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Rates Should Be Lower to Reduce Risks' which was released on March 5, 
2002. 

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United States General Accounting Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

March 2002: 

Tactical Aircraft: 

F-22 Delays Indicate Initial Production Rates Should Be Lower to 
Reduce Risks: 

GAO-02-298: 

Contents: 
Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

F-22 Development Program Continues to Experience Delays and Risks in 
Meeting Key Schedule Goals: 

F-22 Development Costs Likely to Increase: 

More Testing Needed to Confirm F-22 Performance Estimates: 

Status of Aircraft Modifications: 

Risks in the F-22 Proposed Acquisition Plan: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix I: Calendar Year 2001 Test Criteria Required to Continue with 
Low-Rate Initial Production: 

Appendix II: Estimates of Performance for Key Parameters: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Staff Acknowledgments: 

Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Revised Schedule Dates Associated with the Test Program 
Realignment: 

Table 2: Planned Versus Actual Assembly Hours for Development Test 
Aircraft: 

Table 3: Delays in First Flight Dates of F-22 Development Test 
Aircraft: 

Table 4: Planned Aircraft Quantity Reductions: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: F-22 Test Program Schedule Before and After Realignment: 

Figure 2: Increase in Estimated Hours to Assemble F-22 Development 
Test Aircraft at the Marietta, Georgia, Facility (October 1995-July 
2000): 

Figure 3: Planned Verses Actual Usage of Development Test Aircraft 
4001, 4002, and 4003: 

Figure 4: Lockheed Costs Over Budgets during Fiscal Years 2000 and 
2001: 

Figure 5: Total Post-Development Funding As Planned Each Year in 
Fiscal Years 2000, 2001, and 2002: 

[End of section] 

United States General Accounting Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 5, 2002: 

Congressional Committees: 

The Air Force is developing the F-22 aircraft to replace its fleet of 
F-15 aircraft. The F-22 is to be superior to the F-15 by being less 
detectable, capable of flying at higher speeds for longer distances, 
and able to provide the pilot with substantially improved awareness of 
the surrounding situation. The Air Force began the F-22 development 
program in 1991 and plans to complete it by March 2004. In 1998, 
following repeated increases in the program's estimated development 
cost, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 
[Footnote 1] limited the cost of F-22 development to $20.443 billion. 
[Footnote 2] The act also required us to assess the Air Force's F-22 
development program annually and determine whether key cost, schedule, 
and performance goals are being met.[Footnote 3] This is our fifth 
report. In our last report, issued in March 2001,[Footnote 4] we 
stated that the Air Force had not met its schedule goals for 2000 and 
that flight-testing delays coupled with prior years' delays made it 
unlikely that the development program could be completed as scheduled 
within the $20.443 billion congressional cost limitation. 

On September 13, 2001, the secretary of defense notified the 
congressional defense committees that the Department of Defense (DOD) 
had approved the F-22 program for low-rate initial production and that 
the cost to complete the program's development phase would be $557 
million more than the cost limit. This increased the cost estimate for 
development to $21 billion. The National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 20025 has since eliminated the cost limitation but still 
requires us to provide annual assessments. 

This report addresses (1) the extent to which the development program 
is meeting its schedule, cost, and performance goals, including 
whether the program is likely to be completed within the current cost 
estimate; (2) the status of F-22 modifications; and (3) the Air 
Force's plans for low-rate initial production of F-22 aircraft and the 
risks associated with those plans. 

Results in Brief:  

The F-22 program did not meet key schedule goals for 2001, the cost to 
complete planned development is likely to exceed the $21 billion 
reported to Congress, and the program is not far enough along in 
flight-testing to confirm Air Force estimates of the aircraft's 
performance. First, while progress was made in testing the aircraft's 
capabilities, problems and delays continue with the assembly and 
delivery of development test aircraft and the flight-test program 
continues to be less efficient than planned. The delays and the less 
than planned efficiency have prevented the Air Force from completing 
the flight-testing planned for 2001. In June 2001, the Air Force 
extended the development test program 8 months and delayed the 
beginning of operational testing. However, even with the extension, it 
is unlikely that the development and operational tests programs can be 
completed as scheduled for several reasons, including the fact that 
test aircraft are taking longer to assemble and are being delivered 
late to the flight-test program. DOD's director, operational test and 
evaluation, and an Air Force independent test review team have 
characterized the new test plan as very optimistic.[Footnote 6] 
Second, delays in the flight-test program make it unlikely that the 
development program can be completed as planned within the current $21 
billion cost goal. Third, based on initial testing, the Air Force 
projects that the F-22 will meet or exceed its performance goals by 
the end of development. However, testing to demonstrate performance is 
not far enough along to enable the Air Force to confirm its 
projections. 

Regarding the status of modifications, the Air Force has implemented 
and continues to implement process and manufacturing changes to solve 
problems with the horizontal tail section and cracking in the cockpit 
canopy that we reported on last year. While the results to date appear 
adequate, the Air Force continues to monitor the results to ensure the 
corrective actions will be sufficient. 

In September 2001, the Air Force submitted to Congress a revised 
acquisition plan. Because of the recent slip in the projected start of 
operational testing, the revised plan will increase the number of 
aircraft committed to low-rate production before the completion of 
operational testing. In previous reports, we have said that buying 
production articles before they are adequately tested can be costly, 
if further testing identifies problems that then require costly 
modifications. Further, the increase in production commitments could 
occur without the F-22 program office knowing the extent that the 
contractor's key manufacturing processes are in control.[Footnote 7] 
Program officials state that they no longer track this information. 
Our prior reviews have found that proceeding into production without 
manufacturing processes in control can increase both cost and schedule 
risks. 

We are recommending that the Air Force reassess the cost to complete the
F-22 development program and report the results to Congress. We are 
also recommending that DOD limit the low-rate production of F-22 
aircraft until operational testing is completed and manufacturing 
processes are in control. We are further recommending that the Air 
Force monitor the status of the contractor's key manufacturing 
processes. 

In commenting on our report, DOD said that it continuously tracks the 
cost to complete the F-22 development phase of the program and that if 
the budget for that phase of the program were to increase, it would 
report this increase to Congress. However, it said that a report was 
unnecessary at this time. As discussed in this report, there are 
strong indications the F-22 development program is unlikely to be 
completed within the current cost estimate of $21 billion. We believe 
that Congress should be notified as soon as possible of projected cost 
increases in the development program. In response to our second 
recommendation, DOD said that it does not believe there is sufficient 
justification to limit the F-22 production rate. We believe this 
report provides ample justification for limiting low-rate production 
quantities. DOD agreed that it is important to ensure that 
manufacturing processes are maturing as production progresses and that 
these processes are in control. It said that an assessment of key F-22 
manufacturing processes would be included in an upcoming report on 
production readiness. We support DOD's plan to conduct the assessment 
and believe that the F-22 program office should continue to accumulate 
statistics on the percentage of key manufacturing processes in control 
as the program proceed towards full-rate production. 

Background: 

he F-22 is an air superiority aircraft with advanced features to make 
it less detectable to adversaries (stealth characteristics) and 
capable of high speeds for long ranges.[Footnote 8] It has integrated 
avionics to greatly improve pilots' awareness of the situation 
surrounding them. The objectives of the F-22 development program are 
to (1) design, fabricate, test, and deliver 9 F-22 development test 
aircraft, 2 non-flying structural test aircraft, 6 production 
representative test aircraft, and 37 flight-qualified engines; (2) 
design, fabricate, integrate, and test the avionics suite; and (3) 
design, develop, and test the support and training systems. The F-22 
is being developed under contracts with Lockheed Martin Corporation 
(for the aircraft) and Pratt & Whitney Corporation (for the engine). 

Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete the 
development phase of the F-22 program, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a cost limitation 
of $18.688 billion for F-22 development and a limitation of $43.4 
billion for production.[Footnote 9] The act instructed the secretary 
of the air force to adjust the cost limitation for the amounts of 
increases or decreases in costs attributable to economic inflation 
after September 30, 1997, and for compliance with changes in federal, 
state, and local laws enacted after September 30, 1997. Congressional 
direction in fiscal year 2000 legislation added six production 
representative test aircraft to the development program, which helped 
increase the cost limitation to $20.443 billion. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 required 
that before the secretary of the air force awards a contract for F-22 
low-rate initial production,[Footnote 10] the secretary of defense had 
to certify that the (1) test plan in the program's development phase 
is adequate for determining the operational effectiveness and 
suitability of the F-22 aircraft and (2) development phase and the 
production phase for the F-22 program could be executed within the 
congressionally mandated cost limitations.[Footnote 11] If the 
Secretary of Defense was unable to make either of these 
certifications, he would be required to submit to the congressional 
defense committees a report that includes (1) the reasons the 
certifications could not be made, (2) a revised acquisition plan if 
the decision to proceed with low-rate initial production is made, and 
(3) revised cost estimates for the remainder of the development phase 
and the production phase if the decision is made to proceed with low-
rate initial production. 

On September 13, 2001, the under secretary of defense for acquisition, 
technology, and logistics notified the congressional defense 
committees that DOD had approved the F-22 program for low-rate initial 
production. The under secretary certified that the development test 
plan is adequate to determine the operational effectiveness and 
suitability of the F-22 aircraft. The under secretary said DOD could 
not certify that the F-22 development phase or the production phase 
could be completed within the existing congressional cost limitations. 
In his letter, he stated that both the Air Force and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense estimates of the cost to complete the development 
phase exceeded the cost limitation. He indicated that the development 
phase would cost an additional $557 million. However, instead of 
requesting an increase in the cost limitation amount, he asked that 
the development cost limitation be removed. The under secretary also 
developed a revised acquisition plan and requested that Congress 
remove the production cost limitation, estimating that the production 
phase could cost $5.4 billion more than the $37.6 billion production 
cost limitation. 

In December 2001, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002 eliminated the development cost limitation.[Footnote 12] The 
production cost limitation remains in effect. 

F-22 Development Program Continues to Experience Delays and Risks in 
Meeting Key Schedule Goals:  

The F-22 program met DOD's test criteria to continue with low-rate 
initial production, but it did not meet key schedule goals for 
developmental flight-testing. The Air Force reduced and extended the 
development flight-test program due to delays in flight-testing. The 
development flight-test program now overlaps with operational testing. 
However, the extended flight-test schedule is also experiencing 
delays. These delays will likely require the Air Force to extend the 
development flight-test schedule again to complete current testing 
objectives. DOD's director, operational test and evaluation, and an 
Air Force chartered independent test review team have characterized 
the new test plan as very optimistic. 

F-22 Program Meets DOD's Test Criteria to Continue with Low-Rate 
Production: 

According to the Air Force, the F-22 program had fulfilled all test 
criteria considered prerequisites for awarding the fiscal year 2002 
low-rate production contract. The under secretary of defense for 
acquisition, technology, and logistics established the criteria The 
test criteria included completing specific testing of the avionics for 
guided missile launch, engine, and radar. DOD required the criteria to 
be met prior to the planned December 2001 contract award date for 13 
low-rate production aircraft. (See appendix I for a listing of the 
criteria.) 

Delays Result in Flight-Test Program Being Reduced and Extended: 

In March 2001, we reported that the F-22 development flight-test 
program was significantly behind schedule due to (1) problems and 
delays with the assembly and delivery of development test aircraft, 
(2) delivered development test aircraft not being ready for testing, 
and (3) lower than planned efficiency in the flight-test program. 
[Footnote 13] We concluded that the Air Force would have to either 
extend the developmental test program past its planned completion date 
of August 2002, or start operational testing, scheduled to begin in 
August 2002, without completing all development flight-tests. 

In June 2001, the Air Force realigned the test program. The 
realignment extended the completion of the development flight-test 
program, delayed the beginning of operational testing, and reduced the 
content of the test program. Development flight-testing determined by 
the Air Force as necessary to begin operational testing was extended 8 
months and the beginning of operational testing was delayed 8 months. 
Some additional development flight-testing is now planned to be 
concurrent with operational testing. Figure 1 shows the program 
schedule before and after the realignment and shows a 9-month overlap 
between development flight-testing and operational testing that did 
not exist prior to the realignment. 

Figure 1: F-22 Test Program Schedule Before and After Realignment: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Before realignment: 

Developmental Flight-Testing: 
Began 1991, through August 2002.     

Operational Testing: 
August 2002 through February 2003. 
 
After realignment: 
Developmental Flight-Testing: 
Began 1991, through April 2003.    

Operational Testing: 
April 2003 through December 2003. 
  
Source: Air Force. 

[End of figure] 

Office of the Secretary of Defense officials involved in operational 
testing were included in the testing realignment process and did not 
take exception to some development flight-testing being planned 
concurrent with operational testing. However, according to these 
officials, there is an increased risk involved in the concurrency, and 
there is still a high risk of not completing an adequate amount of 
development flight-testing before operational testing is scheduled to 
begin. The start of operational testing could be delayed if the 
required development flight-testing is not completed as scheduled. 

During the program realignment, the Air Force established new schedule 
dates for the remaining major schedule events. Table 1 shows the prior 
and current schedule dates and the slip in schedule between the prior 
and current dates. 

Table 1: Revised Schedule Dates Associated with the Test Program 
Realignment: 

Schedule event: Completion of development flight-testing necessary; 
prior to operational testing; 
Estimate prior to realignment: August 2002; 
Current estimate: April 2003; 
Slip in schedule estimate (months): 8. 
 
Schedule event: Start of operational testing; 
Estimate prior to realignment: August 2002; 
Current estimate: April 2003; 
Slip in schedule estimate (months): 8. 

Schedule event: Completion of operational testing;
Estimate prior to realignment: February 2003; 
Current estimate: December 2003; 
Slip in schedule estimate (months): 10. 

Schedule event: High-rate production decision; 
Estimate prior to realignment: July 2003; 
Current estimate: March 2004; 
Slip in schedule estimate (months): 8. 

Source: Air Force. 

[End of table] 

In addition to extending the flight-test program schedule, the Air 
Force reduced the content of the F-22 development flight-test program. 
Specifically, the Air Force eliminated and consolidated some test 
points (specific test objectives conducted during flight-testing) and 
deferred other test points that it did not have to complete before the 
start of operational testing. As a result, the combined total flight-
test points (airframe and avionics) remaining have been reduced by 
approximately 4,708 points, or 31 percent. 

Extended Test Schedule Likely to Slip: 

The realigned test schedule established by the Air Force in June 2001 
is likely to slip for a number of reasons. First, development test 
aircraft are taking longer to assemble and, as a result, are being 
delivered late to the flight-test program. Second, the schedule for 
completing airframe flight-testing is high risk because (1) the 
available test aircraft are not achieving the number of test 
objectives per flight hour specified in the test plan and (2) the 
completion of the schedule is heavily dependent on one test aircraft 
in lieu of three as originally planned. Third, the avionics portion of 
the flight test program is being delayed by the late delivery of test 
aircraft. 

The director, operational test and evaluation, and the Air Force's 
independent test review team have expressed concerns that the revised 
test schedule still does not provide enough time for adequate testing 
and is very optimistic. The director, operational test and evaluation, 
has reported that extending the portion of development flight-testing 
necessary to begin operational testing by 8 months, to April 2003, 
still does not provide enough time to sufficiently complete that 
testing. The director estimates that the F-22 program will probably 
not be ready to begin operational testing until at least August 2003, 
not April 2003 as currently planned. 

Delays in Aircraft Assembly Delay Flight-Test Program:  

The contractor is taking considerably more time than originally 
estimated to assemble development test aircraft. For example, a few 
months after the critical design review in February 1995,[Footnote 14] 
the contractor estimated that it would take 665,111 hours to assemble 
nine development test aircraft at the Marietta, Georgia, facility. 
[Footnote 15] According to the latest data provided to us and as shown 
in figure 2, that estimate continued to grow through July 2000. As the 
figure shows, the contractor estimated in July 2000 that it would take 
1,025,290 hours, or around 360,000 more hours to assemble the nine 
development test aircraft. 

Figure 2: Increase in Estimated Hours to Assemble F-22 Development 
Test Aircraft at the Marietta, Georgia, Facility (October 1995-July 
2000): 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Graph depicts assembly hours from October 1995 through July 2000.   

Source: Lockheed. 

[End of figure] 

The three aircraft completed during 2001 took more hours to complete 
than planned. Also, the two aircraft that are still being assembled 
are requiring more assembly time than planned. Table 2 shows the 
planned versus actual assembly hours for these five aircraft. 

Table 2: Planned Versus Actual Assembly Hours for Development Test 
Aircraft: 

Aircraft: 4005[B];  
Planned assembly hours[A]: 207,345; 
Actual assembly hours[A]: 231,567; 
Difference: +24,222. 

Aircraft: 4006[B]; 
Planned assembly hours[A]: 204,554; 
Actual assembly hours[A]: 232,573; 
Difference: +28,019. 

Aircraft: 4007[B]; 
Planned assembly hours[A]: 202,843; 
Actual assembly hours[A]: 226,533; 
Difference: +23,690. 

Aircraft: 4008[C]; 
Planned assembly hours[A]: 197,171; 
Actual assembly hours[A]: 206,798; 
Difference: +9,627. 

Aircraft: 4009[C]; 
Planned assembly hours[A]: 175,170; 
Actual assembly hours[A]: 187,496; 
Difference: +12,326. 

[A] Planned and actual hours at the Marietta, Georgia; Fort Worth, 
Texas; and Seattle, Washington, facilities. 

[B] Completed aircraft. 

[C] As of November 2001. These aircraft are not yet completed. 

Source: Air Force. 

[End of table] 

According to Air Force officials the development test aircraft are 
taking longer to assemble than planned because of necessary design 
changes and modifications to the aircraft, parts shortages, and 
problems integrating hardware and software subsystems. For example, an 
engineering redesign that affected all aircraft was required because 
of problems with the separation of materials in the aircraft's 
horizontal tail section. In addition, manufacturing problems 
associated with some of the avionics components—the communication, 
navigation, and identification and the electronic warfare systems—
resulted in lower than expected software productivity and the late 
release of engineering drawings. Moreover, the contractor experienced 
higher levels of scrap and rework, and increased labor hours for 
inspection of nonconforming parts. 

The delays in assembling development test aircraft continue to delay 
the flight-test program. Table 3 shows the delay in the development 
test aircraft's first flights. 

Table 3: Delays in First Flight Dates of F-22 Development Test 
Aircraft: 

Test aircraft: 4001; 
Planned first flight dates: May 29, 1997; 
Actual first flight dates:  September 7, 1997; 
Total delay to first flight dates (months): 3. 

Test aircraft: 4002; 
Planned first flight dates: July 9, 1998; 
Actual first flight dates:  June 29, 1998; 
Total delay to first flight dates (months): 0. 

Test aircraft: 4003; 
Planned first flight dates: June 16, 1999; 
Actual first flight dates:  March 6, 2000; 
Total delay to first flight dates (months): 9. 

Test aircraft: 4004; 
Planned first flight dates: August 17, 1999; 
Actual first flight dates:  November 15, 2000; 
Total delay to first flight dates (months): 15. 

Test aircraft: 4005; 
Planned first flight dates: January 11, 2000; 
Actual first flight dates:  January 5, 2001; 
Total delay to first flight dates (months): 12. 

Test aircraft: 4006; 
Planned first flight dates: May 18, 2000; 
Actual first flight dates:  February 5, 2001; 
Total delay to first flight dates (months): 9. 

Test aircraft: 4007; 
Planned first flight dates: September 25, 2000; 
Actual first flight dates:  October 15, 2001; 
Total delay to first flight dates (months): 3. 

Test aircraft: 4008; 
Planned first flight dates: February 2, 2001; 
Actual first flight dates:  February 8, 2002; 
Total delay to first flight dates (months): 12. 

Test aircraft: 4009; 
Planned first flight dates: June 1, 2001; 
Actual first flight dates:  March 21, 2002[A];
Total delay to first flight dates (months): 108. 

Test aircraft: Total delay;  
Total delay to first flight dates (months): 83. 

[A] Projected as of February 2002. 

Source: Air Force. 

[End of table] 

In early 2001, the Air Force anticipated that the five development 
test aircraft that remained to be assembled at that time (aircraft 
4005-4009) would be available for flight-testing by the end of 2001 
and planned to use these aircraft for flight-testing under the flight-
test program realignment. However, only aircraft 4005-4007 became 
available. Although aircraft 4007 took its first flight, other delays 
prevented it from being fully incorporated into the flight-test 
program during 2001. Aircraft 4008 was delayed until February 2002 and 
aircraft 4009 is projected to be delayed until March 2002. 

Schedule for Completing Airframe Flight-Testing Is High Risk:  

The Air Force's plan to complete developmental airframe flight-testing 
necessary for the start of operational testing in April 2003 and all 
airframe flight-testing by February 2004 is high risk because (1) the 
planned number of test objectives per flight-hour are not being 
achieved and (2) most of the planned flight-test program is 
essentially being performed by only one test aircraft rather than the 
three originally planned. Airframe testing demonstrates the aircraft's 
flight capabilities.  

The Air Force is not accomplishing the planned number of airframe test 
objectives per flight-hour. Aircraft flight capabilities are 
demonstrated by performing specific test objectives or flight-test 
points. A gauge of flight-testing efficiency is the number of flight-
test points achieved in each flight-test hour. In our March 2001 
report, we noted that the Air Force had planned to accomplish an 
average of 10.4 test points per flight-test hour through December 2000 
but were only accomplishing an average of 6.9 points per hour, or 30 
percent less than planned. We found a similar situation in 2001. 
Specifically, the Air Force's plan continues to have a test point goal 
of around 10 points per hour, but is only accomplishing a program 
average of 7 test points per hour, or 30 percent less than planned. 

It is unlikely that the planned flight-test hours will be achieved, 
much less increased, because flight-test plans were based on the 
availability of three test aircraft, and only one is available for 
most of such testing. The original 1997 test program contained a plan 
for using development test aircraft 4001, 4002, and 4003 for the 
airframe flight-test program. The plan was for aircraft 4001, 4002, 
and 4003 to concurrently accomplish approximately 80 percent of the 
testing required to expand the F-22 flight parameters and then 
aircraft 4003 would continue to the 100 percent level. However, 
program officials determined that aircraft 4001 and 4002 would not be 
capable of accomplishing more than 40 percent of flight parameters and 
that the structures of all subsequent development test aircraft would 
need to be strengthened. This structural strengthening began with 
aircraft 4003. Aircraft 4003 remains the only development test 
aircraft that is structurally strong enough and adequately equipped 
with test instrumentation to accomplish the other 60 percent of flight 
parameters and to complete the planned airframe portion of flight-
testing. Therefore, the completion of future airframe test points and 
flight hours relies heavily on this one aircraft. Figure 3 below 
compares the planned and actual usage of aircraft 4001, 4002, and 4003. 

Figure 3: Planned Verses Actual Usage of Development Test Aircraft 
4001, 4002, and 4003: 

[Refer to PDF for figure: horizontal bar graph] 

The graph depicts the following: 

Aircraft usage: Flight parameters in percents: 

Original planned usage: 
Aircraft 4001: 80%; 
Aircraft 4002: 80%; 
Aircraft 4003: 100%. 

Actual usage: 
Aircraft 4001: 40%; 
Aircraft 4002: 40%; 
Aircraft 4003: 100%. 

Source: Air Force. 

[End of figure] 

An assessment by the director, operational test and evaluation, 
indicated that the availability of only one development test aircraft 
to complete essentially all the remaining airframe flight-testing 
including structural, performance, propulsion, and flying qualities, 
creates a significant risk. The director concluded that without 
augmentation of aircraft 4003 with another aircraft, the completion of 
the required developmental flight-testing necessary to begin 
operational testing in April 2003 is high risk. Our computations show 
that the development flight-testing necessary for the start of 
operational testing might not be completed until March 2004, or 11 
months later than planned. Air Force officials told us they understand 
that completing the tests as scheduled with only one development test 
aircraft is high risk. 

Based on Air Force F-22 flight-test accomplishment data and current 
flight plans, we project that airframe flight-testing will have to 
continue until February 2008 to accomplish all the remaining 8,199 
test points with one aircraft. Our computations are based on an 
average completion rate of 7 test points per flight-test hour at an 
average of 15.2 flight-test hours per aircraft completed per month. 
Thus, unless the test plan changes, it will take almost 4 years beyond 
the February 2004 scheduled completion date to complete all airframe 
flight-testing. An F-22 program office testing official agreed with 
our projection. Officials in the program office also told us that in 
November 2001 the Air Force reviewed the flight-testing delays, but 
the conclusions reached during this review are still unofficial. 

Avionics Flight-Test Schedule Is at Risk: 

The original 1997 program and realigned flight-test program planned to 
use development test aircraft 4004-4009 for avionics flight-testing.
[Footnote 16] However, the late delivery of these aircraft is 
increasing the risk of not completing the avionics portion of the 
realigned flight-test program by the planned September 2003 date. 
Aircraft 4007, 4008, and 4009 will be delivered later than the planned 
dates under the flight-test program realignment, which could result in 
additional delays in completing flight-test points. As of January 
2002, the three aircraft had been delayed a total of 8 months since 
the realignment, and aircraft 4008 and 4009 were not scheduled to be 
delivered until sometime in calendar year 2002. 

 In addition to late deliveries of aircraft 4007-4009, aircraft 4004-
4006 are accomplishing less than one avionics test point per flying 
hour. Based on F-22 flight-test data provided by the Air Force, we 
project it would take until August 2004 to complete the remaining 
1,271 avionics flight-test points. This would require an extension of 
about 11 months in avionics flight-testing beyond the September 2003 
scheduled end of testing. 
 
Air Force officials also told us they understand that completing 
avionics flight-testing as scheduled will be a program challenge, but 
they still expect to meet the planned completion date and consider the 
completion of airframe flight-testing an even higher risk. These 
officials also explained that once test aircraft 4007, 4008, and 4009 
are fully incorporated into the flight-test program, the test program 
will have six test aircraft designated for avionics flight-testing 
instead of just the three current aircraft and the program will be 
able to accomplish the projected 70 avionics flight-test hours per 
month. However, our projection assumes that aircraft 4007, 4008, and 
4009 will be incorporated into the flight-test program as scheduled 
and still shows that avionics flight-testing could be delayed if the 
program accomplishes only 54 avionics flight-test hours per month, 
which is the projected accomplishment rate based on the historical 
average for the program. 

F-22 Development Costs Likely to Increase:  

The F-22 development program is not likely to be completed within the 
current cost estimate of $21 billion. Costs will likely increase 
further because (1) delays in the flight-test program may require an 
extension of the development program, and (2) Lockheed's development 
costs continue to increase. In addition to development costs, the 
estimated cost of post-development activities continues to increase. 

Flight-Test Delays Would Increase Costs: 

The delays that increase the number of months to complete development 
will result in increased costs for the F-22 program. As noted earlier 
in this report, it is unlikely that the Air Force will be able to 
complete the development program as scheduled. Continued delays in the 
assembly and delivery of development test aircraft and a flight-test 
program that is less efficient than planned will likely result in 
delays in the completion of development flight-testing and the 
beginning of operational testing after April 2003. If this happens, 
the development program will cost more than currently estimated. For 
example, the recent test program realignment that extended the 
majority of development testing and the start of operational testing 8 
months resulted in a cost increase of $557 million. 

Increases in Lockheed's Cost Will Likely Increase Development Costs: 

Lockheed's development costs continue to increase and, because of the 
cost reimbursement type contract Lockheed has with DOD, those costs 
are liabilities to the government. Over the last two fiscal years, 
Lockheed's costs have exceeded budgets by a total of $218 million. 
Figure 4 shows the costs over budgets for fiscal years 2000 and 2001. 

Figure 4: Lockheed Costs Over Budgets during Fiscal Years 2000 and 
2001: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2000; 
Costs Over Budgets: $91 million. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Costs Over Budgets: $127 million. 

Source: Lockheed.  

[End of figure] 

At the beginning of fiscal year 2001, F-22 program officials told us 
that Lockheed's costs for the fiscal year should be closer to their 
budget than that experienced in 2000 because the development program 
was closer to completion and there was more certainty concerning the 
cost of the remaining development activities. However, Lockheed's 
costs over budget in fiscal year 2001 exceeded the fiscal year 2000 
amount. If cost increases continue in fiscal year 2002 and these are 
not offset by cost savings initiatives, the development program will 
cost more than currently estimated.  

Planned Post-Development Funding Continues to Increase: 

The Air Force has defined another phase of the program separate from  
development and production that will require additional funds. The 
Air  Force budget includes additional planned funding of almost $1.4 
billion through fiscal year 2007 for activities the Air Force has 
defined as post-development, or separate from the activities 
associated with the $21 billion development estimate. These activities 
include avionics software upgrades, partial funding for a ground 
collision avoidance system, an improved short-range missile, 
instrumentation for testing, and a classified project. Air Force 
officials told us they consider these funds and the activities 
associated with these funds outside the scope of the F-22 development 
and production programs. We are reporting on these planned activities 
and potential costs because they have increased significantly since 
fiscal year 2000. Figure 5 shows that planned funding has increased 
each year from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2002. 

Figure 5: Total Post-Development Funding As Planned Each Year in 
Fiscal Years 2000, 2001, and 2002: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 
 
Fiscal year: 2000; 
Post-Development Funding: $166.1 million. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Post-Development Funding: $580.7 million. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Post-Development Funding: $1.366 billion. 

Source: Air Force. 

[End of figure] 

More Testing Needed to Confirm F-22 Performance Estimates: 

In November 2001, the Air Force estimated that by the time the 
development program ends, the program will have met and, in some 
instances, exceeded the major F-22 performance goals. However, the Air 
Force's estimates are based on limited flight-test data, computer 
models, ground tests, and analyses. Flight-test progress has been 
slower than expected, thus delaying the confirmation that the F-22 
will deliver the required performance. Moreover, the F-22's 
performance may be affected by other factors such as increasing 
aircraft weight, maintenance needs, and a potential problem with the 
aircraft's vertical tail. 

Significant Testing Remains to Confirm Performance Estimates: 

Even though F-22 development began in 1991 and flight-testing began in 
1997, a significant amount of testing remains before the planned 
completion of development flight-testing in February 2004. F-22 
performance goals are described in 10 key performance parameters, 
about which the Air Force reports regularly to the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 
Through November 2001, the Air Force reported that ground and flight-
test experience, engineering analyses, and computer models indicate F-
22 performance will meet or exceed all required parameters. However, 
most ground and flight-tests will have to be completed before the 
estimates are confirmed. A recent review by the Air Force Operational 
Test and Evaluation Center concluded there was insufficient testing 
completed to assess 9 of the 10 key performance parameters. 

Appendix II shows the goal for each parameter and the estimated 
performance the Air Force believes is consistent with models, ground 
tests, analyses, and flight-tests for each parameter as of November 
2001. The appendix also shows the Air Force's latest estimates of 
expected performance for each parameter by the end of the development 
program. 

While avionics testing with development test aircraft has been 
limited,[Footnote 17] the program has been able to accomplish airborne 
avionics testing in a flying avionics laboratory, a commercial 
aircraft reconfigured as flying laboratory. This has helped provide 
information to testers and has helped to identify many problems with 
the hardware and software. However, while avionics testing in a flying 
laboratory is effective testing, it is not the equivalent of avionics 
testing in an actual F-22 test aircraft for two main reasons. First, 
because the flying laboratory is a large Boeing 757 passenger aircraft 
and not a more agile F-22, the Air Force cannot test the F-22's 
avionics performance in a dynamic flight environment where the 
aircraft is maneuvering at speeds and angles more characteristic of a 
smaller, fighter aircraft. A DOD testing official advised us that 
avionics performance can change when operated under the more demanding 
conditions of a fighter aircraft. Second, the flying laboratory does 
not contain the full complement of avionics sensors that are planned 
to be on an F-22, and in some cases, the position of sensors on the 
laboratory are not representative of how they are to be positioned on 
an F-22. 

Performance May Be Affected by Additional Factors: 

The F-22's performance may be affected by (1) increased aircraft 
weight, (2) maintenance needs that exceed established objectives, and 
(3) a potential problem with the aircraft's vertical tails. Aircraft 
weight, which impacts several of the key performance parameters such 
as supercruise,[Footnote 18] maneuverability, acceleration, and combat 
radius has increased since 1995. During 2001, the aircraft's weight 
increased 285 pounds because the airframe had to be strengthened with 
additional materials. Even though the aircraft weight continues to 
increase, the Air Force continues to estimate that by the end of the 
development program, the F-22 will meet or exceed its supercruise, 
maneuverability, acceleration, and combat radius key parameters. 

In addition to weight increases, the F-22's performance may also be 
affected by maintenance needs that exceed established objectives. The 
Air Force has estimated that the F-22 should at this point in 
development be able to complete 1.55 flying hours between maintenance 
actions. The Air Force also estimates the F-22 will be able to 
complete 1.95 flying hours between maintenance actions by the end of 
development and 3 flying hours between maintenance actions when the F-
22 reaches maturity in 2008.[Footnote 19] (The figure of 3 flying 
hours between maintenance actions is a key performance parameter.) 
However, the development test aircraft have been completing only .60 
flying hours between maintenance actions, which means significantly 
more maintenance actions than are currently expected at this point in 
development and significantly more than are expected at system 
maturity. 

Further, extensive maintenance has been associated with compounds that 
are used to fill gaps or seams on the aircraft's surface to help 
maintain the aircraft's low observable or stealthy nature.[Footnote 
20] As a result, when maintenance actions related to low observable 
features are included, the flying hours between maintenance figure 
decreases to only .44 flying hours between maintenance actions. In 
March 2001, we reported that program officials had earlier determined 
that the compound planned for this use on the F-22 was not meeting 
expectations; under certain conditions, it would swell or crack after 
application. Since then, a new compound has been formulated and is 
being tested, but the cracking problem continues under certain 
conditions. This issue is a concern because in early 2002 the test 
program is about to enter a phase where the Air Force expects aircraft
 4007, 4008, and 4009 to maintain 100 percent of their planned low 
observable configuration throughout their use in the test program. 
Moreover, the maintenance of low observable features has historically 
been more difficult and time consuming than expected. 
 
The Air Force is also investigating a problem with the aircraft's 
vertical tails that could impact performance. The problem involves a 
"buffet," or excess movement back and forth, of the aircraft's two 
vertical tails when the aircraft is operating at certain speeds and 
angles. Additional test instrumentation has been added to development 
test aircraft 4003 to better define the problem and determine the 
possible final solutions. 

Status of Aircraft Modifications: 

Air Force and Lockheed officials said they have implemented and are 
continuing to implement needed changes to solve problems discovered 
with separation between some of the materials within the horizontal 
tail and cracking around the cockpit canopy holes. These are problems 
we reported on last year. The Air Force continues to monitor these 
problems closely to ensure the corrective actions will be sufficient. 

The current problem they are working on with the horizontal tail 
section involves separations between some of the materials and the 
shaft that allows the horizontal tail to pivot. Because the 
separations reduce the strength of the tails, the Air Force restricted 
the flight-testing of aircraft 4002 and 4003, the two development test 
aircraft that had this problem. To remove the test restriction, 
Lockheed repaired the horizontal tails of these two aircraft. The Air 
Force and Lockheed officials believe that improvements to the 
aircraft's manufacturing process will solve this problem, and 
experience to date appears to confirm their position. According to Air 
Force officials, these improvements are to be used in the manufacture 
of the horizontal tail for aircraft 4012, scheduled for delivery in 
June 2002. 

The problem with the cockpit canopy involves cracks emanating from the 
mounting holes in the clear section of the canopy. In our March 2001 
report, we stated that the contractor and the supplier had identified 
over 100 potential causes for the cracks and were developing plans to 
address each cause. Manufacturing changes have been made to reduce 
exposure of the canopy to harmful solvents and excess stress placed on 
the clear section of the canopy during assembly into its frame. 
Additional changes are also being evaluated. According to Air Force 
officials, while the potential for cracking still exists, it is being 
continually reduced as manufacturing improvements are made. 

Risks in the F-22 Proposed Acquisition Plan: 

The F-22 revised acquisition plan, submitted to Congress in September 
2001, has risks. First, the plan increases the total number of 
aircraft committed to production before the completion of operational 
testing. We have previously reported that buying production articles 
before they are adequately tested can be costly when testing 
identifies problems requiring costly modifications to achieve 
satisfactory performance. Second, the increase in production 
commitments could increase cost and schedule risks if the contractor's 
key manufacturing processes are not in control. The F-22 program 
office no longer tracks the percentage of the contractor's key 
manufacturing processes that are in control. Third, the plan would 
increase annual production quantities even though tests of the F-22's 
structural integrity are not complete. 

Increasing Production Prior to Completion of Operational Testing 
Increases Risks: 

In September 2001, DOD informed Congress that the F-22 production 
program would exceed the congressional cost limit by $5.4 billion and 
the Air Force would purchase a minimum of 303 aircraft, a reduction of 
36 aircraft.[Footnote 21] The Air Force proposed an acquisition plan 
that extends initial low-rate production two additional years and 
begins high-rate production in fiscal year 2006 rather than 2004. The 
proposed plan is designed to provide funds for cost reduction 
initiatives by funding fewer aircraft in the early production years of 
the proposed plan. Table 5 shows the planned aircraft purchases under 
the prior and the proposed acquisition plans and the quantity 
reductions through 2005. 

Table 4: Planned Aircraft Quantity Reductions: 

Program plan: Prior acquisition plan; 
Fiscal year: 2001: 10; 
Fiscal year: 2002: 13; 
Fiscal year: 2003: 24; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 36[A]; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 36[A]; 
Fiscal year: Total: 119. 

Program plan: Proposed acquisition plan; 
Fiscal year: 2001: 10; 
Fiscal year: 2002: 13; 
Fiscal year: 2003: 23; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 27; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 32; 
Fiscal year: Total: 105. 

Program plan: Reduction; 
Fiscal year: 2001: 0; 
Fiscal year: 2002: 0; 
Fiscal year: 2003: 1; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 9; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 4; 
Fiscal year: Total: 14. 

[A] High-rate production. 

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

[End of table] 

The fiscal year 2002 Defense Appropriations Act provided funds to 
increase initial low-rate production to 13 F-22 aircraft.[Footnote 22] 
The act also provided advance procurement funds for F-22s in fiscal 
year 2003. The Air Force proposes to continue low-rate initial 
production through 2005 and begin high-rate production of 40 aircraft 
in fiscal year 2006. 

In several reports over the last 7 years, we concluded that DOD should 
minimize commitments to F-22 production until completion of 
operational testing. In our March 2001 report, we concluded that 
limiting production to no more than 10 aircraft a year (the fiscal 
year 2001 quantity) was a prudent way to mitigate risks until the Air 
Force completes operational testing. 

The Air Force's current plan would reduce the annual buy of low-rate 
production aircraft, but it would increase the total commitment of 
production aircraft before the projected completion of operational 
testing in December 2003. Specifically, the Air Force had planned to 
buy 47 aircraft at about $9.8 billion prior to the completion of 
operational testing in February 2003. However, under the current 
acquisition plan, it plans to buy 71 aircraft at about $14.9 billion 
prior to the completion of operational testing, now scheduled for 
December 2003. Moreover, should the schedule for operational testing 
slip further, as indicated earlier in this report, the Air Force's 
commitment to a greater number of aircraft before the end of 
operational testing could increase significantly. Buying production 
articles before they can be adequately tested can result in buying 
systems that require significant, and sometimes costly, modifications 
to achieve satisfactory performance; accepting less capable systems 
than planned; and deploying substandard systems to combat forces. 
Conversely, lower production rates could increase average procurement 
cost over the life of the program. 

Key Manufacturing Processes Need to Be in Control to Reduce Production 
Risks: 

Our reviews of world class organizations during the last four years 
found that these organizations minimize risk when they manufacture 
products by relying on existing manufacturing processes and 
controlling key manufacturing processes before production begins. 
[Footnote 23] In fact, most of the firms we visited during these 
reviews told us that all of their key manufacturing processes are in 
control before production begins. In November 2000, when the F-22 
program office ceased collecting information on the percentage of key 
processes in control, the contractor had only 44 percent of its 
manufacturing processes in control. Less than a year later, in 
September 2001, a contract for 10 aircraft was awarded to begin F-22 
production. 

During our current review, F-22 program officials told us that neither 
they nor the prime contractors track the status of manufacturing 
processes in control because of the cost involved in tracking these 
processes. They rely on the subcontractors to manage their own 
manufacturing processes. Hence, the program office may be committing 
to increased production quantities without knowing the percentage of 
key manufacturing processes that are in control. Continuing to 
increase the F-22 aircraft production quantities in low-rate 
production before 100 percent of the key manufacturing processes are 
in control increases the risk that manufacturing and assembly problems 
evident with the development test aircraft will carry over to the 
production program. The cost involved in correcting manufacturing and 
assembly problems would most likely exceed the cost of tracking 
manufacturing processes. 

Need to Complete Fatigue Testing to Reduce Risks: 

The F-22 test plan requires two major tests (static and fatigue) of 
the structural integrity of the F-22's airframe. These tests are 
important to reduce the risk of structural problems emerging during 
the production of aircraft or during aircraft operations. Static 
testing is undertaken to ensure the aircraft will withstand stresses 
that are expected to be encountered throughout the aircraft's flight 
regime. The aircraft structure is tested to determine if it can 
withstand stresses up to 150 percent of its design limits. After a 14-
month delay, static testing was essentially completed in December 2000. 

In 1997, the Air Force estimated that fatigue testing, which measures 
the aircraft's durability over its expected life, would be completed 
in December 1999. After several subsequent delays, fatigue testing was 
started on December 21, 2000, and is expected to be completed by April 
2002, more than 2 years later than planned. Delays in the completion 
of fatigue testing affect when structural changes can be identified 
and incorporated into F-22 production. DOD's director, operational 
test and evaluation, has expressed concern over the delays in the 
completion of fatigue testing for these reasons. 

Conclusions: 

In June 2001, the Air Force extended the F-22 development test 
program. This schedule may have to be extended further because 
problems and delays continue with the assembly and delivery of flight-
test aircraft, the flight-test program continues to be less efficient 
than planned, and there are limited development test aircraft to 
accomplish required test objectives. If the schedule slips again, the 
cost of the development program will increase beyond the $21 billion 
reported to Congress in September 2001. 

The current acquisition plan would increase the total number of 
aircraft committed to production before the completion of operational 
testing compared with the previous plan. The number of aircraft 
committed to production could be even higher than that in the current 
plan if the test schedule slips again. Buying production aircraft 
before they are adequately tested can result in problems, such as the 
need for costly modifications to achieve satisfactory performance. 

The F-22 program office does not know the percentage of the 
contractor's key manufacturing processes that are in control because 
they no longer collect these statistics. As of November 2000, the 
contractor had only 44 percent of its key manufacturing processes in 
control. Increasing F-22 production quantities before key 
manufacturing processes are in control increases the risk that 
manufacturing and assembly problems with development test aircraft 
will transition to the production program. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Because of Congress's past and continuing interest in the cost of the 
F-22 program, it is important that it be kept apprised of the current 
cost to complete the F-22 development program. Therefore, we recommend 
that the Secretary of the Air Force reassess the cost to complete the 
F-22 development program and, as a supplement to the fiscal year 2003 
budget request, provide information on any funds that would be 
necessary above the $21 billion previously reported to Congress. 

To help minimize the risks of producing large quantities of aircraft 
that may require costly modifications, we recommend that the Secretary 
of Defense limit aircraft production to no more than 13 aircraft a 
year until operational testing is completed and key manufacturing 
processes are in control. 

To help ensure that manufacturing and assembly problems with the 
development test aircraft do not carry over to the production program, 
we recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force direct the F-22 
program office to monitor the status of key manufacturing processes by 
accumulating statistics on the percentage of key manufacturing 
processes in control as the program continues to proceed toward high-
rate production. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 
with our first recommendation. In responding, DOD said that it 
continuously tracks the cost to complete the engineering and 
manufacturing development phase of the F-22 program and reports the 
results to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics at quarterly reviews. DOD also said that if the budget 
for that phase of the program were to increase, it would report this 
increase to Congress. DOD did not believe that it was necessary to 
provide Congress with a supplement to the fiscal year 2003 budget 
request. 

We support DOD's tracking of the F-22's development costs and its 
intent to report cost increases to Congress. As discussed in this 
report, there are strong indications the F-22 development program is 
unlikely to be completed within the current cost estimate of $21 
billion because delays in the flight-test program may require an 
extension of the development program and delays result in increased 
costs. Moreover, Lockheed's development costs continue to increase 
and, because of the cost reimbursement type contract Lockheed has with 
DOD, these costs are liabilities to the government. We believe that 
Congress should be notified as soon as possible of projected cost 
increases in the development program. 

DOD did not concur with our second recommendation. It stated it does 
not believe there is sufficient justification to limit the production 
rate for the F-22 until operational testing is completed. DOD said 
that while flight-testing has progressed at a slower than predicted 
rate, the F-22 continues to make progress in development. DOD believes 
this progress confirms the F-22's potential to meet air superiority 
mission needs. DOD also said that limiting the number of aircraft 
acquired during low-rate production would make it difficult for the 
contractor to persuade its suppliers to make improvements leading to 
full-rate production readiness. 

We believe that there is sufficient justification to limit F-22 low-
rate production until operational testing is completed because the Air 
Force's estimates of performance are based on limited flight-test 
data, computer models, ground tests, and analyses. Our previous work 
has shown that buying production articles before they can be 
adequately tested can result in buying systems that require 
significant and sometimes costly modifications to achieve satisfactory 
performance, accepting less capable systems than planned, and 
deploying substandard systems to combat forces. Deferring a 
substantial increase in production rates would reduce the amount of 
production funds committed until the operational effectiveness and 
suitability of the F-22 has been successfully demonstrated during 
operational testing. Although DOD said that lower production rates may 
cause the contractor to have difficulty persuading its suppliers to 
make improvements in their manufacturing process needed for full-rate 
production readiness, we believe this possibility would be an 
acceptable risk to the alternative of producing larger quantities of 
aircraft before the operational effectiveness and suitability of the F-
22 has been demonstrated. 

In regard to the third recommendation, DOD partially concurred. It 
agreed that it is important to ensure that manufacturing processes are 
maturing as production progresses and that these processes are in 
control. DOD further said that an assessment of the status of key F-22 
manufacturing processes would be included in an upcoming report 
assessing production readiness. This report is scheduled for 
completion prior to the lot 3 low-rate production contract award 
planned for December 2002. We support DOD's plan to conduct an 
assessment of the status of key F-22 manufacturing processes prior to 
the next planned low-rate production contract and believe that the F-
22 program office should continue to accumulate statistics on the 
percentage of key manufacturing processes in control as the program 
continues to proceed towards full-rate production. 

DOD's comments are reproduced in appendix Ill. DOD also provided 
updated information and suggested additional technical changes, which 
we incorporated in the report where appropriate. 

Scope and Methodology: 

To determine whether the program is expected to meet schedule goals, 
we reviewed program and avionics schedules and discussed potential 
changes to these schedules with F-22 program officials. We also 
compared current schedules with those developed in 1997 as a result of 
a study by a cost estimating team. We tracked progress in the flight-
test program and evaluated schedule variances in the contractors' 
performance management system and compared planned milestone 
accomplishment dates with actual dates. We tracked technical problems 
in manufacturing and assembling the development test aircraft. 

To determine whether the program is likely to meet the cost goal, we 
examined (1) the extent to which the development program is likely to 
be completed within the current cost estimate, (2) the Air Force's 
plans to fund the program for fiscal year 2002, and (3) the program 
funding plan compared to the current cost estimate. We compared the 
estimated cost at completion of the prime contracts with planned 
amounts, evaluated cost variances identified in the contractors' cost 
reporting systems, and reviewed the status of initiatives designed to 
avoid cost growth. 

To determine whether the development program is likely to meet 
performance goals, we analyzed information on the key performance 
parameters and those sub-parameters that are measured. We compared
 performance goals established by the under secretary of defense for 
acquisition, technology, and logistics with the Air Force's current 
estimates of performance in November 2001 and at completion of 
development. 
 
To identify the status of F-22 modifications, we collected updated 
information on the status of existing aircraft structural problems 
that have required aircraft modifications. 

To assess the Air Force's plans for low-rate initial production and 
the risks associated with those plans, we determined the amount of 
overlap between the development program and the production plans, 
particularly in reference to the completion of initial operational 
testing and evaluation. 

In making these determinations, assessments, and identifications, we 
required access to current information about test results, performance 
estimates, schedule achievements and revisions, costs being incurred, 
aircraft modifications, and the program's plans for continued 
development and initial production. The Air Force and contractors gave 
us access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on the 
matters covered in this report. 

In performing our work, we obtained information or interviewed 
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington 
D.C.; the F-22 System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
Ohio; the Defense Contract Management Command, Marietta, Georgia; 
Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems, Marietta, Georgia; and the F-22 
Combined Test Force, Edwards Air Force Base, California. We performed 
our work from July 2001 through February 2002 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We are sending copies of this report to the secretary of defense; the 
secretary of the air force; and the director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request. 
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Robert Pelletier at (202) 512-
4032 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. 
Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

James F. Wiggins: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John W. Warner: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bob Stump: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Calendar Year 2001 Test Criteria Required to Continue with 
Low-Rate Initial Production: 

Criteria: Establish the flight envelope for Block 2 aircraft 
structures; 
Completion date: May 2001. 

Criteria: Conduct sufficient engine initial service release testing to 
determine engine hot section life; 
Completion date: June 2001. 

Criteria: Complete F-22 radar detection range measurement; 
Completion date: April 2001. 

Criteria: Complete first segment of radar cross-section stability over 
time testing; 
Completion date: June 2001. 

Criteria: Complete F-22 first Block 3.0 avionics AIM-120 missile 
guided launch; 
Completion date: September 2001. 

Criteria: Conduct full scale airframe fatigue testing sufficient to 
define life limits and initial airframe inspection requirements;  
Completion date: September 2001. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Estimates of Performance for Key Parameters: 

Key performance parameter: Supercruise; 
Goal (acquisition program baseline): 100 percent; 
Air Force assessment of estimated performance through November 2001: 
114 percent; 
Estimated performance at completion of development: 115 percent. 

Key performance parameter: Acceleration (< 100% is favorable)[A]; 
Goal (acquisition program baseline): 100 percent; 
Air Force assessment of estimated performance through November 2001: 
89 percent; 
Estimated performance at completion of development: 87 percent. 

Key performance parameter: Maneuverability; 
Goal (acquisition program baseline): 100 percent; 
Air Force assessment of estimated performance through November 2001: 
101 percent; 
Estimated performance at completion of development: 102 percent. 

Key performance parameter: Airlift support (C-141 equivalents); 
Goal (acquisition program baseline): 8; 
Air Force assessment of estimated performance through November 2001: 
6.6; 
Estimated performance at completion of development: 6.6. 

Key performance parameter: Sortie generation rate; 
Goal (acquisition program baseline): 100 percent; 
Air Force assessment of estimated performance through November 2001: 
100 percent; 
Estimated performance at completion of development: 100 percent. 

Key performance parameter: Radar cross section (front sector only); 
Goal (acquisition program baseline): 100 percent; 
Air Force assessment of estimated performance through November 2001: 
Favorable (data classified); 
Estimated performance at completion of development: Favorable (data 
classified). 

Key performance parameter: Average flight-test hours between 
maintenance; 
Goal (acquisition program baseline): 3.0; 
Air Force assessment of estimated performance through November 2001: 
0.44; 
Estimated performance at completion of development: 1.95 (at end of 
development); 3.0 (by system maturity in year 2008). 

Key performance parameter: Payload (missiles); 
Goal (acquisition program baseline): four medium-range, two short-range;
Air Force assessment of estimated performance through November 2001: 
six medium-range, two short-range;
Estimated performance at completion of development: six medium-range, 
two short-range. 

Key performance parameter: Combat radius; 
Goal (acquisition program baseline): 100 percent; 
Air Force assessment of estimated performance through November 2001: 
112 percent; 
Estimated performance at completion of development: 115 percent. 

Key performance parameter: Radar detection range; 
Goal (acquisition program baseline): 100 percent; 
Air Force assessment of estimated performance through November 2001: 
105 percent; 
Estimated performance at completion of development: 105 percent. 

[A] The acceleration parameter is a measure of the time it takes the 
aircraft to increase speed to a certain level. If the aircraft is able 
to increase speed to a certain level in less time than expected, this 
is considered favorable. Therefore, a measure of less than 100 percent 
is favorable. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

February 21, 2002: 

Mr. James Wiggins
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. General Accounting Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Wiggins: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-02-298, "Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays Indicate Initial 
Production Rates Should Be Lower to Reduce Risks," Dated January 17, 
2002 (GAO Code 120084). The Department appreciates the opportunity to 
comment on the draft report. 

Delays in the delivery of development aircraft during the past two 
years, and delays in flight-testing have contributed to cost and 
schedule pressures on the program. However, the remedies proposed by 
the GAO could increase cost and schedule risks. 

The GAO's report makes three recommendations. The Department partially 
concurs with Recommendation 1, agreeing that we need to continually 
assess the cost to complete the engineering and manufacturing 
development program. The Department does not concur with 
Recommendation 2, which is to limit to 13 the number of aircraft in 
future production lots until operational testing is completed. The 
Department believes that the GAO's proposed remedy will destabilize 
program cost and schedule. The Department partially concurs with 
Recommendation 3, agreeing that we need to track the maturity of the 
manufacturing processes to ensure that the quality and timing of 
production deliveries meet our objectives. Comments regarding 
recommendations are enclosed. 

The Department has provided more detailed comments on the report under 
separate cover. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Spiros G. Pallas: 
Acting Director: 
Strategic and Tactical Systems: 

Enclosure: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated January 17, 2002: 
(GAO-02-298/GAO Code 120084): 

"Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays Indicate Initial Production Rates 
Should Be Lower to Reduce Risks" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Air 
Force reassess the cost to complete the F-22 development program and, 
as a supplement to the fiscal year 2003 budget request, provide 
information on any funds that would be necessary above the $21 billion 
previously reported to Congress. (Draft Report/p. 26) 

DOD Response: Partially Concur. The Department continuously tracks the 
cost to complete the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) 
program, and reports the results to the USD(AT&L) at each quarterly 
review. If the budget for EMD were to increase, the Department would 
report the increase to Congress. We do not believe that it is 
necessary to provide a supplement to the FY 2003 budget. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
limit aircraft production to no more than 13 aircraft a year until 
operational testing is completed and key manufacturing processes are 
in control. (Draft Report/p. 26) 

DOD RESPONSE: Non-concur. We do not believe that there is a sufficient 
justification to limit the production rate for the F-22 until 
operational testing is completed. While flight-test has progressed at 
a slower than predicted rate, the F-22 continues to make progress in 
Development Test and Evaluation, which is confirming that the F-22 has 
the potential to meet air superiority mission needs. During LRIP, 
production process controls mature to such an extent that the program 
may move away from developmental fabrication methods. Limiting the 
number of aircraft to be acquired during LRIP also makes it more 
difficult for the contractor to persuade its suppliers to make 
improvements leading to full-rate production readiness. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Air 
Force direct the F-22 program office to monitor the status of key 
manufacturing processes by accumulating statistics on the percentage 
of key manufacturing processes in control as the program continues to 
proceed toward high-rate production. (Draft Report/p. 26) 

DOD Response: Partially Concur. It is important that we ensure that 
manufacturing processes are maturing as production progresses, and 
that these processes are "in control." The update to the Production 
Readiness Review, incorporated as an exit criterion for the Lot 3 
award in CY02, will include an assessment of the status of the key 
manufacturing processes. The Department also monitors those processes 
through other metrics-for example, scrap rework and repair data. The 
CY02 exit criteria speak directly to the GAO's recommendation. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Staff Acknowledgments: 

Acknowledgments: 

Marvin E. Bonner, Edward Browning, Arthur Cobb, Travis Masters, Gary
Middleton, Robert D. Murphy, Don M. Springman, and John Van Schalk
made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Tactical Aircraft: Continuing Difficulty Keeping F-22 Production Costs 
Within the Congressional Limitation. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-782]. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 
2001. 

Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Development and Testing Delays Indicate Need 
for Limit on Low-Rate Production. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-01-310]. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 
2001. 

Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded
Congressional Limitation. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-178]. Washington, D.C.: 
August 15, 2000. 

Defense Acquisitions: Use of Cost Reduction Plans in Estimating F-22
Total Production Costs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-00-200]. Washington, D.C.: 
June 15, 2000. 

Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal
Year 2001. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/OCG-00-8]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2000. 

F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are
Avoided. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-68]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2000. 

Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F-22 Cost and Schedule Goals.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-00-58]. 
Washington, D.C.: December 7, 1999. 

Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD's Procurement and RDT&E Programs. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-233R]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1999. 

Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal
Year 2000. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/OCG-99-26]. 
Washington, DC: April 16, 1999. 

Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development Programs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 17, 1999. 

F-22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-55]. Washington, D.C.: March 
15, 1999. 

F-22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Program. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-98-137]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 25, 1998. 

F-22 Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-67]. Washington, D.C.: March 
10, 1998. 

Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-156]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 4, 1997. 

Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on
Optimistic Budget Projections. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103]. Washington, D.C.:
March 5, 1997. 

F-22 Restructuring. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-100R]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 28, 1997. 

Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22
Aircraft Should Be Reduced. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-95-59]. Washington, D.C.: April 
19, 1995. 

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Issues. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-94-176].
Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1994. 

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-94-118]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 25, 1994. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] P.L. 105-85, Nov. 18, 1997. 

[2] As adjusted under the act's provisions. 

[3] The act also requires us to assess whether we had access to 
sufficient information to make informed judgments on matters covered 
by our report. 

[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Tactical Aircraft: F-22 
Development and Testing Delays Indicate Need for Limit on Low-Rate 
Production, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-310] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2001). 

[5] P.L. 107-107, Dec. 28, 2001. 

[6] The team is comprised mainly of former Air Force and Office of the 
Secretary of Defense officials with extensive aircraft testing 
experience and was formed by the principal deputy assistant secretary 
of the air force for acquisition. 

[7] A manufacturing process is considered to be in control when it can 
consistently be done in a high-quality manner. 

[8] Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the 
conduct of operations by land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive 
interference by the enemy. 

[9] P.L. 105-85, Nov. 18, 1997. 

[10] P.L. 106-65, Oct. 5, 1999. 

[11] The limitation on production cost does not specify a quantity of 
F-22 aircraft. 

[12] P.L. 107-107, Dec. 28, 2001. 

[13] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-310], Mar. 15, 
2001. 

[14] A review conducted to determine that the detailed design 
satisfies the performance and engineering requirements of the aircraft. 

[15] This figure was an estimate based on actual assembly hours of 
historical fighter aircraft. 

[16] Flight-testing of the aircraft electronics. 

[17] Only 288 of about 1,324 planned avionics flight-test points, or 
22 percent, have been accomplished. 

[18] Supercruise is the aircraft's ability to travel at high speeds 
for long ranges. 

[19] System maturity is defined as 100,000 flying hours. 

[20] Because the presence of any seams around maintenance access 
panels can potentially allow the aircraft to more easily be detected 
by enemy radar, a compound is applied to these seams in an effort to 
eliminate them and make the aircraft's surface smooth. 

[21] The Air Force still intends to try to procure these 36 aircraft 
if cost savings are realized through ongoing cost savings projects. 

[22] P.L. 107-117, Jan.10, 2002. 

[23] U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Successful 
Application to Weapon Acquisitions Requires Changes in DOD's 
Environment, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-56] 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 1998). 

[End of section] 

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