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United States General Accounting Office: GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

May 2002: 

Military Transformation: 

Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade 
Combat Teams: 

GAO-02-442: 

Contents: 

Results In Brief: 

Background: 

IBCTS Are Expected to Fill a Perceived Gap in Military Capability: 

Regional Commander in Chiefs View Planned IBCTS Favorably and Could 
Use Them in Various Ways: 

IBCTs Would Fill a Capabilities Gap: 

Challenges Have Arisen in Forming the Initial IBCT: 

Installation Support Needed for IBCTs Has Been Greater than 
Anticipated: 

Lessons Learned on Brigade Formation Are Not Readily Available: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Scope and Methodology: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Sections from Public Laws 107-107 and 106-398 Concerning 
Limitations on Army Transformation Actions: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Examples of Legacy Weapon Systems—-Black Hawk Helicopter, 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and Abrams Tank: 

Figure 2: Representative Interim Armored Vehicles—-Mobile Gun System 
Vehicle and Infantry Carrier Vehicle: 

Figure 3: C-130 Aircraft: 

Figure 4: Areas of Operational Responsibility for the Geographical
Combatant Commands: 

Figure 5: Army's Approach to Develop Multi-Skilled Soldiers: 

Figure 6: A C-17 Aircraft and a C-5A Aircraft That Would Provide 
Strategic Lift for the IBCT: 

Figure 7: Comparison of Fiscal Year 2001 Retention Rates for Soldiers 
in the IBCTs, at Fort Lewis, and throughout Forces Command: 

Figure 8: Comparison of IBCT and I Corps Soldiers Electing to Remain 
in Their Existing Unit: 

Figure 9: Shoot House Training Facility Constructed at Fort Lewis to 
Train IBCT Soldiers to Confront the Enemy in an Urban Setting: 

[End of section] 

United States General Accounting Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

May 17, 2002: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John W. Warner: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bob Stump: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

In October 1999, the U.S. Army announced its intentions to transform 
its forces into a more strategically responsive force that could more 
rapidly deploy and effectively operate in all types of military 
operations, whether small-scale contingencies or major theater wars. 
Army plans call for an over 30-year transformation that will lead to 
the ability to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, 
a division in 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days. The first 
step in this process is to form and equip six Interim Brigade Combat 
Teams (IBCT) by 2008. The first two brigades are being formed at Fort 
Lewis, Washington, with the goal of organizing, equipping, training, 
and certifying the first such brigade to deploy by May 2003. The Army 
Chief of Staff stated that it would cost approximately $1 billion to 
form each brigade. 

Because these brigades are entirely new, many questions have arisen as 
to how their capabilities differ from those of more traditional 
brigades, how the Army plans to use them, and whether they will 
possess capabilities that the war-fighting Commanders in Chief (CINC) 
need. Thus, we monitored IBCT formation at Fort Lewis during 2001 to 
gain a better understanding of the challenges that have arisen that 
might apply to subsequent brigades scheduled to be formed in other 
locations. We also visited the war-fighting CINCs responsible for 
Europe, Southwest Asia, Korea, and the Pacific to gain their 
perspectives on how they might use these brigades. Our objectives were 
to (1) identify the expected capabilities of the IBCT, (2) determine 
the CINCs' views on the utility of the IBCTs and how the CINCs might 
use them, (3) identify the challenges that have arisen in forming the 
brigades, and (4) determine if the Army has an effective means of 
capturing lessons learned. This is the third in a planned series of 
reports related to Army Transformation and is being provided to you 
because of your oversight responsibilities for these issues.[Footnote 
1] 

Results In Brief: 

The IBCT—intended to be a lethal and survivable deterrent force that 
can be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world—was devised to fill a 
gap in military capability. The Army's heavy combat forces, though 
lethal and survivable, are not rapidly deployable, and its light 
infantry forces are rapidly deployable but lack survivability and 
lethality. Although the IBCT is optimized for use in small-scale 
contingencies, it is also expected to engage in all types of military 
conflicts, including a major theater war when supplemented with 
additional forces and weapons. Its interim vehicles are designed to 
maneuver in various kinds of terrain, from mountains to urban 
settings. Its digital systems are intended to allow soldiers to "see" 
an enhanced view of the battlefield through robust intelligence, 
reconnaissance, and surveillance. These capabilities are expected to 
enable the IBCT to engage an enemy before coming into actual contact. 
The Army will test and validate new doctrine, training, and leadership 
development concepts as well as new organizational structures in the 
IBCTs. This is intended to provide insights for future transformation. 

The war-fighting CINCs believe that the IBCT's planned capabilities 
will help fill a gap in capability by providing a rapidly deployable 
force that is both lethal and survivable. The specific uses that the 
CINCs envision for the IBCTs vary according to the unique requirements 
of their respective regions. However, they generally agreed that the 
IBCTs as envisioned would provide them with a broader choice of 
capabilities to meet their operational requirements. 

The Army faces numerous challenges in forming its first IBCT that need 
to be addressed. For example, some planned combat capabilities will 
not be present when the IBCT is to be certified for deployment in May 
2003. Specifically, two interim armored vehicles—the mobile gun system 
vehicle and the nuclear, biological, and chemical vehicle—require 
further development and will not be delivered until 2004, requiring 
substitute vehicles in their stead. Similarly, training challenges 
exist since the interim armored vehicle delivery schedule has 
compressed the time available for training. The IBCT will not have a 
full 6 months to train after receiving most of the vehicles as desired 
by Fort Lewis officials. However, a senior Fort Lewis official 
contended that all the training requirements would be accomplished in 
the reduced time available. In addition, maintaining proficiency in 
digital systems has challenged the IBCT due to personnel turnover. As 
a result, the Training and Doctrine Command is currently developing a 
plan to sustain soldier skills on the digitized systems for the two 
brigades. However, the Army has a draft plan for sustaining soldiers' 
skills on digitized systems that will be applicable to the entire 
Army. Further, it is questionable whether the Army will be able to 
deploy its first brigades anywhere in the world in 96 hours. While 
this is now only a goal for the IBCTs, it is a requirement for units 
entering the force after 2008. The first IBCTs will likely not meet 
this goal due to both the lack of a sufficient number of aircraft to 
meet the timetable and possibly the need for airfield upgrades. 
Further, the IBCT is designed to carry limited supplies and after 72 
hours to "reach" for needed logistical support from, among others, a 
foreign country's commercial system. However, the Army has not yet 
determined how this approach will work. The deployability shortfall 
and combat capability shortfalls create risks for the CINCs to 
consider. However, information about the extent of these shortfalls 
has not been made available to the CINCs so they can plan for 
mitigating any identified risks. 

Additional challenges have arisen at Fort Lewis. As a human capital 
challenge, reenlistment data show that digitally trained soldiers have 
been transferring out of the IBCT. This disrupts the continuity that 
is important to these new brigades. The Army has developed a personnel 
stabilization policy to help retain soldiers and avoid the constant 
training of new soldiers, but it does not have data to determine why 
the soldiers left. Such data would enable the Army to decide what 
actions might be needed to reduce personnel turnover. With respect to 
IBCT installation support, Fort Lewis has had to assume an increased 
maintenance workload because the IBCT was designed with fewer 
maintenance personnel in order to deploy quickly. Fort Lewis officials 
had to request additional funds to absorb the additional workload. 
Such a workload increase can be expected at the installations that 
will be home stations to future IBCTs. 

Army officials believe that the organization created at Fort Lewis to 
help form the brigades has been effective in addressing day-to-day 
challenges, thereby permitting brigade officials to concentrate on 
critical training and operational matters. Further, the Army has a 
process in place that chronicles lessons learned in forming the IBCTs. 
However, this information is not readily available to the rest of the 
Army from a central source. By not having that information available 
for research, the Army may be unaware of previous best practices or 
repeat mistakes in forming subsequent IBCTs. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army to 
provide the CINCs with the combat capability limitations and 
logistical requirements that the first IBCT will have when it is 
certified for deployment. This information will assist the CINCs in 
their planning to mitigate any risks associated with the employment of 
the IBCT. Because some mobility issues are beyond the Army's purview 
and a long lead time could be necessary to rectify any identified 
shortfalls, we are further recommending that the Secretary of Defense 
obtain the Army's specific IBCT mobility requirements to meet its 96-
hour deployment goal and determine how best to address any shortfalls. 
Additional recommendations are aimed at enhancing future IBCT 
formation by addressing other challenges that have arisen in forming 
the first brigade. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department generally 
agreed with the report's findings and recommendations and outlined 
ongoing management actions to address the concerns named in the report. 

Background: 

In testimony before the U.S. Senate in March 2000,[Footnote 2] the 
Chief of Staff of the Army stated that the Army had to transform to 
meet current and future strategic requirements. The Army believes that 
the transformation is necessary to respond more effectively to (1) the 
growing number of peacekeeping operations and small-scale 
contingencies and (2) the challenges posed by nontraditional threats 
such as subnational and transnational terrorist groups. The Army plans 
to transform its forces over a 30-year period. 

The first phase of the Army's transformation is to form six IBCTs, the 
first two of which are being formed at Fort Lewis, Washington. The 
first of these brigades has been in the process of being formed since 
fiscal year 2000. The Army's plan is to certify it as achieving its 
initial operational capability by May 2003, at which time it will be 
deployable. The second brigade is in its early stages of formation. 
The Army has programmed funding for six IBCTs and has announced the 
locations of the remaining four.[Footnote 3] Under current plans, all 
six brigades are to have been formed, equipped, trained, and ready to 
deploy by 2008. The Army is also considering how it might accelerate 
the fielding of the last three brigades so that all six can be fielded 
by 2005. Additionally, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review stated that 
an IBCT be stationed in Europe. Because this was not in the Army's 
plans, it is considering establishing an IBCT in Europe. Taken 
together, the IBCTs represent what the Army terms its Interim Force 
because it begins to meet the Army's rapid deployment needs for the 
next decade. 

Beginning in 2008 and continuing beyond 2030, the Army plans to 
transition to its Objective Force.[Footnote 4] During this period, all 
Army forces, including the IBCTs, are to be transformed into new 
organizational structures operating under new war-fighting doctrine. 
Their new combat systems are to be lighter and more mobile, 
deployable, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than current systems. 
Four competing research and development teams have completed work on 
alternative designs for these future combat systems and a contract has 
been awarded to a single lead systems integrator. 

As the Army transitions to its Objective Force, it plans to maintain 
the organizational designs of a portion of its existing combat force, 
which it terms its Legacy Force, and to modernize selected equipment 
in this force. This equipment includes such major weapons systems as 
the Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and Black Hawk helicopter. 
Figure 1 depicts these weapons systems. This selective modernization 
is intended to enable the Army to maintain capability and readiness 
until the future combat systems are delivered to the Objective Force. 

Figure 1: Examples of Legacy Weapon Systems-—Black Hawk Helicopter, 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and Abrams Tank: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 3 photographs] 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

IBCTS Are Expected to Fill a Perceived Gap in Military Capability: 

The Army expects the IBCT to provide a force capability that it does 
not currently have: a rapidly deployable early-entry combat force that 
is lethal, survivable, and capable of operating in all types of 
military operations, from small-scale contingencies like the Balkans' 
missions to a major theater war. It also expects to use the IBCT to 
test new concepts that would be integrated into the Army's future 
Objective Force. Many of these concepts are still under development. 

Expected Uses: 

The IBCT has been optimized for small-scale contingencies, being 
specifically designed to operate in a variety of terrains, including 
mountains and urban areas. Yet it is expected to also be capable of 
participating in a major theater war and addressing both conventional 
and nonconventional threats. As an early-entry force, the brigade is 
expected to have sufficient built-in combat power to conduct immediate 
combat operations upon arrival in theater if required. It is designed 
to supply its own needs for 72 hours, after which time it would need a 
source of resupply. The IBCT is intended, in general, to fight as a 
component of a division or corps but also be capable of operating 
separately under the direct control of a higher headquarters, such as 
a joint task force. The Army expects that in many possible 
contingencies, the IBCT could initially be the single U.S. maneuver 
component under a higher headquarters. 

In a major theater war, the IBCT under current plans would fight as a 
subordinate maneuver component within a division or corps. However, 
the brigade would be augmented with additional mission-specific combat 
capabilities such as armor, aviation, and air defense artillery. The 
Army, however, is considering the need for an Interim Division 
structure that would include IBCTs as the maneuver forces because some 
analyses have concluded that placing an IBCT with its differing design 
into an existing infantry or armored division might impede the 
division's ability to achieve its full combat capabilities. The Army 
expects to complete the new divisional concept by spring 2003 if the 
Chief of Staff decides to go forward with it. 

Expected Organization, Equipment, and Capabilities: 

The IBCT is organized primarily as a mobile infantry organization and 
will contain about 3,500 personnel and 890 vehicles. The brigade 
includes headquarters elements; three infantry battalions, composed of 
three rifle companies each; an antitank company; an artillery 
battalion; an engineer company; a brigade support battalion; a 
military intelligence company; a signal company; and a unique 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition squadron. This 
squadron is expected to be the IBCT's primary source of combat 
information through the traditional role of reconnaissance, 
surveillance, and target acquisition. However, the squadron is also 
designed to develop a situational understanding of other elements 
within the operational environment, including political, cultural, 
economic, and demographic factors. This awareness is expected to 
enable the brigade to anticipate, forestall, or overcome threats from 
the enemy. The squadron offers the IBCT a variety of new systems and 
capabilities that are generally not contained in an infantry brigade 
including manned reconnaissance vehicles and ground reconnaissance 
scouts, counterintelligence, human intelligence collectors, unmanned 
aerial vehicles, ground sensors, and radars. Moreover, the squadron's 
all-weather intelligence and surveillance capabilities, coupled with 
the digitized systems, are designed to enable it to maintain 24-hour 
operations. 

All six of the IBCTs are planned to be equipped with new light-armored 
wheeled vehicles, termed interim armored vehicles, which are 
significantly lighter and more transportable than existing tanks and 
armored vehicles. These vehicles include ten types of vehicles that 
share a common chassis—infantry carriers, mobile gun systems, 
reconnaissance and surveillance vehicles, and others. These wheeled 
vehicles are expected to enable the IBCT to maneuver more easily in a 
variety of difficult terrains. The first vehicles were scheduled for 
delivery to the first brigade in April 2002. Meanwhile, the brigade 
has been training on substitute vehicles, including 32 Canadian 
infantry vehicles and German infantry carrier and nuclear, biological, 
and chemical vehicles. These vehicles approximate the capabilities of 
the interim armored vehicles. Figure 2 depicts two of the interim 
armored vehicles. 

Figure 2: Representative Interim Armored Vehicles-—Mobile Gun System 
Vehicle and Infantry Carrier Vehicle: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

The brigade's digitized communications are designed to enable brigade 
personnel to "see" the entire battlefield and react before engaging 
the enemy. In addition to light armored vehicles equipped with digital 
systems, the IBCT is expected to rely on advanced command, control, 
computer, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance systems purchased from commercial or government 
sources. The squadron's all-weather intelligence and surveillance 
capabilities, together with its digitized systems, are intended to 
enable it to maintain 24-hour operations. The Army expects this 
awareness to enable the IBCT to anticipate, forestall, or overcome 
threats from the enemy. 

The IBCT's planned capabilities also differ in other ways from those 
found in traditional divisional brigades. For example, the Army 
determined that achieving decisive action while operating in various 
types of terrain, including urban settings, would require the brigade 
to possess a combined arms capability at the company level, rather 
than at the battalion level. Focusing on dismounted assault, companies 
are expected to support themselves with (1) direct fire from weapon 
systems on the infantry carrier vehicle and from the mobile gun system 
and (2) indirect support through mortars and artillery. This combined 
arms capability is to be reinforced through the Army's current 
development of a training program aimed at developing soldiers with a 
wider range of stalls as well as leaders who can adapt to many 
different kinds of conflict situations. 

Expected Deployment Capability and Relation to Objective Force: 

The Army expects the IBCT to rely on new sustainment concepts that 
will permit it to deploy more rapidly because it will carry fewer 
supplies and have lighter vehicles, resulting in less weight to be 
shipped. Due to its smaller and lighter vehicles, the Army expects 
that the IBCT will be transported within the theater by C-130 
aircraft. There are more of these aircraft, and they provide greater 
access to airstrips than would be possible with larger C-17 and C-5A 
aircraft that are intended for use in deploying an IBCT from its home 
station to the theater. Figure 3 shows a C-130 aircraft. 

Figure 3: C-130 Aircraft: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: U.S. Air Force. 

[End of figure] 

The IBCTs will serve an additional purpose in that they will test and 
validate new doctrine and organizational structures as well as new 
combat training and leadership development concepts. As such, the Army 
expects the formation and operation of the IBCT to provide insights 
for subsequent transformation. 

Estimated Schedule for Accelerating IBCTs: 

In September 2001, Army officials announced the possibility of 
accelerating the formation of the last three IBCTs. Under this 
proposal, all six IBCTs would be formed by 2005, 3 years earlier than 
planned. A key to acceleration is the ability of the manufacturer to 
deliver the vehicles ahead of the current delivery schedule. According 
to this schedule, the first IBCT would begin receiving its vehicles in 
April 2002. The second brigade would begin receiving its vehicles in 
February 2003. 

The Army cannot acquire vehicles for more than the second IBCT until 
it meets certain legislative requirements.[Footnote 5] The Army must 
compare the costs and operational effectiveness of the Interim Armored 
Vehicle with its existing vehicles before it can acquire the Interim 
Vehicle for the third IBCT. The Army must also complete an operational 
evaluation of the first IBCT. The evaluation must include a unit 
deployment to the evaluation site and execution of combat missions 
across the spectrum of potential threats and operational scenarios. 
The Army cannot acquire vehicles for the fourth and subsequent IBCTs 
until the Secretary of Defense certifies that the operational 
evaluation results indicate that the IBCT design is operationally 
effective and suitable. The significance of this is that the Army 
would need to complete this evaluation and authorize vehicle 
production for the fourth brigade by June 2003 for the Army to 
accelerate formation of the fourth and subsequent brigades, as has 
been proposed. This is because the manufacturer must have 330 days of 
lead time to produce and deliver the vehicles. 

Regional Commander in Chiefs View Planned IBCTS Favorably and Could 
Use Them in Various Ways: 

Our visits to the unified combat commands covering Europe, Southwest 
Asia, the Pacific, and the United Nations Command/U.S. Forces in Korea 
confirmed their support for the Army's plans for the IBCT. They 
generally agree that the current Army force structure does not meet 
their requirements for a rapidly deployable, lethal, and survivable 
force. According to the CINCs, if the IBCTs are formed and deployable 
as planned, they should fill the perceived near-term gap in military 
capability. The CINCs view the IBCT as a means to provide them with a 
broader choice of capabilities to meet their varied operational 
requirements rather than a substitute for current force structure. 
However, CINC planners need information about the brigade's 
deployability and other limitations for planning purposes. Their 
anticipated uses of an IBCT vary from serving as an early entry force 
within the European Command to conducting reconnaissance and securing 
main supply routes in Southwest Asia for the Central Command. To 
ensure that the CINCs' needs and concerns are addressed as the 
transformation evolves, the Army has created a forum that meets 
periodically with their active participation. 

IBCTs Would Fill a Capabilities Gap: 

Our discussions with CINC officials confirmed their agreement with 
Army conclusions about a gap in military capability. In announcing the 
Army's plans for its transformation in October 1999, the Army's Chief 
of Staff pointed to this gap in current war-fighting capabilities and 
the IBCT's planned ability to rapidly deploy. He noted that although 
the Army can dominate in all types of conflicts, it is not 
strategically responsive. The light forces can deploy within a matter 
of days but lack combat power, tactical mobility, and the ability to 
maintain sustained operations. On the other hand, armor and mechanized 
forces possess significant combat power and are able to maintain 
sustained operations but cannot deploy rapidly. 

CINC officials cited past military operations that pointed to this 
gap. For example, in the Persian Gulf War, the Army deployed a light 
infantry force—the 82nd Airborne Division—as the early entry force to 
deter Iraq and defend Saudi Arabia. However, there is general 
agreement that this force did not possess the anti-armor capability to 
survive and stop a heavy armored attack. Moreover, it took 6 months to 
position the heavy forces and associated support units and supplies 
needed to mount offensive actions against Iraq-—a time frame that 
might not be available in the future. The urban operation in 
Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1993 that resulted in the deaths of 16 
U.S. soldiers was also mentioned to illustrate the need for a force 
that is lethal, is maneuverable, and provides sufficient protection to 
U.S. forces. The difficulty in maneuvering heavy vehicles in 
peacekeeping operations in the Balkans was also cited by CINC 
representatives as a reason why lighter, more maneuverable vehicles 
are needed. 

CINC officials pointed out many features of the IBCT that they felt 
would address the existing capability shortfalls These features 
included its planned ability to deploy within 96 hours anywhere in the 
world and to provide a formidable, survivable deterrent force that 
could bring combat power to bear immediately if necessary. Also 
mentioned was its expected ability to rapidly transition from being a 
deterrence, to serving in a small-scale contingency, to fighting in a 
major theater of war in the event operations escalated. 

CINC officials also commented on the IBCT's enhanced capabilities for 
situational awareness. Situational awareness is the ability to see and 
understand the battlefield before coming into actual contact with the 
opponent through the use of advanced integrated systems that provide 
command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. This expected 
improvement in awareness should provide a major comparative advantage 
over potential enemies. They also noted that the IBCT would support 
their rapid deployment needs by using interim armored vehicles that 
would be deployable within theater by C-130 aircraft, which are more 
readily available, better able to access small airfields, and 
therefore better able to be moved around the battlefield. CINC 
officials also pointed out that the IBCT relies on a family of 
vehicles with a common platform, which reduces logistics and support 
requirements through commonality of spare parts, fuel, and lubricants. 

While generally positive about the IBCTs, CINC officials cautioned 
that many questions remain about whether these brigades will be able 
to achieve all their envisioned capabilities, especially by the time 
they are certified for deployment. Concerns expressed to us included: 

* whether the IBCT would actually be available to deploy anywhere in 
the world in 96 hours, given many potential competing demands for 
mobility assets; 

* what combat capability shortfalls might exist in the IBCT until it 
receives all its planned vehicles and weapon systems; 

* whether new logistics concepts would succeed in reducing supply 
tonnages sufficiently to achieve rapid deployment and intratheater 
goals; 

* when the vehicles that need further development, such as the mobile 
gun system and the nuclear, biological, and chemical vehicle, would be 
available; and; 

* whether the IBCT will be able to provide sufficient combat power 
when heavy forces are needed. 

CINC operational and logistics planners need specific data regarding 
the brigade's combat capabilities and logistics factors that are not 
yet available. They emphasized that it was important to have these 
data to adequately integrate the IBCTs into their plans. If, for 
instance, certain planned capabilities would not be in place when the 
first IBCTs become deployable, planners would need to know this so 
that they could plan for mitigating any risks that this might create. 
For example, Army officials in Korea related their concern that the 
IBCT will not include the mobile gun system until after the Army 
certifies the brigade as operationally capable. In the Korean theater, 
the capability of this weapon system is a high priority. 

CINC officials raised additional concerns about the IBCT's support on 
our visits. Logistics planners in Korea said the amounts of fuel, 
water, and ammunition used by the brigade need to be analyzed to 
determine what the theater needs to have when a brigade arrives. 
Although Korea contains significant support resources, logistics 
planners need to know the unit's unique and specific support 
requirements. In the Pacific Command, questions remain regarding the 
adequacy of the IBCT's 3-day supply of medical items. 

CINCs' Employment of IBCTs Will Vary: 

The CINCs' specific requirements and planned use for the IBCTs varies 
depending on the requirements of their respective areas of operational 
responsibility. (See figure 4.) Officials in both Europe and Korea 
expressed their views that IBCTs could be used effectively in their 
theaters of operation. Officials of the U.S. Central Command, which 
covers Southwest Asia, said that an IBCT had utility in their theater—
notably Africa—where fighting in urban terrain might occur. According 
to Pacific Command officials, their theater could use Army forces that 
are more deployable, lethal, and sustainable than currently assigned, 
especially for use in the urban areas prevalent in that theater. CINC 
representatives generally did not expect the IBCT to substitute for 
forces currently assigned. Rather, they saw the IBCT as providing them 
with a broader choice of capabilities to meet their operational needs. 

Figure 4: Areas of Operational Responsibility for the Geographical 
Combatant Commands: 

[Refer to PDF for image: world map] 

Map depicts the following Areas of Operational Responsibility for the 
Geographical Combatant Commands: 

USEUCOM — U.S. European Command 
USCENTCOM — U.S. Central Command 
USPACOM — U.S. Pacific Command 
UNC/USFK — United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea; 
USSOUTHCOM; 
USJFCOM; 
USCEUCOM. 

Source U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

U.S. European Command: 

The European Command wants the Army to station an IBCT in its area of 
responsibility. As noted earlier, the most recent Quadrennial Defense 
Review stated that an IBCT would be stationed in Europe. Command 
officials emphasized that the planned characteristics of the IBCT—-
rapid deployment, enhanced situational awareness, tactical mobility, 
and lethality-—are key to the requirements of the European theater. 
Further, the expected intelligence-gathering capabilities of the IBCT 
reconnaissance squadron will exceed that of the Command's currently 
assigned divisions. This capability is a necessity for missions such 
as those in the Balkans. 

Recognizing strategic and tactical mobility deficiencies from past and 
ongoing contingency operations in the Balkans, in the year 2000 
Command officials in fact created a rapid reaction force with some of 
the same characteristics as the IBCT. This rapid reaction force is 
composed of both light and heavy forces and is expected to deploy 
within 24 hours after being alerted. By using on-hand forces and 
equipment, the European Command has created an immediate reaction 
force that possesses some of the IBCT's capabilities. However, this 
reaction force lacks the intelligence, reconnaissance, and 
surveillance systems found in the IBCT that allows greater situational 
understanding of the battlefield. Furthermore, the force is not 
equipped with the new interim armored vehicles, which allows for a 
commonality among sustainment requirements and training. Command 
officials said that an IBCT would complement this rapid reaction force 
by providing an early entry force that could bring more combat power 
to bear. 

U.S. Central Command: 

The Central Command's primary area of responsibility is Southwest Asia 
and is one of two geographic areas that have required war planning for 
a major theater war. One official noted that an IBCT could provide 
significant capability to the CINC's theater engagement plans by 
providing mobile training teams and other military-to-military 
missions with developing nations. 

Command officials stated that the IBCTs would offer new capabilities 
to their theater in certain circumstances. For example, had an IBCT 
been available during the Persian Gulf War, the IBCT could have been 
used rather than the 82nd Airborne Division since the IBCT's planned 
anti-armor capability far exceeds that of a light division. Moreover, 
the IBCT would be useful in conducting missions such as reconnaissance 
and security and securing main supply routes. Command officials stated 
that an IBCT would have been valuable had it been available for the 
urban mission in Mogadishu, Somalia, during October 1993. They added 
that the IBCT could also be used for evacuating noncombatants. Command 
officials noted that even though the IBCT offers them new 
capabilities, they would not substitute it for the heavy combat forces 
that are required for a major war such as the Gulf War. 

United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea: 

Army officials in Korea have stated that they want to station an IBCT 
in Korea. According to one senior Army official in Korea, the IBCT 
would provide the maneuverability and combat power needed to operate 
in the mountains and the increasingly urbanized areas of Korea War 
planners in Korea expressed their view that the IBCT is optimized to 
meet the operational requirements of the Korean peninsula and that the 
IBCT would have more utility than Bradley Fighting Vehicles and M1 
tanks. They explained that these latter weapons would have to be used 
primarily as stationary weapon platforms because the terrain and the 
sprawling urban terrain limit their use. They noted that IBCTs are 
more mobile than light forces and once equipped with all their new 
weapon systems will have good lethality and be survivable. Further, 
according to CINC officials, the theater will not lose or diminish its 
combat capability by substituting IBCTs for heavy forces. 

U.S. Pacific Command: 

While Pacific Command officials noted that Army forces currently 
assigned to the theater are capable of meeting most CINC operational 
requirements, an IBCT would bring certain desirable capabilities to 
the theater. For example, an IBCT would provide increased situational 
awareness, tactical mobility, and firepower currently unavailable 
within assigned Army forces. Command war planners explained that the 
IBCT's communications capabilities would help eliminate some 
communications shortfalls between and among the Command's service 
components. Moreover, an IBCT could be more effectively employed for 
stability and support operations in the Pacific, providing a rapid 
deployment capability. They mentioned that the planned capabilities of 
the IBCT offer both (1) considerable flexibility by having substantial 
nonlethal capabilities for use in stability and support missions and 
(2) substantial lethality for more intense operations such as peace 
enforcement. Command officials noted that the IBCT's interim armored 
vehicles would provide better protection for infantry forces than can 
be provided by currently assigned infantry forces. 

Forum Exists to Address CINC Concerns: 

The Army has established a CINC Requirements Task Force that provides 
a forum for the commanders to voice their current and future 
requirements. Army officials assigned to the combatant commands stated 
that the quarterly meetings have allowed the CINCs to ensure that 
their concerns are heard. Issues raised are then forwarded to the Army 
staff for resolution. For example, the task force has addressed issues 
such as how the U.S. Pacific Command plans to employ IBCTs in that 
theater as well as reintegrating the Army's first IBCT into the 
operational plans. Based on discussions with combatant command 
officials, the perceived value of the forum is such that participation 
at the quarterly meetings is generally obligatory for command 
representatives. 

Challenges Have Arisen in Forming the Initial IBCT: 

Fort Lewis officials said that they are generally satisfied with the 
progress being made to date in fielding the first IBCT and believe the 
IBCT is on track to meet its certification milestone of May 2003. 
However, the Army has encountered challenges in forming the IBCT at 
Fort Lewis. One challenge to overcome is a combat capability shortfall 
in the first IBCT when it is certified. Specifically, certain 
specialized interim vehicles, such as the mobile gun system, will not 
be available. Further, the interim armored vehicle delivery schedule 
has compressed the time available for soldiers to train on the 
vehicles; personnel turnover resulted in more time spent on digital 
training than planned; and the 96-hour deployment capability, while a 
goal rather than a requirement, will not be attained by the first 
IBCT. Army planners are still developing plans on how the IBCT will 
obtain needed logistics support in the theater after its planned 72-
hour supply is depleted. Other challenges relate more to the first 
IBCT; its home station, Fort Lewis; and potentially, future home 
stations. These challenges include retention of skilled soldiers and 
the increased costs to provide maintenance support and facilities at 
Fort Lewis and ultimately to subsequent IBCT home stations. 

First IBCT Will Not Possess All Envisioned Combat Capabilities: 

Delivery Schedule for Interim Armored Vehicles Will Impact Planned 
Combat Capabilities at Certification Date: 

The first IBCT will not achieve all designed combat capabilities by 
the time it reaches its certification date because it will not have 
all the interim infantry vehicle variants. One key variant it will 
lack is the mobile gun system, which is expected to be more capable 
than the system currently being used. Until the first IBCT is fully 
equipped with its complement of interim armored vehicles, it will be 
limited in its designed capabilities by using in-lieu-of vehicles. 
Specifically, until the mobile gun system vehicle and the nuclear, 
biological, and chemical vehicle arrive, the IBCT cannot fully meet 
its planned war-fighting capabilities. These vehicles—-particularly 
the mobile gun system—-are critical to meet the expectations of the 
war-fighting CINC in Korea, as well as the Army's transformation 
plans. Based on the current delivery schedule, at the time of its 
operational certification in May 2003, the first IBCT will have about 
86 percent of its interim armored vehicles and the remaining 14 
percent will be approved substitutes. Army regulations allow a unit to 
use substitute equipment and vehicles to meet its initial operational 
capability date. The first mobile gun systems and nuclear, biological, 
and chemical vehicles will be delivered beginning in 2004. 

Delayed Vehicles and Digitized Systems Have Created Training 
Challenges: 

The Army has encountered training challenges due to the delivery 
schedule for the interim armored vehicles and the need for extensive 
training on digital systems. Despite these challenges, training 
officials believe that the IBCT has made great strides in achieving 
training goals, including the transformation goal of developing 
soldiers who are skilled in a wide range of tasks so that they can 
transition quickly from small-scale contingencies to higher levels of 
combat and the reverse. 

Because deliveries of the interim vehicles are not scheduled to begin 
until April 2002, the IBCT has been dependent on substitute wheeled 
infantry carriers loaned by the Canadian and German governments. These 
vehicles have been passed from unit to unit, thereby limiting training 
to company level and below. Training officials said that although they 
were disappointed that they did not have sufficient vehicles to train 
as a battalion or brigade, a hidden benefit was that the IBCT was able 
to focus more training on individual and dismounted infantry skills 
instead. According to a senior Fort Lewis official, subsequent 
brigades should not experience the same training limitations as the 
first brigade unless, for any unforeseen reason, the contractor's 
expected delivery schedule cannot be met. However, the first brigade 
will experience a further training challenge in that the revised 
delivery schedule will compress the time available to train at the 
battalion and brigade level to just 3 months. Fort Lewis training 
officials would have liked to have a full 6 months to train after 
receiving most of the vehicles. However, a senior Fort Lewis official 
also told us that he is confident that all the training requirements 
will be accomplished in the lesser time available. 

The need to train IBCT soldiers in digital systems has posed other 
challenges. Digitization provides a critical situational awareness 
capability to the IBCT similar to that afforded units at Fort Hood, 
Texas, under the Army's Force XXI program.[Footnote 6] These systems 
use sophisticated information technology, that allows personnel in the 
IBCT to achieve superior battlefield information enabling them to 
engage the enemy long before coming into contact. IBCT soldiers train 
with many digitized systems and must maintain specific levels of 
proficiency. Maintaining proficiency in these systems has been 
challenging due to personnel turnover in the IBCT. The Army does not 
currently have a formal digital sustainment-training program for 
individual soldiers and leaders. Fort Lewis officials cited their 
concerns that without a digital sustainment-training program, soldier 
skills will quickly erode. The Army Training and Doctrine Command is 
currently developing an individual digital sustainment-training 
program for the two brigades, which may be applicable to the entire 
Army. However, the Army has not yet implemented initial formal 
training in digitized systems within its institutional centers and 
schools; as a result, many individual leaders and soldiers arrive at 
the IBCT unit without any prior experience with the hardware or 
software. The Army plans to begin teaching digitized systems at its 
schoolhouses in 2004, but even then, the training will only be an 
initial overview. 

As part of the Army's multi-skilled soldier concept, the Army's 
Infantry branch has combined the occupational skill specialties of 
infantryman, fighting-vehicle infantryman, and heavy anti-armor 
weapons infantryman into a single consolidated specialty and will 
train them in a wide range of infantry skills. Army officials spoke 
favorably about this concept and said that concerns that the Army may 
be requiring too many skills and capabilities for individual soldiers 
to absorb have not been borne out in their experience so far. In their 
view, individual soldiers at Fort Lewis had adapted well to the 
requirements of the digitized systems and multiple combat skills 
needed for IBCT missions. They are generally satisfied with the 
progress being made to date and believe that the IBCT is on track to 
meet its certification milestone of May 2003. Figure 5 depicts a 
schematic of this multi-skilled soldier approach. 

Figure 5: Army's Approach to Develop Multi-Skilled Soldiers: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Multi-skilled soldier: 
* Focus on function performed; 
* Competency based; 
* Specialization focused to unit and equipment; 
* Evolves with transformation. 

Combine Military Occupational Specialties with similar functions: 
* Larger/fewer Military Occupational Specialties; 
* Predictability; 
* Ability to optimize; 
* Leader prerogative in utilization;
* Army flexibility in distribution. 

Quantify Military Occupational Skill Qualification: 
* Headquarters Department of the Army defines Military Occupational 
Skill Qualification 
* Training and Doctrine Command develops standards. 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

Impediments to Achieving Deployability Goals: 

The Army's ability to meet its rapid deployment goal for the first 
IBCT will depend on availability of aircraft to transport unit 
equipment, completed infrastructure improvements at Fort Lewis 
specifically, and Air Force certification of the IBCT as deployable. 
In commenting on the draft report, Army officials stated that Air 
Force certification of the interim armored vehicle is currently 
underway with weight and load certification scheduled for May 2002. 

Initially the Army announced that the IBCTs would be capable of 
deploying within 96 hours anywhere in the world, but the Army has 
since made it a goal for the IBCTs rather than a requirement. It has 
not established a substitute deployability timetable for the first 
IBCT. However, under current plans, the Army retains the 96-hour 
deployment requirement for the future transformed units entering the 
Army's force following formation of all six brigades in 2008. Other 
requirements for this future force are to be able to deploy a division 
in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days. 

It appears that this 96-hour deployability goal for the first IBCT 
will not be achieved. Army transportation planners have determined 
that it would take 201 C-17 and 51 C-5 aircraft to transport all of 
the IBCT's equipment to a distant theater. (See figure 6.) Army 
officials have stated that with all the competing demands for these 
aircraft, the Air Force currently does not possess sufficient numbers 
of them to meet the 96-hour goal for the IBCTs. Additional analyses 
would be needed to evaluate other ways to supplement this capability, 
such as through the forward positioning of some materials or the use 
of commercial aircraft. Strategic airlift is an Air Force 
responsibility and therefore beyond the purview of the Army. 

Figure 6: A C-17 Aircraft and a C-5A Aircraft That Would Provide 
Strategic Lift for the IBCT: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Source: U.S. Air Force. 

[End of figure] 

The installation where an IBCT is located will dictate the additional 
infrastructure requirements necessary to deploy the brigade. In 
October 2000, the Army's Military Traffic Management Command reported 
in its Army Transformation study that the existing infrastructure at 
Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base could not meet the Army's 
requirements for deploying the IBCT. The study identified five 
projects at the air base and Fort Lewis that needed to be constructed 
or upgraded at an estimated cost of about $52 million. Since the 
publication of the report, the Army has funded four of the five 
projects at a cost of more than $48 million and begun one of the 
projects. The remaining project requires improvements to deployment 
ramps at McChord Air Force Base. According to Army officials, the 
remaining project has not been funded and will most likely not be 
completed before the Army certifies the IBCT as deployable in May 2003. 

Another impediment to achieving this goal is the Air Force's 
certification that the IBCT and all its equipment items can be loaded 
on and deployed by aircraft. The Air Force cannot certify the unit 
until the vehicles are fielded and loaded aboard the aircraft in 
accordance with combat mission requirements. The fiscal year 2002 
National Defense Authorization Act requires the Secretary of the Army 
to conduct an operational evaluation of the first IBCT and the 
Secretary of Defense to certify that its design is operationally 
suitable and effective. The evaluation is to include deployment of the 
brigade to the site of the evaluation. Generally, the IBCT cannot be 
deployed outside the United States until this requirement is met. 
[Footnote 7] A successful evaluation will be necessary if the Army is 
to achieve its goal of having six IBCTs by 2008. 

Other Challenges Have Arisen at Fort Lewis: 

Personnel Stabilization Has Been the Key Human Capital Challenge: 

Army officials recognized early on that some form of personnel 
stabilization policy for the IBCTs might be needed to provide 
sufficient continuity of leadership and training to the brigade. 
However, the delay in setting up the policy and certain exemptions 
from the policy have led to more turbulence than officials would have 
liked. They believe that the personnel turnover may have diminished 
training effectiveness in some instances and may have led to devoting 
more time than they could afford to digitization training. 

Officials explained that the need for stabilization stems from the 
unique nature of the training being done at Fort Lewis and from the 
normal Army rotational policy that generally has personnel rotating 
between assignments in 2 years or less. In short, when the trained 
personnel rotate out of the IBCT, they take their training with them; 
but no equally trained personnel are available to rotate in. 
Consequently, the IBCT requires a constant program of providing basic 
training to incoming personnel on digital equipment, which is 
available only at Fort Lewis or Fort Hood. 

Moreover, because this skill is perishable, periodic refresher 
training is also required. Similarly, the IBCT is training to future 
war-fighting concepts and doctrine and new concepts for leadership 
development. Finally, the first IBCT expects to begin receiving some 
of its interim armored vehicles, which are not available elsewhere in 
the Army. These unique training requirements argue for more continuity 
than can be achieved through the normal Army rotational policies that 
create a constant turnover of personnel within a 24-month period. 

Recognizing this need for more continuity, Fort Lewis officials 
expressed to Army headquarters their concern that permitting normal 
policies to remain in place would adversely affect the IBCT's 
readiness and ability to achieve certification on time. In response, 
the Department of the Army established a formal stabilization policy 
for the IBCTs in May 2001. Except for certain exemptions under this 
policy, soldiers must remain in an IBCT for 1 year following 
certification of the brigade's operational capability. 

By stabilizing its soldiers, the unit had hoped to reduce the amount 
of time it has to spend on training soldiers new to the IBCT on 
digital and other specialized equipment. Unfortunately, the 
stabilization policy has not been as effective as officials had hoped. 
First, the stabilization policy was not in place until May 2001, and 
by then, many IBCT soldiers had already begun leaving the unit under 
normal Army rotational procedures. As a result, IBCT trainers spent 
much of the year repeating their training to new soldiers. 

A second problem in the stabilization policy's effectiveness stemmed 
from the exemptions that are allowed under the policy. For example, 
soldiers are allowed to rotate out of an IBCT to attend a required 
school, when promoted, or they can elect to leave an IBCT when they 
come up for reenlistment. Fort Lewis officials have been encouraged by 
the fact that IBCT soldiers re-enlisted in fiscal year 2001 at higher 
rates than those achieved by either of the brigade's higher 
headquarters—-I Corps at Fort Lewis and Forces Command (FORSCOM). As 
shown by figure 7, all three organizations achieved over 100 percent 
of the retention goals set by the Army. 

Figure 7: Comparison of Fiscal Year 2001 Retention Rates for Soldiers 
in the IBCTs, at Fort Lewis, and throughout Forces Command: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

FORSCOM: 
First term: 110% of goal; 
Mid term: 117% of goal. 

Fort Lewis: 
First term: 110% of goal; 
Mid term: 103% of goal. 

IBCT: 
First term: 115% of goal; 
Mid term: 123% of goal. 

Legend: 
First term = initial term of service of 3 years or less. 
Mid term = a subsequent period of 10 years or less. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Officials noted, however, that IBCT soldiers who have elected to 
remain in the Army have not necessarily elected to remain in the IBCT. 
As shown by figure 8, whereas 34 percent on average of I Corps 
soldiers elected to remain in their units, only 27 percent of IBCT 
soldiers elected to stay with the IBCT. Moreover, despite the 
acknowledged need for continuity in the IBCTs, officials have not been 
capturing data on the reasons why IBCT soldiers are re-enlisting to 
leave the brigade early and therefore lack information that could help 
them reduce personnel turbulence. Further, data are not available to 
determine which re-enlistment options IBCT soldiers are choosing other 
than remaining in the unit. 

Figure 8: Comparison of IBCT and I Corps Soldiers Electing to Remain 
in Their Existing Unit: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

IBCT: 27%; 
I Corps: 34%. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Fort Lewis officials said that the problems with stabilization may not 
be as severe with subsequent brigades since the stabilization policy 
will be in effect from the beginning, unlike the first brigade when 
the policy was not instituted until months after its formation began. 
As a result, Army officials anticipate that these latter brigades will 
experience fewer departures. Personnel turbulence related to 
reenlistments would become more significant if the brigades experience 
slippage in their certification dates and lose more soldiers to re-
enlistment transfers. 

Installation Support Needed for IBCTs Has Been Greater than 
Anticipated: 

The Army specifically designed the IBCT to have fewer support 
personnel, fewer supplies, and lighter vehicles so that the brigade 
could be quickly deployed. As a result, the IBCT cannot provide all 
its own support and requires installation support when located at its 
home station and other outside support after 72 hours once deployed. 
In addition, the home station must provide additional and costly 
facilities for that support. 

The IBCT is designed with an austere support battalion that contains 
fewer mechanics to support and maintain its vehicles. IBCT battalion 
commanders pointed out, however, that the number of vehicles to 
support has remained the same, even though the number of mechanics has 
been reduced by two-thirds. Therefore, the IBCT is capable of 
conducting only about one-third of its vehicle maintenance 
requirements. As a result, the IBCT must depend on its home 
installation for scheduled maintenance support. Fort Lewis addressed 
this capability limitation by hiring contractors and temporary 
employees to meet the IBCT support requirements. Fort Lewis officials 
estimate the IBCT's recurring maintenance requirements at about $11.1 
million a year. 

After being deployed for 72 hours, the IBCT must be supported by other 
organizations due to its streamlined support battalion and, under 
transformation concepts, must "reach" for this support. Under the 
reach concept, the IBCT is expected to request fuel, ammunition, food, 
spare parts, water, and other supplies through an integrated 
distribution system by a linked communications network that includes 
the IBCT home station, contractor support, and multinational or 
foreign national commercial systems. Army logistics planners have not 
yet determined how all this will work. Further, in the interim, the 
support battalion logistical systems are not yet integrated and lack a 
dedicated secure network interface to the Army's computerized Battle 
Command System. As a result, IBCT soldiers are being temporarily used 
as couriers to relay logistics data between headquarters. The Army's 
immediate solution to this challenge may be to increase the IBCT 
support battalion personnel. For the long term, the Army is developing 
a system software fix. 

Providing support to IBCTs will require Army installations to provide 
new and costly facilities to meet IBCT requirements. The extent and 
cost of needed improvements at the other installations will vary 
widely depending upon the location. Army planners noted that it takes 
at least 3 to 5 years to plan and construct maintenance and other 
needed infrastructure facilities and that therefore it will be 
important to develop these plans as soon as possible. Moreover, Army 
officials have determined that at a minimum, future IBCT home stations 
will require a mission-support training facility,[Footnote 8] a fixed 
tactical Internet, ammunition igloos, and digital classrooms. Examples 
of long-term requirements include live-fire ranges, maneuver-training 
areas, mock villages for urban training, and deployment facilities. 
Figure 9 shows the facility constructed at Fort Lewis to train 
soldiers in urban warfare techniques. 

Figure Setting 9: Shoot House Training Facility Constructed at Fort 
Lewis to Train IBCT Soldiers to Confront the Enemy in an Urban Setting: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

At Fort Lewis and Yakima Training Center, existing support facilities-—
such as barracks, motor pools, ammunition storage facilities, and 
training ranges-—need to be upgraded or constructed. To meet IBCT 
training needs, Fort Lewis converted an existing building to a mission-
support training facility, which accelerated the normal new 
construction timeline. However, all support requirements have not yet 
been funded. For example, Fort Lewis has requested about $10 million 
for IBCT communication infrastructure requirements that include a 
secure fiber optic upgrade to link to McChord Air Force Base. 
Installations also need the ability to integrate digitized systems 
between home stations and training centers. 

Brigade Coordination Cell Has Proven to Be Valuable Coordinating 
Mechanism: 

After the Army announced its planned transformation, the Army Chief of 
Staff designated the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command as the lead 
agent for transformation. The Command in turn established the Brigade 
Coordination Cell (BCC) at Fort Lewis. Its mission is to ensure 
successful formation of the first two IBCTs at Fort Lewis, synchronize 
efforts between FORSCOM and the Training and Doctrine Command, and 
provide insight on Army Battle Command System architecture. The BCC is 
empowered to directly coordinate with other Army major commands and 
agencies. It provides a centralized link between the IBCT and a 
variety of Army organizations responsible for doctrine, training, 
organization, material, and leadership development. Fort Lewis 
officials emphasized to us that resolving some of the challenges they 
are facing points to the need for subsequent installations to 
establish some sort of mechanism, such as a Brigade Coordination Cell, 
to deal with the many issues that will inevitably arise. 

The BCC is designed as a matrix organization and conduit for feedback 
between various Army organizations pertaining to training, equipment, 
and logistics. IBCT soldiers as well as analysts from the BCC, the 
Army Test and Evaluation Command, and the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned evaluate and validate training doctrine provided by the 
Infantry and Armor schools. After training exercises, IBCT commanders 
and soldiers as well as the appropriate Army agencies provide informal 
and formal lessons-learned data to the cell. The BCC communicates 
these data to the doctrine writers for their use as they develop the 
training support packages for squad-to brigade-level collective tasks 
and formulate conceptual guidance for use by the IBCT commanders. Cell 
personnel are a part of the working groups created to solve issues in 
training, deployment, and logistics. A representative from the Army 
Materiel Command coordinates the vehicle fielding and its associated 
new equipment training between the IBCT and the civilian contractors. 

The BCC supplements an existing staff hierarchy. It provides staff 
enforcement and support for the I Corps staff while existing external 
to the Fort Lewis chain of command. The BCC is not a higher 
headquarters staff for the IBCT. The cell's focus is the same as its 
mission-—to successfully deliver the first two IBCTs to the Army. 

Senior Fort Lewis officials have stated that the BCC has proven to be 
a valuable means of coordinating activities related to brigade 
formation and has offered several important benefits. For example, 
they noted that some of the difficulties that have arisen have been 
time-consuming to resolve. The existence of the BCC has relieved such 
burdens from brigade operations personnel so that they could 
concentrate more on their substantive work, such as training. The BCC 
also acted as a communication intermediary between the IBCT and the 
institutional schoolhouses to develop training doctrine for the 
brigade's new mission requirements. In addition, the BCC relieved Fort 
Lewis from some of the public affairs requirements. The acknowledged 
benefits of the BCC have led Fort Lewis officials to conclude that a 
similar organization may be needed at subsequent locations. 

Lessons Learned on Brigade Formation Are Not Readily Available: 

In accordance with Army regulations,[Footnote 9] the Army routinely 
documents the lessons it learns from battles, projects, and 
reorganizations using lessons after-action reports, messages, 
briefings, and other historical documents. Various organizations 
traditionally chronicle Army strengths and weaknesses with respect to 
organization, peacekeeping missions, and wartime operations. During 
our review, we determined that while fielding the initial IBCT at Fort 
Lewis, the Army learned valuable lessons that would be critical to 
future IBCT formation. These lessons were captured and communicated in 
a variety of ways. However, they were not always forwarded to the 
Center for Army Lessons Learned, as required, for retention. Further, 
there is no central location or database where all relevant IBCT 
lessons learned are available for research. Without having the lessons 
learned available, the Army may repeat mistakes in fielding subsequent 
brigades and may lose opportunities that could help it field 
subsequent brigades more efficiently. 

Lessons Learned Not Always Forwarded as Required: 

Army Regulation 11-33 designates the Center for Army Lessons Learned 
as the focal point for its lessons-learned system. The regulation 
stresses that all Army entities are to forward appropriate analytical 
data, including after-action reports, to the Center. After-action 
reviews are structured discussions among commanders and soldiers after 
military exercises to determine what went right or wrong and what can 
be improved. However, it appears that the Army is not taking full 
advantage of this repository to capture all relevant IBCT lessons 
learned. For example, we found that organizations that have played 
important roles in the initial brigades' formation are all 
independently chronicling IBCT fielding information. Furthermore, 
there is an indication that all lessons learned are not being 
forwarded to the Center. For example, in May 2001, the Army Test and
Evaluation Command published two independent reports that assessed 
IBCT training events at the squad and platoon levels at Fort Lewis. 
These reports contained analyses and lessons-learned data about 
training exercises, equipment, and tasks. The Test and Evaluation 
Command reports stated that the after-action reviews identified 
significant issues in conducting adequate equipment training. However, 
the reports are available from the Test and Evaluation Command, not 
the Center for Army Lessons Learned. 

The Center for Army Lessons Learned published one newsletter dated 
July 2001 that identified some lessons learned and issues concerning 
the IBCT. This information was compiled from subject matter experts' 
observations during training events such as the Senior Leader and 
Tactical Leaders Course, digital equipment training, and news articles 
printed in professional publications. Center officials stated that as 
a result of the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, 
homeland security has become the Center's primary focus, not the 
IBCTs. Although the Center intends to publish a second newsletter 
addressing the support concepts and requirements for the IBCT, it does 
not anticipate publishing it until later in 2002. An official at the 
Center for Army Lessons Learned said that information comes in 
sporadically from disparate sources. Although fielding of the IBCTs is 
no longer a Center priority, it intends to continue collecting lessons 
learned and historical information regarding the fielding of the IBCTs 
and to publish subsequent newsletters as appropriate. 

Fort Lewis Held Conference to Share Lessons Learned: 

Officials at Fort Lewis, at the behest of FORSCOM, hosted an 
Information Exchange Conference, from November 27 to November 29, 
2001, to provide a forum to communicate IBCT lessons learned to 
officials who will be overseeing formation of subsequent IBCTs as well 
as to officials from organizations such as Army headquarters, U.S. 
Army Europe, U.S. Army Pacific, and the National Guard Bureau. At this 
conference, Fort Lewis officials noted the challenges that they had 
faced in several areas. The problem areas included personnel turnover 
and stabilization, digitization training, classroom shortages, issues 
related to maintenance and support, budget shortfalls related to 
vehicle maintenance, difficulties related to equipment turn-in, and 
deficiencies in installation infrastructure. Other lessons learned 
concerned information technology requirements and the need to 
establish working relationships throughout the Army. Fort Lewis 
officials told us that they hoped that the conference attendees would 
use these lessons learned as they plan and budget for the subsequent 
brigades at their locations starting in fiscal years 2004 and beyond. 

However, it did not appear that these valuable lessons learned would 
necessarily be readily available for future use. We were told, for 
example, that FORSCOM would maintain copies of the various slide 
presentations given at the conference on its Web site for about 12 
days. Moreover, there was no plan to submit this information to the 
Center for Army Lessons Learned for later availability to interested 
officials of subsequent brigades. While Army officials emphasized that 
lessons learned are being discussed at all levels throughout the Army, 
one official commented that he was waiting for the Center for Army 
Lessons Learned to contact him regarding the lessons identified by his 
department rather than being proactive about forwarding the 
information to the Center. Senior officials at Fort Lewis did not know 
of any other central repository for such information. In our opinion, 
with the frequent turnover of personnel in the brigades and in some 
installation functions, it would be valuable to have all IBCT lessons 
learned available in a central repository. 

Conclusions: 

Successful formation of the first IBCT is critical to the Army's 
transformation plan because it will begin to fill a near-term gap in 
military capability and test new concepts that would be integrated 
into the future Objective Force. Although Army officials are pleased 
with the progress made thus far, concerns remain about whether all 
capabilities envisioned for the brigade will be achieved in time for 
the IBCT's May 2003 certification milestone. Concerns include, 
notably, the unavailability of the mobile gun system, which provides a 
key combat capability, and the likelihood that the IBCT will be unable 
to meet the 96-hour deployment goal due to insufficient quantities of 
aircraft. Because the IBCT could be deployed to their theaters, it is 
important that CINC war planners know as soon as possible what planned 
capabilities are likely to be missing when the brigade is certified as 
having achieved its initial operating capability. Similarly, logistics 
planners will need logistics data soon to enable them to plan how best 
to meet the support requirements of the IBCT if it is deployed to 
their theater. 

Certain challenges have also arisen in forming the first IBCT at Fort 
Lewis. These challenges include concerns about retaining skilled 
personnel in the brigade, the ability of IBCT soldiers to sustain 
their skills on digital systems, and the need for and cost of facility 
improvements to support the formation of this brigade and, 
potentially, subsequent brigades. Taking actions now to address these 
and other challenges faced by the Fort Lewis facility could enhance 
the chances that subsequent IBCT formations will be accomplished 
smoothly. 

The BCC set up at Fort Lewis appears to have been an effective means 
of funneling the day-to-day challenges that have arisen in forming the 
IBCT to the appropriate Army entity for resolution and thus allowing 
brigade officials to focus on critical training and operational 
matters. Each installation will likely experience similar issues and 
benefit from a similar organization. The experiences of those forming 
the first IBCT and of Fort Lewis in hosting the IBCT provide examples 
of pitfalls and best practices that, if systematically recorded and 
made available in a central repository to others throughout the Army, 
could help the Army form subsequent brigades more efficiently. The 
Army's Center for Lessons Learned is the designated focal point for 
lessons learned; however, the Center is neither collecting nor 
receiving all the lessons learned from forming the first IBCT. 

Recommendations Executive Action: 

for To ensure that regional CINCs have the information they need to 
plan for mitigating any risks associated with shortfalls in IBCT 
combat capability as well as logistical requirements, we recommend 
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to: 

* estimate the combat capabilities that will exist at the time the 
IBCTs are certified as deployable and set milestones for providing 
this information to CINC planners, and: 

* provide CINC planners with relevant logistics information as soon as 
possible so that they can adequately plan how best to support the 
IBCTs. 

Because some mobility issues are beyond the Army's purview and a long 
lead time could be necessary to rectify any identified shortfalls, we 
are further recommending that the Secretary of Defense obtain the 
Army's specific IBCT mobility requirements to meet its goal for 
deploying a brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours and determine 
how best to address any shortfalls. 

To assist subsequent installations where IBCTs will be formed in their 
planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Secretary of the Army to: 

* expedite development of a program to sustain personnel skills on 
digitized equipment so that it will be available for subsequent IBCTs, 

* collect and analyze data on why soldiers leave the IBCTs and take 
appropriate action to reduce personnel turnover, 

* estimate the extent and cost of facility improvements that will be 
needed at installations scheduled to accommodate the subsequent
IBCTs to assist them in their planning, 

* establish a BCC-type organization at subsequent IBCT locations to 
deal with day-to-day challenges, and, 

* provide a central collection point for IBCT lessons learned so as to 
make the information available to personnel throughout the Army. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 
generally agreed with the report's findings and recommendations and 
outlined ongoing management actions to address the concerns noted in 
the report. In addition, we obtained technical comments from the 
Department on a draft of this report and incorporated them where 
appropriate. 

In responding to our recommendations that the Army estimate the combat
capabilities and logistics requirements of the IBCT and provide the 
data to CINC planners, the Department acknowledged that since the 
first IBCT has not been fully fielded, there might be some planning 
information shortfalls that may inhibit CINC war planning. However, 
the Department noted that the Army, through the CINC Requirements Task 
Force, has provided a successful forum to address CINC concerns and 
derive solutions. We acknowledge that the CINC Requirements Task Force 
meetings provide a valuable communication tool. Nevertheless, during 
our fieldwork, CINC operational and logistics planners, who have been 
represented at these meetings, expressed concerns about not yet 
receiving specifics regarding the combat capabilities of the IBCT and 
its logistics requirements. As noted in our report, the planners 
emphasized that it was important to have these data to adequately 
integrate the IBCTs into their plans. Moreover, if certain planned 
capabilities would not be in place when the first IBCTs become 
deployable, the planners would need to know this. Accordingly, we do 
not believe that the CINCs' participation in the Requirements Task 
Force can substitute for being directly provided data on planned 
combat capabilities and logistics requirements, as we recommended. 
Providing information as soon as possible to the CINCs would enable 
operational planners to begin their risk mitigation process in 
developing their contingency and operational plans. 

Regarding Army mobility requirements for the IBCTs, the Department 
stated that the Army would continue to define the mobility 
requirements to meet the goals for IBCT deployment. We recognize that 
prioritization and allocation of lift assets is an operational 
challenge to be faced by the CINCs and acknowledge that timely 
allocation of strategic and tactical mobility is needed for the IBCTs 
to meet planned operational capabilities. However, because the Army 
does not control mobility allocations, we believe that our 
recommendation is appropriately directed to the Secretary of Defense, 
who is in a better position to assess how best to mitigate any 
projected shortfalls. 

With respect to our recommendation that the Army expedite development 
of a program to sustain personnel skills on digitized equipment that 
will be available for subsequent IBCTs, the Department said that its 
ability to accelerate digitized training at the proponent schools was 
limited due to the equipment delivery schedules. Our recommendation, 
however, was directed at accelerating development of a sustainment 
training program for future use at the IBCT locations rather than the 
proponent schools, as noted in our report. During our review, Army 
officials expressed concerns that the individual soldiers' 
digitization skills would quickly erode without a continuing focused 
regimen of training. Therefore, we continue to believe that the Army 
needs to expedite developing such a program and implement it as a part 
of each IBCT's training program. 

In responding to our recommendation regarding IBCT reassignments, the 
Department said that the Army is carefully managing IBCT personnel 
reassignments pointing to the IBCT personnel stabilization policy that 
the Army instituted. Although this policy is intended to limit 
personnel turnover in the IBCT, the fact remains that IBCT soldiers 
are re-enlisting to leave the IBCT at a higher rate than other units 
in I Corps. We believe that collecting information on the reasons why 
IBCT soldiers are leaving at this higher rate would help Army 
officials identify actions that they might take to encourage re-
enlistments in the IBCT. We also believe that this recommendation is 
especially important in that continuity is critical to achieving 
training objectives. 

In responding to our recommendation concerning facility requirements 
at subsequent IBCT locations, the Department stated that the Army 
routinely conducts estimates as part of the annual budgetary process. 
The Department said that the Army now has a draft transformation 
template for Army installations that will provide facility 
requirements to support IBCT stationing, training, and sustainment. 
The draft template is designed to provide installation planners a 
starting point to determine their installation peculiar requirements 
to support an IBCT. 

With regard to establishing a BCC-like organization at future IBCT 
sites, the Department stated that the Army has identified certain 
functions, processes, and support capabilities required to transform a 
unit into an IBCT. The Department noted that each IBCT location will 
have different levels of internal staff capability to execute 
transformation and that the Army will tailor, on a case-by-case basis, 
the resources required to fill the shortfalls at each location. We did 
not intend to dictate the size nor organizational structure for the 
BCC-like organization we recommended. We agree that as the Army learns 
about fielding IBCTs, requirements will differ from location to 
location and the Army should tailor whatever organization it sets up 
to fit the situational needs. 

In response to our recommendation regarding establishing a central 
collection point for IBCT lessons learned, the Department acknowledged 
that some lessons learned have not been disseminated throughout the 
Army nor sent to the Army's Center for Lessons Learned. It said that 
the Army is planning to establish a central repository and procedures 
to inform the Army about past and future lessons learned from the 
Army's transformation as we recommended. 

Appendix II contains the full text of the Department's comments. 

Scope and Methodology: 

To identify and gain an understanding of the anticipated capabilities 
of the IBCT, we discussed planned IBCT capabilities with Army 
officials at Fort Lewis, Washington; I Corps; the Brigade Coordination 
Cell; 3rd Brigade/2nd Infantry Division; and officials at the Armor 
and Infantry Schools and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas. We also obtained and reviewed various briefing documents, the 
IBCT Organizational and Operational Concept, the Center for Lesson 
Learned newsletter, test and evaluation reports, and the IBCT's 
modified table of organization and equipment. 

To determine whether the CINCs believe the IBCTs' planned combat 
capabilities will meet their requirements, we received briefings and 
discussed IBCT capabilities with commanders and staff at the U.S. 
Pacific Command and U.S. Army, Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii; U.S. Forces 
Korea and 8th U.S. Army, Seoul, Korea; U.S. European Command, 
Stuttgart, Germany; and U.S. Army Europe, Heidelberg, Germany; and 
U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. We reviewed 
documents that the Army developed concerning its respective areas of 
responsibility and planning. 

To identify challenges in forming the IBCTs, we concentrated our 
efforts on the first brigade being formed at Fort Lewis since the 
second brigade is in its early stages of formation. We attended weekly 
transformation update meetings at Fort Lewis from April 2001 through 
January 2002 to gain a sense of the challenges being faced. We 
interviewed the Commanding General and Deputy Commanding General for I 
Corps and Fort Lewis, the Deputy Commanding General for Training and 
Readiness, the Deputy Commanding General for Transformation (TRADOC) 
at Fort Lewis, their staffs, representatives from the Brigade 
Coordination Cell, the IBCT Commander and his battalion commanders, 
and the Army Materiel Command's Director of Transformation Support on 
the extent of issues and challenges that had arisen in forming the 
first IBCT. In addition, to gain the perspective of the Army's schools 
for training the IBCTs, we interviewed Army representatives from the 
U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia; the U.S. Army Armor 
Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky; and the Combined Arms Center, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. We obtained and reviewed IBCT training doctrine 
and manuals and discussed the IBCTs with senior Army officials and 
their staff to understand IBCT training issues. Based on the results 
from the Army's weekly IBCT meetings and our interviews and analysis 
of documentation, we were able to discuss issues regarding potential 
challenges in the core areas of maiming, equipping, training, 
supporting, and deploying the initial IBCT. 

To determine if the Army had an effective means for capturing lessons 
learned that may be applied to subsequent brigade formations, we 
interviewed I Corps and Fort Lewis representatives and the BCC 
historian; received briefings and interviewed representatives from the 
Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and 
attended the Information Exchange Conference held at Fort Lewis. We 
obtained reports published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned and 
the Army's Test and Evaluation Command with regards to fielding the 
IBCTs at Fort Lewis. In addition, we acquired the current history 
files from the I Corps and Fort Lewis historian as well as the 
regulations for recording the Army's history and lessons learned. As a 
result, we identified the Army's process to capture lessons learned 
that may be applied to subsequent IBCT formations. 

Our review was performed from April 2001 to March 2002 in accordance 
with generally accepted government audit standards. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and 
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make 
copies available to appropriate congressional committees and to other 
interested parties on request. In addition, the report will be 
available at no cost on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any questions about 
this report, please call me at (202) 512-5140. 

Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.; Beverly 
G. Burke; Timothy A. Burke; Kevin Handley, M. Jane Hunt; Tim R. 
Schindler; Pat L. Seaton; and Leo B. Sullivan. 

Signed by: 

Carol R. Schuster: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Sections from Public Laws 107-107 and 106-398 Concerning 
Limitations on Army Transformation Actions: 

Public Law 107-107—DEC. 28, 2001: 

Sec. 113 Limitations On Acquisition Of Interim Armored Vehicles And 
Deployment Of Interim Brigade Combat Teams. 

Section 113 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398; 114 
Stat. 165A-23) is amended: 

(1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (j); and; 

(2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsections: 

"(f) Waiver Of Comparison Requirement. The Secretary of Defense may 
waive subsections (c) and (e)(1) and submit to the congressional 
defense committees a certification under subsection (e)(2) without 
regard to the requirement in that subsection for the completion of a 
comparison of costs and operational effectiveness if the Secretary 
includes in the submittal a certification of each of the following: 

"(1) That the results of executed tests and existing analyses are 
sufficient for making a meaningful comparison of the costs and 
operational effectiveness of the interim armored vehicles referred to 
in subparagraph (A) of subsection (c)(1) and the medium armored 
vehicles referred to in subparagraph (B) of such subsection. 

"(2) That the conduct of a comparative evaluation of those vehicles in 
a realistic field environment would provide no significant additional 
data relevant to that comparison. 

"(3) That the Secretary has evaluated the existing data on cost and 
operational effectiveness of those vehicles and, taking that data into 
consideration, approves the obligation of funds for the acquisition of 
additional interim armored vehicles. 

"(4) That sufficient resources will be requested in the future-years 
defense program to fully fund the Army's requirements for interim 
brigade combat teams. 

"(5) That the force structure resulting from the establishment of the 
interim brigade combat teams and the subsequent achievement of 
operational capability by those teams will not diminish the combat 
power of the Army. 

"(g) Experimentation Program. The Secretary of the Army shall develop 
and provide resources for an experimentation program that will: 

"(1) provide information as to the design of the objective force; and; 

"(2) include a formal linkage of the interim brigade combat teams to 
that experimentation. 

"(h) Operational Evaluation. (1) The Secretary of the Army shall 
conduct an operational evaluation of the initial interim brigade 
combat team. The evaluation shall include deployment of the team to 
the evaluation site and team execution of combat missions across the 
full spectrum of potential threats and operational scenarios. 

"(2) The operational evaluation under paragraph (1) may not be 
conducted until the plan for such evaluation is approved by the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of 
Defense. 

"(i) Limitation On Procurement Of Interim Armored Vehicles And 
Deployment Of IBCTs. (1) The actions described in paragraph (2) may 
not be taken until the date that is 30 days after the date on which 
the Secretary of Defense: 

"(A) submits to Congress a report on the operational evaluation 
carried out under subsection (h); and 

"(B) certifies to Congress that the results of that operational 
evaluation indicate that the design for the interim brigade combat 
team is operationally effective and operationally suitable. 

"(2) The limitation in paragraph (1) applies to the following actions: 

"(A) Procurement of interim armored vehicles in addition to those 
necessary for equipping the first three interim brigade combat teams. 

"(B) Deployment of any interim brigade combat team outside the United 
States. 

"(3) The Secretary of Defense may waive the applicability of paragraph 
(1) to a deployment described in paragraph (2)(B) if the Secretary: 

"(A) determines that the deployment is in the national security 
interests of the United States; and; 

"(B) submits to Congress, in writing, a notification of the waiver 
together with a discussion of the reasons for the waiver.". 

Public Law 106-398—Oct. 30, 2000: 

Sec. 113. Reports And Limitations Relating To Army Transformation. 

(a) Secretary Of The Army Report On Objective Force Development 
Process. The Secretary of the Army shall submit to the congressional 
defense committees a report on the process for developing the 
objective force in the transformation of the Army. The report shall 
include the following: 

(1) The operational environments envisioned for the objective force. 

(2) The threat assumptions on which research and development efforts 
for transformation of the Army into the objective force are based. 

(3) The potential operational and organizational concepts for the 
objective force. 

(4) The operational requirements anticipated for the operational 
requirements document of the objective force. 

(5) The anticipated schedule of Army transformation activities through 
fiscal year 2012, together with: 

(A) the projected funding requirements through that fiscal year for 
research and development activities and procurement activities related 
to transition to the objective force; and; 

(B) a summary of the anticipated investments of the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency in programs designed to lead to the fielding 
of future combat systems for the objective force. 

(6) A proposed plan for the comparison referred to in sub-section (c). 

If any of the information required by paragraphs (1) through (5) is 
not available at the time the report is submitted, the Secretary shall 
include in the report the anticipated schedule for the availability of 
that information. 

(b) Secretary Of Defense Report On Objective Force Development 
Process. Not later than March 1, 2001, the Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the process 
for developing the objective force in the transformation of the Army. 
The report shall include the following. 

(1) The joint warfighting requirements that will be supported by the 
fielding of the objective force, together with a description of the 
adjustments that are planned to be made in the war plans of the 
commanders of the unified combatant commands in relation to the 
fielding of the objective force. 

(2) The changes in lift requirements that may result from the 
establishment and fielding of the combat brigades of the objective 
force. 

(3) The evaluation process that will be used to support decisionmaking 
on the course of the Army transformation, including a description of 
the operational evaluations and experimentation that will be used to 
validate the operational requirements for the operational requirements 
document of the objective force. 

If any of the information required by paragraphs (1) through (3) is 
not available at the time the report is submitted, the Secretary shall 
include in the report the anticipated schedule for the availability of 
that information. 

(c) Costs And Effectiveness Of Medium Armored Combat Vehicles For The 
Interim Brigade Combat Teams. (1) The Secretary of the Army shall 
develop a plan for comparing: 

(A) the costs and operational effectiveness of the infantry carrier 
variant of the interim armored vehicles selected for the infantry 
battalions of the interim brigade combat teams; and; 

(B) the costs and operational effectiveness of the troop-carrying 
medium armored vehicles currently in the Army inventory for the use of 
infantry battalions. 

(2) The Secretary of the Army may not carry out the comparison 
described in paragraph (1) until the Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation of the Department of Defense approves the plan for that 
comparison developed under that paragraph. 

(d) Limitation Pending Receipt Of Secretary Of The Army Report. Not 
more than 80 percent of the amount appropriated for fiscal year 2001 
for the procurement of armored vehicles in the family of new medium 
armored vehicles may be obligated until: 

(1) the Secretary of the Army submits to the congressional defense 
committees the report required under subsection (a); and; 

(2) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date of the submittal of 
such report. 

(e) Limitation Pending Comparison And Certification. No funds 
appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of the Army 
for any fiscal year may be obligated for acquisition of medium armored 
combat vehicles to equip a third interim brigade combat team until: 

(1) the plan for a comparison of costs and operational effectiveness 
developed under subsection (c)(1), as approved under subsection 
(c)(2), is carried out; 

(2) the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense 
committees, after the completion of the comparison referred to in 
paragraph (1), a certification that: 

(A) the Secretary approves of the obligation of funds for that 
purpose; and; 

(B) the force structure resulting from the acquisition and subsequent 
operational capability of interim brigade combat teams will not 
diminish the combat power of the Army; and; 

(3) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date of the certification 
under paragraph (2). 

(f) Definitions. In this section: 

(1) The term "transformation", with respect to the Army, means the 
actions being undertaken to transform the Army, as it is constituted 
in terms of organization, equipment, and doctrine in 2000, into the 
objective force. 

(2) The term "objective force" means the Army that has the 
organizational structure, the most advanced equipment that early 
twenty-first century science and technology can provide, and the 
appropriate doctrine to ensure that the Army is responsive, 
deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable for 
the full spectrum of the operations anticipated to be required of the 
Army during the early years of the twenty-first century following 2010. 

(3) The term "interim brigade combat team" means an Army brigade that 
is designated by the Secretary of the Army as a brigade combat team 
and is reorganized and equipped with currently available equipment in 
a configuration that effectuates an evolutionary advancement toward 
transformation of the Army to the objective force. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office of The Under Secretary of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

May 3, 2002: 

Ms. Carol R. Schuster: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. General Accounting Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. Schuster: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-02-442, "Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to 
Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams," March 28, 
2002 (GAO Code 350064). The DoD generally agrees with the report, as 
noted in the enclosed comments to the GAO recommendations. However, 
ongoing management actions are appropriate to address the concerns 
raised in the report, so additional intervention by the Secretary of 
Defense is not required. 

As a result of meetings with the Army staff and continuing visits to 
the field, the GAO has identified challenges the Army faces during its 
Transformation. We intend to continue to address these challenges as 
we attempt to maintain our current timelines for the Army's Interim 
Force, and will continue to share the results of our efforts with the 
GAO as it continues its study of the Army's Transformation. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to review the draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Spiros G. Pallas: 
Acting Director: 
Strategic and Tactical Systems: 

Enclosure: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Code 350064/GAO-02-442: 

"Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of 
Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams" Department of Defense Comments
to the Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The General Accounting Office (GAO) recommended that 
the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to estimate 
the combat capabilities that will exist at the time the Interim 
Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) are certified as deployable and set 
milestones for providing this information to CINC planners. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. While the report finds the regional 
CINCs in agreement on the need of an IBCT force with a wide spectrum 
of capabilities, the GAO report asserted that there exists a lack of 
information required for CINC planners to fully integrate an IBCT in 
their war plans. Since the Army has not completed the fielding of the 
first IBCT and has some materiel challenges to be resolved, there may 
be planning information shortfalls that may inhibit a CINC's war 
plans. However, the Army, through the CINC's Requirements Task Force 
(CRTF), has provided a successful forum to address CINC concerns and 
derive solutions. As doctrine is finalized and additional collective 
training is completed, this Task Force will continue to assist CINC 
planners in the employment of IBCTs. Accordingly, no further direction 
to the Army is necessary. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to provide CINC planners with 
relevant logistics information as soon as possible so that they can 
adequately plan how best to support the IBCTs. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. The Army has analyzed and approved 
initial baseline consumption estimates for the IBCT and will ensure 
CINC planners receive relevant logistics information as soon as 
possible. The CRTF forum will be utilized to assist as the 
disseminator of planning information. The Army Service Component 
Commands will also be provided IBCT sustainment planning guidance. As 
the Army continues to develop the sustainment doctrine for the IBCT, 
the Army will ensure it is provided to the CINCs. No further direction 
to the Army is necessary. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
obtain the Army's specific IBCT mobility requirements to meet its goal 
for deploying a brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours and 
determine how best to address any shortfalls. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. The Army will continue to define the 
mobility requirements to meet the goals for IBCT deployment. 
Prioritization and allocation of lift assets is always likely to be an 
operational challenge to be faced by the warfighting Commanders in 
Chief, and IBCT deployment timelines will be one of many 
considerations in addressing this challenge. Timely availability of 
lift is required to fully realize the potential operational 
capabilities presented by the IBCT. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to expedite development of a program 
to sustain personnel skills on digitized equipment so that it will be 
available for subsequent IBCTs. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. The Army training developers are 
designing a digital skills sustainment program based on feedback from 
the Brigade Coordination Cell (BCC) and interaction with the initial 
Brigade Combat Teams. One of the reasons formal training on digitized 
equipment cannot accelerate is the acquisition process that delivers 
the equipment to the proponent schools after Milestone B. The Army 
should stay on course with the Training and Doctrine Command's 
development of the Digital Training Strategy scheduled for a May 02 
completion date. All training is included in the Institutional Digital 
Education Plan (IDEP) funded for FY03 through FY09. Request change to 
recommendation from "expedite" to read "complete." 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to collect and analyze data on why 
soldiers leave the IBCTs and take appropriate action to reduce 
personnel turnover. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. IBCT personnel reassignments are 
carefully managed and tracked by the Army's Personnel Command career 
branches, the Distribution Division, and the losing organizations. To 
reduce turbulence, soldiers are stabilized in IBCT units from date of 
arrival until one year after the unit reaches its Initial Operating 
Capability (IOC). Accordingly, no further direction to the Army is 
necessary. 

Recommendation 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to estimate the extent and cost of 
facility improvements that will be needed at installations scheduled 
to accommodate the subsequent IBCTs to assist them in their planning. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. The Army routinely conducts estimates 
as part of the annual Program Objective Memorandum build process. It 
has developed a draft Transformation Template for Installations (TT-I) 
to provide Army Major Commands and installations with a menu of 
facility requirements to support IBCT stationing, training, and 
sustainment. This template provides a start point for installation 
planners to determine their facility shortfalls and develop an initial 
list of required projects to support an IBCT. Accordingly, no further 
direction to the Army is necessary. The United States Army Europe 
(USAREUR) currently is working with DA Staff to determine costs 
associated with stationing an IBCT in Europe. A visit by Army Staff to 
USAREUR is tentatively scheduled for early May 02. 

Recommendation 7: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a BCC-type organization 
at subsequent IBCT locations to deal with day-to-day challenges. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. The Army has identified certain 
functions, processes, and support capabilities required to transform a 
unit into an IBCT. Each IBCT location will have different levels of 
internal staff capability to execute transformation, and the Army will 
tailor, on a case-by-case basis, the resources required to fill the 
shortfalls at each location. Lessons learned from Ft. Lewis can be 
passed on to the subsequent IBCT locations and current BCC function 
can be executed by a much smaller cell. Request change to 
recommendation from "establish" to read "consider." 

Recommendation 8: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to provide a central collection point 
for IBCT lessons learned so as to make the information available to 
personnel throughout the Army. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. The GAO report emphasizes that there 
is a lack of captured lessons learned on transforming the initial 
brigades at Fort Lewis. Army Forces Command hosted an Information 
Exchange Conference at Fort Lewis on 27-29 November 2001 in which 
lessons learned were briefed to Headquarters Department of the Army, 
Training and Doctrine Command, Army Materiel Command, and IBCT gaining 
Major Commands. These lessons learned were not disseminated Army-wide 
to review or sent to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). The 
Army already is planning to establish procedures and a central 
repository to allow past and future lessons learned to inform Army 
Transformation. No further direction to the Army is necessary. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army Has 
a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major 
Challenges, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-96] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2001); Defense Acquisition: Army 
Transformation Faces Weapons Systems Challenges [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-311], May 21, 2001. 

[2] Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
March 1, 2000. 

[3] The first two are a heavy brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division and 
a light infantry brigade of the 25th Infantry Division both of which 
are at Fort Lewis. The next four are the 172nd Infantry Brigade 
(Separate), Forts Wainwright and Richardson, Alaska; the 2nd Armored 
Cavalry Regiment (Light), Fort Polk, Louisiana; the 2nd Brigade, 25th 
Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and the 56th 
Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Pennsylvania Army 
National Guard. 

[4] The Objective Force is the force that achieves the objectives of 
the Army's transformation. This future force will be rapidly 
deployable and capitalize on advances in science and technology. These 
advances will enable the Army to equip its forces with significantly 
advanced systems such as the Future Combat System. 

[5] See appendix I for the specific legislative requirements that are 
contained in section 113, Floyd D. Spence National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, P. L.106-398 (Oct. 30, 2000) 
and section 113, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2002, P. L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001). 

[6] This Army initiative begun, in the mid-1990s, involved equipping 
infantry troops at Fort Hood, Texas, with digitized equipment and 
testing it in several field exercises. The IBCT is being equipped with 
these same digitized systems. 

[7] The law permits the Secretary of Defense to waive this limitation 
if deployment is required by national security interests. 

[8] A mission support training facility provides a comprehensive 
environment within which the IBCT can conduct individual and multi-
echelon digital training and mission support. 

[9] Army Regulation 11-33: Army Lessons Learned Program: System 
Development and Application, 10 October 1989; Army Regulation 870-5: 
Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures, 29 
January 1999. 

[End of section] 

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