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entitled 'Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other 
Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and 
Planning' which was released on May 16, 2002. 

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United States General Accounting Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Emerging 
Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. 

May 2002: 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: 

U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need 
Strengthened Coordination and Planning: 

GAO-02-426: 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

U.S. Government Has Spent about $86 Million to Help Countries Combat 
Nuclear Smuggling: 

U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Lacks a Coordinated 
Approach: 

U.S. Assistance Has Helped Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling, but 
Problems with Equipment Undermine Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents: 
Incidents Involving Weapons Usable Nuclear Material: 
Luch Scientific Production Association (Russia), 1992: 
Vilnius, Lithuania, 1993: 
Murmansk, Russia, 1993: 
Murmansk, Russia, 1993: 
St. Petersburg, Russia, 1994: 
Tengen, Germany, 1994: 
Landshut, Germany, 1994: 
Munich, Germany, 1994: 
Prague, Czech Republic, 1994: 
Rousse, Bulgaria, 1999: 
Kara-Balta, Kyrgyzstan, 1999: 
Batumi, Georgia, 2000: 
Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000: 
Germany, 2000: 
Greece, 2001: 
France, 2001: 

Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance Programs: 
Department of Energy: 
Department of State: 
Department of Defense: 
U.S. Customs Service: 
U.S. Coast Guard: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Customs Service: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and Expenditures 
through Fiscal Year 2001: 

Table 2: Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons-Usable Material 
since 1992: 

Table 3: International Export Control Program Expenditures through 
Fiscal Year 2001: 

Table 4: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program 
Funding, Fiscal Year 1998-2001: 

Table 5: Cooperative Threat Reduction Expenditures through Fiscal Year 
2001: 

Table 6: U.S. Customs Service Expenditures, by Funding Source, through 
Fiscal Year 2001: 

Figures: 
Figure 1: U.S.-Installed Portal Monitors: 

Figure 2: Typical Handheld Radiation Detector Used by Border Guards: 

Figure 3: U.S.-Supplied Mobile X-Ray Van: 

Figure 4: U.S.-Funded Portal Monitors at the Sheremetyevo Airport in 
Moscow: 

[End of section] 

United States General Accounting Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 
May 16, 2002: 

The Honorable Pat Roberts: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

Dear Senator Roberts: 

Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive 
materials occurs worldwide and has reportedly increased in recent 
years. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency[Footnote 1] 
(IAEA), as of December 31, 2001, there had been 181 confirmed cases of 
illicit trafficking of nuclear material since 1993. (See appendix I 
for more information about nuclear smuggling cases.) A significant 
number of the cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be 
used to produce a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional 
explosives with radioactive material ("dirty bomb") to spread 
radioactive contamination over a wide area. Nuclear material can be 
smuggled across a country's border through a variety of means: it can 
be hidden in a car, train, or ship, carried in personal luggage 
through an airport, or walked across an unprotected border. 

Many nuclear smuggling cases have been traced to nuclear material that 
originated in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The United 
States, through the Department of Energy's Material Protection, 
Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program,[Footnote 2] has helped these 
countries secure nuclear material at civilian and defense facilities—
this effort is considered the first line of defense against potential 
theft and/or diversion of nuclear materials. To address the threat 
posed by nuclear smuggling, the United States is helping these 
countries improve their border security—a second line of defense—but 
these assistance efforts face daunting challenges.[Footnote 3] For 
example, Russia alone has almost 12,500 miles of borders with 14 
countries, including North Korea. It is also in close geographical 
proximity to Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. 

As agreed with your office, this report addresses U.S. efforts to 
combat nuclear smuggling by (1) identifying the U.S. federal programs 
tasked with combating the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear 
materials and the amount of U.S. funding spent on this effort; (2) 
determining how well the U.S. assistance is coordinated among federal 
agencies; and (3) assessing the effectiveness of the equipment and 
training provided by the United States. We visited four countries to 
obtain a first hand look at U.S. radiation detection equipment 
installed at different border crossings and meet with officials 
responsible for border security, law enforcement, and export controls. 

Results in Brief: 

U.S. assistance efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among 
six federal agencies—the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; 
the U.S. Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); 
and the U.S. Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 
2001, the six agencies spent about $86 million to help about 30 
countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern 
Europe, combat the threat of smuggling of nuclear and other materials 
that could be used in weapons of mass destruction. The agencies have 
provided a range of assistance, including radiation detection 
equipment and training, technical exchanges to promote the development 
and enforcement of laws and regulations governing the export of 
nuclear-related equipment and technology, and other equipment and 
training to generally improve countries' ability to interdict nuclear 
smuggling. The Department of Energy (DOE) has two programs to combat 
nuclear smuggling and primarily focuses on Russia. Energy has 
installed radiation detection monitors at eight border crossings, 
including at an airport in Moscow, and plans to install similar 
equipment at close to 60 sites in Russia. The State Department has 
provided radiation detection monitors, mobile vans equipped with 
radiation detectors, handheld radiation detectors, and other 
assistance to about 30 countries through two separate programs. The 
Department of Defense (DOD) has two programs that have provided 
radiation detection monitors, handheld detectors, and other assistance 
to about 20 countries. With funding provided by the Departments of 
State and Defense, the U.S. Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the U.S. Coast Guard have provided a variety of 
training and equipment to customs, border guard, and law enforcement 
officials in numerous countries. 

U.S. assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall 
governmentwide plan to guide it. Although an interagency group, 
chaired by the State Department, exists to coordinate U.S. assistance 
efforts, the six agencies that are providing assistance do not always 
coordinate their efforts through this group. As a result, the 
Departments of Energy, State, and Defense have pursued separate 
approaches to installing radiation detection equipment at other 
countries' border crossings; consequently, some countries' border 
crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others. 
Specifically, the Department of Energy is installing equipment at 
border sites in Russia and the Department of Defense is installing 
equipment in another country that is better able to detect weapons-
usable nuclear material, while the State Department has installed less 
sophisticated radiation detection monitors in other countries. 
Coordination problems also exist within agencies. For example, the 
Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense program does not 
coordinate its efforts with another office within the Department that 
also provides radiation detection equipment because that office 
receives funding from and installs equipment on behalf of the State 
Department. Officials of the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense 
have acknowledged that U.S. assistance efforts lack adequate planning 
and need better coordination among all the agencies. In addition, 
these officials told us that the roles and responsibilities of each 
agency in the overall U.S. assistance effort should be better 
clarified. This report makes recommendations to improve the planning 
and coordination of U.S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. 

While U.S. assistance is generally helping countries combat the 
smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials, serious problems 
with installing, using, and maintaining radiation detection equipment 
have undermined U.S. efforts. Representatives of 17 recipient 
countries told us that U.S. assistance has provided needed radiation 
detection equipment at border sites and training for border security 
guards and other law enforcement personnel. Without U.S. assistance, 
some countries would not have any radiation detection equipment at 
their borders or training in how to inspect vehicles, luggage, and 
people and investigate nuclear smuggling cases. In other countries, 
U.S. assistance has bolstered existing nuclear smuggling detection 
programs. We observed at border sites in countries we visited that 
U.S.-provided equipment was working and was being used for the 
purposes intended. However, we also found serious problems with some 
of the equipment provided to various countries. For example, about one-
half of the stationary radiation detection monitors funded by the 
Department of Defense to one country in the former Soviet Union was 
never installed; numerous portable radiation detectors could not be 
accounted for; and radiation detection equipment provided by the State 
Department to Lithuania was stored in the basement of the U.S. embassy 
for about 2 years because of a disagreement between the department and 
the recipient country about the need for a power supply line costing 
$12,600. These and other problems are largely a result of the lack of 
oversight and follow-up by the agencies providing the assistance. U.S. 
officials are attempting to correct some of these problems by, among 
other things, stationing advisors in countries receiving U.S. 
assistance. Another problem affecting U.S. assistance efforts is that 
recipient countries do not systematically report incidents of nuclear 
material detected at their borders, which limits the ability of U.S. 
agencies to measure the effectiveness of the equipment they are 
providing. This report makes several recommendations designed to 
improve management of U.S.-provided radiation detection equipment and 
to secure recipient country assurances that information about detected 
nuclear materials is shared in a timely basis. 

We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State, 
Energy, and Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and comment. 
The Coast Guard and FBI had no comments on the draft report. DOD 
provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as 
appropriate. The agencies agreed with the facts presented in the 
report and State specifically said that it agreed with the report's 
conclusions and recommendations. Customs suggested that we reword our 
recommendation to specifically include it as one of the agencies to 
develop a governmentwide plan to combat nuclear smuggling, which we 
did. DOE did not comment on the conclusions and recommendations. 

Background: 

Over the past decade, the United States has paid increased attention 
to the threat that unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material in the 
countries of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia, could be 
stolen and fall into the hands of terrorists or countries seeking 
weapons of mass destruction. 

By some estimates, the former Soviet Union had about 30,000 nuclear 
weapons and over 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material when it 
collapsed about 10 years ago. Several cases of illicit trafficking in 
nuclear material in Germany and the Czech Republic in the early to mid-
1990s underscored the proliferation threat. The United States 
responded to the threat by providing assistance to increase security 
at numerous nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union, 
particularly in Russia, in order to prevent weapons-usable nuclear 
material from being stolen. In addition, the United States has 
provided portal monitors (stationary equipment designed to detect 
radioactive materials carried by pedestrians or vehicles) and smaller, 
portable radiation detectors at border crossings in many countries of 
the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. The equipment, 
which is installed at car and truck crossings, railroad crossings, 
seaports, and airports, can serve two purposes: deterring smugglers 
from trafficking in nuclear material and detecting cases of actual 
nuclear smuggling. 

Radiation detection equipment can detect radioactive materials used in 
medicine and industry, patients who have recently had radiological 
treatment, commodities that are sources of naturally occurring 
radiation such as fertilizer, and—of primary concern in terms of 
nonproliferation—nuclear material that could be used in a nuclear 
weapon. Nuclear material includes radioactive source materials–such as 
natural uranium, low enriched uranium used as fuel in commercial 
nuclear power reactors, and plutonium and highly enriched uranium–that 
are key components of nuclear weapons. The capability of the equipment 
to detect nuclear material depends on a number of factors including 
the amount of material, the size of the detection device, and whether 
the material is shielded from detection. For example, a small amount 
of material shielded by a lead container would likely escape detection 
while a large amount of material with no shielding would be more 
likely to cause an alarm Detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking 
in weapons-usable nuclear material is complicated because one of the 
materials that is of greatest concern in terms of proliferation—highly 
enriched uranium—is among the most difficult materials to detect due 
to its relatively low level of radioactivity. In contrast, medical and 
industrial radioactive sources, which could be used in a radiological 
dispersion device or "dirty bomb," are highly radioactive and 
therefore easier to detect. Because of the complexity of detecting 
nuclear material, the customs officers or border guards who are 
responsible for operating the equipment must also be trained in how to 
use handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm, 
identify false alarms, and respond to cases of illicit nuclear 
smuggling. 

U.S. Government Has Spent about $86 Million to Help Countries Combat 
Nuclear Smuggling: 

From fiscal year 1992 through 2001, six federal agencies received $140 
million and spent $86.1 million to combat the threat of nuclear 
smuggling in about 30 countries, including all of the countries of the 
former Soviet Union and numerous countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The Departments of State and Defense provide funding to four 
other agencies, and some agencies have carried over millions of 
dollars in program funds into fiscal year 2002 because they have 
received more funding than they have been able to spend. 

U.S. Assistance Is Divided Among Six Federal Agencies: 

The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U.S. Customs 
Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the U.S. Coast Guard 
have provided assistance to about 30 countries' customs, border, and 
law enforcement agencies to detect, interdict, and investigate nuclear 
smuggling. Radiation detection equipment is one of the many types of 
assistance that the U.S. agencies are providing. Other equipment 
ranges from simple hand tools for taking apart and searching different 
compartments of a vehicle for hidden contraband to boats and vehicles 
for conducting patrols. Similarly, training ranges from hands-on 
instruction in using the equipment and conducting searches to high-
level technical exchanges on establishing the legal and regulatory 
basis for preventing illicit trafficking and trade in sensitive goods 
and materials that could be used in a nuclear weapon. U.S. assistance 
began in the mid-1990s under DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction 
program and then expanded to State, DOE, and other DOD programs. 

While DOE, DOD, and State receive their own funding for their 
assistance programs, Customs, the FBI, and the Coast Guard receive 
their funding from State and/or DOD. DOE also receives part of its 
funding from State. 

Departments of Energy, State, and Defense Have the Primary Role in 
Delivering U.S. Assistance: 

DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear 
material smuggling—the Second Line of Defense program and the 
International Export Control Program (IECP). The Second Line of 
Defense Program focuses on providing radiation detection equipment to 
Russia From fiscal year 1997 through 2001, DOE spent $11.2 million, 
including $2.7 million provided by the State Department, to install 70 
portal monitors at eight sites in Russia, including a Moscow airport. 
DOE has identified close to 60 sites in Russia where it plans to 
install portal monitors over the next decade at a total cost of about 
$50 million and has begun work at 19 of these sites. In addition, DOE 
may expand the program beyond Russia to include other countries of the 
former Soviet Union. DOE's International Export Control Program spent 
$22 million, including $2.4 million provided by State, from fiscal 
year 1992 through 2001 to help countries of the former Soviet Union 
control the export of goods and technologies that could be used in the 
development of nuclear weapons. Whereas the Second Line of Defense 
program focuses on the nuclear material needed to manufacture a 
nuclear bomb, the IECP focuses on the other high-technology components 
needed for a bomb such as equipment for enriching uranium. The program 
provides assistance to prevent legitimate enterprises, such as 
businesses that were affiliated with the Soviet Union's nuclear 
weapons complex, from intentionally or unintentionally engaging in 
illicit trade in such goods and technologies. DOE also spent $1.8 
million to support State and DOD programs to combat nuclear smuggling. 

The State Department has received the largest amount of funding 
through the end of fiscal year 2001 for assistance to combat nuclear 
smuggling in about 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and 
Central and Eastern Europe. State spent $11.4 million primarily 
through two programs—the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the 
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program. Through 
the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, State spent $8.5 million 
from fiscal year 1994 through 2001 to, among other things, install 
portal monitors in countries other than Russia. In addition, State 
provided handheld radiation detectors, dosimeters (to measure levels 
of radiation), and mobile vans equipped with x-ray machines and 
radiation detectors that can be driven among a number of border 
crossings. From fiscal year 1998 through 2001, State's Export Control 
and Related Border Security Assistance program spent $2.7 million to, 
among other things, purchase three vans equipped with radiation 
detectors for Russia and another van for Poland. State's Georgia 
Border Security and Law Enforcement program (implemented by Customs) 
also spent $0.2 million to provide radiation detection equipment as 
part of its assistance to strengthen Georgia's overall border 
infrastructure and security against any type of crime, including 
nuclear material smuggling. State also provided $58.8 million to DOE, 
Customs, and the Coast Guard to fund their assistance activities. 

DOD has provided assistance to combat nuclear smuggling under two 
programs—the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the 
International Counterproliferation program. From fiscal year 1993 to 
2001, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program spent $16.3 million to 
assist five countries. The assistance included $1 million for 
radiation detection equipment-36 pedestrian portal monitors (to screen 
people) and 100 handheld radiation detectors for one country and an 
additional 100 handheld detectors for another country—and about $10 
million for other equipment to enable the countries to better patrol 
their borders, conduct searches for smuggled contraband, and equip 
their border posts. In addition, as part of the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program, in fiscal year 2001 DOD began to work with DOE's 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to install seven portal 
monitors at three border crossings in another country. DOD has begun 
site surveys at about eight additional border crossings in that 
country where it plans to install portal monitors. As part of the 
International Counterproliferation program, DOD spent $10.2 million 
from fiscal year 1997 through 2001 to provide Customs and FBI training 
and equipment to 17 countries of the former Soviet Union and Central 
and Eastern Europe. 

U.S. Customs Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Coast 
Guard Implement Assistance with Funding from the Departments of State 
and Defense: 

The U.S. Customs Service, the largest recipient of funding provided by 
State and DOD, spent $11.1 million from fiscal year 1993 through 2001 
on assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. Customs has provided 
training and equipment to customs agencies and border guards in close 
to 30 countries. The equipment includes radiation pagers (small 
detectors that can be worn on a belt to continuously monitor radiation 
levels or used as a handheld device to pinpoint the location of 
radioactive material detected by a portal monitor) as well as a 
variety of other high- and low-tech tools to conduct searches and 
detect sensitive goods and materials, such as fiber optic scopes for 
examining fuel tanks for contraband. Training includes assistance in 
operating the x-ray vans equipped with radiation detectors; providing 
hands-on instruction in using equipment to detect nuclear smuggling; 
teaching techniques for investigating smuggling operations; tracking 
the movements of smugglers between ports of entry, including through 
rough terrain; and providing "train-the-trainer" courses to enable 
countries to train more personnel than the U.S. assistance can reach. 
In addition to equipment and training, Customs has stationed 22 in-
country advisors covering 25 countries on behalf of State to help 
implement and coordinate the assistance. 

From fiscal year 1997 through 2001, the FBI spent $0.4 million as part 
of the DOD International Counterproliferation program. The DOD/FBI 
effort trained and equipped law enforcement agencies to investigate 
and respond to actual seizures of smuggled nuclear or other material. 
Training included seminars for high-level officials and courses on 
conducting investigations and managing a crime scene where a seizure 
has taken place. Equipment provided as part of the training included 
protective equipment, such as HAZMAT suits to make handling of seized 
material safer; evidence collection and sampling kits; and chemical 
detection equipment. In addition, the FBI recently expanded the 
equipment list to include radiation pagers. 

From fiscal year 1999 through 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard spent $1.6 
million in funding received from the State Department Export Control 
and Related Border Security Assistance program. The Coast Guard has 
provided assistance for maritime interdiction of nuclear smuggling to 
countries of the former Soviet Union. Assistance provided to one 
country includes two boats with spare parts and stationing of an in-
country Coast Guard advisor. 

Table 1 lists each program and activity, expenditures through fiscal 
year 2001, and the general nature of the assistance provided. For 
additional details about each of the six agencies' programs and 
expenditures, see appendix II. 

Table 1: Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and Expenditures 
through Fiscal Year 2001: 

Programs/activities: DOE Second Line of Defense; 
Program/activity description: Install radiation detection portal 
monitors at Russian border crossings; 
Expenditures: $11.2 million; 
Funding source: Includes $8.5 million in DOE funds and $2.7 million 
from State. 

Programs/activities: DOE International Export Control Program; 
Program/activity description: Provide nuclear-specific export control 
assistance to countries of the former Soviet Union; 
Expenditures: $22.0 million; 
Funding source: Includes $19.6 million in DOE funds and $2.4 million 
from State. 

Programs/activities: DOE; 
Program/activity description: Install radiation detection equipment in 
countries of the former Soviet Union (other than Russia) and Central 
and Eastern Europe; 
Expenditures: $1.8 million; 
Funding source: Includes $0.5 million from State and $1.3 million from 
DOD. 

Programs/activities: State Dept. Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund; 
Program/activity description: Provide radiation detection equipment 
and other assistance for interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former 
Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe; 
Expenditures: $8.5 million; 
Funding source: 

Programs/activities: State Dept. Export Control & Related Border 
Security Assistance; 
Program/activity description: Provide radiation detection equipment 
and other assistance for interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former 
Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. (Took over 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund radiation detection assistance 
beginning in FY 2002); 
Expenditures: $2.7 million; 
Funding source: 

Programs/activities: State Dept. Georgia Border Security & Law 
Enforcement; 
Program/activity description: Provide wide range of assistance to 
Georgia border guards and customs service to interdict nuclear 
smuggling, fight other crimes such as drug smuggling, and develop 
border infrastructure; 
Expenditures: $0.2 million; 
Funding source: 

Programs/activities: DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction; 
Program/activity description: Provide radiation detection equipment 
and other assistance for interdicting nuclear smuggling to 5 
countries, and install radiation detection portal monitors in one 
country; 
Expenditures: $16.3 million; 
Funding source: 

Programs/activities: DOD International Counterproliferation program; 
Program/activity description: Train and equip customs officers, border 
guards, and law enforcement officials to detect, interdict, and 
respond to nuclear smuggling; 
Expenditures: $10.2 million; 
Funding source: 

Programs/activities: U.S. Customs Service; 
Program/activity description: Train and equip customs officers and 
border guards in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern 
Europe to detect and interdict nuclear smuggling; 
Expenditures: $11.1 million; 
Funding source: Includes $8.8 million from State and $2.3 million from 
DOD. 

Programs/activities: Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
Program/activity description: Train and equip law enforcement 
officials in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe to 
investigate and respond to nuclear smuggling incidents; 
Expenditures: $0.4 million; 
Funding source: Includes $0.4 million from DOD. 

Programs/activities: U.S. Coast Guard; 
Program/activity description: Provide assistance for maritime 
interdiction of nuclear smuggling; 
Expenditures: $1.6 million; 
Funding source: Includes $1.6 million from State. 

Programs/activities: Total; 
Expenditures: $86.1 million. 

Source: Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, U.S. Customs 
Service, U.S. Coast Guard, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

[End of table] 

Some Agencies' Expenditures Have Not Kept Pace with Growth in Funding: 

Funding for State's Export Control and Related Border Security 
Assistance program grew over tenfold, from $3 million allocated in 
fiscal year 1998 to $40.1 million allocated in fiscal year 2001. Due 
to the rapid increase, some agencies receiving funds from State have 
carried over millions of dollars in program funds into fiscal year 
2002 because they have received more funding than they have been able 
to spend. For example, Customs' program expenditures have not kept 
pace with its growth in funding, and it carried over $33.1 million in 
unspent funds into fiscal year 2002, including $6.5 million in 
obligated but unspent funds and $26.5 million in funds that had not 
been obligated or spent. Customs officials attributed the carryover to 
not receiving funds from State until late in the fiscal year and not 
obtaining agreements from the recipient countries under which the 
assistance would be provided. Furthermore, according to Customs and 
State officials, carryover is to be expected because State provides 
the funds to Customs under agreements to spend the funds over a 2 to 3 
year period. 

After September 11, 2001, State received an emergency supplemental 
appropriation of $24.7 million. State Department officials said that 
they have designated $21.5 million of the emergency supplemental for 
assistance (including detection equipment) to six countries. 

U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Lacks a Coordinated 
Approach: 

Because U.S. efforts are not effectively coordinated, the Departments 
of Energy, State, and Defense are pursuing separate approaches to 
enhancing other countries' border crossings, with the result that some 
countries' border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling 
than others. While DOE and DOD have installed more sophisticated 
portal monitors at border sites in Russia and another country, the 
State Department has installed less sophisticated portal monitors in 
other countries. In addition, no governmentwide plan links all of the 
six agencies' programs together, which exacerbates the coordination 
problems. 

Efforts to Coordinate Assistance Have Been Inadequate: 

The six agencies that are providing training and equipment to combat 
nuclear smuggling coordinate their assistance through an interagency 
group chaired by the State Department. The group, which includes 
representatives from all the U.S. programs that are providing 
assistance, meets about once a month to discuss such issues as funding 
and financial management of the agencies' various programs, upcoming 
assistance activities, and results of program personnel's recent trips 
to recipient countries. In addition, program managers of the various 
agencies work together to implement the programs. For example, DOD 
officials said that they regularly meet with Customs and FBI program 
managers to implement assistance and that they participate in the FBI 
and Customs training courses that DOD funds. 

A number of agency officials said that coordination has improved since 
State established a separate office in November 2000—the Office of 
Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions—to manage and coordinate U.S. 
assistance. For example, the new office provided funding to Customs to 
station 22 in-country advisors, covering 25 countries, that are 
responsible for coordinating the assistance for all of the six 
agencies within a country. DOD and DOE officials said that the 
advisors play an important role in implementing their programs. In 
addition, the new office has assumed responsibility for much of the 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund assistance related to nuclear 
smuggling. For instance, the office has taken over responsibility for 
providing and maintaining radiation detection equipment to countries 
other than Russia. 

Despite these coordination efforts, no one agency is in charge of the 
overall U.S. effort to provide assistance to combat nuclear smuggling; 
consequently, the agencies have implemented their programs without 
always coordinating their efforts through the interagency group. For 
example, DOD installed portal monitors at three sites in one country 
of the former Soviet Union before the State official who chairs the 
interagency group learned of the project. According to a DOD official, 
the project was coordinated with other State Department officials. 
Similarly, although State provides its radiation detection assistance 
through DOE, the DOE office that works with State is completely 
separate from the Second Line of Defense program, and a Second Line of 
Defense official said that his program and the other office do not 
communicate with each other. According to the official, a few years 
ago the two offices were discussing the possibility of merging, but 
the discussions ended after a new director took over the other office 
even though Second Line of Defense officials still believe that the 
two offices should be merged. Even within the State Department, 
different offices implement their programs without full coordination. 
For example, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund approved a 
project to install portal monitors in a country after agreeing that 
the Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions would take over 
State's radiation detection assistance, and a separate office at State 
has oversight over the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement 
program even though one of the objectives of the program is to 
strengthen Georgia's ability to interdict nuclear smuggling. Finally, 
even though it funds much of the assistance provided by other 
agencies, State could not provide accurate information on the other 
agencies' program expenditures during the course of our review. For 
example, State's records did not match Customs' financial data on 
expenditures of funds provided to Customs by State. State officials 
said that they have now developed a financial database to track how 
the other agencies have spent State's funds. 

In addition, DOE, DOD, and State do not share the same views on the 
appropriate role of each agency. For example, while State sees itself 
as the agency that is leading the coordination effort and setting 
policy, a DOD official said that State does not have the necessary 
expertise or resources to manage the overall U.S. effort. In contrast, 
DOE officials said that State should have a lead role in coordination 
and diplomatic support for the assistance programs and that DOE would 
depend on State to establish the diplomatic basis that would allow the 
Second Line of Defense program to expand into other countries. 
However, DOE officials questioned whether State and DOD are the 
appropriate agencies for installing portal monitors in countries other 
than Russia. 

Ineffective Coordination Has Resulted in Some Border Crossings Being 
More Vulnerable to Nuclear Smuggling Than Others: 

As a result of ineffective coordination, DOE, DOD, and State have 
installed portal monitors that have different levels of capability to 
detect weapons-usable nuclear material, leaving some border crossings 
more vulnerable to nuclear material smuggling than others. While DOE 
and DOD have installed more sophisticated portal monitors at border 
sites in Russia and another country, State has installed less 
sophisticated portal monitors in other countries. In addition, in the 
mid-1990s, the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program provided less 
sophisticated portal monitors to another country in the former Soviet 
Union. 

The more sophisticated portal monitors detect two types of radiation—
gamma and neutron—whereas the portal monitors installed by State and 
the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program detect only gamma 
radiation. The ability to detect neutron radiation translates into a 
greater ability to detect weapons-usable plutonium, one of the 
materials of greatest concern in terms of nonproliferation. In 
addition, according to DOE officials, due to their configuration and 
sensitivity the State Department portal monitors are less likely to 
detect small quantities of highly enriched uranium, the other material 
that is of greatest nonproliferation concern, or material that is 
shielded, for example by a lead container or certain parts of a 
vehicle. DOE's office that installs the portal monitors on behalf of 
State acknowledged that the less sophisticated portal monitors have a 
limited capability to detect weapons-usable nuclear material and said 
that the portal monitors serve mostly as a deterrent to smuggling. In 
addition, DOE and DOD have taken different approaches even though the 
two agencies have installed the same Russian-manufactured portal 
monitors. For example, DOE officials said that the Second Line of 
Defense program has calibrated the monitors in Russia to detect a 
smaller quantity of material than the monitors installed by DOD in 
another country. In contrast, a DOD official said that DOE's approach 
runs the risk of a high rate of false alarms, which can lead to 
complacency among officials in charge of responding to alarms. 

State Department officials with the Nonproliferation and Disarmament 
Fund said that they used less sophisticated portal monitors because of 
their lower cost and the difficulty many countries would have in 
maintaining sophisticated equipment. For example, some countries lack 
even the basic infrastructure to operate and maintain portal monitors, 
such as a source of electricity. Because of the different 
circumstances existing in each country, State officials said that 
radiation detection assistance should be tailored to each country's 
needs. The Director of State's Office of Export Control Cooperation 
and Sanctions said that State is reevaluating its approach to 
providing radiation detection equipment, including installing better 
equipment where appropriate. Second Line of Defense officials 
expressed concern about using less sophisticated portal monitors at 
border crossings on potential smuggling routes leading to countries 
seeking nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Second Line of Defense officials 
said that because of the differences in the portal monitors, DOE would 
replace State's portal monitors with more sophisticated equipment if 
the Second Line of Defense program expands into another country and 
perhaps use the old portal monitors at lower-priority sites. Overall, 
Second Line of Defense officials said that the U.S. government 
assistance to provide radiation detection equipment is diffuse and 
lacks a single, coherent approach and that the portal monitors should 
meet a minimum standard for detecting weapons-usable nuclear material. 

The three agencies have also pursued different approaches to providing 
handheld radiation detection equipment. With support from DOD and 
State, the U.S. Customs Service has provided customs and border 
officials with radiation pagers. In contrast, DOE's Second Line of 
Defense program provides larger handheld detectors but not radiation 
pagers, and DOE officials said that they view the pagers as personal 
safety devices that are ineffective at detecting weapons-usable 
nuclear material. According to State and Customs officials, pagers are 
a useful part of a radiation detection system at border crossings. 
Customs officials also said that pagers are just one part of a multi-
layered radiation detection system used by border personnel. 

Need Exists for Plan to Guide U.S. Assistance Efforts: 

No governmentwide plan links all of the six agencies' programs 
together through common goals and objectives, strategies and time 
frames for providing assistance, and performance measures for 
evaluating the effectiveness of assistance. The in-country customs 
advisors have developed country-specific plans, and DOD has developed 
a plan for its International Counterproliferation program that 
includes threat assessments and a prioritization of countries into 
three levels of weapons of mass destruction proliferation risk in the 
context of border security and customs enforcement. Similarly, DOE has 
developed a list of close to 60 border crossings where it plans to 
install radiation detection equipment as part of the Second Line of 
Defense program and estimated the cost and timeframe for completing 
the program. On the other hand, the State Department has no plan for 
providing radiation detection equipment that details how many portal 
monitors it plans to install, in what countries, and at which border 
crossings. Furthermore, the six agencies have not developed a joint 
assessment of the nuclear smuggling threat and the best mix and 
location of radiation detection equipment to address the threat. 

While DOE conducted an in-depth assessment of the smuggling threat to 
prioritize the border crossings where it is installing portal 
monitors, State and DOD have not conducted a similar assessment to 
prioritize the countries or border crossings to which they are 
providing radiation detection equipment. Numerous agency officials 
acknowledged that the U.S. effort to improve countries' ability to 
combat nuclear smuggling lacks adequate planning. For example, the 
director of State's Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions 
said that ideally the U.S. government would have a process for 
determining how much funding to allocate to each country and what to 
spend the funds on. Similarly, a DOD official said that the U.S. 
effort requires a centralized and integrated leadership and a 
redefinition of the role of each agency in order to overcome 
coordination issues. 

U.S. Assistance Has Helped Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling, but 
Problems with Equipment Undermine Efforts: 

U.S. assistance has, in general, strengthened the ability of numerous 
countries throughout the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern 
Europe to deter and detect illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. 
However, serious problems with installing, using, accounting for, and 
maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U.S. 
efforts. These problems are largely the result of the lack of 
oversight and follow-up by some of the U.S. agencies providing the 
equipment. Another problem is that many countries that have received 
radiation detection equipment are not reporting information about 
nuclear materials detected by U.S.-supplied equipment. Recently, the 
United States began stationing advisors in many of the countries 
receiving the assistance to, among other things, correct equipment 
problems. 

Recipient Country Officials Cite Benefits of U.S. Assistance: 

Officials from 17 recipient countries receiving U.S. assistance to 
combat nuclear smuggling told us that the assistance had provided much 
needed radiation detection equipment and training. According to 
officials from several countries, U.S.-supplied portal monitors 
installed at border crossings and handheld detection equipment 
represent the only assistance of this type that their countries have 
received. In other countries the U.S. assistance has supplemented 
equipment and training received from other countries. For example, 
Latvia has received radiation detection equipment from Finland, 
Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, and Estonia has received equipment from 
Finland and Germany. 

In one country, we visited two border crossings with Russia and saw 
that a U.S.-furnished portal monitor and U.S.-supplied handheld 
detectors and radiation pagers were being used to inspect cargo and 
other materials. 

According to this country's officials, the U.S.-supplied portal 
monitors installed at several border crossings are well-maintained and 
serviced regularly. See figures 1 and 2 for U.S. equipment in that 
country. 

Figure 1: U.S.-Installed Portal Monitors: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Note: The arrows indicate the location of the portal monitors. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 2: Typical Handheld Radiation Detector Used by Border Guards: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

[End of figure] 

In another country we visited, we saw a U.S. Customs Service-furnished 
mobile x-ray van equipped with a radiation detector being used to 
inspect luggage and other small items entering the country from Russia 
A few hours later, the van was driven to another crossing point along 
the border where passengers and their possessions were screened at a 
train station. Passengers' bags and other personal items were passed 
through an x-ray machine that was part of the van's screening 
apparatus. Occasionally, the border guard who was operating the x-ray 
machine would examine the contents of the items that had been x-rayed 
to determine their exact content. Figure 3 shows the x-ray van. 

Figure 3: U.S.-Supplied Mobile X-Ray Van: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

[End of figure] 

Russian customs officials told us that radiation detection equipment 
funded by DOE's Second Line of Defense program has helped accelerate 
Russia's plans to improve border security. According to these 
officials, as of October 2001, DOE had financed the purchase of about 
15 percent of Russia's 300 portal monitors. The U.S.-funded equipment 
is manufactured in Russia and is subject to site acceptance testing 
conducted by DOE national laboratory personnel. This testing is 
designed to ensure that portal monitors are placed in an optimal 
configuration (to maximize detection capability) and that the 
equipment is being used as intended. According to Russian officials, 
there is excellent cooperation with DOE on ways to continually improve 
the performance of the equipment. Russian customs officials also told 
us that DOE has done a very credible job of making follow-up visits to 
inspect the equipment and ensure that it is recalibrated as necessary 
to meet performance specifications. 

During our visit to Russia, we observed several U.S.-funded pedestrian 
portal monitors that were installed at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport 
(see figure 4) as well as a control room that included video equipment 
and a computerized monitoring system, also funded by DOE, that was 
connected to the portal monitors. DOE's detection equipment installed 
throughout Russia is monitored by closed circuit cameras. Russian 
officials tested the equipment we saw at the airport on our behalf. 
They "planted"-—with our knowledge-—a radioactive source in an attaché 
case that we carried past a pedestrian portal monitor, which activated 
an alarm. A computer screen in the control room displayed our 
movements past the portal monitor. 

Figure 4: U.S.-Funded Portal Monitors at the Sheremetyevo Airport in 
Moscow: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

[End of figure] 

U.S. assistance includes training, which U.S. and recipient country 
officials told us is part of an integrated approach that is needed to 
combat nuclear smuggling. This approach should include equipment, 
training, and intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. Training 
is a critical component of combating nuclear smuggling. For example, 
border personnel need to be trained in inspection techniques, 
laboratory specialists need to be able to analyze and properly 
identify material that is detected and law enforcement officials need 
to be able to conduct investigations in order to prosecute, when 
appropriate, individuals apprehended in nuclear smuggling cases. U.S. 
agencies have trained more than 3,500 border security and law 
enforcement personnel in a broad range of weapons of mass destruction 
interdiction programs. The U.S. Customs Service trained over 2,970 
customs and law enforcement officers from more than 25 countries 
during 1996-2001, and the FBI trained approximately 600 foreign 
country personnel during a similar period. DOE has funded the 
development of a guidebook printed in Russian for 300 customs officers 
to help identify equipment that could be used to develop a nuclear 
weapon. In addition, DOE, in concert with the Russian Customs Academy, 
implemented a mobile training program that provides training to 
customs agents in remote locations. 

U.S. agency officials provided several examples to show how U.S.-
provided equipment and training have strengthened countries' ability 
to detect and deter nuclear smuggling. 

* In July 2001, portal monitors furnished by DOD to one country 
detected radioactive material that had been driven in a truck across 
the border. According to DOD and country officials, the equipment at 
the border crossing had only been operational for 2 days when the 
incident occurred. 

* According to DOE officials, U.S. equipment in Russia has detected 
more than 275 instances involving radioactive material. These cases 
include contaminated scrap metal, irradiated cargo, and other 
radioactive materials that could pose a proliferation concern. 

* In 1999, customs officials in a country that had received 
DOD/Customs training on inspecting vehicles and passengers for 
smuggled nuclear materials seized weapons-usable material that had 
been hidden inside the trunk of a car. According to U.S. Customs 
officials, this case shows the importance of providing training that 
combines general border inspection techniques with specialized 
training in nuclear materials. 

Problems with Equipment Undermine U.S. Assistance Efforts: 

We found numerous problems with various types of radiation detection 
equipment that has been provided by DOD, the State Department, and the 
U.S. Customs Service. According to officials from these agencies and a 
DOE office responsible for installing portal monitors in some 
countries, U.S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling has lacked 
effective follow-up to ensure that equipment delivered was properly 
maintained and used for the purposes intended. Several officials told 
us that there has been inadequate funding for maintenance and training 
on the use of the equipment in many countries of the former Soviet 
Union. U.S. officials frequently described this practice as "drop and 
run." A State Department official told us that it had always been the 
responsibility of the recipient countries to alert the United States 
when equipment needed to be repaired. This official noted, however, 
that country officials did not systematically report problems and, as 
a result, malfunctioning equipment was sometimes left unrepaired for 
extended periods of time. He also noted that until recently there was 
no consolidated list of all the equipment that different agencies had 
provided. He compiled such a list but could not be certain that all 
equipment provided under DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction program 
was included. 

At a January 2002 IAEA conference, a DOD official provided information 
about problems with U.S.-supplied equipment. He noted that audits 
found that detection equipment in several countries had never been 
used and remained in storage; expensive high-technology equipment was 
only used in the presence of visiting U.S. delegations; and equipment 
was going unused because it needed battery replacement, very minor 
repairs, or major repairs that required out-of-country servicing. The 
DOD official noted that recipient country officials offered numerous 
reasons why the equipment was being underutilized or not used at all, 
including (1) the equipment was too difficult to use; (2) nobody was 
trained to use it; (3) the equipment would be broken; (4) use of the 
equipment could cause injuries; (5) repairs were too difficult; (6) no 
funds had been provided for new batteries; and (7) a lack of knowledge 
about where or how to send the equipment for repairs. 

During the course of our work, we also found numerous problems with 
U.S. radiation detection equipment provided to many countries, 
including the following examples, which are based on, among other 
things, discussions with U.S. program officials and representatives of 
countries receiving U.S. assistance: 

* The condition of equipment provided by the United States at a border 
crossing in one country in Eastern Europe has been described as 
deplorable, and the equipment was not being used, according to a 
November 2001 U.S. embassy memorandum. Another memorandum noted that 
according to a customs official from this recipient country, the 
portal monitors were not being used because they emitted too much 
radiation and posed a health and safety hazard. According to a U.S. 
official, the incident indicates how little some recipient country 
officials know about the equipment, because the portal monitors do not 
emit radiation. In addition, based on a recent inventory, a U.S. 
official was unable to locate many radiation pagers furnished to that 
country. In another country, the whereabouts of several dozen handheld 
radiation detectors could not be determined. 

* About half of the pedestrian portal monitors provided to one country 
in the former Soviet Union were never installed or are not 
operational. Officials from this country told us that they were given 
more equipment then they could use. In addition, the equipment had 
limited capability to detect nuclear material. 

* Portal monitors delivered to Lithuania were stored in the U.S. 
embassy basement for about 2 years because the State Department and 
the Lithuanian border organization disagreed about the need for a 
power supply that cost $12,600 to operate the equipment. In February 
2002, the monitors were finally installed. 

* Equipment worth about $80,000, including radiation protection suits 
and pagers, could not be given to Estonia as part of a DOD/FBI 
training program because an agreement governing the release of such 
equipment had not been finalized. The equipment was placed in an 
embassy garage for about 7 months before it was transferred to Estonia 
in December 2001. 

* A portal monitor furnished by the State Department to Bulgaria a 
couple of years ago was installed on an unused road that is not 
expected to open for another 1-1/2 years. Plans are underway to 
relocate the equipment. 

* In November 2001, a U.S. official visited a border crossing in one 
country of the former Soviet Union where a portal monitor had been 
disconnected. Country officials told him that it had been shut off 
because it was lunchtime and no traffic was being allowed to pass. The 
monitor is designed to be operated continuously. 

We also found problems with the mobile vans equipped with radiation 
detection equipment furnished by the State Department. These vans have 
limited utility because they cannot operate effectively in cold 
climates or are otherwise not suitable for conditions in some 
countries. For example, customs officials from one country told us 
that the vans (which had a total cost of about $900,000) they received 
within the last 2 years had to be moved to a warmer part of the 
country. Nevertheless, they told us that the vans could only be 
operated about 9 months each year and that even when operational, they 
are very fuel inefficient. Officials from another country told us the 
van they received about 1 year ago has rarely been used because of the 
cold weather and the expense associated with its operation. They said 
that the van is now stored in a shipping crate at customs' 
headquarters. 

Country Advisors Trying to Improve Delivery of U.S. Assistance: 

In the past 2 years, the State Department has placed advisors in many 
of the countries receiving U.S. assistance to improve program 
effectiveness. These advisors, generally retired U.S. Customs Service 
officials, are responsible for, among other things, developing, 
coordinating, and updating recipient country border security 
requirements. In addition, they seek to ensure that the appropriate 
foreign officials attend training courses; track the assistance that 
countries receive from various programs to avoid duplication of 
equipment; meet with government ministries in the recipient countries; 
and inventory equipment and determine how it is being used, including 
assessing its effectiveness. In addition, State is using the advisors 
to improve equipment sustainability and facilitate routine maintenance 
and equipment repair. Although the State Department funds them, the 
advisors work on behalf of all the programs, and DOE and DOD officials 
said that the advisors play a valuable role in implementing their 
assistance programs. Country officials we met with also said that the 
advisors have been effective at identifying program needs and 
resolving problems with equipment. 

Lack of Consistent Reporting Hampers U.S. Efforts to Measure Impact of 
Radiation Detection Equipment: 

According to DOE, State, and other U.S. officials, in many cases 
countries that have received U.S. radiation detection equipment are 
not systematically providing information about nuclear materials 
detected by U.S.-supplied equipment. As a result, it is difficult to 
determine the overall impact and effectiveness of the equipment. While 
agencies are receiving feedback on the performance level of equipment, 
such as whether the equipment is properly calibrated or performing 
according to technical specifications, limited information is provided 
about the impact of the equipment—namely to what extent is it 
detecting weapons-usable and other types of radioactive material. Two 
U.S. advisors told us that recipient country officials have ignored 
their requests for this type of information. An official from DOE's 
office that installs portal monitors in some countries told us that 
his program does not have the means to verify the effectiveness of 
portal monitors due to the lack of incident reporting by some 
countries. He noted that information about nuclear smuggling cases 
varies from country to country and depends on good relationships 
between the recipient country's border security organization and the 
U.S. embassy. Officials from DOE's Second Line of Defense program told 
us that they receive information about incidents from their Russian 
counterparts on a voluntary basis. However, the reporting is not 
consistent and they are not confident that there has been a complete 
sharing of information about nuclear materials detected with U.S.-
funded equipment. DOE is seeking to formalize the reporting of 
information as part of an overall agreement with Russia on the Second 
Line of Defense program. 

Other Challenges to Border Security: 

In addition to the problems with the equipment, there are other 
factors that impact U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, 
including corruption in countries' border organizations and the amount 
of territory, including borders that are not clearly marked, that 
requires protection. According to officials from several recipient 
countries, corruption is a pervasive problem within the ranks of 
border security organizations. For example, approximately 1,500 
Russian customs officers were fired in 1998 for corruption. Russian 
customs officials noted that efforts are underway to root corruption 
out but that this is a slow process. An official from one country told 
us that border security personnel turned off radiation detection 
equipment at one border crossing in exchange for a bottle of alcohol. 
In fiscal year 2002, the U.S. Customs Service started providing a new 
anti-corruption training course. Regarding the challenge posed by the 
expanses of territory, numerous recipient country officials told us 
that it is impossible to secure every border crossing. Every country 
has green borders—expanses of territory that are not patrolled or 
regulated by border security personnel. These areas are very 
attractive to smugglers in general. In addition, borders are not 
always clearly marked or well established following the breakup of the 
former Soviet Union. A high-level official from one country's border 
guard told us that the biggest problem he faces is the lack of 
agreement with Russia over boundaries. Furthermore, a border security 
official from another country told us that a dedicated nuclear 
smuggler has a 90-percent chance of successfully defeating his 
country's border controls. A customs official from Russia told us that 
equipment is a deterrent and must be supported by trained border 
personnel, effective law enforcement, and intelligence gathering 
operations. He stated that the most effective approach to combating 
nuclear smuggling is to secure the nuclear material at its source at 
civilian and military facilities. 

Conclusions: 

The current multiple-agency approach to providing U.S. assistance to 
combat nuclear smuggling is not, in our view, the most effective way 
to deliver this assistance. To date, the efforts of the six U.S. 
agencies participating in these programs and activities have not been 
well coordinated, and there is no single agency that leads the effort 
to effectively establish funding priorities and thoroughly assess 
recipient country requirements. Coordination is also a problem within 
agencies providing assistance. We question why, for example, there are 
two offices within the Department of Energy that are providing 
radiation detection equipment and two offices within the Department of 
State that have funded similar types of equipment for various 
countries. To ensure the efficient and effective delivery of 
assistance and the timely and effective expenditure of program funds, 
we believe that the development of a governmentwide plan is needed. 
Such a plan could identify a unified set of program goals and 
priorities and define agency roles and responsibilities; determine 
program cost estimates; establish time frames for effectively spending 
program funds; develop strategies to maintain and sustain the 
operation of equipment; and develop exit strategies for each country 
receiving assistance, including a plan for transferring responsibility 
for equipment maintenance to the countries. 

We are also concerned about how U.S. equipment is being used by the 
recipient countries. While foreign officials told us that U.S.-
provided equipment had improved their ability to detect radioactive 
material, some equipment has not been well maintained, adequately 
accounted for, or installed on a timely basis. A fundamental issue 
surrounding nuclear smuggling is the sharing of information about 
incidents that occur in each country. Currently, the agencies that are 
providing the equipment have limited access to this type of 
information. There is currently no systematic effort to obtain this 
data, and the United States depends on the willingness of the 
countries to voluntary provide information. It is difficult to assess 
the impact and effectiveness of the U.S.-supplied equipment unless 
data are routinely obtained and analyzed. We believe that U.S. agency 
personnel must continue to make the case to each country that sharing 
such data is of critical importance to the success of the U.S. program 
and countries' efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. 

Recommendations: 

We recommend that the Secretary of State take the lead in facilitating 
the development of a governmentwide plan to help other countries 
develop an integrated approach to combat nuclear smuggling. The plan 
should be developed in conjunction with the Secretaries of Defense and 
Energy (working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration), and the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs 
Service, as well as the heads of other federal agencies participating 
in this effort. The plan should, at a minimum, identify (1) a unified 
set of program goals and priorities, including defining participating 
agencies' roles and responsibilities; (2) overall program cost 
estimates; (3) time frames for effectively spending program funds; (4) 
performance measures; (5) strategies to maintain and sustain the 
operation of the equipment, including cost estimates; and (6) an exit 
strategy for each country receiving assistance, including a plan for 
transferring responsibility for equipment maintenance to the host 
country. 

In concert with the development of the plan, we believe there are 
other steps that could be taken immediately to improve U.S. efforts. 
We think that this is an opportune time for agencies with duplicative 
or overlapping responsibilities to consolidate their efforts under a 
single agency program office. To that end, we recommend that the: 

* Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Administrator of the 
National Nuclear Security Administration, consolidate radiation 
detection equipment activities in one DOE office, preferably within 
the Second Line of Defense program and, 

* Secretary of State consolidate all border security and nuclear 
smuggling efforts under one program office. 

In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy, in 
consultation with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, and the Secretaries of State and Defense: 

* strengthen efforts to obtain a full accounting of the equipment that 
is in each country, including the handheld radiation detection 
equipment; 

* ensure that equipment is installed in a timely fashion and is 
adequately maintained; and; 

* seek recipient country assurances that information about nuclear 
materials detected by U.S.-supplied equipment is shared with U.S. 
agencies on a timely basis. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State, 
Energy, and Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and comment. 
The Coast Guard and FBI had no comments on the draft report. DOD 
provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as 
appropriate. State's, DOE's, and Customs Service's written comments 
are presented in appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. The agencies 
agreed with the facts presented in the report and State specifically 
said that it agreed with the report's conclusions and recommendations. 
Customs suggested that we reword our recommendation to specifically 
include it as one of the agencies to develop a governmentwide plan to 
combat nuclear smuggling. DOE did not comment on the conclusions and 
recommendations. 

In commenting on the report, the Department of State agreed that 
interagency coordination to help other countries combat nuclear 
smuggling can be strengthened. The State Department noted that, per 
our recommendation, it is taking the lead in facilitating the 
development of a governmentwide plan to provide detection equipment 
and maintenance support. State also commented, however, that the 
report gave insufficient weight to the progress that has been made in 
the past 1-1/2 years to improve coordination and planning. 
Specifically, State cited its establishment of the Office of Export 
Control Cooperation and Sanctions, which is responsible for, among 
other things, managing and coordinating U.S. government export control 
and related border security programs. In addition, the Office chairs 
an interagency working group that evaluates, prioritizes, and approves 
projects that U.S. agencies undertake to improve countries' export 
control and related border security capabilities. The Department also 
stated that it has taken steps to improve internal coordination as 
well as accountability for equipment previously provided to other 
countries and noted that the country advisors play a prominent role in 
these matters. Regarding these points, we recognized in the draft 
report that State had improved coordination through an interagency 
group that it chairs. Further, we noted that recipient country 
officials told us that the advisors play a valuable role in 
implementing their assistance programs. In addition, we recognized in 
the draft report that the Office of Export Control Cooperation and 
Sanctions has improved coordination. However, we continue to believe 
that interagency coordination has been inadequate and needs to be 
improved. State acknowledged this point in its comments and said that 
a more coherent, better coordinated approach to providing radiation 
detection equipment is needed. The Department concurred with all of 
our recommendations and said that it will work with other agencies to 
implement them. 

In its comments, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security 
Administration agreed that it is difficult to assess the impact and 
effectiveness of U.S.-supplied equipment unless data from the 
recipient countries are routinely obtained and analyzed. DOE believes 
that sharing data is critical to the success of the U.S. program and 
countries' efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. DOE also endorsed the 
need for a more uniform approach to radiation monitoring at countries' 
borders. The Department wanted to clarify that it has three programs 
that operate in this area: the Second Line of Defense program that has 
historically focused on Russia; the International Export Control 
program that deals with equipment that has both civilian and military 
applications, material and technology; and a program that uses 
Department of State funding to maintain and install equipment outside 
of Russia. DOE also pointed out that radiation detection monitors 
installed by other U.S. agencies are not as sensitive to special 
nuclear materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) as the 
monitors funded by DOE, and have limited or no ability to detect 
shielded plutonium. Regarding DOE's point about its different 
programs, we noted in the draft report that DOE has three separate 
programs under way to combat nuclear smuggling. We highlighted the 
Second Line of Defense program, however, because it is DOE's primary 
effort to combat nuclear smuggling. Regarding DOE's comment about the 
limitations of equipment installed by other U.S. programs, we 
recognized in the draft report that DOE has installed more 
sophisticated portal monitors in Russia and that the State Department 
has installed less sophisticated equipment in other countries. 

The U.S. Customs Service noted that the U.S. government's 
nonproliferation efforts are not limited to nuclear materials, but 
instead cover the entire spectrum of weapons of mass destruction, 
including chemical and biological weapons. Customs also noted that 
although our report focused on the use of technology to detect nuclear 
or radioactive materials, the importance of highly skilled and trained 
border inspection personnel should not be underestimated. Finally, 
because Customs has been the largest recipient of funds appropriated 
for nuclear smuggling assistance, it suggested that our recommendation 
be reworded to include Customs specifically as one of the agencies to 
develop a governmentwide plan to help other countries combat nuclear 
smuggling. While we agree with Customs' assertion that U.S. 
nonproliferation activities are aimed at a broad range of threats, our 
review focused only on the nuclear material smuggling component of 
this effort. We agree with Customs' point about highly skilled and 
trained personnel, and we recognized in the draft report that training 
is a critical component and should be part of an integrated approach 
to combat nuclear smuggling. Finally, we have reworded our 
recommendation to specifically identify Customs as one of the agencies 
that should develop a governmentwide plan to help other countries 
combat nuclear smuggling. 

Scope and Methodology: 

To determine program expenditures, we obtained budget, obligation and 
expenditure data through fiscal year 2001 from the six agencies 
participating in the program—the Departments of Energy, State, and 
Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our task was complicated because each 
agency collects and reports its financial data differently. We 
attempted to standardize the reporting format for each agency and 
verify the accuracy of the data by crosschecking financial records 
maintained by each agency. When we found discrepancies, we brought 
them to the attention of the agencies. The agencies' data did not 
allow us to aggregate cost on a country-by-country basis because data 
was generally reported on a project, not country, basis. Our task was 
further complicated because the Department of State, which is 
responsible for tracking funds it has received for border security 
assistance, did not have an adequate financial management system in 
place to report program expenditures. Department of State officials 
responsible for monitoring program expenditures are aware of this 
deficiency and are taking steps to improve its current financial 
management system. 

To assess how well U.S. assistance is coordinated, we met with program 
officials from each of the agencies providing assistance and reviewed 
pertinent documents, including individual agency's assistance plans, 
as available. We assessed coordination through the interagency group 
headed by the Department of State and met with the lead official of 
that effort—the Director of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions—
and members of his staff. We also discussed coordination issues with 
U.S. advisors stationed in countries receiving U.S. assistance 
including Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Several of these advisors were responsible 
for tracking assistance efforts in more than one country. For example, 
the advisor stationed in Latvia was also responsible for Lithuania, 
Estonia, and Poland. 

We obtained information from a number of sources to assess the 
effectiveness of the U.S. assistance. We visited Estonia, Latvia, 
Poland, and Russia to obtain a first hand look at U.S. radiation 
detection equipment installed at different border crossings and meet 
with officials responsible for border security, law enforcement, and 
export controls. We also attended a technical conference on radiation 
detection equipment sponsored by the IAEA in January 2002, where we 
met with officials from 13 additional countries that had received U.S. 
assistance: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Romania, the 
Slovak Republic, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. We also met with 
representatives from the IAEA, the U.S. Mission to International 
Organizations in Vienna, and the U.S. embassies in Latvia, Estonia, 
Poland, and Russia to discuss nuclear smuggling. We obtained technical 
information on radiation detection equipment from DOE; Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory; Los Alamos National Laboratory; the 
Savannah River Site; and one equipment manufacturer, TSA Systems Ltd. 

We conducted our review between May 2001 and April 2002 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of 
this report to the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National 
Nuclear Security Administration; the Secretary of State; the Secretary 
of Defense; the Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service; the Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard; the 
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested 
congressional committees. We will make copies available to others upon 
request. 

If you have any questions concerning this report, I can be reached at 
(202) 512-3841. MAjor contributors to this report include Gene Aloise, 
Joseph Cook, and Glen Levis. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

(Ms.) Gary L. Jones
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents: 

This appendix provides information about nuclear material smuggling 
incidents over the past decade. It focuses primarily on 20 incidents 
involving weapons-usable nuclear material. The information was 
obtained from, among other sources, data provided by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)[Footnote 4] and the Department of Energy. 

Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit 
trafficking in many types of nuclear materials worldwide. According to 
IAEA, nuclear materials include nuclear source material, such as 
natural uranium, depleted uranium, thorium,[Footnote 5] plutonium, and 
uranium enriched in the isotopes U-233 or U-235. Plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium[Footnote 6]—-known as weapons usable material—-are 
considered to pose the greatest proliferation risk because they are 
used to produce nuclear weapons. In 1993, IAEA established a database 
to record incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear 
materials. Sixty-nine countries, or about one-half of IAEA's member 
states, currently participate in the database. As of December 31, 
2001, IAEA listed 181 confirmed incidents involving the illicit 
trafficking in nuclear materials, including weapons-usable material. 
According to IAEA, a confirmed incident is one in which the 
information has been verified to IAEA through official points of 
contact from the reporting country. Of the 181 confirmed illicit 
trafficking incidents reported by IAEA, 17 involved either highly 
enriched uranium or plutonium. More than half of the 17 incidents 
involving weapons-usable material occurred during 1993-95. The 
remaining cases occurred during 1999-2001. 

Incidents Involving Weapons Usable Nuclear Material: 

IAEA, DOE, and other U.S. officials provided us with information about 
20 cases involving the smuggling of weapons-usable material since 
1992. Officials told us that the actual number of smuggling cases 
involving weapons-usable material is probably larger than what is 
currently being reported because countries are not always willing to 
share sensitive nuclear smuggling information. Furthermore, the 
premature public disclosure of information could undermine an ongoing 
criminal investigation or could be politically embarrassing. Another 
factor that affects the number of cases reported is the credibility of 
the information. DOE officials who analyze smuggling cases told us 
that a significant amount of time must be spent analyzing a particular 
incident before it can be deemed credible, and many of the reported 
incidents turn out to be unsubstantiated. For example, several 
reported cases over the years have been scams whereby a "smuggler" has 
been apprehended trying to sell material that is purported to be 
weapons-usable but is not. Regardless of the number of actual cases of 
nuclear smuggling, officials stated that the threat posed by illicit 
trafficking is real and should not be underestimated. The head of 
IAEA's Office of Physical Protection and Material Security told us 
that every reported case should be taken seriously. Further, she noted 
that countries need to more systematically report smuggling incidents 
so that better assessments can be performed. 

Officials from IAEA, DOE, and other U.S. agencies provided several 
observations about the 20 incidents involving weapons-usable nuclear 
material. 

* Many of the incidents involved material that came from countries of 
the former Soviet Union, primarily Russia. 

* From the early 1990s through about 1998, the nuclear material was 
seized primarily in Russia and eastern and western Europe. In the past 
few years, there appears to have been an increase in trafficking in 
nuclear material through the Caucasus (Georgia), Central Asia 
(Kyrgyzstan), Greece, and Turkey. According to IAEA, it is uncertain 
whether the increase represents more trafficking in this material or 
better detection and reporting of activities that may have been going 
on in earlier years. 

* Most of the smuggling incidents involved relatively small quantities 
of weapons-usable material that were insufficient to construct a 
nuclear bomb. In some cases, the small quantities of material involved 
may indicate that the seller was trying to attract a potential buyer 
with a "sample size" quantity of material. In other cases, it appears 
doubtful that the traffickers had or claimed access to larger 
quantities of nuclear material. 

* The incidents do not appear to be part of an organized criminal or 
terrorist activity or organization. 

* In most of the incidents, the weapons-usable material was seized as 
a result of a police investigation. The material was not detected by 
equipment or personnel stationed at border crossings. One notable 
exception involved material detected by customs agents at a Bulgarian 
border crossing. In addition, the Bulgarian incident represents one of 
a few reported instances where the nuclear material was shielded or 
protected to avoid detection. 

Table 2 provides information about the 20 incidents involving the 
smuggling of weapons-usable material since 1992. A brief discussion of 
some of the significant incidents follows the table. 

Table 2: Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons-Usable Material 
since 1992: 

Date: May 1992; 
Source of material: Russia (Luch Scientific Production Association); 
Country where material seized: Russia; 
Material/quantity: 1.5 kilograms (90 percent highly enriched uranium); 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: May 1993; 
Source of material: Russia; 
Country where material seized: Lithuania; 
Material/quantity: 0.1 kilogram (50 percent highly enriched uranium); 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: July 1993; 
Source of material: Russia; 
Country where material seized: Russia; 
Material/quantity: 1.8 kilograms (36 percent highly enriched uranium); 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: November 1993; 
Source of material: Russia; 
Country where material seized: Russia; 
Material/quantity: 4.5 kilograms (20 percent highly enriched uranium); 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: March 1994; 
Source of material: Russia; 
Country where material seized: Russia; 
Material/quantity: 3.05 kilograms (90 percent highly enriched uranium); 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: May 1994; 
Source of material: Unspecified; 
Country where material seized: Germany; 
Material/quantity: 0.006 kilograms plutonium-239; 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: June 1994; 
Source of material: Russia; 
Country where material seized: Germany; 
Material/quantity: 0.0008 kilograms (87.8 percent highly enriched 
uranium); 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: July 1994; 
Source of material: Russia; 
Country where material seized: Germany; 
Material/quantity: 0.00024 kilograms plutonium; 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: August 1994; 
Source of material: Russia; 
Country where material seized: Germany; 
Material/quantity: 0.4 kilograms of plutonium; 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: December 1994; 
Source of material: Russia; 
Country where material seized: Czech Republic; 
Material/quantity: 2.7 kilograms (87.7 percent highly enriched 
uranium); 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: June 1995; 
Source of material: Russia; 
Country where material seized: Czech Republic; 
Material/quantity: 0.0004 grams (87.7 percent highly enriched uranium); 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: June 1995; 
Source of material: Russia; 
Country where material seized: Czech Republic; 
Material/quantity: 0.017 kilograms (87.7 percent highly enriched 
uranium); 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: June 1995; 
Source of material: Russia; 
Country where material seized: Russia; 
Material/quantity: 1.7 kilograms (21 percent highly enriched uranium); 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: May 1999; 
Source of material: Russia; 
Country where material seized: Bulgaria; 
Material/quantity: 0.004 kilograms of highly enriched uranium; 
How material was found: Interdiction at border by Bulgarian customs. 

Date: October 1999; 
Source of material: Unspecified; 
Country where material seized: Kyrgyzstan; 
Material/quantity: 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium; 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: April 2000; 
Source of material: Unspecified but Russia suspected; 
Country where material seized: Georgia; 
Material/quantity: 0.9 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (30 
percent); 
How material was found: Possible combination of radiation detection 
equipment at border and police investigation. 

Date: September 2000; 
Source of material: Possibly Russia and/or Ukraine; 
Country where material seized: Georgia; 
Material/quantity: 0.0004 kilograms of plutonium; 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: December 2000; 
Source of material: Germany; 
Country where material seized: Germany; 
Less than 1 milligram of plutonium; 
How material was found: Radioactive contamination disclosed in a test. 

Date: January 2001; 
Source of material: Unspecified; 
Country where material seized: Greece; 
Approximately 0.003 kilograms of plutonium; 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Date: July 2001; 
Source of material: Unspecified; 
Country where material seized: France; 
About 0.005 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (approximately 80 
percent enriched); 
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation. 

Note: Uranium enriched with 20 percent or higher U-235 is considered 
weapons-usable material. One kilogram equals 2.2 pounds. One thousand 
grams equal 1 kilogram and 1 gram is equal to about 0.04 ounces, or 
the weight of a paperclip. 

Source: Various U.S. agencies and international organizations. 

[End of table] 

Luch Scientific Production Association (Russia), 1992: 

This incident involved a chemical engineer and long-time employee of 
the State Research Institute, Scientific Production Association (also 
known as Luch) which is located 22 miles from Moscow.[Footnote 7] 
Beginning in May 1992, over a 5-month period, the individual smuggled 
out of the institute small quantities of highly enriched uranium 
totaling 1.5 kilograms. In October 1992, the engineer was arrested 
because police suspected him of stealing equipment from the Luch 
facility. Once in custody, the police discovered the nuclear material 
that he had stolen. The individual did not have a specific buyer in 
mind, but was trying to determine if there was a market for the stolen 
nuclear material. He was tried before a Russian court and received 3 
years' probation. 

Vilnius, Lithuania, 1993: 

In May 1993, Lithuanian authorities recovered 4.4 tons of beryllium in 
a smuggling investigation. Beryllium is a metal that is used in the 
production of, among other things, x-ray tubes, lasers, computers, 
aircraft parts, nuclear reactors, and nuclear weapons. When Lithuanian 
authorities seized the material, they discovered that some of the 
beryllium (141 kilograms) was contaminated with approximately 0.1 
kilogram of highly enriched uranium. There was no evidence that the 
individuals involved were aware that the beryllium contained the 
enriched uranium. Some reports indicated that the beryllium originated 
at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Russia. This 
institute is involved in the research and development of nuclear power 
reactors and employs about 5,000 people and possesses several tons of 
weapons-usable material. 

Murmansk, Russia, 1993: 

In July 1993, two Russian naval enlisted personnel stole two fresh 
fuel rods from a storage facility in Murmansk, Russia. These rods were 
for Russian naval propulsion reactors that power submarines and 
contained 36-percent enriched uranium. (Uranium enriched at 20 percent 
or greater is considered to be weapons usable material.) The amount of 
material totaled about 1.8 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. 
Russian security officers discovered the missing material and 
apprehended the individuals before the material left the Murmansk 
area. One of the individuals arrested was a guard at the facility and 
was suspected by authorities after the material was missing. The two 
enlisted personnel who were caught implicated two Russian naval 
officers in the plan. However, at the ensuing trial only the two 
enlisted personnel were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of 4 
and 5 years. 

Murmansk, Russia, 1993: 

In November 1993, approximately 4.5 kilograms of 20-percent enriched 
uranium, intended for use in submarine propulsion reactors, was stolen 
from a fuel storage facility in the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk, 
Russia Three individuals were arrested in connection with the theft, 
including two naval officers. The group stored the fuel rods in a 
garage for several months while they were looking for a prospective 
buyer. The three individuals were arrested and two of the men received 
3-1/2-year sentences while the third person was acquitted. 

St. Petersburg, Russia, 1994: 

In March 1994, three men were arrested in St. Petersburg, Russia for 
trying to sell approximately 3 kilograms of uranium enriched to 90 
percent. The material was allegedly smuggled from the Elektrostal 
Production Association which is located in the Moscow suburbs. The 
facility produces low-enriched uranium for commercial nuclear power 
reactors and also has the capacity to produce highly enriched uranium 
for nuclear powered icebreakers and submarines. The material was 
smuggled out of the facility and approximately 500 grams of the 
material were found inside a glass jar in a refrigerator in one of 
individuals homes. 

Tengen, Germany, 1994: 

In May 1994, German police discovered a lead container containing 
0.006 kilograms of highly concentrated plutonium-239 in the home of a 
German citizen. The material found in the container was a mixture of 
many components, including aluminum, silicon, mercury, zirconium, 
broken glass, and brush bristles as well as the plutonium. The 
presence of mercury in the mixture suggests that the material may have 
been used as part of a red mercury scam.[Footnote 8] In November 1995, 
the German national was sentenced to 2-1/2 years in prison for 
violating arms control laws. The sentence was added onto a 3-year term 
he was already serving time for counterfeiting. 

Landshut, Germany, 1994: 

In June 1994, less than 0.001 kilogram of highly enriched uranium was 
recovered in Landshut, Germany, a city near Munich. This material, 
along with 120 low enriched uranium fuel pellets, was found as a 
result of a police undercover operation. The material was seized in an 
undercover police operation. Three individuals apprehended were 
citizens of the Slovak Republic and one was a resident of Germany. A 
German court sentenced several of the individuals to probationary 
terms but one of the group's leaders was sentenced to 2 years in 
prison. 

Munich, Germany, 1994: 

In 1994, undercover German police acting as prospective buyers 
intercepted approximately 0.4 kilograms of plutonium at the Munich 
Airport. It is believed that the material originated in Russia's 
Institute of Physics and Power Engineering. The institute, which is 
operated by Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, is involved in the 
research and development of nuclear power reactors and possesses 
several tons of weapons-usable material. The material was in a 
suitcase that had arrived on a flight from Moscow. The individuals 
involved in the smuggling case were from Colombia and Spain. A German 
court sentenced the Colombian national to almost 5 years in prison and 
the Spanish nationals received prison sentences of between 3 and 4 
years. All of the individuals were expelled from Germany after serving 
half of their sentences. By February 1996, Russian authorities had 
arrested several Russian accomplices, including a key figure involved 
in the theft of the material from the institute. 

Prague, Czech Republic, 1994: 

In December 1994, police in Prague, Czech Republic, seized 
approximately 2.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The material 
is believed to have been stolen from the Russian Institute of Physics 
and Power Engineering. The individuals involved included a Tajikistan 
national, a former Russian nuclear institute worker, and at least one 
Czech national. The material was brought into the Czech Republic on a 
train and then hidden for about 6 months while the individuals 
involved tried to sell it. They were arrested after Czech authorities 
received an anonymous tip and a Czech judge gave several members of 
the group prison sentences ranging from about 18 months to 8 years. 

Two related incidents were reported in June 1995 and involved the 
seizure of highly enriched uranium in the Czech Republic. According to 
available information, the composition of the material and its 
location were linked to the 1994 Prague and Landshut incidents. In 
both instances, the small quantities of material involved indicated 
that it was a sample that could be used to attract a potential buyer. 

Rousse, Bulgaria, 1999: 

In May 1999, Bulgarian customs officials at the Rousse border 
checkpoint seized a vial containing about 0.004 kilograms of highly 
enriched uranium on the Bulgarian/Romanian border. Rousse is a city 
that serves as Bulgaria's principal river port and is a transportation 
hub for road and rail traffic. The material was hidden in a shielded 
(lead) container inside the trunk of a car being driven by a Turkish 
citizen. The driver attempted to sell the material first in Turkey and 
then traveled through Bulgaria on his way to Romania, where he planned 
to find a buyer. A Bulgarian customs agent, using standard profiling 
techniques, suspected that the driver was a smuggler. A search of the 
driver's papers revealed a document describing uranium. When the 
driver attempted to bribe the customs officer, his car was thoroughly 
inspected and the officer eventually discovered the vial containing 
the weapons-usable nuclear material. Bulgarian scientists concluded 
that the material was highly enriched uranium. Although the source of 
the material is not certain, it is probable that it came from the 
Mayak Production Association in Russia. This large complex produces 
special isotopes used for industrial, agricultural, and medical 
purposes and also reprocesses naval and civil nuclear power reactor 
fuel for plutonium and uranium recovery. 

Kara-Balta, Kyrgyzstan, 1999: 

In October 1999, two persons were arrested in the act of selling a 
small metallic disk containing 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium. The item 
was analyzed by the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Kazakhstan and the 
two individuals arrested were convicted and sentenced to prison. 

Batumi, Georgia, 2000: 

In April 2000, Georgian police arrested four persons in Batumi, 
Georgia, for unauthorized possession of 0.9 kilogram of highly 
enriched uranium fuel pellets. Batumi is a seashore resort at the 
Black Sea located along the Georgia-Turkey border. According to one 
press report, the material may have been smuggled from Russia. The 
pellets mass and shape, together with the reported enrichment level, 
suggest that the pellets were produced for use in a commercial or 
experimental fast breeder reactor. Another report also stated that the 
smugglers were detected when they crossed the Russian border into 
Georgia, possibly by radiation monitoring equipment and were then 
trailed to the city of Batumi, where they were apprehended. It is 
believed that the individuals were trying to smuggle the material into 
Turkey. 

Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000: 

In September 2000, three persons were arrested at Tbilisi airport for 
attempting to sell a small quantity of mixed powder containing about 
0.0004 kilograms of plutonium and 0.0008 kilograms of low enriched 
uranium, as well as a 0.002 kilogram sample of natural uranium. 
According to press reports, an official in the Georgian Ministry of 
State Security said that two individuals arrested were Georgian 
citizens, and the third was from Armenia. The individuals said they 
had brought the uranium and plutonium from Russia and Ukraine to sell 
it. 

Germany, 2000: 

In December 2000, a worker at a closed spent fuel reprocessing plant 
removed radioactively contaminated items from the facility, 
deliberately evading radiation safety monitors. The contaminated 
items, described as rags and a test tube filled with aging waste 
material, contained a very minute amount of plutonium. 

Greece, 2001: 

In January 2001, police found a cache of about 300 metallic plates 
buried in a forest in northern Greece. The material in the plates was 
determined to be plutonium and a radioactive source known as 
americium. According to one report, the material had been smuggled 
into Greece either from one of the countries of the former Soviet 
Union or Bulgaria. Each plate contained a small quantity of plutonium 
but the total amount was about 0.003 kilograms. An official from 
Greece's atomic energy commission said that the quantity of nuclear 
material found was insufficient to build a nuclear weapon but the 
material posed a health hazard. A law enforcement officer speculated 
that the individuals who buried the metal plates were probably waiting 
for a potential buyer. 

France, 2001: 

In July 2001, police seized several grams of highly enriched uranium 
and arrested three suspects in Paris, France. According to preliminary 
reports, the enrichment level was about 80 percent, but results of 
laboratory analysis have not yet been reported to the IAEA. One of the 
suspects had recently completed a prison sentence for fraud charges, 
and the other two reportedly were citizens of Cameroon. According to 
one press account, French police found the material encased in a glass 
bulb that was stored in a lead cylinder. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance Programs: 

This appendix provides additional information about each of the six 
agencies that are providing assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. 

Department of Energy: 

DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear 
material smuggling—the Second Line of Defense program and the 
International Export Control program. From fiscal year 1997 through 
2001, DOE spent $11.2 million on the Second Line of Defense program, 
including $2.7 million provided by the State Department, to install 70 
portal monitors at eight border crossings in Russia and provide 20 
handheld radiation detectors. The eight border crossings include an 
airport in Moscow, six seaports and one railroad crossing. The eight 
border crossings are the first of close to 60 sites that DOE has 
included in the Second Line of Defense program based on a study in 
which DOE evaluated the need for radiation detection equipment at over 
300 border crossings in Russia. DOE prioritized the border crossings 
based on factors that might increase the risk that potential smugglers 
would use those border crossings to smuggle nuclear material out of 
Russia. For example, the study placed a higher priority on border 
crossings that are close to Russian facilities that store weapons-
usable nuclear material or to potential markets for smuggled nuclear 
material. DOE began work at two additional border crossings in Russia 
in fiscal year 2001 and 17 additional border crossings in fiscal year 
2002. DOE expects that it will complete 12 of the sites in fiscal year 
2002. 

DOE officials said that they have taken a number of steps to ensure 
that radiation detection equipment is operated and maintained and that 
Russia is using the equipment for the intended purpose. First, DOE 
uses equipment manufactured in Russia by a Russian contractor in order 
to facilitate equipment installation and maintenance. Then, after the 
Russian contractor installs the systems, DOE tests the equipment at 
the border crossings to ensure that the portal monitors are placed in 
an optimal configuration and calibrated correctly and that they are 
installed as agreed. For example, DOE conducted testing in October 
2000 and found that some portal monitors were not configured optimally 
or calibrated correctly and that some pedestrian and vehicle crossings 
did not have radiation detection equipment. DOE officials said that 
they withheld final payment for installation until the contractor 
submitted evidence showing that any problems had been resolved. 

According to DOE officials, the Russian government is strongly 
committed to the Second Line of Defense program and has provided DOE 
with good access to the border crossings where equipment is being 
installed. For example, in October 2000, Russian officials allowed DOE 
to participate in a search of a truck that set off an alarm at one of 
the portal monitors provided by DOE. (The search revealed that the 
truck was transporting fertilizer, which can cause a false alarm.) In 
addition, DOE estimated that Russia spent $300,000 to install 14 
pedestrian portal monitors at another terminal of the airport in 
Moscow. 

DOE budgeted $10 million for the Second Line of Defense program and 
spent $8.5 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001, and the program 
received $12 million in fiscal year 2002 appropriations.[Footnote 9] 
The State Department provided a total of $7.5 million to support the 
Second Line of Defense program—$5.1 million to pay the Russian 
enterprise that manufactures and installs the portal monitors and $2.4 
million that it provided to DOE. Of the $5.1 million for the Russian 
contractor, State spent $2.6 million through fiscal year 2001. 
[Footnote 10] Of the $2.4 million that it received from State (through 
the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program), 
DOE spent $0.1 million through fiscal year 2001 and carried over $2.3 
million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002. 

DOE spent $22 million from fiscal year 1992 through 2001, including 
$2.4 million from the State Department, on assistance to countries of 
the former Soviet Union—primarily Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—to 
improve their ability to control the export of goods that could be 
used in the development of nuclear weapons. The assistance provided 
under this program falls into three general categories: export 
licensing, industry awareness and compliance, and border enforcement. 
The export licensing assistance helps establish the regulations and 
procedures for issuing licenses to enterprises that allow them to 
export their goods and technologies. For example, DOE is providing 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan with computerized export control licensing 
systems that are specific to nuclear goods. Industry awareness and 
compliance consists primarily of workshops for enterprises that need 
training in understanding the export control system and complying with 
export control laws and regulations. DOE officials estimate that about 
1,000 or so enterprises in Russia, most of which are spin-offs of the 
nuclear weapons complex, need such training. Border enforcement 
assistance consists of equipment and training to help customs 
officials stationed at border crossings recognize nuclear-related good 
and technologies that require an export license before they can be 
exported from the country. 

Table 3 shows a breakdown of International Export Control Program 
expenditures by country and source of funding. State's Export Control 
and Related Border Security Assistance program provided a total of 
$4.9 million through fiscal year 2001 to support the program, of which 
DOE spent $2.4 million through fiscal year 2001 and carried over $2.5 
million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002. 

Table 3: International Export Control Program Expenditures through 
Fiscal Year 2001: 

Country: Russia; 
DOE funds: $4.6 million; 
State funds: $0.5 million; 
Total: $5.1 million. 

Country: Ukraine; 
DOE funds: $2.1 million; 
State funds: $0.4 million; 
Total: $2.4 million. 

Country: Kazakhstan; 
DOE funds: $1.3 million; 
State funds: $0.6 million; 
Total: $1.9 million. 

Country: Baltic states; 
DOE funds: less than $0.1 million; 
State funds: $0.2 million; 
Total: $0.2 million. 

Country: Regional/other; 
DOE funds: $11.7 million; 
State funds: $0.8 million; 
Total: $12.5 million. 

Country: Total; 
DOE funds: $19.6 million; 
State funds: $2.4 million; 
Total: $22.0 million. 

Note: Regional/other expenditures includes $9.3 million spent from 
fiscal years 1992 through 1997 that DOE was not able to break down by 
country. 

Source: DOE. 

[End of table] 

In addition to the Second Line of Defense program and the 
International Export Control Program, DOE spent $0.5 million on the 
Special Technologies Program to install portal monitors in countries 
other than Russia with funding from the State Department 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. State's Export Control and 
Related Border Security Assistance program also provided $0.5 million 
to this office to repair and maintain portal monitors already 
installed, but DOE had not spent any of this funding as of the end of 
fiscal year 2001. DOE also spent $1.3 million in DOD funds to support 
DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction program. For example, DOE's Los 
Alamos National Laboratory helped to install portal monitors in one 
country in the former Soviet Union. 

Department of State: 

The State Department has provided assistance to combat nuclear 
smuggling primarily through two programs—the Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund and the Export Control and Related Border Security 
Assistance program. In addition, the Georgia Border Security and Law 
Enforcement program has a small radiation detection component. State 
established the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund in 1994 to 
provide funding for unexpected needs or opportunities in U.S. 
nonproliferation efforts. Of the $115 million the fund received from 
fiscal year 1994 through 2001, State spent $8.5 million on assistance 
to combat nuclear smuggling. State provided radiation detection 
equipment and other assistance to 22 countries including vehicle 
portal monitors, mobile vans equipped with x-ray machines and 
radiation detection equipment, handheld radiation detectors, 
dosimeters, and radiation pagers.[Footnote 11] The projects also 
provided customs officials and border guards with other equipment such 
as fiber optic scopes to search fuel tanks, special equipment to 
detect chemicals and metals that could be used in weapons of mass 
destruction, night vision equipment, and radios. 

Other Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund projects included 
assessments of countries' ability to interdict nuclear smuggling, 
multinational conferences on the threat of nuclear material smuggling 
and techniques for analyzing seized nuclear material, and course 
development for hands-on training in interdicting nuclear smuggling 
offered at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Although State has 
begun to consolidate assistance for combating nuclear smuggling under 
the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, it 
continues to provide some assistance through the Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund. In particular, in fiscal year 2001, State approved a 
$1.3 million Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund project to install 
vehicle portal monitors at up to 16 sites in one country, and a $0.5 
million project to assist another country upgrade their domestically 
produced portal monitors to better detect weapons-usable nuclear 
material. State also provided $4.3 million from the Nonproliferation 
and Disarmament Fund to DOE and the U.S. Customs Service to implement 
part of the assistance$3 million to DOE's Second Line of Defense 
Program in Russia, $0.5 million to DOE's Special Technologies Program 
to install the portal monitors provided by State, and $0.8 million to 
the U.S. Customs Service to help State provide equipment and training 
to the recipient countries. 

From fiscal year 1998 through 2001, the State Department allocated 
$86.6 million for the Export Control and Related Border Security 
Assistance program. State spent $2.7 million of that amount and 
provided $40.2 million to the U.S. Customs Service, $4.4 million to 
the U.S. Coast Guard, $4.9 million to DOE's International Export 
Control Program, $4.5 million to DOE's Second Line of Defense program, 
and $0.5 million to DOE's Special Technologies Program, which installs 
and maintains portal monitors in countries other than Russia on behalf 
of State.[Footnote 12] After September 11, State received an emergency 
supplemental appropriation of $24.7 million for the program. State's 
own $2.7 million in expenditures included $0.9 million for three vans 
equipped with radiation detectors and x-ray machines for Russia, $0.2 
million for a van for another country, and $0.4 million to support a 
multinational conference on export controls and travel expenses of 
program personnel. State also spent $0.7 million to hire outside firms 
to conduct audits of the funding it provided to other agencies and 
evaluations of assistance provided to three countries that State 
considers more advanced in terms of their ability to interdict nuclear 
smuggling. To provide criteria for evaluating the capability of 
countries receiving U.S. assistance to interdict smuggling, State's 
Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions, which manages the 
program, developed a list of export control system standards by which 
to evaluate export control systems in host countries. The standards 
include criteria for evaluating the ability of countries to interdict 
smuggling using radiation detection equipment at border crossings. 

State has allocated funds for the Export Control and Related Border 
Security Assistance program primarily from the FREEDOM Support Act, 
which is targeted to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet 
Union, and from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and 
Related Programs account. Table 4 shows funding levels and sources for 
export control and related border security assistance from fiscal year 
1998 through 2001. 

Table 4: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program 
Funding, Fiscal Year 1998-2001: 

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs: 
1998: $3.0 million; 
1999: $5.0 million; 
2000: $14.5 million; 
2001: $19.1 million; 
Total: $41.6 million. 

FREEDOM Support Act: 
1998: 0; 
1999: 0; 
2000: $15.0 million; 
2001: $21.0 million; 
Total: $36.0 million. 

Other: 
1998: 0; 
1999: $4.0 million; 
2000: $5.0 million; 
2001: 0; 
Total: $9.0 million. 

Emergency supplemental appropriation: 
1998: 0; 
1999: 0; 
2000: 0; 
2001: $24.7 million; 
Total: $24.7 million. 

Total: 
1998: $3.0 million; 
1999: $9.0 million; 
2000: $34.5 million; 
2001: $64.8 million; 
Total: $111.3 million. 

Source: State Department. 

[End of table] 

In addition to the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the 
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, State's 
Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program provides some 
radiation detection assistance to combat nuclear material smuggling. 
The Georgia program focuses more broadly on developing the country's 
border infrastructure, assisting it to gain control of its border 
including its seacoast, and strengthening border security against any 
type of crime such as drug smuggling. One of the objectives of the 
program is also to strengthen the country's border security against 
nuclear smuggling. Customs, which manages the program for State, 
received a total of $71.1 million from State and spent $38.3 million 
through fiscal year 2001, of which $0.2 million was for radiation 
detection equipment including two portal monitors and 44 handheld 
radiation detectors. 

Department of Defense: 

From fiscal year 1993 to about 1998, the DOD Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program spent $16 million on assistance to five countries. 
In addition, DOD provided $1.3 million to DOE and $1.1 million to the 
U.S. Customs Service to implement some of the assistance. Of the $16 
million, DOD spent $1 million on radiation detection equipment 
including $0.9 million for 36 pedestrian portal monitors and 100 
handheld radiation detectors for one country in the former Soviet 
Union and $0.1 million for 100 handheld radiation detectors for 
another country. The $10.2 million worth of other equipment that DOD 
provided consisted a range of items to enable the countries to better 
patrol their borders, conduct searches for smuggled contraband, and 
equip their border posts. For example, DOD provided vans equipped with 
x-ray systems (but not radiation detectors) to search cargo to two 
countries, boats to two other countries for patrolling their coasts, 
and 50 contraband detection kits to another country with tools such as 
fiber optic scopes to search fuel tanks. See table 5 for breakdown of 
expenditures by country and category of assistance to combat nuclear 
smuggling. 

Table 5: Cooperative Threat Reduction Expenditures through Fiscal Year 
2001: 

Radiation detection equipment: 
Russia: 0; 
Ukraine: 0; 
Kazakhstan: $0.1 million; 
Belarus: $0.9 million; 
Georgia: $0; 
Total: $1.0 million. 

Other equipment: 
Russia: 0; 
Ukraine: $2.3 million; 
Kazakhstan: $4.2 million; 
Belarus: $2.6 million; 
Georgia: $1.0 million; 
Total: $10.2 million. 

Program management: 
Russia: less than $0.1 million; 
Ukraine: $2.1 million; 
Kazakhstan: $0.4 million; 
Belarus: $2.2 million; 
Georgia: $0.1 million; 
Total: $4.8 million. 

Total: 
Russia: less than $0.1 million; 
Ukraine: $4.4 million; 
Kazakhstan: $4.7 million; 
Belarus: $5.7 million; 
Georgia: $1.1 million; 
Total: $16.0 million. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of table] 

DOD spent $10.2 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001 on the 
International Counterproliferation Program to provide training and 
equipment to customs, border guard, and law enforcement personnel in 
17 countries. The International Counterproliferation Program includes 
a program in cooperation with the U.S. Customs Service, which received 
$2.1 million from DOD to provide assistance, and another program in 
cooperation with the FBI, which received $1 million. The DOD/Customs 
program provides instruction on the detection, identification, and 
investigation of nuclear smuggling. The training comes with equipment 
packages that include radiation pagers and tools for searching persons 
and vehicles. The DOD/FBI program provides training and equipment with 
an emphasis on investigating and responding to nuclear smuggling 
incidents. 

Also under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, DOD spent $0.3 
million to install portal monitors at three border crossings in one 
country in the former Soviet Union. DOE installed the equipment in 
cooperation with DOE's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which 
has begun site surveys at about eight additional border crossings. 
Although DOD provided the same Russian portal monitors to the country 
that DOE is providing to Russia under the Second Line of Defense 
program, DOD has also worked with that country to develop an 
indigenous capability to manufacture and maintain portal monitors. 

U.S. Customs Service: 

The U.S. Customs Service, the largest recipient of funding provided by 
State and DOD, received a total of $44.2 million from the two agencies 
and spent $11.1 million from fiscal year 1993 through 2001 on 
assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. Specifically: 

* Customs received $40.2 million from State's Export Control and 
Related Border Security Assistance program and spent $8.1 million from 
fiscal year 1999 through 2001 for equipment and training for close to 
30 countries. Assistance under this program includes stationing 
advisors in many of the countries to help coordinate and implement 
assistance from all of the programs to combat nuclear smuggling. 

* Customs received $0.8 million from State's Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund and spent $0.6 million for Project Amber from fiscal 
year 1994 through 2001. Project Amber provided equipment and training 
to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
and Slovakia. Customs also provided assistance to Cyprus and Malta 
with funding from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. 

* Customs received $2.1 million from DOD's International 
Counterproliferation Program and spent $1.6 million from fiscal year 
1997 through 2001 for assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 

* Customs received $1.1 million from DOD's Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program and spent $0.7 million from fiscal year 1993 through 
1999 for assistance to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. 
Customs returned $0.4 million in unspent funds to DOD. 

Customs' assistance included radiation pagers that border officials 
wear on their belts and that can also be used as handheld devices to 
pinpoint the location of radioactive material that caused a portal 
monitor alarm. Customs provided a variety of other high- and low-tech 
tools ranging from very basic items such as flashlights and tools for 
opening containers where smuggled goods may be hidden to more 
sophisticated equipment such as fiber optic scopes for searching fuel 
tanks. Training includes operation of the x-ray vans equipped with 
radiation detectors; hands-on instruction in using equipment to detect 
nuclear smuggling; techniques for investigating smuggling operations; 
tracking the movements of smugglers who avoid legal border crossings 
by going through rugged and remote areas between ports of entry; and 
"train-the-trainer" courses to enable countries to train more 
personnel than the U.S. assistance can reach. Hands-on training 
includes a 2-week course at DOE's Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory on interdicting smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, 
including nuclear materials. Officials from several countries that 
have received U.S. assistance told us that the training improved their 
border security interdiction and investigation skills and promoted 
better understanding of how to operate radiation detection equipment. 
For example, one country's border security and customs personnel told 
us that the U.S. Customs Service-sponsored training at Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory was particularly beneficial because it 
provided for "hands-on" training to detect nuclear materials hidden in 
vehicles. Table 6 shows a breakdown of U.S. Customs Expenditures. 

Table 6: U.S. Customs Service Expenditures, by Funding Source, through 
Fiscal Year 2001: 

State Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance: 
Funding: $40.2 million; 
Expenditures: $8.1 million; 
Obligations: $6.3 million; 
Balance: $25.8 million. 

State Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund: 
Funding: $0.8 million; 
Expenditures: $0.6 million; 
Obligations: less than $0.1 million; 
Balance: $0.1 million. 

DOD International Counterproliferation program: 
Funding: $2.1 million; 
Expenditures: $1.6 million; 
Obligations: $0.2 million; 
Balance: $0.3 million. 

DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction: 
Funding: $1.1 million; 
Expenditures: $0.7 million; 
Obligations: 0; 
Balance: $0.3 million. 

Total: 
Funding: $44.2 million; 
Expenditures: $11.1 million; 
Obligations: $6.5 million; 
Balance: $26.5 million. 

Source: U.S. Customs Service. 

[End of table] 

U.S. Coast Guard: 

Through the end of fiscal year 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard received 
$4.4 million from the State Department Export Control and Related 
Border Security Assistance program and spent $1.6 million to provide 
assistance for maritime interdiction of nuclear smuggling to countries 
of the former Soviet Union. The Coast Guard used $1.5 million of that 
amount in one country to provide two boats with spare parts, station a 
Coast Guard advisor in country, and provide training. In addition, the 
Coast Guard provided some assistance to four countries and budgeted 
funds for assistance to four other countries. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

The FBI has provided assistance to 13 countries of the former Soviet 
Union and Central and Eastern Europe as part of the DOD International 
Counterproliferation program. DOD managed the program and paid all the 
FBI travel expenses associated with delivering the training. The FBI's 
only expenditures have been for developing the curriculum for the 
training courses. Through fiscal year 2001, the FBI received 
approximately $1 million from DOD and spent $0.4 million. Until fiscal 
year 2001, FBI assistance consisted only of an awareness seminar for 
high-level government officials on weapons of mass destruction 
nonproliferation at the International Law Enforcement Academy in 
Budapest, Hungary. In fiscal year 2001, the FBI began providing 
additional courses with more detailed training geared toward the law 
enforcement officers who investigate and respond to smuggling 
incidents. One of the new courses, which the DOD/FBI effort had 
provided only to one country as of the end of fiscal year 2001, trains 
law enforcement and emergency management personnel through practical 
exercises simulating a seizure of nuclear or other smuggled material. 
As part of the course, the DOD/FBI effort provides equipment packages 
worth $240,000 to outfit three 30-man response teams with a variety of 
equipment including HAZMAT suits to facilitate the safe handling of 
seized material, evidence collection and sampling kits, chemical 
detection equipment, and also radiation pagers. (The FBI originally 
planned to provide equipment packages worth $70,000, but it increased 
the amount of equipment because it received additional funding from 
DOD.) Other new courses that were initiated in fiscal year 2001 
include crime scene management and crisis management, which trains 
different government agencies to work together to respond to a 
smuggling incident. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

Ms. Susan S. Westin: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. General Accounting Office: 

Dear Ms. Westin: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear 
Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning," GAO-02-426, 
GAO Job Code 360093. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
John Schlosser, Director, Office of Export Control Cooperation, Bureau 
of Non Proliferation, at (202) 647-1966. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Christopher B. Nurnham: 
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer: 

Enclosure: As stated. 

cc: 
GAO/NRE - Ms. Gary L. Jones: 
State/OIG - Mr. Berman: 
State/NP - Mr. Van Diepen: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State: 

Comments on the GAO Draft Report: Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. 
Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need 
Strengthened Coordination and Planning (GAO-02-426, Job Code 360093): 

In general, the Department of State concurs with this report's 
conclusions and recommendations. The Department recognizes that inter-
agency coordination and planning with regard to U.S. Government 
efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling can be 
further strengthened. State is taking the lead in facilitating 
development of a government-wide plan for an integrated approach to 
the provision of detection equipment and related maintenance and 
support to the countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and 
Eastern Europe, as recommended in the report. 

The Department believes, however, that the report gives insufficient 
weight to the progress that has been registered in the past year and a 
half to improve coordination and planning in this area and to address 
many of the technical concerns discussed in the report. These 
improvements were effected amid a dramatic ramping-up of the State 
Department's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 
assistance program, of which the provision of nuclear detection 
equipment is only a part, aimed at confronting the increased 
proliferation threat. (The program grew from $9 million in FY 1999 to 
$40 million in FY 2001.) 

The Department established the Office of Export Control Cooperation 
and Sanctions (NP/ECS) within the Bureau of Nonproliferation in 
December 2000. This office was charged with, inter alia, implementing, 
managing and coordinating U.S. Government export control and related 
border security programs in countries aimed at stemming the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, 
related goods and technologies, and other weapons. In carrying out 
this function, NP/ECS chairs an inter-agency working group that 
evaluates, prioritizes, and approves projects that USG agencies 
propose to undertake to improve countries' export control and related 
border security capabilities and coordinates implementation of such 
projects. This working group has done much to ensure that individual 
agencies' activities within the EXBS program and related to it are 
mutually coordinated and directed toward the accomplishment of U.S. 
Government foreign policy goals. Although they have their own sources 
of funding, the Departments of Defense and Energy regularly 
participate in the working group and have contributed significantly to 
an overall rationalization of assistance programs provided through 
different Congressional appropriations. 

The Department has taken a number of additional steps to improve the 
planning and implementation of export control assistance efforts. 
State maintains a planning calendar for agencies' worldwide program 
activities in order to ensure that they are properly coordinated and 
completed. To implement programs in the countries of the former Soviet 
Union, NP/ECS works closely with the Department's Office of the 
Coordinator for Assistance to Europe and Eurasia to ensure that EXBS 
program activities are fully consistent with larger U.S. foreign 
policy goals and harmonized with other related U.S. assistance 
programs in those countries. NP/ECS also has implemented a series of 
measures to ensure that strict financial management controls over the 
EXBS program and individual agencies' activities within it are 
maintained and enhanced. 

Similarly, the State Department independently has taken steps to 
improve internal coordination as well as accountability for equipment 
previously provided to other countries. In October 2001, NP/ECS 
assumed responsibility for all export control assistance functions at 
State including maintenance and support for radiation detection and 
other equipment previously provided to foreign governments by other 
USG programs (including another program that had been administered by 
the State Department), and also evaluation of host governments' 
employment of that equipment. The State-funded export control 
advisors, who keep inventory of all such equipment in 20 countries in 
Central, Southern and Eastern Europe and the NIS, report on its 
condition and use, and whether it should be repaired, upgraded or 
replaced. This has done much to rationalize the implementation of the 
assistance program in the field. 

While substantial progress has been made, the State Department 
believes there is more to be done to ensure a coherent, coordinated 
approach to the provision of radiation detection equipment to foreign 
governments, taking into account the diversity of conditions, threats 
and levels of technical capability present in various countries that 
receive U.S. assistance. The Department welcomes all the 
recommendations in the report, and will work with other agencies to 
implement them. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Department of Energy: 
National Nuclear Security Administration: 
Washington, DC 20585: 

April 26, 2002: 

Ms. Gary L. Jones: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. General Accounting Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. Jones: 

The General Accounting Office's draft report GAO-02-426, "Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear 
Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning," has been 
reviewed by my office. We understand that the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) was requested to review the National Nuclear Security 
Administration's (NNSA) Second Line of Defense program. Specifically, 
the GAO was asked to (1) identify other federal programs devoted to 
detecting illicit nuclear materials trafficking at country borders; 
(2) analyze funds received for these programs through fiscal year 2001 
and future budget plans; (3) determine the level or coordination among 
these programs; (4) assess these programs' effectiveness; (5) identify 
the host countries' contributions and commitments to these programs; 
and (6) analyze nuclear material smuggling cases in the former Soviet 
Union and Central Asian republics over the past decade. 

GAO has concluded that the current multiple-agency approach to 
providing U.S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling is not the most 
effective way to deliver this assistance. Furthermore, GAO has 
concluded that coordination is also a problem within agencies that 
provide assistance. Finally, GAO has expressed concern about how U.S. 
equipment is being used by the recipient countries. We realize that it 
is difficult to assess the impact and effectiveness of the 
U.S.supplied equipment unless data are routinely obtained and 
analyzed. We, like GAO, believe that sharing data is of critical 
importance to the success of the U.S. program and countries' efforts 
to combat nuclear smuggling. 

The NNSA appreciates having had the opportunity to review this draft 
report. While we agree with the general findings of the report we 
would like to clarify that NNSA has: (1) one program to combat nuclear 
smuggling (the Second Line of Defense [SLD] Program) that has 
historically focused primarily on Russia and is now expanding to other 
countries; (2) one program on export control outreach (the 
International Export Control Program) that deals with dual-use 
equipment, material, and technology; and (3) a DOE work for others 
program (the Special Technologies Program now the Advanced 
Technologies Program) that uses Department of State funding to 
maintain and place radiation detectors outside of Russia. 

Additionally, calculations and tests of the SLD installed monitors in 
Russia, that are calibrated at more sensitive levels, have proven that 
there is no change in the already-low false-alarm-rate of these 
instruments. While it is not immediately apparent from GAO's report, 
data and reports about non-SLD monitors indicate that they are not as 
sensitive to special nuclear materials, are not as reliable, and most 
have limited or no ability to detect shielded plutonium. While most 
monitors will detect strong gamma-emitting radioactive sources that 
could be used by terrorists for radiation dispersal devices, not all 
monitors are sensitive enough to detect the small signature of highly 
enriched uranium. 

Finally, NNSA's Second Line of Defense program endorses the need for a 
more uniform approach to radiation monitoring at borders to combat 
nuclear smuggling. This is in line with its philosophical approach to 
providing a comprehensive systems solution to combat nuclear smuggling 
through the careful deployment of quality equipment, training of 
officials, and adequate provisions for maintenance. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Kenneth E. Baker, for: 
Linton F. Brooks: 
Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation: 

cc: Anthony R. Lane: 
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Customs Service: 

U.S. Customs Service: 

Memorandum: 

Date: April 25, 2002: 

File: AUD-1-OP BBS: 

Memorandum For Gary L. Jones, General Accounting Office: 

From: Director, Office of Planning: 

Subject: Draft Audit Report Entitled "Nuclear Nonproliferation: US 
Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and 
Planning" 

Thank you for providing us with a copy of your draft report on nuclear 
nonproliferation and the opportunity to discuss the issues in this 
report. 

It is important to note that the U.S. government's non-proliferation 
efforts are not limited to nuclear materials, but have a wider focus 
and cover the entire spectrum of WMD, including chemical and 
biological weapons. 

This report focuses on the use of technology to detect nuclear or 
radioactive materials. However, readers should not lose sight of the 
highly developed skills and experience of the individuals involved in 
nonproliferation efforts. Technology is only a tool in the hands of a 
border inspection officer, making training and procedures equally 
critical to a successful program. 

Since U.S. Customs actually expends the lion's share (two-thirds) of 
all funds appropriated for these activities (see page 44), we 
recommend that the recommendation regarding the development of a plan 
by the State Department be reworded to specifically include Customs. 

If you have any questions regarding these comments, please contact Ms. 
Brenda Brockman Smith at (202) 927-1507. 

Signed by: 

William F. Riley: 

Attachment: 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] IAEA is affiliated with the United Nations and has 133 member 
states, including the United States. Its objectives are to promote the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy and to verify that nuclear material 
under its supervision or control is not used to further any military 
purpose. 

[2] This review will only focus on U.S. assistance to combat nuclear 
smuggling at countries' borders. We recently reported on the 
Department of Energy's MPC&A program and found that the program is 
reducing the risk of theft of nuclear material but hundreds of metric 
tons of nuclear material still lack improved security systems and are 
vulnerable to theft. See Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of 
Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-312], Feb. 28, 2001. 

[3] While some of the assistance specifically targets nuclear 
smuggling, a portion of the assistance is intended to improve 
countries' ability to interdict any weapons smuggling—-nuclear, 
chemical, biological, and conventional. 

[4] IAEA is an autonomous organization affiliated with the United 
Nations. Its objectives are to promote the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy and to verify that nuclear material under its supervision or 
control is not used to further any military purpose. 

[5] Thorium is a radioactive material that is used in a wide array of 
products and processes. Handling and disposing of thorium is a 
challenge because it is radioactive and produces radon gas when it 
decays. 

[6] Highly enriched uranium means uranium enriched to 20 percent or 
more in the isotope U-235. Uranium enriched in U-235 above the level 
found in nature (.071 percent) but less than 20 percent is called low 
enriched uranium. 

[7] This institute is involved in developing space and mobile 
reactors, including the TOPAZ reactor used in Russian satellites. Luch 
has several tons of weapons-usable material on site. 

[8] According to DOE, red mercury has been used in over 50 scams since 
1979. Red mercury is a material that would-be smugglers have tried to 
sell claiming that the material can be used to produce a nuclear 
weapon. 

[9] DOE carried over $0.9 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 
2002 and transferred $0.7 million from Second Line of Defense to the 
International Export Control Program in fiscal year 2001 when DOE made 
the Second Line of Defense program part of the Material Protection, 
Control, and Accounting program. 

[10] The $5.1 million includes $3 million from the Nonproliferation 
and Disarmament Fund and $2.1 million from the Export Control and 
Related Border Security Assistance program. The Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund has a contract with the Russian enterprise and 
manages the entire $5.1 million in funding. 

[11] The countries included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 

[12] State also used the Export Control program to provide $15.9 
million to Department of Commerce assistance to improve countries' 
export control systems and $0.8 million to DOD to update an export 
control computer system that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program 
provided to one country. 

[End of section] 

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