This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-02-346
entitled 'Social Security Administration: Fugitive Felon Program Could
Benefit from Better Use of Technology' which was released on October
08, 2002.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products’ accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, U.S.
Senate:
September 2002:
Social Security Administration:
Fugitive Felon Program Could Benefit from Better Use of Technology:
GAO-02-346:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Technological and Other Barriers Contribute to Inefficiencies in the
Fugitive Felon Program:
SSA’s Efforts to Obtain Data-Matching Agreements Have Not Resulted in
Comprehensive Data:
Legislation Prohibiting OASI and DI Benefits for Fugitive Felons Could
Have a Substantial Impact on the Program:
Increased Reliance on Other Agencies’ Databases Could Help Enhance
Fugitive Felon Program Operations:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Fugitive Felon Program Data-Matching Process:
Appendix III: Fugitive Felon Program’s Assistance in Apprehending
Fugitives
and Preventing Then from Receiving SSI Payments:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Social Security Administration:
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Justice:
Figures :
Figure 1: Organizations Tasked with Implementing SSA’s Fugitive Felon
Program:
Figure 2: Overview of the SSA Fugitive Felon Program Process:
Figure 3: Fugitive Felon Process Timeline (Estimated):
Figure 4: Status of the SSA Fugitive Felon Agreements:
Abbreviations:
BOP: Bureau of Prisons:
CMPPA: Computer Matching Privacy and Protection Act:
EVS: Enumeration Verification System:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
GAO: U.S. General Accounting Office:
ITC: Information Technology Center:
NCC: National Computer Center:
NCIC: National Crime Information Center:
OASI/DI: Old Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance:
OIG: Office of Inspector General:
PRWORA: Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act:
SSA: Social Security Administration:
SSI: Supplemental Security Income :
USMS: U.S. Marshals Service:
Letter:
September 6, 2002:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate:
Dear Senator Grassley:
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, administered by the
Social Security Administration (SSA), is the largest cash assistance
program in the United States. For fiscal year 2002, SSA expects to pay
SSI benefits totaling approximately $31.5 billion to more than 6
million financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled.
Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996,[Footnote 1] any individuals fleeing to avoid prosecution
or confinement after conviction for a crime that is a felony or who
violate a condition of probation or parole imposed under federal or
state law are ineligible to receive SSI benefits. SSA has the authority
to suspend such benefits when these individuals are identified.
Further, under certain conditions, the act allows SSA to disclose
information on these individuals to law enforcement agencies to aid in
their location and apprehension.
In August 1996, SSA established the fugitive felon program to
facilitate identifying individuals in violation of the act and help
protect the integrity of the SSI program and ensure the public’s
safety. SSA, state and local governments, and federal law enforcement
agencies rely on numerous databases and information systems to carry
out the fugitive felon program. Accordingly, you requested that we
review the technological aspects of the program to (1) identify
technological barriers restricting (a) data matching between SSA’s and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) databases and (b) ongoing
efforts by SSA to obtain data-matching agreements with state and local
law enforcement agencies; (2) assess the technological impact on SSA
and the FBI should Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and
Disability Insurance (DI) benefits be included in legislation
restricting payments to fugitive felons; and (3) determine whether
other databases, such as those maintained by the Department of
Justice’s Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. Marshals Service, can provide
additional support to the fugitive felon program.
In performing this review, we analyzed key documentation maintained by
SSA, the FBI, the Bureau of Prisons, and the U.S. Marshals Service.
These included data-matching policies and standards, operational and
security procedures, and technical infrastructure descriptions
associated with the fugitive felon program. We also analyzed data-
matching agreements and laws regulating data-matching activities with
state and local law enforcement agencies. We conducted site visits and
telephone conferences with 17 state and local law enforcement agencies
to determine their involvement in the fugitive felon program, identify
any technological barriers prohibiting their ability to effectively and
efficiently share data with SSA and other federal agencies, and assess
issues and concerns affecting their efforts to negotiate data-matching
agreements with SSA. In addition, we interviewed officials at SSA’s
Headquarters, Office of Inspector General, and National Computer
Center; at the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division in
Clarksburg, West Virginia, and its Information Technology Center in
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and at the Bureau of Prisons and U.S.
Marshals Service. Our review focused on the ways in which information
technology is being used to achieve fugitive felon program
efficiencies, but did not assess the program’s effectiveness. We plan
to issue a report later this year that will in part address the
program’s effectiveness. We performed our review from August 2001
through May 2002, in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Additional details concerning the objectives,
scope, and methodology of our review are contained in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Since becoming operational in August 1996, the fugitive felon program
has provided a valuable service by helping SSA to identify and prevent
payments to ineligible SSI benefits recipients and helping law
enforcement agencies to locate and apprehend fugitive felons.
Nevertheless, several technological and other barriers are contributing
to inefficiencies in the program’s operations. As currently
administered, the processing of fugitive warrant information to
identify ineligible SSI recipients is complex and fragmented, involving
numerous organizations performing multiple steps to obtain and act on
the information. In addition, while matches of fugitive warrant records
against SSI recipient files are conducted using computers, most of the
essential tasks of sharing and verifying warrant information are
performed manually. For example, SSA currently lacks the capability to
accept warrant information from law enforcement agencies on line; thus,
the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service, and some participating state law
enforcement agencies must download this information from their
databases and information systems onto electronic media, such as
cartridges and tapes, and send it to SSA via the U.S. mail or FedEx. In
addition, certain information systems that SSA and the FBI use in
processing matched data are not interoperable or compatible, thus also
hindering the efficient exchange of warrant information. Collectively,
the manual activities in processing warrant information have resulted
in an inefficient and time-consuming operation that, based on our
analysis of the process used, can take up to 165 days to complete (from
SSA’s receipt of warrant information until SSI benefits are suspended).
Contributing to these inefficiencies is that no one office within SSA
has been designated to oversee and manage the overall performance of
the fugitive felon program. Consequently, no program officials could
explain the overall data sharing and matching process.
Largely because of SSA’s and states’ limited uses of information
technology to support the fugitive felon program, many state law
enforcement agencies have been reluctant to enter into data-matching
agreements with SSA. According to SSA and law enforcement officials,
among the factors that made some states reluctant to enter into the
agreements were that some states did not maintain central repositories
of warrant information and SSA’s guidance for formatting, downloading,
and manually transmitting the information created additional resource
requirements that some states were unable to meet. In addition, some
states report warrant information on a voluntary basis, and some states
that have signed agreements have not yet submitted any data to SSA. SSA
officials acknowledged that the agency’s efforts to obtain
comprehensive warrant information have not yielded anticipated results.
The enactment of legislation prohibiting OASI and DI payments to
fugitive felons could increase SSA’s recovery of improperly paid
benefits and prevent more potentially dangerous fugitives from fleeing
justice. However, the additional matches of warrant records against
OASI and DI recipient files could substantially increase the data
processing workloads of both SSA and the FBI’s Information Technology
Center. The center plays a major role in verifying the accuracy of
warrant records and supplies fugitives’ addresses to law enforcement
agencies. SSA and FBI officials recognize the need for additional
information technology support to conduct computer matches of warrant
information against the OASI and DI recipient files. However, at the
conclusion of our review, neither SSA nor the FBI had yet initiated
evaluations to assess the anticipated technological impact on their
operations.
SSA may be able to improve the fugitive felon program’s operational
efficiency and outcomes by exploring its existing telecommunications
connectivity supporting other federal, state, and local programs. SSA
currently has direct, on-line connections with every state that
transmits and receives data supporting various other programs,
including its program to suspend SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to
prisoners. In addition, while SSA does not currently have
telecommunications connectivity with the FBI’s National Crime
Information Center--a national database of warrant and other criminal
information--agency officials believed this database could offer a more
comprehensive and readily accessible means of obtaining outstanding
warrant information from the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service, and state
agencies. However, all states report warrant information to this
database voluntarily. Further, while SSA officials viewed the database
as a potential single source of comprehensive warrant information, they
had not assessed the feasibility of this alternative or other options
for using on-line connections with federal, state, and local agencies
to more efficiently obtain the information.
To ensure that the fugitive felon program is positioned to meet its
current and future obligations toward preventing payments of SSI
benefits to fugitive felons, we are making recommendations to the
Commissioner of Social Security that include (1) designating a program
office and manager to oversee and direct the program; (2) fully
assessing the program’s current operations and performance; and (3)
examining and proposing options for using technology to automate
currently manual functions involved in exchanging fugitive warrant
information.
SSA and the Department of Justice provided written comments on a draft
of our report. These comments are reprinted in appendixes IV and V. In
its comments, SSA expressed disappointment with our report and
generally disagreed with our recommendations. Among its specific
comments, SSA disagreed with the need for a program manager and
additional monitoring and analysis of the program’s operations. Given
the complexities of the fugitive felon processes, we continue to
believe that SSA’s program could benefit from more focused program
management and additional monitoring and analysis to identify process
improvements and technological enhancements. In addition, as part of
continual monitoring and analysis, SSA needs to identify aggregate
tracking data to assess the program’s overall cost and performance. The
Department of Justice provided technical comments, which we
incorporated, as appropriate.
Background:
Under the SSI program, SSA pays monthly benefits to individuals who
have limited assets and income and are aged, blind, or disabled. These
benefits are funded by general tax revenues and based on financial
need. SSA has estimated that, during fiscal year 2002, it will make SSI
benefits payments totaling approximately $31.5 billion to about 6.4
million individuals. Since 1997, we have designated SSI a high-risk
program because of its susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse and
SSA’s insufficient management oversight.[Footnote 2] Long-standing
concerns regarding program abuses and mismanagement, increasing
overpayments, and the inability to recover outstanding SSI debt have
led to congressional criticism of SSA’s ability to effectively manage
and ensure the program’s integrity.
In addition to SSI, SSA administers the OASI and DI programs--together
commonly known as Social Security. These are entitlement programs
funded from trust funds supported by taxes that workers pay on their
wages. OASI provides monthly cash retirement to workers and their
dependents or, when workers die, benefits to their survivors. The DI
program provides monthly cash benefits to workers and their dependents
when workers are disabled. In fiscal year 2002, the OASI and DI
programs collectively are expected to pay approximately $447 billion in
benefits to about 46 million eligible workers, dependents, and
survivors.
In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) prohibited fugitive felons from collecting
SSI benefits. Specifically, under the law, an individual is ineligible
to receive SSI payments during any month in which he or she is:
* fleeing to avoid prosecution for a crime that is a felony under the
laws of the place from which the person flees,[Footnote 3]
* fleeing to avoid custody or confinement after conviction for a crime
that is a felony under the laws of the place from which the person
flees, or:
* violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under federal or
state law.[Footnote 4]
PRWORA provides SSA with the authority to suspend SSI payments to
fugitive felons and parole and probation violators and to provide
information to law enforcement agencies to aid in locating and
apprehending these individuals. The act does not provide similar
authority for OASI and DI benefits payments.
In response to PRWORA, SSA established the fugitive felon program and
entered into a partnership with its Office of Inspector General (OIG).
SSA’s OIG, with its 63 field divisions and offices, has both program
integrity and law enforcement functions and is the primary interface
between SSA and law enforcement entities. It can investigate and make
arrests for program fraud in collaboration with other law enforcement
agencies pursuing SSI recipients engaging in criminal activities.
Beyond OIG, numerous other offices also assist in implementing the
program. As shown in figure 1, these include SSA’s offices of
operations, disability and income security programs, and systems; its
regional and field offices; and the FBI’s Information Technology Center
in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Congress does not appropriate funds to
administer the fugitive felon program. Rather, according to SSA
officials, each participating SSA office (for example, the office of
operations and OIG) and the FBI Information Technology Center use
existing funding to support the program.
Figure 1: Organizations Tasked with Implementing SSA’s Fugitive Felon
Program:
[See PDF for image]
[A] In commenting on our draft report, SSA stated that, as part of an
Office of Systems’ reorganization, the Office of Systems Analysis and
the Office of Information Management have been replaced by the Office
of Earnings, Enumeration and Administrative Systems; the Office of
Systems Design and Development has been replaced by the Office of
Disability and Supplemental Security Income Systems.
Source: GAO analysis based on SSA’s data.
[End of figure]
Under the fugitive felon program, SSA relies on warrant information
from available federal and state sources to identify ineligible SSI
recipients on its rolls. SSA receives federal and state warrant
information from several sources, including (1) the FBI’s National
Crime Information Center (NCIC); (2) state and local law enforcement
agencies; and (3) the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). SSA receives
warrant information from the FBI and USMS under memorandums of
understanding and from certain state and local law enforcement agencies
under matching agreements that establish conditions for SSA’s use of
the warrant information in its matching operations. According to SSA,
in calendar year 2001, it received approximately 27 million warrant
records from these federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
Of these, about 2 million records were eligible to be matched against
SSI benefits files.[Footnote 5] Appendix II provides a detailed
description of the fugitive felon data-matching process.
OIG reports that, since 1996, the fugitive felon program data matching
operations (manual and automated) have helped identify about 45,000
fugitives who were paid approximately $82 million in SSI benefits; of
these fugitives, approximately 5,000 were subsequently apprehended.
Appendix III presents selected cases in which fugitives were
apprehended and SSI benefits were suspended as a result of the fugitive
felon program.
Technological and Other Barriers Contribute to Inefficiencies in the
Fugitive Felon Program:
In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA faces several
technological and other barriers that create inefficiencies in its
processing of fugitive warrant information to identify ineligible SSI
recipients. These barriers include a complex, multistep process to
obtain and act on fugitive warrant information and a heavily manual
approach to accomplishing critical program tasks, such as exchanging
and verifying warrant information. In addition, where information
systems are used to support the program, many of them are not
interoperable or capable of exchanging data electronically.
Consequently, key portions of the data-matching process are complicated
and time-consuming. Contributing to this situation is that SSA has not
designated a single, central point of management accountability to
direct the fugitive felon program’s operations.
Fugitive Felon Data-Matching Process Is Complex and Highly
Manual:
The steps in administering the fugitive felon program--from the point
that SSA receives the fugitive warrant information through the
suspension of SSI benefits--are complicated and include many back-and-
forth exchanges of warrant information among the participating
entities. At the time of our review, each of the organizations
participating in the program had responsibility for distinct segments
of the tasks involved in processing fugitive warrant information
received from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
However, there was no single entity within SSA that was able to provide
a full explanation of the complete chain of activities comprising the
data sharing and matching process; as a result, we mapped the process
ourselves. We have depicted this overall process in figure 2.
Figure 2: Overview of the SSA Fugitive Felon Program Process:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
As figure 2 illustrates, SSA receives warrant records (usually on a
monthly basis) from the FBI’s national repository--NCIC--and from USMS
and state and local law enforcement agencies. Using its Enumeration
Verification System, SSA matches the warrant records against its master
files of Social Security number holders and applications to verify
identity information, such as the name, date of birth, and Social
Security number of the individual for whom the warrant was issued. Of
those records for which identities can be verified, OIG screens the
data to eliminate misdemeanors.[Footnote 6] Then, a second match is
conducted against files maintained in SSA’s supplemental security
record to determine which of the fugitives are receiving SSI benefits.
The results of the second match (addresses of the fugitive benefits
recipients) are forwarded to OIG for further processing.
OIG and its field offices work with the FBI’s Information Technology
Center (ITC) to verify that the felony, probation, or parole violation
warrants are active and that the appropriate individuals have been
identified. Once verifications are made, ITC provides address
information about each SSI recipient (called “leads”) to the
appropriate federal, state, or local law enforcement agency so that it
can locate and apprehend the individual. After action by the law
enforcement agency, OIG refers its findings to the appropriate SSA
field offices, which initiate suspension of SSI benefits.
In this process, SSA relies on its mainframe computers and systems to
match the fugitive warrant information that it receives against the
master files of Social Security number holders and applications and the
supplemental security record. Most other steps, including sharing the
warrant information used in the matching process, are performed
manually. For example, SSA does not have a telecommunications
capability that would allow it to accept warrant information on line.
As a result, the FBI, USMS, and state and local law enforcement
agencies must download warrant information from their respective
databases and information systems onto various electronic media (such
as cartridges, tapes, and CD-ROMS) and send this information to SSA via
the U.S. mail or FedEx. Depending on the type of media used, two
separate SSA offices--the Office of Central Operations and the Office
of Telecommunications and Systems Operations--receive, log, and upload
the information onto SSA’s mainframe computer to begin the matching
process.
Beyond manually sharing warrant information, many of the steps in
verifying and referring information contained in the matched records
also are performed manually. For example, to accurately identify and
locate fugitives, SSA’s field offices, OIG, and the FBI’s ITC exchange
numerous forms with law enforcement agencies.[Footnote 7] However, none
of these forms are automated, requiring SSA and ITC staff to manually
prepare and fax or mail them to the appropriate entities.
In addition, both OIG’s and ITC’s program activities are supported by
distinct systems that are not interoperable or compatible, thus further
preventing the efficient exchange of information. Specifically, OIG’s
allegation and case investigative system and ITC’s automated case
support system are used, respectively, to assign case and allegation
numbers to matched records and to verify duplicate instances of matched
data. However, these systems cannot electronically share the matched
records on which both offices must act. Rather, the OIG must download
files containing matched records and mail them to ITC. Further, OIG’s
system uses Microsoft Word and ITC’s system uses Corel WordPerfect;
thus, when ITC receives the files, it must convert them to a usable
format to be able to process the warrant information.
Manual Processes Have Resulted in a Time-Consuming Operation:
The various manual interventions in processing fugitive warrants all
contribute to a time-consuming operation that is less than optimally
efficient. According to program officials, the warrant files that
federal and state law enforcement agencies send to SSA sometimes are
not formatted in accordance with SSA’s specifications and must be
returned to the agencies for correction, delaying action on matching
these files. In addition, the electronic media containing warrant
records are sometimes lost during the mail delivery process or are
misplaced before being entered into SSA’s computers. As a result, this
time-sensitive information may go unaccounted for a number of days. SSA
had not determined the extent to which warrant records are being lost
or mishandled and over what length of time, but program officials
acknowledged that the longer it takes to match the warrant information,
the greater the opportunity for fugitives to remain unaccounted for and
to continue to receive SSI benefits payments. Further, the officials
stated that the manual steps involved in verifying fugitives’
identities and obtaining address information for referring leads to law
enforcement agencies often slow the overall process of locating and
apprehending fugitives.
SSA officials were unable to tell us how much time was actually
required to complete the processing of fugitive warrants. However, our
analysis of data that SSA provided on its existing procedures found
that the steps required to fully process a case that did not involve
circumstances such as lost or mishandled files, or improperly formatted
warrant information received from states reporting warrant information
for the first time, could take up to 165 days.[Footnote 8] This
approximate processing time could be increased up to an additional 70
days if the fugitive SSI recipient decides to appeal SSA’s decision to
suspend benefits.
As figure 3 shows, the approximate processing time includes about 65
days during which SSA and the FBI’s ITC conduct matches and initial
verifications of warrant information and refer leads to law enforcement
agencies.[Footnote 9] The approximate time also includes a total of 90
days that is devoted to ensuring that individuals are correctly
identified and that their privacy and other rights are protected--60
days that state and local law enforcement agencies are allowed to
locate and apprehend fugitives before SSA serves notice that benefits
will be suspended and 30 days during which OIG field offices conduct
additional verifications prior to sending summaries of actions taken on
matched records to SSA field offices for suspension of benefits.
Program officials informed us that state and local law enforcement
agencies originally were allowed 14 days to locate and apprehend
fugitives; however, the number of days allowed was increased to 60 to
provide these agencies more time to identify and certify actions taken
on the fugitives. According to SSA, one of the difficulties with data
matches is that, because fleeing felons often use aliases, law
enforcement agencies frequently do not have accurate Social Security
numbers or identifying information for them. Moreover, unlike
prisoners, fleeing felons are not incarcerated and may not have been
convicted of a crime. Consequently, the time devoted to manually
verifying the currency of warrant information is vital for ensuring
that the correct individuals are identified and apprehended.
Figure 3: Fugitive Felon Process Timeline (Estimated):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of SSA data.
[End of figure]
Program officials added that some manual verifications of warrant
information are necessary to help ensure the program’s integrity.
However, automating key tasks, such as the capability to accept warrant
information from other agencies’ databases on line, could help
eliminate much of the time devoted to initially processing and matching
warrant information and verifying and referring leads that results from
the matched records (now estimated to take about 65 days).
At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials told us that they had
recently begun considering options to automate manual processes in the
field offices. For example, they stated that the agency was considering
eliminating many of the field offices’ benefits suspension activities,
such as providing due process notices and preparing OIG final reports
and, instead, performing these activities in one regional office with
the use of computers.
Although SSA’s consideration of options for improving the fugitive
felon process is a positive step, the agency has not analyzed or mapped
its existing fugitive felon data sharing and matching process. Without
doing so, SSA lacks critical information needed for targeting processes
that are most in need of improvement, setting realistic improvement
goals, and ensuring that it selects an appropriate approach for
improving its manual operations. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 requires
agency heads to analyze, revise, and improve mission-related and
administrative processes before making significant investments in
supporting information technology. Further, an agency should have an
overall business process improvement strategy that provides a means to
coordinate and integrate the various reengineering and improvement
projects, set priorities, and make appropriate budget decisions. By
doing so, an agency can better position itself to maximize the
potential of technology to improve performance, rather than simply
automating inefficient processes.
SSA Could Benefit from Clear and Unified Management Accountability to
Direct the Fugitive Felon Program:
Although the fugitive felon program is achieving results, it could
benefit from increased management accountability. SSA relies on
multiple agencies and offices to implement the fugitive felon program.
However, there is no unified source of management accountability to
provide the consistent oversight and program continuity that is
essential to sustaining program success. Consequently, staff assigned
to administer the program offered conflicting accounts as to what
program tasks were being performed and by whom. For example, program
officials identified three different SSA offices--operations, program
support, and OIG--as having responsibility for leading the program; yet
no officials in these offices could explain the overall data-matching
process or had decision-making and oversight responsibility for the
other participating entities.
In addition, critical data needed to make informed decisions about the
program’s operations, such as technological capabilities, program costs
and benefits, and resource requirements, were not being captured. For
example, none of the participating SSA and FBI offices could state with
certainty the amount of time they devoted to processing fugitive
warrant records. As discussed earlier, no one office within SSA had
mapped the overall fugitive felon data sharing and matching process to
comprehensively assess how many days were required from SSA’s receipt
of warrant information until SSI benefits payments to fugitive felons
were actually suspended. Further, although the program has been in
place for 6 years, program officials were unable to provide data on the
total costs of the program.
In discussing their management of the fugitive felon program, SSA
officials acknowledged that the program lacked unified management
accountability. An OIG official stated that, while the agency had
initially decided that both headquarters offices and OIG would jointly
administer the program, these offices had only recently begun
considering ways to improve their management of the program. The agency
was considering the development of a management board to oversee and
address program issues and concerns. However, it had not developed any
specific tasks or milestones for this improvement effort. Given the
inherent complexity of the fugitive felon program and the many entities
involved in its implementation, effective management of operations and
data is essential for determining how best to achieve and sustain
future program operations and reporting.
SSA’s Efforts to Obtain Data-Matching Agreements Have Not Resulted in
Comprehensive Data:
Having complete and comprehensive warrant information from states is
crucial to ensuring that the objectives of the fugitive felon program
are achieved. Yet, according to SSA, states currently report warrant
information to NCIC on a voluntary basis; therefore, not all
outstanding warrants are being included in the FBI’s NCIC database--a
prime source of SSA’s matching information. Since May 2000, SSA has
been taking steps to obtain more comprehensive state and local
information by pursuing data-matching agreements with states that do
not report all of their warrant information to NCIC. However, a number
of these states have been reluctant to enter into agreements or, once
they have, have not always abided by them, largely because of SSA’s and
the states’ concerns regarding the lack of information technology and
adequate resources to support the program.
SSA considers states to be fully reporting warrant information to NCIC
if they submit information on all felonies and parole or probation
violators. States are considered to be partially reporting warrant
information if, for example, they report felonies but not parole and
probation violators.[Footnote 10] As of May 2002 (the latest month for
which data were available), SSA had identified 21 states and the
District of Columbia as fully reporting warrant information to NCIC and
29 states as partially reporting warrant information.
In pursuing data-matching agreements to obtain all of the states’
warrant information,[Footnote 11] SSA reported as of May 2002 that it
had signed agreements with 18 states[Footnote 12] and was in various
stages of negotiating agreements with 5 other states. SSA had been
unsuccessful in reaching agreements with 3 states, all of which had
declined to enter into the agreements. It had not yet begun negotiating
agreements with 6 additional states. Figure 4 reflects the status of
SSA’s attempts to obtain data-matching agreements with the states as of
May 2002.
Figure 4: Status of the SSA Fugitive Felon Agreements:
[See PDF for image]
[A] The states that SSA is pursuing agreements with include 3
(Delaware, Indiana, and New Jersey) identified as submitting all of
their warrant information to NCIC, but from which SSA, for various
reasons, negotiated agreements to also directly obtain data.
[B] SSA does not pursue data-matching agreements with states that fully
report to NCIC.
Source: SSA.
[End of figure]
SSA and state officials cited various factors--often related to their
uses of information technology--that had made negotiating data-matching
agreements difficult. For example, in explaining their decision to
decline an agreement, Iowa officials stated that, because SSA does not
have the capability to receive fugitive warrant records on line, state
officials would have to reformat, download to electronic media, and
mail the warrant information to SSA Headquarters. The officials
believed that doing so would not be cost-effective and, thus, elected
to continue their practice of submitting paper printouts of warrant
information to the SSA OIG field office in Des Moines. In Florida,
officials explained that their state had not entered an agreement with
SSA and instead was fully reporting warrant information to NCIC because
of SSA’s specifications for formatting and downloading the warrant
information onto electronic media. They expressed concern that
additional resources would be required to perform these formatting
tasks and manually provide the warrant information to SSA.
Further, SSA and state officials noted that negotiating data-matching
agreements had been hindered by the lack of centralized databases or
repositories of warrant information in some state and local law
enforcement agencies. For example, officials in Oklahoma told us that
because that state lacked a central repository, they did not want to
enter into a data-matching agreement with SSA. The officials explained
that not all of the states’ approximately 700 local law enforcement
offices currently report all of their warrant information at the state
level and to NCIC. Thus, to meet the intent of a data-matching
agreement, each local agency would have to provide their warrant
information directly to SSA. However, most local law enforcement
agencies within the state do not have central repositories for
reporting the information to SSA.
Idaho officials added that, in addition to lacking a central
repository, they had chosen not to sign a data-matching agreement with
SSA because of privacy considerations. Specifically, the officials
expressed concerns with the privacy and security implications of
submitting sensitive warrant information via the U.S. mail.
Even when agreements had been reached, however, SSA had not fully
achieved its objective of obtaining comprehensive warrant information
from the states. Specifically, at the time of our review, of the 18
states with which SSA had signed agreements, only 9 were actually
submitting warrant information to the agency. According to SSA, the
remaining 9 states that had signed agreements but had not yet sent
warrant information provided similar reasons for not complying with the
agreements. These included states’ concerns about the privacy and
security of the warrant information and difficulties complying with
SSA’s record layout or formatting requirements. In addition, although
having agreed to submit warrant information to SSA, 3 states (Kentucky,
Rhode Island, and Colorado) later decided instead to report all warrant
information to NCIC.
At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials acknowledged that the
process for obtaining data-matching agreements was difficult and had
not yielded the results that they had anticipated. States essentially
provide warrant information on a voluntary basis, and the agreements
are intended primarily to protect states’ data from unauthorized
disclosure and use. Nonetheless, SSA officials believed that, in the
absence of a single and complete source of fugitive warrant records
from all states, the data-matching agreements were necessary for
ensuring that the agency could obtain comprehensive warrant
information. We agree that comprehensive warrant information is vital
to the success of the fugitive felon program. However, the data-
matching agreements have not ensured that SSA will obtain the
comprehensive warrant information that it seeks.
Legislation Prohibiting OASI and DI Benefits for Fugitive Felons Could
Have a Substantial Impact on the Program:
Under current statutory provisions, fugitives are prohibited from
receiving SSI benefits, but can continue to be paid OASI and DI
benefits. Specifically, SSA maintains address information on fugitives
receiving SSI, OASI, and DI benefits, but can only share information
with law enforcement agencies on those fugitives receiving SSI.
However, the increasing realization that OASI and DI benefits payments
may also finance a potentially dangerous fugitive’s flight from justice
has prompted the Congress to pursue implementing provisions to prohibit
payments to fugitives in these programs as well.[Footnote 13]
Implementing a nonpayment provision would also permit SSA to share
address information on fugitives who receive OASI and DI benefits. In
its own consideration of such a measure, OIG projected that doing so
could result in substantial savings to the OASI and DI programs.
Specifically, in an August 2000 study, OIG estimated that between
August 1996 and June 1999, about 17,300 fugitives had been paid at
least $108 million in OASI and DI benefits. In August 2001, the office
revised its estimates, projecting that OASI and DI benefits amounting
to approximately $40 million would be paid to fugitives through October
2001, and in each additional year that legislation was not enacted to
prohibit such benefits payments--for a 5-year total payout of
approximately $198 million.
Should this legislative proposal be enacted, the fugitive felon
program’s workload could increase substantially. SSA officials
acknowledged that the additional OASI and DI files could significantly
increase the program’s data-matching activities. According to an
analysis that the OIG performed, the enactment of the legislative
proposal would result in three times the current work level of SSI
matches.
The FBI believed that implementing the legislation could have varying
effects on its operations. Specifically, officials in the Criminal
Justice Information Services Division, which manages the NCIC database,
stated that implementing the provision would have no technological
impact on that organization’s ability to provide SSA fugitive warrant
information. They anticipated that the database would continue to
supply SSA with warrant records received daily from state and local law
enforcement agencies. However, FBI and SSA OIG officials stated that
the additional matched records for OASI and DI recipients could
substantially increase ITC’s workload associated with verifying the
accuracy of the matched records and supplying fugitives’ addresses to
law enforcement agencies. Further, based on its study, OIG officials,
and those of the FBI, believed that ITC’s workforce would have to
increase substantially--from the current staff of 7 to about 60--to
accommodate the additional workload associated with handling all the
leads generated through the matching process.
With the potential for workload increases in the fugitive felon
program, SSA and ITC officials recognized that additional information
systems support would be needed to conduct computer matches of warrant
information against the OASI and DI recipient files. However, neither
SSA nor the FBI had yet initiated any evaluations to assess the
anticipated technological impact on their operations. Such an
assessment is critical to helping SSA make an informed decision
regarding its ability to ensure that comprehensive and efficient data-
matching operations would continue under expanded operations. As
discussed in our investment guide, good decisions require good data
[Footnote 14] Consequently, having solid data on a program’s operations
is essential for making informed decisions concerning workload
management
and the technological solutions needed to sustain efficient and
effective
performance.
Increased Reliance on Other Agencies’ Databases Could Help Enhance
Fugitive Felon Program Operations:
As SSA proceeds with implementing the fugitive felon program, having
efficient and effectively run operations will be essential to achieving
sustained program results. SSA officials have acknowledged
inefficiencies in the existing fugitive felon processes and have
indicated that they expect to rely more heavily on information
technology to help improve the program’s operations and outcomes.
Information systems and databases maintained by some of the federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies that currently participate in
the fugitive felon program could offer SSA opportunities for more
efficiently obtaining warrant information to enhance the program.
Much of the foundation for using information technology to improve the
fugitive felon processes may already exist among state and local
agencies participating in other programs. According to SSA systems
officials, SSA currently has a direct, dedicated on-line connection
with every state’s department of social services.[Footnote 15] States
use these lines to submit information to SSA covering various programs,
such as child support enforcement. Similarly, as part of the prisoner
program, some state and local prison facilities send federal prisoner
data to SSA on line to aid in suspending SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to
incarcerated inmates.[Footnote 16]
In discussing the exchange of states’ fugitive warrant information, SSA
officials told us that they had not evaluated how on-line connections
with state and local agencies could be used to receive information
supporting the fugitive felon program. They indicated that implementing
an on-line connection to receive fugitive warrant information from each
state law enforcement agency would require each state to have access to
a secure (encrypted), dedicated telecommunications line with SSA. They
believed that data compatibility and privacy issues would also need to
be addressed. Nonetheless, at the conclusion of our review, an SSA
official told us that the agency had reached agreement with one state-
-Connecticut--to exchange fugitive felon data via electronic file
transfer. According to the official, Connecticut is preparing to submit
data via a Connect:Direct electronic file transfer method, in which
data will be encrypted and sent from one mainframe computer to another
over dedicated lines.
An alternative to each state sending data would be increased reliance
on the NCIC database, which could provide a comprehensive and readily
accessible means of attaining outstanding warrant records from the FBI,
USMS, and from the states. According to FBI data, NCIC’s technical
infrastructure includes high-level security controls and validation and
confirmation procedures for all warrant information exchanged with the
database. In addition, it is designed to interact in an on-line, real-
time capacity with other information systems and databases, including
those of USMS and all 50 states. For example, states transmit warrant
data to NCIC via state criminal justice systems that are linked to the
FBI Criminal Justice Information Services’ network.[Footnote 17] As
discussed earlier, all states transmit all or some portion of their
warrant information on line to the NCIC database each month.
Within the Department of Justice, USMS relies on on-line connections to
transmit fugitive warrant information to NCIC. Like many state and
local law enforcement agencies, USMS transmits to NCIC the same warrant
information that it sends to SSA via U.S. mail. On the other hand, SSA
officials stated that the Bureau of Prison’s database of incarcerated
inmates, which supports SSA’s prisoner program, could not be used to
effectively support the fugitive felon program, because that database
does not maintain information on the status of fugitive felons.
Both SSA and its OIG officials believed that having a single source of
warrant information would help make the data-matching process less
laborious and eliminate processing inefficiencies. Accordingly, in
November 2001, OIG recommended to Congress the need for a national
warrant database. In addition, at the conclusion of our review, SSA
officials told us they that they viewed the NCIC database as a
potential single source of warrant information to support the fugitive
felon program. The officials believed that receiving USMS’s and state
and local law enforcement agencies’ warrant information on line via
NCIC could potentially eliminate much of the duplicate warrant
information that now contributes to the program’s inefficiencies. For
example, according to federal, state, and local law enforcement
officials, USMS and all states currently transmit all or some of their
warrant information to the FBI’s NCIC. Thus, when the FBI downloads
warrant information from this database to mail to SSA, the information
duplicates some of that which federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies also send to SSA. Fugitive felon program officials reported
that, in calendar year 2001, SSA received approximately 60,000
duplicate warrant records (approximately 5,000 warrant records per
month) as a result of these dual exchanges.
SSA officials noted, however, that achieving a single source of
fugitive warrant information would require that SSA have the capability
to accept data from NCIC on line. At the conclusion of our review, SSA
officials stated that the agency had not explored using an on-line
connection to NCIC to enhance the sharing of fugitive warrant
information. In addition, they stated that, for NCIC to be effective as
a single source of comprehensive warrant information, state agencies
would have to be willing to report that portion of warrant information
to NCIC that SSA currently must obtain from them under data-matching
agreements. However, according to FBI officials, there is no statute or
regulation requiring the states to fully report warrant information to
NCIC; rather, states report information to this database voluntarily.
Conclusions:
In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA faces significant
technological and other barriers to achieving and sustaining efficient
and effective program operations and, ultimately, helping SSI overcome
its high-risk status. While the program has helped prevent SSI benefits
payments to fugitives, its complex and manually intensive processes
have resulted in operational inefficiencies that could hinder the
program’s long-term success. Further, difficulties in negotiating data-
matching agreements with the states have hindered SSA’s efforts to
obtain comprehensive warrant information needed to fulfill program
objectives. In the absence of essential management accountability, SSA
lacks critical data needed to make informed decisions about the
program’s processes and activities, as well as existing and future
plans for technology supporting the program. Overcoming these
inefficiencies and limitations will be critical to ensuring that the
fugitive felon program is organized and implemented to achieve the
greatest possible results and that SSA is effectively positioned to
fulfill its potentially broader role in preventing OASI and DI benefits
payments to fugitives.
SSA officials recognized that increased program efficiency and outcomes
could result from more substantial uses of information technology to
perform key data sharing and verification functions and to streamline
data-matching operations. Further, given the potential increase in
SSA’s workload that could result from implementing an OASI and DI
nonpayment provision, having the necessary information technology to
support its operations will be even more critical. SSA already has a
proven capability to share data on line with federal, state, and local
agencies in support of other programs. However, SSA has taken few steps
toward examining its current data-matching operations and approaches to
obtaining warrant information or exploring how best to use technology
to enhance the overall fugitive felon process.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the fugitive felon program’s operational efficiency and
ensure sustained, long-term success in identifying fugitive SSI
beneficiaries, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security
designate a program management office and program manager to direct,
monitor, and control the program’s activities and progress. In
addition, we recommend that the commissioner direct the program
management office and manager to:
* conduct a detailed assessment of the fugitive felon program’s current
operations and performance, including a complete analysis of the
organizations, processes, information flows, and time frames required
to administer the program, a full accounting of the program’s costs,
estimated and actual program benefits, and current workload
requirements;
* identify and prioritize, based on its assessment, those fugitive
felon processes that need improvement and develop a strategy for
resolving technological and administrative barriers preventing their
efficient operation;
* continue to examine and propose options for using technology to
automate the currently manual functions involved in exchanging fugitive
warrant information with federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies and in completing the verifications and referral of this
information, including assessing alternatives to using data-matching
agreements to obtain fugitive warrant information, and determining
whether on-line connections with state and local law enforcement
agencies and/or direct telecommunications connections with the FBI’s
NCIC database could offer viable and more efficient means of sharing
warrant information; and:
* assess the anticipated technological impact on fugitive felon
operations from the implementation of provisions prohibiting OASI and
DI benefits payments to fugitives, including identifying the additional
information systems support that would be needed to conduct and process
leads resulting from computer matches of warrant information against
these benefits recipients’ files.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the
Commissioner of Social Security (see app. IV) and from the Director,
Audit Liaison Office, Justice Management Division, Department of
Justice (see app. V). The Commissioner of Social Security expressed
disappointment with our report and generally disagreed with our
recommendations. The Department of Justice provided technical comments,
which we have incorporated, as appropriate.
Regarding the commissioner’s statement expressing disappointment in our
report, we believe our report provides a fair assessment of the
efficiency of the fugitive felon program. We identify those areas in
which improvements can be made that can benefit SSA’s future efforts at
streamlining the program’s inefficient processes, improving
performance and operations, and applying technology, where appropriate.
In SSA’s comments, the commissioner also stated that the report implied
that neither SSA nor the OIG had a vision for the fugitive felon
program and did not mention that SSA and OIG had embraced the program
without start-up funding or additional resources. We recognize the
valuable role that SSA plays in implementing the fugitive felon program
to prevent benefits payments to ineligible SSI recipients. In pointing
out technological and other barriers to the program’s operations, our
intent was not to imply that SSA and other participating components
lack a vision for the program. Rather, given the program’s complexity
and multiple entities involved in its administration, we believe it is
important to highlight critical conditions and operational
inefficiencies necessitating SSA’s continual attention in order to
ensure sustained program success. Also, our report does recognize that
funding has not been appropriated to administer the program. SSA, as a
steward of the program, has a responsibility to ensure that it
consistently carries out all aspects of the fugitive felon data-
matching operations in an efficient manner.
Regarding our recommendation to designate a program management office
and program manager to direct, monitor, and control the program’s
activities and progress, SSA disagreed that an agency-wide program
manager was necessary. SSA stated that managers within its office of
operations and OIG are responsible for the program and that all
involved offices are aware of the overall process and individual office
responsibilities. Further, SSA stated that the Inspector General Act
does not allow its OIG to take direction from or participate in
administrative decisions that appropriately belong to SSA. In addition,
regarding our statement that no program official could explain the
overall data sharing and matching process, SSA disagreed, stating that
OIG and SSA officials are able to explain the process in its entirety.
SSA also stated that, to ensure all involved offices are aware of the
overall process and individual office responsibilities, it had released
a detailed process description and provided a copy to us. Further, SSA
added that because its officials had chosen not to answer questions
pertaining to other components’ work during our review, we had
mistakenly inferred that no one within the agency could explain the
overall process.
We recognize that the fugitive felon program is a joint effort and that
there are responsible and knowledgeable managers within each of the
participating components involved in administering the program. Our
recommendation is intended to ensure a unified management oversight
capability for the fugitive felon program that does not currently
exist. It is not intended to prescribe the exact nature or form of that
management oversight capability. With respect to comments regarding
possible limitations on joint efforts as a result of the Inspector
General Act, the Act does not prohibit coordination of joint action
between the OIG and the head of the establishment involved to ensure
efficiency of operation and to avoid duplication of effort, nor do we
believe that such coordination would affect OIG’s personal and
professional independence. In this respect, as we noted in our report,
an OIG official has commented on the need for improved coordination and
management of the fugitive felon program. That official also noted that
OIG had already begun to work with SSA’s Office of Operations to
improve management of the program.
Further, during our review, it was evident that management and staff in
each component could explain the distinct segments of tasks that they
were responsible for accomplishing; however, we could not identify any
officials within these organizations who had a clear perspective of
overall program performance and operations. As our report noted, staff
within the SSA and OIG offices provided conflicting accounts of the
fugitive felon data-matching process. While we acknowledge that SSA
revised its policy instructions in April 2002, outlining involved
offices’ roles and responsibilities, these instructions do not address
SSA’s overall fugitive felon processes. In addition, we were unable to
identify any aggregate tracking data to assess the program’s overall
cost and performance. Given the multiple agencies and offices involved
in administering this complex program, we continue to believe that
having a unified source of accountability and authority for the program
is essential to effectively and consistently oversee its progress and
ensure that informed decisions are being made about its implementation.
In discussing our findings on May 10, 2002, SSA and OIG officials
agreed that the program lacked uniform management accountability and
stated that they had just recently begun considering the development of
a management board to oversee and address program management issues and
concerns.
SSA also disagreed with our recommendation that called for it to
conduct a detailed assessment of the fugitive felon program’s current
operations and performance, including a full accounting of the
program’s costs and benefits and workload requirements. SSA stated that
its analysis of the program’s operations is an ongoing process and that
enhancements are made when deemed necessary. SSA further stated that it
had completed many of the tasks cited in our recommendation prior to
starting the matching process in calendar year 1999, and that OIG has
regularly reported its performance in the program. We agree that
ongoing monitoring and analysis of the program’s operations is
essential for ensuring that management is informed of the program’s
cost and progress and to assess risks to overall performance. However,
during our review, SSA could not demonstrate that it had made an
aggregate assessment of the program’s current operations and
performance, including an awareness of the processes, information
flows, and time involved in administering the program, as well as a
full accounting of its costs and requirements. Such information is
vital for making informed decisions about the program’s progress and
for determining where process improvements are needed and how best to
achieve them. The fugitive felon program has been in place since 1996
(with computerized matching since 1999), giving SSA sufficient
opportunities to perform these necessary and critical assessments.
Further, while SSA stated that OIG has regularly reported its
performance in the fugitive felon program, it is important that SSA
conduct its own program assessment that includes all participating
components, which ensures that the program can be consistently and
comprehensively controlled and managed.
Regarding the need for an assessment, SSA stated that it had completed
a cost-benefit analysis of the fugitive felon program in January 2001.
Our review of the two-page summary found that it lacked substantial
information about the program’s overall costs and benefits. An
operations official who provided the document told us that the summary
had constituted only a rough estimate, rather than an accurate
reflection, of the program’s costs and benefits, and that it had been
developed only for the purpose of renewing SSA’s computer-matching
program. The official added that the development of actual cost and
benefits data for the fugitive felon program would require
significantly more time than had been invested in preparing the current
summary.
SSA believed that our recommendation to identify and prioritize those
fugitive felon processes that need improvement and develop a strategy
for resolving technological and administrative barriers preventing
their efficient operation is unnecessary, stating that it provides for
these actions during normal operations. The agency added that it has a
number of efforts under way to automate some of the fugitive felon
processes. However, SSA stated that there are some manual processes in
the program that contribute to minor interruptions to the fugitive
felon process.
While SSA stated that it has undertaken efforts to automate some
fugitive felon processes, it needs to develop a strategy for resolving
the technological and administrative barriers affecting the program’s
operations. As our report notes, an overall business process
improvement strategy will better position SSA to prioritize and
integrate its various reengineering and improvement projects and, thus,
maximize the potential of technology to improve the program’s
performance. Further, at the conclusion of our review, SSA provided us
with documentation outlining discussions to automate field office
functions. However, the information provided did not include enough
detail on the initiative that it said was being undertaken; therefore,
we could not comment on these developments. We recognize that there are
many steps within the fugitive felon process that must be completed
manually. While we agree that some of these manual processes are
necessary, our report notes that technology may enhance the program.
Given our assessment of the length of the process (approximately 165
days), we continue to believe that SSA needs to perform a complete
analysis of the fugitive felon program to identify areas for
improvement, as well as areas where technology can be used to support
more efficient operations.
SSA found potential merit in our recommendation that it examine and
propose options for using technology to automate the currently manual
functions involved in exchanging fugitive warrant information with
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and in determining
the most efficient means of sharing warrant information. Although our
recommendation included determining whether direct telecommunication
connections with the FBI’s NCIC could offer a viable solution, SSA
believed that the creation of a single national warrant database would
be a better solution to efficiently sharing warrant information. SSA
stated that its OIG had testified before the Congress on the benefits
that would be derived if such a database were established. SSA added
that NCIC would be effective as a single source of comprehensive
warrant information only if entry of states’ warrant information became
mandatory.
We acknowledge in our report that the states enter warrant information
into NCIC voluntarily and agree that this could be an impediment to
achieving a comprehensive information repository. Nonetheless,
achieving an optimal solution will in large measure depend on SSA
examining the strengths and limitations of all of the potential
alternatives to sharing warrant information, including NCIC.
Accordingly, this recommendation remains in our report. However, we
have also incorporated language reflecting SSA’s views regarding a
national warrant database.
Also in its response to this recommendation and in additional comments,
SSA noted several instances where it believed we had made incorrect
assumptions regarding the fugitive felon process. SSA disagreed with
our assertion that it cannot determine the amount of time that is
actually required to complete the processing of fugitive warrants and
stated that it was able to track the number of days it takes for each
individual subject (fugitive) to be processed. In addition, SSA stated
that our analysis of the fugitive felon processing timeline had
incorrectly considered start-up/test file processing times that can be
associated with states’ first submissions of warrant files, thus
accounting for our approximation of 165 days. We acknowledge that SSA
has been able to track fugitive warrant information on a subject-by-
subject basis; however, our review did not find that SSA had performed
any aggregate tracking of the time required to process fugitive
warrants--data that would be helpful to SSA in gauging the program’s
performance. Also, as our report noted, our analysis was limited to
case processing data that did not involve lost, mishandled, or
improperly formatted data. However, we have amended our report to
specifically reflect that we also did not include trial and error times
for states reporting warrant information for the first time.
In addition, SSA interpreted our discussion of states’ perspectives
regarding fugitive felon data formatting and transmission requirements
as an implication that the requirements were unduly restrictive.
However, we recognize the importance of prescribed standards for
ensuring consistent reporting of warrant information and other
computerized data. In this regard, our report aims only to highlight
some of the circumstances that currently prevent SSA from receiving
comprehensive warrant information from state and local law enforcement
agencies.
Further, SSA stated that our report had included erroneous information
about the agency’s on-line connections with states’ departments of
social service and in describing its data exchanges with the Bureau of
Prisons. SSA stated that the agency has dedicated lines connecting to
each state and that these lines are used to exchange batch files, and
that real-time transfers are not occurring as indicated in our report.
Based on documentation that SSA’s Office of Systems provided, we
determined that SSA has direct, dedicated on-line connections with
every state’s department of social services. However, we do not imply
in our report that on-line connections mean real-time connections. We
have added language to clarify that SSA’s existing on-line connections
with state and local agencies primarily involve batch, rather than
real-time, transfers of data.
Finally, regarding our recommendation that SSA assess the anticipated
technological impact on fugitive felon operations from the
implementation of provisions prohibiting OASI and DI benefits payments
to fugitives, SSA stated that it and the OIG have already completed
this task. In particular, SSA stated that a joint SSA/OIG analysis of
state and federal warrant files had been started in January 2001 to
determine what impact OASI and DI legislation would have on the
program. According to SSA, this analysis had determined that the
legislation would affect staff resources, but would not affect its need
for technology. Further, SSA stated that this information had been
shared with us during our review.
While conducting our review, OIG officials did inform us that they had
performed an analysis to assess the impact of the OASI and DI
legislation on fugitive felon program operations; however, by the
conclusion of our review, the officials had not met our request for
documentation supporting this analysis. OIG officials subsequently
provided the analysis to us while reviewing and commenting on our draft
report. We agreed to review the analysis and make revisions to our
report, as necessary. Our review of the analysis found that OIG’s main
objective had been to determine the increase in the current fugitive
felon program workload. However, the analysis did not include any
discussion of the technological implications resulting from the OASI
and DI legislation. Further, SSA commented that, in June 2001, its
Office of Systems had estimated that adding OASI and DI to the fugitive
felon program would require about 8 work years, but that the agency did
not envision any major new or unique information technology
expenditures. In discussing the impact of the legislation during our
review, SSA did not inform us of the Office of Systems’ projection or
of documentation supporting this evaluation. Thus, while we have
modified our report to reflect that OIG had performed analysis that
assessed the workload impact resulting from the OASI and DI
legislation, we continue to believe that additional assessment is
necessary to determine whether and what information systems support
would be required to meet the broader mission.
Beyond these comments, SSA offered clarifications to table 1, which
listed the organizations tasked with implementing the fugitive felon
program and to the definition of “high misdemeanors” discussed in
footnote 6 to the report.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Commissioner of Social Security and to the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We also will make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your office have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-6253, or Valerie Melvin, Assistant
Director, at (202) 512-6304. We can also be reached by E-mail at
willemssenj@gao.gov and melvinv@gao.gov, respectively. Individuals
making key contributions to this report were Nabajyoti Barkakati, Mary
J. Dorsey, Sophia Harrison, David L. McClure, Valerie C. Melvin, Tammi
Nguyen, Henry Sutanto, and Eric Trout.
Sincerely yours,
Joel C. Willemssen
Managing Director, Information Technology Issues:
Signed by Joel C. Willemssen
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to examine the technological aspects of the
fugitive felon program in order to (1) identify technological barriers
restricting (a) data matching between the Social Security
Administration’s (SSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI)
databases and (b) ongoing efforts by SSA to obtain data-matching
agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies; (2) assess
the technological impact on SSA and the FBI should Old Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) benefits be
included in legislation restricting payments to fugitive felons; and
(3) determine whether other databases, such as those maintained by the
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. Marshals
Service, can provide additional support to the fugitive felon program.
To understand the fugitive felon data-matching process, we obtained and
analyzed various documentation maintained by SSA, the FBI, the Bureau
of Prisons and the U.S. Marshals Service. These documents described
data sharing and matching policies, operational and security
procedures, and the technical infrastructure supporting the fugitive
felon program. We complemented our understanding of the data-matching
process by arranging a demonstration with SearchSoftwareAmerica, an
industry leader with expertise in data-matching software, to understand
how data-matching software works in a database environment.
At the time of our review, SSA did not have documentation showing the
flow of warrant information through the fugitive felon data-matching
process, requiring that we map the process ourselves. To accomplish
this, we relied on the results of our document analyses and used
business process flow software to construct a graphical presentation of
the fugitive felon program’s process flow. We provided copies of the
completed business process flowchart to SSA Headquarters offices and
its Office of Inspector General (OIG) to verify the accuracy of our
process depiction and incorporated changes based on their review and
comments. In addition, to further confirm the process, we interviewed
agency officials in all of the offices involved in administering the
fugitive felon program. These included SSA’s OIG and office of
operations, SSA and OIG field offices, and the FBI Information
Technology Center (ITC) in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
Also, because SSA had not performed an analysis to determine how many
days it took to process warrant information, we determined the
approximate number of days involved in the process from the receipt of
warrant information from federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies until the suspension of fugitives’ SSI benefits. We derived
the number of days by performing a detailed analysis of documentation
obtained from various SSA offices. For example, we reviewed completed
samples of incoming data included on log sheets from both the Office of
Central Operations and Office of Telecommunications and Systems
Operations to calculate the approximate number of days it took these
offices to process the warrant data from its receipt until they
forwarded it to OIG. We also interviewed officials in SSA Headquarters,
its OIG, and the FBI ITC regarding the number of days involved in
processing fugitive warrants. We shared the results of our analysis
with appropriate SSA officials to confirm the validity of our
processing timeline estimate.
To identify technological barriers restricting data matching between
SSA’s and the FBI’s databases, we relied on our detailed analysis of
SSA’s fugitive felon process and assessed information describing its
supporting technical infrastructure. We also analyzed documentation
describing the FBI’s repository of fugitives and other criminals--the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC)--along with the agency’s
approach to providing warrant information to SSA. To support our
analysis, we applied various guidance, including Office of Management
and Budget Circular A-130, Appendix I: Federal Agency Responsibilities
for Maintaining Records about Individuals and Appendix II, Security of
Federal Automated Information Resources; and National Institute of
Standards and Technology computer security guidance.
Regarding SSA’s ongoing efforts to obtain data-matching agreements with
state and local law enforcement agencies, we applied the Computer
Matching Privacy and Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988 (P. L. 100-503),
amending the Privacy Act (5 U. S. C. 552a); data-matching agreements
fall under the provisions of the Act, which protects unauthorized
disclosures of computerized data through data matching. In addition, we
applied the Privacy Act of 1974 (P. L. 93-579), which stipulates
provisions for protecting individuals from unauthorized disclosure of
non-computerized information. We also applied knowledge gained through
our detailed analysis of the fugitive felon process, as well as SSA’s
model data-matching agreements, reports documenting the status of
negotiations between SSA and state and local law enforcement agencies,
and other policy and procedural documentation. We conducted site visits
and telephone conferences with 17 randomly selected state and local law
enforcement agencies--Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania--to determine their involvement in the fugitive felon
program, identify any technological barriers prohibiting their ability
to effectively and efficiently share data with SSA and other federal
agencies, and assess issues and concerns affecting their efforts to
negotiate data-matching agreements with SSA.
To assess the technological impact on SSA and the FBI should
legislation be enacted to prohibit fugitives from receiving OASI and DI
benefits payments, we analyzed applicable laws: the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P. L.
104-193), amending Title XVI of the Social Security Act, as well as
OASI and DI legislation proposed by the House of Representatives and
U.S. Senate. We also assessed SSA OIG reports and testimony that
highlighted the Inspector General’s position regarding proposed
legislation prohibiting OASI and DI benefits payments to fugitive
felons and determined SSA’s decisions and actions regarding the
potential impact of such proposed legislation. In addition, as part of
our analysis, we considered our recent correspondence to the House
Committee on Way and Means, which reported on whether SSA has the
authority to deny OASI and DI benefits to fugitive felons and provide
law enforcement agencies with the current addresses and Social Security
numbers of OASI and DI beneficiaries who are fugitive felons.[Footnote
18] Finally, to determine whether other databases, such as those
maintained by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons and U.S.
Marshals Service could provide additional support to the fugitive felon
program, we obtained and analyzed documentation describing the
agreements between SSA’s OIG and these agencies. In addition, we
analyzed systems documentation pertaining to the Bureau of Prisons and
U.S. Marshals Service’s databases, as well as the FBI’s NCIC and state
and local law enforcement agencies’ databases. This documentation
included data standards, reporting requirements (memoranda of
understanding and data-matching agreements), policies, and procedures.
We also interviewed pertinent management and staff of SSA’s
Headquarters, field offices, and OIG; the FBI Criminal Justice
Information Services Division; the U.S. Marshals Service; and the
Bureau of Prisons to gain an understanding of how their databases could
be used to support the fugitive felon program.
We conducted our review from August 2001 through May 2002, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Fugitive Felon Program Data-Matching Process:
Under the fugitive felon program, the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service
(USMS), and state and local law enforcement agencies download warrant
information from their respective databases onto electronic media, such
as cartridges, diskettes, and CD-ROMs, and send it to SSA via the U.S.
mail or FedEx. Warrant information contained on diskettes, paper, and
CD-ROMs is sent to SSA’s Office of Central Operations (any warrant
information received on paper is keyed to diskette), whereas warrant
information contained on tapes, cartridges, or electronic files is sent
to SSA’s Office of Telecommunications and Systems Operations. Upon
receipt, staff in these two offices upload the warrant information onto
SSA’s mainframe computer, located at its National Computer Center
(NCC), to begin the data-matching process.
As part of the data-matching operations, the NCC staff makes backup
copies of the warrant information and processes the data in overnight
batches, using SSA’s Enumeration Verification System (EVS) to verify
fugitives’ names, Social Security numbers, sex, and birth dates. The
NCC staff then notifies SSA’s OIG that the data files are in
production. The OIG is responsible for ensuring that the data files
include only individuals charged with felony and parole or probation
violations; it deletes any files naming individuals charged with
misdemeanors.
Following OIG’s review, NCC staff processes the data files against the
supplemental security record to identify fugitives receiving SSI
benefits payments. The records of fugitives identified--called matched
records--are then returned to the OIG for further processing.
OIG enters the files containing the matched records into its allegation
and case investigative system and assigns case numbers to them. Case
numbers are assigned based on whether the records represent “exact”
matches or “good” matches.[Footnote 19] OIG then sends the records
containing exact matches (on electronic media via FedEx) to the FBI’s
ITC in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey and to USMS for additional processing.
OIG also notifies its field offices via E-mail that exact and good
matches have been entered into its allegation and case investigative
system.
Upon receiving the exact matches, ITC staff then verifies the address
and status of each individual named in the NCIC matched warrant records
to determine whether the warrants are still active, using a personal
computer to access and query fugitives’ records that are maintained in
the NCIC database. ITC staff does not query NCIC to determine whether
states’ matched warrant records are still active, but rather processes
and mails the records to the applicable states for their verification.
ITC staff also obtains from the NCIC database address information on
the law enforcement agencies that originally issued the arrest warrants
on the individuals named in the warrants and manually type each
originating law enforcement agency’s address onto a cover letter. The
staff then uses the address information to mail the “leads,” together
with the cover letter, law enforcement referral form (OI-5B), and the
law enforcement certification form (OI-5C) to the originating law
enforcement agencies for their use in locating and apprehending the
fugitives. According to OIG, ITC generally requires approximately 30
days to process the matched records.
State and local law enforcement agencies use information contained in
the “leads” to locate the fugitive felons and then return certification
forms to ITC indicating the action they have taken on the warrant.
Before acting to suspend SSI benefits, SSA generally allows the
originating law enforcement agencies 60 days to apprehend a fugitive
based on the leads provided. By allowing this “sunset” phase, SSA
avoids letting fugitives know that their status and whereabouts have
been revealed before law enforcement authorities can arrest them.
When ITC receives the certification forms from the law enforcement
agencies indicating the status of the warrants, it forwards the forms
to the appropriate OIG field offices. OIG agents have 30 days from the
time that the forms are returned to them to work the cases (a case
consists of 50 subjects or felons) or perform additional verifications,
enter the information from these forms into the allegation and case
investigative system, complete summary and benefits suspension forms,
and mail the forms to SSA field offices. If law enforcement agencies do
not return certification forms indicating the status of the arrest
warrant to ITC within 60 days, OIG agents follow up with the law
enforcement agencies either by letter or telephone to determine whether
the warrant is still active. OIG agents also perform additional
identification activities for good matches and send these matches to
SSA field offices, where staff query the supplemental security record
for verification. If records cannot be verified using the supplemental
security record, OIG contacts the law enforcement agencies for
verification. If, after contacting law enforcement agencies, warrants
still cannot be verified, records are either destroyed or mailed back
to the originating law enforcement agencies and a note is attached to
records contained in the allegation and case investigative system.
Once warrant records are verified and are determined to be still
active, OIG agents refer them to the appropriate SSA field offices,
where action is taken to suspend the fugitive’s SSI benefits, calculate
the amount of overpayment, and update the SSI files. SSA officials told
us that the process to suspend SSI benefits payments takes
approximately 10 days.
Based on our analysis of data that SSA provided about its process, we
determined that from the date on which SSA first receives warrant data
from the law enforcement agencies to when it identifies fugitives who
receive SSI benefits, locates and apprehends them, and then suspends
SSI benefits, the process can take up to 165 days.[Footnote 20] This
approximate processing time includes 35 days for SSA systems,
operations, and OIG staff to process the matches, 30 days for ITC to
verify and batch process warrants, 60 days for state and local law
enforcements agencies to locate and apprehend fugitives before SSA
serves notice of benefits suspension, 30 days for OIG field offices to
act on information received from the law enforcement agencies, and 10
days for processing the suspension of benefits.
Following the suspension of benefits, fugitive SSI recipients are given
due process. That is, fugitive SSI recipients have 10 days to contact
SSA for a continuance of benefits and 60 days to appeal the suspension.
If the fugitive loses the appeal, SSA will suspend the SSI benefits and
again update the supplemental security record. SSA’s NCC runs master
tapes once a month and submits them to the Department of the Treasury,
informing it of any updated information. Treasury discontinues issuing
checks to the identified fugitive felons.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Fugitive Felon Program’s Assistance in Apprehending
Fugitives and Preventing Them from Receiving SSI Payments:
SSA reports that, since its inception in August 1996, the fugitive
felon program has been instrumental in helping identify approximately
45,000 fugitives who improperly collected at least $82 million in
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. In addition, SSA reports
that, as a result of sharing fugitive warrant information, officer and
public safety throughout the United States has increased. According to
SSA’s OIG, among those fugitives who have been identified as receiving
SSI benefits, more than 5,000 have been apprehended since the fugitive
felon program began.
The following cases highlight examples of how the fugitive felon
program has contributed to identifying and apprehending fugitives and
preventing improper payments of SSI benefits:
* On February 8, 2001, authorities arrested two fugitives as a result
of computer matching between SSA’s OIG and the FBI’s NCIC. Agents from
OIG’s New York field division, state troopers from New Jersey, and
deputies from the Essex County, New York sheriff’s office, arrested one
fugitive wanted on arson charges and a second wanted on charges of
producing and distributing a dangerous controlled substance. Both
fugitives were remanded to the custody of the Essex County jail, and
these cases resulted in the suspension of the fugitives’ SSI benefits.
* In New York, the field division of SSA’s OIG used leads from matched
fugitive warrant records to identify a fugitive wanted by the Union
County, New Jersey sheriff’s office on a burglary charge. This
fugitive, arrested in June 2001, with the assistance of an FBI agent,
had 13 prior arrests and 5 prior convictions, including one for
homicide. This case resulted in SSI benefits suspension.
* Under the direction of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern
District of Michigan, agents from the OIG Detroit office participated
in an operation that focused on locating and arresting 400 adult and
juvenile chronic violent offenders. The 3-day operation resulted in the
arrest of 82 individuals--67 of whom were receiving SSI benefits. The
apprehended individuals were wanted for offenses ranging from criminal
sexual conduct to armed robbery and assault with intent to do bodily
harm.
* In California on December 7, 2000, the Operation Pretenders Task
Force, (composed of agents from the SSA OIG, U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and California state parole), assisted by
California’s Department of Health Services and Department of Motor
Vehicles, arrested a registered child sex offender for a parole
violation. The fugitive had eluded officials for approximately 5 years
by assuming the identity of his deceased brother and had applied for
and received SSI benefits under the assumed identity. On January 31,
2001, a grand jury indicted him on two counts of false statements for
SSI benefits, two counts of fraudulent use of a Social Security number,
and three counts of identity theft.
[End of section]
Appendix IV Comments from the Social Security Administration:
SOCIAL SECURITY:
The Commissioner:
August 5, 2002:
Mr. David L. McClure:
Director, Information Technology Management Issues:
U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. McClure:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft
report, “Social Security Administration: Fugitive Felon Program Could
Benefit from Better Use of Technology and Increased Management
Accountability” (GAO-02-346). Our comments on the report, including
comments from the Inspector General, are enclosed. If you have any
questions, please have your staff contact Janet Carbonara at (410) 965-
3568.
Sincerely,
Jo Anne B. Barnhart:
Signed by Jo Anne B. Barnhart:
Enclosure:
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (SSA) COMMENTS ON THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE (GAO) DRAFT REPORT, “SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: FUGITIVE
FELON PROGRAM COULD BENEFIT FROM BETTER USE OF TECHNOLOGY AND INCREASED
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY” (GAO-02-346{PRIVATE }):
Thank you for the opportunity to review this draft report. We wish to
express our disappointment in the report, as it implies that neither
SSA nor the Office of Inspector General (OIG) has a vision for this
program. The report also neglects to mention that SSA and OIG embraced
this program with no start-up funding or additional resources. As our
response to the recommendations will show, SSA works diligently to make
this program a success.
Our specific comments to each recommendation are below.
GAO Recommendation 1:
The Commissioner of Social Security should designate a program
management office and program manager to direct, monitor, and control
the program’s activities and progress.
SSA Comment:
We disagree that one Agency-wide program manager is necessary. The
fugitive felon program is a joint effort between SSA’s Office of
Operations and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and within the
two offices, there are managers who are responsible for the program.
Communication and cooperation among all components within SSA have been
excellent, and we see steady refinement in our processes and anticipate
continued success as this program continues to mature.
To ensure that all involved offices are aware of the overall process
and individual office responsibilities, we released a detailed process
description (EM 02046 - “Roles and Responsibilities for Fugitive Felon
Case Processing”) to involved offices in April 2002. We provided a copy
of the message to GAO during this review.
Also, it does not appear that the implications of the Inspector General
Act were properly considered when this recommendation was put forth.
The Inspector General Act does not allow OIG to take direction from nor
take part in administrative decisions that appropriately belong to SSA.
GAO Recommendation 2:
The program management office should conduct a detailed assessment of
the fugitive felon program’s current operations and performance,
including a complete analysis of the organizations, processes,
information flows, and timeframes required to administer the program, a
full accounting of the programs costs, estimated and actual program
benefits, and current workload requirements.
SSA Comment:
We disagree. Monitoring and analysis of the program’s operations is an
ongoing process. Enhancements are made when deemed necessary and
timeframes required to administer the program continue to decrease.
Based on August 1996 legislation for the matching of fugitive felon
information, SSA completed many of the tasks cited in the
recommendation prior to starting the matching process in calendar year
1999. Also, beginning with the semi-annual report to Congress dated
October 1, 1997 through March 31, 1998, the OIG has regularly reported
its performance in the fugitive felon program.
In addition, SSA completed a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) on the
fugitive felon program in January 2001, which reflected a 4.8 to 1
return on investment. This CBA document was supplied to GAO during this
review.
In terms of determining current workload requirements, it is too early
in the process for SSA to accurately project workloads; however, we do
have estimates based on earlier OIG reports. We consider this an
ongoing monitoring initiative.
Recommendation 3:
Identify and prioritize those fugitive felon processes that need
improvement and develop a strategy for resolving technological and
administrative barriers preventing their efficient operation.
SSA Comment:
We disagree. We do not believe this is necessary as we already provide
for these actions in our normal operations. SSA has a number of efforts
underway to automate some of the fugitive felon processes. OIG and the
Office of Operations are partnered in developing an Allegation
Management System that will allow for the effective and efficient
management of allegations of fraud that SSA encounters, both
programmatic and employee. This software will support fugitive felon
processing as part of “programmatic fraud.” Additionally, software is
being designed to automate: OIG referral of fugitive felon cases to
SSA’s field offices for suspension action; suspension action and
release of the due process notice to the Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) recipient; update of the Supplemental Security Record
(eliminating field office handling of most of the fugitive felon
cases); and feedback to OIG. This software, designed to automate the
backend processing, is expected to be operational by the end of
calendar year 2002. This information was shared with GAO during this
review.
Also, the OIG, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI) Information Technology Center (ITC) has recently
developed an electronic means for the ITC to return information
obtained from law enforcement to the OIG. This not only significantly
cuts down on the amount of paper transferred between the ITC and the
OIG, but also reduces OIG field processing time.
There is some manual processing within the fugitive felon process. When
a file is received by SSA, it must be manually logged as received and
reviewed to determine if the records are acceptable. This is a minor
interruption in the fugitive felon file process; however, once past the
logging and initial check, the file follows the same path as any of our
other successful, high-volume SSA matching operations. However, SSA is
examining a means for automating the receipt of files.
GAO Recommendation 4:
Examine and propose options for using technology to automate the
currently manual functions involved in exchanging fugitive warrant
information with Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies and
in completing the verifications and referral of this information,
including assessing alternatives to using data-matching agreements to
obtain fugitive warrant information, and determining whether on-line
connections with State and local law enforcement agencies and/or direct
telecommunications connections with FBI’s National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) database could offer viable and more efficient means of
sharing warrant information.
SSA Comment:
While this recommendation may have merit, we believe the better
solution would be the creation of a single National Warrant Database.
In November 2001, the OIG expressed the need for a National Warrant
Database and testified before Congress about the many benefits that
would be derived if such a database were established. The database
would be a mandatory deposit for all warrant information from law
enforcement jurisdictions. SSA supports OIG’s recommendation for
creation of such a database. We shared with this information with GAO
during the review.
The NCIC entry of information is voluntary and participation varies
from State to State. NCIC would only be effective as a single source of
comprehensive warrant information if entry of information became
mandatory. Currently, only 13 States and the District of Columbia
report 100 percent of their warrants to NCIC. Six additional States
report virtually all their warrant information to NCIC. Since July
2000, SSA has been involved in negotiating fugitive felon matching
agreements with the States. SSA has secured agreements with 24 States
and four local law enforcement jurisdictions. In States where
participation was not 100 percent, agreements have been pursued to
obtain reporting of warrant information directly to SSA. In some
States, successful reporting has not yet occurred due to delays in the
State’s programming efforts. The process is tedious. Once agreements
are negotiated, work begins to establish the receipt of data from all
sources in the State. When the State has completed the programming
correctly, the reporting process runs smoothly.
Additionally, this process accounts for GAO’s mention of extended
processing time for the fugitive felon cases, citing 165 days as the
general processing time. GAO incorrectly attributed the start-up/test
file processing time, which includes many old records, to all files
received and included a step, unnecessary after the first file, for
each file to go to OIG for review.
We address GAO’s statements that States are reluctant to provide SSA
with fugitive felon data (files) because SSA’s requirements for
formatting and transmitting data create resource requirements that they
are not able to meet. The implication is that our requirements are
unduly restrictive. With respect to formatting data to be provided to
SSA, it is critical that files that are submitted follow prescribed and
uniform record layouts. If reporters were to submit their files using
formats and data elements that were not uniform, SSA would have to
evaluate
each file to determine if the critical elements were provided. Further,
conversion software would have to be customized and developed for each
unique file and invoked for each submission so that it could process
through SSA’s systems. This would delay the processing of the fugitive
felon reports and require a significant resource commitment by SSA to
process the files. Further, if SSA’s operating systems that process
these
files were modified/updated, each of the unique software routines that
processed the fugitive felon files could require updates and
revalidation.
It is for the above reasons that SSA specifies standards and, as in the
prisoner program, has a standard record format that over 1,150
reporters comply with.
Related to the above concerns, GAO’s report makes some general
assumptions that are neither realistic, nor accurate. The report notes
that SSA has a direct dedicated on-line connection with every State’s
Department of Social Services. It goes on to note that, as part of the
prisoner program, State and local prison facilities send Federal
prisoner data to SSA on-line to aid in suspending benefits. Further,
the implication is that SSA and the reporters should and can be
exchanging fugitive felon data on-line.
The report should state that SSA has dedicated lines that connect to
each State. These lines are established to serve the States’ and SSA’s
exchange of batch files, and, in some cases, on-line transactions.
However, establishing on-line, not batch, exchanges with the State
Social Service agencies has not moved quickly and is not in place in
most of the States for various reasons. Also, on-line exchanges of
prisoner data files are not occurring. Specifically, of the over
1,150 prisoner reports that are submitted using an electronic format
(cartridge, disc, File Transfer Management System, email or Vital
Information System Network), only 21 are submitted electronically to
SSA. These few electronic transmissions are submitted as batch
transfers, not as on-line updates. We are very supportive of receiving
electronic reports as we do in various ways for the 21 electronic
reporters. Due to network and compatibility issues within the States,
only 1 State uses the established dedicated lines we have for prisoner
file transfers.
We have also established a process with the State of Connecticut for
transferring fugitive felon files but, to date, we have received no
files over this connection.Expecting various State and local agencies
that have fugitive felon files to use these connections in the near-
term is not realistic. And, those transfers would be batch transfers,
not real-time on-line transfers. Also, the State and local prison
facilities are likely sending State and local prisoner records to SSA,
as opposed to Federal prisoner data noted in GAO’s narrative on page
26.
Further, the report implies that SSA has not looked at the
technological impact of adding title 11 as part of the fugitive felon
program. In fact, SSA’s Office of Systems has looked at this effort and
in June 2001, estimated that the work effort would be about 8 work
years. It should also be noted that this evaluation included sharing
this information with other benefit paying agencies. That aspect would
require about 1 to 2 of the 8 work years projected. In addressing the
technological impact for title Il expansion, we do not envision any
major new or unique information technology expenditures. However, SSA,
as always, continues to look at ways to improve the exchange of data
with governmental and private organizations.
GAO Recommendation 5:
Assess the anticipated technological impact on fugitive felon
operations from the implementation of provisions prohibiting OASDI and
DI benefits payments to fugitives, including identifying the additional
information systems support that would be needed to conduct and process
leads resulting from computer matches or warrant information against
these benefits recipients’ files.
SSA Comment:
SSA and OIG have already completed this task. In January 2001, a joint
SSA/OIG in-depth analysis of the State and Federal warrant files
received by SSA was started to determine what impact OASDI legislation
would have on the program. It was determined there would not be any
technological impact issues, as the cases would follow the same path as
SSI, and this legislation would only impact manpower. Thus far, it has
been determined the result would be approximately 3 times the current
workload. This information was shared with external entities, including
congressional staff and the FBI. This information was also shared with
GAO during this review.
Additional Comments:
We disagree with the contention on page 3 that no program official can
explain the overall data sharing and matching process. OIG officials,
as well as officials from other SSA components, are able to explain the
process in its entirety. Because we chose not to answer questions
pertaining to other components’ work, it was mistakenly inferred that
no one within SSA could explain the overall process.
Page 8, Table 1 - The organization designations should be revised to
reflect the Office of Systems’ reorganization. Replace the Office of
Systems Analysis and the Office of Information Management with the
Office of Earnings, Enumeration and Administrative Systems. Replace the
Office of Systems Design and Development with the Office of Disability
and Supplemental Security Income Systems.
Page 13, Footnote 6 - GAO states that with exception of “high
misdemeanors” in the State of New Jersey, the law does not address and
SSA does not conduct data matches of, misdemeanor charges. This
information is misleading as it suggests that SSA matches on
misdemeanants in New Jersey. In fact, SSA does not match on any
traditional misdemeanor (minor crime). The term “high misdemeanor” is
used by the State of New Jersey to categorize serious crimes that other
States call felonies. New Jersey, at least at the time that the PRWORA
became law, did not use the term “felony” to describe crimes in its
laws. For example, a homicide or rape would be deemed a high
misdemeanor. As such, without the use of “high misdemeanor” in section
161(e)(4)(A) of the Social Security Act, SSA might lack the authority
to suspend SSI benefits to those if being prosecuted in New Jersey. The
language was included to ensure that SSA could suspend SSI benefits in
these cases as well, not so SSA could match on misdemeanors in New
Jersey.
Page 15 of the report contends that SSA officials are unable to
determine the amount of time that is actually required to complete the
processing of fugitive warrants. This is not true. We are able to track
the number of days it takes for each individual subject to be processed
from the time the warrant is received by SSA to the time payments are
suspended. This time will vary from subject to subject.
[End of section]
Appendix V Comments from the U.S. Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Washington, D.C. 20530:
August 2, 2002:
David L. McClure:
Director, Information Technology Management Issues U.S. General
Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. McClure:
On July 9, 2002, the General Accounting Office (GAO) provided the
Department of Justice (DOJ) copies of its draft report “ Social
Security Administration: Fugitive Felon Program Could Benefit from
Better Use of Technology and Increased Management Accountability.” The
draft was reviewed by representatives of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Bureau of Prisons and the United States Marshals
Service. The DOJ is providing the enclosed technical comments for your
consideration and understand that they will be incorporated as
appropriate.
I hope the comments will be beneficial in completing the final
document. If you have any questions concerning the Department’s
comments you may contact me or Otis Jackson of my staff on (202) 514-
0469.
Vickie L. Sloan Director, Audit Liaison Office Justice Management
Division:
Signed by Vickie L. Sloan:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. No. 104-193, 202 Stat. 2105, 2186 (1996), commonly known as
the Welfare Reform Act.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Social Security Administration, GAO-01-261 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2001).
[3] A felony is a serious offense that is usually punishable by
imprisonment for more than
1 year.
[4] Parole is a conditional release from imprisonment that allows
parolees to serve the remainder of their term outside the confines of a
penal institution if they satisfactorily comply with all terms and
conditions provided. Probation is a type of sentence imposed by a court
for the commission of a crime whereby a convicted criminal offender is
released into the community under the supervision of a probation
officer. Violation of probation can result in probation being revoked
and a sentence of confinement imposed.
[5] According to SSA data, during an initial screening of these records
against information it had on all holders and applicants of Social
Security numbers, a majority of the approximately 27 million warrant
records that it actually received could not be verified against a
Social Security number or other vital information, and therefore, were
not included in its match against files identifying SSI recipients.
[6] PRWORA does not specifically address, and SSA does not conduct data
matches of, misdemeanor charges, with the exception of high
misdemeanors, which are considered felonies under the laws of New
Jersey.
[7] These forms include the OI-5B (Referral Form), OI-5C (Law
Enforcement Certification Form), OI-5D (Investigative Certification
Form), and OI-5E (SSA Feedback Form).
[8] The approximate processing days were compiled based on our analysis
of information provided by several SSA offices involved in the process.
To confirm the validity of our timeline estimate, we shared the results
of our analysis with appropriate SSA officials.
[9] The approximate 65 days includes certain unaccounted for
activities, such as uploading and initial processing, screening for
misdemeanors, and sorting duplicate warrant records.
[10] According to two states that SSA identified as fully reporting to
NCIC (Florida and Kansas), most, but not all, felony warrants are
reported to this database because the submission of felony warrants is
at the discretion of local agencies within these states.
[11] At the time that SSA began pursuing data matching agreements,
three states (Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania) did not maintain
central repositories of state and local warrant information. Therefore,
to obtain a majority of the states’ warrant information, SSA negotiated
agreements with their largest local law enforcement agencies.
[12] This number includes 3 states (Delaware, Indiana, and New Jersey)
identified as submitting all of their warrant information to NCIC, but
from which SSA, for various reasons, negotiated agreements to also
directly obtain data.
[13] In February 2002, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the
House Ways and Means Committee, Subcommittee on Social Security
introduced legislation (H.R. 4070) to deny Title II (OASI and DI)
benefits to fugitive felons and persons fleeing prosecution. In April
2002, a similar bill (S. 2387) was introduced before the Senate Finance
Committee.
[14] U.S General Accounting Office, Assessing Risks and Returns: A
Guide for Evaluating Federal Agencies’ IT Investment Decision-making,
GAO/AIMD-10.1.13 (Washington, D.C.: February 1997).
[15] SSA’s receipt of state and local agencies’ data via dedicated on-
line connections primarily involve batch, rather than real-time,
transfers of data.
[16] In response to PRWORA, SSA also instituted the prisoner program.
Under this program, SSA has agreements with state and local
correctional facilities to obtain information that is used to suspend
SSI and OASI and DI benefits to prisoners.
[17] These systems, called control terminal agencies, provide statewide
services such as overseeing the transmission of all warrant information
within a state, controlling security, and providing information
security program training.
[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Social Security Programs: The
Scope of SSA’s Authority to Deny Benefits to Fugitive Felons and to
Release Information about OASI and DI Beneficiaries Who Are Fugitive
Felons, GAO-02-459R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2002).
[19] Exact matches are those having only one person with a particular
name, Social Security number, date of birth, and sex. Good matches are
those having one or two of the data elements, such as name and date of
birth, but not a Social Security number. Good matches require the OIG
field offices to perform additional identification and verification.
[20] The approximate processing days were compiled based on our
analysis of information provided by several SSA offices involved in the
process. Our analysis considered the steps required to fully process a
case that did not involve circumstances such as lost, mishandled, or
improperly formatted warrant information. To confirm the validity of
our timeline estimate, we shared the results of our analysis with
appropriate SSA and FBI officials.
GAO’s Mission:
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress,
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to daily E-mail alert for newly
released products” under the GAO Reports heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000
TDD: (202) 512-2537
Fax: (202) 512-6061
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800
U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548: