to Figure 7 (page 35) of the Draft Report 

(as rounded to the nearest percent) are attached.



The Draft Report states (page 34) that the agencies “often rely on 

passive recruitment through the Federal Register...... This statement 

is misleading. As part of the biennial re-chartering process, Commerce 

places notices in the Federal Register on a recurring basis. However, 

these notices are merely the starting point - a legally required 

threshold - for Commerce recruitment and outreach efforts. Commerce 

officials recruit for the committees in many venues and fora. Commerce 

has increased its already significant outreach and recruitment efforts 
by 

holding ISAC and IFAC meetings outside of Washington, D.C., with either 

open/partially open meetings for the public to attend, speaking before 

trade associations and outside groups on the ICP, and coordinating 

trade shows and events with our U.S. Export Assistance Centers to help 

recruit new members.



As noted above, Commerce and USTR actively and continuously recruit 

nominations for membership from all sectors of the U.S. economy, in a 

wide range of venues, and will continue to do so. We attempt to portray 

active participation in the most favorable possible terms, while 

recognizing that it places substantial financial and programmatic 

demands on the participants. However, as GAO recognizes in the Draft 

Report, the choice whether to participate in the system ultimately lies 

with industry.



6) Nonbusiness membership. [Pages 6, 10, 38, 39, 40]



The Draft Report states (page 6) that “nonbusiness stakeholders report 

being marginalized ... because they are permitted membership on 

relatively few committees...... On page 38, the Draft Report further 

states: “Most nonbusiness members currently participating in the system 

are placed on a few committees in the second tier. . . “:



Commerce believes that treatment by the Draft Report of the issue of 

nonbusiness participation may be somewhat misleading. First, the Draft 

Report should contain a more detailed and specific discussion of the 

Congressional delegation as evidenced in the statute, particularly in 

distinguishing the functions and make-up of each of the three “tiers” 

of committees. For example, the statute provides specifically for 

representation of consumer interests only in the first tier committee, 

the ACTPN - not in the second or third tiers. Likewise, environmental 

interests are specifically provided for only in the first tier. 

Although the Draft Report implies that environmental and labor 

interests have been “relegated” to “a few committees in the second 

tier” (page 38), in fact their representation on committees such as the 

TEPAC - established by Executive Order --actually goes beyond what the 

statute requires. (As noted elsewhere in the Draft Report, this attempt 

to “marry” inconsistent interests in one Committee is widely regarded 

as unproductive.):



The Draft Report notes (page 10, para. 1; pages 39, 40) that one of 

FACA’s requirements is that advisory committees be “fairly balanced” in 

terms of points of view represented and the functions the committees 

perform. We think this issue could benefit from a more clearly focused 

discussion. With regard to “fairly balanced,” Commerce and USTR have 

interpreted this to mean “fairly balanced”:



[Z] The Trade and Environmental Policy Advisory Committee was created 

pursuant to Presidential Executive Order Number 12905, March 25, 1994.



among industry points of view. We believe this is a reasonable 

interpretation, well supported by the legislative history, and our 

legal position is that section 135(c) of the Trade Act, as amended, 

allows the President to establish sectoral and functional committees 

comprised solely of industry representatives.



The Draft Report refers (page 39) to “successful legal challenges” 

brought by nonbusiness groups; however, it should make clear that the 

Clinton Administration elected not to pursue a pending appeal in one 

case, and the current Administration voluntarily settled the second 

case.



However, the Draft Report does fairly conclude that until the issue of 

nonbusiness participation is clarified, there will continue to be 

confusion and ambiguity in this area.



C. Management Issues:



1) Leadership direction and administrative support by USTR and the 
other 

managing agencies. [Page 7]



The Draft Report states (page 7, para. 1) that “leadership direction 

and administrative support by USTR and the other managing agencies have 

not been sufficient to ensure that the advisory committee system works 

as intended.” Commerce does not agree with this conclusion of the Draft 

Report.



Commerce and USTR believe that the ICP is effectively managed and is 

functioning effectively as intended by Congress. Commerce has a good 

working relationship with USTR and will continue to work more closely 

in providing leadership for the ISACs and IFACs. USTR oversees a large 

number of committees and it is a small agency. Of the 34 trade advisory 

committees in the system, Commerce is responsible for 22 of them, and 

believes it is making available adequate resources for managing the 

system, given competing budgetary priorities. The average cost to 

administer each of commerce’s 22 committees is approximately $50,000 

(excluding travel). Commerce will shortly hire an additional two FTEs 

to work solely on ICP management.



Both agencies have a broad mandate and many other statutory 

responsibilities, and operate under tight budgetary constraints. Our 

resources are properly and appropriately allocated to meet our many 

responsibilities. Commerce is committed to improving the efficiency of 

the advisory committee operations, and is taking many steps to do so 

within its existing budget.



D. Miscellaneous Comments:



Commerce has the following additional technical comments on the Draft 

Report:



Enclosure:



1) USTR has the discretion to create, change, and terminate committees 

in the second and third tiers. [Page 10, para. 2]



Comment: USTR’s discretion is to be exercised jointly with the relevant 

Executive Department.



2) The advisory committees are administered by USTR, which assumes a 

leadership role; the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and 

the EPA. [Page 11, bottom]



Comment: The advisory committees are administered jointly by the USTR 

and the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, Labor, Agriculture, the 

Treasury, or other executive departments as appropriate. EPA does not 

administer any advisory committees under Section 135 of Trade Act, as 

amended.



3) Footnote 11: The Committee of Chairs was established to advise the 

Secretary and the USTR on trade matters.... [Page 12]



Comment: Change footnote 11 to “The Committee of Chairs of the ISACs 

and IFACs was established to advise the Secretary of Commerce and the 

USTR. . . .”:



4) Footnote 13: ... and 303 accepted invitations to continue their 

membership. [Page 14]



Comment: Correct Footnote 13 to read “. . and 309 accepted invitations 

to continue their membership.” [ICP re-appointed 309 for 2002-2004 

charter term.]



5) While the DFOs take and distribute both restricted and unclassified 

summaries and minutes of the third-tier committee meetings, only 

classified transcripts are kept for the first-and second tier 

committees. [Page 16]



Comment: The sentence should read, “The DFOs of the ISACs and IFACs 

prepare classified minutes of closed meetings for internal committee 

use only, and prepare unclassified public summaries. Only classified 

transcripts. . .”:



6.	Figure 8: Time-line for Trade Advisory Committees. [Page 37]



Comment: Since GAO is using the 1980 re-constituted period of advisory 

committees for time-line, the arrow for the Committee of Chairs should 

be moved to 1980 for alignment with the other ISACs and IFACs that were 

re-constituted at that time.



Attachment:



ATTACHMENT - FIGURE 7 [Page 35]



ISACs --Committee Name	Charter/Current Members/ Percentage:



Aerospace Equipment	30	17	56%:



Capital Goods	30	15	50%:



Chemicals and Allied Products	50	23	46%:



Consumer Goods	40	24	60%:



Electronics and Instrumentations	50	11	22%:



Energy	30 11 37%:



Ferrous Ores and Metals	30	14	47%:



Footwear, Leather and Leather Products	30	13	43%:



Building Products and Other Materials	30	10	33%:



Lumber and Wood Products	30	13	43%:



Non-Ferrous Ores and Metals	30	15	50%:



Paper and Paper Products	30	8	27%:



Services	50 31 62%:



Small and Minority Businesses	35	19	54% Textiles and Apparel	30	19	63% 

Transportation, Construction, Mining:



and Agricultural Equipment	30	8	27%:



Wholesaling and Retailing	30	17	57%:



*IFACs Committee Name:



Customs Matters	20	12	60%:



Standards	25 14 56%:



Intellectual Property Rights	20	13	65%:



Electronic Commerce	30	17	57%:



*Note: Percentage is based for number of private-sector members the 

IFAC charters allow. One member (or in exceptional circumstances two 

members) from each ISAC may serve on each IFAC. Such service does not 

count as additional company representation.



The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Commerce’s letter 

dated August 5, 2002.



GAO Comments:



1. The Department of Commerce stated that our draft report understated 

member satisfaction with the timeliness of consultations, arguing that 

62 percent of the respondents to our survey reported that consultations 

were held on a timely basis to a moderate or great extent. We do not 

agree with this characterization of our survey data. In our survey, we 

asked to what extent the executive branch timed requests so that 

committee input could be used in trade negotiations. Respondents 

answered this question according to a five-point extent scale that 

ranged from “No extent” through “Very great extent.” Only 25 percent of 

respondents checked the top two categories, “Great extent” and “Very 

great extent.” As the Department of Commerce notes, another 37 percent 

of respondents checked the middle category on the scale, which was 

“Moderate extent.” If all three of these categories are added together, 

they total 62 percent of respondents. However, we do not agree that all 

three categories should be added together. Our report includes the full 

range of responses to the question, adding together only the top two 

(very great and great extent) and bottom two (some or little and no 

extent) categories, and reporting those who checked “to a moderate 

extent” separately. As the report already notes, 37 percent of 

respondents reported that they were satisfied to a moderate extent, the 

third point on a five-point scale. Furthermore, 30 percent checked the 

final two points on the scale, “Some or little extent” and “No extent.” 

Consequently, we believe our finding that “[C]onsultations were not 

always timely enough to have an impact on U.S. policy . . .” is 

justified. Finally, we are accurately reporting member statements in 

both the survey and interviews that there were instances when advice 

was sought after the fact or not sought at all.



2. We agree that the frequency of meetings varies considerably across 

committees, and we have added language to this report to that effect. 

With respect to scheduling meetings on a timely basis, we recognize 

that there is a tension between scheduling meetings far enough in 

advance and scheduling additional meetings as needed. However, it is 

clearly important to have timely consultations.



3. We recognize that Commerce, USTR, and USDA have made extensive use 

of electronic transmissions to provide information to and seek input 

from committee members. To capture the extent of such communication, we 

reported on our analysis of such transmissions during fiscal year 2001. 

Specifically, we calculated the number of times during fiscal year 2001 

that USTR officials used electronic means to request comment from 

advisers, including when USTR sent requests for comment to Commerce’s 

Industry Consultations Program (ICP) office, which relayed them to 

advisers electronically. Our analysis yielded a result of 63 requests 

for comments, rather than the 84 suggested by Commerce in its agency 

comments. Commerce may have additional information not made available 

to GAO about the content of each communication that could account for 

the discrepancy between our counts of agency requests for comment in 

fiscal year 2001. However, because GAO and Commerce are analyzing the 

same data for the same period, the number of requests for comment is 

certainly not 63 plus 84, as Commerce’s comments imply. We welcome the 

fact that use of electronic means to communicate with advisers is 

continuing in fiscal year 2002, a period that was outside the scope of 

our document review.



4. Commerce reports that USTR has been responsive to ICP requests to 

extend deadlines for ISAC and IFAC members to provide comments on fast-

moving issues. However, we note that in earlier interviews ICP 

officials told us that the reason they have requested extensions from 

USTR was because members complained that the given deadlines were too 

short to provide meaningful input.



5. We believe that, if implemented, the technological improvements 

Commerce and USTR are pursuing to allow sensitive documents to be 

viewed on a secure interactive Web site could help remedy member 

concerns over access to key documents required for meaningful and 

timely advisory committee input.



6. Regarding agency procedures, Commerce does not disagree with our 

statement that Commerce’s and USTR’s procedures and rules “do not 

address the principle of timeliness or consulting to the maximum extent 

feasible.” However, it requests a clarification in the report to the 

effect that these rules and procedures only apply to the ISACs and 

IFACs operating at the third, technical tier of the advisory committee 

system. But in reaching the conclusion that Commerce’s and USTR’s 

procedures and rules do not address the principle of timeliness and 

consulting to the maximum extent feasible, we examined procedures that 

apply to all three tiers of the advisory process, including the first-

and second-tier committees having the most severe scheduling problems. 

Specifically, we examined the procedures for the USTR-only, Commerce-

USTR, and USDA-USTR committees. The procedures for USTR-only committees 

pertain to the first-and second-tier committees having the most acute 

meeting scheduling problems. The Commerce-USTR procedures pertain to 22 

of the third-tier committees. Neither the USTR-only nor the Commerce-

USTR procedures address the principle of timeliness or consulting to 

the maximum extent feasible. The USDA procedures--which apply to six 

committees at the second and third tieræ also do not address these 

issues. Although we recognize that the procedures are based on the 

legal framework created by Section 135 of the Trade Act as well as 

other laws and orders, Section 135 (i) states that it shall be the 

responsibility of the United States Trade Representative, in 

conjunction with the Secretary of Commerce and other executive 

departments, “to adopt procedures for consultation with and obtaining 

information and advice from the advisory committees” on “a continuing 

and timely basis.”:



7. Commerce recognizes that committee meetings frequently include a 

very full agenda, but stresses that this reflects efforts to balance a 

variety of factors, including cost, members’ time, and the number of 

issues to be addressed. We have added language to the report to this 

effect, but we note that many survey respondents expressed a desire for 

more time for committees to discuss issues and formulate advice. Survey 

respondents and interviewees also indicated that the format of meetings 

is sometimes not conducive to the two-way dialogue that would 

characterize quality consultations. Formulation of advice is the 

fundamental purpose of the advisory committees, and we urge Commerce to 

consider time available for committee deliberations as it seeks to 

structure meetings to make best use of members’ time.



8. We have added language to the report noting Commerce and USTR’s 

concerns over safeguarding classified information.



9. We have added language to the report noting that Commerce and USTR 

already have some mechanisms to bring to the table crosscutting issues 

including the Committee of the Chairs of the ISACs and IFACs. We note 

that according to documents we obtained from Commerce, that committee 

met three times in fiscal year 1999, twice in fiscal year 2000, and 

twice in fiscal year 2001.



10. Commerce notes that the statute places limits on sharing of advice 

and information across advisory committees that could inhibit the trade 

advisory committee system’s capacity for cross-fertilization. Although 

we agree that Section 135 places some limitations on the disclosure of 

trade secrets and confidential information, it does not appear to 

preclude provision of confidential information to designated advisory 

committee members who possess the requisite security clearances.



11. Commerce asserted that significant departures from committee advice 

are rare, and that in those infrequent instances committee members are 

appropriately informed. This point of view is supported by the GAO 

survey, in Commerce’s opinion. In our survey, we asked committee 

members how often the executive branch had pursued negotiating 

strategies that significantly differed from the committee advice. One 

hundred twenty committee members responding to our survey reported that 

the executive branch significantly departed from their committees’ 

advice about half of the time, or more frequently. These 120 members 

constitute 25 percent of all respondents to our survey, and about one-

third of those who provided an answer to this question. While they, by 

no means, constitute a majority of respondents, they do represent a 

sizable minority. In any case, significant departures from committee 

advice do not seem to be a rare event, as Commerce suggests. Our survey 

then asked a follow-on question for respondents who indicated that 

there had been significant departures from committee advice. Thirty 

percent of those answering this question indicated that they had rarely 

or never been informed of these significant departures. Another 21 

percent of those who answered this question indicated that they had 

been informed of significant departures about or less than half of the 

time. As a result, we do not agree with Commerce’s statement that 

committee members are appropriately informed when there are significant 

departures from advice. Section 135(i) clearly states that USTR “shall 

inform the advisory committees of significant departures” from 

committee advice or recommendations.



12. We have updated this report with the information Commerce provided 

about its practices for handling formal letters from advisory 

committees. We note that chairmen and members with whom we spoke 

expressed some frustration about lack of feedback from the government 

as to how it intends to use or respond to committee advice--a sentiment 

not inconsistent with Commerce’s practice of providing pro forma 

responses to committee advice unless it has already made a final 

decision on policy. Moreover, 21.9 percent of committee chairmen 

responding to our survey reported that their committees written advice 

was not acknowledged most of the time 

(see Q25). In general, the members told us they want to have an 

opportunity to influence policy before it is finalized and expressed 

dissatisfaction when feedback on committee input was not substantive or 

timely in nature.



13. Regarding changes to sectoral and functional committee, our report 

already notes that only three committees have been created in the past 

decade to respond to emerging needs. We believe that continued efforts 

by Commerce and USTR to reevaluate the sectoral and functional advisory 

committee alignments with the economy and trade policy needs are 

warranted.



14. Commerce’s position on the services committee is consistent with 

the statements in this report that certain services negotiators and 70 

percent of ISAC 13’s members said that the services sector is well 

represented in the system. However, we note that some negotiators with 

whom GAO spoke made a point of saying that the services sector is a 

large share of U.S. output and trade and that it is only represented in 

2 of the 17 industry sector advisory committees; in the scheme of the 

whole committee system, therefore, they stated that services is 

underrepresented relative to manufacturing. This report has been 

updated to note that Commerce has efforts under way to fill the gap in 

representation of the software industry.



15. Commerce asks us to “note and explain” USTR’s long-standing policy 

against including foreign-owned or -controlled firms among committee 

membership. Commerce indicates that this policy is based on the 

sensitivity of the matters considered by the committees and the 

possible conflicts that would be experienced by U.S. firms that have 

foreign owners, and we have added language to this report to that 

effect. However, we note that first, the U.S. government does not have 

a uniform policy against inclusion of foreign-owned firms on the trade 

advisory committees. USDA stated in its technical comments on our draft 

report that it does not preclude foreign-owned firms from participating 

in its trade advisory committees. Indeed, USDA indicates that at least 

one foreign-owned or -controlled firm already participates. USDA 

officials indicate that although foreign ownership can be considered in 

the nomination review process, in practice, it was not actually 

considered during the 2001 rechartering of the six USDA trade advisory 

committees. Second, as to the rationale for the USTR/Commerce 

exclusion, we note that there does not appear to be any bar in Section 

135, FACA, and GSA implementing regulations specifically precluding 

participation by foreign-owned or -controlled firms from having 

representatives on trade advisory committees. The legislative history 

of Section 135 does not deal directly with this issue, and in their 

comments, neither USTR nor Commerce bases its long-standing policy on a 

legal prohibition. Third, while we recognize Commerce’s and USTR’s 

concerns about the sensitivity of the subject matters considered by the 

committees, we note that neither Commerce nor USTR has provided us with 

requested explanations of why the requirements that advisory committee 

members obtain security clearances and sign a legally binding 

nondisclosure agreement to protect classified information, along with 

giving members procedural guidance on safeguarding trade sensitive 

information, are not sufficient to address these concerns. Fourth, we 

acknowledge that a majority of our survey respondents expressed 

reservations about inclusion of foreign-owned firms in the system. 

However, several members and negotiators still suggested that the long-

standing policy barring foreign-owned firms from membership altogether 

should be revisited, in part because of the contribution to U.S. 

employment and production that some of these firms provide. Indeed, 

several U.S. negotiators reported to GAO that they already actively 

work with foreign-owned firms on an informal basis during trade 

negotiations, many of which are already members of key trade 

associations.



16. Regarding participation levels and outreach, Commerce took issue 

with our position that the number of members specified in each 

committee’s charter represents a proper level of membership. We note 

Commerce’s assertion that the “authorized capacity” numbers specified 

in each committee’s charter are “somewhat arbitrary,” but we hold that 

they do provide useful guidance regarding committee size. Each 

committee charter specifies that it “consists of approximately X 

members,” and each committee’s charter specifies a distinct membership 

number, ranging from 30 to 50 members. For example, the charter for the 

Small and Minority Businesses Committee states that it “consists of 

approximately 35 members,” while the charter for the Chemicals and 

Allied Products Committee specifies approximately 50 members. Further, 

while for some trade advisory committees managed by other agencies the 

charter states that these numbers represent a maximum, this is not the 

case for the committees that Commerce administers. Even if the numbers 

specified in the charters do not represent an absolute ideal, our 

conclusion that the trade advisory committees were at 49 percent of 

their authorized capacity in fiscal year 2001 highlights the ample room 

available on the committees that could be used to fill gaps in 

representation.



17. We appreciate that Commerce provided us with current membership 

numbers as of August 2002, although the scope of our document review 

was through fiscal year 2001 (September 30, 2001). We note that 

according to these current membership numbers, at 48.3 percent of 

charter levels, the committees administered by Commerce remain just 

below half of their authorized capacity, and well below the 55 percent 

of capacity they had reached in fiscal 2000.



18. We recognize Commerce’s efforts to recruit new members and have 

updated the report to reflect them more fully. These efforts may 

alleviate the difficulties of maintaining robust and representative 

membership, concerns that both Commerce and USTR officials expressed 

during our review.



19. Commerce believes that the draft report’s treatment of the issue of 

nonbusiness participation may be somewhat misleading and states that 

the report should contain a more detailed and specific discussion of 

the congressional delegation in Section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974, 

particularly in distinguishing the functions and makeup of each of the 

three “tiers” of committees. We believe this report’s treatment of the 

nonbusiness issue is fair and accurate and note that appendix II of our 

draft report contains a detailed discussion of the functions and 

committee structure for each tier.



20. We recognize that many members expressed satisfaction with the 

support provided to committees by USTR and other managing agencies, 

including Commerce and USDA, and we have added language to this report 

to that effect. However, certain members also expressed concerns about 

overall leadership of the system and stated that delays or disruptions 

associated with agency execution of administrative tasks such as 

rechartering and new appointments were hindering the system’s ability 

to fulfill its statutory purpose. Our report already notes thatæ unlike 

USTR, USDA, and Laboræ Commerce’s ICP successfully avoided disruptions 

in committee operations typically associated with rechartering. This 

report has been updated to note that Commerce is taking steps to fill 

administrative support needs by hiring additional staff. With the 

renewal of trade promotion authority on August 6, 2002, the U.S. 

negotiating agenda and resulting demands on the committee system are 

likely to increase.



[End of section]



Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:



GAO Contact:



Kim Frankena, (202) 512-8124:



Staff Acknowledgments:



In addition to the person named above, Dennis Richards, Venecia Rojas 

Kenah, Kay Halpern, Jon Rose, Janet Lewis, Sharla Draemel, Martin De 

Alteriis, Richard Seldin, and Janey Cohen made key contributions to 

this report.



FOOTNOTES:



[1] P. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933.



[2] The response rate to our survey was 72 percent, or 515 of the 720 

members surveyed. Due to variations in response rates by committee, we 

do not generalize the responses to all committee members. See the 

technical survey methodology in appendix IV.



[3] P. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1996, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2155. 

Throughout this report, we refer to this provision as “Section 135 of 

the Trade Act.”



[4] For example, five members from each House are formally appointed, 

as required by Section 161 of the Trade Act of 1974, as official 

congressional advisers on trade policy. Furthermore, a provision in the 

Trade Act of 2002 required establishment of a Congressional Oversight 

Group, one of whose purposes is to closely coordinate with USTR at all 

critical periods during trade negotiations and regarding ongoing 

compliance with and enforcement of trade agreements.



[5] 19 U.S.C. § 2155(j).



[6] P.L. 96-39, 93 Stat. 308.



[7] 19 U.S.C. 2155(i).



[8] 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-14.



[9] 19 U.S.C. § 2155(f).



[10] 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(2).



[11] Subsequent to our survey, Department of Defense officials told us 

that the Defense Policy Advisory Committee on Trade, a second tier 

committee whose charter expired in 2001, would not be reconstituted. In 

July 2002, USTR officials said rechartering of the committee is being 

considered again.



[12] The Committee of Chairs of the ISACs and IFACs was established to 

advise the Secretary and the USTR on trade matters of interest common 

to the ISACs and IFACs, and comprises all the ISAC and IFAC chairs.



[13] Travel costs vary widely by location and depend on advance notice. 

According to a committee member based in Sacramento, California, the 

estimated cost for a recent meeting was about $1,000 for a flight, two 

nights’ lodgings, and related expenses. Another member reported that a 

round-trip ticket from Chicago to Washington, D.C., given short notice 

of a meeting, cost $1,600.



[14] According to Commerce officials, 29 members resigned, 28 were not 

invited to rejoin their committees, and 309 accepted invitations to 

continue their membership.



[15] See appendix II for an expanded discussion of the legal issues on 

representation of nongovernmental organizations.



[16] The number of meetings is approximate, because General Services 

Administration reports and agency documents occasionally conflict on 

the number of meetings a committee held in one year.



[17] Between 1980 and 1996, USTR imposed a blanket closure every 2 

years on all private sector advisory committee meetings that would take 

place in that period. However, in Public Citizen v. Barshefsky, 939 F. 

Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1996), the court found that USTR’s 1996 to1998 blanket 

closure was inconsistent with the Trade Act and conflicted with 

Congress’ presumption of open meetings. USTR now determines meeting 

closure on a case-by-case basis.



[18] FACA uses the term “designated federal official” to indicate an 

agency representative with responsibility for attending each committee 

meeting. In this report, we use the term to mean the agency 

representative responsible for attending the meetings, although the 

title may differ by agency.



[19] Since October 2001, only restricted meeting minutes are prepared 

for the first-and second-tier committees.



[20] Documents for ad hoc meetings in August and September 2001 were 

not available for our analysis.



[21] Commerce indicated in agency comments that the number of requests 

for comment in fiscal year 2001 was slightly higher, at 84.



[22] We asked the committee members to rank their level of satisfaction 

or dissatisfaction in several areas. Respondents could choose among 

seven possible responses: “very satisfied,” “generally satisfied,” 

“neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,” “generally dissatisfied,” “very 

dissatisfied,” “not applicable,” or “no answer.”



[23] Of the remainder, 37 percent reported that consultations were 

scheduled appropriately to a “moderate extent,” and 8 percent did not 

answer the question (see app. IV, question 6).



[24] USTR did provide five briefings on the agreement to all trade 

advisers in which one or two ACTPN staff liaisons participated in the 4 

months leading up to the October 2000 agreement.



[25] The Department of Commerce has recently improved the comfort and 

convenience of its reading rooms by incorporating them as part of its 

new committee meeting facilities.



[26] The USTR briefly mentioned the report in the ACTPN’s March 1, 

2000, meeting but did not solicit comments on it. It should be noted 

that discussions relating to an item on the agenda for that meeting--a 

letter on a potential congressional vote on continued participation in 

the WTO--suggest that the committee supported continuation of U.S. 

participation in the WTO.



[27] The second-tier committees, and particularly the Intergovernmental 

Policy Advisory Committee and the Labor Advisory Committee, had low 

response rates. Consequently, the results reported by survey 

respondents in those tiers and committees might not be representative 

of all the members of those tiers and committees.



[28] All but two of the Labor Advisory Committee respondents had 

attended steering committee meetings in the past year.



[29] All TEPAC members responding to our survey reported that their 

committee had “mixed” or “different” views on trade policy; no member 

reported that the committee had similar views. In comparison, about 

half of the other respondents to our survey stated that their committee 

members held similar views on trade policy.



[30] The 10 committees are ISAC 1, ISAC 3, ISAC 4, ISAC 5, ISAC 6, ISAC 

9, ISAC 11, ISAC 14, IFAC 4, and the ATAC on Fruits and Vegetables.



[31] 19 U.S.C. §§ 2155(e), 2902 (e)(4).



[32] P. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933.



[33] We used calendar year 2000 data in our analysis because at the 

time of our study it was the most current year for which complete 

annual trade data were available.



[34] However, USDA officials applied a more selective process in 

choosing members for its tier-2 agricultural policy committee, focusing 

on representative interests and a membership ceiling of about 35 

advisers.



[35] In its August 2002 comments on our draft report, Commerce reported 

that it was taking steps to fill the void in representation of the 

software industry.



[36] USDA does not prohibit membership of foreign-owned companies, 

though internal procedures and rules indicate that this factor can be 

taken into consideration in the nomination review. In practice, 

however, foreign-ownership was not considered in the most recent 

rechartering of USDA’s six committees because USDA’s application 

materials did not request information on ownership.



[37] Although neither Section 135 of the Trade Act nor agency 

implementing procedures and rules limit the number of committees that 

may be formed for tiers 2 and 3, executive order 12838 places some 

restrictions on the overall number of advisory committees subject to 

FACA. The legislative history of Section 135 indicates that at least in 

1974, Congress thought that approximately 30 advisory committees might 

be sufficient. S. Rep. No. 93-1298, at 102 (1974); H.R. Rep. No. 93-

571, at 38 (1973). Furthermore, the legislative history of the 1979 

amendments to Section 135 show congressional intention to substantially 

reduce the number of committees from the 45 that were operating at that 

time. S. Rep. No. 96-249, at 259 (1979); H.R. Rep. No. 96-317, at 188 

(1979).



[38] Some consolidation of the agriculture committees in the mid-1990s 

eliminated technical advisory committees on oilseeds and processed 

foods. The committee on intellectual property rights was created in 

1986.



[39] Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. USTR, Civ. No. C99-1165R (W.D. 

Wash. 1999); Washington Toxics Coalition v. USTR, Civ. No. C00-0730 

(W.D. Wash. 2001).



[40] 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(2).



[41] 67 Fed. Reg. 12969-70 (Mar. 20, 2002).



[42] A White House official indicated to us in early September 2002 

that over 100 candidates had been considered for the more than 35 

vacancies on the committee, that the President had approved a list of 

persons whom he intends to appoint, and that these persons were 

presently undergoing the full background investigation associated with 

a presidential appointment. USTR’s security clearance process will not 

begin until after this background investigation is complete.



[43] Aspects over which agencies have limited control include the 

information required on standardized forms, the time it takes members 

to return paperwork, and the time it takes the Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM) to complete a background investigation.



[44] For instance, the Department of Commerce conducts the major 

portion of its internal vetting of candidates concurrently with the 

security clearance process, resulting in the most timely appointment 

process of the three agencies. Commerce also sends the membership 

applications to the various offices required for internal vetting at 

the same time, rather than sequentially. Members of committees 

administered by USTR and USDA, on the other hand, only begin undergoing 

security clearance procedures at the conclusion of the full internal 

vetting period, which can also be quite time consuming. Both USTR and 

USDA, however, have offered interim clearances to appropriate 

candidates, which allow them to participate pending the outcome of the 

investigation. Although Commerce uses this procedure for its employees, 

it has not adopted the procedure for committee members. Commerce 

officials said they are exploring the possibility of interim clearances 

for future appointments.



[45] According to USDA, the rechartering process was also delayed due 

to the change in administration and pending arrival of senior agency 

officials.



[46] U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: Major Human Capital 

Challenges at SEC and Key Trade Agencies, GAO-02-662T (Washington, 

D.C.: April 23, 2002).



[47] One FTE is equal to one person working full-time; two people 

working half-time; one person working half-time and two people working 

one-quarter-time, etc. A fraction of several employees’ time can add up 

to half of an FTE.



[48] This does not include the time that negotiators spend briefing and 

discussing issues with committee members. We estimate that committee 

members themselves collectively spent about 4,320 hours of their time 

last year attending meetings. Our estimate assumes that half of the 720 

members who attended meetings last year attended an average of 3 

meetings that lasted an average of 4 hours.



[49] Members of the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and 

Negotiations (ACTPN), the Trade and Environment Policy Advisory 

Committee (TEPAC), and the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee 

(IGPAC) are permitted to appoint one or more staff liaisons to help 

them prepare for and participate in committee deliberations. These 

liaisons have clearances and meet on their own; some also participate 

in member meetings.



[50] These codes are available at dataweb.usitc.gov.



[51] Although services data were all grouped under the Services 

Industry Sector Advisory Committee (ISAC) 13 group, some services trade 

may be covered by ISAC 6 (Energy), ISAC 7 (Ferrous Ores and Metals), 

and ISAC 17 (Wholesaling and Retailing) groups. The data available did 

not allow the level of disaggregation needed to assign portions of 

overall services trade to these groups.



[52] 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-14.



[53] Id. § 5(b)(2).



[54] 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.



[55] Id. § 102-3.60(b)(3).



[56] National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s 

Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074n.2 (D.C. 

Cir. 1983).



[57] H.R. Rep. No. 92-1017, at 6 (1972).



[58] P. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 and following.



[59] 19 U.S.C. § 2155(f)(2).



[60] Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. USTR, No. C99-1165R (W.D. Wash. 

1999). The other court did not directly address this issue.



[61] 19 U.S.C. § 2155.



[62] Section 135 has been amended several times over the years to 

broaden the purposes for which trade advisory committees provide advice 

to executive branch officials and to increase the kinds of committees 

that are to be established. For example, the 1979 amendments added the 

“operation of any trade agreement once entered into,” and “other 

matters arising in connection with the administration of trade policy 

of the United States” to the matters on which the President should seek 

advice from the trade advisory committees. These amendments also added 

“services” to the tier-2 and tier-3 committees that should be formed. 

P. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 308-10. The 1994 amendments added 

“nongovernmental environmental and conservation organizations” to the 

list of interests required to be on the tier-1 committee. P. L. No. 

103-465, 108 Stat. 4836.



[63] The three-tier structure is the term commonly used to describe the 

three different kinds of committees. It should be emphasized, however, 

that section 135 neither establishes any formal relationship among the 

three different kinds of committees nor specifically authorizes the 

first tier to exercise any control over the other two tiers.



[64] 19 U.S.C. § 2155(b).



[65] Id. § 2155(c).



[66] S. Rep. No. 93-1298, at 101-02; H.R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 38.



[67] P. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 308-10.



[68] S. Rep. No. 96-249, at 259.



[69] H.R. Rep. No. 96-317, at 187-88. This comment was made partly 

because of the initial failure to include a major, well-recognized farm 

group in the agricultural advisory process.



[70] For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia rejected (1) a fair balance challenge to membership on an 

advisory committee appointed to study social service programs, which 

was brought by individual recipients of federal food assistance 

benefits and an anti-hunger coalition, and (2) a fair balance challenge 

to membership on an advisory committee established to provide advice 

and recommendations on development of microbiological criteria for 

foods, which was brought by various public interest and consumer 

groups. National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Exec. Comm. of the 

President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074-

75 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Public Citizen v. National Advisory Comm. on 

Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 886 F.2d 419, 423-24 (D.C. Cir. 

1989)(Per Curiam). See also Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 

323, 336-39 (5TH Cir. 1999). (The court rejected a fair balance 

challenge by mine owners to composition of the National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health’s Board of Scientific Counselors.)



[71] In an earlier action brought by domestic electronics producers, 

which challenged the composition of the industry sector advisory 

committee for electronics and instrumentation, the U.S. Court of 

International Trade held that there was no statutory requirement that a 

representative from any specific industry be included in any of the 

advisory committees established under section 135. Kemet Electronics 

Corp. v. Barshefsky, 969 F. Supp. 82, 87 (Ct. Int’l Trade (1997).



[72] No. C99-1165R (W.D. Wash. 1999).



[73] Both the plaintiffs and the U.S. government defending agencies 

agreed that the industry sector advisory committees involved were 

subject to FACA’s balanced representation requirement and that the 

proper test was whether a committee’s members represent a fair balance 

of viewpoints given the functions to be performed. Id.



[74] Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. USTR, No. C99-1165R (W.D. Wash. 

Nov. 8, 1999). This was soon followed by an order requiring USTR and 

the Department of Commerce to name interim environmental 

representatives while the appointment process was being completed.



[75] Brief for Appellants, Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. USTR, No. 

00-35060 (9TH Cir. Mar. 23, 2000).



[76] Civ. No. C00-0730R (W.D. Wash. 2001).



[77] Civ. No. 01-0018 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2001).



[78] Id. (D.D.C. May 8, 2001). The court found that the chemical 

committee members did not have standing because they failed to show an 

injury that was “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” 

and could cite no authority for their contention that consensus of 

opinion on the chemical committee was required.



[79] Id. This decision was appealed, but the appeal was dismissed at 

the request of the chemical and allied products committee members who 

brought the case. Gamble v. USTR, No. 01-5236 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 

2001).



[80] 67 Fed. Reg. 12969-70 (Mar. 20, 2002).



[81] Until 2002, USDA granted clearances for 5 years.



[82] See Appendix I for a discussion of the information and data we 

used to identify the goods and services represented by individual tier 

-3 committees.



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