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Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts' 
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United States General Accounting Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Honorable Vic Snyder, House of Representatives: 

June 2002: 

State Department: 

Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System Compromise
Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts: 

GAO-02-626: 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Staffing Shortfalls Put Diplomatic Readiness at Risk: 

Assignment System Is Not Effective for Staffing Hardship Posts: 
Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Overview of the Foreign Service Assignment System: 

Appendix III: Staffing Issues at Selected Posts: 

Appendix IV: Most Heavily Bid and Underbid Countries: 

Appendix V: Characteristics of Posts: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: State Department Worldwide American Staffing Allocation (as 
of March 2002): 

Table 2: Average Number of Bids by Type of Position and Level of 
Hardship: 

Table 3: Staffing Issues in China: 

Table 4: Staffing Issues in Kazakhstan: 

Table 5: Staffing Issues in Nigeria: 

Table 6: Staffing Issues in Pakistan: 

Table 7: Staffing Issues in Russia: 

Table 8: Staffing Issues in Saudi Arabia: 

Table 9: Staffing Issues in Ukraine: 

Table 10: Countries with the Most and Fewest Bids: 

Table 11: U.S. Diplomatic Posts and Their Hardship Differential
and Danger Pay Rates (2001/2002): 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Hardship Posts by Region (2002): 

Figure 2: Outcome of Fair Share Bidding (2001): 

Figure 3: Fewer Bids at Higher Differential Posts (2002): 

Figure 4: How Is the Hardship Burden Shared? 

Figure 5: Comparison of D.C. Pay and Overseas Pay: 

Figure 6: Organization and Functions of the Bureau of Human Resources, 
Office of Career Development and Assignments: 

Abbreviation: 

HR/CDA: Bureau of Human Resources, Office of Career Development
and Assignments: 

[End of section] 

United States General Accounting Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 18, 2002: 

The Honorable Vic Snyder: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Snyder: 

Foreign Service employees from the Department of State experience a 
variety of adverse environmental and living conditions while assigned 
to U.S. embassies and consulates that are considered hardship posts. 
Among these conditions are inadequate medical facilities, few 
opportunities for spousal employment, poor schools, high levels of 
crime, and severe climate. State has designated about 60 percent of 
its 259 diplomatic posts worldwide as hardship posts. Many of these 
posts are of strategic interest to the United States, including those 
in China, the Middle East, and the former Soviet states. 

In response to your request to review State's performance in filling 
positions at hardship posts, we examined (1) the number, experience, 
and skills of staff in hardship positions and how these may affect 
diplomatic readiness[Footnote 1] and (2) how well State's assignment 
system is meeting the staffing requirements of hardship posts. 

To conduct our review, we examined staffing in seven countries of 
significant importance to the United States and visited hardship posts 
in three of these countries-—China, Saudi Arabia, and Ukraine—-to 
obtain human resources data not available in headquarters and to 
assess the impact that staffing shortfalls may have on diplomatic 
readiness. These staffing shortfalls include positions that are vacant 
due to staff shortages as well as positions that are filled by staff 
who lack the experience, skills, or language requirements of their 
assignments. We analyzed the process and results of the 2001 
assignments cycle, bidding data for the 2002 assignments cycle, and 
the assignment history of 1,100 Foreign Service officers. (For a 
detailed discussion of our scope and methodology, see appendix I.) We 
met with State's Office of Career Development and Assignments and 
other offices within the Bureau of Human Resources, which is 
responsible for managing the assignment system. In addition, we met 
with executive directors and human resources officials in five of 
State's regional bureaus, representatives of the American Foreign 
Service Association, and nine current and former ambassadors. 

Results in Brief: 

State is understaffed relative to its permanent positions—both in 
terms of the number and types of employees in its workforce. 
Therefore, it is difficult for the department to ensure that it has 
the right people in the right place at the right time. The impact of 
these staffing shortfalls is felt most at hardship posts, including 
some of strategic importance to the United States. As a result, 
diplomatic programs and management controls at hardship posts could be 
vulnerable and posts' ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy 
objectives effectively could be weakened. Seven countries we reviewed, 
including three that we visited—China, Saudi Arabia, and Ukraine—all 
had staffing shortfalls, in varying degrees. In addition, in these 
countries, many employees, including new or untenured junior officers, 
were either working well above their grade levels or did not meet the 
minimum language proficiency requirements of the positions to which 
they were assigned. However, the magnitude of this problem on an 
aggregate level is not fully known because State lacks certain human 
resources data, which makes it difficult for State to assess staffing
limitations and capabilities worldwide. 

State's assignment system is not effectively meeting the staffing 
needs of hardship posts. Although Foreign Service employees are 
obligated to be available to serve anywhere in the world, State rarely 
directs employees to serve in locations for which they have not shown 
interest by bidding on a position. Because few employees bid on 
positions at some hardship posts, State has difficulty filling these 
positions. For example, in two countries of strategic importance—China 
and Russia—a total of 25 positions had no bidders this year. State has 
financial and nonfinancial incentives designed to attract qualified 
staff to hardship posts, but our analysis found that these incentives 
have not enticed a sufficient number of bidders for some positions in 
a number of hardship posts. As part of its Diplomatic Readiness 
Initiative, State hopes to address some of these problems by hiring 
more Foreign Service employees. However, a comprehensive, integrated 
approach to human capital management is required, which may include a 
rigorous assessment of staffing priorities, targeted hiring, greater 
financial and nonfinancial incentives, and more directive approaches 
to assignments, for State to achieve its goal of having the right 
people in the right place with the right skills. 

This report makes recommendations to the Secretary of State to improve 
State's human resources data, determine staffing priorities, consider 
a targeted hiring strategy, and develop incentives and implement 
actions to steer Foreign Service employees toward serving in hardship 
posts. 

The State Department, in commenting on a draft of our report, 
concurred with our recommendations relating to improving State's human 
resources data systems to enhance the department's planning, 
management, and reporting capabilities and developing a package of 
incentives and implementing actions to steer employees toward serving 
at hardship posts. State did not comment on our recommendations to 
rigorously and systematically determine priority positions worldwide 
and to consider a targeted hiring strategy. We continue to believe 
that our recommendations, if implemented, would help enable State to 
steer officers to hardship posts, including those of critical 
importance to the United States. 

Background: 

As of March 2002, State had 16,867 American employees worldwide—more 
than one-third of whom are overseas. Of those serving overseas, about 
60 percent are stationed at hardship posts. Of the 158 hardship posts, 
nearly half are found in Africa and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, which 
includes the Newly Independent States (see figure 1). 

Figure 1: Hardship Posts by Region (2002): 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart and subchart] 

Nonhardship posts (101): 39%; 
Hardship posts (158): 61%. 

Hardship posts (158): 
Africa (39): 25%; 
Europe and Eurasia (37): 23%; 
Western Hemisphere (27): 17%; 
East Asia and Pacific (24): 15%; 
Near East Asia (19): 12%; 
South Asia (12): 8%. 

Note: The regions correspond with State's six regional bureaus. 

Source: GAO analysis based on State Department data. 

[End of figure] 

State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S. 
government provides differential pay incentives—an additional 5 to 25 
percent of base salary depending on the severity or difficulty of the 
conditions—to encourage employees to bid on assignments to these posts 
and to compensate them for the hardships they encounter.[Footnote 2] 
Among the conditions State uses to determine hardship pay are poor 
medical facilities,[Footnote 3] substandard schools for children, 
severe climate, high crime, political instability, and physical 
isolation. Recently, State has begun recognizing the lack of spousal 
employment opportunities as another factor in determining hardship. 
Where conditions are so adverse as to require additional pay as a 
recruitment and retention incentive, State can provide additional 
differential pay of up to 15 percent of base salary.[Footnote 4] 
Moreover, State pays an additional 15 percent to 25 percent of salary 
for danger pay to compensate employees for the security risks they 
face in certain countries.[Footnote 5] 

Under State's open assignment system, employees submit a list (bids) 
of assignments they want and then the department tries to match 
bidders' experience and preferences with the needs of posts and 
bureaus. (For an overview of the bidding and assignment process, see 
appendix II.) 

Staffing Shortfalls Put Diplomatic Readiness at Risk: 

The Department of State has reported a shortage of professional staff 
in its Foreign Service overseas workforce. Many positions at hardship 
posts, including some of strategic importance to the United States, 
remain vacant for extended periods of time or are filled with staff 
whose experience or skills fall short of the requirements for the 
position. Our discussions with former and current ambassadors, senior 
post officials, and the regional bureaus indicate that this is a 
widespread problem that weakens diplomatic programs and management 
controls and impedes posts' ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy 
objectives effectively. In the three countries we visited—China, Saudi 
Arabia, and Ukraine—we found that (1) mid-level officers were working 
in positions well above their grade, (2) first-tour officers were in 
positions that require experienced officers, and (3) staff did not 
meet the minimum language proficiency required to perform their jobs 
effectively. However, the magnitude of this problem on an aggregate 
level is unclear because State lacks certain human resources data that 
are necessary to fully assess staffing limitations and capabilities 
worldwide. 

State Has Staff Shortages: 

State has more positions than it has staff to fill them. As shown in 
table 1, the State Department reported a staff deficit of 1,340 
employees worldwide as of March 2002. The biggest shortages are in 
overseas Foreign Service employees, which had a staff deficit of 543, 
and in the civil service, which had a staff deficit of 811. According 
to State, 60 percent of its Foreign Service overseas workforce are in 
hardship posts, which have a vacancy rate of 12.6 percent, compared 
with a vacancy rate of 8.4 percent in nonhardship posts. 

Table 1: State Department Worldwide American Staffing Allocation (as 
of March 2002): 

Total State Department: 
Full-time permanent positions: 18,207; 
Full-time staff available: 16,867; 
Staff deficit (surplus): 1,340. 

Total Foreign Service: 
Full-time permanent positions: 10,025; 
Full-time staff available: 9,496; 
Staff deficit (surplus): 529. 

Foreign Service-—overseas: 
Full-time permanent positions: 6,646; 
Full-time staff available: 6,103; 
Staff deficit (surplus): 543[A]. 

Foreign Service-—domestic: 
Full-time permanent positions: 3,049; 
Full-time staff available: 2,670; 
Staff deficit (surplus): 379. 

Foreign Service-—training complement: 
Full-time permanent positions: 330[B]; 
Full-time staff available: 723; 
Staff deficit (surplus): (393). 

Total civil service: 
Full-time permanent positions: 8,182; 
Full-time staff available: 7,371; 
Staff deficit (surplus): 811. 

[A] This Foreign Service overseas deficit includes more than 200 new 
positions created in fiscal 2002. Recruitment for these positions is 
under way. 

[B] These 330 funded training positions include both junior officers 
and long-term training positions. These positions may be occupied by 
more than one incumbent, depending on the number of employees in 
training at any given time. They are not included in the other 
position totals. 

Source: State Department. 

[End of table] 

Inadequate Staffing Compromises Diplomatic Readiness at Selected Posts: 

Data from posts in the seven countries we reviewed showed staffing 
shortfalls, in varying degrees. (Key staffing issues in these selected 
countries are outlined in appendix III.) These shortfalls, according 
to ambassadors and senior post officials, compromise diplomatic 
readiness. We found many employees working in positions well above 
their grade levels as well as staff who did not meet the minimum 
language proficiency requirements of the positions to which they were 
assigned. Moreover, post staff complained of the lack of training to 
upgrade their language proficiency and other skills. 

Staffing Shortfalls Impact Efficiency and Effectiveness of Post 
Operations: 

Senior post officials, including chiefs of mission and former 
ambassadors, stated that staffing shortfalls (1) weaken diplomatic 
programs and management controls and (2) impede posts' ability to 
effectively carry out U.S. foreign policy objectives. For a number of 
the hardship posts we examined, the dual problem of a shortage in the 
number of positions a post has and the lack of fully qualified, 
experienced, and trained staff to fill them has been a long-standing 
concern, dating back to the 1990s when hiring below attrition levels 
resulted in what some State officials characterize as the "hollowing 
out" of the Foreign Service workforce. 

The State Inspector General has issued numerous reports citing serious 
problems filling hardship posts with adequately skilled staff. In a 
semiannual report to the Congress,[Footnote 6] the Inspector General 
stated that inadequate training for first-tour staff in consular 
offices has led to lapses in nonimmigrant visa management at posts in 
a region where alien smuggling and visa fraud are prevalent. 
Furthermore, in Conakry (Guinea)-—a 25 percent hardship post where 
visa fraud and administrative problems were attributed to 
inexperienced staff—-the Inspector General found a high proportion of 
junior officers, mostly on their first tour, and officers in positions 
above their grade, making them ill-prepared to deal with work 
challenges. Similarly, in Bamako (Mali), another 25 percent hardship 
post that is chronically understaffed, the Inspector General again 
cited staff inexperience when consular employees failed to detect an 
alien smuggling ring. In these cases, the Inspector General called on 
the State Department to examine whether staff assigned to these posts 
have the level of experience necessary to operate effectively. 
Meanwhile, chronic staffing problems experienced in many African posts 
persist, and because consular positions worldwide are often filled by 
lower level staff, the Bureau of Consular Affairs considers African 
posts at risk. In Lagos (Nigeria), for example, 12 State positions 
were unfilled as of February 2002; and many of those filling positions 
were first-tour junior officers and civil service employees who had 
never served overseas. In the 10-officer consular section in Lagos, 
only the consul had more than one tour of consular experience. 
According to bureau and post officials, with virtually no mid-level 
Foreign Service officers at post, the few senior officers there were 
stretched thin in training and mentoring junior officers. 

Many Employees Are Working in Positions above Their Grades: 

While the State Department considers assignment of employees to 
positions that are at grade and within their functional specialty to 
be the most effective use of its human resources, many employees are 
working in positions well above their grade. State policy does allow 
"stretch" assignments—-positions either above an officer's grade (an 
"upstretch") or below an officer's grade level (a "downstretch") 
[Footnote 7]-—at certain points of the assignments cycle and under 
certain conditions. For instance, when there are no eligible bidders 
at grade, an upstretch assignment may be made for positions that are 
hard to fill, including those at high differential posts (15 percent 
or higher) and posts that are among the most difficult to staff. 

State officials pointed out that one-grade stretches are often offered 
as a reward and as career-enhancing opportunities for those who have 
demonstrated outstanding performance. Thus, human resources officials 
at State cautioned us that while global information on employees 
working in positions above their grade could be generated from the 
department's personnel database, records would need to be examined on 
a case-by-case basis to determine the rationale for each individual 
assignment. 

In the countries we examined for our review, we focused on staffing 
data for those officers working two or three grades above their rank. 
We found instances where this occurred, often with junior officers 
serving in midlevel and, occasionally, senior-level positions. For 
example, in Kiev (Ukraine), about half of the Foreign Service officer 
positions were staffed by junior officers or others in the positions 
for the first time; several employees were working in positions at 
least two levels above their grades. In addition, with the consul 
general position vacant in Kiev for a year and the deputy consul 
general position vacant for 15 months, a junior officer was serving as 
acting consul general. A similar situation occurred at a U.S. 
consulate in Russia when an untenured junior officer was serving as 
the consul general in 2001. A junior officer told us that, prior to 
joining the Foreign Service in 1999, he was hired as a part-time 
intermittent temporary employee in Almaty (Kazakhstan) to serve for 7 
months as consular chief at the embassy. 

Many Staff Lack Minimum Language Proficiency: 

Data from several of our post staffing reviews suggest that language 
requirements make it more challenging to staff some hardship posts—
particularly those with languages that are hard to learn. Many of 
those assigned to these posts lacked the minimum language proficiency 
to perform their jobs effectively.[Footnote 8] State officials 
emphasized the importance of language proficiency to perform 
effectively, and as one former ambassador stated, "a Foreign Service 
officer who does not know the language would be inhibited at every 
turn." Based on our review of language capabilities of Foreign Service 
employees at the seven countries we examined, we found that many staff 
lacked the minimum language proficiency requirements of the positions 
to which they were assigned. For example, post officials told us that 
at the U.S. mission in China, 62 percent of Foreign Service employees 
did not meet the language proficiency requirements of their positions. 
In Russia, 41 percent of U.S. mission employees did not meet the 
language proficiency level designated for their positions. In 
Pakistan, five public diplomacy positions in Islamabad, Lahore, and 
Karachi were held by employees without the language proficiency State 
would consider useful. In Saudi Arabia, the head of the public 
diplomacy section at a consulate had no Arabic language skills. 
According to post officials, language requirements are regularly 
lowered or waived to fill some positions quickly and reduce lengthy 
staffing gaps. To compensate for this, missions like China and Russia 
offer staff the opportunity to pursue language training while they are 
at post. Although staff felt these opportunities were very helpful, 
they told us that such training was difficult to pursue because the 
languages were extremely hard to learn and heavy workloads prevented 
them from devoting time during normal working hours for training. 

Improving State's Human Capital Data Could Enhance Workforce Planning: 

State's human resources data system does not provide complete and 
accurate information that can be readily used for management purposes. 
More specifically, State officials could not provide, on a global 
basis, information necessary to assess the extent of staffing 
shortfalls, including whether the experience and skills of employees 
match those needed for the positions they fill. We have reported that 
valid and reliable data are a key element to effective workforce 
planning and strategic human capital management.[Footnote 9] While 
State officials told us they are making significant efforts to improve 
the department's mechanisms for workforce planning, we found the 
existing human resources data that State maintains and analyzes to be 
limited. For example, State does not maintain historical bidding data, 
data on directed assignments, and data on the dispersion of employee 
ratings and promotions at an aggregate level and the extent to which 
hardship service was considered in these personnel actions. In 
addition, State does not regularly analyze assignment histories to 
determine how the burden of hardship service is shared among Foreign 
Service employees. Finally, State has not fully assessed the impact 
that financial incentives and disincentives may have on recruiting 
employees for hardship posts. 

In January 2002, we reported that State had difficulties generating a 
consistent global aggregate measure of its actual language shortfalls 
because of inadequate departmentwide data on the number of positions 
filled with qualified language staff.[Footnote 10] State officials 
acknowledged errors in data collection and processing and indicated 
that corrective action was imminent, but as of May 2002, the human 
resources bureau was still unable to generate accurate language 
information from its database. 

Assignment System Is Not Effective for Staffing Hardship Posts: 

State's assignment system is not effective in staffing hardship posts. 
While Foreign Service employees are expected to be available to serve 
worldwide, few bid on positions at some hardship posts, and very few—-
excluding junior officers, whose assignments are directed[Footnote 
11]--are forced to take assignments they have not bid on. We found 
that State's mechanisms for sharing hardship service and determining 
staffing priorities have not achieved their intended purposes—to place 
qualified personnel in appropriate positions while meeting the needs 
of the Foreign Service and the employees' professional aspirations and 
career development goals. Furthermore, financial and nonfinancial 
recruiting and retention incentives have not enticed employees to bid 
on some hardship posts in sufficient numbers. According to State 
officials, the problem of staffing hardship posts is exacerbated by a 
shortage of officers in the mid-level ranks, as well as certain 
restrictions such as medical problems (an employee's or a family 
member's), difficulty obtaining jobs for spouses, inadequate schooling 
for children, or the time to become proficient in a difficult 
language. (Appendix III discusses many of the key staffing issues at 
selected posts.) State has launched an aggressive program to hire more 
staff, but absent a comprehensive approach to human capital management 
that addresses the needs of hardship posts, these efforts may still 
fall short of putting the right people where they are most needed and 
filling the most demanding positions with the most experienced talent. 

Approaches to Filling Hardship Positions Fall Short of Fully 
Addressing Staffing Problems: 

Foreign Service employees are obligated to serve overseas, and mid-
level and senior officers are expected to serve a substantial amount 
of time overseas. However, there is no requirement for hardship 
service, and the primary approaches State uses to encourage and steer 
employees toward hardship service have fallen short of their intended 
objectives to fill critical staffing gaps and to share the burden of 
hardship assignments. One example illustrating this problem is the 
assignment of senior officers. These officers are needed at overseas 
posts, particularly at hardship posts, to apply their experience and 
give guidance to junior officers. However, as we discuss later, senior 
officers nearing retirement often prefer to complete their careers in 
Washington for financial reasons. State's assignment system tends to 
accommodate these preferences even though this means that some service 
needs at hardship posts will not be met. 

Directed Assignments Are Rare: 

Although procedures are in place to force employees into assignments 
if there is an urgent service need to fill a position, procedures for 
directed assignments have rarely been enforced in recent years. 
Because State does not routinely track the number of directed 
assignments made, statistics for the 2001 and 2002 assignments cycles 
were not available. However, previously recorded data showed that only 
39 assignments were directed by the Director-General in 1998, 37 in 
1999, and 12 from January to June 2000.[Footnote 12] At the same time, 
State has no criteria that clearly define what constitutes an urgent 
service need-—leaving this determination for the functional and 
regional bureaus, rather than the human resources office that 
coordinates assignments, to make. In a February 2002 joint statement, 
the Director-General of the Foreign Service and the American Foreign 
Service Association underscored the need to strengthen worldwide 
availability of Foreign Service employees and called for more 
aggressive enforcement of existing procedures so that Foreign Service 
employees serve where their skills are needed most. While there were 
those who favored directed assignments to deploy staff where and when 
they are needed, many State officials we interviewed were concerned 
that such an approach would only create more problems at the post 
level because employees who are forced into positions they do not want 
are more apt to have poor morale and be less productive. 

Fair Share Bidding Does Not Require Hardship Assignments: 

Based on an expectation that Foreign Service employees be available 
for their share of hardship assignments, State has special bidding 
requirements for employees who have not served at a hardship post in 
the last 8 years. Under the program, Foreign Service employees who 
have not served 18 months[Footnote 13] at a hardship post in an 8-year 
period are considered "fair share" bidders. However, State does not 
require that these bidders actually be assigned to hardship posts. In 
fact, rules under this program permit some fair share bidders to bid 
only on domestic positions.[Footnote 14] If fair share bidders bid on 
any overseas assignment, three of the six bids that they submit at 
their grades and within their specialty must be on hardship posts. 
Bidders may include up to three bids on assignments one level above 
their grade at 15 percent hardship posts or higher. However, employees 
may still choose to bid on posts with lesser hardship (5 to 10 percent 
differential). In the 2001 assignments cycle, 464 employees were 
designated as fair share bidders. As shown in figure 2, the vast 
majority of the fair share bidders--322-—were assigned to domestic 
positions or nonhardship posts. Only 79 bidders, or 17 percent of the 
total, received hardship assignments. Of this number, 49 bidders were 
assigned to the greater hardship posts-—those with a pay differential 
of 15 percent or higher. The remaining 63 bidders have already retired 
or resigned from the Foreign Service or will retire or resign soon. 

Figure 2: Outcome of Fair Share Bidding (2001): 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart and subchart] 

Bidders receiving hardship assignments: 322[A]: 69%; 
Bidders soon to retire/resign or already retired/resigned: 63: 14%; 
Bidders receiving nonhardship or domestic assignments: 79: 17%. 

Bidders receiving nonhardship or domestic assignments: 79: 
22 Bidders assigned to 25% differential posts: 28%; 
18 Bidders assigned to 5% differential posts: 23%; 
15 Bidders assigned to 15% differential posts: 19%; 
12 Bidders assigned to 20% differential posts: 15%; 
11 Bidders assigned to 10% differential posts: 10%. 

[A] Out of 322 nonhardship assignments, 96 were assigned to 
nondifferential posts overseas and 226 were assigned to Washington, 
D.C. 

Source: GAO analysis based on State Department data. 

[End of figure] 

Efforts to Set Staffing Priorities Are Not Based on Realistic 
Assumptions: 

Recognizing that it faced a staffing deficit, State in the past 
engaged in an exercise just prior to the assignments cycle to identify 
those positions that are less essential and, therefore, it would not 
fill. However, this exercise was not based on realistic expectations 
of the number of employees available for placement, and State 
continues to advertise positions for which it has no staff to fill. 
For example, in June 2000, only 53 mid-level generalist positions were 
on the list of positions State decided not to fill—-a fraction of the 
222 mid-level generalist positions that the department identified as 
the shortfall for the 2001 cycle. 

For the 2002 cycle, State officials decided not to designate positions 
it would not fill. Instead, because of increased hiring, in July 2001, 
regional bureaus identified about 120 mid-level positions to be 
offered to and filled by junior officers-—also well below the staffing 
shortfall of 607 mid-level positions in this current cycle. 

Neither of these actions prioritized the positions that needed to be 
filled based on the actual number of employees available for new 
assignment, and neither is based on an assessment of State's staffing 
priorities worldwide. Several former and current ambassadors with whom 
we met believe the assignment process should include a rigorous and 
systematic assessment upfront that identifies critical positions that 
need to be filled based on State's worldwide strategic priorities and 
other positions that, although important, should not be filled until 
State has more staff available. 

Hardship Posts Attract Fewer Bidders: 

In analyzing bidding data for the 2001 and 2002 summer assignments 
cycles, we found that positions at hardship posts received 
significantly fewer bids on average than positions at nonhardship 
posts. In addition, many mid-level positions at posts with significant 
U.S. interests had few or no bidders, and the higher the differential 
incentive paid for a hardship assignment, the fewer the number of 
bidders. Figure 3 shows the average bids on mid-level positions at 
overseas posts by differential rate for the 2002 summer assignments 
cycle. As the graph shows, nondifferential posts such as London, 
Toronto, Canberra (Australia), Madrid, and The Hague are highly 
sought, and received, on average, 25 to 40 bids per position. On the 
other hand, many positions at hardship posts received few, and 
sometimes no bids. For example, posts such as Karachi (Pakistan), St. 
Petersburg (Russia), Shenyang (China), Lagos (Nigeria), Kiev 
(Ukraine), and Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) received, on average, two, one, 
or no bids per position. We found that, in the 2002 assignments cycle, 
74 mid-level positions had no bidders, including 15 positions in China 
and 10 positions in Russia. 

Figure 3 may suggest that the hardship pay has not been sufficient to 
attract bidders to certain posts, even at posts where employees can 
earn an additional 25 percent above their base pay. In fact, according 
to a State Department Inspector General's survey issued in 1999 of 
Foreign Service employees, 80 percent of the respondents did not 
believe that the differential pay incentives were sufficient to staff 
hard-to-fill positions.[Footnote 15] 

The line in the graph (figure 3) shows the median of the average 
number of bids for each differential rate. As the line indicates, the 
median of the average at a nonhardship post is about 14 bids while the 
median of the average at a 25 percent differential rate post is about 
3 bids. 

Figure 3: Fewer Bids at Higher Differential Posts (2002): 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated line graph] 

Differential rate: 0: 
Average number of bids: 30+ Canberra, Toronto, London. 
Average number of bids: 25-30: The Hague, Barcelona, Madrid, 
Capetown. 
Average number of bids: 20-25: Oslo, Hong Kong, Geneva. 
Average number of bids: 15-20: Paris, Montreal, Rome, Kuala Lumpur, 
Marseille, Nassau, Brussels. 
Average number of bids: 10-15: Bern, Singapore, Pretoria, Rabat, 
Helsinki, Tijuana, Johannesburg. 
Average number of bids: 5-10: Bratislava, Tokyo, Frankfurt, Buenos 
Aires, Casablanca. 
Average number of bids: 0-5: Panama City, Reykjavik, Naha, Seoul, 
Nagota, Durban, Dusseldorf. 

Differential rate: 5%: 
Average number of bids: 15-20: Recife. Adana. 
Average number of bids: 10-15: Bridgetown. 
Average number of bids: 5-10: Athens, Harare, Tunis, Dubai, Zagreb, 
Caracas. 
Average number of bids: 0-5: Port Louis, Tel Aviv, Sao Paulo, Kingston. 

Differential rate: 10%: 
Average number of bids: 10-15: Istanbul, Tallinn, Bangkok. 
Average number of bids: 5-10: Abu Dhabi, Manama, Mexico City, Riga. 
Average number of bids: 0-5: Suva, Warsaw, Guatamala City, Amman, 
Jerusalem. 

Differential rate: 15%: 
Average number of bids: 15-20: Bandar Seri. 
Average number of bids: 10-15: Kolonia, Quito. 
Average number of bids: 5-10: Santo Domingo, Shanghai, Manila, Lusaka, 
Rangoon, Beijing. 
Average number of bids: 0-5: Kuwait, Moscow, Sarajevo, Mostar, St, 
Petersburg. 

Differential rate: 20%: 
Average number of bids: 10-15: Havana. 
Average number of bids: 5-10: New Delhi, Lima, Cairo, Jakarta, 
Damascus, Georgetown. 
Average number of bids: 0-5: Minsk, Begrade, Abidjan, Asmara, Jeddah, 
Guangzhou, Karachi. 

Differential rate: 25%: 
Average number of bids: 10-15: Vientiane, Calcutta. 
Average number of bids: 5-10: Freetown, Accra, Hanoi, Beirut, 
Peshawar, Nairobi. 
Average number of bids: 0-5: Lahore, Dar Es Salaam, Riyadh, Tashkent, 
Islamabad, Kiev, Chengdu, Abuja, Lagos, Shenyang. 

Note: The line is based on the median of the average for each post 
differential grouping. In addition, only selected posts are named; 
thus, certain dots, each of which represents a post, may not show the 
name of the post. 

Source: GAO analysis based on State Department data. 

[End of figure] 

For a complete list of the countries that we identified as the most 
heavily bid and underbid for the 2001 and 2002 cycles combined, see 
table 10 in appendix IV. 

Administrative, Consular, and Public Diplomacy Bidders and Specialists 
in Higher Differential Posts Are in Short Supply: 

According to State, the biggest shortages are for Foreign Service 
generalists in the mid-level ranks, particularly in the 
administrative, consular, and public diplomacy areas, as well as 
Foreign Service specialists who provide infrastructure support 
services. It is in these areas that positions tend to have fewer 
bidders-oftentimes two or fewer bidders who meet the grade and 
functional specialty requirements, the threshold at which State 
considers a position hard-to-fill. As shown in table 2, we analyzed 
the average number of bids submitted for the 2002 assignments cycle 
and found an average of fewer than three bidders for administrative 
and consular positions in 20 and 25 percent hardship posts; and an 
average of fewer than three bidders for public diplomacy positions in 
15 and 25 percent hardship posts. Finally, Foreign Service specialist 
positions in 25 percent hardship posts also had, on average, fewer 
than three bidders. Based on these data, it appears that, on average, 
positions in other functional areas and in the lesser hardship posts 
(e.g., economic, political, and rotational positions in 
nondifferential posts) have a greater supply of interested bidders. 

Table 2: Average Number of Bids by Type of Position and Level of 
Hardship: 

Average number of bids at each level of post hardship pay: 

Type of position or functional specialty: Administrative; 
All: 6.7; 
0%: 16.7; 
5%: 10.5; 
10%: 7.6; 
15%: 4.0; 
20%: 2.2; 
25%: 2.1. 

Type of position or functional specialty: Consular; 
All: 5.7; 
0%: 13.6; 
5%: 5.7; 
10%: 3.7; 
15%: 3.3; 
20%: 2.9; 
25%: 2.4. 

Type of position or functional specialty: Economic; 
All: 11.4; 
0%: 21.5; 
5%: 8.0; 
10%: 12.0; 
15%: 8.3; 
20%: 8.9; 
25%: 3.1. 

Type of position or functional specialty: Interfunctional[A]; 
All: 6.6; 
0%: 11.0; 
5%: 8.5; 
10%: 10.5; 
15%: 4.5; 
20%: 4.8; 
25%: 4.7. 

Type of position or functional specialty: Political	
All: 9.4; 
0%: 17.7; 
5%: 6.7; 
10%: 8.0; 
15%: 5.4; 
20%: 6.4; 
25%: 3.1. 

Type of position or functional specialty: Public diplomacy; 
All: 4.6; 
0%: 8.0; 
5%: 6.3; 
10%: 6.0; 
15%: 2.7; 
20%: 3.3; 
25%: 2.0. 

Type of position or functional specialty: Rotational[B]; 
All: 8.4; 
0%: 20.4; 
5%: 7.8; 
10%: 7.0; 
15%: 4.6; 
20%: 5.2; 
25%: 4.0. 

Type of position or functional specialty: Specialist[C]; 
All: 6.2; 
0%: 12.1; 
5%: 3.9; 
10%: 10.6; 
15%: 5.3; 
20%: 4.5; 
25%: 2.5. 

[A] An interfunctional position is not covered by any single 
functional specialty and requires a mix of skills and abilities from 
various functional specialties. 

[B] A rotational position typically involves an employee spending the 
first year of a 2-year tour in one functional specialty and the second 
year of the tour in another functional specialty. 

[C] A specialist position may include facets of administration, 
construction engineering, information technology, medical, office 
management, and security. 

Source: GAO analysis based on State Department data. 

[End of table] 

Short-Term Options to Fill Hardship Positions Help but Are Less Than 
Ideal: 

To fill positions that are difficult to staff, primarily in hardship 
posts, State's policies allow bidding and assignment rules to be 
relaxed when there are not enough bidders. In addition, various 
employment mechanisms are available to allow post management to fill 
staffing gaps with temporary or limited-term personnel when necessary. 
While these options help ease the staffing problems at hardship posts 
and offer short-term relief, they are less than ideal. Senior post 
officials acknowledged that employing staff with less experience and 
expertise than the positions require impedes the efficiency of post 
operations but that the alternative—absorbing the impact of extended 
staffing gaps—is worse. 

Bidding and assignment rules may be relaxed for (1) hard-to-fill 
positions-—where there are two or fewer fully qualified bidders who 
are at grade and are in the designated specialty and (2) posts that 
are identified as among the most difficult to staff—-where 50 percent 
of the positions advertised have two or fewer bidders. Ninety-eight, 
or about 38 percent, of the posts overseas met the criteria to be 
designated most difficult to staff in the 2002 assignments cycle. To 
staff positions at these posts, State eases certain rules, which could 
compromise diplomatic readiness. For example, to attract employees to 
bid on these positions, the department may allow stretch assignments 
early in the assignments cycle, waive language requirements, or offer 
unusually short tours of duty (12 to 18 months). The vast majority of 
the most-difficult-to-staff posts are in the Bureau of African 
Affairs, with about 40 percent (39) of the posts, and the Bureau of 
European and Eurasian Affairs, with 27 percent (26 posts, mostly in 
the Newly Independent States). (A complete list of U.S. diplomatic 
posts worldwide is shown in appendix V.) 

In addition, State offers assignment opportunities for State 
Department civil service employees to temporarily fill Foreign Service 
positions that remain underbid. State targeted 50 such positions to 
fill in 2001. In 2002, State established a limit to fill 50 Foreign 
Service positions with civil service employees, including those who 
were already in the program and went on to a subsequent tour. 
Approximately 200 civil service employees are now assigned to hard-to-
fill positions overseas that are ordinarily staffed by Foreign Service 
officers. In a report to State in March 2001, the Office of the 
Inspector General supported using civil service employees to fill 
overseas vacancies but stated that the program had not substantially 
reduced the systemwide staffing shortage.[Footnote 16] Moreover, 
despite widespread support for the program, use of civil service staff 
in Foreign Service positions raises workforce planning concerns, 
particularly for the bureaus that are sending, and thus temporarily 
losing, their civil service staff. 

State also employs retired Foreign Service officers for temporary 
duty, international fellows and presidential management interns, 
family members, and American residents who are hired locally as part-
time intermittent temporary employees or on personal services 
contracts or agreements. According to post officials, although these 
staff augment the capabilities of mission operations, the methods by 
which they are hired, the tasks to which they are assigned, and the 
employee benefits to which they are entitled are not applied 
consistently—thereby raising some personnel and morale issues at the 
post level. 

Differences Seen in Individual Officers' Hardship Experience: 

State does not regularly analyze how the burden of hardship service is 
being shared among Foreign Service officers, although this has been a 
long-standing concern. To measure how the burden is shared, we 
analyzed the careers of 1,100 mid-level Foreign Service officers who 
were hired between 1986 and 1991, which represents about 10 to 15 
years of service. We performed the analysis by using the Lorenz curve, 
which is a methodology traditionally used to measure income 
inequality. Figure 4 shows the relationship between the percentage of 
employees and the percentage of weighted hardship burden. (For a 
detailed discussion of our methodology, see appendix I.) 

Figure 4: How Is the Hardship Burden Shared? 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Cumulative percentage of hardship burden is plotted against Cumulative 
percentage of Foreign Service officers. 

Depicted on the graph: 
Perfect share of burden; 
Actual share of burden; 
Point A: Half of the officers had 27% of the burden while the other 
half had 73%; 
Point B: Bottom 20 percent of employees served 5 percent of the 
hardship; 
Point C: Top 20 percent served about 37 percent of the hardship. 

Source: GAO analysis based on State Department data. 

[End of figure] 

The graph is an indication of how the hardship burden is being shared. 
The broken diagonal line represents perfect sharing of burden while 
the curve reflects how the actual burden is shared. The data indicate 
that half of the officers experienced 27 percent of the hardship 
burden while the other half experienced 73 percent (point A). Viewed 
another way, the bottom 20 percent of employees served 5 percent of 
the hardship (point B) while the top 20 percent served about 37 
percent of the hardship (point C).[Footnote 17] State officials noted 
several reasons why some employees cannot serve at certain hardship 
posts, such as medical conditions,[Footnote 18] inadequate schools for 
their children, and a lack of spousal employment opportunities. 

Financial Incentives for Hardship Service Show Mixed Results: 

Locality Pay Has Diminished the Relative Value of Differential Pay
State offers some financial incentives for hardship service, which 
have yielded mixed results. These financial incentives include a post 
differential allowance (or hardship pay) ranging from 5 to 25 percent 
of base pay[Footnote 19] to compensate employees for service where 
environmental conditions differ substantially from those in the United 
States and to entice them to serve.[Footnote 20] While there are 
factors other than money that may keep an officer from bidding for a 
position at a particular hardship post or restrict an officer's 
options to only selected posts, our analysis of bidding data (figure 3) 
suggests that the differential rate does not appear to be effective in 
enticing a significant number of employees to certain posts. To 
address this issue, in 2001, State began to provide an additional 15 
percent incentive to those who sign up for a third year at selected 2-
year posts that have been extremely difficult to staff. 

Locality Pay Has Diminished the Relative Value of Differential Pay: 

According to State officials and Foreign Service employees, the 
incentive provided by differential (hardship) pay for overseas service 
has been diminished by rules governing locality pay.[Footnote 21] 
Locality pay is a salary comparability benefit to attract workers in 
the continental United States to the federal government versus the 
private sector. In 1994, an executive order began the process of 
allocating annual governmentwide pay increases between base pay and 
locality pay. However, Foreign Service employees serving overseas do 
not get locality pay. Thus, the differences in the statutes governing 
differential pay for overseas service and locality pay have created a 
gap between the compensation of domestic[Footnote 22] and overseas 
employees—a gap that grows each year as locality pay rates continue to 
rise by 1 percent or more annually. State has not analyzed the effect 
that this difference has had since 1994 on the number of Foreign 
Service employees who bid on overseas assignments, including hardship 
posts. However, State Department officials, the American Foreign 
Service Association, and many officers with whom we met said that this 
gap penalizes overseas employees and that if it continues to grow, it 
will inevitably keep employees from choosing an overseas career in the 
Foreign Service. Figure 5 illustrates the effect that increases in 
locality pay have on the relative value of overseas differential 
rates. As figure 5 shows, the advantage of overseas pay with 
differential has eroded over time and locality pay has created a 
financial disincentive for all overseas employees. As of January 2002, 
the locality pay rate for Washington, D.C., was 11.48 percent. We 
estimate that by 2006 and 2010, the differential pay incentives for 
the 15 percent and 20 percent differential posts, respectively, will 
be less than the locality pay for Washington, D.C., assuming that the 
locality pay rate continues to increase at about 1 percent per year. 

Figure 5: Comparison of D.C. Pay and Overseas Pay: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

The graph plots pay from $50,00 to $105,000 against years 1994 through 
2015. 

The following are depicted on the graph: 

Overseas salary with: 
25% hardship pay; 
20% hardship pay; 
15% hardship pay; 
10% hardship pay; 
5% hardship pay; 
0% hardship pay. 

D.C. pay with locality surpasses overseas salary with 10% hardship pay. 

D.C. pay with locality surpasses overseas salary with 5% hardship pay. 

D.C. pay with locality. 

Source: Office of Personnel Management data and GAO assumptions and 
analysis. 

[End of figure] 

Post Differential Is Not Considered in Determining Retirement Benefits: 

In addition, Foreign Service employees we interviewed emphasized that 
it is also a financial disincentive to retire while serving overseas 
because post differential is not used to determine an officer's 
retirement benefits whereas locality pay, which is offered to those 
employees who serve in Washington, D.C., is factored into the 
retirement benefit. According to State human resources officials, 
retiring with a high three average salary calculated on service abroad 
can result in a substantial reduction in annuity annually, compared 
with a Washington-based high three average salary.[Footnote 23] As a 
result, a significant number of employees who are nearing retirement 
return to Washington, D.C., for their last tour of duty to have their 
locality pay factored into their high three salaries for purposes of 
calculating retirement benefits. In fact, according to State, since 
1997, 62 percent of senior Foreign Service and management level 
employees who retired concluded their careers in Washington rather 
than from an overseas tour. This exacerbates the problem of staffing 
hardship posts because the most experienced employees tend not to 
choose overseas service during their last tour of duty. 

To address these overseas pay and retirement benefit issues, State, 
with the support of the American Foreign Service Association, proposed 
that Foreign Service employees working overseas should get locality 
pay equal to the Washington, D.C., rate. The Office of Personnel 
Management agrees that locality pay should be extended to overseas 
employees and has asked the Office of Management and Budget to 
consider this issue. The State Department estimates that it would cost 
$50 million to $60 million a year to increase overseas employees' pay 
to the Washington, D.C., level. State officials believe that extending 
locality pay to overseas employees is the best way to address pay 
comparability issues with employees serving in Washington, D.C. As a 
short-term measure in the interim, the administration has approved and 
forwarded to Congress a supplemental retirement proposal to address, 
for those who are nearing retirement, the immediate problem of reduced 
retirement annuities due to service overseas.[Footnote 24] While these 
proposals could encourage overseas service, there are no assurances 
that they will fully address the problem of staffing hardship posts 
because all overseas Foreign Service employees would gain the same 
benefit and may continue to bid on assignments at nonhardship posts. 

Service Need Differential Program Is Beginning to Make a Difference: 

The State Department has developed a pilot program that offers an 
additional financial incentive to employees accepting a 3-year tour in 
41 designated hardship posts. This effort has begun to make a 
difference in a number of posts. Nonetheless, some employees choose 
not to remain at post for an additional year and thus forego the 
additional differential of 15 percent. Out of 173 positions that were 
eligible for the program in the 2001 assignments cycle, the first full 
year the program became operational, 127 employees (73 percent) signed 
up for a third year at posts that ordinarily require a 2-year tour. 
Based on State records, the program was estimated to cost about $1.8 
million in fiscal year 2002.[Footnote 25] While many State officials 
with whom we met—-in Washington and at the posts we visited-—were 
enthusiastic about the new program, it appears that some of the more 
difficult hardship posts have not yet realized the benefits they had 
hoped the additional incentive might bring. For example, 10 employees 
in two China posts—-Chengdu and Shenyang-—extended their tours to take 
advantage of the new incentive. However, bureau officials noted that, 
even with the additional 15 percent differential offered as a 
recruiting incentive, Shenyang has no bidders for any of the six 
positions advertised in the current 2002 cycle; Chengdu had a few 
bidders, but none of them opted to take advantage of the incentive and 
sign up for an additional year. None of the staff assigned to two 
posts in Russia-—Vladivostok and Yekaterinburg—-has chosen an extended 
tour, and none of the employees newly assigned to these posts has 
opted for an additional year. In Kiev, about half of those eligible 
signed up for the program and extended their tours for a third year. 
In Lagos and Abuja, 16 percent of the employees who were eligible 
extended their tours in 2002, the first year that the program went 
into effect there. 

Rewards for Hardship Service Are Not Explicit: 

While several State officials in Washington suggest that service at 
hardship posts is favorably considered in various aspects of a Foreign 
Service officer's career, such as promotions and onward assignments, 
many of the post staff with whom we met said they believe otherwise. 
However, State could not provide data on the extent to which hardship 
service is actually taken into account in such personnel decisions. 
The criteria that State's selection boards use to determine promotion 
of Foreign Service officers do not explicitly require hardship 
service. However, the guidelines do state that an officer's 
performance under unusually difficult or dangerous circumstances is 
relevant in evaluating whether an officer has the qualities needed for 
successful performance at higher levels. In addition, the guidelines 
do not require service abroad as a prerequisite for promotion, but 
they do encourage selection boards to consider an officer's 
demonstrated competence in that regard. Ironically, some employees 
believe that hardship service could actually disadvantage them on 
promotion decisions. 

State officials also told us that service at hardship posts is 
generally considered in determining an employee's next assignment, and 
a number of post management officials agreed that fair onward 
assignments are one way to reward employees for serving at hardship 
posts. However, many employees at several hardship posts we visited 
were not convinced that their service at a hardship assignment would 
necessarily be rewarded in determining their next assignment. 
Nonetheless, we noted that bidding instructions for junior officers do 
state that in filling heavily bid vacancies at popular nonhardship 
posts, priority and appropriate credit will be given to those serving 
at hardship posts. Bidding instructions for mid-level and senior 
positions do indicate that prior service at hardship posts is one of 
several factors considered in determining assignments, in addition to 
an employee's language competence, rank, and functional expertise for 
the position. 

State Has Launched an Aggressive Recruiting Program to Boost 
Diplomatic Readiness: 

As part of its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative announced in January 
2001, State has launched an aggressive recruiting program to rebuild 
the department's workforce. 

According to State officials, the department is on track to meet its 
hiring goal of 465 new Foreign Service officers this fiscal year. As 
of March 2002, State reported hiring or committing to hire 344 new 
junior officers, 74 percent of State's hiring target for this fiscal 
year. Under the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, State requested a 
total of 1,158 new employees above attrition over the 3-year period 
from fiscal years 2002 to 2004. State officials, particularly those in 
Washington, D.C., believe that State's hiring program will largely 
address the staffing shortage the department now faces as new entry-
level junior officers advance to the mid-level ranks. However, it will 
take years before the new hires advance to the mid-level ranks, where 
State has reported experiencing its biggest staffing deficit. 

Moreover, as the influx of new employees advance to mid-level 
positions, they may also tend not to bid on hardship assignments. 

Although post officials were encouraged by the new hiring, a number of 
them were not clear as to whether and how the additional officers 
hired under the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative will address specific 
staffing shortfalls experienced at some hardship posts. A senior 
official in China told us that neither the geographic bureau nor the 
post has advance knowledge about the new recruits—posts in China can 
hope but have no assurances that there are enough recruits with some 
language skills to keep an adequate pool of language-trained staff in 
the pipeline. An officer in Nigeria noted that individuals with 
backgrounds in development work and humanitarian affairs, such as 
former Peace Corps volunteers and those who have worked with 
nongovernmental organizations, would be especially appropriate for 
many of the hardship posts in Africa; and for that reason, 
diversifying the pool of applicants to reach out to such groups is 
important. 

Human resources officials in Washington told us that State has 
embarked on an active outreach program that targets, for example, 
college campuses, professional associations, and other groups that 
offer a pool of potential applicants who are proficient in difficult 
languages and possess other knowledge, skills, and competencies the 
Foreign Service desires. In addition, they said State is intensifying 
overseas recruitment efforts. Although State has numerical hiring 
goals for broad occupational skill categories, State does not have 
numerical targets for specific skill requirements such as language or 
regional expertise. In general, the department recruits generalists 
with a broad range of skills, and they are later trained in specific 
areas to meet changing requirements. Thus, although State officials 
are optimistic that enough new hires are being brought in to address 
the overall staffing shortage, there are no assurances that the 
recruiting efforts will result in the right people with the right 
skills needed to meet specific critical shortfalls at some hardship 
posts. 

Conclusions: 

The State Department is facing serious staffing shortfalls at many of 
its posts, especially those designated hardship posts, and State's 
system for assigning available staff has been ineffective in ensuring 
that overseas staffing requirements, particularly at strategic posts, 
are adequately addressed. In making assignment decisions, State 
attempts to strike a balance between matching the preferences, 
personal circumstances, and professional development goals of 
individual employees with the needs of the service. However, in an 
environment where the number of positions exceeds the number of staff 
to fill them, State is not able to ensure that staff are assigned 
where they are needed most. The new service need differential program 
holds some promise, but the extent to which it will address the 
problem of staffing hardship posts remains unclear. State believes 
that the department's new hiring initiatives will gradually solve its 
current staffing problem. However, positions at hardship posts will 
continue to have fewer bids from qualified Foreign Service employees 
unless (a) adequate incentives are in place to entice these employees 
to bid on and accept assignments at hardship posts and (b) appropriate 
levers are used, when necessary, to assign experienced staff where 
they are most needed. Moreover, an assignment system that puts Foreign 
Service employees in the driver's seat and does not systematically 
prioritize the posts and positions that must be filled does not ensure 
that State's staffing requirements at hardship posts are adequately 
addressed. Without a comprehensive, strategic approach to marshaling 
and managing State's human capital, there is little assurance that 
State will be able to place the right people in the right posts at the 
right time. As a result, diplomatic readiness could be at risk at 
hardship posts, many of them of significant importance to the United 
States. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

In light of our findings that State's assignment system has not been 
effective in addressing staffing requirements at hardship posts, 
including many of strategic importance, we recommend that the 
Secretary of State: 

* improve personnel and assignment data so that they will (1) allow 
State to fully assess its human capital capabilities and limitations 
and enhance the department's workforce planning efforts, and (2) 
enable State to take a fact-based, performance-oriented approach to 
human capital management that would involve analyzing bidding and 
assignment data to determine its success in addressing staffing needs 
at all posts, including hardship posts and posts of strategic 
importance to the United States; 

* rigorously and systematically determine priority positions that must 
be filled worldwide as well as positions that will not be filled 
during each assignments cycle, based on the relative strategic 
importance of posts and positions and realistic assumptions of 
available staff resources; 

* consider a targeted hiring strategy, with measurable goals, designed 
to specifically address critical shortfalls, such as employees who are 
proficient in certain foreign languages; are interested in those 
particular positions, functional specialties, or career tracks that 
are in short supply; and are interested in serving in hardship 
locations; and; 

* develop a package of incentives and implement appropriate actions to 
steer employees toward serving at hardship posts. Such measures could 
include: 

1. proposing a set of financial incentives to Congress that State 
believes will entice more employees to bid on and accept hardship 
positions based on analyses that estimate the costs and likelihood of 
increasing the number of Foreign Service employees who bid on 
assignments in the selected hardship posts; 

2. making hardship service an explicit criterion for promotions and 
onward assignments; and; 

3. employing more directive approaches to assignments as necessary to 
steer fully qualified employees toward hardship posts that require 
their skills and experience and to ensure that hardship assignments 
are shared equitably. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

The State Department provided written comments on a draft of our 
report. State's comments, along with our responses to specific points, 
are reprinted in appendix VI. 

In general, State found our report to be very helpful. It acknowledged 
the difficulties the department faces in staffing hardship posts 
around the world and the negative effect that staffing problems have 
on these posts. State found our statistical findings, including our 
analyses of bidding and assignment patterns as well as the relative 
decline of hardship pay due to the lack of locality pay for employees 
assigned abroad, to be very useful. State indicated that it would 
implement two of our recommendations. The department said it will (1) 
study alternative ways to provide additional incentives for employees 
to serve at hardship posts, and (2) review the implementation of human 
resources data systems to enhance State's reporting capabilities along 
the lines that we suggested. State did not indicate its position with 
regards to our two other recommendations—that State rigorously and 
systematically determine staffing priorities worldwide and consider a 
targeted hiring strategy. 

State attributes the problem of staffing hardship posts to the 
department's staffing shortfall of 1,100 people, which the department 
is addressing through its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. In addition 
to hiring more staff, a major thrust of State's efforts is addressing 
the locality pay issue. While we acknowledge that these efforts would 
ease State's overall staffing problem, both domestically and overseas, 
we do not believe that they would necessarily fully address the 
staffing requirements of hardship posts, including those of 
significant importance to the United States. We hold this opinion 
because staffing decisions made under State's assignment system tilt 
the balance toward employee preferences, rather than the needs of the 
service. Although there will be more staff available to fill 
positions, it will take years before the new hires advance to the 
midlevel ranks where State has reported the largest deficit. 
Furthermore, as the new employees advance to mid-level positions, they 
may tend to bid on and be assigned to non-hardship posts unless State 
(1) hires people with the specific skills that are in short supply and 
who are inclined to serve in hardship posts and (2) puts in place 
appropriate levers to steer employees with the right skills and 
experience to serve in hardship posts. We do not believe that hardship 
posts should suffer disproportionately from staff shortages. Our 
recommendations, if implemented, would help ensure that the staffing 
needs of hardship posts, including those critical to U.S. interests, 
are met. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 
committees. We are also sending copies of this report to the Secretary 
of State. Copies will be made available to others upon request. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me on (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff 
acknowledgments are listed in appendix VII. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Jess T. Ford: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the number, experience, and skills of staff in hardship 
positions and the potential impact on diplomatic readiness, we 
selected seven countries identified by State as strategically 
important to U.S. interests: China, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Ukraine. We also visited seven hardship 
posts in three of the countries we examined-—Beijing, Guangzhou, 
Shanghai, and Shenyang in China; Riyadh and Jeddah in Saudi Arabia; 
and Kiev, Ukraine—-where we met with numerous post officials to obtain 
human resources data not available in headquarters and to assess the 
impact that staffing shortfalls may have on diplomatic readiness. 

To examine how well State's assignment system is meeting the staffing 
requirements of hardship posts, we reviewed State's policies, 
processes, and programs for filling hardship posts, as well as State's 
open assignments manuals and other human resources documents. In 
addition, we analyzed the process, mid-level bidding data, and results 
of the 2001 assignments cycle, including fair share assignments; mid-
level bidding data on the 2002 assignments cycle; and the assignment 
histories of 1,100 midlevel generalists hired between 1986 and 1991. 
We did not validate the accuracy of the data obtained from State. We 
also met with several offices within the Bureau of Human Resources; 
executive directors, post management, and human resources officials in 
five of the six regional bureaus; nine current and former ambassadors 
who have served in hardship posts; and representatives of the American 
Foreign Service Association. 

Bidding Data: 

We analyzed bidding data to determine the average number of position 
bids by posts, the median average bid for each differential rate, and 
the areas of specialization that are difficult to staff. For these 
analyses, we used the mid-level bidding data for the 2001 and 2002 
summer assignments cycles.[Footnote 26] The bidding data include the 
number of positions to be filled at each post and the number of bids 
received for each position. We used the mid-level bidding data because 
mid-level positions comprised 58 percent of the total Foreign Service 
workforce. We also used the bidding data for the summer assignments 
cycle because, according to State officials, most employees are 
transferred during this cycle, compared to the winter cycle. In 
addition, the analysis was limited to 2 years because State has 
bidding data for only the 2001 and 2002 cycles. Although we analyzed 
data for the two cycles, we provided information for only the 2002 
cycle (see figure 3) because the results for 2001 were similar: 

* To obtain the average number of bids for each post, we took the 
total number of bids received on all positions at each post and 
divided it by the total number of positions to be filled at the post. 
For example, in the 2002 summer assignments cycle, Beijing had 12 
positions to be filled and received a total of 53 bids, resulting in 
an average of 4.4 bids for this post. 

* To obtain the median bid at each differential rate, as represented 
in the line in figure 3, we arranged in ascending order the average 
bid for each post at the corresponding differential rate and used the 
middle average bid. For example, assuming there are only 5 posts at 
the 25 differential rate and their average bids are 3, 5, 7, 9, and 
16, the median of the average bids is 7. 

Hardship Burden: 

To measure how the hardship burden is shared by Foreign Service 
employees (figure 4), we analyzed about 10,000 assignments of 1,100 
midlevel generalists with 10 to 15 years of service.[Footnote 27] We 
performed the analysis by using the Lorenz curve, which is a 
methodology traditionally used to measure income inequality: 

* First, we assigned weights to posts based on State's level of 
differential (hardship) pay. State differential pay range from 5 
percent to 25 percent of base pay. For example, we assigned 1.0 to a 
nonhardship post, 1.10 to a 10 percent hardship post, and 1.25 to a 25 
percent hardship post. 

* Next, we multiplied the number of days each mid-level generalist 
served at each post by the weighted post differential to obtain total 
hardship weighted days. We subtracted the total number of unweighted 
days served at all posts to obtain the number of hardship burden days 
for each generalist. The number of hardship burden days was divided by 
the number of career years served to obtain hardship burden per year 
per employee. 

* The graph represents the ordering of employees from the lowest to 
the highest weighted hardship burden. 

In addition, we analyzed D.C. pay, which incorporates locality pay, 
versus overseas pay with differential rates to determine the effects 
of the locality rate on the relative value of overseas differential 
rates (figure 5). For our analysis, we focused on a hypothetical 
Foreign Service officer at the FS-04 step 13 level, who would have had 
a base salary of $50,526 when locality pay was put in place in 1994. 
We then compared subsequent increases in pay for D.C. employees with 
pay increases for personnel at nonhardship posts and at posts with 
varying levels of differential rate. For the period from 1994 through 
2002, we used historical data provided by the Office of Personnel 
Management. Based on these historical patterns and projections of 
increases in federal pay levels by the Office of Management and 
Budget, we assumed that D.C. pay increases will average 4 percent 
annually from 2003 to 2011 and that overseas pay increases will 
average 3 percent annually over that period because locality pay is 
not included in overseas pay. The overseas pay does not include other 
allowances such as education and housing, of which the value varies 
depending on the circumstances of the individual employee. 

We conducted our review from July 2001 to May 2002 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Overview of the Foreign Service Assignment System: 

The authority to make assignments, which is granted to the Secretary 
of State, is delegated to the Undersecretary for Management. This 
authority is exercised through the Director-General of the Foreign 
Service, who is responsible for formulating and implementing personnel 
policies and programs. Under the direction of the Director-General and 
the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Resources, the 
Director of the Office of Career Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) 
is responsible for assigning Foreign Service personnel resources 
throughout the State Department and overseas. The functions of HR/CDA 
are divided into four divisions: Senior Level, Mid-level, Entry Level, 
and Assignments. (Figure 6 below illustrates the organization and 
functions of HR/CDA.) 

Figure 6: Organization and Functions of the Bureau of Human Resources, 
Office of Career Development and Assignments: 

[Refer to PDF for image: organizational chart] 

Top level: Undersecretary for Management. 

Second level, reporting to Undersecretary for Management: 
* Director-General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human 
Resources. 

Third level, reporting to: Director-General of the Foreign Service and 
Director of Human Resources: 
* Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Resources. 

Fourth level, reporting to: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Human Resources: 
* Director, Career Development and Assignments HR/CDA Foreign Service 
Personnel: 				
- Office of Continuity and Career Counseling. 

Fifth level, reporting to: Director, Career Development and 
Assignments HR/CDA Foreign Service Personnel: 

* Senior Level Division (CDA/SL): Division responsibilities:
- Provides counseling and assignment support to senior level 
generalists and specialists; 
- Manages presidential appointments; 
- Coordinates long-term training and details; 
- Adjudicates title and rank issues; 
- Handles limited Foreign Service issues. 

* Mid-Level Division (CDA/ML): Division responsibilities: 
- Provides counseling and assignment support to mid-level specialists 
and generalists and certain entry-level management specialists; 
- Administers multifunctionality and skill code change programs; 
- Administers civil service to Foreign Service excursion program. 

* Entry Level Division (CDA/EL): Division responsibilities: 
- Provides counseling and assignment management to entry-level 
generalists and specialists; 
- Coordinates career mobility programs. 

* Assignments Division (CDA/AD): Division responsibilities: 
- Represents regional and functional bureau interest at weekly 
assignments panels; 
- Advises and informs bureaus on personal policies and procedures; 
- Maintains and updates open assignments vacancy cables; 
- Manages the hard-to-fill and most-difficult-to-staff exercises 
noncareer appointment issues; 
- Issues travel orders and personnel actions in conjunction with 
Foreign Service transfers and reassignments; 
- Coordinates the transfer of Foreign Service employees from one 
assignment to the next. 
		
Legend: HR/CDA = Bureau of Human Resources, Career Development and 
Assignments Source: State Department. 

Page 33	GAO-02-626 State Department. 

[End of figure] 

State's Guiding Principles: 

State policy is that Foreign Service employees are to be available to 
serve worldwide. Foreign Service personnel are assigned through an 
"open assignment system." The current open assignment process was 
established in response to a directive issued from the Secretary of 
State in June 1975, which called for creating a more open, centrally 
directed assignment process. The system is designed to engage all 
Foreign Service employees directly in the assignment process by 
providing information on all position vacancies and giving them the 
opportunity to compete openly. According to HR/CDA, while a major 
element of the 1975 directive was to eliminate the right of a bureau 
or post to veto assignments, the mandate for HR/CDA to take bureau and 
post interests into account in making assignments was extended and 
strengthened. 

The Process: 

Prior to the start of the assignments cycle, the open assignments 
agreement is negotiated each year between management and the American 
Foreign Service Association to cover applications for positions 
represented by the association (bargaining unit positions). Based on 
State's open assignments manual, management, for the purposes of 
transparency and efficiency, also applies the agreement to 
nonbargaining unit positions, such as the deputy chiefs of mission. 
State has two assignments cycles: summer and winter.[Footnote 28] 
State's assignment process centers on the high-volume summer transfer 
season, which is when most Foreign Service employees assume their new 
assignments. 

The assignment process begins when approximately 3,500 Foreign Service 
employees who are eligible to be transferred from their current 
assignment each year receive a list of instructions and upcoming 
vacancies for which they may compete. Staff then must submit a list of 
those positions for which they want to be considered. In general, 
employees must bid on at least 6 positions and no more than 15; 6 of 
the bids should be at their grades and within their designated 
functional specialty (called "core" bids) and be in more than one 
bureau or geographic region.[Footnote 29] To encourage service at 
hardship posts, three bids on one-grade stretch assignments at 15 
percent and above differential posts now may count among an employee's 
core bids.[Footnote 30] The remaining nine bids may be on any other 
positions, including those outside of an officer's specialty or for 
training, detail, and stretch assignments. There are other regulations 
that pertain to fair share and service at hardship posts, length of 
service in Washington, D.C., tandem couple procedures, and medical 
clearances. Employees also submit bids based on their preferences by 
indicating whether bids are high, medium, or low priority. This 
designation is shared with the panels but not with the bureaus or posts.
After employees make their choices, most submit bids electronically to 
their career development officers, who review the bids for compliance 
with applicable rules and regulations. From this point forward, the 
process takes various paths depending upon an officer's grade and 
functional specialty. Junior and certain senior positions are governed 
by different procedures, as are assignment categories including long-
term training,[Footnote 31] hard-to-fill positions, and details to 
other agencies and organizations. 

Special Bidding Requirements: Priority of Assignments/Posts: 

Certain assignments/positions are determined early in the assignment 
process. Starting about 3 months into the summer assignment process 
(around the end of October), employees may be assigned to certain 
positions by a panel.[Footnote 32] These positions include at-grade 
fair share bidders at 15 percent or higher differential post, deputy 
chief of mission, principal officer of consulates, office director, 
positions at Special Embassy Program posts, long-term training, and 
other key positions. Fair share bidders also may be assigned to at-
grade positions at differential posts, and to one-grade stretch 
positions at 15 percent or higher differential posts. When the regular 
assignment season begins in December, HR/CDA proceeds with at-grade 
assignments, where language requirements are met, and stretch 
assignments at 15 percent differential and most difficult-to-staff 
posts. Other stretch proposals are held until March. HR/CDA will 
continue to focus on the hard-to-fill positions, and by the middle of 
March of the following year civil service personnel can bid on Foreign 
Service hard-to-fill positions. 

Senior Officers/Key Positions Assignment Process: 

Certain specified domestic and overseas positions cannot be filled 
without the agreement of the interested principal officer, assistant 
secretary, and/or the ambassador. These positions include deputy 
assistant secretaries, office managers for principal and assistant 
secretaries, deputy chiefs of mission, special assistant to the 
ambassador, and chief of mission office managers. The appropriate 
HR/CDA division, working through the assignment officers, consults 
with bureaus to define position requirements and to request names of 
preferred potential candidates. Slates of qualified candidates for 
policy-level positions (deputy chief of mission, deputy chief of 
mission/special embassy posts) are reviewed and approved by a special 
committee and submitted to the Director-General for selection. After a 
candidate is selected, the assignment officer or career development 
officer will bring the assignment to panel for approval. 

Mid-Level Assignment Process: 

The mid-level employees comprise the majority of the Foreign Service 
staff. Generally, the process brings together the employee's 
interests, represented by the career development officers, and the 
bureau's interests, represented by the assignment officers. State 
Department officials stressed that it has become increasingly useful, 
and in some cases essential, for mid-level employees to make 
themselves known to their prospective supervisors when pursuing their 
next assignment. 

After all the bids are submitted, HR/CDA prepares a bid book, which 
lists the bidders for every projected job vacancy. All bureaus and 
posts receive a copy of the bid book, which represents the official 
start of what is referred to at State as the "meat market." This is 
when the bureaus attempt to identify the most qualified bidders for 
jobs available. It is also when bidders start marketing themselves to 
secure their choice assignments. However, State employees told us that 
marketing or lobbying actually starts long before bids are submitted, 
adding that lobbying for a job is not easy for many people. Assignment 
decisions ultimately are made by panels within the Career Development 
and Assignments Office. According to State, panels apply a variety of 
criteria when considering applicants for a position, including 
transfer eligibility, language competence, rank, and functional 
specialty. In addition, panels consider and give varying weights to 
service need, employee and bureau preferences, employee career 
development and professional aspirations, special personal 
circumstances (such as medical limitations and educational 
requirements of family members), and prior service at hardship posts. 
Bureaus or individuals may appeal panel decisions to the Director-
General. The mid-level panel makes roughly 60 percent of Foreign 
Service assignments. 

Junior Officers Assignment Process: 

The assignment process for untenured junior (entry-level) officers is 
somewhat different than the process for mid-level and senior-level 
officers. While junior officers also submit bids that indicate their 
preferences, their assignments are directed by the Entry Level 
Division with little input from the posts or bureaus on which the 
employees bid. In fact, junior officers are strongly advised not to 
lobby the bureaus and posts in which they have an interest. According 
to State, the directed approach ensures maximum fairness in making 
assignments. The Entry Level Division proposes assignments to the 
assignments panel only after taking into account an officer's 
preferences, language probation status, functional and geographic 
diversity, equities from prior service in hardship posts, timing, and 
other important factors. In addition, according to HR/CDA, while the 
list of bidders goes to the panel, the assignment is done "off panel." 
Junior officers serve their first two tours overseas and are expected 
to serve in consular positions in either the first or second of these 
assignments, normally for a minimum of 1 year but not less than 10 
months. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Staffing Issues at Selected Posts: 

The following tables summarize staffing data and some of the factors 
that affect staffing of hardship posts in each of the seven countries 
we examined. Information for the four countries we included in our 
review but did not visit—Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Russia—was 
obtained from the regional bureaus in Washington, D.C., with input 
from post officials. 

Table 3: Staffing Issues in China: 

Issue: Staffing data; 
Field observations: 	
* Post officials agree that the number of positions is inadequate to 
effectively perform the work of this major mission; 
* Ninety-three percent of total positions require language skills, but 
only 38 percent of officers meet the language requirements; 
* Staff at some posts wear multiple hats, many employees are in 
positions higher than their grade, and some are in positions lower 
than their grade; 
* Sections with the most shortages and employees in positions above 
their grade are in the administrative and consular areas. 

Issue: Environmental factors and other obstacles to 
recruitment/retention; 
Field observations: 
* Staff at the five China posts complained of extremely high workload, 
especially in Guangzhou and Beijing; 
* Local medical facilities are ill-equipped to handle basic care. 
Staff are frequently medevaced to Beijing and Hong Kong for common 
medical problems such as upper respiratory viruses and 
gastrointestinal diseases and are faced with high medical costs; 
* Opportunities for spousal employment are very limited; 
* Staff are under strict surveillance, and travel is restricted to 
certain parts of the country; 
* Appropriate places of worship are limited and controlled; 
* Language is a major problem for almost everyone at posts, including 
spouses, especially in Guangzhou where Mandarin and Cantonese are 
essential. Potential bidders also are intimidated by the length of 
time to learn the language; 
* Some posts lack adequate schools; 
* Heavy air pollution and widespread sanitation problems are common. 

Issue: Impact on post operations/diplomatic readiness; 
Field observations: 
* There are insufficient staff to cover and report on key issues, 
including World Trade Organization compliance and human rights; 
* Posts rely heavily on local staff, especially to assist with visa 
interviews; 
* There are insufficient staff and training to investigate visa fraud, 
especially in a high volume consular post such as Guangzhou, which has 
a high rate of visa fraud. 

Issue: Other information; 
Field observations: 
* Service need differential has been effective in retaining staff in 
Shenyang and Chengdu, where some employees extended their tour. 
However, it has not been successful in attracting new bidders to 
Shenyang, which had no bidders in 2002. Chengdu had a few bidders, but 
none of them opted to sign up for an additional year; 
* Some junior officers are interested in developing area expertise and 
would consider extending their tour but are unable to do so because 
they are encouraged to work in at least two countries before they are 
tenured; 
* Heavy workload limits officers' time for post language training; 
* Housing conditions have vastly improved, but this is not yet widely 
known; 
* Physical infrastructure is inadequate to properly perform work. 

Source: GAO and State Department. 

[End of table] 

Table 4: Staffing Issues in Kazakhstan: 

Issue: Staffing data; 
Post responses: 
* A number of employees are serving in positions above their grade-—a 
few are working in positions two levels above their grade. Incumbents 
who were the only bidders held four of the positions; 
* The administrative, public diplomacy, and office management 
specialist jobs are the hardest to fill—-though most positions are 
considered hard-to-fill; 
* In the 2001 bidding cycle, Almaty had six bidders for four open 
positions; only one was at the grade level required. There were no 
bidders for two public diplomacy positions. 

Issue: Environmental factors and other obstacles to 
recruitment/retention; 
Post responses: 
* Almaty has poor sanitation and medical facilities, as well as 
substandard housing and public utilities; 
* Geographic isolation inhibits out-of-country travel; 
* Regional transportation is unsafe; 
* There is uncertainty over when the embassy will move to the new 
capital; 
* Potential bidders have preconceived notions of cold, Soviet-style 
hardship; 
* The quality of the local school raises concern. 

Issue: Impact on post operations/diplomatic readiness; 
Post responses: 
* Diplomatic readiness is characterized as fair. However, the embassy 
lacks key administrative staff. The lack of information management and 
security staff has forced existing staff to work excessive overtime. 
Some employees in key positions lack required training; 
* Section heads and supervisors must provide extra guidance to junior 
officers in positions above their grade and experience level; 
* In some cases, lack of language training hinders direct local 
contact (although 83 percent of employees in language-designated 
positions do meet the requirements). 

Issue: Other information; 
Post responses: 
* The service need differential program has been successful and has 
boosted a traditionally high extension rate. The program is credited 
with enticing a tandem couple to extend their tour of duty. A few 
employees assigned to the post in 2001 exercised their option to 
extend their service for a third year. Post expects some employees 
assigned in 2002 to exercise their options for a third year because of 
the program; 
* A number of positions at post are occupied by employees who extended 
their tour. In general, employees choosing to extend their service 
have often cited the good seasonal weather and good morale at post. 

Source: State Department. 

[End of table] 

Table 5: Staffing Issues in Nigeria: 

Issue: Staffing data; 
Post responses: 
* Consular and administrative positions have been historically 
difficult to fill; 
* In Lagos, there are virtually no mid-level officers. Four political, 
financial management, and public diplomacy positions have been vacant 
since summer or fall of 2001. The political officer position will have 
been vacant for over 10 months by the time the new officer arrives in 
the summer of 2002; 
* In Abuja, a political officer position will have been vacant for 
over a year, and an administrative officer position was vacant for 7 
months; 
* There were no mid-level bidders within their grade and functional 
specialty for Lagos in the 2002 assignments cycle; 
* In a 10-officer consular section in Lagos, only the consul general 
has more than one tour of consular experience. 

Issue: Environmental factors and other obstacles to 
recruitment/retention; 
Post responses: 
* Crime is high, and there is high potential for political unrest and 
violence. Lagos is considered one of the most dangerous cities in the 
world. Employees are virtually confined to small enclaves; many have 
adopted a "bunker" mentality; 
* Abuja and Lagos have poor public sanitation, prevalence of tropical 
diseases and infections, and inadequate or nonexistent local health 
care; 
* Housing is poorly constructed; power outages occur daily and other 
utilities (water, telephone service) are unreliable; 
* The climate is hot and humid.; 
* Secondary level schooling in Abuja is of poor quality; 
* In Abuja, there are limited work opportunities for spouses; 
* The feeling of isolation is a problem in Abuja; 
* Especially for consular positions in Lagos, work is very demanding 
due to high fraud environment and applicant volume. 

Issue: Impact on post operations/diplomatic readiness; 
Post responses: 
* Diplomatic readiness is inadequate, with inexperienced officers 
filling vital positions requiring experience, and few experienced 
mentors are available; 
* Some employees are stretched thin and overworked. The few 
experienced employees must also provide guidance to the others. 
Performance of more than basic reporting and infrastructure support 
tasks has been problematic. 

Issue: Other information; 
Post responses: 
* Out of the total eligible employees, only 16 percent assigned to 
Lagos and Abuja in 2002 opted for the service need differential. It is 
probably too early to assess the full impact of the added 
differential, which became available only recently; 
* Word that the post in Lagos is addressing the housing problem is 
filtering out, resulting in serious inquiries from prospective bidders. 

Source: State Department. 

[End of table] 

Table 6: Staffing Issues in Pakistan: 

Issue: Staffing data; 
Post responses: 
* Sections with the greatest number of employees serving in positions 
above their grade include consular, administrative, and public 
diplomacy; 
* Five language-preferred public diplomacy positions in Islamabad, 
Lahore, and Karachi are held by incumbents without language skills; 
* In Islamabad, many employees are in positions above their grade 
because no qualified employees at-grade were interested in bidding on 
the positions. In Karachi, a number of employees are in positions 
above their grade; 
* One office management specialist position in Islamabad has been 
vacant since September 2001. Three other positions, including one 
consular and one facility supervisor position, have been vacant since 
February 2002. No replacements are expected until the summer of 2002 
at the earliest. 

Issue: Environmental factors and other obstacles to 
recruitment/retention; 
Post responses: 
* Some staff have been evacuated recently due to political events. 
Employees tend to think of Pakistan posts as being "frequently 
evacuated"—-the most significant factor discouraging bidders. As a 
result, some employees hesitate to bid on jobs in Pakistan, fearing 
disruption to their families. 

Issue: Impact on post operations/diplomatic readiness; 
Post responses: 
* Employees with high levels of experience spend extra time performing 
more than one job and more of their time mentoring less experienced 
employees. This increases the potential for stress and burnout. 

Issue: Other information; 
Post responses: 
* Peshawar is the only post that is part of the service need 
differential program. None of the employees eligible to participate 
has opted for a third year; 
* Based on anecdotal information, a number of employees in Islamabad 
have extended their tour of duty because they find the overall quality 
of life to be high. Very few employees with families chose not to have 
their dependents accompany them, although recent events may change 
this; 
* Because of the positive information on extensions, posts decided to 
keep the tour of duty at 3 years when the post differential went to 20 
percent, rather than reduce the tour to 2 years; 

Source: State Department. 

[End of table] 

Table 7: Staffing Issues in Russia: 

Issue: Staffing data; 
Post responses: 
* About one-third of the Foreign Service employees in Moscow are 
working in positions above their grade; 60 percent of the section head 
and principal deputy positions are staffed by officers in assignments 
above their grade; 
* Sections with the greatest number of employees above their grade 
include consular, administrative, public affairs, and regional 
security; 
* The mission's inability to fill all its positions is most pronounced 
in the consulates of Yekaterinburg and Vladivostok; a junior officer 
was serving as consul general in Vladivostok in 2001; 
* Four positions in Vladivostok had no bids; the public affairs 
position (vacant for at least a year) had one bid but not at the 
required grade. Neither the information management nor the public 
affairs positions in Yekaterinburg received bids. 

Issue: Environmental factors and other obstacles to 
recruitment/retention; 
Post responses: 
* Health care, housing, and public utilities are deficient throughout 
the country, but to a greater degree in Yekaterinburg and Vladivostok, 
where access to amenities and recreational activities is particularly 
difficult due to geographic isolation; 
* All types of crime are prevalent; public safety is a concern; 
* Goods and services are difficult to obtain; 
* Workload is demanding, accentuated by the number of high-level 
visitors; 
* The weather is harsh; 
* Acquiring proficiency in Russian takes a long time; 
* The size of many housing units is inadequate or (in Moscow) distance 
from post requires long commutes. 

Issue: Impact on post operations/diplomatic readiness; 
Post responses:
* Diplomatic readiness is lowest in remote Yekaterinburg and 
Vladivostok; the effect of junior officers filling positions of great 
responsibility is felt acutely there because there is no one to give 
them advice; 
* In Yekaterinburg and Vladivostok, existing staff members are 
required to cover responsibilities of vacant positions; 
* Internal controls suffer when responsible employees are 
inexperienced and overworked. 
		
Issue: Other information; 
Post responses:		
* The service need differential program has been unsuccessful in 
Yekaterinburg and Vladivostok. None of the eligible staff opted for a 
3-year tour under the program; 
* State's language incentive program does appear to be a major 
incentive for extensions in Moscow. 

Source: State Department. 

[End of table] 

Table 8: Staffing Issues in Saudi Arabia: 

Issue: Staffing data; 
Field observations: 
* Post management believes the limited number of bidders for positions 
makes it difficult to assign qualified employees. As a result, the 
overall qualifications of employees do not match the ideal level that 
is sought; 
* The public diplomacy section is particularly affected by shortages 
in Riyadh. Two public affairs officers will leave in summer of 2002. 
One possible replacement is civil service but with no Arabic skills; 
the other transferred to another assignment; 
* The head of the public diplomacy section in one consulate is also on 
civil service excursion but with no Arabic language skills. He was 
selected because there were no bidders; 
* A position in the economic section in Riyadh had one at-grade bidder 
with no language or area experience; 
* Out of the total language-designated positions in Jeddah, 75 percent 
of the incumbents do not meet the language requirement; 
* The financial management officer position in Riyadh had been vacant 
for 1 year before it was filled. 

Issue: Environmental factors and other obstacles to 
recruitment/retention; 
Field observations: 
* There is an overall sense of cultural and geographic isolation; 
* Social culture, especially in Riyadh, is repressive, particularly 
for women. Both women and men are subject to harassment by the local 
religious police who enforce certain standards of dress and conduct.
* Women are not permitted to drive motor vehicles and rely entirely on 
post motor pools or spouses for any kind of travel; 
* Women face severe restrictions on traveling alone in public; 
* There are enormous restrictions on social activities for single men 
and women. There are no public places where men and women can 
socialize; 
* Family activities are disrupted because public places close five 
times a day for prayer time; 
* Severe heat forces residents to stay indoors, compounding the sense 
of isolation; 
* Regional travel for vacations is very expensive. 

Issue: Impact on post operations/diplomatic readiness; 
Field observations: 
* Diplomatic readiness is not as strong as desirable, particularly in 
terms of public diplomacy.
* The prevalence of inexperienced employees increases the burden on 
senior staff to provide more supervision. 

Issue: Other information; 
Field observations: 
* The service need differential appears to have had an impact. A 
substantial number of employees opted to take the incentive and serve 
for a third year. 

Source: GAO and State Department. 

[End of table] 

Table 9: Staffing Issues in Ukraine: 

Issue: Staffing data; 
Field observations: 
* Roughly 50 percent of the Foreign Service officer positions in Kiev 
are staffed by junior or first-tour officers; 
* Several employees are working in positions at least two levels above 
their grade; 
* Sections with the most shortages and employees working above their 
grade include consular, economic, and public diplomacy; 
* The consul general position was vacant for a year. The deputy consul 
general position was vacant for 15 months. A junior officer had 
previously been in charge of new immigrant visas for 8 months.
* The supervisory general services officer position has been vacant 
since summer 2001; 
* The economic section had two junior officers in positions two levels 
above their grade; two public diplomacy employees were on civil 
service excursion tours. 

Issue: Environmental factors and other obstacles to 
recruitment/retention; 
Field observations: 
* Kiev has an extremely high workload with consequent stress.
* Local medical facilities are poor or nonexistent; 
* Interior housing is generally adequate, but entryways are poorly lit 
and insecure; water shutoffs are a recurring problem; 
* Street crime against westerners has increased. Minorities are 
particularly subject to harassment; 
* Adequate and accessible recreation facilities do not exist.
* Telephone and fax connections are poor; there are not enough 
upgraded computers for the number of staff; 
* Concerns continue about risks from Chernobyl; 
* Post has a word-of-mouth reputation for an extremely high workload; 
* Winters are severe. 

Issue: Impact on post operations/diplomatic readiness; 
Field observations: 
* Some first-tour employees are in positions requiring prior 
experience (such as providing advice to government ministers on 
economic policies).
* There are few mentors to provide guidance to junior or first-tour 
employees.
* First-tour employees suffer burnout, increasing chances they will 
decide to leave the Foreign Service.
* There is insufficient time to more fully investigate visa fraud.
* There is insufficient time for further language study at post due to 
heavy workload. 

Issue: Other information; 
Field observations: 
* The service need differential program has had some success. Out of 
the total employees eligible for the program in 2001 and 2002, 47 
percent accepted the additional incentive to remain for a third year. 
Three heads of sections opted not to accept the incentive. 

Source: GAO and State Department. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Most Heavily Bid and Underbid Countries: 

Table 10 lists the countries in each region that had the most number 
of bids per position, on average, and the fewest bids. 

Table 10: Countries with the Most and Fewest Bids: 

Region/country[A]: Africa; 
Most heavily bid countries (20 bids or more per position): 
Mauritius. 
Most underbid countries	(fewer than 3 bids per position)[B]: 
Algeria; 
Angola; 
Benin; 
Burkina Faso; 
Cameroon; 
Cape Verde; 
Central African Republic; 
Chad; 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the (formerly Zaire); 
Congo, Republic of; 
Cote d'Ivoire; 
Eritrea; 
Gabon; 
Guinea; 
Liberia; 
Malawi; 
Mali;	
Niger;	
Nigeria; 
Rwanda; 
Togo. 	 

Region/country[A]: East Asia and Pacific; 
Most heavily bid countries (20 bids or more per position): 
Australia; 
Hong Kong; 
New Zealand. 
Most underbid countries	(fewer than 3 bids per position)[B]: 
China; 
Mongolia; 
Papua New Guinea; 
South Korea. 

Region/country[A]: Europe and Eurasia; 
Most heavily bid countries (20 bids or more per position): 
Austria; 
Czech Republic; 
Cyprus; 
Denmark; 
France; 
Ireland; 
Italy; 
Luxembourg; 
The Netherlands; 
Spain; 
Switzerland; 
United Kingdom; 
Most underbid countries	(fewer than 3 bids per position)[B]: 
Albania; 
Armenia; 
Belarus; 
Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
Georgia; 
Kazakhstan; 
Krygyzstan; 
Macedonia; 
Moldova; 
Russia; 
Serbia-Montenegro; 
Turkmenistan; 
Ukraine. 

Region/country[A]: Near East; 
Most underbid countries	(fewer than 3 bids per position)[B]: 
Yemen. 

Region/country[A]: South Asia; 
Most underbid countries	(fewer than 3 bids per position)[B]: 
Bangladesh. 

Region/country[A]: Western Hemisphere; 
Most heavily bid countries (20 bids or more per position): 
Bahamas; 
Canada; 
Grenada. 
Most underbid countries	(fewer than 3 bids per position)[B]: 
Haiti; 
Jamaica. 

[A] The geographic regions correspond to State's six regional bureaus. 

[B] State considers posts most difficult to staff when half of the 
positions open have zero to two bidders. 

Source: GAO analysis based on State bidding data for the 2001 and 2002 
assignments cycles. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Characteristics of Posts: 

Table 11 lists the 259 diplomatic posts that State operates worldwide, 
by region and by country. For every post, the tour of duty, hardship 
differential pay, and any danger pay that may be applicable are shown. 
The list also shows the 41 posts that have been designated for a 
service need differential—an additional recruitment and retention 
incentive of 15 percent above base pay for those who agree to serve 
for a third year—and the 98 posts that State has designated most-
difficult-to-staff. 

Table 11: U.S. Diplomatic Posts and Their Hardship Differential and 
Danger Pay Rates (2001/2002): 

Regional bureau: Bureau of African Affairs; 
Country: Angola; 
Post: Luanda; 	
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Benin; 
Post: Cotonou; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Botswana; 
Post: Gaborone; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Burkina Faso; 
Post: Ouagadougou; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
		
Country: Burundi; 
Post: Bujumbura; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: 25%; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
	
Country: Cameroon; 
Post: Yaounde; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
		
Country: Cape Verde; 
Post: Praia; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
	
Country: Central African Republic; 
Post: Bangui; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: 20%; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Chad; 
Post: N'Djamena; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Congo, Democratic Republic of the (formerly Zaire); 
Post: Kinshasa; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
						
Country: Congo, Republic of; 
Post: Brazzaville; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Cote d'Ivoire; 
Post: Abidjan; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Djibouti, Republic of; 
Post: Djibouti; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Eritrea; 
Post: Asmara; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Ethiopia; 
Post: Addis Ababa; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Gabon; 
Post: Libreville; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Gambia; 
Post: Banjul; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Ghana; 
Post: Accra; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Guinea; 
Post: Conakry; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Kenya; 
Post: Nairobi; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Lesotho; 
Post: Maseru; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Liberia; 
Post: Monrovia; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: 15%; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Malagasy Republic; 
Post: Antananarivo; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Malawi; 
Post: Lilongwe; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Mali; 
Post: Bamako; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Mauritania; 
Post: Nouakchott; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Mauritius; 
Post: Port Louis; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Mozambique; 
Post: Maputo; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Namibia; 
Post: Windhoek; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Niger; 
Post: Niamey; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Nigeria; 
Post: Abuja; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Nigeria; 
Post: Lagos; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Rwanda; 
Post: Kigali; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Senegal; 
Post: Dakar; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Sierra Leone; 
Post: Freetown; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: 25%; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: South Africa; 
Post: Capetown; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: South Africa;	
Post: Durban; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: South Africa;
Post: Johannesburg; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: South Africa;	
Post: Pretoria; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
	
Country: Sudan; 
Post: Khartoum; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: 15%; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
	
Country: Swaziland; 
Post: Mbabane; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
	
Country: Tanzania; 
Post: Dar es Salaam; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
		
Country: Togo; 
Post: Lome; 		
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Uganda	
Post: Kampala; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
	
Country: Zambia; 
Post: Lusaka; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
	
Country: Zimbabwe; 
Post: Harare; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
		
Regional bureau: African Affairs subtotals: 
Posts: 46; 
Service need differential: 13; 
Most difficult to staff: 39. 

Regional bureau: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: 

Country: Australia; 
Post: Canberra; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Australia; 			
Post: Melbourne; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Australia; 	
Post: Perth; 	
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Australia; 	
Post: Sydney; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Brunei; 
Post: Bandar Seri Begawan; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Cambodia; 
Post: Phnom Penh; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: China; 
Post: Beijing; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: China; 
Post: Chengdu; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: China; 
Post: Guangzhou; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: China; 	
Post: Shanghai; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: China; 
Post: Shenyang; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
	
Country: East Timor; 
Post: Dili; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Fiji Islands; 
Post: Suva; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Hong Kong; 
Post: Hong Kong; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Indonesia; 
Post: Jakarta; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Indonesia; 
Surabaya; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Japan; 
Post: Fukuoka; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Japan; 
Post: Nagoya; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Japan; 
Post: Naha; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Japan; 
Post: Osaka-Kobe; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Japan; 
Post: Sapporo; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Japan; 
Post: Tokyo; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Laos; 
Post: Vientiane; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
			
Country: Malaysia; 
Post: Kuala Lumpur; 		
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Marshall Islands; 
Post: Majuro; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Micronesia; 
Post: Kolonia; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Mongolia; 
Post: Ulaanbaatar; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Burma (Myanmar); 
Post: Rangoon; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: New Zealand; 
Post: Auckland; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: New Zealand; 		
Post: Wellington; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Palau; 
Post: Koror; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Papua New Guinea; 
Post: Port Moresby; 	
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Philippines; 
Post: Manila; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Samoa; 
Post: Apia; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]; 
		
Country: Singapore; 
Post: Singapore; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: South Korea; 
Post: Seoul; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Thailand; 
Post: Bangkok; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Thailand; 		
Post: Chiang Mai; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Vietnam; 
Post: Hanoi; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Vietnam; 		
Post: Ho Chi Minh City; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Regional bureau: East Asian and Pacific Affairs subtotals: 
Posts: 40; 
Service need differential: 6; 
Most difficult to staff: 13. 

Regional bureau: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs: 

Country: Albania; 
Post: Tirana; 
Length of tour (in years): 1; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
		
Country: Armenia; 
Post: Yerevan; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
		
Country: Austria; 
Post: Vienna; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Austria; 		
Post: Vienna-OSCE; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Austria; 		
Post: Vienna-UNVIE; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Azerbaijan; 
Post: Baku; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Belarus; 
Post: Minsk; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Belgium; 
Post: Brussels; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Belgium; 		
Brussels-NATO; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Belgium; 
Brussels-USEU; 		
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Bermuda; 
Hamilton; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
			
Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
Post: Sarajevo; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: 15%; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
Post: Sarajevo-OHR; 
Length of tour (in years): 1; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: 25%; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
Post: Banja Luka; 
Length of tour (in years): 1; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: 25%; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
Post: Mostar; 
Length of tour (in years): 1; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: 25%; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Bulgaria; 
Post: Sofia; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Croatia; 
Post: Zagreb; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Cyprus; 
Post: Nicosia; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Czech Republic; 
Post: Prague; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: None; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Denmark; 
Post: Copenhagen; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Estonia; 
Post: Tallinn; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Finland; 
Post: Helsinki; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: France; 
Post: Paris; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]; 

Country: France; 	
Post: Paris-OECD; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: France; 
Post: Bordeaux; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: France; 
Post: Lille; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: France; 
Post: Lyon; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: France; 
Post: Marseille; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: France; 
Post: Rennes; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: France; 
Post: Toulouse; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: France; 
Post: Strasbourg; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Georgia; 
Post: Tbilisi; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
	
Country: Germany; 
Post: Berlin; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Germany; 
Post: Dusseldorf; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Germany; 
Post: Frankfurt; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Germany; 
Post: Hamburg; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: v
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Germany; 
Post: Leipzig; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Germany; 
Post: Munich; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Greece; 
Post: Athens; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Greece; 
Post: Thessaloniki; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Holy See; 
Post: Vatican City; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Hungary; 
Post: Budapest; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Iceland; 
Post: Reykjavik; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Ireland; 
Post: Dublin; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Italy; 
Post: Florence; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Italy; 
Post: Milan; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Italy; 
Post: Naples; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Italy; 
Post: Rome; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Kazakhstan; 
Post: Almaty; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: 
Most difficult to staff: 

Country: Kyrgyzstan; 
Post: Bishkek; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
	
Country: Latvia; 
Post: Riga; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 
	
Country: Lithuania; 
Post: Vilnius; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Luxembourg; 
Post: Luxembourg; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Macedonia; 
Post: Skopje; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Malta; 
Post: Valletta; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Moldova; 
Post: Chisinau; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Netherlands; 
Post: Amsterdam; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Netherlands; 	
Post: The Hague; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Norway; 
Post: Oslo; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Poland; 
Post: Krakow; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Poland; 
Post: Warsaw; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Portugal; 
Post: Lisbon; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Portugal; 
Post: Ponta Delgada; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Romania; 
Post: Bucharest; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Romania; 
Post: Cluj; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: 
Service need differential: 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Russia; 
Post: Moscow; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Russia; 
Post: St. Petersburg; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Russia; 
Post: Vladivostok; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Russia; 
Post: Yekaterinburg; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Slovak Republic; 
Post: Bratislava; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Slovenia; 
Post: Ljubljana; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Spain; 
Post: Barcelona; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Spain; 
Post: Madrid; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]; 
	
Country: Sweden;	
Post: Stockholm; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Switzerland; 
Post: Bern; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Switzerland; 
Post: Geneva-I0; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Tajikistan; 
Post: Dushanbe; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: 15%; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Turkey; 
Post: Adana; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Turkey; 
Post: Ankara; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Turkey; 
Post: Istanbul; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Turkmenistan; 
Post: Ashgabat; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Ukraine; 
Post: Kiev; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: United Kingdom; 
Post: Belfast; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: United Kingdom; 
Post: Edinburgh; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: United Kingdom; 
Post: London; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Uzbekistan; 
Post: Tashkent; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Yugoslavia; 
Post: Belgrade; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: 25%; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Yugoslavia; 
Post: Pristina; 
Length of tour (in years): 1; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: 20%; 
Service need differential: 
Most difficult to staff: 

Length of tour (in years): ; 
Hardship differential: %; 
Danger Pay: 
Service need differential: 
Most difficult to staff: 

European and Eurasian Affairs subtotals: 
Post: 88; 
Service need differential: 13; 
Most difficult to staff: 26. 

Regional Bureau: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: 

Country: Algeria; 
Post: Algiers; 
Length of tour (in years): 1; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: 25%; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Bahrain; 
Post: Manama; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Egypt; 
Post: Cairo; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Egypt; 		
Post: Alexandria; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Israel; 
Post: Tel Aviv; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Jerusalem	
Post: Jerusalem; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Jordan; 
Post: Amman; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Kuwait; 
Post: Kuwait; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Lebanon; 
Post: Beirut; 
Length of tour (in years): 1; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Morocco; 
Post: Casablanca; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Morocco; 
Post: Rabat; 	
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Oman; 
Post: Muscat; 	
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Qatar; 
Post: Doha; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Saudi Arabia; 
Post: Dhahran; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Saudi Arabia; 
Post: Jeddah; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Saudi Arabia; 
Post: Riyadh; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Syria; 
Post: Damascus; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Tunisia; 
Post: Tunis; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: United Arab Emirates; 
Post: Abu Dhabi; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: United Arab Emirates; 
Post: Dubai; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Yemen; 
Post: Sanaa; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Near Eastern Affairs subtotals: 		
Post: 21; 
Service need differential: 3; 
Most difficult to staff: 9. 

Regional Bureau: Bureau of South Asian Affairs: 

Country: Afghanistan; 
Post: Kabul; 
Length of tour (in years): 1; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: 25%; 
Service need differential: 
Most difficult to staff: 
	
Country: Bangladesh; 
Post: Dhaka; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: India; 
Post: Calcutta; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: India; 
Post: Chennai (Madras); 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: India; 
Post: Mumbai (Bombay); 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: India; 	
Post: New Delhi; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Nepal; 
Post: Kathmandu; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Pakistan; 
Post: Islamabad; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Pakistan; 
Post: Karachi; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: 15%; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Pakistan; 
Post: Lahore; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Pakistan; 
Post: Peshawar; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Sri Lanka; 
Post: Colombo; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

South Asian Affairs subtotals: 
Post: 12; 
Service need differential: 3; 
Most difficult to staff: 8. 

Regional Bureau: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: 

Country: Argentina; 
Post: Buenos Aires; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Bahamas; 
Post: Nassau; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Barbados; 
Post: Bridgetown; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
			
Country: Belize; 
Post: Belize City; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Bolivia; 
Post: La Paz; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Brazil; 
Post: Brasilia; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Brazil; 
Post: Recife; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Brazil; 
Post: Rio De Janeiro; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Brazil; 
Post: Sao Paulo; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Canada; 
Post: Calgary; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Canada; 
Post: Halifax; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Canada; 
Post: Montreal; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Canada; 
Post: Montreal-ICAO; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Canada; 
Post: Ottawa; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Canada; 
Post: Quebec; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Canada; 
Post: Toronto; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Canada; 
Post: Vancouver; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Chile; 
Post: Santiago; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Colombia; 
Post: Bogota; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: 15%; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
	
Country: Costa Rica; 
Post: San Jose; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Cuba; 
Post: Havana; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Dominican Republic; 
Post: Santo Domingo; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Ecuador; 
Post: Guayaquil; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Ecuador; 
Post: Quito; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: El Salvador; 
Post: San Salvador; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Grenada; 
Post: St. George's; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: Guatemala; 
Post: Guatemala City; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Guyana; 
Post: Georgetown; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Haiti; 
Post: Port-au-Prince; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 25%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Honduras; 
Post: Tegucigalpa; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Jamaica; 
Post: Kingston; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Mexico; 
Post: Ciudad Juarez; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Mexico; 
Post: Guadalajara; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Mexico; 
Post: Hermosillo; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Mexico; 
Post: Matamoros; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Mexico; 
Post: Merida; 	
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Mexico; 
Post: Mexico City; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 10%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Mexico; 
Post: Monterrey; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Mexico; 
Post: Nogales; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Mexico; 
Post: Nuevo Laredo; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Mexico; 
Post: Tijuana; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Netherlands Antilles; 
Post: Curacao; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Nicaragua; 
Post: Managua; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Panama; 
Post: Panama City; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Paraguay; 
Post: Asuncion; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Peru; 
Post: Lima; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 20%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Suriname; 
Post: Paramaribo; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 15%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Check]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Check]. 

Country: Trinidad; 
Post: Port of Spain; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 
		
Country: United States; 
Post: New York-USUN; 
Length of tour (in years): 2; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: United States; 
Post: Washington-USOAS; 
Length of tour (in years): 1; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Uruguay; 
Post: Montevideo; 
Length of tour (in years): 4; 
Hardship differential: 0; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Country: Venezuela; 
Post: Caracas; 
Length of tour (in years): 3; 
Hardship differential: 5%; 
Danger Pay: [Empty]; 
Service need differential: [Empty]; 
Most difficult to staff: [Empty]. 

Western Hemisphere Affairs subtotals: 
Post: 52
Service need differential: 3; 
Most difficult to staff: 3. 

Total - worldwide: 259	41	98
Post: 259; 
Service need differential: 41; 
Most difficult to staff: 98. 

Legend: 

ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization. 
I0: Bureau of International Organization Affairs. 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
OHR: Office of High Commissioner. 
OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
UNVIE: U.S. Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna. 
USEU: U.S. Mission to the European Union. 
USOAS: U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States. 
USUN: U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. 

Note: Length of tours, hardship differential rates, and danger pay 
rates are those that were applicable in July 2001 when employees were 
submitting bids for the 2002 assignments cycle. Service need 
differential and most difficult to staff post designations are for 
2002. 

Source: State Department. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at 
the end of this appendix. 

United States Department of State: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

June 5, 2002: 

Ms. Susan S. Westin: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. General Accounting Office: 

Dear Ms. Westin: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "State 
Department: Staff Shortages and Ineffective Assignment System 
Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Post," GAO-02-626, GAO Job 
Code 320061. 

The Department's comments are enclosed for incorporation, along with 
this letter, as an appendix to the GAO final report. Please find 
technical comments also attached. 

If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact 
Laura Hall, Policy Coordination Staff, Bureau of Human Resources on 
(202) 647-2675. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Christopher B. Burnham: 
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer: 

Enclosure: As stated. 

cc: GAO/IAT - Mr. Ford: 
State/OIG - Mr. Berman: 
State/DGHR - Mr. Delawie: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System Compromise 
Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts (GAO-02-626, GAO Job Code 
320061): 

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on the 
draft report, which we believe is generally very helpful. The GAO is 
correct in identifying a number of difficulties the Department faces 
in meeting its challenges of staffing hardship posts around the world. 
We agree that operations at hardship posts are negatively affected by 
staffing gaps and we are making every effort to address this problem. 
The statistical and data analyses performed by the GAO on the 
distribution patterns of hardship posts among Foreign Service 
employees were very helpful in providing concrete facts to back up 
impressions that are widely held within the Department. The GAO's 
warning on the continued relative decline in the value of the hardship 
differential due to the lack of locality pay for employees assigned 
abroad is particularly timely as the Department has legislation 
pending action in Congress that would partially address this issue. 

We believe that our challenge in staffing hardship posts is only one 
of several symptoms of the larger problem that the GAO also noted: the 
Department's staffing shortfall of over 1100 people. Without adequate 
capacity to fill all of our positions, those that are hardest to 
staff, whether because of employee preferences, lack of adequate 
health or educational facilities, or for other reasons, will continue 
to suffer disproportionately from gaps compared with positions in non-
hardship locations. 

Secretary Powell has committed to, and won Administration and 
Congressional support for, the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), 
which is aimed at eliminating our staffing gap over a three-year 
period. Mid-way through FY 2002, we are on target to meet our hiring 
goals for the first year of the DRI. In fact, regarding Foreign 
Service Generalist Junior Officers, we have already met our hiring 
target for the whole year, hiring or committing to hire 465 
individuals, 249 above attrition, by September 30. 

We believe that the GAO significantly understates the contribution 
that continuing to implement the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative will 
make toward minimizing the hardship staffing gap. The mathematics of 
this exercise are relatively straightforward: while we will be hiring 
hundreds of Foreign Service employees above attrition, we will be 
creating a much smaller number of new positions as part of this 
exercise; under the Foreign Service assignment maxim that "everybody 
has to be somewhere," this extra hiring will translate, over the next 
year, into fewer vacancies at hardship posts, since those are the only 
options that will be available to many transferring employees as the 
hiring program progresses. [See comment 1] 

Additionally, for a variety of reasons, entry-level employees such as 
the hundreds being hired under the DRI typically seek and accept 
assignment to even the most difficult-to-fill hardship posts - a 
historical fact not mentioned in the GAO report. The Department 
therefore is confident that the increased entry-level hiring under DRI 
will translate directly and immediately into much improved staffing 
levels, via all relevant training, at all foreign service posts. [See 
comment 2] 

We must also take issue with the GAO's assertion that we are not able 
to ensure that employees are "assigned where they are needed most." 
Hardship posts are not necessarily the same as critical posts; whereas 
some positions at hardship posts such as Beijing and Moscow are
clearly of strategic importance, there are positions at other hardship 
locations that are far less significant strategically than positions 
at non-hardship locations such as Paris or Tokyo. We believe that in 
general, we are very successful in assigning employees where they are 
needed most; for example, we have had no trouble staffing Kabul and 
Islamabad, despite the difficulties presented by the war in 
Afghanistan and the terrorist threat in Pakistan. [See comment 3] 

The Department has made, as the GAO acknowledges, some important 
strides in providing incentives for hardship post staffing in the 
recent past. Our effort to increase the number of medical units at 
posts abroad, for example, will be an important factor in making 
hardship posts more desirable, especially among employees with 
families. Likewise, the Service Need Differential Pilot Program 
appears to have been very successful in persuading employees to sign 
up for a third year at many of the 41 particularly difficult posts it 
covers. 

As recommended by the GAO, we will study alternative ways to provide 
additional incentives for employees to serve at hardship posts. We 
believe that providing Washington-based locality pay to Foreign 
Service employees assigned abroad will be an important factor in this 
equation; since hardship differentials, compared with Washington, are 
effectively reduced by 11.48% (the Washington locality pay rate), an 
employee must serve at a 15% differential post in order to make as 
much money as in a domestic assignment. Correcting the locality pay 
inequity would provide significant incentives for service abroad, 
including in hardship posts, especially for those employees nearing 
retirement. we will also look at other incentives, and in fact have 
already commissioned the Corporate Leadership Council to study 
corporate best practices in this area. [See comment 4] 

Regarding the assignment data difficulties noted by the GAO, we 
acknowledge that our data systems were not designed to provide reports 
of the type the GAO sought. We will review the implementation of our 
HR data systems with a view toward modifying them to provide more 
reporting capabilities along the lines suggested by the GAO. 

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter 
dated June 5, 2002. 

1. We agree that hiring staff under the Diplomatic Readiness 
Initiative will enable State to fill more of its positions. However, 
unless other actions are taken, such as those we have recommended, 
certain hardship posts may continue to be disproportionately staffed 
with entry-level employees who may not have the right experience, 
training, and skills to perform their jobs effectively. Furthermore, 
it will take years for new employees to acquire the skills and 
experience required to fill the mid-level positions. In the meantime, 
State needs to ensure that hardship posts do not suffer 
disproportionately from State's shortages of mid-level employees. 

2. We acknowledge that entry-level employees are frequently assigned 
to hardship posts. Our concern is that entry-level employees are 
assigned to positions that require more experience and that they may 
not get the supervision and guidance they need from more experienced 
staff due to the shortage of mid-level officers at hardship posts. 

3. Our work shows that State is having difficulty filling positions at 
hardship posts that are critical to U.S. interests with qualified, 
experienced staff. Based on our case studies, State's assignment 
system does not necessarily ensure that staff are assigned to 
positions in locations where they are needed most. For example, as 
noted in our report, State had difficulties staffing public diplomacy 
positions in Saudi Arabia with experienced, Arabic-speaking officers. 
In China and Russia, many Foreign Service officers did not meet the 
language proficiency requirements for their positions. Moreover, State 
does not rigorously and systematically determine its worldwide 
staffing priorities. 

4. In studying additional incentives for employees to serve at 
hardship posts, State needs to examine not only financial incentives 
but also nonfinancial incentives and other actions specifically 
designed to steer qualified employees toward hardship posts that 
require their skills and experience and to ensure that the burden of 
hardship service is shared equitably. These actions could include, for 
example, making hardship service an explicit criterion in promotion 
and onward assignment decisions and employing more directive 
approaches to assignments. Any financial incentives that State may 
propose should fully analyze the estimated costs associated with each 
option and assess how they will affect the likelihood of increasing 
the number of Foreign Service employees who bid on assignments at 
selected hardship posts. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John Brummet (202) 512-5260. 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, Joy Labez, Barbara Shields, 
Phil McMahon, Melissa Pickworth, and Janey Cohen made key 
contributions to this report. Rick Barrett, Tim Carr, Martin De 
Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Jeffrey Goebel, Kathryn Hartsburg, Bruce 
Kutnick, Mike Rohrback, and Ray Wessmiller also provided technical 
assistance. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] State defines diplomatic readiness as its "ability to get the 
right people in the right place at the right time with the right 
skills to carry out America's foreign policy." 

[2] 5 U.S.C. 5925(a). 

[3] Eighty-nine posts do not have health units; 39 of these posts are 
in hardship locations. State plans to open 30 health units this year. 

[4] 5 U.S.C. 5925(b). 

[5] As of July 2001, danger pay was applicable at 16 posts, including 
5 in Africa and 6 in Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (see appendix 
V). 

[6] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Inspector General, 
Semiannual Report to the Congress, October 1, 2000, to March 31, 2001 
(Washington, D.C.: May 2001). 

[7] In some situations, officers may choose a downstretch to a 
position lower than their grade—-for example, tandem couples (where 
both spouses are Foreign Service officers) whose bidding options may 
be limited. 

[8] Most of State's positions that require general proficiency in 
speaking and reading abilities are categorized as "language-
designated" positions. In addition, State has some positions 
categorized as "language-preferred," where State considers language 
proficiency useful but not essential. 

[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital 
Management, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2002). 

[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Languages: Human Capital 
Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-375] (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 2002). 

[11] Junior officers also bid for their positions, but their 
assignments are directed by the Bureau of Human Resources, Entry Level 
Division, and not by a panel process. 

[12] In 2001, State made 2,560 assignments. 

[13] Twelve months if the tour of the duty of a post was only 12 
months at the time of an officer's assignment. 

[14] As a rule, domestic assignments are for 2 years up to a maximum 
of 6 years (based on State regulation) or no more than 8 years (as 
allowed by the Foreign Service Act). Fair share bidders may bid solely 
on domestic positions if they have sufficient time remaining before 
they reach the 6-year limit allowed for domestic service. 

[15] See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Inspector General, 
Review of Tours of Duty, Memorandum Report 99-SP-013 (Washington, 
D.C.: May 1999). The Office of the Inspector General contracted an 
independent consulting firm to perform the survey. 

[16] U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Office of 
Audits, Civil Service to Foreign Service Hard-to-Fill Program, Report 
No. 01-HR-L-029 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2001). 

[17] The 37 percent is derived by subtracting 63, which is at the 80-
percent point, from 100 percent. 

[18] Based on 2001 data, about 12 percent of Foreign Service officers 
have limited medical clearances. State medical officers determine, on 
a case-by-case basis, where an officer can serve. 

[19] 5 U.S.C. 5925(a). 

[20] The interagency committee on allowances, led by State working in 
conjunction with other federal agencies, developed the standards by 
comparing environmental and living conditions overseas with those in 
the United States. A study of allowances is under way and expected to 
be completed in summer 2002. 

[21] See 5 U.S.C. 5304. 

[22] For all practical purposes, in the case of Foreign Service 
officers, domestic employees are based in Washington or in other major 
metropolitan areas in the United States, such as New York. 

[23] State's estimates vary depending on the circumstances of an 
employee upon retirement. State estimates that the gap in annuities 
for one who retired from overseas rather than Washington, D.C., could 
range from about $3,000 to $5,740 annually. 

[24] The State Department anticipates that this proposal will be 
considered as part of the State Department authorization bill for 
fiscal year 2002 to 2003. 

[25] These estimated costs for fiscal year 2002 are for employees who 
were at post in 2001 and extended in 2001 for a 3-year tour. 

[26] The bidding and assignment data that we reviewed were for mid-
level positions. In terms of the Foreign Service grade structure, mid-
level positions are FS-04 tenured, FS-03, and FS-02, which are 
equivalent to the civil service GS-12, FS-13, and GS-14, respectively. 
Junior officers are FS-06, FS-05, and FS-04 untenured, which are 
equivalent to GS-9, GS-11, and GS-12. (Junior officers are allowed 5 
years to be tenured; most of them are tenured after 3 years.) 
Management-level and senior officers are FS-01 (GS-15 equivalent) and 
the Senior Foreign Service (comparable to the Senior Executive 
Service.) 

[27] Foreign Service specialists provide technical support or 
administrative services (such as facilities maintenance, general 
services, health practitioners, and security officers). We limited the 
scope of this analysis to the generalists, which include Foreign 
Service officers in the economic, political, administrative, consular, 
and public diplomacy areas. 

[28] Foreign Service employees with tours of duty that end between May 
1 and October 31 are officially on the summer cycle, and those with 
tours of duty that end between November 1 and April 30 are officially 
on the winter cycle. 

[29] The Department of State requires that a generalist applicant 
select a "cone," which is a functional area of specialization, when 
applying to take the written examination. The Foreign Service 
generalist specializations are administrative, consular, economic, 
political, and public diplomacy. All Foreign Service officers are 
assigned a grade, which ranges from FS-07 to FS-01, corresponding to 
entry level to senior level, respectively. 

[30] Stretch assignments are positions above or below an employee's 
grade. 

[31] HR/CDA develops and administers training policy, including long-
term external training. 

[32] There are two panels: the interdivisional panel, which considers 
assignments across divisional lines; and the mid-level panel, which 
considers assignments for mid-level employees. The panels consist of 
14 members and 13 members, respectively, representing employees and 
the bureaus. The continuity counselor sits on both panels. 

[End of section] 

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