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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives:

July 2002:

Public Health:

Blood Supply Generally Adequate Despite New Donor Restrictions:

GAO-02-754:

Contents: 

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

The Blood Supply Generally Is Adequate:

Blood Suppliers' Response to September 11 Attacks Has Focused Emergency 
Planning on Maintaining Adequate Inventory:

Blood Centers Can Compensate for Donors Lost Because of New 
Donor Exclusion Policy:

Recent Blood Price Increases are Partly the Result of New 
Measures to Improve Blood Safety:

Conclusions:

Agency Comments:

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Summary of vCJD Donor Deferrals:

Appendix II: Risk of vCJD Infection through Blood Tranfusion Is Unknown:

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgement:

Table:

Table 1: Average Red Blood Cell Prices per Unit, 1998-2001:

Figures:

Figure 1: Units of Blood Collected and Transfused, 1997-2001:

Figure 2: Volume of Blood Collections before and after the Oklahoma City 
Bombing in April 1995:

Figure 3: Volume of Red Cross Collections before and after the September 
11th Attacks:

Abbreviations:

AABB: American Association of Blood Banks:

ABC: America's Blood Centers:

BSE: bovine spongiform encephalopathy:

CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:

DOD: Department of Defense:

FDA: Food and Drug Administration:

HCV: hepatitis C virus:

HHS: Health and Human Services:

HIV: human immunodeficiency virus:

NAT: nucleic acid testing:

NBDRC: National Blood Data Resource Center:

NHLBI: National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute:

NIH: National Institutes of Health:

NYBC: New York Blood Center:

OBI: Oklahoma Blood Institute:

OPHS: Office of Public Health Science:

PHSA: Public Health Service Act:

PPTA: Plasma Protein Therapeutics Association:

TSE: transmissible spongiform encephalopathies:

TSEAC: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee:

vCJD: variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease:

Letter:

July 22, 2002:

The Honorable James C. Greenwood
Chairman
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, reminded the nation of the 
critical importance of a safe and adequate supply of blood for 
transfusions. Every year, about 8 million individuals donate roughly 14 
million pints of blood, and approximately 4.5 million patients receive 
life-saving blood transfusions, according to the American Association 
of Blood Banks (AABB).[Footnote 1] Efforts to understand supply and 
demand trends have coincided with renewed debate about ensuring the 
safety and availability of blood. Such concerns are evidenced in new 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance for organizations that 
collect, process, and distribute blood, which is aimed at reducing the 
possible risk of transmitting variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), 
the human form of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or "mad cow" 
disease, through transfusion. These "donor deferrals," or exclusions, 
prevent individuals from giving blood if they have traveled extensively 
in the United Kingdom or Europe, thereby reducing the supply of donors. 
Adding to safety and availability concerns is the sharp rise in the 
cost of blood in recent years, partly the result of new measures for 
testing and processing donated blood to identify viruses and reduce 
adverse transfusion reactions. These issues, coupled with a 
historically sporadic monitoring of the blood supply, have led to 
questions about U.S. blood suppliers' ability to respond to 
emergencies.[Footnote 2]

You asked us to address the following objectives regarding the 
availability and safety of the U.S. blood supply:

* determine the adequacy of the current blood supply and describe 
recent trends in supply and demand,

* describe blood suppliers' response to the September 11 terrorist 
attacks and their planning for future emergencies,

* evaluate the potential impact of the new vCJD donor restrictions on 
the U.S. blood supply, and:

* describe recent changes in the price of blood.

To address these objectives, we measured supply and demand trends 
before and after September 11 by obtaining national data on the 
collection and distribution of blood from the National Blood Data 
Resource Center (NBDRC), a nonprofit research group, and the two major 
national blood suppliers--the American National Red Cross[Footnote 3] 
and America's Blood Centers (ABC). We attended FDA and Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) blood advisory committee meetings that 
reviewed blood suppliers' response to the September 11 terrorist 
attacks and interviewed management at the Red Cross and ABC to 
determine how much blood was collected and distributed in response to 
the attacks. In addition, we reviewed current scientific literature, 
FDA advisory committee recommendations, FDA guidelines, and blood 
supplier forecasts regarding the development and potential impact of 
the vCJD deferral policies. To analyze recent changes in the price of 
blood, we reviewed data from ABC and the Red Cross as well other 
studies of these price changes. To address the four objectives, we 
interviewed officials at HHS' Office of Public Health Science (OPHS); 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Center of 
Infectious Disease; the National Institutes of Health (NIH), National 
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute; FDA's Office of Blood Research and 
Review; and the Department of Defense (DOD), Armed Services Blood 
Program Office. We conducted our work from May 2001 through June 2002 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief:

The available data indicate that the blood supply has increased in the 
last 5 years and that its growth has kept pace with the rise in the 
demand for blood. Blood collections in the first half of 2001 were 
significantly greater than for the comparable period in 2000. Blood 
collections increased nearly 40 percent in the weeks immediately 
following September 11, but they have since returned to pre-attack 
levels, following the pattern of collections after earlier emergencies. 
Although local and temporary blood shortages occur from time to time, 
the inventory of blood in America's hospitals was at historically high 
levels before September 11 and has remained adequate through the first 
5 months of 2002.

Blood suppliers received a high volume of blood donations immediately 
after the September 11 attacks. However, the very small amount of blood 
needed to treat survivors of the attacks resulted in a nationwide 
surplus--the supply was substantially greater than that needed for 
transfusions. Consequently, the number of units that passed their 42-
day shelf life and were discarded in October and November 2001 was six 
times the number that expired in an average 2-month period earlier that 
year. Blood suppliers and the federal government now are reevaluating 
how blood is collected during and after disasters to avoid a repeat of 
this experience and also to ensure that enough blood is available 
during emergencies. A task force including members from federal 
agencies and the blood industry has been formed to coordinate the 
response in future emergencies to the need for blood. Insights from the 
experiences of September 11 and other disasters have led the task force 
to conclude that the need for blood in emergencies can be best met by 
maintaining an adequate and stable blood inventory at all times, rather 
than by increasing blood collections following a disaster.

The nation's blood supply can compensate for donors lost because of new 
donor restrictions designed to further reduce the risk of vCJD 
transmission. The increased incidence of BSE in the cattle herds in 
continental Europe has prompted FDA, the Red Cross, and DOD to 
implement more stringent donor deferral policies. Initial FDA guidance 
published in 2000 recommended the exclusion of individuals who had 
spent 6 months or more in the United Kingdom. This guidance was 
tightened in 2002 to exclude individuals who had spent 3 months or more 
in the United Kingdom and individuals who have spent a cumulative total 
of 5 years in European countries where there is a risk of acquiring 
vCJD by eating contaminated meat. FDA estimates that its new deferral 
policy will further reduce the risk of possible exposure to vCJD by 23 
percent but will disqualify about an additional 5 percent of donors in 
the United States. Blood suppliers in areas with a large number of 
donors who have traveled to Europe, such as suppliers in urban areas, 
may be affected more noticeably by the new deferral guidance. 
Nonetheless, we found that, given the overall growth in the blood 
supply in recent years, U.S. blood suppliers as a whole should be able 
to compensate for donor losses resulting from this change.

The average price of blood has risen over 50 percent since 1998. 
Although blood is primarily collected from volunteers, blood suppliers 
incur costs from collecting, processing, and testing donated blood. To 
recover these costs, suppliers sell processed blood to hospitals. 
Nonetheless, there is substantial variation in the prices paid by 
different hospitals and for different types of blood. The introduction 
of new blood safety measures has contributed to these price increases. 
For example, leukoreduction--the removal from blood of white blood 
cells that have been implicated in some adverse transfusion reactions-
-was not widespread in 1998, but most blood sold in the United States 
today is leukoreduced. Leukoreduction adds about $30 to the price of a 
unit of blood.

We asked for comments on a draft of this report from HHS and DOD. HHS 
responded that it had no general comments. DOD concurred with our 
findings.

Background:

About 90 percent of the U.S. blood supply is collected by two 
suppliers--the American Red Cross and independent centers affiliated 
with ABC. Generally, suppliers collect, test, and process blood and 
sell it to health care providers. FDA is responsible for ensuring the 
safety of the U.S. blood supply, which it does by inspecting blood 
collection procedures and enforcing federal regulations. Although past 
monitoring efforts by industry and nonprofit groups have examined 
supply and demand trends for blood, current efforts are focused on 
providing daily monitoring of hospitals' blood inventories.

Blood Collection and Use in the United States:

In the United States, about 8 million volunteers donate approximately 
14 million units of whole blood each year. Sixty percent of the 
population is eligible to donate blood, but in any given year only 
about 5 percent of those who are eligible actually do so.[Footnote 4] 
Eighty percent of donors are repeat donors. A typical donor gives blood 
approximately 1.6 times a year, but donors may give 6 times a year, or 
every 8 weeks, which is the period the body needs to replenish red 
blood cells. The Red Cross and ABC each collect about 45 percent each 
of the nation's blood supply, and roughly 10 percent is supplied by 
other independent blood centers, DOD, and hospitals that have their own 
blood banks.

Most hospital transfusion services purchase blood and blood components 
under a contract with a local supplier which describes the price and 
quantity of blood to be delivered. Blood suppliers use resource-sharing 
programs to help suppliers in high-demand areas buy blood that is not 
needed by the supplier that collected it. Taken together, the Red 
Cross, ABC, and AABB's National Blood Exchange moved about 1.4 million 
units of blood--over 10 percent of the nation's supply--among suppliers 
in 2000. In addition, the Red Cross has a nationwide inventory control 
system to facilitate the movement of its surplus blood.

Donated blood is tested for blood type (A, B, AB, and O) and Rh type 
(positive or negative).[Footnote 5] Donors with type O Rh negative 
blood are known as "universal donors," since it can be given to 
patients of any blood type in an emergency.[Footnote 6] Donated blood 
is also screened for a number of diseases and other elements that could 
prevent its use. For example, blood is tested for red blood cell 
antibodies that may cause an adverse reaction in recipients and 
screened for hepatitis viruses B and C, human immunodeficiency viruses 
(HIV) 1 and 2, other viruses, and syphilis. Most U.S. blood products 
are now filtered to remove a class of cells known as leukocytes (white 
blood cells), which have been implicated in adverse transfusion 
reactions. Each unit of whole blood is separated into specialized 
components, or "products," consisting of various types of blood cells, 
plasma,[Footnote 7] and special preparations of plasma. Health care 
facilities transfuse the resulting 26.5 million components into about 
4.5 million patients per year.

Red blood cells may be stored as a liquid for up to 42 days. Blood 
banks maintain a supply cushion to meet the uncertain demand for blood. 
This means that some blood is discarded; for example, from January 
through August 2001, about 2 percent of the blood supply expired 
without being transfused. Red blood cells can also be frozen and stored 
for later use. The military makes extensive use of frozen blood 
inventories to meet wartime contingencies, maintaining stocks of frozen 
type O units that can be transferred into most patients regardless of 
their blood types. However, because freezing and thawing blood is 
expensive and labor intensive, civilian blood centers maintain 
relatively small inventories of frozen blood, primarily of rare blood 
types. A new device approved by FDA in May 2001 may make frozen blood 
more useful in the future--it can extend the shelf life of thawed, 
previously frozen blood from 24 hours to 14 days.[Footnote 8]

There are several ways for hospitals to reduce the amount of blood they 
use. For example, one large hospital we contacted was able to save
$1 million and 10,000 units of blood over 8 years by promoting 
awareness of blood use among physicians and by improving how blood is 
ordered and used during surgeries. A recent study of blood use during 
neurosurgery at a large teaching hospital found that, because the 
hospital's system for ordering blood had not kept pace with 
advancements in surgical techniques, physicians ordered 5.5 times more 
blood than was transfused during surgery.[Footnote 9] One multifaceted 
approach to blood conservation is known as bloodless surgery. This 
practice involves the use of pharmaceuticals that stimulate the 
production of red blood cells,[Footnote 10] surgical equipment that 
cleans and returns lost blood to the patient, and intravenous solutions 
that maintain blood volume.[Footnote 11] During a pilot study of 
bloodless surgery techniques, one hospital successfully used these 
techniques instead of blood transfusions for several hundred surgical 
patients.[Footnote 12]

Federal Regulation of Blood:

The Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and the Federal Food Drug and 
Cosmetic Act form the basis of the Public Health Service's authority, 
as enforced by FDA, to ensure the safety of blood that is collected and 
transfused in the United States. PHSA requires that all blood and blood 
components distributed in interstate commerce be licensed by FDA in 
order to ensure that the products are safe and effective.[Footnote 13] 
Under PHSA, FDA can recall blood and blood components that present an 
imminent or substantial hazard to public health. The licensing and 
regulatory standards set by FDA attempt to maintain a blood supply that 
is both adequate and safe. Blood suppliers routinely take safety 
precautions beyond those required by FDA. For example, although FDA has 
not required nucleic acid testing (NAT), a sophisticated test to detect 
HIV and hepatitis C virus (HCV), virtually all blood centers perform 
it.[Footnote 14] Similarly, FDA has not mandated universal 
leukoreduction, but most blood centers have adopted the practice.

When suppliers violate regulations, FDA takes legal action to prevent 
further violations. These legal actions can result in the parties 
entering into consent decrees of permanent injunction to comply with 
all applicable blood safety rules. Several blood and plasma suppliers 
as well as manufacturers of blood testing supplies are currently under 
consent decrees for various violations. One of the most significant of 
these agreements now in force is with the Red Cross, which entered into 
a consent decree in 1993,[Footnote 15] after FDA discovered that the 
Red Cross had failed to follow its own standard operating procedures, 
had deficiencies in its quality control processes, and had committed 
other violations.[Footnote 16]

FDA has no authority to determine the amount of blood that should be 
collected or to compel suppliers to make products available. However, 
FDA recognizes that an insufficient blood supply is a public health 
risk, and it can make certain recommendations within its authority 
under PHSA and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, as amended, 
related to the availability of blood during public health emergencies. 
In an emergency, FDA and other HHS agencies can give advice to blood 
banks on prioritizing the use of blood and facilitating the shipment of 
existing inventory to the areas affected.[Footnote 17] For example, 
after the September 11 attacks, FDA issued emergency guidelines to 
speed the delivery of blood to areas affected by the attacks. The 
guidelines allowed donated blood to be shipped to crisis areas before 
NAT was completed and to allow clinical staff who were not trained in 
all procedures to collect blood, in order to supplement the fully 
trained staff.[Footnote 18] FDA's emergency guidelines were rescinded 
on September 14, 2001, upon recognition that blood supplies were more 
than adequate to address current needs. HHS also can purchase blood and 
blood components and make other arrangements to respond to threats to 
the safety and sufficiency of the blood supply.[Footnote 19]

Monitoring the Blood Supply:

While periodic surveys of the blood supply have been conducted for 
years, no data on daily, weekly, or monthly national and regional blood 
collections or usages were readily available to federal officials or 
blood suppliers until 2000. NBDRC has conducted a biennial 
retrospective survey of blood suppliers since 1997, and others 
conducted similar periodic surveys before that. NBDRC's latest 
comprehensive biennial survey of blood supply and usage measured all 
units collected and transfused in 1999. In periods between these 
biennial surveys, NBDRC conducts interim retrospective studies that 
measure the pace and number of collections. In addition, both the Red 
Cross and ABC have reported their annual collections from 1996 through 
2001.

Both the Red Cross and ABC have taken steps recently to improve the 
measurement of blood collections and inventories in their own centers. 
For example, the Red Cross recently introduced a large-scale, 
centralized inventory tracking system. This system monitors blood 
inventories and distribution daily across all Red Cross blood centers, 
enabling projections of demand and potential shortages using both daily 
data and historic blood usage patterns. Since March 2002, the 
independent blood centers affiliated with ABC have participated in a 
less comprehensive daily inventory reporting system.[Footnote 20]

In November 1999, HHS made a commitment to improve the monitoring of 
the blood supply as part of its Blood Action Plan announced in 1998. As 
a first step, the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health and 
NHLBI contracted with NBDRC to provide monthly data on supply and 
demand trends using a statistically representative sample of 26 blood 
suppliers that account for about one-third of U.S. blood collections. 
Data from this survey in 2000 indicated that the blood inventory was 
stable and that blood banks were absorbing the impact of the first vCJD 
donor deferral better than initially expected. NHLBI terminated the 
NBDRC contract, and OPHS assumed support for the NBDRC data collection 
effort through the end of 2001. NBDRC has continued this data 
collection effort without public funding.

Partly to compensate for the loss of the NBDRC data, OPHS introduced 
its own early warning, or sentinel, system in August 2001. The system 
is designed to detect blood shortages that may adversely affect patient 
care and analyze demand trends at transfusion centers and hospitals 
nationwide. OPHS collects daily blood inventory and use data from 26 
hospitals and three transfusion centers that account for about 10 
percent of the national blood inventory. Although the hospital sample 
is not statistically representative, it includes both small and large 
hospitals in different geographic regions of the United States meant to 
serve as indicators of impending blood shortages. To obtain supply 
data, OPHS has also begun negotiations with ABC and the Red Cross to 
make available daily supply data from their collection centers, 
although neither ABC nor the Red Cross has yet agreed to do so.

vCJD:

First reported in 1996, vCJD is a progressive and invariably fatal 
neurodegenerative disease, part of broader class of diseases known as 
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE). As of June 2002, there 
were 130 individuals with confirmed or probable cases of vCJD: 122 in 
the United Kingdom, 6 in France, 1 in the Republic of Ireland, and 1 in 
Italy. It is suspected that these individuals contracted the disease 
from eating meat from cattle infected with BSE (mad cow disease) in the 
United Kingdom before 1990. Cattle herds in the United Kingdom suffered 
an epidemic of BSE that peaked in 1992 and subsequently declined as a 
result of government actions to change the composition of cattle feed. 
The incubation period for vCJD is long, but its precise length is not 
known. This makes it difficult to project how many people will 
ultimately become ill. The United States has one likely case of vCJD, a 
22-year-old citizen of the United Kingdom living in Florida who is 
thought to have acquired vCJD in the United Kingdom. There have been no 
confirmed cases of BSE in U.S. cattle.[Footnote 21]

In response to the possibility that vCJD could be transmitted through 
blood transfusions, in November 1999, FDA recommended deferring by 
April 2000 blood collections from individuals who had resided or 
traveled in the United Kingdom for a total of 6 months or more from 
1980 through 1996. [Footnote 22] In recognition of the evolving BSE 
epidemic, FDA issued a more restrictive policy in January 2002.

The Blood Supply Generally Is Adequate:

Available data indicate that both blood collections and transfusions 
increased substantially from 1997 through 2001. While local and 
temporary blood shortages have occurred periodically, the nation's 
blood supply generally is adequate. Although blood collections 
increased nearly 40 percent in the weeks immediately following 
September 11, they since have returned to pre-September 11 levels, 
following the pattern of collections after other emergencies. The 
inventory of blood in America's hospitals was at historically high 
levels before the surge in collections after September 11 and has 
remained adequate through the first 5 months of 2002.

Blood Supply and Inventory Trends Are Positive:

Although no one data source has comprehensively tracked the nation's 
blood supply in the past, all of the sources we identified indicated 
that the national supply has grown in recent years and was at 
historically high levels before the surge in donations that occurred 
after September 11. Annual blood collections have increased 
substantially--21 percent--since 1997, according to NBDRC measurements 
and estimates of annual blood collections by all blood centers. (See 
fig. 1.) The number of units of blood donated annually increased from 
12.4 million in 1997 to an estimated 15 million in 2001. (NBDRC 
estimated that 2001 collections would have reached 14.5 million units, 
17 percent higher than in 1997, without the post-September 11 surge.) 
The increase in supply has kept pace with the increase in the amount of 
blood transfused; for example, NBDRC data indicated that the number of 
red cell units transfused rose 17 percent from 1997 to 2001, from 11.5 
million to 13.5 million units, and the annual number of units that were 
not transfused remained at about 1 million units, not counting the 
post-September 11 surge.

Figure 1: Units of Blood Collected and Transfused, 1997-2001:

[See PDF for image]

Note: Collection data include allogeneic donations of whole blood and 
red blood cells.

Source: NBDRC.

[End of figure]

Available data indicate that 2001 collections had risen even before the 
increase in donations following September 11. For example, the Red 
Cross reported a 2.2 percent growth in total collections for the first 
7 months of 2001 over the same period in 2000. In addition, reflecting 
the success of a Red Cross campaign to increase donations, the number 
of units collected at Red Cross blood centers was 8 percent higher in 
July and August 2001 than the number collected during the same period 
in 2000. Similarly, NBDRC reported that the 26 blood suppliers included 
in its statistically representative national sample increased blood 
deliveries to transfusion centers by 5 percent in May, June, and July 
2001, compared with that period in 2000.[Footnote 23]

The increased collections placed the inventories in America's blood 
banks at historically high levels just prior to the September 11 
attacks. The Red Cross reported that its total red blood cell inventory 
was 33 percent higher in August 2001 than it was in August 2000 and 
that its type O inventory was 83 percent higher than it was in August 
2000. The New York Blood Center (NYBC) reported that it had a 4-to 5-
day supply of blood on hand in early September. On September 10, 2001, 
the median inventory for the hospitals in HHS's Blood Sentinel 
Surveillance System for all blood types stood at approximately 7 days, 
and for type O Rh negative blood, at 6 days.

Blood Collections Have Returned to Pre-September 11 Levels:

In response to the perception that blood was needed to treat victims of 
the terrorist attacks, Americans greatly increased their blood 
donations in the weeks immediately after September 11. NBDRC estimated 
that total blood collections in the United States were 38 percent 
higher in September 2001 than average monthly collections earlier in 
2001. The Red Cross reported that its national blood collections during 
the week of September 11 more than doubled compared with the preceding 
weeks. However, as with previous disasters, the sharp increase in blood 
collections in response to September 11 did not last. While higher than 
usual blood collections continued for several weeks after September 11, 
the number of units collected had returned to the baseline level or 
slightly below it by the beginning of November.[Footnote 24]

The post-September 11 pattern of collections mirrors the collections 
after the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Edward R. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City. (See figs. 2 and 3) Like the September 11 
attacks, the bombing of the Murrah building was a discrete event--there 
were not continued attacks--and it became clear soon after the attack 
that a large supply of blood would not be needed for the survivors. The 
Oklahoma Blood Institute (OBI), the primary blood supplier for the 
area, recorded a nearly 45 percent increase in donations for April 1995 
compared with the previous month. The spike included an increase in 
repeat donors and an 85 percent increase in first-time donors. But 
collections rapidly returned to their baseline level in May.

In contrast with the Oklahoma City bombing, the Persian Gulf War was 
accompanied by a perceived need for blood that spanned a longer period. 
OBI's data recorded a sustained increase in donations for 3 months 
beginning in November 1990, peaking in January 1991 at more than 25 
percent higher than usual, and continuing through the end of the 
conflict in February 1991. But by March 1991, donations had returned to 
baseline levels.

Figure 2: Volume of Blood Collections before and after the Oklahoma 
City Bombing in April 1995:

[See PDF for image]

Source: OBI.

[End of figure]

Figure 3: Volume of Red Cross Collections before and after the 
September 11TH Attacks:

[See PDF for image]

Source: GAO calculation from Red Cross data.

[End of figure]

The limited information available to us indicates that blood 
collections early in 2002 were roughly comparable to the levels 
immediately prior to September 11. For instance, the number of units 
collected in April 2002 by the 26 blood centers in NBDRC's sample was 
approximately equal to the number collected in August 2001. Similarly, 
the hospital inventories measured by HHS's Blood Sentinel Surveillance 
System in early May 2002 were similar to those levels measured just 
prior to September 11, 2001.

Blood Suppliers' Response to September 11 Attacks Has Focused Emergency 
Planning on Maintaining Adequate Inventory:

The high volume of blood donations made immediately after September 11, 
and the very small amount of blood needed to treat survivors, resulted 
in a national surplus--supply was substantially greater than needed for 
transfusions. Consequently, the proportion of units that expired and 
were discarded in October and November 2001 was six times higher than 
the proportion that expired on an average 2-month period in early 2001. 
Blood suppliers and the federal government are reevaluating how blood 
is collected during and after disasters to avert the large amounts of 
blood that went unused and the logistical strains of collecting 
unneeded blood. A task force of federal and blood supply officials has 
been created to coordinate blood suppliers' response to future 
disasters. Incorporating the lessons learned from past disasters, the 
task force has recommended that blood banks focus on maintaining a 
consistently adequate nationwide inventory in preparation for disasters 
and not collecting more blood after a disaster than is medically 
necessary.

Response of Blood Suppliers to September 11 Had Unintended 
Consequences:

America's blood banks collected an unprecedented amount of blood in a 
short period after the September 11 attacks. HHS, ABC, and the Red 
Cross all issued requests for blood donations, although HHS and ABC 
quickly stopped issuing requests when it became clear that there were 
few survivors of the attacks and there was a limited additional need 
for transfusions. Many blood suppliers were reluctant to turn away 
potential donors, and some hospitals that did not have their own blood 
banks responded to the surge in volunteers by collecting blood anyway. 
This surge of donors stressed the collection system. Shortages in blood 
collecting supplies, phlebotomists (technicians trained to collect 
blood), and storage capacity occurred as more potential donors arrived. 
Long waiting lines developed because there was insufficient staff to 
draw blood.

Far more blood was collected immediately after September 11 than was 
needed by survivors or than ultimately could be absorbed by the 
nation's blood banks. Estimates of the number of additional units 
collected nationwide range from 475,000 to 572,000, and fewer than 260 
units were used to treat victims of the attacks.[Footnote 25]

A portion of this additional supply went unused, expired, and was 
discarded. The Red Cross reported that its collections peaked from 
September 11 through October 14, and that 5.4 percent of the blood it 
collected during that time went unused and expired. ABC officials told 
us that its affiliated blood banks discarded approximately 4 percent of 
the blood they collected after September 11, although the officials 
cautioned that the figures reported to them by their independent 
centers might have underestimated the number of units that expired. 
NBDRC's monthly survey of a nationally representative sample of 26 
blood suppliers found that a higher percentage of units were outdated. 
NBDRC reported that about 10 percent of the units collected in 
September and October by the suppliers it surveyed were outdated and 
discarded. This was nearly a five-fold increase in the proportion of 
units these suppliers outdated and discarded in the first 8 months of 
2001--about 2 percent of their collections, on average. On the basis of 
NBDRC's figures, we estimate that approximately 250,000 units of blood 
were outdated and discarded in October and November 2001; this is 
nearly six times the estimated 42,000 units discarded in an average 2-
month period earlier in 2001. All of these figures may underestimate 
the total number of expired units, since they represent expirations at 
blood suppliers only and do not capture units that may have expired in 
hospital inventories.

Increased errors in the collection process at some blood banks 
accompanied the surge in donations. As much as 20 percent of some blood 
banks' donations were collected improperly and had to be discarded, 
primarily because individuals had not completed the donor questionnaire 
correctly.[Footnote 26] Some blood banks also suffered serious 
financial losses, as they incurred the costs of collecting and 
processing units of blood they could not sell. For example, NYBC 
claimed it lost from $4 million to $5 million and suffered a nearly 
three-fold increase in the number of units it had to discard when blood 
donated in response to the attack expired.

Efforts to Improve Disaster Readiness Have Begun:

Since September 11, federal public health agencies and blood suppliers 
have found fault with their responses to prior disasters and begun to 
plan for a more effective response to future emergencies. Through an 
interorganizational task force organized by AABB in late 2001, the 
focus has begun to shift away from increasing blood collections in an 
emergency to maintaining an adequate inventory of blood at all 
times.[Footnote 27] This shift was prompted by the realization that a 
surge in blood collections following a disaster does not help victims 
because disaster victims rarely require many units of blood and because 
newly collected blood cannot be used immediately.[Footnote 28] For 
example, as with September 11, only a small percentage of the 
additional blood collected after the Oklahoma City bombing was 
transfused into victims (131 units of more than 9,000 units collected). 
Moreover, the units used to treat victims in the hours after a disaster 
are those already on hand at the treating hospital or local blood 
bank.[Footnote 29] It takes 2 days to completely process and test a 
unit of newly donated blood, so existing stores of blood must be used 
to treat disaster casualties. Finally, military experts and blood 
industry officials told us that it is unlikely a discrete disaster 
scenario would require more blood than is normally stored in the 
nation's blood inventory. They noted that large amounts of blood have 
not been needed in building collapses (like the September 11 attacks 
and the Oklahoma City bombing), nor would blood transfusions be a 
likely treatment for illnesses caused by a bioterrorism attack.

The AABB task force report made recommendations for the emergency 
preparedness of the blood supply that were adopted by the HHS Advisory 
Committee on Blood Safety and Availability.[Footnote 30] The 
recommendations are aimed at having federal and other organizations 
that are involved in the collection or use of blood coordinate their 
actions in an emergency. For example, the task force recommended the 
designation of all blood banks as suppliers of blood in an emergency 
and that the Assistant Secretary for Health serve as the spokesperson 
for all organizations involved in managing and transporting blood in an 
emergency. The task force also recommended that it act as the 
coordinating group during emergencies to assess the medical needs of 
victims for blood.

Both the Red Cross and ABC are independently pursuing their own plans 
to meet emergency and long-term needs. The Red Cross expects to 
increase annual collections by 9 percent during each of the next 5 
years. The Red Cross also plans to implement a "strategic blood 
reserve" within the next 5 years using preregistered donors and a 
limited stock of frozen blood cells. ABC has established a "national 
strategic donor reserve" through which it can call on the donors it has 
registered, if needed.

Blood Centers Can Compensate for Donors Lost Because of New Donor 
Exclusion Policy:

In response to the increased incidence of BSE in the cattle herds of 
many European countries, FDA, the Red Cross, and DOD are prohibiting 
blood donations from a greater proportion of individuals who have 
resided in countries where there is a risk of acquiring vCJD by eating 
contaminated meat. FDA estimates that its new deferral policy will 
further reduce the risk of possible exposure to vCJD by 23 percent but 
that it will disqualify about 5 percent of current blood donors in the 
United States. Nonetheless, given the overall growth in blood 
collections in recent years, it is likely that suppliers and others 
involved in blood collections, on the whole, can compensate for donor 
losses from the new policy.

New vCJD Donor Exclusions Are More Restrictive:

In August 1999, FDA issued guidance that recommended prohibiting 
donations from individuals who had resided or traveled in the United 
Kingdom for a total of 6 months or more from 1980 through 1996, a 
period during which that country experienced an epidemic of BSE in 
cattle.[Footnote 31] In response to the detection of BSE in cattle in 
European herds, in January 2002 FDA issued guidance to expand this 
recommended exclusion to prohibit donations from individuals who had 
spent a cumulative 3 months in the United Kingdom from 1980 through 
1996, or 5 years or more in a European country since 1980. The portion 
of FDA's new guidance pertaining to residents of the United Kingdom and 
France took effect on May 31, 2002, and the deferral of donors who have 
resided in other European countries will take effect on October 31, 
2002. FDA's guidance exempts donors of source plasma who had resided in 
Europe for 5 years from 1980 through 1996, but it prohibits source 
plasma donations from those who had resided in the United Kingdom for 
at least 3 months from 1980 through 1996. The guidance also recommends 
indefinite deferral of source plasma donors who have spent 5 or more 
years cumulatively in France from 1980 to present.[Footnote 32]

The Red Cross and DOD have independently adopted donor deferral 
policies for their blood centers that are more stringent than FDA's 
guidance. The Red Cross excludes donors who have spent a cumulative 3 
months or more in the United Kingdom or 6 months in a European country 
since 1980. The Red Cross policy does not exempt plasma donors because 
most of its plasma is recovered plasma from donors of whole blood. 
DOD's policy made minor modifications to FDA's new deferral criteria. 
The new deferral policies are described in greater detail in appendix 
I.

New vCJD Donor Exclusions Lower Potential Risk but Also Reduce the 
Number of Eligible Donors:

Because so little is known about the etiology of vCJD, estimates of the 
public health benefits from blood donor exclusions related to vCJD are 
uncertain. It has not been established that vCJD is transmissible 
through blood, and no tests to diagnose vCJD or detect vCJD in blood 
have been developed. Nonetheless, laboratory experiments point to a 
theoretical risk of transmission of vCJD through blood. (See app. II 
for a description of scientific research on vCJD.):

FDA estimates that the additional risk reduction from the new vCJD 
donor deferral policies is substantially lower than the risk reduction 
derived from its initial deferral guidance. FDA estimates that its 
initial donor deferral that took effect in April 2000 reduced the 
amount of theoretical risk of vCJD transmission through blood 
transfusion in the United States by 68 percent[Footnote 33] and that 
the expanded deferral guidance is expected to reduce total risk of 
donor exposure to the agent that causes vCJD by an additional 23 
percent, for a total risk reduction of 91 percent. Using the same 
methodology, FDA estimates that the Red Cross's new donor deferral 
policy will decrease the total theoretical risk of exposure to the vCJD 
agent by 92 percent (1 percent more than FDA's donor deferral 
recommendations).

Estimates of the percentage of current donors who would be disqualified 
under the new deferral policies are substantially larger than the 
estimated donor losses from the first vCJD donor deferrals. On the 
basis of data from a 1999 survey of blood donors, FDA estimates that 
its new deferral policy will disqualify about 5 percent of current 
blood donors and that the Red Cross deferral policy will disqualify 
about 9 percent.[Footnote 34] On the basis of the results of a June 
2001 survey of its own blood donors, the Red Cross estimated that its 
deferral policy would be less disruptive than FDA expects, resulting in 
a loss of about 4 percent of active donors.[Footnote 35]

Nationwide Blood Supply Can Likely Compensate for Donor Losses 
Resulting from New Policies:

The overall growth in the U.S. blood supply in recent years and the 
demonstrated ability of particular blood suppliers to increase 
collections indicate that the blood industry as a whole can compensate 
for donor losses from the new vCJD donor deferrals. First, as we noted 
earlier, the long-term trends in blood collections are positive, and 
collections have increased substantially over the last 5 years. For 
example, prior to September 11, NBDRC had estimated that the nation's 
blood collections for 2001 would exceed the number of units transfused 
in 2000 by more than 7 percent. Second, the Red Cross was able to 
increase its blood collections in early 2001--collections were 2 
percent higher in the first 7 months of 2001 compared with 2000--
despite the April 2000 implementation of FDA's initial deferral 
guidance and Red Cross's adoption of a new techinique to measure red 
blood cell levels that disqualified 6 percent of potential donors at 
its centers. [Footnote 36] Red Cross reported collections in July 2001 
that were 8 percent higher than for the same period in 2000. Finally, 
before September 11, NYBC was able to increase its collections at a 12 
percent annual rate over the last few years. We believe that this large 
and sustained increase in collections for an individual blood bank that 
was previously known for a chronic shortfall in collections indicates 
that blood centers will be able to increase collections in response to 
the new vCJD donor policy.

Despite the adequacy of the nation's blood supply, individual blood 
collection centers with a relatively large proportion of donors who 
have traveled to Europe will be more severely affected than others by 
the new exclusion policies. If these centers cannot find ways to 
increase local blood collections, they, or the hospitals they serve, 
will need to purchase blood from suppliers with an adequate inventory. 
The Red Cross donor survey found that its most affected regions would 
lose 5 percent of their donors, compared with 2 percent for the regions 
least affected. Blood centers in coastal urban areas that have a 
greater number of donors who have traveled overseas could experience 
deferral rates greater than 5 percent. Some other centers serving areas 
with many people who have lived overseas, such as DOD-affiliated 
personnel, will also be disproportionately affected. NYBC will probably 
be affected the most under FDA's new deferral policy. NYBC currently 
imports about 25 percent of its supply from three European blood 
centers that collect blood under NYBC's FDA license. NYBC will be 
unable to import blood from these centers when the second phase of 
FDA's new deferral policy takes effect on October 31, 2002. Prior to 
September 11, NYBC was confident that it could compensate for the loss 
of supply from its European centers because it had substantially 
increased domestic collections during the last few years. However, NYBC 
now claims that its local donor base has decreased by about 25 percent 
since September 11 because many of the companies that participated in 
its blood drives were directly affected by the terrorist attacks and 
have reduced employment levels in the city. To compensate for the loss 
of blood from its European centers, NYBC has contracted to purchase 
blood from many other domestic blood suppliers, including the Red Cross 
and blood banks affiliated with ABC.

Recent Blood Price Increases are Partly the Result of New Measures to 
Improve Blood Safety:

Although blood is collected primarily from unpaid volunteers, blood 
banks incur costs from collecting, processing, and testing donated 
blood. To recover these costs, blood banks sell the processed blood to 
hospitals. The prices paid by different hospitals and prices for 
different types of blood vary substantially. Furthermore, the average 
price of blood has risen sharply since 1998. One of several 
contributing factors to these price increases has been the introduction 
of new blood safety measures. For example, leukoreduction adds about 
$30 to the price of a unit of blood. Although not widespread in 1998, 
leukoreduction is performed on most blood sold in the United States 
today.

Price of Blood Varies Widely:

To recover the costs of collecting, processing, and testing, blood 
banks sell their processed blood. Because hospitals and suppliers 
negotiate the price and quantity of blood to be delivered, prices vary 
considerably depending on the size and location of the hospital and the 
type of blood purchased. Larger hospitals, and those in areas with more 
than one blood center, may sometimes pay less than other hospitals. For 
example, one of the hospitals we contacted told us that its average 
price for a unit of blood was $135, while another hospital told us that 
its average price was $200. Similarly, ABC told us that the list prices 
charged by its centers for a unit of leukoreduced red blood cells in 
September 2001 averaged $143, but one-quarter of the centers charged 
$124 or less and one-quarter charged at least $160. In addition, prices 
for units of the most useful blood types can be much higher than those 
for blood types that are in less demand. For example, in 2001, one 
independent blood center charged its non-sole-source customers more 
than $260 dollars for a unit of type O-negative blood but less than $60 
for a unit of AB-positive blood.

Price of Blood Has Increased Sharply in Recent Years:

The average price of a unit of blood sold to U.S. hospitals has 
increased substantially since 1998. Both the Red Cross and ABC-
affiliated blood banks increased average prices by more than 50 percent 
from 1998 through 2001 (see table 1). The Red Cross made additional 
price increases of 10 to 35 percent for different types of blood at the 
beginning of its fiscal year 2002 (which began July 1, 2001) that are 
not reflected in the table.

Table 1: Average Red Blood Cell Prices per Unit, 1998-2001:

Year[A]: 1998; ABC[B]: $77; Red Cross: $84.

Year[A]: 1999; ABC[B]: $85; Red Cross: $89.

Year[A]: 2000; ABC[B]: $96; Red Cross: $109.

Year[A]: 2001; ABC[B]: $127; Red Cross: $129.

Percentage change, 1998-2001; ABC[B]: 65%; Red Cross: 54%.

[A] ABC averages are for calendar years; Red Cross averages are for its 
fiscal years, which begin July 1.

[B] Average prices for the Red Cross include both leukoreduced and 
nonleukoreduced units. The ABC figures from 1998 through 1999 include 
only nonleukoreduced blood. The ABC figures for 2000 and 2001 include 
both leukoreduced and nonleukoreduced blood. The ABC price for 2001 is 
based on a GAO calculation.

Source: ABC and Red Cross.

[End of table]

New Processing and Testing Steps Have Contributed to Price Increases:

Blood suppliers gave us several reasons for the recent price increases. 
They claimed that blood prices previously had been too low to support 
their blood collection and processing infrastructure. For example, 
according to a Red Cross official, the Red Cross revenue from blood 
services could not cover its costs associated with transporting blood, 
training and retaining staff, and obtaining and using new technologies. 
In addition, the Red Cross told us that it increased prices in order to 
hire additional staff needed to comply with the terms of its consent 
decree with FDA.

New processing and testing steps that improve blood safety also have 
contributed to the price increases. The most substantial change is 
leukoreduction, the removal of white blood cells from blood. For 
example, the average nationwide price of a unit of blood from the Red 
Cross in fiscal year 2001 was $104 for nonleukoreduced blood and $136 
for leukoreduced blood. The percentage of units that have been 
leukoreduced has risen sharply in recent years. The Red Cross reported 
that the percentage of its blood that was leukoreduced went from zero 
in 1998 to almost 80 percent in 2000 and to 95 percent at the beginning 
of 2002. ABC estimates that by December 2002 about 57 percent of the 
blood supplied by its affiliated blood centers will be leukoreduced. 
Similarly, a study commissioned by AABB has estimated that NAT added 
about $8 to the price of a unit of blood in 2000. Most blood supplied 
in the United States now undergoes NAT.

Conclusions:

The nation's blood supply remains generally adequate, and collectively 
America's blood banks probably will be able to compensate for donors 
lost as a result of the new vCJD donor deferral policies. Lessons 
learned from blood collection and usage after the September 11 
terrorist attacks have prompted efforts to improve how blood suppliers 
respond to public health emergencies. However, questions about the 
adequacy of the blood supply will continue because the demand for blood 
is increasing and because new testing procedures and donor deferral 
policies that arise in response to emerging disease threats may 
continue to reduce the pool of potential donors. For these reasons, 
there is a clear need for comprehensive, long-term monitoring of the 
blood supply.

Agency Comments:

We asked for comments on a draft of this report from HHS and DOD. HHS 
responded that it had no general comments. DOD concurred with our 
findings (see app. III). Both HHS and DOD made additional technical 
comments that we have incorporated where appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Defense, and 
other interested parties. We also will make copies available to others 
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Please contact me at (202) 512-7119 if you have any questions about 
this report. Another GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed 
in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Janet Heinrich
Director, Health Care--Public Health Issues:

Signed by Janet Heinrich:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Summary of vCJD Donor Deferrals:

First FDA deferral guidance; Criteria for donor deferrals: * Cumulative 
travel to United Kingdom, from 1980-1996, of 6 months or more; 
Estimated donor loss: FDA estimated 2.2%; Estimated risk reduction: 
68%; Status: Implemented April 2000.

New FDA donor deferral guidance[A]; Criteria for donor deferrals: * 
Cumulative travel to United Kingdom, 1980-1996, of 3 months or more; * 
Cumulative travel to Europe, 1980-present, of 5 years or more; * DOD 
personnel stationed in Europe, 1980-1990, for cumulative period of 6 
months or more[B]; * Anyone who received a transfusion in the United 
Kingdom, 1980-present; * Anyone having received bovine insulin prepared 
in the United Kingdom since 1980; Estimated donor loss: FDA estimated 
5%; Estimated risk reduction: 91% in total (23% from new deferral 
criteria); Status: Scheduled to be implemented in two phases: the first 
on May 31, 2002; the second by Oct. 31, 2002.

American Red Cross deferral policy; Criteria for donor deferrals: * 
Cumulative travel to United Kingdom, 1980-present, of 3 months or more; 
* Cumulative travel to Europe, 1980-present, of 6 months or more; * 
Anyone who received a transfusion in the United Kingdom, 1980-present; 
Estimated donor loss: FDA estimated 8%; Red Cross estimated 4%; 
Estimated risk reduction: 92% in total; Status: Implemented
October 15, 2001.

DOD deferral; policy; Criteria for donor deferrals: * Cumulative travel 
to United Kingdom, 1980-1996, of 3 months or more; * DOD-affiliated 
personnel with travel to countries with a risk of BSE, 1980-1996, of 5 
months or more; * DOD-affiliated personnel with travel to countries 
with a risk of BSE, 1997-present, of 5 years or more; * Others with 
travel to countries with a risk of BSE, 1980-present, more than 5 
years; * Anyone having a transfusion in the United Kingdom, 1980-
present; * Anyone having received bovine insulin prepared in the United 
Kingdom since 1980; Estimated donor loss: 18% from active duty 
personnel; 17% from dependents; Estimated risk reduction: Not 
estimated; Status: Implemented
October 29, 2001.

[A] FDA recommends deferral of source plasma donors with 5 years 
cumulative travel in France from 1980 to the present. However, FDA's 
new deferral policy for 5 years exposure elsewhere in Europe does not 
apply to source plasma. In part, this reflects FDA's belief that, on 
the basis of the results of experiments conducted by plasma product 
manufacturers, the manufacturing process for plasma-derivative 
products minimizes the risk of transmission of vCJD through plasma. In 
addition, FDA is concerned that disqualifying plasma donors by 
extending the deferral policy to them may threaten the sufficiency of 
the plasma supply. The Plasma Protein Therapeutics Association (PPTA) 
conducted a donor travel survey in 30 plasma collection centers and 
found that donor losses could range from 0 to 13 percent, with the 
greatest losses occurring at centers located near military bases. The 
overall donor loss was estimated to be about 3.5 percent. A survey 
conducted by one of PPTA's member companies suggested that overall 
donor loss would be closer to 5 percent. PPTA also expected that a ban 
on the use of plasma in the United States from European donors, as 
would occur if the vCJD deferral policy was applied to plasma, would 
adversely affect an already tight supply of plasma-derived 
therapeutics, causing some countries to reject European plasma and thus 
putting extreme pressure on other sources of plasma, such as the United 
States, to meet global demand.

[B] FDA's deferral for military personnel differs according to the 
geographic location of the individual's service in Europe. FDA 
recommends the deferral of blood donations from former or current U.S. 
military and civilian military personnel and their dependents who 
resided at U.S. military bases in Germany, United Kingdom, Belgium and 
the Netherlands for 6 months or more from 1980 through 1990, or who 
resided at U.S. military bases in Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and 
Italy for 6 months or more from 1980 through 1996.

Source: FDA, Red Cross, and DOD data.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Risk of vCJD Infection through Blood Transfusion Is 
Unknown:

Transmission of vCJD by human blood or plasma has not been 
demonstrated, and no laboratory or epidemiological studies have shown 
that blood from donors infected with vCJD carries the disease. For 
example, at least 20 people in the United Kingdom have received blood 
or blood components from donors who later developed vCJD. Although 
relatively little time has passed, none of the recipients of the blood 
have developed vCJD. Studies of patients with vCJD and a prior history 
of receiving blood transfusions have not revealed any cases of vCJD 
among the donors involved.

Nonetheless, laboratory experiments point to a theoretical risk of 
transmission of vCJD through blood. For example, tissue samples from 
vCJD patients have found the agents that cause vCJD, protein molecules 
known as prions, in human lymph tissue, such as the tonsils and the 
spleen. Since white blood cells known as B lymphocytes also circulate 
through these tissues and are potentially involved in the pathology of 
vCJD, researchers suggest that these circulating lymphocytes may carry 
infectivity in blood.[Footnote 37] Experiments with animals have shown 
that blood infected with vCJD-like agents contain low-levels of 
infectivity. In addition, one group of researchers has recently 
demonstrated that BSE can be experimentally transmitted between sheep 
by blood transfusion.[Footnote 38] However, results from this 
experiment may not be representative of the human manifestation of 
vCJD.

Epidemiological Predictions:

Researchers are limited in the conclusions they can make concerning 
vCJD and blood safety, and in predicting the future number of vCJD 
cases. Important variables in determining the probability of BSE 
transmission to humans, such as route of exposure, genetic 
susceptibility, and dose, remain unproven. Further, the incubation 
period for vCJD is unknown but is probably many years. Citing the 
current modest number of additional deaths in the United Kingdom caused 
by vCJD (there were 28 confirmed or probable vCJD deaths in the United 
Kingdom in 2000 and 20 in 2001), some researchers suggest that the 
epidemic will not reach the hundreds of thousands once thought 
possible. As a result, the projected number of total cases has been 
revised downward to just a few hundred or few thousand cases, with 
fewer than 100 new cases occurring per year.[Footnote 39] Such revised 
estimates are based on varying assumptions regarding the average 
incubation period and when individuals were infected.[Footnote 40]

The ambiguity of the scientific evidence regarding vCJD transmission 
through blood is reflected in the divided vote of FDA's advisory 
committee (the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory 
Committee, or TSEAC) in favor of the expanded donor deferral. The 
committee voted 10 to 7 in June 2001 to move forward with the proposed 
changes, but several members expressed concern about the expanded 
deferral's impact on blood availability, the effectiveness of current 
efforts to control human exposure to BSE in the United Kingdom, and the 
reliability of European surveillance data.

Detection Tests for vCJD under Development:

The scientific uncertainties surrounding vCJD would be greatly reduced 
if a diagnostic test existed to confirm the presence or absence of vCJD 
in human blood. While tests are being developed, it could be some time 
before an accurate test will be available to screen blood for the vCJD 
agent. Tests do exist to detect vCJD prions in some human tissues, such 
as brain tissue, tonsils, and appendixes, but no suitable tests are 
available to detect vCJD infections in blood. Prions are different than 
viral and bacterial pathogens, which contain nucleic acids. Some 
pathogens and viruses trigger the human body to release specific 
antibodies, which may be detected in the blood. For example, both HIV 
and hepatitis elicit antibodies in the blood that can be detected in a 
blood test. At this point, most scientists believe that prions, such as 
those involved in vCJD, do not contain nucleic acids and do not elicit 
the production of antibodies. This poses a challenge in designing a 
blood test, which must be 100,000 times as sensitive as assays that 
already exist for detecting prions in tissues. If a test were approved, 
it would be required to be extremely sensitive to minimize the 
possibility of false positives, which would unnecessarily defer from 
donating blood many individuals who did not actually have the vCJD 
agent in their blood.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

1200 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200:

HEALTH AFFAIRS:

JUL 17 2002:

Ms. Janet Heinreich Director, Health Care-Public Health Issues:

U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Ms. Heinreich:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report GAO-02-747, "PUBLIC HEALTH: Blood Supply Generally Adequate 
Despite New Donor Restrictions," dated June 14, 2002 (GAO Code 290076).

In general, the DoD concurs with the overall GAO draft report. 
Functional experts from the Department, the Surgeons General, and the 
Armed Services Blood Program Office have also reviewed the report and 
concur. Their specific technical comments and recommendations on the 
draft report are incorporated into our response.

Please feel free to direct any questions on this reply to my project 
officer, Major Henri Hammond (functional), at (703) 681-1724 or Mr. 
Gunther J. Zimmerman (GAO/IG Liaison) at (703) 681-7889, extension 
1229.

Sincerely,

William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD:

Signed by William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD:

Enclosures: As stated:

[End of section]

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Martin T. Gahart, (202) 512-3596:

Staff Acknowledgments:

The following staff made important contributions to this work: Carolina 
Morgan, Sharif Idris, Mark Patterson, and Elizabeth Morrison.

FOOTNOTES

[1] AABB is the professional and accrediting organization for blood 
suppliers and transfusion services.

[2] In this report, we refer to organizations that collect, test, 
process, store, and sell blood as blood suppliers or blood banks.

[3] The American National Red Cross is referred to as the Red Cross in 
this report.

[4] To be eligible to donate, a person must be at least 17 years of 
age, weigh at least 110 pounds, be in good physical health, and provide 
a medical history.

[5] The most common blood type in the United States is O (about 45 
percent of the population have this type), followed by A (40 percent), 
with types AB and B composing the remaining 15 percent. Approximately 
84 percent of U.S. blood donors are Rh-positive.

[6] Rh-negative blood can be transfused into patients who are either 
Rh-negative or Rh-positive. Rh-negative patients must receive Rh-
negative blood.

[7] Plasma is the liquid portion of blood containing nutrients, 
electrolytes, gases, albumin, clotting factors, hormones, and wastes. 
"Source plasma" is collected through a process called plasmapheresis 
that draws only the plasma portion of blood from donors. Plasma that is 
separated from whole blood after it is collected is known as "recovered 
plasma." Each year about 1.5 million paid donors give 13 million units 
of plasma at commercial source plasma collection facilities. Plasma 
donations can be processed further into products used in burn treatment 
and surgery as well as therapy for patients lacking particular blood 
components as a result of hereditary diseases like hemophilia or immune 
deficiencies.

[8] The automated glycerolization and degylcerolization device prepares 
units for freezing with the addition of glycerol, which prevents red 
blood cells from bursting when frozen, and removes glycerol during 
thawing in a closed system that ensures that the blood remains sterile.

[9] D.E. Couture and others, "Blood Use in Cerebrovascular Surgery," 
Stroke, vol. 33, no. 4 (2002), pp. 994-7.

[10] L.T. Goodnough and others, "Transfusion Medicine: Blood 
Conservation," New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 340, no. 7 (1999), 
pp. 525-33.

[11] S. Ozawa and others, "A Practical Approach to Achieving Bloodless 
Surgery," Journal of the Association of Perioperative Registered 
Nurses, vol. 74, no. 1 (2001), pp. 34-47.

[12] Another new technology that may augment the blood supply in the 
future is a device capable of collecting twice as many red blood cells 
from each donor, which it does by returning plasma and platelets to the 
donor. It has been estimated that this device could increase the 
overall blood supply by as much as 17 percent if fully used.

[13] The pertinent provision of the PHSA is §351 (42 U.S.C. §262 
(1994)).

[14] FDA has announced its intention to require HIV-1 and HCV NAT 
testing in the future. See Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for 
Industry: Use of Nucleic Acid Tests on Pooled and Individual Samples 
from Donors of Whole Blood and Blood Components for Transfusion to 
Adequately and Appropriately Reduce the Risk of Transmission of HIV-1 
and HCV (Rockville, Md.: March 2002).

[15] United States v. American National Red Cross, Civil Action No. 93-
0949 (D.D.C.), May 12, 1993.

[16] In December 2001, FDA asked a federal court to hold the Red Cross 
in contempt for violation of the consent decree. FDA inspections found 
quality assurance violations at both Red Cross headquarters and at one 
of its regional blood banks that included incomplete labeling, the 
release of possibly contaminated products, and a lack of adequate 
quarantine and inventory controls. The case was pending as of May 16, 
2002. See Department of Justice, Office of Consumer Litigation, 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants 
Should Not be Held in Civil Contempt of and to Modify the Consent 
Decree of Permanent Injunction, Civil Action No. 93-0949, Dec. 11, 
2001.

[17] See 42 U.S.C §247d (1994).

[18] While FDA does not currently mandate NAT testing, almost all blood 
industry groups perform the serological test. The guidelines stated 
that blood products shipped before any testing was completed must be 
labeled "For Emergency Use Only" and must list the tests that had not 
been completed. FDA Policy Statement on Urgent Collection, Shipment and 
Use of Whole Blood and Blood Components for Transfusion to Address 
Blood Supply Needs in the Current Disaster Situation, (Rockville, Md.: 
Sept. 11, 2001).

[19] CDC, NIH, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services all 
have additional responsibilities regarding the safety of the U.S. blood 
supply. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Blood Supply: FDA Oversight 
and Remaining Issues of Safety, GAO/PEMD-97-1 (Washington D.C.: Feb. 
25, 1997).

[20] See America's Blood Centers Supply Status Report (http://
www.transfuse.org/plsql/ecat/supply_monitor_pkg.web_report).

[21] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Mad Cow Disease: Improvements 
in the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S. 
Prevention Efforts, GAO-02-183 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2002).

[22] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Blood Supply: Availability of 
Blood to Meet the Nation's Requirements, GAO/HEHS-99-187R (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 20, 1999).

[23] According to NBDRC, the 26 blood centers in its survey are 
statistically representative of all U.S. blood centers that collect 
more than 25,000 units of blood annually.

[24] Because donors can only give blood every 8 weeks, large numbers of 
regular donors who give immediately after a disaster may skip their 
next planned donation, thus causing postdisaster inventory to dip below 
normal levels.

[25] P.J. Schmidt, "Blood and Disaster---Supply and Demand," New 
England Journal of Medicine, vol. 346, no. 8 (2002), pp. 617-20.

[26] American Association of Blood Banks: Interorganizational Task 
Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of Terrorism, Report and 
Recommendations (Bethesda, Md.: Jan. 31, 2000) http://www.aabb.org/
Pressroom/In_the_News/idfddat013002.htm (downloaded on Feb 5, 2002).

[27] The AABB Interorganizational Task Force on Domestic Disasters and 
Acts of Terrorism. Members include the HHS Office of Public Health 
Preparedness, FDA, DOD, CDC, the Red Cross, and ABC.

[28] P.J. Schmidt, "Blood and Disaster--Supply and Demand," pp. 617-20.

[29] In an emergency situation, blood that has not been fully tested 
may be on hand and may be used in lifesaving circumstances using 
emergency release procedures. In such circumstances, the requesting 
physician must sign a statement indicating that the clinical situation 
is sufficiently urgent to require the release and use of blood before 
the completion of testing.

[30] The Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability provides 
advice to the Secretary of HHS and to the Assistant Secretary for 
Health on (1) the implications for blood safety and availability of 
various economic factors affecting product cost and supply, (2) 
definition of public health parameters around safety and availability 
of the blood supply, and (3) broad public health, ethical, and legal 
issues related to blood safety.

[31] FDA guidance documents are not regulations, and they do not have 
the force of law. In practice, however, all blood banks have treated 
the guidance as requirements and have implemented donor restrictions 
that are at least as restrictive as those recommended by FDA.

[32] FDA exempted source plasma from donors who had spent time in 
Europe during the period indicated because plasma-derivative processing 
can remove the agent thought to cause vCJD and because of concerns 
about maintaining sufficient supplies of important plasma-derivative 
therapies (see app. I). Plasma derived from whole blood, however, is 
subject to the same restrictions as whole blood.

[33] The model FDA used to estimate donor exposure to the BSE/vCJD 
agent assumes a linear risk related to the duration and likelihood of 
dietary exposure to beef from BSE-affected cattle. Compared with the 
United Kingdom, other European countries have experienced few vCJD 
cases and a lower incidence of indigenous BSE in cattle herds. For 
these reasons, FDA assigned a lower risk estimate to time spent in 
other countries. For example, FDA estimates that the risk in European 
nations is 1.5 percent to 5 percent of the risk in the United Kingdom. 
If the risk of exposure to BSE in Europe is 5 percent of the risk in 
the United Kingdom--at the high end of FDA's estimates--a pan-European 
deferral of 5 years (60 months) would be equivalent to the new 3-month 
deferral for cumulative travel or residence in the United Kingdom. See 
Food and Drug Administration, A Guidance for Industry: Revised 
Preventive Measures to Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease 
(vCJD) by Blood and Blood Products (Rockville, Md.: Jan. 2002).

[34] A 1999 donor survey of multiple blood collection centers amassed 
the travel histories of approximately 9,500 donors, and FDA used these 
data to estimate donor losses from the revised deferral policies.

[35] On the basis of a review of military personnel records, DOD 
expects to defer about 18 percent of active duty personnel and 17 
percent of their dependents as a result of the new deferrals. DOD 
expects greater losses because of the large number of military 
personnel who have been stationed in Europe.

[36] In August 2000, the Red Cross began measuring each potential 
donor's hematocrit, or red blood cell level, by taking a small blood 
sample from a finger instead of from an earlobe. According to the Red 
Cross, the earlobe sampling method overestimates hematocrit levels by 5 
percent. Therefore, some potential donors who would have had adequate 
hematocrit measurements under the old system were disqualified with the 
new, more accurate, finger-prick blood measurements.

[37] A.F. Hill and others, "Investigation of Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
Disease and Other Human Prion Diseases with Tonsil Biopsy Samples," 
Lancet, vol. 353, no. 9148 (1999), pp. 183-189.

[38] F. Houston and others, "Transmission of BSE By Blood Transfusion 
in Sheep," Lancet, vol. 356, no. 9234 (2000), pp. 999-1000.

[39] J.N. d'Aignaux and others, "Predictability of the UK variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Epidemic," Science, vol. 5547, no. 294 
(2001), pp. 729-31.

[40] P. Brown, "Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease," British Medical Journal vol. 322, No. 7290 
( 2001), pp. 841-44, and Rebecca Love, "Has the Variant Creutzfeldt-
Jakob Disease Epidemic Hit Its Peak?" Lancet, vol. 358, no. 9291 
(2001), p. 1432.

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