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Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and
Planning' which was released on May 16, 2002.
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United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate.
May 2002:
Nuclear Nonproliferation:
U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need
Strengthened Coordination and Planning:
GAO-02-426:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
U.S. Government Has Spent about $86 Million to Help Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling:
U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Lacks a Coordinated
Approach:
U.S. Assistance Has Helped Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling, but
Problems with Equipment Undermine Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents:
Incidents Involving Weapons Usable Nuclear Material:
Luch Scientific Production Association (Russia), 1992:
Vilnius, Lithuania, 1993:
Murmansk, Russia, 1993:
Murmansk, Russia, 1993:
St. Petersburg, Russia, 1994:
Tengen, Germany, 1994:
Landshut, Germany, 1994:
Munich, Germany, 1994:
Prague, Czech Republic, 1994:
Rousse, Bulgaria, 1999:
Kara-Balta, Kyrgyzstan, 1999:
Batumi, Georgia, 2000:
Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000:
Germany, 2000:
Greece, 2001:
France, 2001:
Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance Programs:
Department of Energy:
Department of State:
Department of Defense:
U.S. Customs Service:
U.S. Coast Guard:
Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Customs Service:
Tables:
Table 1: Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and Expenditures
through Fiscal Year 2001:
Table 2: Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons-Usable Material
since 1992:
Table 3: International Export Control Program Expenditures through
Fiscal Year 2001:
Table 4: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program
Funding, Fiscal Year 1998-2001:
Table 5: Cooperative Threat Reduction Expenditures through Fiscal Year
2001:
Table 6: U.S. Customs Service Expenditures, by Funding Source, through
Fiscal Year 2001:
Figures:
Figure 1: U.S.-Installed Portal Monitors:
Figure 2: Typical Handheld Radiation Detector Used by Border Guards:
Figure 3: U.S.-Supplied Mobile X-Ray Van:
Figure 4: U.S.-Funded Portal Monitors at the Sheremetyevo Airport in
Moscow:
[End of section]
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 16, 2002:
The Honorable Pat Roberts:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
Dear Senator Roberts:
Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive
materials occurs worldwide and has reportedly increased in recent
years. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency[Footnote 1]
(IAEA), as of December 31, 2001, there had been 181 confirmed cases of
illicit trafficking of nuclear material since 1993. (See appendix I
for more information about nuclear smuggling cases.) A significant
number of the cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be
used to produce a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional
explosives with radioactive material ("dirty bomb") to spread
radioactive contamination over a wide area. Nuclear material can be
smuggled across a country's border through a variety of means: it can
be hidden in a car, train, or ship, carried in personal luggage
through an airport, or walked across an unprotected border.
Many nuclear smuggling cases have been traced to nuclear material that
originated in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The United
States, through the Department of Energy's Material Protection,
Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program,[Footnote 2] has helped these
countries secure nuclear material at civilian and defense facilities—
this effort is considered the first line of defense against potential
theft and/or diversion of nuclear materials. To address the threat
posed by nuclear smuggling, the United States is helping these
countries improve their border security—a second line of defense—but
these assistance efforts face daunting challenges.[Footnote 3] For
example, Russia alone has almost 12,500 miles of borders with 14
countries, including North Korea. It is also in close geographical
proximity to Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.
As agreed with your office, this report addresses U.S. efforts to
combat nuclear smuggling by (1) identifying the U.S. federal programs
tasked with combating the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear
materials and the amount of U.S. funding spent on this effort; (2)
determining how well the U.S. assistance is coordinated among federal
agencies; and (3) assessing the effectiveness of the equipment and
training provided by the United States. We visited four countries to
obtain a first hand look at U.S. radiation detection equipment
installed at different border crossings and meet with officials
responsible for border security, law enforcement, and export controls.
Results in Brief:
U.S. assistance efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among
six federal agencies—the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense;
the U.S. Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
and the U.S. Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year
2001, the six agencies spent about $86 million to help about 30
countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe, combat the threat of smuggling of nuclear and other materials
that could be used in weapons of mass destruction. The agencies have
provided a range of assistance, including radiation detection
equipment and training, technical exchanges to promote the development
and enforcement of laws and regulations governing the export of
nuclear-related equipment and technology, and other equipment and
training to generally improve countries' ability to interdict nuclear
smuggling. The Department of Energy (DOE) has two programs to combat
nuclear smuggling and primarily focuses on Russia. Energy has
installed radiation detection monitors at eight border crossings,
including at an airport in Moscow, and plans to install similar
equipment at close to 60 sites in Russia. The State Department has
provided radiation detection monitors, mobile vans equipped with
radiation detectors, handheld radiation detectors, and other
assistance to about 30 countries through two separate programs. The
Department of Defense (DOD) has two programs that have provided
radiation detection monitors, handheld detectors, and other assistance
to about 20 countries. With funding provided by the Departments of
State and Defense, the U.S. Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the U.S. Coast Guard have provided a variety of
training and equipment to customs, border guard, and law enforcement
officials in numerous countries.
U.S. assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall
governmentwide plan to guide it. Although an interagency group,
chaired by the State Department, exists to coordinate U.S. assistance
efforts, the six agencies that are providing assistance do not always
coordinate their efforts through this group. As a result, the
Departments of Energy, State, and Defense have pursued separate
approaches to installing radiation detection equipment at other
countries' border crossings; consequently, some countries' border
crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others.
Specifically, the Department of Energy is installing equipment at
border sites in Russia and the Department of Defense is installing
equipment in another country that is better able to detect weapons-
usable nuclear material, while the State Department has installed less
sophisticated radiation detection monitors in other countries.
Coordination problems also exist within agencies. For example, the
Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense program does not
coordinate its efforts with another office within the Department that
also provides radiation detection equipment because that office
receives funding from and installs equipment on behalf of the State
Department. Officials of the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense
have acknowledged that U.S. assistance efforts lack adequate planning
and need better coordination among all the agencies. In addition,
these officials told us that the roles and responsibilities of each
agency in the overall U.S. assistance effort should be better
clarified. This report makes recommendations to improve the planning
and coordination of U.S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling.
While U.S. assistance is generally helping countries combat the
smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials, serious problems
with installing, using, and maintaining radiation detection equipment
have undermined U.S. efforts. Representatives of 17 recipient
countries told us that U.S. assistance has provided needed radiation
detection equipment at border sites and training for border security
guards and other law enforcement personnel. Without U.S. assistance,
some countries would not have any radiation detection equipment at
their borders or training in how to inspect vehicles, luggage, and
people and investigate nuclear smuggling cases. In other countries,
U.S. assistance has bolstered existing nuclear smuggling detection
programs. We observed at border sites in countries we visited that
U.S.-provided equipment was working and was being used for the
purposes intended. However, we also found serious problems with some
of the equipment provided to various countries. For example, about one-
half of the stationary radiation detection monitors funded by the
Department of Defense to one country in the former Soviet Union was
never installed; numerous portable radiation detectors could not be
accounted for; and radiation detection equipment provided by the State
Department to Lithuania was stored in the basement of the U.S. embassy
for about 2 years because of a disagreement between the department and
the recipient country about the need for a power supply line costing
$12,600. These and other problems are largely a result of the lack of
oversight and follow-up by the agencies providing the assistance. U.S.
officials are attempting to correct some of these problems by, among
other things, stationing advisors in countries receiving U.S.
assistance. Another problem affecting U.S. assistance efforts is that
recipient countries do not systematically report incidents of nuclear
material detected at their borders, which limits the ability of U.S.
agencies to measure the effectiveness of the equipment they are
providing. This report makes several recommendations designed to
improve management of U.S.-provided radiation detection equipment and
to secure recipient country assurances that information about detected
nuclear materials is shared in a timely basis.
We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State,
Energy, and Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Coast Guard;
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and comment.
The Coast Guard and FBI had no comments on the draft report. DOD
provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as
appropriate. The agencies agreed with the facts presented in the
report and State specifically said that it agreed with the report's
conclusions and recommendations. Customs suggested that we reword our
recommendation to specifically include it as one of the agencies to
develop a governmentwide plan to combat nuclear smuggling, which we
did. DOE did not comment on the conclusions and recommendations.
Background:
Over the past decade, the United States has paid increased attention
to the threat that unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material in the
countries of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia, could be
stolen and fall into the hands of terrorists or countries seeking
weapons of mass destruction.
By some estimates, the former Soviet Union had about 30,000 nuclear
weapons and over 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material when it
collapsed about 10 years ago. Several cases of illicit trafficking in
nuclear material in Germany and the Czech Republic in the early to mid-
1990s underscored the proliferation threat. The United States
responded to the threat by providing assistance to increase security
at numerous nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union,
particularly in Russia, in order to prevent weapons-usable nuclear
material from being stolen. In addition, the United States has
provided portal monitors (stationary equipment designed to detect
radioactive materials carried by pedestrians or vehicles) and smaller,
portable radiation detectors at border crossings in many countries of
the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. The equipment,
which is installed at car and truck crossings, railroad crossings,
seaports, and airports, can serve two purposes: deterring smugglers
from trafficking in nuclear material and detecting cases of actual
nuclear smuggling.
Radiation detection equipment can detect radioactive materials used in
medicine and industry, patients who have recently had radiological
treatment, commodities that are sources of naturally occurring
radiation such as fertilizer, and—of primary concern in terms of
nonproliferation—nuclear material that could be used in a nuclear
weapon. Nuclear material includes radioactive source materials–such as
natural uranium, low enriched uranium used as fuel in commercial
nuclear power reactors, and plutonium and highly enriched uranium–that
are key components of nuclear weapons. The capability of the equipment
to detect nuclear material depends on a number of factors including
the amount of material, the size of the detection device, and whether
the material is shielded from detection. For example, a small amount
of material shielded by a lead container would likely escape detection
while a large amount of material with no shielding would be more
likely to cause an alarm Detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking
in weapons-usable nuclear material is complicated because one of the
materials that is of greatest concern in terms of proliferation—highly
enriched uranium—is among the most difficult materials to detect due
to its relatively low level of radioactivity. In contrast, medical and
industrial radioactive sources, which could be used in a radiological
dispersion device or "dirty bomb," are highly radioactive and
therefore easier to detect. Because of the complexity of detecting
nuclear material, the customs officers or border guards who are
responsible for operating the equipment must also be trained in how to
use handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm,
identify false alarms, and respond to cases of illicit nuclear
smuggling.
U.S. Government Has Spent about $86 Million to Help Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling:
From fiscal year 1992 through 2001, six federal agencies received $140
million and spent $86.1 million to combat the threat of nuclear
smuggling in about 30 countries, including all of the countries of the
former Soviet Union and numerous countries in Central and Eastern
Europe. The Departments of State and Defense provide funding to four
other agencies, and some agencies have carried over millions of
dollars in program funds into fiscal year 2002 because they have
received more funding than they have been able to spend.
U.S. Assistance Is Divided Among Six Federal Agencies:
The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U.S. Customs
Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the U.S. Coast Guard
have provided assistance to about 30 countries' customs, border, and
law enforcement agencies to detect, interdict, and investigate nuclear
smuggling. Radiation detection equipment is one of the many types of
assistance that the U.S. agencies are providing. Other equipment
ranges from simple hand tools for taking apart and searching different
compartments of a vehicle for hidden contraband to boats and vehicles
for conducting patrols. Similarly, training ranges from hands-on
instruction in using the equipment and conducting searches to high-
level technical exchanges on establishing the legal and regulatory
basis for preventing illicit trafficking and trade in sensitive goods
and materials that could be used in a nuclear weapon. U.S. assistance
began in the mid-1990s under DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction
program and then expanded to State, DOE, and other DOD programs.
While DOE, DOD, and State receive their own funding for their
assistance programs, Customs, the FBI, and the Coast Guard receive
their funding from State and/or DOD. DOE also receives part of its
funding from State.
Departments of Energy, State, and Defense Have the Primary Role in
Delivering U.S. Assistance:
DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear
material smuggling—the Second Line of Defense program and the
International Export Control Program (IECP). The Second Line of
Defense Program focuses on providing radiation detection equipment to
Russia From fiscal year 1997 through 2001, DOE spent $11.2 million,
including $2.7 million provided by the State Department, to install 70
portal monitors at eight sites in Russia, including a Moscow airport.
DOE has identified close to 60 sites in Russia where it plans to
install portal monitors over the next decade at a total cost of about
$50 million and has begun work at 19 of these sites. In addition, DOE
may expand the program beyond Russia to include other countries of the
former Soviet Union. DOE's International Export Control Program spent
$22 million, including $2.4 million provided by State, from fiscal
year 1992 through 2001 to help countries of the former Soviet Union
control the export of goods and technologies that could be used in the
development of nuclear weapons. Whereas the Second Line of Defense
program focuses on the nuclear material needed to manufacture a
nuclear bomb, the IECP focuses on the other high-technology components
needed for a bomb such as equipment for enriching uranium. The program
provides assistance to prevent legitimate enterprises, such as
businesses that were affiliated with the Soviet Union's nuclear
weapons complex, from intentionally or unintentionally engaging in
illicit trade in such goods and technologies. DOE also spent $1.8
million to support State and DOD programs to combat nuclear smuggling.
The State Department has received the largest amount of funding
through the end of fiscal year 2001 for assistance to combat nuclear
smuggling in about 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and
Central and Eastern Europe. State spent $11.4 million primarily
through two programs—the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program. Through
the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, State spent $8.5 million
from fiscal year 1994 through 2001 to, among other things, install
portal monitors in countries other than Russia. In addition, State
provided handheld radiation detectors, dosimeters (to measure levels
of radiation), and mobile vans equipped with x-ray machines and
radiation detectors that can be driven among a number of border
crossings. From fiscal year 1998 through 2001, State's Export Control
and Related Border Security Assistance program spent $2.7 million to,
among other things, purchase three vans equipped with radiation
detectors for Russia and another van for Poland. State's Georgia
Border Security and Law Enforcement program (implemented by Customs)
also spent $0.2 million to provide radiation detection equipment as
part of its assistance to strengthen Georgia's overall border
infrastructure and security against any type of crime, including
nuclear material smuggling. State also provided $58.8 million to DOE,
Customs, and the Coast Guard to fund their assistance activities.
DOD has provided assistance to combat nuclear smuggling under two
programs—the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the
International Counterproliferation program. From fiscal year 1993 to
2001, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program spent $16.3 million to
assist five countries. The assistance included $1 million for
radiation detection equipment-36 pedestrian portal monitors (to screen
people) and 100 handheld radiation detectors for one country and an
additional 100 handheld detectors for another country—and about $10
million for other equipment to enable the countries to better patrol
their borders, conduct searches for smuggled contraband, and equip
their border posts. In addition, as part of the Cooperative Threat
Reduction program, in fiscal year 2001 DOD began to work with DOE's
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to install seven portal
monitors at three border crossings in another country. DOD has begun
site surveys at about eight additional border crossings in that
country where it plans to install portal monitors. As part of the
International Counterproliferation program, DOD spent $10.2 million
from fiscal year 1997 through 2001 to provide Customs and FBI training
and equipment to 17 countries of the former Soviet Union and Central
and Eastern Europe.
U.S. Customs Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Coast
Guard Implement Assistance with Funding from the Departments of State
and Defense:
The U.S. Customs Service, the largest recipient of funding provided by
State and DOD, spent $11.1 million from fiscal year 1993 through 2001
on assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. Customs has provided
training and equipment to customs agencies and border guards in close
to 30 countries. The equipment includes radiation pagers (small
detectors that can be worn on a belt to continuously monitor radiation
levels or used as a handheld device to pinpoint the location of
radioactive material detected by a portal monitor) as well as a
variety of other high- and low-tech tools to conduct searches and
detect sensitive goods and materials, such as fiber optic scopes for
examining fuel tanks for contraband. Training includes assistance in
operating the x-ray vans equipped with radiation detectors; providing
hands-on instruction in using equipment to detect nuclear smuggling;
teaching techniques for investigating smuggling operations; tracking
the movements of smugglers between ports of entry, including through
rough terrain; and providing "train-the-trainer" courses to enable
countries to train more personnel than the U.S. assistance can reach.
In addition to equipment and training, Customs has stationed 22 in-
country advisors covering 25 countries on behalf of State to help
implement and coordinate the assistance.
From fiscal year 1997 through 2001, the FBI spent $0.4 million as part
of the DOD International Counterproliferation program. The DOD/FBI
effort trained and equipped law enforcement agencies to investigate
and respond to actual seizures of smuggled nuclear or other material.
Training included seminars for high-level officials and courses on
conducting investigations and managing a crime scene where a seizure
has taken place. Equipment provided as part of the training included
protective equipment, such as HAZMAT suits to make handling of seized
material safer; evidence collection and sampling kits; and chemical
detection equipment. In addition, the FBI recently expanded the
equipment list to include radiation pagers.
From fiscal year 1999 through 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard spent $1.6
million in funding received from the State Department Export Control
and Related Border Security Assistance program. The Coast Guard has
provided assistance for maritime interdiction of nuclear smuggling to
countries of the former Soviet Union. Assistance provided to one
country includes two boats with spare parts and stationing of an in-
country Coast Guard advisor.
Table 1 lists each program and activity, expenditures through fiscal
year 2001, and the general nature of the assistance provided. For
additional details about each of the six agencies' programs and
expenditures, see appendix II.
Table 1: Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and Expenditures
through Fiscal Year 2001:
Programs/activities: DOE Second Line of Defense;
Program/activity description: Install radiation detection portal
monitors at Russian border crossings;
Expenditures: $11.2 million;
Funding source: Includes $8.5 million in DOE funds and $2.7 million
from State.
Programs/activities: DOE International Export Control Program;
Program/activity description: Provide nuclear-specific export control
assistance to countries of the former Soviet Union;
Expenditures: $22.0 million;
Funding source: Includes $19.6 million in DOE funds and $2.4 million
from State.
Programs/activities: DOE;
Program/activity description: Install radiation detection equipment in
countries of the former Soviet Union (other than Russia) and Central
and Eastern Europe;
Expenditures: $1.8 million;
Funding source: Includes $0.5 million from State and $1.3 million from
DOD.
Programs/activities: State Dept. Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund;
Program/activity description: Provide radiation detection equipment
and other assistance for interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former
Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe;
Expenditures: $8.5 million;
Funding source:
Programs/activities: State Dept. Export Control & Related Border
Security Assistance;
Program/activity description: Provide radiation detection equipment
and other assistance for interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former
Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. (Took over
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund radiation detection assistance
beginning in FY 2002);
Expenditures: $2.7 million;
Funding source:
Programs/activities: State Dept. Georgia Border Security & Law
Enforcement;
Program/activity description: Provide wide range of assistance to
Georgia border guards and customs service to interdict nuclear
smuggling, fight other crimes such as drug smuggling, and develop
border infrastructure;
Expenditures: $0.2 million;
Funding source:
Programs/activities: DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction;
Program/activity description: Provide radiation detection equipment
and other assistance for interdicting nuclear smuggling to 5
countries, and install radiation detection portal monitors in one
country;
Expenditures: $16.3 million;
Funding source:
Programs/activities: DOD International Counterproliferation program;
Program/activity description: Train and equip customs officers, border
guards, and law enforcement officials to detect, interdict, and
respond to nuclear smuggling;
Expenditures: $10.2 million;
Funding source:
Programs/activities: U.S. Customs Service;
Program/activity description: Train and equip customs officers and
border guards in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe to detect and interdict nuclear smuggling;
Expenditures: $11.1 million;
Funding source: Includes $8.8 million from State and $2.3 million from
DOD.
Programs/activities: Federal Bureau of Investigation;
Program/activity description: Train and equip law enforcement
officials in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe to
investigate and respond to nuclear smuggling incidents;
Expenditures: $0.4 million;
Funding source: Includes $0.4 million from DOD.
Programs/activities: U.S. Coast Guard;
Program/activity description: Provide assistance for maritime
interdiction of nuclear smuggling;
Expenditures: $1.6 million;
Funding source: Includes $1.6 million from State.
Programs/activities: Total;
Expenditures: $86.1 million.
Source: Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, U.S. Customs
Service, U.S. Coast Guard, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.
[End of table]
Some Agencies' Expenditures Have Not Kept Pace with Growth in Funding:
Funding for State's Export Control and Related Border Security
Assistance program grew over tenfold, from $3 million allocated in
fiscal year 1998 to $40.1 million allocated in fiscal year 2001. Due
to the rapid increase, some agencies receiving funds from State have
carried over millions of dollars in program funds into fiscal year
2002 because they have received more funding than they have been able
to spend. For example, Customs' program expenditures have not kept
pace with its growth in funding, and it carried over $33.1 million in
unspent funds into fiscal year 2002, including $6.5 million in
obligated but unspent funds and $26.5 million in funds that had not
been obligated or spent. Customs officials attributed the carryover to
not receiving funds from State until late in the fiscal year and not
obtaining agreements from the recipient countries under which the
assistance would be provided. Furthermore, according to Customs and
State officials, carryover is to be expected because State provides
the funds to Customs under agreements to spend the funds over a 2 to 3
year period.
After September 11, 2001, State received an emergency supplemental
appropriation of $24.7 million. State Department officials said that
they have designated $21.5 million of the emergency supplemental for
assistance (including detection equipment) to six countries.
U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Lacks a Coordinated
Approach:
Because U.S. efforts are not effectively coordinated, the Departments
of Energy, State, and Defense are pursuing separate approaches to
enhancing other countries' border crossings, with the result that some
countries' border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling
than others. While DOE and DOD have installed more sophisticated
portal monitors at border sites in Russia and another country, the
State Department has installed less sophisticated portal monitors in
other countries. In addition, no governmentwide plan links all of the
six agencies' programs together, which exacerbates the coordination
problems.
Efforts to Coordinate Assistance Have Been Inadequate:
The six agencies that are providing training and equipment to combat
nuclear smuggling coordinate their assistance through an interagency
group chaired by the State Department. The group, which includes
representatives from all the U.S. programs that are providing
assistance, meets about once a month to discuss such issues as funding
and financial management of the agencies' various programs, upcoming
assistance activities, and results of program personnel's recent trips
to recipient countries. In addition, program managers of the various
agencies work together to implement the programs. For example, DOD
officials said that they regularly meet with Customs and FBI program
managers to implement assistance and that they participate in the FBI
and Customs training courses that DOD funds.
A number of agency officials said that coordination has improved since
State established a separate office in November 2000—the Office of
Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions—to manage and coordinate U.S.
assistance. For example, the new office provided funding to Customs to
station 22 in-country advisors, covering 25 countries, that are
responsible for coordinating the assistance for all of the six
agencies within a country. DOD and DOE officials said that the
advisors play an important role in implementing their programs. In
addition, the new office has assumed responsibility for much of the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund assistance related to nuclear
smuggling. For instance, the office has taken over responsibility for
providing and maintaining radiation detection equipment to countries
other than Russia.
Despite these coordination efforts, no one agency is in charge of the
overall U.S. effort to provide assistance to combat nuclear smuggling;
consequently, the agencies have implemented their programs without
always coordinating their efforts through the interagency group. For
example, DOD installed portal monitors at three sites in one country
of the former Soviet Union before the State official who chairs the
interagency group learned of the project. According to a DOD official,
the project was coordinated with other State Department officials.
Similarly, although State provides its radiation detection assistance
through DOE, the DOE office that works with State is completely
separate from the Second Line of Defense program, and a Second Line of
Defense official said that his program and the other office do not
communicate with each other. According to the official, a few years
ago the two offices were discussing the possibility of merging, but
the discussions ended after a new director took over the other office
even though Second Line of Defense officials still believe that the
two offices should be merged. Even within the State Department,
different offices implement their programs without full coordination.
For example, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund approved a
project to install portal monitors in a country after agreeing that
the Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions would take over
State's radiation detection assistance, and a separate office at State
has oversight over the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement
program even though one of the objectives of the program is to
strengthen Georgia's ability to interdict nuclear smuggling. Finally,
even though it funds much of the assistance provided by other
agencies, State could not provide accurate information on the other
agencies' program expenditures during the course of our review. For
example, State's records did not match Customs' financial data on
expenditures of funds provided to Customs by State. State officials
said that they have now developed a financial database to track how
the other agencies have spent State's funds.
In addition, DOE, DOD, and State do not share the same views on the
appropriate role of each agency. For example, while State sees itself
as the agency that is leading the coordination effort and setting
policy, a DOD official said that State does not have the necessary
expertise or resources to manage the overall U.S. effort. In contrast,
DOE officials said that State should have a lead role in coordination
and diplomatic support for the assistance programs and that DOE would
depend on State to establish the diplomatic basis that would allow the
Second Line of Defense program to expand into other countries.
However, DOE officials questioned whether State and DOD are the
appropriate agencies for installing portal monitors in countries other
than Russia.
Ineffective Coordination Has Resulted in Some Border Crossings Being
More Vulnerable to Nuclear Smuggling Than Others:
As a result of ineffective coordination, DOE, DOD, and State have
installed portal monitors that have different levels of capability to
detect weapons-usable nuclear material, leaving some border crossings
more vulnerable to nuclear material smuggling than others. While DOE
and DOD have installed more sophisticated portal monitors at border
sites in Russia and another country, State has installed less
sophisticated portal monitors in other countries. In addition, in the
mid-1990s, the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program provided less
sophisticated portal monitors to another country in the former Soviet
Union.
The more sophisticated portal monitors detect two types of radiation—
gamma and neutron—whereas the portal monitors installed by State and
the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program detect only gamma
radiation. The ability to detect neutron radiation translates into a
greater ability to detect weapons-usable plutonium, one of the
materials of greatest concern in terms of nonproliferation. In
addition, according to DOE officials, due to their configuration and
sensitivity the State Department portal monitors are less likely to
detect small quantities of highly enriched uranium, the other material
that is of greatest nonproliferation concern, or material that is
shielded, for example by a lead container or certain parts of a
vehicle. DOE's office that installs the portal monitors on behalf of
State acknowledged that the less sophisticated portal monitors have a
limited capability to detect weapons-usable nuclear material and said
that the portal monitors serve mostly as a deterrent to smuggling. In
addition, DOE and DOD have taken different approaches even though the
two agencies have installed the same Russian-manufactured portal
monitors. For example, DOE officials said that the Second Line of
Defense program has calibrated the monitors in Russia to detect a
smaller quantity of material than the monitors installed by DOD in
another country. In contrast, a DOD official said that DOE's approach
runs the risk of a high rate of false alarms, which can lead to
complacency among officials in charge of responding to alarms.
State Department officials with the Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Fund said that they used less sophisticated portal monitors because of
their lower cost and the difficulty many countries would have in
maintaining sophisticated equipment. For example, some countries lack
even the basic infrastructure to operate and maintain portal monitors,
such as a source of electricity. Because of the different
circumstances existing in each country, State officials said that
radiation detection assistance should be tailored to each country's
needs. The Director of State's Office of Export Control Cooperation
and Sanctions said that State is reevaluating its approach to
providing radiation detection equipment, including installing better
equipment where appropriate. Second Line of Defense officials
expressed concern about using less sophisticated portal monitors at
border crossings on potential smuggling routes leading to countries
seeking nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Second Line of Defense officials
said that because of the differences in the portal monitors, DOE would
replace State's portal monitors with more sophisticated equipment if
the Second Line of Defense program expands into another country and
perhaps use the old portal monitors at lower-priority sites. Overall,
Second Line of Defense officials said that the U.S. government
assistance to provide radiation detection equipment is diffuse and
lacks a single, coherent approach and that the portal monitors should
meet a minimum standard for detecting weapons-usable nuclear material.
The three agencies have also pursued different approaches to providing
handheld radiation detection equipment. With support from DOD and
State, the U.S. Customs Service has provided customs and border
officials with radiation pagers. In contrast, DOE's Second Line of
Defense program provides larger handheld detectors but not radiation
pagers, and DOE officials said that they view the pagers as personal
safety devices that are ineffective at detecting weapons-usable
nuclear material. According to State and Customs officials, pagers are
a useful part of a radiation detection system at border crossings.
Customs officials also said that pagers are just one part of a multi-
layered radiation detection system used by border personnel.
Need Exists for Plan to Guide U.S. Assistance Efforts:
No governmentwide plan links all of the six agencies' programs
together through common goals and objectives, strategies and time
frames for providing assistance, and performance measures for
evaluating the effectiveness of assistance. The in-country customs
advisors have developed country-specific plans, and DOD has developed
a plan for its International Counterproliferation program that
includes threat assessments and a prioritization of countries into
three levels of weapons of mass destruction proliferation risk in the
context of border security and customs enforcement. Similarly, DOE has
developed a list of close to 60 border crossings where it plans to
install radiation detection equipment as part of the Second Line of
Defense program and estimated the cost and timeframe for completing
the program. On the other hand, the State Department has no plan for
providing radiation detection equipment that details how many portal
monitors it plans to install, in what countries, and at which border
crossings. Furthermore, the six agencies have not developed a joint
assessment of the nuclear smuggling threat and the best mix and
location of radiation detection equipment to address the threat.
While DOE conducted an in-depth assessment of the smuggling threat to
prioritize the border crossings where it is installing portal
monitors, State and DOD have not conducted a similar assessment to
prioritize the countries or border crossings to which they are
providing radiation detection equipment. Numerous agency officials
acknowledged that the U.S. effort to improve countries' ability to
combat nuclear smuggling lacks adequate planning. For example, the
director of State's Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions
said that ideally the U.S. government would have a process for
determining how much funding to allocate to each country and what to
spend the funds on. Similarly, a DOD official said that the U.S.
effort requires a centralized and integrated leadership and a
redefinition of the role of each agency in order to overcome
coordination issues.
U.S. Assistance Has Helped Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling, but
Problems with Equipment Undermine Efforts:
U.S. assistance has, in general, strengthened the ability of numerous
countries throughout the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe to deter and detect illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.
However, serious problems with installing, using, accounting for, and
maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U.S.
efforts. These problems are largely the result of the lack of
oversight and follow-up by some of the U.S. agencies providing the
equipment. Another problem is that many countries that have received
radiation detection equipment are not reporting information about
nuclear materials detected by U.S.-supplied equipment. Recently, the
United States began stationing advisors in many of the countries
receiving the assistance to, among other things, correct equipment
problems.
Recipient Country Officials Cite Benefits of U.S. Assistance:
Officials from 17 recipient countries receiving U.S. assistance to
combat nuclear smuggling told us that the assistance had provided much
needed radiation detection equipment and training. According to
officials from several countries, U.S.-supplied portal monitors
installed at border crossings and handheld detection equipment
represent the only assistance of this type that their countries have
received. In other countries the U.S. assistance has supplemented
equipment and training received from other countries. For example,
Latvia has received radiation detection equipment from Finland,
Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, and Estonia has received equipment from
Finland and Germany.
In one country, we visited two border crossings with Russia and saw
that a U.S.-furnished portal monitor and U.S.-supplied handheld
detectors and radiation pagers were being used to inspect cargo and
other materials.
According to this country's officials, the U.S.-supplied portal
monitors installed at several border crossings are well-maintained and
serviced regularly. See figures 1 and 2 for U.S. equipment in that
country.
Figure 1: U.S.-Installed Portal Monitors:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Note: The arrows indicate the location of the portal monitors.
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Typical Handheld Radiation Detector Used by Border Guards:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
[End of figure]
In another country we visited, we saw a U.S. Customs Service-furnished
mobile x-ray van equipped with a radiation detector being used to
inspect luggage and other small items entering the country from Russia
A few hours later, the van was driven to another crossing point along
the border where passengers and their possessions were screened at a
train station. Passengers' bags and other personal items were passed
through an x-ray machine that was part of the van's screening
apparatus. Occasionally, the border guard who was operating the x-ray
machine would examine the contents of the items that had been x-rayed
to determine their exact content. Figure 3 shows the x-ray van.
Figure 3: U.S.-Supplied Mobile X-Ray Van:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
[End of figure]
Russian customs officials told us that radiation detection equipment
funded by DOE's Second Line of Defense program has helped accelerate
Russia's plans to improve border security. According to these
officials, as of October 2001, DOE had financed the purchase of about
15 percent of Russia's 300 portal monitors. The U.S.-funded equipment
is manufactured in Russia and is subject to site acceptance testing
conducted by DOE national laboratory personnel. This testing is
designed to ensure that portal monitors are placed in an optimal
configuration (to maximize detection capability) and that the
equipment is being used as intended. According to Russian officials,
there is excellent cooperation with DOE on ways to continually improve
the performance of the equipment. Russian customs officials also told
us that DOE has done a very credible job of making follow-up visits to
inspect the equipment and ensure that it is recalibrated as necessary
to meet performance specifications.
During our visit to Russia, we observed several U.S.-funded pedestrian
portal monitors that were installed at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport
(see figure 4) as well as a control room that included video equipment
and a computerized monitoring system, also funded by DOE, that was
connected to the portal monitors. DOE's detection equipment installed
throughout Russia is monitored by closed circuit cameras. Russian
officials tested the equipment we saw at the airport on our behalf.
They "planted"-—with our knowledge-—a radioactive source in an attaché
case that we carried past a pedestrian portal monitor, which activated
an alarm. A computer screen in the control room displayed our
movements past the portal monitor.
Figure 4: U.S.-Funded Portal Monitors at the Sheremetyevo Airport in
Moscow:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
[End of figure]
U.S. assistance includes training, which U.S. and recipient country
officials told us is part of an integrated approach that is needed to
combat nuclear smuggling. This approach should include equipment,
training, and intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. Training
is a critical component of combating nuclear smuggling. For example,
border personnel need to be trained in inspection techniques,
laboratory specialists need to be able to analyze and properly
identify material that is detected and law enforcement officials need
to be able to conduct investigations in order to prosecute, when
appropriate, individuals apprehended in nuclear smuggling cases. U.S.
agencies have trained more than 3,500 border security and law
enforcement personnel in a broad range of weapons of mass destruction
interdiction programs. The U.S. Customs Service trained over 2,970
customs and law enforcement officers from more than 25 countries
during 1996-2001, and the FBI trained approximately 600 foreign
country personnel during a similar period. DOE has funded the
development of a guidebook printed in Russian for 300 customs officers
to help identify equipment that could be used to develop a nuclear
weapon. In addition, DOE, in concert with the Russian Customs Academy,
implemented a mobile training program that provides training to
customs agents in remote locations.
U.S. agency officials provided several examples to show how U.S.-
provided equipment and training have strengthened countries' ability
to detect and deter nuclear smuggling.
* In July 2001, portal monitors furnished by DOD to one country
detected radioactive material that had been driven in a truck across
the border. According to DOD and country officials, the equipment at
the border crossing had only been operational for 2 days when the
incident occurred.
* According to DOE officials, U.S. equipment in Russia has detected
more than 275 instances involving radioactive material. These cases
include contaminated scrap metal, irradiated cargo, and other
radioactive materials that could pose a proliferation concern.
* In 1999, customs officials in a country that had received
DOD/Customs training on inspecting vehicles and passengers for
smuggled nuclear materials seized weapons-usable material that had
been hidden inside the trunk of a car. According to U.S. Customs
officials, this case shows the importance of providing training that
combines general border inspection techniques with specialized
training in nuclear materials.
Problems with Equipment Undermine U.S. Assistance Efforts:
We found numerous problems with various types of radiation detection
equipment that has been provided by DOD, the State Department, and the
U.S. Customs Service. According to officials from these agencies and a
DOE office responsible for installing portal monitors in some
countries, U.S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling has lacked
effective follow-up to ensure that equipment delivered was properly
maintained and used for the purposes intended. Several officials told
us that there has been inadequate funding for maintenance and training
on the use of the equipment in many countries of the former Soviet
Union. U.S. officials frequently described this practice as "drop and
run." A State Department official told us that it had always been the
responsibility of the recipient countries to alert the United States
when equipment needed to be repaired. This official noted, however,
that country officials did not systematically report problems and, as
a result, malfunctioning equipment was sometimes left unrepaired for
extended periods of time. He also noted that until recently there was
no consolidated list of all the equipment that different agencies had
provided. He compiled such a list but could not be certain that all
equipment provided under DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction program
was included.
At a January 2002 IAEA conference, a DOD official provided information
about problems with U.S.-supplied equipment. He noted that audits
found that detection equipment in several countries had never been
used and remained in storage; expensive high-technology equipment was
only used in the presence of visiting U.S. delegations; and equipment
was going unused because it needed battery replacement, very minor
repairs, or major repairs that required out-of-country servicing. The
DOD official noted that recipient country officials offered numerous
reasons why the equipment was being underutilized or not used at all,
including (1) the equipment was too difficult to use; (2) nobody was
trained to use it; (3) the equipment would be broken; (4) use of the
equipment could cause injuries; (5) repairs were too difficult; (6) no
funds had been provided for new batteries; and (7) a lack of knowledge
about where or how to send the equipment for repairs.
During the course of our work, we also found numerous problems with
U.S. radiation detection equipment provided to many countries,
including the following examples, which are based on, among other
things, discussions with U.S. program officials and representatives of
countries receiving U.S. assistance:
* The condition of equipment provided by the United States at a border
crossing in one country in Eastern Europe has been described as
deplorable, and the equipment was not being used, according to a
November 2001 U.S. embassy memorandum. Another memorandum noted that
according to a customs official from this recipient country, the
portal monitors were not being used because they emitted too much
radiation and posed a health and safety hazard. According to a U.S.
official, the incident indicates how little some recipient country
officials know about the equipment, because the portal monitors do not
emit radiation. In addition, based on a recent inventory, a U.S.
official was unable to locate many radiation pagers furnished to that
country. In another country, the whereabouts of several dozen handheld
radiation detectors could not be determined.
* About half of the pedestrian portal monitors provided to one country
in the former Soviet Union were never installed or are not
operational. Officials from this country told us that they were given
more equipment then they could use. In addition, the equipment had
limited capability to detect nuclear material.
* Portal monitors delivered to Lithuania were stored in the U.S.
embassy basement for about 2 years because the State Department and
the Lithuanian border organization disagreed about the need for a
power supply that cost $12,600 to operate the equipment. In February
2002, the monitors were finally installed.
* Equipment worth about $80,000, including radiation protection suits
and pagers, could not be given to Estonia as part of a DOD/FBI
training program because an agreement governing the release of such
equipment had not been finalized. The equipment was placed in an
embassy garage for about 7 months before it was transferred to Estonia
in December 2001.
* A portal monitor furnished by the State Department to Bulgaria a
couple of years ago was installed on an unused road that is not
expected to open for another 1-1/2 years. Plans are underway to
relocate the equipment.
* In November 2001, a U.S. official visited a border crossing in one
country of the former Soviet Union where a portal monitor had been
disconnected. Country officials told him that it had been shut off
because it was lunchtime and no traffic was being allowed to pass. The
monitor is designed to be operated continuously.
We also found problems with the mobile vans equipped with radiation
detection equipment furnished by the State Department. These vans have
limited utility because they cannot operate effectively in cold
climates or are otherwise not suitable for conditions in some
countries. For example, customs officials from one country told us
that the vans (which had a total cost of about $900,000) they received
within the last 2 years had to be moved to a warmer part of the
country. Nevertheless, they told us that the vans could only be
operated about 9 months each year and that even when operational, they
are very fuel inefficient. Officials from another country told us the
van they received about 1 year ago has rarely been used because of the
cold weather and the expense associated with its operation. They said
that the van is now stored in a shipping crate at customs'
headquarters.
Country Advisors Trying to Improve Delivery of U.S. Assistance:
In the past 2 years, the State Department has placed advisors in many
of the countries receiving U.S. assistance to improve program
effectiveness. These advisors, generally retired U.S. Customs Service
officials, are responsible for, among other things, developing,
coordinating, and updating recipient country border security
requirements. In addition, they seek to ensure that the appropriate
foreign officials attend training courses; track the assistance that
countries receive from various programs to avoid duplication of
equipment; meet with government ministries in the recipient countries;
and inventory equipment and determine how it is being used, including
assessing its effectiveness. In addition, State is using the advisors
to improve equipment sustainability and facilitate routine maintenance
and equipment repair. Although the State Department funds them, the
advisors work on behalf of all the programs, and DOE and DOD officials
said that the advisors play a valuable role in implementing their
assistance programs. Country officials we met with also said that the
advisors have been effective at identifying program needs and
resolving problems with equipment.
Lack of Consistent Reporting Hampers U.S. Efforts to Measure Impact of
Radiation Detection Equipment:
According to DOE, State, and other U.S. officials, in many cases
countries that have received U.S. radiation detection equipment are
not systematically providing information about nuclear materials
detected by U.S.-supplied equipment. As a result, it is difficult to
determine the overall impact and effectiveness of the equipment. While
agencies are receiving feedback on the performance level of equipment,
such as whether the equipment is properly calibrated or performing
according to technical specifications, limited information is provided
about the impact of the equipment—namely to what extent is it
detecting weapons-usable and other types of radioactive material. Two
U.S. advisors told us that recipient country officials have ignored
their requests for this type of information. An official from DOE's
office that installs portal monitors in some countries told us that
his program does not have the means to verify the effectiveness of
portal monitors due to the lack of incident reporting by some
countries. He noted that information about nuclear smuggling cases
varies from country to country and depends on good relationships
between the recipient country's border security organization and the
U.S. embassy. Officials from DOE's Second Line of Defense program told
us that they receive information about incidents from their Russian
counterparts on a voluntary basis. However, the reporting is not
consistent and they are not confident that there has been a complete
sharing of information about nuclear materials detected with U.S.-
funded equipment. DOE is seeking to formalize the reporting of
information as part of an overall agreement with Russia on the Second
Line of Defense program.
Other Challenges to Border Security:
In addition to the problems with the equipment, there are other
factors that impact U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling,
including corruption in countries' border organizations and the amount
of territory, including borders that are not clearly marked, that
requires protection. According to officials from several recipient
countries, corruption is a pervasive problem within the ranks of
border security organizations. For example, approximately 1,500
Russian customs officers were fired in 1998 for corruption. Russian
customs officials noted that efforts are underway to root corruption
out but that this is a slow process. An official from one country told
us that border security personnel turned off radiation detection
equipment at one border crossing in exchange for a bottle of alcohol.
In fiscal year 2002, the U.S. Customs Service started providing a new
anti-corruption training course. Regarding the challenge posed by the
expanses of territory, numerous recipient country officials told us
that it is impossible to secure every border crossing. Every country
has green borders—expanses of territory that are not patrolled or
regulated by border security personnel. These areas are very
attractive to smugglers in general. In addition, borders are not
always clearly marked or well established following the breakup of the
former Soviet Union. A high-level official from one country's border
guard told us that the biggest problem he faces is the lack of
agreement with Russia over boundaries. Furthermore, a border security
official from another country told us that a dedicated nuclear
smuggler has a 90-percent chance of successfully defeating his
country's border controls. A customs official from Russia told us that
equipment is a deterrent and must be supported by trained border
personnel, effective law enforcement, and intelligence gathering
operations. He stated that the most effective approach to combating
nuclear smuggling is to secure the nuclear material at its source at
civilian and military facilities.
Conclusions:
The current multiple-agency approach to providing U.S. assistance to
combat nuclear smuggling is not, in our view, the most effective way
to deliver this assistance. To date, the efforts of the six U.S.
agencies participating in these programs and activities have not been
well coordinated, and there is no single agency that leads the effort
to effectively establish funding priorities and thoroughly assess
recipient country requirements. Coordination is also a problem within
agencies providing assistance. We question why, for example, there are
two offices within the Department of Energy that are providing
radiation detection equipment and two offices within the Department of
State that have funded similar types of equipment for various
countries. To ensure the efficient and effective delivery of
assistance and the timely and effective expenditure of program funds,
we believe that the development of a governmentwide plan is needed.
Such a plan could identify a unified set of program goals and
priorities and define agency roles and responsibilities; determine
program cost estimates; establish time frames for effectively spending
program funds; develop strategies to maintain and sustain the
operation of equipment; and develop exit strategies for each country
receiving assistance, including a plan for transferring responsibility
for equipment maintenance to the countries.
We are also concerned about how U.S. equipment is being used by the
recipient countries. While foreign officials told us that U.S.-
provided equipment had improved their ability to detect radioactive
material, some equipment has not been well maintained, adequately
accounted for, or installed on a timely basis. A fundamental issue
surrounding nuclear smuggling is the sharing of information about
incidents that occur in each country. Currently, the agencies that are
providing the equipment have limited access to this type of
information. There is currently no systematic effort to obtain this
data, and the United States depends on the willingness of the
countries to voluntary provide information. It is difficult to assess
the impact and effectiveness of the U.S.-supplied equipment unless
data are routinely obtained and analyzed. We believe that U.S. agency
personnel must continue to make the case to each country that sharing
such data is of critical importance to the success of the U.S. program
and countries' efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.
Recommendations:
We recommend that the Secretary of State take the lead in facilitating
the development of a governmentwide plan to help other countries
develop an integrated approach to combat nuclear smuggling. The plan
should be developed in conjunction with the Secretaries of Defense and
Energy (working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration), and the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs
Service, as well as the heads of other federal agencies participating
in this effort. The plan should, at a minimum, identify (1) a unified
set of program goals and priorities, including defining participating
agencies' roles and responsibilities; (2) overall program cost
estimates; (3) time frames for effectively spending program funds; (4)
performance measures; (5) strategies to maintain and sustain the
operation of the equipment, including cost estimates; and (6) an exit
strategy for each country receiving assistance, including a plan for
transferring responsibility for equipment maintenance to the host
country.
In concert with the development of the plan, we believe there are
other steps that could be taken immediately to improve U.S. efforts.
We think that this is an opportune time for agencies with duplicative
or overlapping responsibilities to consolidate their efforts under a
single agency program office. To that end, we recommend that the:
* Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, consolidate radiation
detection equipment activities in one DOE office, preferably within
the Second Line of Defense program and,
* Secretary of State consolidate all border security and nuclear
smuggling efforts under one program office.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy, in
consultation with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, and the Secretaries of State and Defense:
* strengthen efforts to obtain a full accounting of the equipment that
is in each country, including the handheld radiation detection
equipment;
* ensure that equipment is installed in a timely fashion and is
adequately maintained; and;
* seek recipient country assurances that information about nuclear
materials detected by U.S.-supplied equipment is shared with U.S.
agencies on a timely basis.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State,
Energy, and Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Coast Guard;
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and comment.
The Coast Guard and FBI had no comments on the draft report. DOD
provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as
appropriate. State's, DOE's, and Customs Service's written comments
are presented in appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. The agencies
agreed with the facts presented in the report and State specifically
said that it agreed with the report's conclusions and recommendations.
Customs suggested that we reword our recommendation to specifically
include it as one of the agencies to develop a governmentwide plan to
combat nuclear smuggling. DOE did not comment on the conclusions and
recommendations.
In commenting on the report, the Department of State agreed that
interagency coordination to help other countries combat nuclear
smuggling can be strengthened. The State Department noted that, per
our recommendation, it is taking the lead in facilitating the
development of a governmentwide plan to provide detection equipment
and maintenance support. State also commented, however, that the
report gave insufficient weight to the progress that has been made in
the past 1-1/2 years to improve coordination and planning.
Specifically, State cited its establishment of the Office of Export
Control Cooperation and Sanctions, which is responsible for, among
other things, managing and coordinating U.S. government export control
and related border security programs. In addition, the Office chairs
an interagency working group that evaluates, prioritizes, and approves
projects that U.S. agencies undertake to improve countries' export
control and related border security capabilities. The Department also
stated that it has taken steps to improve internal coordination as
well as accountability for equipment previously provided to other
countries and noted that the country advisors play a prominent role in
these matters. Regarding these points, we recognized in the draft
report that State had improved coordination through an interagency
group that it chairs. Further, we noted that recipient country
officials told us that the advisors play a valuable role in
implementing their assistance programs. In addition, we recognized in
the draft report that the Office of Export Control Cooperation and
Sanctions has improved coordination. However, we continue to believe
that interagency coordination has been inadequate and needs to be
improved. State acknowledged this point in its comments and said that
a more coherent, better coordinated approach to providing radiation
detection equipment is needed. The Department concurred with all of
our recommendations and said that it will work with other agencies to
implement them.
In its comments, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration agreed that it is difficult to assess the impact and
effectiveness of U.S.-supplied equipment unless data from the
recipient countries are routinely obtained and analyzed. DOE believes
that sharing data is critical to the success of the U.S. program and
countries' efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. DOE also endorsed the
need for a more uniform approach to radiation monitoring at countries'
borders. The Department wanted to clarify that it has three programs
that operate in this area: the Second Line of Defense program that has
historically focused on Russia; the International Export Control
program that deals with equipment that has both civilian and military
applications, material and technology; and a program that uses
Department of State funding to maintain and install equipment outside
of Russia. DOE also pointed out that radiation detection monitors
installed by other U.S. agencies are not as sensitive to special
nuclear materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) as the
monitors funded by DOE, and have limited or no ability to detect
shielded plutonium. Regarding DOE's point about its different
programs, we noted in the draft report that DOE has three separate
programs under way to combat nuclear smuggling. We highlighted the
Second Line of Defense program, however, because it is DOE's primary
effort to combat nuclear smuggling. Regarding DOE's comment about the
limitations of equipment installed by other U.S. programs, we
recognized in the draft report that DOE has installed more
sophisticated portal monitors in Russia and that the State Department
has installed less sophisticated equipment in other countries.
The U.S. Customs Service noted that the U.S. government's
nonproliferation efforts are not limited to nuclear materials, but
instead cover the entire spectrum of weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical and biological weapons. Customs also noted that
although our report focused on the use of technology to detect nuclear
or radioactive materials, the importance of highly skilled and trained
border inspection personnel should not be underestimated. Finally,
because Customs has been the largest recipient of funds appropriated
for nuclear smuggling assistance, it suggested that our recommendation
be reworded to include Customs specifically as one of the agencies to
develop a governmentwide plan to help other countries combat nuclear
smuggling. While we agree with Customs' assertion that U.S.
nonproliferation activities are aimed at a broad range of threats, our
review focused only on the nuclear material smuggling component of
this effort. We agree with Customs' point about highly skilled and
trained personnel, and we recognized in the draft report that training
is a critical component and should be part of an integrated approach
to combat nuclear smuggling. Finally, we have reworded our
recommendation to specifically identify Customs as one of the agencies
that should develop a governmentwide plan to help other countries
combat nuclear smuggling.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine program expenditures, we obtained budget, obligation and
expenditure data through fiscal year 2001 from the six agencies
participating in the program—the Departments of Energy, State, and
Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our task was complicated because each
agency collects and reports its financial data differently. We
attempted to standardize the reporting format for each agency and
verify the accuracy of the data by crosschecking financial records
maintained by each agency. When we found discrepancies, we brought
them to the attention of the agencies. The agencies' data did not
allow us to aggregate cost on a country-by-country basis because data
was generally reported on a project, not country, basis. Our task was
further complicated because the Department of State, which is
responsible for tracking funds it has received for border security
assistance, did not have an adequate financial management system in
place to report program expenditures. Department of State officials
responsible for monitoring program expenditures are aware of this
deficiency and are taking steps to improve its current financial
management system.
To assess how well U.S. assistance is coordinated, we met with program
officials from each of the agencies providing assistance and reviewed
pertinent documents, including individual agency's assistance plans,
as available. We assessed coordination through the interagency group
headed by the Department of State and met with the lead official of
that effort—the Director of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions—
and members of his staff. We also discussed coordination issues with
U.S. advisors stationed in countries receiving U.S. assistance
including Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovenia,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Several of these advisors were responsible
for tracking assistance efforts in more than one country. For example,
the advisor stationed in Latvia was also responsible for Lithuania,
Estonia, and Poland.
We obtained information from a number of sources to assess the
effectiveness of the U.S. assistance. We visited Estonia, Latvia,
Poland, and Russia to obtain a first hand look at U.S. radiation
detection equipment installed at different border crossings and meet
with officials responsible for border security, law enforcement, and
export controls. We also attended a technical conference on radiation
detection equipment sponsored by the IAEA in January 2002, where we
met with officials from 13 additional countries that had received U.S.
assistance: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Romania, the
Slovak Republic, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. We also met with
representatives from the IAEA, the U.S. Mission to International
Organizations in Vienna, and the U.S. embassies in Latvia, Estonia,
Poland, and Russia to discuss nuclear smuggling. We obtained technical
information on radiation detection equipment from DOE; Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory; Los Alamos National Laboratory; the
Savannah River Site; and one equipment manufacturer, TSA Systems Ltd.
We conducted our review between May 2001 and April 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of
this report to the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National
Nuclear Security Administration; the Secretary of State; the Secretary
of Defense; the Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service; the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested
congressional committees. We will make copies available to others upon
request.
If you have any questions concerning this report, I can be reached at
(202) 512-3841. MAjor contributors to this report include Gene Aloise,
Joseph Cook, and Glen Levis.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
(Ms.) Gary L. Jones
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents:
This appendix provides information about nuclear material smuggling
incidents over the past decade. It focuses primarily on 20 incidents
involving weapons-usable nuclear material. The information was
obtained from, among other sources, data provided by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)[Footnote 4] and the Department of Energy.
Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit
trafficking in many types of nuclear materials worldwide. According to
IAEA, nuclear materials include nuclear source material, such as
natural uranium, depleted uranium, thorium,[Footnote 5] plutonium, and
uranium enriched in the isotopes U-233 or U-235. Plutonium and highly
enriched uranium[Footnote 6]—-known as weapons usable material—-are
considered to pose the greatest proliferation risk because they are
used to produce nuclear weapons. In 1993, IAEA established a database
to record incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear
materials. Sixty-nine countries, or about one-half of IAEA's member
states, currently participate in the database. As of December 31,
2001, IAEA listed 181 confirmed incidents involving the illicit
trafficking in nuclear materials, including weapons-usable material.
According to IAEA, a confirmed incident is one in which the
information has been verified to IAEA through official points of
contact from the reporting country. Of the 181 confirmed illicit
trafficking incidents reported by IAEA, 17 involved either highly
enriched uranium or plutonium. More than half of the 17 incidents
involving weapons-usable material occurred during 1993-95. The
remaining cases occurred during 1999-2001.
Incidents Involving Weapons Usable Nuclear Material:
IAEA, DOE, and other U.S. officials provided us with information about
20 cases involving the smuggling of weapons-usable material since
1992. Officials told us that the actual number of smuggling cases
involving weapons-usable material is probably larger than what is
currently being reported because countries are not always willing to
share sensitive nuclear smuggling information. Furthermore, the
premature public disclosure of information could undermine an ongoing
criminal investigation or could be politically embarrassing. Another
factor that affects the number of cases reported is the credibility of
the information. DOE officials who analyze smuggling cases told us
that a significant amount of time must be spent analyzing a particular
incident before it can be deemed credible, and many of the reported
incidents turn out to be unsubstantiated. For example, several
reported cases over the years have been scams whereby a "smuggler" has
been apprehended trying to sell material that is purported to be
weapons-usable but is not. Regardless of the number of actual cases of
nuclear smuggling, officials stated that the threat posed by illicit
trafficking is real and should not be underestimated. The head of
IAEA's Office of Physical Protection and Material Security told us
that every reported case should be taken seriously. Further, she noted
that countries need to more systematically report smuggling incidents
so that better assessments can be performed.
Officials from IAEA, DOE, and other U.S. agencies provided several
observations about the 20 incidents involving weapons-usable nuclear
material.
* Many of the incidents involved material that came from countries of
the former Soviet Union, primarily Russia.
* From the early 1990s through about 1998, the nuclear material was
seized primarily in Russia and eastern and western Europe. In the past
few years, there appears to have been an increase in trafficking in
nuclear material through the Caucasus (Georgia), Central Asia
(Kyrgyzstan), Greece, and Turkey. According to IAEA, it is uncertain
whether the increase represents more trafficking in this material or
better detection and reporting of activities that may have been going
on in earlier years.
* Most of the smuggling incidents involved relatively small quantities
of weapons-usable material that were insufficient to construct a
nuclear bomb. In some cases, the small quantities of material involved
may indicate that the seller was trying to attract a potential buyer
with a "sample size" quantity of material. In other cases, it appears
doubtful that the traffickers had or claimed access to larger
quantities of nuclear material.
* The incidents do not appear to be part of an organized criminal or
terrorist activity or organization.
* In most of the incidents, the weapons-usable material was seized as
a result of a police investigation. The material was not detected by
equipment or personnel stationed at border crossings. One notable
exception involved material detected by customs agents at a Bulgarian
border crossing. In addition, the Bulgarian incident represents one of
a few reported instances where the nuclear material was shielded or
protected to avoid detection.
Table 2 provides information about the 20 incidents involving the
smuggling of weapons-usable material since 1992. A brief discussion of
some of the significant incidents follows the table.
Table 2: Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons-Usable Material
since 1992:
Date: May 1992;
Source of material: Russia (Luch Scientific Production Association);
Country where material seized: Russia;
Material/quantity: 1.5 kilograms (90 percent highly enriched uranium);
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: May 1993;
Source of material: Russia;
Country where material seized: Lithuania;
Material/quantity: 0.1 kilogram (50 percent highly enriched uranium);
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: July 1993;
Source of material: Russia;
Country where material seized: Russia;
Material/quantity: 1.8 kilograms (36 percent highly enriched uranium);
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: November 1993;
Source of material: Russia;
Country where material seized: Russia;
Material/quantity: 4.5 kilograms (20 percent highly enriched uranium);
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: March 1994;
Source of material: Russia;
Country where material seized: Russia;
Material/quantity: 3.05 kilograms (90 percent highly enriched uranium);
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: May 1994;
Source of material: Unspecified;
Country where material seized: Germany;
Material/quantity: 0.006 kilograms plutonium-239;
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: June 1994;
Source of material: Russia;
Country where material seized: Germany;
Material/quantity: 0.0008 kilograms (87.8 percent highly enriched
uranium);
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: July 1994;
Source of material: Russia;
Country where material seized: Germany;
Material/quantity: 0.00024 kilograms plutonium;
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: August 1994;
Source of material: Russia;
Country where material seized: Germany;
Material/quantity: 0.4 kilograms of plutonium;
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: December 1994;
Source of material: Russia;
Country where material seized: Czech Republic;
Material/quantity: 2.7 kilograms (87.7 percent highly enriched
uranium);
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: June 1995;
Source of material: Russia;
Country where material seized: Czech Republic;
Material/quantity: 0.0004 grams (87.7 percent highly enriched uranium);
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: June 1995;
Source of material: Russia;
Country where material seized: Czech Republic;
Material/quantity: 0.017 kilograms (87.7 percent highly enriched
uranium);
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: June 1995;
Source of material: Russia;
Country where material seized: Russia;
Material/quantity: 1.7 kilograms (21 percent highly enriched uranium);
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: May 1999;
Source of material: Russia;
Country where material seized: Bulgaria;
Material/quantity: 0.004 kilograms of highly enriched uranium;
How material was found: Interdiction at border by Bulgarian customs.
Date: October 1999;
Source of material: Unspecified;
Country where material seized: Kyrgyzstan;
Material/quantity: 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium;
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: April 2000;
Source of material: Unspecified but Russia suspected;
Country where material seized: Georgia;
Material/quantity: 0.9 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (30
percent);
How material was found: Possible combination of radiation detection
equipment at border and police investigation.
Date: September 2000;
Source of material: Possibly Russia and/or Ukraine;
Country where material seized: Georgia;
Material/quantity: 0.0004 kilograms of plutonium;
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: December 2000;
Source of material: Germany;
Country where material seized: Germany;
Less than 1 milligram of plutonium;
How material was found: Radioactive contamination disclosed in a test.
Date: January 2001;
Source of material: Unspecified;
Country where material seized: Greece;
Approximately 0.003 kilograms of plutonium;
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Date: July 2001;
Source of material: Unspecified;
Country where material seized: France;
About 0.005 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (approximately 80
percent enriched);
How material was found: Discovered by police investigation.
Note: Uranium enriched with 20 percent or higher U-235 is considered
weapons-usable material. One kilogram equals 2.2 pounds. One thousand
grams equal 1 kilogram and 1 gram is equal to about 0.04 ounces, or
the weight of a paperclip.
Source: Various U.S. agencies and international organizations.
[End of table]
Luch Scientific Production Association (Russia), 1992:
This incident involved a chemical engineer and long-time employee of
the State Research Institute, Scientific Production Association (also
known as Luch) which is located 22 miles from Moscow.[Footnote 7]
Beginning in May 1992, over a 5-month period, the individual smuggled
out of the institute small quantities of highly enriched uranium
totaling 1.5 kilograms. In October 1992, the engineer was arrested
because police suspected him of stealing equipment from the Luch
facility. Once in custody, the police discovered the nuclear material
that he had stolen. The individual did not have a specific buyer in
mind, but was trying to determine if there was a market for the stolen
nuclear material. He was tried before a Russian court and received 3
years' probation.
Vilnius, Lithuania, 1993:
In May 1993, Lithuanian authorities recovered 4.4 tons of beryllium in
a smuggling investigation. Beryllium is a metal that is used in the
production of, among other things, x-ray tubes, lasers, computers,
aircraft parts, nuclear reactors, and nuclear weapons. When Lithuanian
authorities seized the material, they discovered that some of the
beryllium (141 kilograms) was contaminated with approximately 0.1
kilogram of highly enriched uranium. There was no evidence that the
individuals involved were aware that the beryllium contained the
enriched uranium. Some reports indicated that the beryllium originated
at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Russia. This
institute is involved in the research and development of nuclear power
reactors and employs about 5,000 people and possesses several tons of
weapons-usable material.
Murmansk, Russia, 1993:
In July 1993, two Russian naval enlisted personnel stole two fresh
fuel rods from a storage facility in Murmansk, Russia. These rods were
for Russian naval propulsion reactors that power submarines and
contained 36-percent enriched uranium. (Uranium enriched at 20 percent
or greater is considered to be weapons usable material.) The amount of
material totaled about 1.8 kilograms of highly enriched uranium.
Russian security officers discovered the missing material and
apprehended the individuals before the material left the Murmansk
area. One of the individuals arrested was a guard at the facility and
was suspected by authorities after the material was missing. The two
enlisted personnel who were caught implicated two Russian naval
officers in the plan. However, at the ensuing trial only the two
enlisted personnel were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of 4
and 5 years.
Murmansk, Russia, 1993:
In November 1993, approximately 4.5 kilograms of 20-percent enriched
uranium, intended for use in submarine propulsion reactors, was stolen
from a fuel storage facility in the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk,
Russia Three individuals were arrested in connection with the theft,
including two naval officers. The group stored the fuel rods in a
garage for several months while they were looking for a prospective
buyer. The three individuals were arrested and two of the men received
3-1/2-year sentences while the third person was acquitted.
St. Petersburg, Russia, 1994:
In March 1994, three men were arrested in St. Petersburg, Russia for
trying to sell approximately 3 kilograms of uranium enriched to 90
percent. The material was allegedly smuggled from the Elektrostal
Production Association which is located in the Moscow suburbs. The
facility produces low-enriched uranium for commercial nuclear power
reactors and also has the capacity to produce highly enriched uranium
for nuclear powered icebreakers and submarines. The material was
smuggled out of the facility and approximately 500 grams of the
material were found inside a glass jar in a refrigerator in one of
individuals homes.
Tengen, Germany, 1994:
In May 1994, German police discovered a lead container containing
0.006 kilograms of highly concentrated plutonium-239 in the home of a
German citizen. The material found in the container was a mixture of
many components, including aluminum, silicon, mercury, zirconium,
broken glass, and brush bristles as well as the plutonium. The
presence of mercury in the mixture suggests that the material may have
been used as part of a red mercury scam.[Footnote 8] In November 1995,
the German national was sentenced to 2-1/2 years in prison for
violating arms control laws. The sentence was added onto a 3-year term
he was already serving time for counterfeiting.
Landshut, Germany, 1994:
In June 1994, less than 0.001 kilogram of highly enriched uranium was
recovered in Landshut, Germany, a city near Munich. This material,
along with 120 low enriched uranium fuel pellets, was found as a
result of a police undercover operation. The material was seized in an
undercover police operation. Three individuals apprehended were
citizens of the Slovak Republic and one was a resident of Germany. A
German court sentenced several of the individuals to probationary
terms but one of the group's leaders was sentenced to 2 years in
prison.
Munich, Germany, 1994:
In 1994, undercover German police acting as prospective buyers
intercepted approximately 0.4 kilograms of plutonium at the Munich
Airport. It is believed that the material originated in Russia's
Institute of Physics and Power Engineering. The institute, which is
operated by Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, is involved in the
research and development of nuclear power reactors and possesses
several tons of weapons-usable material. The material was in a
suitcase that had arrived on a flight from Moscow. The individuals
involved in the smuggling case were from Colombia and Spain. A German
court sentenced the Colombian national to almost 5 years in prison and
the Spanish nationals received prison sentences of between 3 and 4
years. All of the individuals were expelled from Germany after serving
half of their sentences. By February 1996, Russian authorities had
arrested several Russian accomplices, including a key figure involved
in the theft of the material from the institute.
Prague, Czech Republic, 1994:
In December 1994, police in Prague, Czech Republic, seized
approximately 2.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The material
is believed to have been stolen from the Russian Institute of Physics
and Power Engineering. The individuals involved included a Tajikistan
national, a former Russian nuclear institute worker, and at least one
Czech national. The material was brought into the Czech Republic on a
train and then hidden for about 6 months while the individuals
involved tried to sell it. They were arrested after Czech authorities
received an anonymous tip and a Czech judge gave several members of
the group prison sentences ranging from about 18 months to 8 years.
Two related incidents were reported in June 1995 and involved the
seizure of highly enriched uranium in the Czech Republic. According to
available information, the composition of the material and its
location were linked to the 1994 Prague and Landshut incidents. In
both instances, the small quantities of material involved indicated
that it was a sample that could be used to attract a potential buyer.
Rousse, Bulgaria, 1999:
In May 1999, Bulgarian customs officials at the Rousse border
checkpoint seized a vial containing about 0.004 kilograms of highly
enriched uranium on the Bulgarian/Romanian border. Rousse is a city
that serves as Bulgaria's principal river port and is a transportation
hub for road and rail traffic. The material was hidden in a shielded
(lead) container inside the trunk of a car being driven by a Turkish
citizen. The driver attempted to sell the material first in Turkey and
then traveled through Bulgaria on his way to Romania, where he planned
to find a buyer. A Bulgarian customs agent, using standard profiling
techniques, suspected that the driver was a smuggler. A search of the
driver's papers revealed a document describing uranium. When the
driver attempted to bribe the customs officer, his car was thoroughly
inspected and the officer eventually discovered the vial containing
the weapons-usable nuclear material. Bulgarian scientists concluded
that the material was highly enriched uranium. Although the source of
the material is not certain, it is probable that it came from the
Mayak Production Association in Russia. This large complex produces
special isotopes used for industrial, agricultural, and medical
purposes and also reprocesses naval and civil nuclear power reactor
fuel for plutonium and uranium recovery.
Kara-Balta, Kyrgyzstan, 1999:
In October 1999, two persons were arrested in the act of selling a
small metallic disk containing 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium. The item
was analyzed by the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Kazakhstan and the
two individuals arrested were convicted and sentenced to prison.
Batumi, Georgia, 2000:
In April 2000, Georgian police arrested four persons in Batumi,
Georgia, for unauthorized possession of 0.9 kilogram of highly
enriched uranium fuel pellets. Batumi is a seashore resort at the
Black Sea located along the Georgia-Turkey border. According to one
press report, the material may have been smuggled from Russia. The
pellets mass and shape, together with the reported enrichment level,
suggest that the pellets were produced for use in a commercial or
experimental fast breeder reactor. Another report also stated that the
smugglers were detected when they crossed the Russian border into
Georgia, possibly by radiation monitoring equipment and were then
trailed to the city of Batumi, where they were apprehended. It is
believed that the individuals were trying to smuggle the material into
Turkey.
Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000:
In September 2000, three persons were arrested at Tbilisi airport for
attempting to sell a small quantity of mixed powder containing about
0.0004 kilograms of plutonium and 0.0008 kilograms of low enriched
uranium, as well as a 0.002 kilogram sample of natural uranium.
According to press reports, an official in the Georgian Ministry of
State Security said that two individuals arrested were Georgian
citizens, and the third was from Armenia. The individuals said they
had brought the uranium and plutonium from Russia and Ukraine to sell
it.
Germany, 2000:
In December 2000, a worker at a closed spent fuel reprocessing plant
removed radioactively contaminated items from the facility,
deliberately evading radiation safety monitors. The contaminated
items, described as rags and a test tube filled with aging waste
material, contained a very minute amount of plutonium.
Greece, 2001:
In January 2001, police found a cache of about 300 metallic plates
buried in a forest in northern Greece. The material in the plates was
determined to be plutonium and a radioactive source known as
americium. According to one report, the material had been smuggled
into Greece either from one of the countries of the former Soviet
Union or Bulgaria. Each plate contained a small quantity of plutonium
but the total amount was about 0.003 kilograms. An official from
Greece's atomic energy commission said that the quantity of nuclear
material found was insufficient to build a nuclear weapon but the
material posed a health hazard. A law enforcement officer speculated
that the individuals who buried the metal plates were probably waiting
for a potential buyer.
France, 2001:
In July 2001, police seized several grams of highly enriched uranium
and arrested three suspects in Paris, France. According to preliminary
reports, the enrichment level was about 80 percent, but results of
laboratory analysis have not yet been reported to the IAEA. One of the
suspects had recently completed a prison sentence for fraud charges,
and the other two reportedly were citizens of Cameroon. According to
one press account, French police found the material encased in a glass
bulb that was stored in a lead cylinder.
[End of section]
Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance Programs:
This appendix provides additional information about each of the six
agencies that are providing assistance to combat nuclear smuggling.
Department of Energy:
DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear
material smuggling—the Second Line of Defense program and the
International Export Control program. From fiscal year 1997 through
2001, DOE spent $11.2 million on the Second Line of Defense program,
including $2.7 million provided by the State Department, to install 70
portal monitors at eight border crossings in Russia and provide 20
handheld radiation detectors. The eight border crossings include an
airport in Moscow, six seaports and one railroad crossing. The eight
border crossings are the first of close to 60 sites that DOE has
included in the Second Line of Defense program based on a study in
which DOE evaluated the need for radiation detection equipment at over
300 border crossings in Russia. DOE prioritized the border crossings
based on factors that might increase the risk that potential smugglers
would use those border crossings to smuggle nuclear material out of
Russia. For example, the study placed a higher priority on border
crossings that are close to Russian facilities that store weapons-
usable nuclear material or to potential markets for smuggled nuclear
material. DOE began work at two additional border crossings in Russia
in fiscal year 2001 and 17 additional border crossings in fiscal year
2002. DOE expects that it will complete 12 of the sites in fiscal year
2002.
DOE officials said that they have taken a number of steps to ensure
that radiation detection equipment is operated and maintained and that
Russia is using the equipment for the intended purpose. First, DOE
uses equipment manufactured in Russia by a Russian contractor in order
to facilitate equipment installation and maintenance. Then, after the
Russian contractor installs the systems, DOE tests the equipment at
the border crossings to ensure that the portal monitors are placed in
an optimal configuration and calibrated correctly and that they are
installed as agreed. For example, DOE conducted testing in October
2000 and found that some portal monitors were not configured optimally
or calibrated correctly and that some pedestrian and vehicle crossings
did not have radiation detection equipment. DOE officials said that
they withheld final payment for installation until the contractor
submitted evidence showing that any problems had been resolved.
According to DOE officials, the Russian government is strongly
committed to the Second Line of Defense program and has provided DOE
with good access to the border crossings where equipment is being
installed. For example, in October 2000, Russian officials allowed DOE
to participate in a search of a truck that set off an alarm at one of
the portal monitors provided by DOE. (The search revealed that the
truck was transporting fertilizer, which can cause a false alarm.) In
addition, DOE estimated that Russia spent $300,000 to install 14
pedestrian portal monitors at another terminal of the airport in
Moscow.
DOE budgeted $10 million for the Second Line of Defense program and
spent $8.5 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001, and the program
received $12 million in fiscal year 2002 appropriations.[Footnote 9]
The State Department provided a total of $7.5 million to support the
Second Line of Defense program—$5.1 million to pay the Russian
enterprise that manufactures and installs the portal monitors and $2.4
million that it provided to DOE. Of the $5.1 million for the Russian
contractor, State spent $2.6 million through fiscal year 2001.
[Footnote 10] Of the $2.4 million that it received from State (through
the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program),
DOE spent $0.1 million through fiscal year 2001 and carried over $2.3
million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002.
DOE spent $22 million from fiscal year 1992 through 2001, including
$2.4 million from the State Department, on assistance to countries of
the former Soviet Union—primarily Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—to
improve their ability to control the export of goods that could be
used in the development of nuclear weapons. The assistance provided
under this program falls into three general categories: export
licensing, industry awareness and compliance, and border enforcement.
The export licensing assistance helps establish the regulations and
procedures for issuing licenses to enterprises that allow them to
export their goods and technologies. For example, DOE is providing
Ukraine and Kazakhstan with computerized export control licensing
systems that are specific to nuclear goods. Industry awareness and
compliance consists primarily of workshops for enterprises that need
training in understanding the export control system and complying with
export control laws and regulations. DOE officials estimate that about
1,000 or so enterprises in Russia, most of which are spin-offs of the
nuclear weapons complex, need such training. Border enforcement
assistance consists of equipment and training to help customs
officials stationed at border crossings recognize nuclear-related good
and technologies that require an export license before they can be
exported from the country.
Table 3 shows a breakdown of International Export Control Program
expenditures by country and source of funding. State's Export Control
and Related Border Security Assistance program provided a total of
$4.9 million through fiscal year 2001 to support the program, of which
DOE spent $2.4 million through fiscal year 2001 and carried over $2.5
million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002.
Table 3: International Export Control Program Expenditures through
Fiscal Year 2001:
Country: Russia;
DOE funds: $4.6 million;
State funds: $0.5 million;
Total: $5.1 million.
Country: Ukraine;
DOE funds: $2.1 million;
State funds: $0.4 million;
Total: $2.4 million.
Country: Kazakhstan;
DOE funds: $1.3 million;
State funds: $0.6 million;
Total: $1.9 million.
Country: Baltic states;
DOE funds: less than $0.1 million;
State funds: $0.2 million;
Total: $0.2 million.
Country: Regional/other;
DOE funds: $11.7 million;
State funds: $0.8 million;
Total: $12.5 million.
Country: Total;
DOE funds: $19.6 million;
State funds: $2.4 million;
Total: $22.0 million.
Note: Regional/other expenditures includes $9.3 million spent from
fiscal years 1992 through 1997 that DOE was not able to break down by
country.
Source: DOE.
[End of table]
In addition to the Second Line of Defense program and the
International Export Control Program, DOE spent $0.5 million on the
Special Technologies Program to install portal monitors in countries
other than Russia with funding from the State Department
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. State's Export Control and
Related Border Security Assistance program also provided $0.5 million
to this office to repair and maintain portal monitors already
installed, but DOE had not spent any of this funding as of the end of
fiscal year 2001. DOE also spent $1.3 million in DOD funds to support
DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction program. For example, DOE's Los
Alamos National Laboratory helped to install portal monitors in one
country in the former Soviet Union.
Department of State:
The State Department has provided assistance to combat nuclear
smuggling primarily through two programs—the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund and the Export Control and Related Border Security
Assistance program. In addition, the Georgia Border Security and Law
Enforcement program has a small radiation detection component. State
established the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund in 1994 to
provide funding for unexpected needs or opportunities in U.S.
nonproliferation efforts. Of the $115 million the fund received from
fiscal year 1994 through 2001, State spent $8.5 million on assistance
to combat nuclear smuggling. State provided radiation detection
equipment and other assistance to 22 countries including vehicle
portal monitors, mobile vans equipped with x-ray machines and
radiation detection equipment, handheld radiation detectors,
dosimeters, and radiation pagers.[Footnote 11] The projects also
provided customs officials and border guards with other equipment such
as fiber optic scopes to search fuel tanks, special equipment to
detect chemicals and metals that could be used in weapons of mass
destruction, night vision equipment, and radios.
Other Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund projects included
assessments of countries' ability to interdict nuclear smuggling,
multinational conferences on the threat of nuclear material smuggling
and techniques for analyzing seized nuclear material, and course
development for hands-on training in interdicting nuclear smuggling
offered at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Although State has
begun to consolidate assistance for combating nuclear smuggling under
the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, it
continues to provide some assistance through the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund. In particular, in fiscal year 2001, State approved a
$1.3 million Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund project to install
vehicle portal monitors at up to 16 sites in one country, and a $0.5
million project to assist another country upgrade their domestically
produced portal monitors to better detect weapons-usable nuclear
material. State also provided $4.3 million from the Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Fund to DOE and the U.S. Customs Service to implement
part of the assistance$3 million to DOE's Second Line of Defense
Program in Russia, $0.5 million to DOE's Special Technologies Program
to install the portal monitors provided by State, and $0.8 million to
the U.S. Customs Service to help State provide equipment and training
to the recipient countries.
From fiscal year 1998 through 2001, the State Department allocated
$86.6 million for the Export Control and Related Border Security
Assistance program. State spent $2.7 million of that amount and
provided $40.2 million to the U.S. Customs Service, $4.4 million to
the U.S. Coast Guard, $4.9 million to DOE's International Export
Control Program, $4.5 million to DOE's Second Line of Defense program,
and $0.5 million to DOE's Special Technologies Program, which installs
and maintains portal monitors in countries other than Russia on behalf
of State.[Footnote 12] After September 11, State received an emergency
supplemental appropriation of $24.7 million for the program. State's
own $2.7 million in expenditures included $0.9 million for three vans
equipped with radiation detectors and x-ray machines for Russia, $0.2
million for a van for another country, and $0.4 million to support a
multinational conference on export controls and travel expenses of
program personnel. State also spent $0.7 million to hire outside firms
to conduct audits of the funding it provided to other agencies and
evaluations of assistance provided to three countries that State
considers more advanced in terms of their ability to interdict nuclear
smuggling. To provide criteria for evaluating the capability of
countries receiving U.S. assistance to interdict smuggling, State's
Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions, which manages the
program, developed a list of export control system standards by which
to evaluate export control systems in host countries. The standards
include criteria for evaluating the ability of countries to interdict
smuggling using radiation detection equipment at border crossings.
State has allocated funds for the Export Control and Related Border
Security Assistance program primarily from the FREEDOM Support Act,
which is targeted to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet
Union, and from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and
Related Programs account. Table 4 shows funding levels and sources for
export control and related border security assistance from fiscal year
1998 through 2001.
Table 4: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program
Funding, Fiscal Year 1998-2001:
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs:
1998: $3.0 million;
1999: $5.0 million;
2000: $14.5 million;
2001: $19.1 million;
Total: $41.6 million.
FREEDOM Support Act:
1998: 0;
1999: 0;
2000: $15.0 million;
2001: $21.0 million;
Total: $36.0 million.
Other:
1998: 0;
1999: $4.0 million;
2000: $5.0 million;
2001: 0;
Total: $9.0 million.
Emergency supplemental appropriation:
1998: 0;
1999: 0;
2000: 0;
2001: $24.7 million;
Total: $24.7 million.
Total:
1998: $3.0 million;
1999: $9.0 million;
2000: $34.5 million;
2001: $64.8 million;
Total: $111.3 million.
Source: State Department.
[End of table]
In addition to the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, State's
Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program provides some
radiation detection assistance to combat nuclear material smuggling.
The Georgia program focuses more broadly on developing the country's
border infrastructure, assisting it to gain control of its border
including its seacoast, and strengthening border security against any
type of crime such as drug smuggling. One of the objectives of the
program is also to strengthen the country's border security against
nuclear smuggling. Customs, which manages the program for State,
received a total of $71.1 million from State and spent $38.3 million
through fiscal year 2001, of which $0.2 million was for radiation
detection equipment including two portal monitors and 44 handheld
radiation detectors.
Department of Defense:
From fiscal year 1993 to about 1998, the DOD Cooperative Threat
Reduction program spent $16 million on assistance to five countries.
In addition, DOD provided $1.3 million to DOE and $1.1 million to the
U.S. Customs Service to implement some of the assistance. Of the $16
million, DOD spent $1 million on radiation detection equipment
including $0.9 million for 36 pedestrian portal monitors and 100
handheld radiation detectors for one country in the former Soviet
Union and $0.1 million for 100 handheld radiation detectors for
another country. The $10.2 million worth of other equipment that DOD
provided consisted a range of items to enable the countries to better
patrol their borders, conduct searches for smuggled contraband, and
equip their border posts. For example, DOD provided vans equipped with
x-ray systems (but not radiation detectors) to search cargo to two
countries, boats to two other countries for patrolling their coasts,
and 50 contraband detection kits to another country with tools such as
fiber optic scopes to search fuel tanks. See table 5 for breakdown of
expenditures by country and category of assistance to combat nuclear
smuggling.
Table 5: Cooperative Threat Reduction Expenditures through Fiscal Year
2001:
Radiation detection equipment:
Russia: 0;
Ukraine: 0;
Kazakhstan: $0.1 million;
Belarus: $0.9 million;
Georgia: $0;
Total: $1.0 million.
Other equipment:
Russia: 0;
Ukraine: $2.3 million;
Kazakhstan: $4.2 million;
Belarus: $2.6 million;
Georgia: $1.0 million;
Total: $10.2 million.
Program management:
Russia: less than $0.1 million;
Ukraine: $2.1 million;
Kazakhstan: $0.4 million;
Belarus: $2.2 million;
Georgia: $0.1 million;
Total: $4.8 million.
Total:
Russia: less than $0.1 million;
Ukraine: $4.4 million;
Kazakhstan: $4.7 million;
Belarus: $5.7 million;
Georgia: $1.1 million;
Total: $16.0 million.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
DOD spent $10.2 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001 on the
International Counterproliferation Program to provide training and
equipment to customs, border guard, and law enforcement personnel in
17 countries. The International Counterproliferation Program includes
a program in cooperation with the U.S. Customs Service, which received
$2.1 million from DOD to provide assistance, and another program in
cooperation with the FBI, which received $1 million. The DOD/Customs
program provides instruction on the detection, identification, and
investigation of nuclear smuggling. The training comes with equipment
packages that include radiation pagers and tools for searching persons
and vehicles. The DOD/FBI program provides training and equipment with
an emphasis on investigating and responding to nuclear smuggling
incidents.
Also under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, DOD spent $0.3
million to install portal monitors at three border crossings in one
country in the former Soviet Union. DOE installed the equipment in
cooperation with DOE's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which
has begun site surveys at about eight additional border crossings.
Although DOD provided the same Russian portal monitors to the country
that DOE is providing to Russia under the Second Line of Defense
program, DOD has also worked with that country to develop an
indigenous capability to manufacture and maintain portal monitors.
U.S. Customs Service:
The U.S. Customs Service, the largest recipient of funding provided by
State and DOD, received a total of $44.2 million from the two agencies
and spent $11.1 million from fiscal year 1993 through 2001 on
assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. Specifically:
* Customs received $40.2 million from State's Export Control and
Related Border Security Assistance program and spent $8.1 million from
fiscal year 1999 through 2001 for equipment and training for close to
30 countries. Assistance under this program includes stationing
advisors in many of the countries to help coordinate and implement
assistance from all of the programs to combat nuclear smuggling.
* Customs received $0.8 million from State's Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund and spent $0.6 million for Project Amber from fiscal
year 1994 through 2001. Project Amber provided equipment and training
to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
and Slovakia. Customs also provided assistance to Cyprus and Malta
with funding from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.
* Customs received $2.1 million from DOD's International
Counterproliferation Program and spent $1.6 million from fiscal year
1997 through 2001 for assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
* Customs received $1.1 million from DOD's Cooperative Threat
Reduction program and spent $0.7 million from fiscal year 1993 through
1999 for assistance to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.
Customs returned $0.4 million in unspent funds to DOD.
Customs' assistance included radiation pagers that border officials
wear on their belts and that can also be used as handheld devices to
pinpoint the location of radioactive material that caused a portal
monitor alarm. Customs provided a variety of other high- and low-tech
tools ranging from very basic items such as flashlights and tools for
opening containers where smuggled goods may be hidden to more
sophisticated equipment such as fiber optic scopes for searching fuel
tanks. Training includes operation of the x-ray vans equipped with
radiation detectors; hands-on instruction in using equipment to detect
nuclear smuggling; techniques for investigating smuggling operations;
tracking the movements of smugglers who avoid legal border crossings
by going through rugged and remote areas between ports of entry; and
"train-the-trainer" courses to enable countries to train more
personnel than the U.S. assistance can reach. Hands-on training
includes a 2-week course at DOE's Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory on interdicting smuggling of weapons of mass destruction,
including nuclear materials. Officials from several countries that
have received U.S. assistance told us that the training improved their
border security interdiction and investigation skills and promoted
better understanding of how to operate radiation detection equipment.
For example, one country's border security and customs personnel told
us that the U.S. Customs Service-sponsored training at Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory was particularly beneficial because it
provided for "hands-on" training to detect nuclear materials hidden in
vehicles. Table 6 shows a breakdown of U.S. Customs Expenditures.
Table 6: U.S. Customs Service Expenditures, by Funding Source, through
Fiscal Year 2001:
State Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance:
Funding: $40.2 million;
Expenditures: $8.1 million;
Obligations: $6.3 million;
Balance: $25.8 million.
State Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund:
Funding: $0.8 million;
Expenditures: $0.6 million;
Obligations: less than $0.1 million;
Balance: $0.1 million.
DOD International Counterproliferation program:
Funding: $2.1 million;
Expenditures: $1.6 million;
Obligations: $0.2 million;
Balance: $0.3 million.
DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction:
Funding: $1.1 million;
Expenditures: $0.7 million;
Obligations: 0;
Balance: $0.3 million.
Total:
Funding: $44.2 million;
Expenditures: $11.1 million;
Obligations: $6.5 million;
Balance: $26.5 million.
Source: U.S. Customs Service.
[End of table]
U.S. Coast Guard:
Through the end of fiscal year 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard received
$4.4 million from the State Department Export Control and Related
Border Security Assistance program and spent $1.6 million to provide
assistance for maritime interdiction of nuclear smuggling to countries
of the former Soviet Union. The Coast Guard used $1.5 million of that
amount in one country to provide two boats with spare parts, station a
Coast Guard advisor in country, and provide training. In addition, the
Coast Guard provided some assistance to four countries and budgeted
funds for assistance to four other countries.
Federal Bureau of Investigation:
The FBI has provided assistance to 13 countries of the former Soviet
Union and Central and Eastern Europe as part of the DOD International
Counterproliferation program. DOD managed the program and paid all the
FBI travel expenses associated with delivering the training. The FBI's
only expenditures have been for developing the curriculum for the
training courses. Through fiscal year 2001, the FBI received
approximately $1 million from DOD and spent $0.4 million. Until fiscal
year 2001, FBI assistance consisted only of an awareness seminar for
high-level government officials on weapons of mass destruction
nonproliferation at the International Law Enforcement Academy in
Budapest, Hungary. In fiscal year 2001, the FBI began providing
additional courses with more detailed training geared toward the law
enforcement officers who investigate and respond to smuggling
incidents. One of the new courses, which the DOD/FBI effort had
provided only to one country as of the end of fiscal year 2001, trains
law enforcement and emergency management personnel through practical
exercises simulating a seizure of nuclear or other smuggled material.
As part of the course, the DOD/FBI effort provides equipment packages
worth $240,000 to outfit three 30-man response teams with a variety of
equipment including HAZMAT suits to facilitate the safe handling of
seized material, evidence collection and sampling kits, chemical
detection equipment, and also radiation pagers. (The FBI originally
planned to provide equipment packages worth $70,000, but it increased
the amount of equipment because it received additional funding from
DOD.) Other new courses that were initiated in fiscal year 2001
include crime scene management and crisis management, which trains
different government agencies to work together to respond to a
smuggling incident.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Ms. Susan S. Westin:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
Dear Ms. Westin:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Nuclear
Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear
Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning," GAO-02-426,
GAO Job Code 360093.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
John Schlosser, Director, Office of Export Control Cooperation, Bureau
of Non Proliferation, at (202) 647-1966.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christopher B. Nurnham:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Enclosure: As stated.
cc:
GAO/NRE - Ms. Gary L. Jones:
State/OIG - Mr. Berman:
State/NP - Mr. Van Diepen:
[End of letter]
Department of State:
Comments on the GAO Draft Report: Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S.
Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need
Strengthened Coordination and Planning (GAO-02-426, Job Code 360093):
In general, the Department of State concurs with this report's
conclusions and recommendations. The Department recognizes that inter-
agency coordination and planning with regard to U.S. Government
efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling can be
further strengthened. State is taking the lead in facilitating
development of a government-wide plan for an integrated approach to
the provision of detection equipment and related maintenance and
support to the countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and
Eastern Europe, as recommended in the report.
The Department believes, however, that the report gives insufficient
weight to the progress that has been registered in the past year and a
half to improve coordination and planning in this area and to address
many of the technical concerns discussed in the report. These
improvements were effected amid a dramatic ramping-up of the State
Department's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS)
assistance program, of which the provision of nuclear detection
equipment is only a part, aimed at confronting the increased
proliferation threat. (The program grew from $9 million in FY 1999 to
$40 million in FY 2001.)
The Department established the Office of Export Control Cooperation
and Sanctions (NP/ECS) within the Bureau of Nonproliferation in
December 2000. This office was charged with, inter alia, implementing,
managing and coordinating U.S. Government export control and related
border security programs in countries aimed at stemming the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems,
related goods and technologies, and other weapons. In carrying out
this function, NP/ECS chairs an inter-agency working group that
evaluates, prioritizes, and approves projects that USG agencies
propose to undertake to improve countries' export control and related
border security capabilities and coordinates implementation of such
projects. This working group has done much to ensure that individual
agencies' activities within the EXBS program and related to it are
mutually coordinated and directed toward the accomplishment of U.S.
Government foreign policy goals. Although they have their own sources
of funding, the Departments of Defense and Energy regularly
participate in the working group and have contributed significantly to
an overall rationalization of assistance programs provided through
different Congressional appropriations.
The Department has taken a number of additional steps to improve the
planning and implementation of export control assistance efforts.
State maintains a planning calendar for agencies' worldwide program
activities in order to ensure that they are properly coordinated and
completed. To implement programs in the countries of the former Soviet
Union, NP/ECS works closely with the Department's Office of the
Coordinator for Assistance to Europe and Eurasia to ensure that EXBS
program activities are fully consistent with larger U.S. foreign
policy goals and harmonized with other related U.S. assistance
programs in those countries. NP/ECS also has implemented a series of
measures to ensure that strict financial management controls over the
EXBS program and individual agencies' activities within it are
maintained and enhanced.
Similarly, the State Department independently has taken steps to
improve internal coordination as well as accountability for equipment
previously provided to other countries. In October 2001, NP/ECS
assumed responsibility for all export control assistance functions at
State including maintenance and support for radiation detection and
other equipment previously provided to foreign governments by other
USG programs (including another program that had been administered by
the State Department), and also evaluation of host governments'
employment of that equipment. The State-funded export control
advisors, who keep inventory of all such equipment in 20 countries in
Central, Southern and Eastern Europe and the NIS, report on its
condition and use, and whether it should be repaired, upgraded or
replaced. This has done much to rationalize the implementation of the
assistance program in the field.
While substantial progress has been made, the State Department
believes there is more to be done to ensure a coherent, coordinated
approach to the provision of radiation detection equipment to foreign
governments, taking into account the diversity of conditions, threats
and levels of technical capability present in various countries that
receive U.S. assistance. The Department welcomes all the
recommendations in the report, and will work with other agencies to
implement them.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
April 26, 2002:
Ms. Gary L. Jones:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Jones:
The General Accounting Office's draft report GAO-02-426, "Nuclear
Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear
Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning," has been
reviewed by my office. We understand that the General Accounting
Office (GAO) was requested to review the National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) Second Line of Defense program. Specifically,
the GAO was asked to (1) identify other federal programs devoted to
detecting illicit nuclear materials trafficking at country borders;
(2) analyze funds received for these programs through fiscal year 2001
and future budget plans; (3) determine the level or coordination among
these programs; (4) assess these programs' effectiveness; (5) identify
the host countries' contributions and commitments to these programs;
and (6) analyze nuclear material smuggling cases in the former Soviet
Union and Central Asian republics over the past decade.
GAO has concluded that the current multiple-agency approach to
providing U.S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling is not the most
effective way to deliver this assistance. Furthermore, GAO has
concluded that coordination is also a problem within agencies that
provide assistance. Finally, GAO has expressed concern about how U.S.
equipment is being used by the recipient countries. We realize that it
is difficult to assess the impact and effectiveness of the
U.S.supplied equipment unless data are routinely obtained and
analyzed. We, like GAO, believe that sharing data is of critical
importance to the success of the U.S. program and countries' efforts
to combat nuclear smuggling.
The NNSA appreciates having had the opportunity to review this draft
report. While we agree with the general findings of the report we
would like to clarify that NNSA has: (1) one program to combat nuclear
smuggling (the Second Line of Defense [SLD] Program) that has
historically focused primarily on Russia and is now expanding to other
countries; (2) one program on export control outreach (the
International Export Control Program) that deals with dual-use
equipment, material, and technology; and (3) a DOE work for others
program (the Special Technologies Program now the Advanced
Technologies Program) that uses Department of State funding to
maintain and place radiation detectors outside of Russia.
Additionally, calculations and tests of the SLD installed monitors in
Russia, that are calibrated at more sensitive levels, have proven that
there is no change in the already-low false-alarm-rate of these
instruments. While it is not immediately apparent from GAO's report,
data and reports about non-SLD monitors indicate that they are not as
sensitive to special nuclear materials, are not as reliable, and most
have limited or no ability to detect shielded plutonium. While most
monitors will detect strong gamma-emitting radioactive sources that
could be used by terrorists for radiation dispersal devices, not all
monitors are sensitive enough to detect the small signature of highly
enriched uranium.
Finally, NNSA's Second Line of Defense program endorses the need for a
more uniform approach to radiation monitoring at borders to combat
nuclear smuggling. This is in line with its philosophical approach to
providing a comprehensive systems solution to combat nuclear smuggling
through the careful deployment of quality equipment, training of
officials, and adequate provisions for maintenance.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Kenneth E. Baker, for:
Linton F. Brooks:
Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation:
cc: Anthony R. Lane:
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Customs Service:
U.S. Customs Service:
Memorandum:
Date: April 25, 2002:
File: AUD-1-OP BBS:
Memorandum For Gary L. Jones, General Accounting Office:
From: Director, Office of Planning:
Subject: Draft Audit Report Entitled "Nuclear Nonproliferation: US
Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and
Planning"
Thank you for providing us with a copy of your draft report on nuclear
nonproliferation and the opportunity to discuss the issues in this
report.
It is important to note that the U.S. government's non-proliferation
efforts are not limited to nuclear materials, but have a wider focus
and cover the entire spectrum of WMD, including chemical and
biological weapons.
This report focuses on the use of technology to detect nuclear or
radioactive materials. However, readers should not lose sight of the
highly developed skills and experience of the individuals involved in
nonproliferation efforts. Technology is only a tool in the hands of a
border inspection officer, making training and procedures equally
critical to a successful program.
Since U.S. Customs actually expends the lion's share (two-thirds) of
all funds appropriated for these activities (see page 44), we
recommend that the recommendation regarding the development of a plan
by the State Department be reworded to specifically include Customs.
If you have any questions regarding these comments, please contact Ms.
Brenda Brockman Smith at (202) 927-1507.
Signed by:
William F. Riley:
Attachment:
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] IAEA is affiliated with the United Nations and has 133 member
states, including the United States. Its objectives are to promote the
peaceful use of nuclear energy and to verify that nuclear material
under its supervision or control is not used to further any military
purpose.
[2] This review will only focus on U.S. assistance to combat nuclear
smuggling at countries' borders. We recently reported on the
Department of Energy's MPC&A program and found that the program is
reducing the risk of theft of nuclear material but hundreds of metric
tons of nuclear material still lack improved security systems and are
vulnerable to theft. See Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of
Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-312], Feb. 28, 2001.
[3] While some of the assistance specifically targets nuclear
smuggling, a portion of the assistance is intended to improve
countries' ability to interdict any weapons smuggling—-nuclear,
chemical, biological, and conventional.
[4] IAEA is an autonomous organization affiliated with the United
Nations. Its objectives are to promote the peaceful use of nuclear
energy and to verify that nuclear material under its supervision or
control is not used to further any military purpose.
[5] Thorium is a radioactive material that is used in a wide array of
products and processes. Handling and disposing of thorium is a
challenge because it is radioactive and produces radon gas when it
decays.
[6] Highly enriched uranium means uranium enriched to 20 percent or
more in the isotope U-235. Uranium enriched in U-235 above the level
found in nature (.071 percent) but less than 20 percent is called low
enriched uranium.
[7] This institute is involved in developing space and mobile
reactors, including the TOPAZ reactor used in Russian satellites. Luch
has several tons of weapons-usable material on site.
[8] According to DOE, red mercury has been used in over 50 scams since
1979. Red mercury is a material that would-be smugglers have tried to
sell claiming that the material can be used to produce a nuclear
weapon.
[9] DOE carried over $0.9 million in unspent funds into fiscal year
2002 and transferred $0.7 million from Second Line of Defense to the
International Export Control Program in fiscal year 2001 when DOE made
the Second Line of Defense program part of the Material Protection,
Control, and Accounting program.
[10] The $5.1 million includes $3 million from the Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Fund and $2.1 million from the Export Control and
Related Border Security Assistance program. The Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund has a contract with the Russian enterprise and
manages the entire $5.1 million in funding.
[11] The countries included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
[12] State also used the Export Control program to provide $15.9
million to Department of Commerce assistance to improve countries'
export control systems and $0.8 million to DOD to update an export
control computer system that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program
provided to one country.
[End of section]
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