This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-02-658 
entitled 'Environmental Contamination: Corps Needs to Reassess Its 
Determinations That Many Former Defense Sites Do Not Need Cleanup' 
which was released on September 23, 2002.



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Report to Congressional Requesters:



August 2002:



Environmental Contamination:



Corps Needs to Reassess Its Determinations That Many Former Defense 

Sites Do Not Need Cleanup:



GAO-02-658:



Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



About 38 Percent of the Corps’ Determinations That No DOD Action Is 

Indicated Are Questionable:



Corps Did Not Consistently Notify Owners and Regulatory Agencies about 

NDAI Determinations and Non-DOD Contamination:



Conclusions:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



Scope and Methodology:



Appendixes:



Appendix I: Additional Details on Our Scope and Methodology:



Appendix II: Results of Our Analysis of 603 Randomly Selected NDAI 
Properties:



Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:



Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:



Tables:



Table 1: Corps Districts in Our Sample:		



Table 2: Results of GAO’s Analysis of 603 Randomly Selected NDAI 

Properties (Shown by Corps District):



Figures:



Figure 1: Examples of Hazards That Might Be Present at FUDS Properties:



Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of 4,030 FUDS Properties That the 

Corps Has Determined Require No Further DOD Study or Cleanup Action:



Figure 3: Photo of Locked Gate and Corps Staff Notes from a Site Visit 

to a 255-Acre Former Nike Missile Site:



Figure 4: Photo of Large Log Home and Corps Staff Notes from a Site 

Visit to a 255-Acre Former Nike Missile Site:



Figure 5: Photo from a Site Visit to a Former Gap Filler Annex:



BD/DR: building demolition and debris removal:



CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 

Liability Act of 1980:



CON/HTRW: containerized hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste:



DCI: data collection instrument:



DOD: Department of Defense:



EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:



FUDS: formerly used defense sites:



GAO: General Accounting Office:



HTRW: hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste:



NDAI: no DOD action indicated:



OEW: ordnance and explosive waste:



SARA: Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986:



Letter August 23, 2002:



The Honorable John D. Dingell

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Energy and Commerce

House of Representatives:



The Honorable Tom Sawyer

House of Representatives:



The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that cleaning up 

contamination and hazards at thousands of properties that it formerly 

owned or controlled will take more than 70 years and cost from $15 

billion to $20 billion. These formerly used defense sites (FUDS), now 

owned by states, local governments, and individuals, are used for 

parks, farms, schools, and homes. Many of these properties, which can 

range in size from less than an acre to many thousands of acres, were 

acquired or used by DOD more than 30 to 40 years ago and in some cases 

more than 100 years ago. Hazards at these properties can include unsafe 

buildings; hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes; containerized 

hazardous wastes; and ordnance and explosive wastes. The U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers (Corps) is responsible for identifying, 

investigating, and cleaning up such hazards if DOD caused them.



Since 1984, the Corps has determined that more than 4,000 of the 9,181 

properties potentially eligible for its FUDS cleanup program do not 

have hazards that require further Corps study or cleanup action. The 

Corps made these determinations following a preliminary assessment of 

eligibility in which the Corps first established whether the properties 

were ever under DOD control and thus eligible for the FUDS program. If 

a property met this criterion, the Corps then determined if any hazards 

caused by DOD might be present. To make this determination, Corps 

guidance calls for (1) obtaining available information on the present 

and prior uses of the site from records, owners, and federal, state, 

and local agencies; (2) requesting from the current owner both 

information on any hazards caused by DOD that might be present and 

permission to physically inspect the property; and (3) visiting the 

site to examine it for obvious signs of hazards. If the Corps does not 

find evidence that hazards caused by DOD might be present, the Corps 

designates the properties as “No DOD action indicated, Category I” 
(NDAI).

[Footnote 1] Corps guidance also calls for the owner to be notified of 

the NDAI determination. The Corps will reconsider an NDAI 
determination, 

and, if necessary, take appropriate action if evidence of DOD-caused 

hazards is found later. However, the Corps does not generally initiate 

further review, but relies on owners and federal and state regulatory 

agencies for new information about potential hazards caused by DOD.



Depending on the types of hazards, the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) or state environmental regulatory agencies may be responsible for 

ensuring that the Corps meets applicable cleanup requirements and 

standards. EPA and some states have questioned the adequacy of the 

Corps’ process for assessing the presence of potential hazards and the 

validity of some of its determinations that no DOD action is indicated. 

In this context, you asked us to determine the extent to which the 

Corps (1) has a sound basis for its NDAI determinations and (2) has 

communicated its NDAI determinations to owners and to the regulatory 

agencies that may have responsibility and notified the owners that it 

will reconsider an NDAI determination if evidence of DOD-caused hazards 

is found later.



To determine if the Corps has a sound basis for its NDAI 

determinations, we reviewed a statistical sample of 635 of 4,023 NDAI 

files at nine Corps districts selected from 21 of the 22 Corps 

districts that execute the FUDS program.[Footnote 2] These 21 districts 

accounted for 99.8 percent of the NDAIs at the time of our review. We 

excluded 32 of the 635 properties from our analysis because the files 

contained evidence that the property either was not eligible for the 

FUDS program or that a cleanup project was proposed. Based on our 

sample, we estimate that 3,840 of the 4,023 determinations in our study 

population met the definition of an NDAI--the property was eligible for 

the FUDS program and the Corps determined that no further study or 

cleanup action was needed. We reviewed each file to determine 

if it contained evidence that the Corps (1) had reviewed or obtained 

information on the prior uses of the site that would allow it to 

identify the types of hazards potentially resulting from DOD’s use and 

(2) had taken sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential 

hazards. We did not question the soundness of an NDAI determination 

based on the absence of a single piece of information, such as a site 

map or a record of contact with an owner. Rather, we based our 

assessment of the Corps’ efforts on the totality of the evidence in the 

file. Our questioning of an NDAI determination does not mean that the 

property is contaminated; rather, it indicates that the Corps’ file did 

not contain evidence that the Corps took steps to identify and assess 

potential hazards at the property that would support the NDAI 

determination. To determine whether the Corps communicated its NDAI 

determinations to owners and the regulatory agencies and notified 

owners of its willingness to reconsider an NDAI decision, we examined 

the NDAI files for evidence that the Corps had done so. The results of 

our analysis can be projected to the NDAI population in the 21 

districts. The percentages and numbers of questionable NDAIs and those 

related to the universe of NDAIs presented in this report are 

statistical estimates based on our analysis of 603 NDAI files. We 

express the precision of the results of our analysis (that is, the 

sampling errors associated with these estimates) as 95 percent 

confidence intervals.[Footnote 3] All percentage estimates have 

sampling errors of plus or minus 10 percentage points or less, unless 

otherwise stated. All other numeric estimates have sampling errors of 

plus or minus 10 percent of the value of those estimates or less, 

unless otherwise stated.



Results in Brief:



Our analysis of Corps files indicates that the Corps does not have a 

sound basis for determining that about 38 percent, or 1,468, of 3,840 

formerly used defense sites do not need further study or cleanup 

action.[Footnote 4] The Corps’ determinations are questionable because 

there is no evidence that the Corps reviewed or obtained information 

that would allow it to identify all the potential hazards at these 

properties or that it took sufficient steps to assess the presence of 

potential hazards. For example, we estimate that for about 74 percent 

of all NDAI properties, the files do not indicate that the Corps 

reviewed or obtained information such as site maps or photos that would 

show facilities, such as ammunition storage facilities, that could 

indicate the presence of hazards (e.g., unexploded ordnance). We also 

estimate that the files for about 60 percent of all NDAI properties do 

not indicate that the Corps contacted all the current owners to obtain 

information about potential hazards.[Footnote 5] In addition, the Corps 

appeared to have overlooked or dismissed information in its possession 

that indicated hazards might be present. For example, at a nearly 

1,900-acre site previously used as an airfield by both the Army and the 

Navy, the file included a map showing bomb and fuse storage units on 

the site that would suggest the possible presence of ordnance-related 

hazards. However, despite the map, we found no evidence that the Corps 

searched for such hazards. In other cases, the files contained no 

evidence that the Corps took sufficient steps to assess the presence of 

potential hazards. For example, although Corps guidance calls for a 

site visit to look for signs of potential hazards, we estimate that the 

files do not show that Corps conducted the required site visits for 

686,[Footnote 6] or about 18 percent, of all NDAI properties. 

The problems with the Corps’ assessments occurred, in part, because 

Corps guidance does not specify (1) what documents or level of detail 

the Corps should obtain when looking for information on the prior uses 

of and the facilities located at FUDS properties to identify potential 

hazards or (2) how to assess the presence of potential hazards. For 

example, some Corps district staff stated that there was no guidance 

showing the types of hazards normally found at certain types of 

facilities. Since many properties may have not been properly assessed, 

the Corps does not know the number of additional properties that may 

require cleanup, the hazards that are present at those properties, the 

risk associated with these hazards, the length of time needed for 

cleanup, or the cost to clean up the properties.



Our analysis also indicates that the Corps frequently did not notify 

owners of its determinations that the properties did not need further 

action, as called for in its guidance, or instruct the owners to 

contact the Corps if evidence of DOD-caused hazards was found later. 

Based on our review of Corps files, we estimate that the Corps did not 

notify all the current owners of its determinations for about 72 

percent of the properties that the Corps determined do not need further 

study or cleanup action. Even when the Corps notified the owners of its 

determinations, we estimate that at about 91 percent of these 

properties it did not instruct the owners to contact the Corps if 

evidence of potential hazards was found later.[Footnote 7] In some 

cases, several years elapsed before the Corps notified owners of its 

determinations. This lack of communication with the owners hinders the 

Corps’ ability to reconsider, when appropriate, its determinations that 

no further study or cleanup action is necessary. The Corps also did not 

notify EPA or state environmental agencies of its determinations or of 

potential hazards it identified that were not the result of DOD use, 

even though these agencies may have regulatory responsibilities to 

ensure that cleanup occurs. Although there is no specific requirement 

for the Corps to notify regulatory agencies of non-DOD contamination, 

its failure to do so results in missed opportunities to assist the 

agencies’ efforts to carry out their statutory responsibilities to 

protect human health and the environment.



We are including recommendations in this report that address the need 

for the Corps to (1) develop more specific guidelines and procedures 

for identifying and assessing potential hazards at FUDS and (2) use the 

revised guidelines and procedures to review its NDAI files and 

determine which properties should be reassessed. We are also 

recommending that the Corps consistently implement procedures to ensure 

that owners and regulatory agencies are notified of NDAI determinations 

and its policy of reconsidering its determinations if evidence of DOD-

caused hazards is found later.



In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it did not 

agree that the Corps did not (1) consistently obtain information 

necessary to identify potential hazards at FUDS or (2) take sufficient 

steps to assess the presence of potential hazards. Although DOD 

included a number of statements that described the Corps’ procedures 

and process for evaluating FUDS in its comments, it did not provide any 

evidence to support its position. Further, DOD partially agreed with 

our recommendations and indicated that efforts are underway to evaluate 

current Corps guidance and determine if revisions or additional 

guidance are needed. DOD also indicated that it has plans to reevaluate 

two to five NDAIs per year at each state’s request. In addition, DOD 

provided a number of technical comments and clarifications, which we 

incorporated as appropriate.



Background:



Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, DOD is authorized 

to identify, investigate, and clean up environmental contamination and 

other hazards at FUDS. The environmental restoration program was 

established by section 211 of the Superfund Amendments and 

Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), which amended the Comprehensive 

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 

(CERCLA).[Footnote 8] Under the environmental restoration program, 

DOD’s activities addressing hazardous substances, pollutants, or 

contaminants are required to be carried out consistent with section 120 

of CERCLA.



DOD delegated its authority for administering the FUDS program to the 

U.S. Army; in turn, the U.S. Army delegated execution of the program to 

the Corps. To be eligible for cleanup under the FUDS program, a 

property must have been owned by, leased to, possessed by, or otherwise 

controlled by DOD during the activities that caused hazards. These 

hazards consist of:



* unsafe buildings, structures, or debris,[Footnote 9] such as leaning 

or weakened load-bearing walls or supports; open-sided platforms or 

floors more than 6 feet above the next lower level; and any pit, 

depression, or tank that can collect or contain standing water, such as 

underground missile silos, septic tanks, and sewers;



* hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste, which includes contaminants 

such as arsenic, certain paints, some solvents, petroleum and some 

related products, and toxic pollutants from landfills;



* containerized hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste, such as 

transformers and underground and aboveground storage tanks that contain 

petroleum, solvents, or other chemicals; and:



* ordnance and explosive waste such as military munitions and chemical 

warfare agents.



Figure 1 shows examples of the types of hazards that might be found at 

FUDS properties.



Figure 1: Examples of Hazards That Might Be Present at FUDS Properties:



[See PDF for image]



Source: U.S. Department of Defense and www.uxoinfo.com.



[End of figure]



According to DOD’s fiscal year 2001 report on the status of its various 

environmental cleanup programs, there were 9,181 properties identified 

by the Corps, the states, or other parties as potentially eligible for 

cleanup under the FUDS program.[Footnote 10] To determine if an 

identified property is eligible for the FUDS program, the Corps 

conducts a preliminary assessment of eligibility to establish whether 

the property was ever owned or controlled by DOD and if hazards from 

DOD’s use are potentially present. Corps officials point out that the 

preliminary assessment of eligibility is not intended to be a 

comprehensive evaluation of the FUDS property; instead, it is a 

screening effort intended to determine if potential hazards caused by 

DOD exist and, if so, whether additional study or cleanup actions are 

required to address such hazards. Corps guidance generally calls for 

staff to use the following procedures when conducting a preliminary 

assessment of eligibility:



* obtain available information on the present and prior uses of the 

site from real estate and archival records; present and former owners; 

and other federal, state, and local agencies;



* identify any relevant conditions, such as a release of liability or a 

requirement to restore the property, in real estate deeds that would 

affect the federal government’s liability;



* contact the current owner to obtain permission for an initial survey 

of the property to determine if DOD-caused hazards are potentially 

present; and:



* visit the property to examine it for obvious signs of hazards and 

identify any areas that may require further study or testing.



At the end of the preliminary assessment of eligibility, the Corps 

determines if any further study or cleanup action is needed. If the 

Corps determines that no further action is needed, the property is 

designated as NDAI.[Footnote 11] According to Corps guidance, the 

districts must notify current owners of the result of the preliminary 

assessment of eligibility within 30 to 60 days after the final NDAI 

determination.



Because FUDS properties may have changed significantly since DOD owned 

or controlled them, the facilities once present and any potential 

hazards that may still exist may not be obvious. For example, former 

DOD facilities at a FUDS property may have been renovated, destroyed, 

or removed, and areas no longer used may be overgrown with vegetation, 

making potential hazards more difficult to detect. As a result, key 

components of the Corps’ preliminary assessment of eligibility are 

(1) obtaining historical documents, such as maps and photos that can 

aid Corps staff in identifying and locating the facilities at the 

property and indicate how the property was used (prior uses and the 

activities that took place), and (2) conducting an inspection of the 

property (site visit) to check for existing hazards caused by DOD.



Although DOD guidance states that CERCLA is the statutory framework for 

the environmental restoration program, in recent years EPA has 

questioned whether the Corps’ process is consistent with CERCLA, and 

both EPA and some state regulatory officials have questioned its 

adequacy. While the Corps is required to carry out the program in 

consultation with EPA, the Corps is not required to consult with state 

regulatory agencies until hazards are discovered. Corps guidance now 

instructs staff to keep EPA and state regulatory agencies informed of 

the status and disposition of each NDAI determination, but the Corps 

does not consult with EPA or the states when making its determination 

because it considers the preliminary assessment of eligibility an 

internal management process. Figure 2 shows the location of the 4,030 

FUDS properties that the Corps has designated as NDAI.



Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of 4,030 FUDS Properties That the 

Corps Has Determined Require No Further DOD Study or Cleanup Action:



[See PDF for image]



Note: When we selected our random sample in June 2001, there were 4,030 

NDAIs.



[End of figure]



Source: GAO’s analysis of data provided by the Corps of Engineers.



About 38 Percent of the Corps’ Determinations That No DOD Action Is 

Indicated Are Questionable:



Based on our review of NDAI files, we estimate that the Corps does not 

have a sound basis for about 38 percent or 1,468,[Footnote 12] of the 

estimated 3,840 NDAI determinations in our study population because the 

property files did not contain evidence showing that the Corps 

consistently reviewed or obtained information that would have allowed 

it to identify all of the potential hazards at the properties or that 

it took sufficient steps to assess their presence. In many cases, when 

attempting to identify potential hazards resulting from DOD activities, 

the Corps apparently did not obtain relevant information about former 

DOD activities and facilities at the properties, such as buildings and 

underground storage tanks constructed and used by DOD. For example, 

based on our review of Corps files, we estimate that for about 74 

percent, or 2,828,[Footnote 13] of all NDAI determinations, the Corps 

did not review or obtain site maps, aerial photos, or ground photos 

that could provide information about potential hazards (e.g., a site 

map showing an ammunition storage facility could suggest the presence 

of unexploded ordnance). Furthermore, in a number of cases, it appeared 

that the Corps overlooked or dismissed information in its possession 

when it looked for evidence of potential hazards. In addition, we 

estimate that the Corps did not conduct a site visit at 686,[Footnote 

14] or about 18 percent, of all NDAI properties despite Corps guidance 

that requires site visits to determine if potential hazards are 

present. The problems we noted occurred, in part, because Corps 

guidance is not specific about what documents the Corps should obtain, 

the level of detail required when seeking information on the prior uses 

of the FUDS properties and the facilities located at them, or how to 

assess the presence of potential hazards.



Corps Did Not Consistently Obtain Information Needed to Identify 

Potential Hazards at FUDS:



The files for the NDAI properties that we reviewed did not always 

indicate that the Corps reviewed or obtained information that would 

have aided in identifying potential hazards at the properties. 

Information on what DOD activities occurred, what DOD facilities 

existed, and where those activities and facilities were located at FUDS 

can provide leads about potential hazards and where they might be. Such 

information could be obtained from site maps showing buildings or 

facilities at the property; aerial and ground photos; current 

landowners; or federal, state, and local agencies. However, although 

Corps guidance instructs staff to obtain available information on the 

present and prior uses of the site, the FUDS manual offers no specific 

guidelines on what documents or level of detail to obtain.[Footnote 15] 

While our review indicates that at some sites Corps staff obtained site 

maps, aerial or ground photos, or information from owners or other 

agencies, it appeared that the Corps did not do so consistently; as a 

result, potential hazards may have been overlooked.



The random sample of NDAI files that we reviewed contained little 

evidence that Corps staff reviewed or obtained site maps to identify 

potential hazards. Maps can provide detailed information on the 

facilities that were present when DOD owned or used the site and could 

aid the Corps in identifying potential hazards resulting from military 

activities at the site. For example, although there were no DOD 

structures remaining at an anti-aircraft artillery site whose file we 

reviewed, a detailed map showed the exact location of a gun 

emplacement, an ammunition magazine, a motor pool area, a mess hall, 

seven barracks, two administrative buildings, a communications 

building, a drainage area, a septic tank, a grease rack, a 5,000-gallon 

storage tank, an oil storage facility, a pump house, a grease trap, two 

generators, a paint shed, a latrine, and a refueling area.



Obtaining such maps for sites could provide knowledge of site 

facilities and could lead Corps staff to identify potential locations 

of hazardous substances, ordnance, or unsafe buildings. Without the 

site map, many of these facilities might not have been identified as 

features that were likely to be located at an anti-aircraft artillery 

site. Further, without the map, it might have been difficult to 

establish the former locations of these facilities because of the size 

of the property and the length of time that has elapsed between DOD’s 

use and the Corps’ assessment. However, despite the usefulness of site 

maps, based on our review, we estimate that for about 77 percent, or 

2,972,[Footnote 16] of all NDAI properties, the files do not contain 

site maps or references to a map review.



There was also little evidence that the Corps obtained aerial or ground 

photos of the FUDS to identify potential hazards. Photos, like maps, 

can provide information that may be useful in identifying potential 

hazards. In addition to providing information on what facilities 

existed and where they were located when the military owned or used the 

site, photos can also provide information on the condition of the 

facilities when the military was present. This information is 

particularly important because if a facility was in good condition when 

the military disposed of the property, but has since been allowed to 

deteriorate, the Corps is not responsible for cleanup. Photos can also 

help the Corps identify areas that were used as landfills or other 

disposal sites. However, based on the information contained in the 

Corps’ files, we estimate that for about 92 percent, or 3,522, of all 

NDAI determinations, the files do not contain aerial or ground photos 

or indicate that photos were reviewed as part of the Corps’ process.



In addition, there was little evidence that the Corps used the current 

owner (or owners) as a source of information for the majority of the 

sites that we reviewed. The current owner has the potential to provide 

information about a FUDS property. If the current owner is the person 

who first obtained the property from DOD, then the owner might be able 

to describe the facilities that were present at acquisition and explain 

what has become of those facilities. Even if the current owner is not 

familiar with the DOD activities conducted at the site, the owner might 

be able to describe the current condition of the property and note any 

hazards present. Based on our review of NDAI files, we estimate that 
the 

Corps did not contact all the current owners for about 60 percent, or 

2,319, of all NDAI properties in our study population.[Footnote 17]



Information on FUDS may also be available from various local, state, 

and federal agencies. For example, during a preliminary assessment for 

one property in the New York district, the Corps obtained information 

on:



* the potential presence of ammunition or explosive wastes from the 

city police department;



* facilities that may have been at the site during military use from a 

city environmental office, the port authority transportation 

department, the city police department, and the national archives;



* site maps from the city library; and:



* permits issued for underground storage tanks from the city building 

department.



However, it appears that the Corps seldom asked these kinds of agencies 

for information. For example, a New Jersey state official told us that 

his department has 15,000 files on sites within the state, but the 

Corps has never gone through the department’s files. We estimate that 

the Corps contacted a local, state, or federal agency to obtain 

information that could indicate potential hazards for only about 10 

percent, or 375, of the 3,840 NDAI properties in our study 

population.[Footnote 18]



Camp O’Reilly, a FUDS in Puerto Rico, exemplifies how obtaining 

historical information on how a site was used or current information on 

the condition of the property could have helped the Corps identify 

potential hazards. Camp O’Reilly was a 907-acre military post that 

included 591 buildings and other facilities and housed about 8,000 

troops from August 1942 to June 1945. In September 1992, the Corps 

determined that there were no hazards at Camp O’Reilly that were 

eligible for FUDS cleanup and designated the site as NDAI. Yet, there 

is no evidence in the Corps’ files that the Corps obtained or reviewed 

maps, archival photos, or studies, or that it contacted the current 

owners to identify potential hazards during its preliminary assessment 

of eligibility for Camp O’Reilly. Had the Corps obtained and made use 

of historical information, it could have identified a number of 

potential hazards. In July 1997, the University of Puerto Rico, the 

current owner, contacted the Corps and indicated that several locations 

on the property contained hazards caused by DOD use. In a second 

assessment--with the aid of the owner’s information, site maps, and 

records--the Corps identified three 15,000-gallon underground storage 

tanks, an area adjacent to a drinking water source that is “highly” 

contaminated with oil by-products, a 12,000-square-foot landfill, and a 

concrete structure (15 feet wide, 70 feet long, and 60 feet deep) 

filled with water that presents a drowning hazard. These hazards have 

all been determined to result from DOD use of the property and are 

eligible for cleanup under the FUDS program.



Information on potential hazards found at certain types of FUDS 

properties may also be useful in identifying potential hazards at other 

similar properties. For example, in August 1994, the Corps issued 

“Procedures for Conducting Preliminary Assessments at Potential 

Ordnance and Explosive Waste Sites.” This document notes that certain 

types of former sites are highly likely to contain unexploded ordnance 

and that such sites “must not be determined as [NDAI] unless strong 

evidence or extenuating circumstances can be presented as to why no 

[ordnance] contamination is expected.” The sites specified in the 

document included Army airfields, auxiliary airfields, practice bombing 

ranges, rifle ranges, and prisoner of war camps. Although these 

procedures are not referenced in the FUDS Manual, and we cannot show a 

cause-and-effect relationship between the issuance of the procedures 

and the more frequent identification of unexploded ordnance as a 

potential hazard, we found that that Corps staff identified unexploded 

ordnance as a possible hazard at these types of sites more often after 

the issuance of these procedures. For example, in our sample, which 

included 48 auxiliary airfields, unexploded ordnance was identified as 

a possible hazard at only 8 of 36 sites that the Corps reviewed before 

the procedures were issued. In contrast, for the 12 auxiliary airfields 

in our sample that the Corps reviewed after the procedures were issued, 

the Corps identified unexploded ordnance as a potential hazard at 10 of 

the airfields. Our sample also included 15 prisoner of war camps. 

Before the procedures were issued, unexploded ordnance was not 

identified as a possible hazard at any of the seven sites the Corps 

reviewed. After the procedures were issued, five of the eight prisoner 

of war camps in our sample were identified as having potential 

unexploded ordnance hazards.



The Corps also developed a formal guide for assessing Nike missile 

sites. In addition we found that a FUDS project manager in the Corps’ 

Fort Worth district developed an informal guide for assessing 14 

different types of FUDS properties that listed the hazards most likely 

to be found at each. For example, if a property contained a laundry 

facility, this informal guide indicates that staff should look for dry 

cleaning solvents and tanks. Similarly, for a property containing an 

unmanned radar station, staff should look for underground storage 

tanks. The Fort Worth project manager told us that he developed the 

guide because he did not know what to look for when he began working in 

the FUDS program. However, while the use of such procedures or guides 

appears to be useful in identifying potential hazards at certain types 

of sites, we were able to identify or obtain only the three guides 

discussed previously.



Corps Did Not Take Sufficient Steps to Assess the Presence of Potential 

Hazards:



We found that at times Corps officials overlooked or dismissed 

information in their possession that indicated potential hazards might 

be present. Often, these problems appear to have involved a failure to 

act upon information obtained during identification efforts or a 

failure to consider information from owners or from federal, state, or 

local environmental agencies. In other cases, the information in the 

file suggested potential hazards at the site and did not indicate the 

basis for the Corps’ NDAI determination. We also found instances where 

it appears that the Corps’ assessment focused on only one of the four 

potential hazards included in the Corps’ program--unsafe buildings, 

structures, or debris; hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes; 

containerized hazardous wastes; and ordnance and explosive wastes. 

According to several headquarters and district officials, the FUDS 

program was focused primarily on cleaning up unsafe buildings and 

debris in the early years of the program. Of the NDAI determinations 

that we believe lack a sound basis, we estimate that the:



Corps either overlooked or failed to adequately assess the potential 

for hazardous wastes at about 88 percent of the properties, for 

containerized hazards at about 78 percent of the properties, and for 

ordnance and explosive wastes at about 40 percent of the 

properties.[Footnote 19] The following cases illustrate situations 

where the Corps overlooked or dismissed information in its possession 

that suggested that hazards might be present:



* The Corps identified a variety of facilities at Fort Casey, an almost 

1,050-acre FUDS property in the state of Washington, and developed 

information on prior uses; yet, the Corps apparently failed to use this 

information in its assessment of the site. Facilities identified by the 

Corps included a coal shed, oil and pump houses, a paint shop, a 

gasoline station, a grease rack location, and a target shelter--

indicating, among other things, possible hazardous containerized and 

ordnance-related wastes. Yet, the file contained no evidence that these 

facilities and related potential hazards were considered. The potential 

hazards stemming from the use of these facilities were not addressed in 

documents or site visit descriptions, and the site was designated as 

NDAI. Subsequent to our review, we learned that after the Corps 

completed its assessment, the state environmental agency performed 

independent reviews in 1999 and 2001, in part to document any threats 

or potential threats to human health or the environment posed by this 

site. The state reported finding hazardous wastes exceeding state 

cleanup levels that were believed to have occurred during DOD ownership 

of this site. The state also found what appeared to be fill pipes 

normally associated with underground storage tanks--something the Corps 

overlooked during its site visit and overall assessment of this site.



* Fort Pickens is an approximately 1,600-acre FUDS property on 

the Florida coast that was used to defend against invasion during 

World Wars I and II. The Corps identified numerous facilities, 

including a power plant building, oil houses, ordnance warehouses, an 

ordnance magazine, search light towers, transformers, electric poles, 

water and “miscellaneous” facilities, and underground storage tanks. A 

site visit revealed open manholes, confirmed the presence of 

underground storage tanks and vent pipes and old ammunition lifts with 

magazines, and identified a septic tank. The Corps also noted 

vegetation stress and attributed this to the local drought. The file 

contained no evidence that the Corps assessed the property for possible 

chemical contamination. Despite noting the potential hazards associated 

with these types of facilities and uses during its assessment and site 

visit, the Corps designated the site as NDAI.



* The former Othello Air Force Station (Z-40) was a 77-acre aircraft 

warning station in the state of Washington. At this site the Corps 

initially identified approximately 106 facilities, including a diesel 

plant; an auto maintenance shop; a possible 3,000-gallon underground 

storage tank and two 25,000-gallon underground storage tanks; a vehicle 

fueling station and many other oil, grease, ammunition, and paint 

storage sites; a transformer; and “other structures required for 

operation of a radar station” that existed during DOD ownership. The 

presence of these facilities suggests the potential for both 

containerized and freestanding hazardous wastes and ordnance hazards at 

the property. However, there was no evidence the Corps considered the 

former facilities and their characteristics as potential hazards in 

reaching their NDAI determination, and, according to the file, the site 

visit was “only a cursory drive-thru inspection.” An independent study 

of this site by the state found hazards (i.e., petroleum compounds such 

as gasoline, diesel, lube or hydraulic oil; polychlorinated biphenyls; 

and pesticides) and some chemicals exceeding state cleanup levels at 

two locations, which are believed linked to military 

ownership.[Footnote 20]



* At the Millrock Repair and Storage Depot of New York, the Corps 

identified potential aboveground storage tanks, gas pumps, a dynamite 

storage building, and a generator shed. The Corps’ file contained 

conflicting trip reports, one indicating potential oil and gas spills 

and another indicating that no hazards were found. The initial Corps 

proposal for designating the site as NDAI was rejected by the 

appropriate Corps district office, and a cleanup project was proposed 

to sample for gasoline-related chemicals at the site of former storage 

tanks and a gas pump. Subsequently, the proposed project was rejected 

on the grounds that there was no evidence that the hazards were related 

to DOD’s use of the site. Despite the presence of potential hazards, 

the file contains no evidence that the Corps took additional steps to 

determine the source of the hazards or that it reported their presence 

to the appropriate regulatory agencies.



* At the Mount Vernon Municipal Airport in the state of Washington, a 

nearly 1,900-acre site previously used by both the Army and the Navy, 

the Corps overlooked information in its possession indicating possible 

ordnance hazards. In the preliminary assessment of eligibility for this 

site, the Corps obtained a map showing conditions of the site on 

June 30, 1944, which indicated bomb and fuse storage units. Although 

the Corps assessed the site for unsafe buildings and debris and 

containerized hazards, the file contained no evidence that the Corps 

searched for possible unexploded ordnance despite both guidance issued 

by the Corps in 1994, which states that Army airfields are likely to 

contain unexploded ordnance, and the presence of the bomb and fuse 

storage units, which would also indicate the potential presence of 

unexploded ordnance.



We also found that in some cases the files did not contain evidence 

that Corps staff conducted a site visit, as required by Corps guidance. 

A site visit is one of the primary methods used by the Corps to 

determine if the potential hazards are in fact present at a site. For 

example, if the Corps identifies underground storage tanks as potential 

hazards because a site was once used as a motor pool facility, a site 

visit can be used to determine if underground storage tanks are still 

in place. A typical site visit would include at least a visual check 

for signs of filler or vent pipes, which would normally protrude 

aboveground if tanks were still present. Without a site visit, the 

Corps cannot check for the continued presence of potential hazards. 

Based on our review of NDAI files, we estimate that about 18 percent, 

or 686, of the estimated 3,840 NDAIs in our study population did not 

receive site visits that met Corps requirements: about 428 properties 

received no site visits, and about 258 properties received site visits 

conducted from the air or from a vehicle, which are not appropriate, 

according to Corps program officials.[Footnote 21]



The following case illustrates a situation where the Corps conducted 

the site visit from the air:



* At the former Kasiana Island Base Station in Alaska, the site visit 

consisted of an over-flight. Although a bunker was noted during the 

flyover, the contractor conducting the assessment for the Corps said in 

its report that the area was heavily overgrown. In addition, the file 

contained no evidence that the Corps tried to identify power sources 

(and any associated fuel storage tanks) that were likely present to 

operate the searchlight positions and seacoast radar stations located 

at the site. Although it was not possible to determine what, if any, 

hazards may still exist at the site without being on the ground to 

check for the presence of hazards, the file contained no evidence that 

the Corps took any further action before designating the site as an 

NDAI. Subsequent to designating the site as an NDAI, the Corps 

revisited the site and found two underground storage tanks, several 55-

gallon drums, and a storage battery. Tests conducted in the area of the 

underground storage tanks showed that diesel products in the 

groundwater exceeded acceptable limits.



For some files designated as NDAI, it appeared that Corps staff 

remained in their vehicles and took site visit photos from the site’s 

periphery. Figures 3, 4, and 5 are examples of such photos for visits 

to a former Nike missile site and a former gap filler annex.



Figure 3: Photo of Locked Gate and Corps Staff Notes from a Site Visit 

to a 255-Acre Former Nike Missile Site:



[See PDF for image]



Corps Staff Notes: “Locked gate and road into the missile site area. 

Property is posted. Owners could not be reached. No available telephone 

number.”:



Source: Corps of Engineers files.



[End of figure]



Figure 4: Photo of Large Log Home and Corps Staff Notes from a Site 

Visit to a 255-Acre Former Nike Missile Site:



[See PDF for image]



Corps Staff Notes: “Large log home in distance is built on top of a 

silo. Neighbor stated no H.T.W. [hazardous and toxic waste] at this 

site.”:



Source: Corps of Engineers files.



[End of figure]



According to a 1986 guide developed by the Corps for assessing Nike 

missile sites, hazards typically found at Nike sites include petroleum 

compounds, paints and solvents, leaking underground storage tanks, and 

lead from batteries. The guide also notes that dumping of wastes was 

common at Nike sites. On-site dumps were usually located in secluded 

areas that “would evade the attention of inspecting military officers,” 

according to the guide.



Figure 5: Photo from a Site Visit to a Former Gap Filler Annex:



[See PDF for image]



Note: The Corps found no evidence of environmental problems at the 

site.



Source: Corps of Engineers files.



[End of figure]



Gap filler annexes are typically unmanned radar sites that are remotely 

located. According to the guide developed by Corps staff in Fort Worth, 

containerized hazards, such as underground or aboveground storage 

tanks containing petroleum, are usually found at such sites. 

Transformers containing toxic wastes (polychlorinated biphenyls) have 

also been found at similar sites.



Because 30 or more years may pass between the closure of a former 

defense site and a Corps site visit, it is likely that potential 

hazards would go unnoticed from a vehicle because the area may be too 

large to see or may be overgrown with vegetation that could hide any 

evidence of potential hazards. In fact, one of the many concerns 

expressed by state and EPA officials was that Corps “windshield” or 

“drive-by” site visits did not involve a thorough assessment of an 

entire site. While Corps guidance requires a site visit, the guidance 

provides no specifics, only a general framework for assessing potential 

hazards. However, Corps officials told us that site visits conducted 

from the air or a vehicle are considered inadequate and would not 

fulfill the requirement to conduct a site visit.



Other Factors Contributed to Inadequate Preliminary Assessments of 

Eligibility:



A number of other factors contributed to inadequate preliminary 

assessments of eligibility. Corps officials explained that, during the 

early stages of the FUDS cleanup program, they were hampered by limited 

knowledge of hazards that might be present. They also explained that 

the priorities of the program have changed over time. For example, 

several Corps officials told us that during its early stages, the 

program’s focus was on identifying unsafe building hazards. Later, the 

focus changed to identifying and removing containerized hazards--

primarily underground storage tanks. As a result of changing 

priorities, not all of the potential hazards were identified and 

assessed. Moreover, several Corps officials told us that although 

hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes are one category of hazards 

covered by the program, they cannot propose a project to clean up such 

hazards without evidence of their existence. However, since 1990, 

sampling soil and water has not been allowed during the preliminary 

assessment of eligibility to determine the presence and type of any 

contamination that might have been caused by DOD activities. According 

to these officials, without sampling to indicate the presence of 

hazardous wastes, it is difficult to develop the evidence needed to 

justify a cleanup project. As a result, NDAI determinations have been 

made even when the presence of hazardous waste was suspected. Some 

Corps officials agreed that some of the older NDAI determinations might 

not be justified and stated that those determinations may need to be 

reexamined.



Several district officials indicated that although they would like to 

reexamine some of the NDAI determinations, the FUDS program is now 

focused on cleaning up hazards already identified, and limited funds 

are available for reviewing past NDAI determinations. Although Army 

guidance on the FUDS program issued in March 2001 authorized the 

districts to reexamine two to five NDAI determinations annually per 

state in each of the 22 relevant Corps districts if regulatory agencies 

request the reexaminations and if funds are available, funding 

shortfalls already hamper the program, according to program officials. 

For example, the Corps estimates that at current funding levels--

approximately $220 million in fiscal year 2002--cleaning up the hazards 

already identified will take more than 70 years. In its 2001 Funding 

Strategies report, the Corps proposed that the Army and DOD increase 

the annual FUDS program funding by $155 million to approximately $375 

million per year. If the increased funding were approved and sustained, 

the Corps could complete cleanup by 2050.



Corps Did Not Consistently Notify Owners and Regulatory Agencies about 

NDAI Determinations and Non-DOD Contamination:



In the files we reviewed, we found no evidence that the Corps 

consistently notified owners of its NDAI determinations, as required by 

Corps guidance. In some cases, the Corps did not notify the owners for 

several years after it made the NDAI determinations. In addition, while 

Corps policy calls for reconsidering an NDAI determination if evidence 

is later discovered, it appeared that the Corps rarely instructed the 

owners to contact the Corps with such evidence or told them of the 

Corps’ policy. Furthermore, the Corps did not notify federal and state 

regulatory agencies of its NDAI determinations because Corps guidance 

at that time did not require it to do so, even though these agencies 

might have regulatory responsibilities or could have information that 

might cause the Corps to reconsider its NDAI determination. The Corps 

also generally did not notify federal or state regulatory agencies of 

potential hazards that it identified but determined were not caused by 

DOD’s use. By not routinely notifying the regulatory agencies of 

hazards caused by non-DOD users, the Corps lost an opportunity to 

assist these agencies’ efforts to protect human health and the 

environment.



Corps Did Not Consistently Notify Owners about NDAI Determinations:



According to Corps guidance, the districts must notify current owners 

of the result of the preliminary assessment of eligibility. However, 

based on our review of the NDAI files, we estimate that the Corps did 

not provide this information to all the current owners at about 72 

percent, or 2,779,[Footnote 22] of the NDAI properties included in our 

study population. At one district, a Corps official stated that owners 

were sent notification of NDAI determinations only if they requested 

it. Further, in spite of the requirement that owners be notified within 

30 to 60 days after a final NDAI determination, in some cases the Corps 

did not notify owners for several years. In one district, notification 

letters were not sent to owners until 1994, although NDAI 

determinations had been made as many as 8 years before. The late-

arriving letters caused many owners to call the district office with 

questions about their NDAI determinations. As a result, the:



district decided to stop sending notification letters to owners. In 

addition, while Corps policy calls for reconsidering an NDAI 

determination if evidence of potential hazards is discovered later, we 

found that the Corps rarely instructed the owners to contact the Corps 

with such evidence or told them of the Corps’ policy. Based on our 

review of Corps files, we estimate that even when the Corps notified 

the owners of the NDAI determinations, at about 91 percent of these 

properties it did not instruct the owners to contact the Corps with 

evidence of potential hazards, if found later.[Footnote 23] However, 

because the preliminary assessment of eligibility is not a 

comprehensive evaluation of these properties, and the Corps does not 

routinely review its past NDAI determinations, owners are an essential 

outside source of new information about potential hazards at a given 

site. By not notifying owners of the NDAI determinations or advising 

them to contact the Corps if evidence of potential hazards is 

discovered, the Corps may be reducing its ability to gather new 

information about potential hazards and reconsider previous NDAI 

determinations.



Corps Did Not Consistently Notify EPA and State Regulatory Agencies 

about NDAI Determinations and Non-DOD Contamination:



Even though EPA and state regulatory agencies might have relevant 

statutory responsibilities or could have information that might cause 

the Corps to reconsider its NDAI determination, based on our review of 

Corps files, we estimate that the Corps did not notify the regulatory 

agencies of the NDAI determinations at the time they were made for 

about 99 percent of the properties. Although Corps officials told us 

that they have now provided copies of all the NDAI determinations to 

the relevant federal and state agencies, some EPA and state officials 

indicated that they have not yet received copies of the NDAI 

determinations. Even when notification was provided, it was often done 

in a way that did not encourage agencies’ involvement. For example, one 

state regulatory agency received a bulk delivery of Corps FUDS summary 

documents for past NDAI determinations with no explanation. According 

to state officials, sending agencies NDAI determinations made several 

years earlier limits the agencies’ ability to provide timely input 

about potential hazards at a given site. Sending bulk deliveries of 

documents with no explanation does not encourage the involvement of 

state regulators who might be unfamiliar with Corps documentation or 

procedures.



Notifying EPA and state regulatory agencies of NDAI determinations in a 

timely and appropriate manner could facilitate regulators’ involvement 

and address some of the concerns that these agencies have about the 

adequacy of the Corps’ preliminary assessment of eligibility. State 

regulators told us that their concurrence with an NDAI determination 

could increase the credibility of the Corps’ determination and improve 

its quality. State regulators indicated that, in some cases, they could 

provide the Corps with information about FUDS sites and properties 

adjacent to FUDS sites, including sampling data that could assist the 

Corps in determining if further study or cleanup actions by DOD were 

needed. State regulators also told us that they could provide the Corps 

with best practice guidance on conducting site visits and engaging the 

public in data-gathering. A state official also pointed out that his 

state could assist the Corps in gaining entry to a property if the 

owner refused to allow the Corps to conduct a site visit. Typically, if 

the owner refuses entry, the Corps designates the property as NDAI.



EPA and some state regulatory agencies believe that the involvement of 

their agencies is crucial to the successful implementation and review 

of the Corps’ preliminary assessment of eligibility process. One 

example where state involvement has led to the reconsideration of an 

NDAI determination is the former Wilkins Air Force Base in Ohio, where 

a school is now located. Following increased public interest in school 

sites that were once owned by DOD, the state regulatory agency became 

concerned about the number of FUDS in the state where schools or school 

activities are now located and conducted a file review of all FUDS 

sites with school-related activities. Based on new information from the 

state agency, and after conducting a joint site visit, the Corps 

proposed a new project at the former Wilkins Air Force Base. The Army 

is taking steps to improve communication among the Army, regulators, 

and other stakeholders. In 2000, the Army created the FUDS Improvement 

Working Group to (1) address the concerns of regulators and other 

stakeholders about the FUDS program and (2) identify new or modified 

policies and procedures that will improve communication.



We also noted during our review of NDAI files that the Corps routinely 

did not notify regulatory agencies when it identified potential hazards 

that were not the result of DOD use. Although, according to a Corps 

official, it is “common sense” that the Corps would notify EPA or state 

regulatory agencies of non-DOD hazards that it identified during its 

preliminary assessment of eligibility, we estimate that at about 246 

NDAI properties the Corps did not notify EPA or state regulatory 

agencies of non-DOD hazards.[Footnote 24] For example, when conducting 

a site visit in Louisiana in 1986, Corps staff identified an 

underground diesel oil storage tank of unknown size that held 

approximately 12 inches of diesel oil. The Corps concluded that this 

hazard was not the result of DOD activities, but was left by the Coast 

Guard. However, the file contains no evidence that the Corps 

notified EPA or state regulators of the suspected hazard. An EPA 

official told us that the Corps never notified EPA of the hazard at 

this site, and that EPA became aware of the hazard only in 2000, as the 

result of an initiative it undertook to review Corps FUDS files. While 

not notifying regulatory agencies of potential hazards that were not 

the result of DOD use does not affect the Corps’ NDAI determination, it 

presents a lost opportunity to assist regulators in their efforts to 

protect human health and the environment.



Conclusions:



The Corps does not have a sound basis for about a third of its NDAI 

determinations for FUDS properties. In making its determinations, the 

Corps was handicapped by a lack of information about how these 

properties were used and which facilities were present when DOD 

controlled the property. In addition, the Corps, at times, apparently 

overlooked or dismissed information in its possession that suggested 

that hazards might be present. In still other cases, the Corps did not 

conduct an adequate site visit to assess the presence of hazards. 

Because of inadequacies in the Corps’ process for assessing the 

presence of DOD-caused hazards at these properties, potential hazards 

may have gone unnoticed. The Corps also did not consistently notify 

owners and regulatory agencies of its findings and determinations. By 

not communicating with these parties, the Corps lost opportunities to 

obtain information on potential hazards that were not discovered during 

their preliminary assessment of eligibility, which is not 

comprehensive.



These shortcomings resulted, in part, because Corps guidance does not 

specify what documents or level of detail the Corps should obtain when 

identifying potential hazards. Also, the guidance does not include 

information about typical hazards that might be present at certain 

types of properties or specify how to assess the presence of potential 

hazards. As a result, the Corps’ assessment that almost 4,000 FUDS 

require no further study or cleanup action may not be accurate. In 

essence, the Corps does not know the number of additional properties 

that may require further study or cleanup actions, the hazards that may 

be present at these properties, or the risk level associated with these 

hazards. Given that one of the factors used in establishing the Corps’ 

cleanup priorities is the risk that each property poses to the public 

or to the environment, unless the Corps improves its guidance and 

reviews past NDAI determinations to determine which sites should be 

reassessed, the Corps cannot be reasonably certain that it has 

identified all hazards that may require further study or cleanup 

action. Without knowing the full extent of the hazards at these 

properties, the Corps cannot be assured that the properties it is 

currently cleaning up or that it plans to clean up in the future are 

the sites that pose the greatest risk. The Corps also cannot estimate 

how much additional money and time may be needed to clean up properties 

that were not properly assessed.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



To help ensure that all potential hazards are adequately identified and 

assessed, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Corps 

to develop and consistently implement more specific guidelines 

and procedures for assessing FUDS properties. These guidelines and 

procedures should:



* specify the historical documents such as site maps, aerial and ground 

photos, and comprehensive site histories that the Corps should try to 

obtain for each property to identify all of the potential hazards that 

might have been caused by DOD’s use;



* include a listing of typical hazards that might be present at certain 

types of properties, such as communication facilities or motor pools, 

and incorporate the guides already developed for ordnance hazards and 

Nike missile sites into Corps procedures;



* require that the Corps contact other interested parties--including 

federal, state, and local agencies--as well as owners during the 

preliminary assessment of eligibility to discuss potential hazards at 

the properties; and:



* provide instructions for conducting site visits to ensure that each 

site receives an adequate site visit and that all potential hazards are 

properly assessed.



To further ensure that all hazards caused by DOD at FUDS properties are 

identified, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, as an initial 

step, direct the Corps to use the newly developed guidance and 

procedures to review the files of FUDS properties that it has 

determined do not need further study or cleanup action to determine if 

the files contain adequate evidence to support the NDAI determinations. 

If there is an insufficient basis for the determination, those 

properties should be reassessed.



To ensure that all parties are notified of the Corps’ NDAI 

determinations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Corps to develop and consistently implement procedures to ensure that 

owners and appropriate federal, state, and local environmental agencies 

are notified of the results of the Corps’ preliminary assessments of 

eligibility in a timely manner. The Corps should also ensure that 

owners are aware that the Corps will reconsider an NDAI determination 

if new evidence of DOD hazards is found. In addition, when preliminary 

assessments of eligibility identify potential hazards that did not 

result from DOD activities, the procedures should direct the Corps to 

notify the appropriate regulatory agencies in a timely manner.



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



We provided a copy of this report to the DOD for review and comment. In 

written comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with our 

conclusions, but partially agreed with each of the three 

recommendations included in this report.



DOD disagreed with our conclusion that the Corps did not consistently 

obtain information necessary to identify potential hazards at FUDS 

properties. While DOD acknowledged that the Corps did not have 

consistent procedures for evaluating FUDS properties during the early 

years of the program, the agency stated that it does not believe that 

such inconsistencies led to inadequate assessments. Our conclusion that 

the Corps did not consistently obtain information necessary to identify 

potential hazards at FUDS properties is based on our review of over 

600 randomly selected NDAI files at nine Corps district offices. We 

found numerous instances where the files did not contain evidence that 

potential hazards associated with the property’s prior uses were 

identified or that Corps staff looked for hazards other than unsafe 

buildings or debris. Furthermore, during our review, several district 

officials told us that they would like to reexamine some of the NDAI 

determinations, but that limited funding is available for this purpose. 

DOD also stated that the use of tools developed in the later years of 

the program, such as checklists for specific types of sites, have 

contributed to a more consistent approach. We agree that tools such as 

checklists and guides, which provide information on potential hazards 

that might be found at certain types of FUDS properties, would be 

useful. However, as we point out in our report, we identified only 

three such checklists or guides during our review and they were not 

referenced in the Corps’ FUDS manual that provides information and 

guidance to staff. For this reason, we recommended that the Corps 

develop guidelines and procedures that include a listing of typical 

hazards that might be present at certain types of facilities and 

incorporate the guides already developed.



DOD also disagreed that the Corps did not take sufficient steps to 

assess the presence of potential hazards at FUDS properties. In its 

comments, DOD stated that the FUDS eligibility determination was never 

intended as a means to characterize all the hazards at a site and 

cannot be compared to the CERCLA preliminary assessment/site 

inspection. We recognize that the preliminary assessment of eligibility 

is not, nor is it intended to be, a comprehensive evaluation of a FUDS 

property, and our report does not compare the Corps’ preliminary 

assessment of eligibility to the CERCLA preliminary assessment/site 

inspection. DOD also stated that if the Corps determines that a 

property is eligible for the program, an investigation process is 

undertaken to determine the extent of DOD-caused hazards at the site. 

Actually, all eligible FUDS properties do not automatically proceed to 

the investigative phase. In fact, NDAIs, which account for over 4,000 

of the approximately 6,700 properties the Corps has determined are 

eligible for the FUDS cleanup program, do not undergo further 

investigation. Only properties eligible for the FUDS program and where 

the Corps believes that potential hazards caused by DOD may exist 

undergo further investigation. However, as we point out in our report, 

we found instances where Corps officials appeared to overlook or 

dismiss information in their possession that suggested potential 

hazards might be present, and we included specific examples where this 

occurred.



DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to develop and 

consistently implement more specific guidelines and procedures for 

assessing FUDS properties. DOD pointed out that the Army, through the 

FUDS Improvement Initiative, is currently evaluating the need for any 

additional guidance or requirements. Our report describes some of the 

shortcomings that we found in the Corps’ guidance, and our 

recommendation identifies key areas where we believe that the Corps’ 

guidelines and procedures should be made more specific.



DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation to use newly 

developed guidance and procedures to determine if NDAI files contained 

adequate evidence to support the Corps’ determinations. DOD noted that 

the Corps would reevaluate an NDAI determination if additional 

information were discovered and pointed out that the Army has already 

agreed to reevaluate two to five NDAIs per year at each state’s 

request. Our report acknowledges both the Corps’ policy of 

reconsidering an NDAI determination if evidence of DOD-caused hazards 

is later found and its plans to reevaluate two to five NDAIs per year 

at each state’s request. We do not believe that the Corps should wait 

to be asked to reconsider its past NDAI determinations. Under the 

Defense Environmental Restoration Program, DOD and the Corps, as the 

executive agent for the FUDS program, bear the responsibility of 

identifying, investigating, and cleaning up, if necessary, DOD-caused 

hazards at FUDS properties. Therefore, we continue to believe that the 

Corps should undertake a review of NDAI property files and reassess 

those properties where the Corps’ determinations are not adequately 

supported.



In response to our recommendation aimed at improving its notification 

procedures, DOD commented that eligibility determination reports are 

now routinely provided to the states and, where appropriate, to EPA 

regional offices, and that recent efforts have increased coordination 

and communication between regulatory agencies and property owners. DOD 

also pointed out that the Army plans to include, as part of the FUDS 

manual revision, guidance that specifically requires notification of 

landowners and regulatory agencies of all NDAI determinations. While 

DOD did not specifically comment on our recommendation to develop 

procedures to direct the Corps to notify the appropriate regulatory 

agencies when its preliminary assessment of eligibility identifies 

potential hazards that did not result from DOD activities, DOD 

indicated in its technical comments that the Corps will notify the 

proper authorities of such hazards.



In addition to its written comments, DOD also provided a number of 

technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated as 

appropriate. DOD’s comments appear in appendix III.



Scope and Methodology:



To determine the extent to which the Corps (1) has a sound basis for 

its determinations that more than 4,000 formerly used defense sites 

need no further study or cleanup actions and (2) communicated its NDAI 

determinations to owners and regulatory agencies that may have 

responsibilities and notified the owners that it will reconsider an 

NDAI determination if evidence of DOD-caused hazards is found later, we 

reviewed a statistical sample of 635 NDAI files at nine Corps districts 

that execute the FUDS program. The districts selected were (1) Alaska, 

(2) Fort Worth, (3) Jacksonville, (4) Louisville, (5) New York, (6) 

Omaha, (7) Sacramento, (8) Savannah, and (9) Seattle. The Alaska 

district was selected with certainty because it had the highest number 

of NDAIs when we began our review. The remaining 8 districts were 

selected at random from 21 of the 22 Corps districts that execute the 

FUDS program, with the probability of selection proportional to the 

number of NDAIs in their districts. The Huntington district was 

excluded from our study population because it only had seven NDAIs and 

was not considered to be a practical choice to examine if selected. The 

21 districts from which we selected our random sample accounted for 

99.8 percent of the NDAI files. Thirty-two of the properties whose 

files we selected for review were excluded from our analysis because 

the files contained evidence that either the property was not eligible 

for the FUDS program or that a cleanup project was proposed. Each NDAI 

selected was subsequently weighted in the analysis to account 

statistically for all eligible NDAIs in the 21 districts, including 

those that were not selected.



We obtained and reviewed the Corps’ policies and procedures and program 

documents to obtain information about the preliminary assessment of 

eligibility. We also interviewed past and present FUDS program 

officials from headquarters and district offices to obtain information 

about the practices followed by Corps staff in completing this phase. 

From the information provided by these officials and a review of a 

sample of NDAI files at the Baltimore district, we developed a data 

collection instrument (DCI). The DCI was used to document, in a 

consistent manner, the evidence that we abstracted from each file 

reviewed and our assessment of the soundness of the Corps’ NDAI 

determination.



We also contacted environmental officials from 17 states that interact 

with Corps districts on the FUDS program. We judgmentally selected 

these states to provide a range of opinion and perception of the Corps’ 

preliminary assessment of eligibility. In addition, we contacted 

officials from EPA regional offices that interact with the Corps’ 

districts included in our review. These offices included Atlanta 

(Region 4); Chicago (Region 5); Dallas (Region 6); Denver (Region 8); 

Kansas City (Region 7); New York City (Region 2); San Francisco (Region 

9); and Seattle (Region 10). Appendix I contains additional details on 

our scope and methodology, and appendix II presents the results of our 

review of 603 randomly selected NDAI files.



We conducted our review from May 2001 through June 2002 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.



As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the 

contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it 

until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to 

the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Office of Management and 

Budget; the appropriate congressional committees; and other interested 

parties. We will also provide copies to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available, at no charge, on the GAO Web 

site at http://www.gao.gov/.



If you or your staff have any questions, please call me or Edward 

Zadjura at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed 

in appendix IV.



(Ms.) Gary L. Jones

Director, Natural Resources and Environment:



Signed by Gary L. Jones:



[End of section]



Appendixes:



Appendix I: Additional Details on Our Scope and Methodology:



The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) (1) has a sound basis for 

determining that more than 4,000 formerly used defense sites (FUDS) 

need no further study or cleanup and for designating those properties 

as “No Department of Defense (DOD) Action Indicated, Category I” (NDAI) 

and (2) communicated its NDAI determinations to owners and to the 

regulatory agencies that may have responsibility and notified the 

owners that it will reconsider an NDAI determination if evidence of 

DOD-caused hazards is found later. To address these objectives, we 

analyzed a statistical sample of 603 NDAI files at nine Corps districts 

that execute the FUDS program. The districts selected were (1) Alaska, 

(2) Fort Worth, (3) Jacksonville, (4) Louisville, (5) New York, (6) 

Omaha, (7) Sacramento, (8) Savannah, and (9) Seattle. The Alaska 

district was selected with certainty because it had the highest number 

of NDAIs when we began our review. The remaining districts were 

randomly selected, with the probability of selection proportional to 

the number of NDAIs in the district. Table 1 provides additional 

information on the districts selected for our review, including the 

states within their boundaries, the number of FUDS properties 

designated as NDAI, the NDAI files we selected for review, and the 

number of determinations that we questioned.



Table 1: Corps Districts in Our Sample:



Corps district: Alaska; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within the 

district’s boundaries: Alaska; NDAI-designated properties: 371; NDAI-

designated properties analyzed by GAO: 77; NDAI-designated properties 

where GAO questioned the Corps’ determination: 33.



Corps district: Fort Worth; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within 

the district’s boundaries: Louisiana, Texas[A]; NDAI-designated 

properties: 238; NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO: 68; NDAI-

designated properties where GAO questioned the Corps’ determination: 

28.



Corps district: Jacksonville; States and other U.S. jurisdictions 

within the district’s boundaries: Florida, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin 

Islands; NDAI-designated properties: 381; NDAI-designated properties 

analyzed by GAO: 77; NDAI-designated properties where GAO questioned 

the Corps’ determination: 27.



Corps district: Louisville; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within 

the district’s boundaries: Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio; 

NDAI-designated properties: 178; NDAI-designated properties analyzed 

by GAO: 63; NDAI-designated properties where GAO questioned the Corps’ 

determination: 25.



Corps district: New York; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within 

the district’s boundaries: New Jersey, New York; NDAI-designated 

properties: 232; NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO: 68; NDAI-

designated properties where GAO questioned the Corps’ determination: 

22.



Corps district: Omaha; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within the 

district’s boundaries: Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North 

Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Wyoming; NDAI-designated properties: 

157; NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO: 60; NDAI-designated 

properties where GAO questioned the Corps’ determination: 23.



Corps district: Sacramento; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within 

the district’s boundaries: California,[A] Nevada, Utah; NDAI-

designated properties: 192; NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO: 

64; NDAI-designated properties where GAO questioned the Corps’ 

determination: 15.



Corps district: Savannah; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within 

the district’s boundaries: Georgia; NDAI-designated properties: 100; 

NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO: 49; NDAI-designated 

properties where GAO questioned the Corps’ determination: 27.



Corps district: Seattle; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within the 

district’s boundaries: Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington; NDAI-

designated properties: 377; NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO: 

77; NDAI-designated properties where GAO questioned the Corps’ 

determination: 29.



Corps district: Total; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within the 

district’s boundaries: [Empty]; NDAI-designated properties: 2,226; 

NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO: 603; NDAI-designated 

properties where GAO questioned the Corps’ determination: 229.



[A] Only a portion of this state is included in the geographic 

boundaries of the district. The Fort Worth district covers most of 

Texas and has oversight responsibility for 183, or about 94 percent, of 

the 194 properties in the state designated as NDAI. The Sacramento 

district covers the northern portion of California and has oversight 

responsibility for 148, or about 36 percent, of the properties in the 

state designated as NDAI.



[End of table]



We reviewed each selected file to determine if it contained evidence 

that the Corps (1) reviewed or obtained information on the buildings, 

structures, and other facilities (such as underground storage tanks) 

associated with DOD’s use of the site that would allow the Corps to 

identify the types of hazards potentially resulting from DOD’s use and 

(2) took sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards.



If we did not find evidence in the file that indicated the Corps 

reviewed or obtained information on prior DOD uses of the site, we 

concluded that the Corps did not identify all of the hazards that might 

be present at the site. However, the absence of a single piece of 

information, such as a site map or record of contact with an owner, did 

not automatically cause us to question the adequacy of the Corps’ 

efforts to identify the prior uses and the associated potential 

hazards. Rather, we based our assessment of the Corps’ efforts on the 

totality of the evidence in the file. For example, if the file did not 

contain a site map, but the file contained evidence that the Corps 

staff made use of a site map during its assessment, we concluded that 

the Corps reviewed a site map.



If the file contained evidence that the Corps determined that potential 

hazards might be present, but did not take certain actions, such as 

conducting a site visit, we concluded that the Corps did not take 

sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards at the 

site. However, if the file contained evidence that a site visit was 

conducted, such as the date of a site visit, we concluded that the 

Corps conducted a site visit even if the file did not contain photos or 

a trip report. If a file contained evidence that the Corps overlooked 

or dismissed information in its possession that potential hazards might 

be present, we concluded that the Corps did not take sufficient steps 

to assess the presence of potential hazards. If we found either or all 

of these scenarios when reviewing the files, we determined that the 

NDAI determinations were questionable. Our questioning of an NDAI 

determination does not mean that the property is contaminated; rather, 

it indicates that the Corps’ file did not contain evidence that the 

Corps took steps to identify and assess potential hazards at the 

property that would support the NDAI determination.



We also reviewed the NDAI files to determine how often the Corps 

notified owners and regulatory agencies of its NDAI determinations and 

of its policy of reconsidering the determinations if additional 

evidence of DOD-caused hazards was found later.



We used a data collection instrument (DCI) to document, in a consistent 

manner, the evidence that we abstracted from each file and our 

assessment of the soundness of the Corps’ NDAI determinations. Each DCI 

was independently reviewed and compared to the original file to ensure 

that the information documented on the DCI was accurate and that our 

assessment of the Corps’ determination was reasonable, i.e., that 

another person looking at the information in the file would come to the 

same conclusion about the Corps’ determination. We copied the contents 

of the files to ensure that any further questions or issues could be 

researched later and that we had sufficient evidence to support the 

information recorded on the DCI. From the DCIs, we created an 

electronic database. The members of our team reviewing the files and 

the person conducting the supervisory review changed for each district. 

While we rotated staff to reduce bias, we also used this rotation to 

help increase consistency of judgments. In addition, we conducted an 

independent quality check of our database entries created from the 

DCIs. For each of the districts visited, we randomly selected 10 

percent of the electronically entered DCIs. An independent verifier 

checked 100 percent of the data for every question, sub-question, and 

comment box on the DCI, comparing the “hard copy” of the DCI to the 

entries found in the database to ensure that there were no data entry 

errors. Our error rate was 0.379 percent--less than ½ of 1 percent. All 

errors found were corrected. In addition, we verified 100 percent of 

the responses to questions and sub-questions on the DCI that were key 

to supporting our findings.



The information presented in this report consists, in part, of 

statistical estimates based on our review of randomly selected files. 

The results of our analysis are projectable to NDAI determinations 

nationwide, excluding the Huntington district. Because we followed a 

probability procedure based on random selections, our sample is only 

one of a large number of samples that we could have drawn. Each sample 

could have provided different estimates. We therefore express our 

confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as 95 

percent confidence intervals. Each of these intervals contains the 

actual (unknown) population value for 95 percent of the samples we 

could have drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of 

the confidence intervals in the report will include the true value in 

the study population.



All percentage estimates from the file review have 95 percent 

confidence intervals whose width does not exceed plus or minus 10 

percentage points, unless otherwise noted. All numerical estimates 

other than percentages (such as averages or totals) have 95 percent 

confidence intervals whose width does not exceed 10 percent of the 

value of those estimates, unless otherwise noted. The widths of the 

confidence intervals are shown as footnotes to the text, where 

appropriate.



While the results of our analysis are generally projectable nationwide, 

we also used our selected samples to develop case examples of the 

preliminary assessments of eligibility conducted by the Corps. These 

case examples are for illustration only.



[End of section]



Appendix II: Results of Our Analysis of 603 Randomly Selected NDAI 

Properties:



To determine the extent to which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(Corps) has a sound basis for its determinations that more than 4,000 

formerly used defense sites (FUDS) need no further Department of 

Defense (DOD) study or cleanup and for designating those properties as 

“No DOD Action Indicated” (NDAI), we reviewed and analyzed a 

statistical sample of 603 NDAI files at nine Corps districts. Table 2 

shows the property name, the FUDS number, and whether we found, based 

on our review of the evidence in the file, that the Corps had a sound 

basis for its NDAI determination. In those cases where we do not 

believe that the Corps has a sound basis, the table includes an 

explanation for our finding. Our questioning of an NDAI determination 

does not mean that the property is contaminated; rather, it indicates 

that the Corps’ file did not contain evidence that the Corps took steps 

to identify and assess potential hazards at the property that would 

support the NDAI determination. In the table, we use abbreviations for 

the four types of hazards: building demolition and debris removal (BD/

DR); hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste (HTRW); containerized 

hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste (CON/HTRW); and ordnance and 

explosive waste (OEW).



Table 2: Results of GAO’s Analysis of 603 Randomly Selected NDAI 

Properties (Shown by Corps District):



[See PDF for image]



[End of section]



Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:



3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:



ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:



JUL 23 2002:



Ms. Gary L. Jones:



Director, Natural Resources and Environment General Accounting Office:



441 G. Street NW Washington, DC 20548:



Dear Ms. Jones:



This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 

report, GAO-02-658, “ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION: Corps Needs to 

Reassess Its Determinations That Many Former Defense Sites Do Not Need 

Cleanup”, dated:



June 27, 2002 (GAO Code 360090). In the report, GAO asserted that many 

of the Corps’ No DoD Action Indicated (NDAI) determinations did not 

have a sound basis and that the Corps did not consistently notify 

stakeholders of their findings.



The Department disagrees with GAO’s conclusion that the Corps did not 

consistently obtain information necessary to identify potential hazards 

at Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS). Many of the files surveyed had 

eligibility determinations prepared in the 1980s and early 1990s. While 

we agree that, especially in the early days of the program, the Corps 

may not have had consistent procedures for evaluating FUDS, we do not 

agree that inconsistencies in approach necessarily led to inferior 

results. In fact, some of the earlier eligibility determinations were 

very detailed. As the program has matured, however, the use of tools, 

such as checklists for specific types of sites, have contributed to a 

more consistent approach in defining hazards.



The Department also disagrees with GAO’s conclusion that the Corps did 

not take sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards 

at FUDS. The FUDS eligibility determination is used primarily to 

support authorization and appropriation, and is guided solely by DoD’s 

contribution, if any, to contamination at a site. The eligibility 

determination was never intended as a means to characterize all hazards 

present at the site, and therefore, cannot be compared to the CERCLA 

preliminary assessment/site inspection (PA/SI). If the Corps determines 

that a property is eligible for the program, an investigation process 

is undertaken to characterize the extent of DoD hazards at the site, 

which is consistent with the CERCLA PA/SI process. We have confidence 

in the Corps’ ability to assess hazards and do not believe there have 

been deliberate failures or efforts to dismiss relevant information in 

any of these cases.



Regarding the issue of other factors contributing to inadequate 

preliminary assessments of eligibility, the Corps has always maintained 

that NDAIs would be reopened on discovery of additional information. 

Even in the absence of new information, the Army, through the FUDS 

Improvement Work Group, has agreed to reevaluate two to five NDAIs per 

year at each state’s request.



Regarding GAO’s concern that the Corps did not consistently notify 

owners and regulatory agencies about NDAI determinations, eligibility 

determination reports are now routinely provided to states, and where 

appropriate, to EPA regional offices. In addition, recent efforts by 

the Army through the FUDS Improvement Initiative, have increased 

coordination and communication between the Corps, regulatory agencies 

and property owners. For example, development of state-wide management 

actions plans assure that state priorities are given top consideration 

in the Corps’ program execution planning.



Finally, regarding coordination with landowners, the Corps must obtain 

right of entry from the landowner to conduct an eligibility 

determination. Hence, there is always some level of communication with 

the landowner through rights of entry.



While the Department partially agrees with each of GAO’s 

recommendations, especially since they closely mirror efforts currently 

underway by the Army to improve the program, the Department is 

concerned with the broad nature of the conclusions contained within the 

report. Our response to GAO’s recommendations and specific comments, 

are attached.



We welcome the opportunity to revisit this issue at your convenience. 

My point of contact is Mr. Kurt Kratz at (703) 697-5372.



Sincerely,



Raymond F. DuBois, Jr. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations 

and Environment):



Signed by Raymond F. DuBois, Jr.:



Enclosure:



GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED JUNE 27, 2002:



(GAO CODE 360090):



“ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION:CORPS NEEDS TO REASSESS ITS 

DETERMINATIONS THAT MANY FORMER DEFENSE SITES DO NOT NEED CLEANUP”:



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:



RECOMMENDATION 1: Recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Corps 

to develop and consistently implement more specific guidelines and 

procedures for assessing FUDS properties...



DoD RESPONSE: Partially Agree. The Corps of Engineers has had for a 

number of years specific guidelines and procedures for the evaluation 

and documentation of NDAIs. The Army, through the FURS Improvement 

Initiative, is currently evaluating the need for any additional 

guidance or requirements. The Corps of Engineers is also in the process 

of revising its FUDS regulations, and plans to standardize existing 

procedures, as well as incorporate new guidance recommended by 

stakeholders, through the FUDS Improvement Initiative Workgroup. The 

Department of Defense will monitor the Army’s progress in carrying out 

these initiatives.



RECOMMENDATION 2: Recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Corps 

to use the newly developed guidance and procedures to review the files 

of FUDS properties that it has determined do not need further study or 

clean up action to determine if the files contain adequate evidence to 

support the NDAI determinations. If there is not a sufficient basis for 

the determination, those properties should be reassessed.



DoD RESPONSE: Partially Agree. The Corps has always maintained that 

NDAIs would be reopened on discovery of additional information. In 

addition, even in the absence of new information, the Army, through the 

FUDS Improvement Work Group, has agreed to reevaluate two to five NDAIs 

per year at each state’s request. The particular properties to be 

reviewed and their sequencing will be coordinated with stakeholders, as 

appropriate, through development of FUDS state-wide Management Action 

Plans.



The Army is also currently considering a formalized process for closing 

out the 6,000 NDAIs currently in the FUDS inventory, which would 

include re-notification of property owners and regulatory agencies, and 

archiving all site information. The Office of the Secretary of Defense 

will monitor Army progress in implementing these initiatives.



RECOMMENDATION 3: Recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Corps 

to develop and consistently implement procedures to ensure that owners 

and appropriate federal, state, and local environmental agencies are 

notified of the results of the Corps’ preliminary assessments of 

eligibility in a timely manner. The Corps should also ensure that 

owners are aware that the Corps will reconsider an NDAI determination 

if new evidence of DoD hazards is found. In addition, when preliminary 

assessments of eligibility identify potential hazards that did not 

result from DoD activities, the procedures should direct the Corps to 

notify the appropriate regulatory agencies in a timely manner.



DoD RESPONSE: Partially Agree. The Corps has procedures and practices 

in place to notify stakeholders of the results of eligibility 

determinations. All of the Corps’ files have been made available to the 

states and EPA regions that have asked for copies.The Corps has never 

denied access to these files. Outreach and public participation in the 

FUDS program have been a primary focus of the Army’s FUDS Improvement 

Initiative, and the Corps is currently implementing recommendations 

that would ensure availability of the eligibility determinations and 

other information, through enhanced notification procedures. The Army 

plans to include, as part of the FUDS Manual revision, guidance that 

specifically requires notification of landowners and regulatory 

agencies of all NDAI determinations. The Department will continue to 

monitor Army progress in its on-going effort to improve the FUDS 

program.



[End of section]



Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:



GAO Contacts:



Ms. Gary L. Jones, (202) 512-3841

Edward Zadjura, (202) 512-9914:



Acknowledgments:



In addition to those named above, Ian Ferguson, Ken Lightner, Sherry 

McDonald, and Aaron Shiffrin made key contributions to this report. 

Also contributing to this report were Doreen S. Feldman, Susan W. 

Irwin, Cynthia Norris, and Sidney Schwartz.



FOOTNOTES



[1] The Corps previously used the term “no further action” (NOFA) to 

characterize this determination. Beginning in fiscal year 2001, the 

Corps changed the “no further action” designation to “no DOD action 

indicated” (NDAI).



[2] The Corps uses its database of FUDS properties on a daily basis to 

plan, schedule, and monitor the FUDS program, so there are constant 

changes and updates. In June 2001, when we selected our random sample, 

there were 4,030 NDAIs in the 22 districts. We did not include the 

Huntington district in our review because it had only seven NDAIs and 

was not considered a practical choice to examine if selected.



[3] Each of these intervals contains the actual (unknown) population 

value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, 

we are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence intervals in 

the report will include the true value in the study population.



[4] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval 

are 1,201 and 1,750, respectively. We adjusted the number of NDAIs in 

our study population to reflect the small portion of properties in our 

sample that we excluded from our analysis because the files contained 

evidence that the property either was not eligible for the FUDS program 

or that a cleanup project was proposed.



[5] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval 

are 44 percent and 75 percent, respectively.



[6] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval 

are 456 and 974, respectively.



[7] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval 

are 70 percent and 99 percent, respectively.



[8] In the early 1980s, congressional concern about abandoned military 

buildings and debris in Alaska and releases of hazardous substances 

from federal facilities laid the foundation for the DOD environmental 

restoration program. The Defense Appropriations Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-

212) provided 1 year of funding for the cleanup of hazardous substances 

released from DOD properties and the removal of unsafe or unsightly DOD 

buildings and debris. Annual appropriations for these activities have 

continued, but since 1986 they have been funded under the Defense 

Environmental Restoration Accounts established by Congress as part of 

DOD’s environmental restoration program.



[9] According to the Corps, this type of hazard is a DOD responsibility 

only on property that is currently owned by state or local governments 

or native corporations.



[10] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Environmental Contamination: 

Cleanup Actions at Formerly Used Defense Sites, GAO-01-557 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 31, 2001) for information on the number and location of FUDS 

properties that are eligible for cleanup, the types of hazards 

identified, and status of cleanup projects. The report is available, at 

no charge, on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov/.



[11] The Corps can also designate the property as NDAI if (1) the 

current owner refuses right of entry, (2) cleanup projects have been 

initiated or completed by past or current owners, (3) cleanup would be 

limited to removal of asbestos-containing material or lead-based paint, 

or (4) past or current owners have used the buildings or facilities, 

such as underground storage tanks, present on the property.



[12] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval 

are 1,201 and 1,750, respectively.



[13] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval 

are 2,520 and 3,105, respectively.



[14] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval 

are 456 and 974, respectively.



[15] The FUDS Manual provides general policy guidance on the execution 

of the FUDS program and is intended to provide information and guidance 

to Corps staff. The manual consolidates previous program guidance but 

does not supersede any applicable regulations, contract requirements, 

or command authority. The first FUDS manual was issued in 1993. Efforts 

are underway to update the existing FUDS manual, which was issued in 

1998.



[16] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval 

are 2,656 and 3,249, respectively.



[17] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence intervals 

for the percentage and total are 44 percent and 75 percent, and 1,688 

and 2,909, respectively.



[18] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence intervals 

for the percentage and total are 2 percent and 28 percent, and 64 and 

1,081, respectively.



[19] Because more than one category of potential hazards may be present 

at a property, the sum of these percentages exceeds 100.



[20] Washington State Department of Ecology, Preliminary Assessment 

Report for Formerly Used Defense Site Othello Air Force Station (Z-40), 

Othello, Washington, prepared for U.S. EPA Region 10, June 2001. The 

state of Washington randomly selected 10 NDAI-designated FUDS to check 

the quality of the Corps’ determinations. This often involved soil and 

groundwater sampling with the results compared to state cleanup 

standards. Eighty percent of the FUDS with NDAI designations were 

contaminated above state cleanup standards. The Corps assured the state 

that it would re-evaluate these sites provided funding was available.



[21] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval 

for the estimate of the number of NDAI properties that did not receive 

an appropriate site visit are 456 and 974. The lower and upper bounds 

of the 95 percent confidence intervals for the number of properties 

that received no site visit or received site visits conducted from a 

vehicle or from the air are 212 and 749, and 124 and 465, respectively.



[22] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval 

are 2,398 and 3,118, respectively.



[23] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval 

are 70 percent and 99 percent, respectively.



[24] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval 

are 176 and 333, respectively.



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