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United States General Accounting Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

May 2002: 

Force Structure: 

Air Force Needs a Periodic Total Force Assessment: 

GAO-02-541: 

United States General Accounting Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 2, 2002: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John W. Warner: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bob Stump: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

In May 2000, the Air Force initiated an assessment to test whether the 
force requirements derived from its manpower requirements-
determination process were sufficient to support the spectrum of 
military operations envisioned in the defense strategy: from 
simultaneously fighting two major theater wars to conducting multiple 
contingency operations in peacetime. This assessment, called the Total 
Force Assessment, was the Air Force's first evaluation of manpower 
adequacy in these contexts since 1995. Past assessments have been done 
on an irregular basis. In addition to assessing whether the Air Force 
could support the envisioned wartime and peacetime military 
operations, the most recent Total Force Assessment was generally 
expected to provide information to assist Air Force leadership in 
other force-management and decision-making processes. For example, the 
Air Force anticipated that Total Force Assessment results might be 
used to assess the appropriateness of its force mix, provide 
additional support for budgetary submissions, and provide data for day-
to-day management of manpower assets. 

A sound process for determining the military services' ability to 
support Department of Defense's (DOD's) strategy for military 
operations that occurs on a regular basis is critical. Without it, the 
services cannot assess war-fighting risk and effectively allocate 
personnel to meet both wartime and peacetime requirements. In setting 
its corporate-level performance goals, DOD has recognized the need for 
an appropriately sized force to respond to the full spectrum of 
crises, and the Congress, too, has Page 1 GAO-02-541 Force Structure 
demonstrated interest in knowing whether service force size and 
structure are consistent with strategy demands. 

Accordingly, in this report we address the following questions: (1) 
Did the Total Force Assessment demonstrate that the Air Force has the 
forces needed to carry out the full spectrum of military operations 
envisioned in the defense strategy? (2) To what extent did the Air 
Force use results from the Total Force Assessment to improve force-
management and decision-making processes? We are providing this report 
to you because of your oversight responsibilities and past interest in 
the Air Force process. 

Results in Brief: 

Because the Total Force Assessment was not implemented as planned, the 
Air Force cannot objectively demonstrate that it has the forces needed 
to carry out the full spectrum of military operations. Although 
intended to examine whether authorized Air Force personnel were 
sufficient to meet both the wartime and peacetime scenarios, the 
assessment only addressed the wartime scenario. Work on the adequacy 
of manpower for conducting multiple contingency operations in 
peacetime was never initiated. Further, although Air Force officials 
concluded that manpower was adequate to support the wartime scenario, 
this assessment was somewhat inconclusive because the effort was 
discontinued before all discrepancies in the assessment's results were 
resolved. The assessment's incomplete nature and its irregular timing 
suggest that the Air Force is not placing a high priority on this type 
of analysis. Not completing the assessment as planned and on a regular 
basis impairs the credibility of the process and prevents the Air 
Force from consistently and objectively demonstrating that it has a 
sufficient number and mix of forces to carry out the defense strategy. 

Although the Air Force spent considerable time and effort conducting 
at least a portion of its planned assessment, it has not used the 
results to the full extent anticipated. On the positive side, Total 
Force Assessment results have been used by functional managers to 
discuss the health of their career fields with the chief of staff of 
the Air Force. For example, the Total Force Assessment identified 
force mix imbalances and as a result some functional managers have 
been asked to consider making greater use of reserve forces. However, 
the results are not being used as planned to support changes in Air 
Force budget submissions or to provide data for day-to-day management 
of manpower assets. The Department of the Air Force may be losing 
important opportunities to improve overall force management processes 
by not fully using the results of the assessment. 

We are recommending that the secretary of defense direct the Air Force 
to conduct this assessment on a regular basis and clearly define how 
its results will be used. 

The Department of Defense concurred with our recommendation, noting 
that the Air Force has already taken steps to initiate a new iteration 
of the Total Force Assessment, with the first results due for 
completion in December 2002. The department also provided several 
observations on our analysis, which are addressed on pages seven and 
eight of this report. 

Background: 

The Air Force's manpower requirements are determined by individual 
major commands, using a number of methodologies, including manpower 
standards, logistical models, and crew ratios. Once approved by Air 
Force leadership, the results serve as the basis for authorizing 
military, civilian, and contractor positions in the Air Force and are 
entered into the Air Force's Manpower Data System.[Footnote 1] 

The Air Force's Directorate of Manpower and Organization designed the 
Total Force Assessment (TFA) process to assess whether the various 
methodologies used by the Air Force to determine manpower requirements 
generated sufficient manpower to accomplish two purposes: (1) meet 
deployment commitments should it be called on to fight two major 
theater wars and (2) conduct multiple small-scale contingency 
operations in peacetime. To assess whether the authorized manpower was 
adequate for the wartime scenario, the Air Force compared the 
authorized forces in the Manpower Data System to the deployment 
commitments demanded by the two major theater wars. It then calculated 
the effect of deploying these forces on the manpower needed to 
continue operations at existing airbases (i.e., in-place support 
forces). Demands for the deployment commitments were identified using 
troop deployment lists[Footnote 2] generated from war plans for 
conducting wars in Southwest and Northeast Asia. The requirements for 
in-place support forces were calculated using a model that adjusts 
manpower requirements to account for changes in the personnel needed 
to support ongoing Air Force operations when forces are deployed. 
Plans for assessing the adequacy of forces in peacetime were never 
finalized. 

Total Force Assessment Has Not Established the Air Force's Ability to 
Carry Out the Defense Strategy: 

The Air Force conducted only the wartime component of the assessment, 
not the component assessing the adequacy of its manpower in conducting 
multiple contingency operations in peacetime. Moreover, the wartime 
component of the assessment was stopped before all discrepancies were 
resolved and, as a result, it was not conclusive. The incompleteness 
and irregular timing of this and similar past assessments indicate 
that they have not been a high priority for the Air Force. 

Total Force Assessment Not Fully Implemented: 

The Total Force Assessment was not entirely implemented as planned, 
and as a result the Air Force cannot objectively demonstrate that it 
has the manpower needed to carry out the operations envisioned by DOD. 
Begun in May 2000, this effort was conducted, in part, to provide the 
Air Force with an overarching analysis of its personnel requirements 
in preparation for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. It was to be 
completed by January 2001. However, as of January 2002, the Air Force 
had essentially completed its assessment of wartime requirements, but 
it had not yet begun its assessment of whether Air Force authorized 
personnel were sufficient to support contingency operations in 
peacetime. The peacetime analysis was important because it would 
demonstrate whether particular career fields might be overburdened in 
peacetime even if sufficient forces were available to meet the two-
theater-war scenario. 

The results of the wartime analysis were somewhat inconclusive because 
the Air Force stopped work on the study before some discrepancies in 
the assessment's results were resolved. These discrepancies occurred 
because the process used for the study resulted in double counting 
some requirements, which in turn required the Air Force to manually 
review results for accuracy. Air Force officials told us they 
discontinued further work resolving discrepancies because Air Force 
leadership believed there was a strong likelihood that defense 
guidance would be changed from the two major theater war scenario to 
some other scenario.[Footnote 3] Such a change would have reduced the 
utility of any further efforts to produce more accurate results. At 
the time they stopped work, Air Force officials had concluded that 
results were about 90 percent accurate. According to Air Force 
officials, the leadership of the Air Force Directorate of Manpower and 
Organization believed that, at that point, the assessment results 
showed that forces were adequate to support the wartime scenario, and 
these results were subsequently briefed to the chief of staff of the 
Air Force. 

At the time of our review, Air Force officials still planned to 
conduct the peacetime analysis, but in view of the change in defense 
strategy they no longer plan to complete this portion of the current 
assessment. Instead, the Air Force plans to revamp the TFA process. 
Air Force officials advised us that in the future the TFA might be 
streamlined and shortened in duration since Air Force leadership 
believes that the current assessment is too time-consuming and 
manpower intensive. These officials said that they had proposed that 
the next TFA capitalize on the modeling that was used in the most 
recent Quadrennial Defense Review to test whether Air Force manpower 
is sufficient to meet a wide range of scenarios indicated by that 
review. Using this new approach, Air Force officials now anticipate 
completing a new iteration of TFA, covering the full spectrum of 
conflict, by December 2002. 

Air Force Has Not Made This Type of Analysis a High Priority: 

The incomplete implementation of the TFA reflects that, to some 
extent, the Air Force has not placed a high priority on achieving the 
goals of this type of assessment, as evidenced by the long interval 
experienced between assessments. A forerunner to Total Force 
Assessment, FORSIZE, was last completed in 1995-—more than 6 years 
ago. No FORSIZE study was conducted in 1996 or 1997 because the 
analytical resources needed to conduct the assessment were devoted to 
the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review instead.[Footnote 4] 

Planning for the most recent TFA began in 1999, but efforts were 
impeded by other changes the Air Force was undergoing, such as the 
recognition that the Air Force needed forces to conduct contingency 
operations as well as forces to meet the wartime scenarios, a need 
that then had to be incorporated in TFA's design. While these changes 
certainly complicated the Air Force analysis, such uncertainty and 
change have almost become constants within DOD. Doing without a 
regular, institutionalized process—-on the basis of inevitable 
complications—-denies the Air Force's Directorate of Manpower and 
Organization a way to determine objectively whether it has the forces 
needed to carry out the defense strategy. 

Air Force Not Capitalizing as Anticipated on Assessment's Results: 

The Air Force did not use the results from the assessment for all of 
the purposes it had envisioned. On the positive side, Air Force 
officials told us that TFA results had been useful in helping some 
functional managers discuss the health of their career fields in 
briefings to the chief of staff of the Air Force. For example, the 
Total Force Assessment showed that the number of active forces fell 
somewhat short of the numbers demanded for the wartime scenario, while 
the number of reserve forces exceeded demands. In some situations, 
functional managers were asked to consider making greater use of 
reserve forces if active forces were deemed insufficient. On the other 
hand, the Air Force did not use TFA results as anticipated to support 
changes in budget submissions or to influence day-to-day management of 
manpower assets. Officials also noted that TFA results were not used 
to reallocate forces among various functional managers to make the 
best use of available forces, although they noted that TFA was not 
designed to do this. As a result, TFA has not lived up to its full 
potential for assisting Air Force leadership in making manpower 
decisions that can lead to a more effective force. 

We believe there are two possible reasons why the Air Force did not 
use TFA results to the full extent expected. First, because 
implementation of TFA was incomplete, the results themselves are 
incomplete and thus may have been viewed as of limited value for 
supporting changes to the budget or in making day to day management 
decisions. For example, officials told us that, with the changes to 
defense guidance and deployment schedules, TFA results are now viewed 
as one more data source on which to base decisions. Second, because 
TFA has not been institutionalized and does not occur on a regular 
basis, its results may have been viewed as insufficient or not timely 
for these purposes; for example, the Air Force might not have been 
able to link TFA results to very formalized and regularly occurring 
systems like the budget. 

Conclusions: 

Because the Air Force cannot objectively demonstrate that it has the 
forces necessary to carry out the full spectrum of military operations 
envisioned in defense guidance, its operational risk in both wartime 
and peacetime may not be fully understood. Both the secretary of 
defense and the Congress need this information to effectively 
discharge their respective oversight responsibilities. Without an 
institutionalized process for assessing risk, which occurs on a 
regular basis, the Air Force has no way of knowing what mitigating 
actions might be warranted. On the positive side, the Air Force has 
identified other aspects of force management that could benefit from 
the results of a Total Force Assessment. However, it has not been able 
to capitalize on this potential because the results to date have been 
incomplete and irregularly obtained. By not placing a high enough 
priority on conducting a regularly occurring assessment and by 
underutilizing assessment results, the Air Force may be shortchanging 
itself in terms of achieving an appropriate force size and mix and in 
terms of fully developing the related funding requirements. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To enable the Air Force to objectively demonstrate it has the forces 
necessary to support the spectrum of military operations envisioned in 
the defense strategy and to enhance force management processes, we 
recommend that the secretary of defense direct the secretary of the 
Air Force to institutionalize a Total Force Assessment process to be 
conducted on a regular basis with clearly articulated uses for its 
results. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 
recommendation that the Air Force institutionalize TFA but took issue 
with some of the findings and analysis in our assessment. DOD's 
concerns center around whether the Air Force implemented TFA as 
planned and was able to establish its ability to carry out the full 
spectrum of missions envisioned by the defense strategy. Our assertion 
that the TFA was not implemented as planned is based on the fact that 
the chief of staff of the Air Force tasking letter that initiated TFA 
and the subsequent overarching guidance written by the Air Force 
specified an assessment of manpower requirements for both peacetime 
and wartime operations. At the time of our review, the Air Force had 
completed the wartime portion, but had not yet addressed peacetime 
operations. We understand, and noted in our report, that the Air Force 
now expects to complete a new iteration of TFA, covering the full 
spectrum of conflict, by December 2002. We endorse this effort and are 
hopeful that it reaches fruition. It does not alter the fact, however, 
that the fiscal year 1999 TFA was not fully implemented as planned, 
and that, lacking requirements for peacetime operations, it did not 
objectively establish the Air Force's ability to fully execute the 
defense guidance. 

DOD's comments also stress that the two major theater war portion of 
TFA was completed and briefed to the chief of staff of the Air Force 
and that the results showed that the Air Force had sufficient manpower 
to satisfy mission requirements. Our report acknowledges these facts. 
We noted, however, that the numbers resulting from the assessment were 
somewhat inconclusive and less useful than they might have been 
because work on the study was discontinued before all discrepancies 
were resolved. As stated in our report, Air Force officials estimated 
that final results were about 90 percent accurate. 

DOD's comments further questioned our conclusion that TFA had not 
capitalized as anticipated on the assessment's results, stating that 
the results of TFA were used widely for initiating taskings and making 
decisions. Our report does not indicate that TFA results were not used 
at all, only that its intended potential was not realized. We were 
unable to document the extent to which TFA was used for tasking and 
decision-making because the Air Force Directorate of Manpower and 
Organization did not produce a final report on TFA results, and it did 
not establish procedures for systematically tracking issues developed 
from TFA data and resulting actions to resolve them. Based on 
information provided by Air Force officials, we did acknowledge in our 
report that TFA results were used by functional managers to explore 
increasing the use of reserve forces to mitigate shortfalls in the 
active forces. However, during our review Air Force officials told us 
that TFA results would not be used for other purposes envisioned in 
the initial guidance written for TFA (e.g., supporting budget 
submissions and for day-to-day management of manpower assets). The 
department's written comments are presented in their entirety in 
appendix I. 

Scope and Methodology: 

To evaluate whether the Air Force's Total Force Assessment 
demonstrated that forces are adequate to carry out the defense 
strategy, we reviewed Air Force policy, guidance, and documents used 
in planning and conducting the assessment from calendar year 1999 
through 2001. We also reviewed the assessment's results and discussed 
these results with officials responsible for this analysis. These 
included representatives of the Air Force's Directorate of Manpower 
and Organization at the Pentagon; Air Force Manpower Readiness Flight 
at Fort Detrick, Maryland; and the Air Force Manpower and Innovation 
Agency in San Antonio, Texas. We also discussed the assessment's 
methodology and past assessments with these officials. We did not 
independently verify the underlying manpower-requirements system 
information that serves as the starting point for the Total Force 
Assessment. To determine how the Air Force used the assessment's 
results, we identified its anticipated uses and discussed with Air 
Force officials how these results were actually used. 

We conducted our review from July 2001 through January 2002, in 
accordance with generally accepted government audit standards. We 
obtained comments on a draft of this report from the Department of 
Defense and incorporated its comments where appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the secretary of defense and 
the director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make 
copies available to appropriate congressional committees and to other 
interested parties on request. If you or your staff has any questions 
about this report, please call me at (202) 512-3958. Major 
contributors to this report were Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, James K. 
Mahaffey, Norman L. Jessup, Jr., and Susan K. Woodward. 

Signed by: 

Carol R. Schuster: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Personnel And Readiness: 
4000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000: 

April 15, 2002: 

Ms. Carol R. Schuster: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
United States General Accounting Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. Schuster: 

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report, 
"Force Structure: Air Force Needs a Periodic Total Force Assessment," 
dated March 22, 2002 (Code 350088). We concur with your findings, 
subject to the issues discussed below and in the enclosed detailed 
comments. 

We agree that the Air Force should institutionalize the Total Force 
Assessment (TFA) process. The Air Force has already taken steps to do 
so. However, we take issue with some of the analysis and findings in 
the report. The report stresses that the Air Force did not fully 
complete either of the two analytical phases of TFA: two major theater 
wars (MTW), or steady state contingencies (SSC). By contrast, the two 
MTW results were briefed—-from both total Air Force and individual 
career field perspectives-—to the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF) last 
summer. Actions were tasked and decisions were made based on these 
briefings. 

Before the final briefing could be presented to CSAF on August 1, 
2001, the underlying Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) that had 
previously dictated the requirement to plan for two simultaneous MTWs 
was changed. Because the TFA's doctrinal foundation had been changed, 
the Air Force did not publish a final report (other than an info copy 
to the MAJCOMs). The Air Force advised GAO of this and other errors in 
fact, as addressed in detail in the enclosure. 

The OSD primary action officer for this audit is Colonel Sid Evans, 
USAF, of the Requirements Directorate, (703) 695-0813, e-mail: 
sidney.evans@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jeanne B. Fites: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Integration):

Enclosure: As stated. 

[End of section] 

GAO Code 350088/GAO-02-541: 

"Force Structure: Air Force Needs A Periodic Total Force Assessment" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendation And Detailed 
Comments To The Report: 

Recommendation: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to institutionalize a Total 
Force Assessment (TFA) process to be conducted on a regular basis with 
clearly articulated uses for its results. (Page 7/Draft Report) 

DoD Response: Concur. As discussed during the audit and the exit 
conference, the Air Force has already initiated a process that should 
institutionalize TFA and allow for periodic and timely TFA reviews. A 
copy of the Air Force's August 2001 contract with the ABTech Group of 
Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute (IITRI) to develop 
SSC scenarios was forwarded to the GAO audit team. This portion of the 
contract is nearly complete and Air Force managers will obligate the 
funds to complete the TFA modeling effort within the coming weeks. 
This model will be complete by December 31, 2002 and will allow for 
periodic and quick-turn analysis of Air Force TFA requirements. 

Detailed Comments To The Report: 

"Results In Brief" Section: 

1a. GAO Comments: (T)he TFA was not implemented as planned ... the 
assessments only addressed the wartime scenario. (Page 2/Draft Report) 

1b. DoD Response: Two major theater war (MTW) results were briefed, 
from both a total Air Force and an individual career field 
perspective, to the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF). Career field 
managers were tasked and decisions were made based on these 
presentations. However, before the final brief to CSAF on August 1, 
2001, the 2 MTW direction was removed from the DPG. Because the Total 
Force Assessment (TFA) results were based on a previous strategic 
concept, the Air Staff only provided information copies of the TFA 
results to the MAJCOMs. 

2a. GAO Comments: (T)his assessment was somewhat inconclusive because 
the effort was discontinued before all the discrepancies in the 
assessment were resolved. (Page 2/Draft Report) 2b. DoD RESPONSE: As 
outlined in the DoD response to the recommendation above, the 2 MTW 
results were briefed to CSAF. These briefings resulted in decisions 
that impacted resources and force mix. Had the DPG not changed, the 
TFA data briefed to CSAF would have been used by the functional 
managers and major commands for an even broader range of 1 resource 
management decisions. No further analysis of the numbers would have 
taken place, as Air Force manpower managers were confident they had 
resolved all major discrepancies. The TFA validated that for a 2 MTW 
scenario, the Air Force had sufficient funded authorizations to 
satisfy mission requirements, and this position was briefed to CSAF on 
August 1, 2001. 3a. GAO COMMENTS: (T)he results are not being used as 
planned to support changes in Air Force budget submissions or to 
provide data for day-to-day management of manpower assets. (Page 
2/Draft Report) 

3b. DoD Response: See the DoD response to the recommendation and para 
1b above. 

"Background" Section: 

4a. GAO Comments: Plans for assessing the adequacy of forces in 
peacetime were never finalized. (Page 3/Draft Report) 

4b. DoD Response: In August 2001, the Air Force contracted with ABTech 
to develop small-scale contingency (SSC) scenarios that tie unit type 
code (UTC) taskings to deployment requirements. ABTech's previous work 
(J8/NDU Alt Strategic Project, Dynamic Commitment, Positive Match, 
etc.) allowed them to adapt existing technology and data to rapidly 
meet TFA requirements. The phases in the contract forwarded to ABTech 
in August 01 included the three phases outlined below. They are 
nearing completion of the SSC phase, and the Air Force Directorate of 
Manpower and Organization will obligate funds in this month to 
complete the home-station and in-place requirements for various SSCs. 
They will then finalize the TFA modeling effort. The current statement 
of work with ABTech outlines the following requirements: 

1. Phase 1: Provide manpower deployment requirements for postures of 
engagement (POEs) that range from current steady state deployments up 
to the most demanding MTW+ scenarios (i.e., light, medium, and heavy 
engagements). 

2. Phase 2: Define home-station, in-place total force manpower 
functional requirements for each posture of engagement. 

3. Phase 3: Develop a computer model to help allocate forces according 
to the AEF schedule. 

"Total Force Assessment Has Not Established The Air Force's Ability To 
Carry Out The Defense Strategy" Section: 

5a. GAO Comments: Moreover, the wartime component of the assessment 
was stopped before all discrepancies were resolved and, as a result it 
was not conclusive. The incompleteness and irregular timing of this 
and similar past assessments indicate that they have not been a high 
priority for the Air Force. (Page 4/Draft Report). 

5b. DoD Response: The 2 MTW portion of the exercise was completed as 
outlined in para 1b above. The results were briefed to the CSAF, and 
Air Staff and major command functional managers have the results. 
Major discrepancies were resolved and ABTech is nearing completion of 
its effort to assess SSC impact. The next step is for the Air Staff 
functional managers to validate or adjust UTC requirements used to 
determine manpower demand for each SSC. 

Originally, the TFA was an attempt to assess the Air Force's ability 
to execute the 2 MTW scenario dictated by the previous DPG . While 
coordinating the original plans for TFA at the Air Staff, it became 
clear that steady state operations (e.g., Operations Northern Watch 
and Southern Watch) were creating a heavy day-to-day burden on the Air 
Force. However, the decision was made to focus on the most demanding 
scenario (i.e., 2 MTW) and accomplish the SSC assessment at a later 
date. Before that could be implemented, the underlying DoD strategy 
changed. The SSC analysis was completed on the front end of the new 
TFA assessment vice the tail end of the FY 99 TFA. 

As indicated in paragraph 3b above, the Air Force initiated 
development of the next TFA, including obtaining support from a 
leading university research institute, immediately upon completion of 
the FY 99 TFA (an 18 month effort). In our view, in recent years the 
Air Force has made great strides to emphasize wartime manpower 
planning and to incorporate it into resource management processes. We 
do not believe it appropriate to assert that the Air Force does not 
consider this type of analysis important. The Air Force expects to 
have a TFA model, which will allow for periodic reviews based on 
readily updateable scenarios, available by December 31, 2002. 

"Total Force Assessment Not Fully Implemented" Section: 

6a. GAO Comments: The Air Force cannot objectively demonstrate that it 
has the manpower needed to carry out the operations envisioned by DoD. 
(Page 4/Draft Report) 6b. 

DoD Response: See 1b above. 

7a. GAO Comments: At the time of our review, Air Force officials still 
planned to conduct the peacetime analysis, but in view of the change 
in defense strategy they no longer plan to complete this portion of 
the current assessment. (Page 5/Draft Report) 7b. DoD RESPONSE: See 
para 3b above. 

"Air Force Not Capitalizing As Anticipated On Assessment's Results" 
Section: 

8a. GAO Comments: TFA has not lived up to its full potential for 
assisting Air Force leadership in making manpower decisions that can 
lead to a more effective force. (Page 6/Draft Report) 

8b. DoD Response: See para 1b above. Air Force functional managers 
briefed CSAF, who in turn, levied talkers and made decisions that 
impacted resources and total force mix. Contrary to GAO's observation, 
TFA was the catalyst for many real-world resource management decisions. 

Technical Comment: 

The Air Force organization that conducted the TFA process is referred 
to throughout the report as the "Air Force Directorate of Plans and 
Programs." Please correct your nomenclature to either refer to this 
office as the "Air Force Directorate of Manpower and Organization" (HQ 
USAF/XPM) or as its parent organization, the "Office of the Air Force 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs" (HQ USAF/XP). 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The Air Force's Manpower Data System is the official source of 
manpower authorization data for active Air Force, Air National Guard, 
Air Force Reserve, and civilian and contractor personnel. 

[2] Includes deploying combat and support forces identified in the 
Time Phased Force and Deployment Data, which are based on the 
operation plans for the two -major -theater -war scenario. 

[3] The September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review report states DOD's 
intentions to shift the focus of U.S. force planning from optimizing 
for conflicts in two particular regions to building a portfolio of 
capabilities that is robust across the spectrum of possible force 
requirements. DOD intends to maintain the ability to defeat aggression 
in two critical areas in overlapping time frames. 

[4] There were no FORSIZE exercises in 1989 through 1993 because of 
the changing world environment, numerous Air Force command 
reorganizations, and the Persian Gulf War. 

[End of section] 

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