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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, July 14, 2011: 

DOD Civilian Personnel: 

Competency Gap Analyses and Other Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's 
Strategic Workforce Plans: 

Statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

and: 

John P. Hutton, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

GAO-11-827T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-827T, a testimony before the Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Since 2001, strategic human capital management for federal agencies 
has been on GAO’s high-risk list. Although some progress has been 
made, GAO reported in February 2011 that the area remains on the high-
risk list because of the need for agencies, including DOD, to address 
current and emerging skill gaps that are undermining their ability to 
fulfill their missions. The Department of Defense (DOD) had about 
718,000 civilians as of March 2010, which includes its senior leader 
and acquisition workforces. DOD has noted that approximately 30 
percent of its civilian workforce—and 90 percent of its senior leader 
workforce—will be eligible to retire by March 31, 2015. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required 
(1) DOD to report on plans for its overall civilian, senior leader, 
and acquisition workforces for 2009 through 2012; (2) DOD to address a 
series of legislative requirements for each workforce; and (3) GAO to 
review and report on these plans. DOD has informed GAO that it expects 
to issue its next set of plans in September 2011. In anticipation of 
these plans, it is helpful to understand key issues identified during 
GAO’s review of DOD’s 2009 plans. 

This statement discusses DOD’s progress in addressing selected 
legislative requirements, especially as they relate to the human 
capital management challenges included in GAO’s 2011 high-risk report 
and the federal government’s current budget environment. Specifically, 
this statement summarizes GAO’s observations on DOD’s plans for its 
(1) overall civilian, (2) senior leader, and (3) acquisition 
workforces. 

What GAO Found: 

In DOD’s 2009 overall civilian workforce plan, GAO found that the 
department had assessed the critical skills of its existing civilian 
workforce. Specifically, DOD’s plan discussed 22 mission-critical 
occupations that, according to DOD, represented the results of the 
department’s assessment of critical skills. However, GAO found that 
DOD had not completed (1) an assessment of gaps in the existing or 
projected overall civilian workforce, (2) a plan of action identifying 
recruiting and retention goals and funding, and (3) an assessment of 
its progress in implementing the legislative requirement for the plan 
using results-oriented performance measures. For example, DOD’s plan 
only discussed competency gap analyses for 3 of its 22 mission-
critical occupations. Moreover, while DOD’s plan identified recruiting 
and retention goals, GAO found that some of these goals were not based 
on competency gap analyses and the plan lacked information regarding 
needed funding to achieve these goals. Additionally, GAO found that 
although other DOD documents—for example, DOD’s Civilian Human Capital 
Management Report for Fiscal Year 2009—provided some information on 
performance measures, DOD’s plan did not report on the progress the 
department made on specific goals using results-oriented performance 
metrics. 

GAO found that DOD’s senior leader workforce plan included a plan of 
action to address gaps in critical skills and competencies that 
included changes in the number of personnel authorized in categories 
of the senior leader workforce. Specifically, DOD’s plan identified 
changes needed in the number of personnel authorized and, at the time 
of GAO’s review, stated that it expected executive requirements to 
increase by more than 400 positions by fiscal year 2015. However, GAO 
found that while DOD had conducted a baseline review to assess and 
validate its civilian senior leader requirements, it did not document 
its analysis or summarize the results of its review—resulting in a 
recommendation that DOD do so in future reviews. DOD generally 
concurred with this recommendation. GAO will be evaluating DOD’s 
progress in implementing the recommendation, especially in light of 
the impact of the Secretary of Defense’s efficiency initiatives that 
propose reductions in the number of senior leaders. GAO also found 
that the department had not assessed the critical skills for its 
existing and future senior leader workforce. While the plan notes the 
need for skills in areas such as leadership and management, it does 
not provide details for these skills and does not identify skills 
related to senior leader or scientific and professional positions. 

With regard to DOD’s acquisition workforce plan, GAO found that DOD 
identified the need to increase the size of its acquisition workforce 
(totaling about 118,000 civilians, as of September 2009) by 20,000 
personnel by fiscal year 2015. To do so, DOD outlined its strategies 
for growing the acquisition workforce through retention, new hiring, 
and in-sourcing, which involves the conversion of functions currently 
performed by contractor personnel to performance by federal civilians. 
DOD, however, had not (1) completed assessments of the skills and 
competencies of its acquisition workforce; (2) included in its plan an 
assessment of what the appropriate mix of its total acquisition 
workforce should be; and (3) at the time of our report, included 
information on the funding needed to achieve DOD’s human capital 
initiatives for the acquisition workforce. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-827T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 
512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov or John P. Hutton at (202) 512-7773 or 
huttonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for providing us the opportunity to be here today to discuss 
our issued work on the Department of Defense's (DOD) strategic human 
capital management of its large, diverse civilian workforce. This 
workforce performs a wide variety of duties and responsibilities, 
including mission-essential combat support functions, such as 
logistics support and maintenance, that traditionally have been 
performed by the uniformed military. A key component of this workforce 
also provides deployable civilian experts to Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
other theaters of operation. We initially included strategic human 
capital management for all federal civilians on our high-risk list in 
2001[Footnote 1] because of the long-standing lack of leadership in 
this area. While significant steps have been taken, the area remains 
high risk governmentwide[Footnote 2] because of a need to develop and 
implement plans to address current and emerging critical skill gaps 
that are undermining agencies' abilities to meet their vital missions. 
The federal government's current budget and long-term fiscal pressures 
underscore the importance of a strategic and efficient approach to 
human capital management--an approach that would help ensure the 
recruitment and retention of individuals with the needed critical 
skills. DOD's civilian workforce is no exception. According to the 
department, as of March 2010, DOD's total civilian workforce included 
about 718,000 full-time civilians. Approximately 30 percent of DOD's 
civilian workforce--and 90 percent of its senior leaders--will be 
eligible to retire by March 31, 2015, according to DOD. 

Over the years, Congress has required DOD to conduct human capital 
planning efforts for its overall civilian, senior leader, and 
acquisition workforces[Footnote 3] and provided various tools to help 
manage the department's use of contractors, which augments DOD's total 
civilian workforce.[Footnote 4] While the specific requirements vary 
for each category, recent legislation--the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010[Footnote 5]--required 
DOD to assess the skills, competencies, and gaps; projected workforce 
trends; and needed funding, among other things (see app. I for the 
specific requirements set forth in the act). The legislation also 
required us to assess and report on DOD's workforce plans. To date, we 
have issued three reports in response to prior legislation.[Footnote 
6] Our review of DOD's 2009 workforce plans found that some progress 
has been made by specifically addressing more than one-third of the 
legislative requirements. Most of the remaining requirements, however, 
were partially addressed--including key requirements such as 
conducting competency gap analyses, identifying funding needs, and 
assessing progress. Moreover, we have emphasized in our work that 
effective human capital planning can enable DOD to have the right 
people, with the right skills, doing the right jobs, in the right 
places, at the right time by making flexible use of its internal 
workforce and appropriately using contractors. 

Furthermore, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010[Footnote 7] required us to 
review and report on DOD's workforce plans for 2009 through 2012 no 
later than 180 days after DOD's submission of the plans to the 
congressional defense committees. DOD has informed us that it expects 
to issue its next set of workforce plans in September 2011. In 
anticipation of our review of the department's next strategic 
workforce plan, it is helpful to understand key issues identified 
during our review of DOD's 2009 plans. In today's statement, we will 
discuss the department's progress in addressing selected legislative 
requirements, especially as they relate to human capital management 
challenges included in our most recent high-risk report and the 
federal government's current budget and long-term fiscal pressures. 
Specifically, we will summarize our observations on DOD's plans for 
its (1) overall civilian workforce, (2) senior leader workforce, and 
(3) acquisition workforce. 

For this testimony, we primarily relied on our September 2010 review 
of DOD's 2009 workforce plans.[Footnote 8] For that report, we 
analyzed the plans and compared them with the requirements in section 
1108(a) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 for DOD to submit a strategic 
workforce plan. Specifically, we analyzed DOD's 2009 Civilian Human 
Capital Strategic Workforce Plan, key sections of DOD's Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Strategy,[Footnote 9] and other relevant 
information, including a supplemental draft report on funding of the 
acquisition workforce and DOD's Civilian Human Capital Management 
Report for Fiscal Year 2009 that was submitted to the Office of 
Personnel Management. We considered a requirement to be "addressed" if 
DOD demonstrated, through evidence, that it discussed all aspects of 
the legislative requirement in its workforce plan. In several 
instances, "any" was a key word in the legislative requirement, and we 
considered those requirements addressed if DOD discussed one or more 
actions that demonstrated the requirements. Additionally, we 
considered the requirement to be "partially addressed" if DOD provided 
evidence that it discussed some aspects of the legislative 
requirement, and "not addressed" if DOD did not discuss aspects of the 
requirements in the workforce plan. Furthermore, we took steps to 
ensure that the data upon which DOD based its workforce assessments 
and gap analyses were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our 
review.[Footnote 10] In addition, we interviewed relevant officials in 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness' Office of Civilian Personnel Policy and the Civilian 
Personnel Management Service and the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. We also interviewed 
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense's functional 
communities--which include human resources, intelligence, and 
financial management--the Defense Acquisition University, and Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy, as well as senior staff in 
acquisition career functional communities for contracting and 
production, quality, and manufacturing. Finally, we reviewed prior GAO 
reports assessing DOD's human capital strategic planning efforts. 

We conducted the work supporting our September 2010 report from 
December 2009 through September 2010 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provided a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

DOD Addressed Some Requirements for Its Overall Civilian Workforce, 
but Partially Addressed Those Related to Competency Gaps, Recruiting 
and Retention Goals, and Performance Measures: 

In DOD's 2009 overall civilian workforce plan, GAO found that the 
department had addressed some legislative requirements, including 
assessing the critical skills of its existing civilian workforce. 
Specifically, the department's plan discusses 22 mission-critical 
occupations that, according to DOD ,represented the results of its 
assessment of critical skills.[Footnote 11] According to DOD, mission- 
critical occupations are those occupations that are key to current and 
future mission requirements, as well as those that present a challenge 
regarding recruitment and retention rates and for which succession 
planning is needed. However, during our prior review of DOD's 2008 
plan,[Footnote 12] DOD officials told us that enterprisewide mission- 
critical occupations referred to both critical skills and critical 
competencies, and at that time, the department was working on guidance 
to define those terms and various other workforce planning terms. 
Nonetheless, at the time of our review of DOD's 2009 plan, the 
guidance had not yet been completed and issued. 

Key legislative requirements that DOD's plan partially addressed 
included (1) an assessment of gaps in the existing or projected 
overall civilian workforce;[Footnote 13] (2) a plan of action 
identifying specific recruiting and retention goals and funding--
especially in areas identified as critical skills and competencies; 
and (3) an assessment of the department's progress in implementing the 
workforce plan, using results-oriented performance measures. Although 
some aspects of the legislative requirements were addressed, DOD still 
has significant work to do to fully meet the requirements. For 
example, while the plan included gap analyses related to the number of 
personnel needed for some of the 22 mission-critical occupations, the 
department had only discussed competency gap analyses for 3 of its 22 
mission-critical occupations--language, logistics management, and 
information technology management. As we have previously reported, it 
is essential that gap analyses for strategic workforce planning 
include an evaluation of gaps--not only in the numbers of personnel 
needed, but also in the critical skills and competencies needed by the 
workforce. 

Furthermore, we found that DOD's overall civilian workforce plan 
identified recruiting and retention goals for each mission-critical 
occupation--that is, the number of positions needed. However, we found 
that most of these recruiting and retention goals were not based on 
competency gap analyses--especially since, as we have previously 
noted, competency gap analyses were discussed for only 3 of the 22 
mission-critical occupations. We further reported that the 
department's plan lacked information regarding the funding needed to 
achieve DOD's recruitment and retention goals. 

Lastly, regarding assessments of the department's progress, we found 
that DOD's plan did not report on the department's progress in 
implementing the overall civilian workforce plan, using results- 
oriented performance metrics. We noted, however, that other DOD 
documents provided some information on performance measures related to 
the workforce plan. For example, DOD's Civilian Human Capital 
Management Report for Fiscal Year 2009[Footnote 14] provided a metric 
for measuring progress toward DOD's goal of having a mission-ready 
workforce. Regarding the overall civilian workforce plan, we found 
that DOD identified a number of specific strategies for developing, 
training, deploying, compensating, and motivating the civilian 
workforce, but it did not specify the performance measures to 
determine how and if the strategies were implemented. Moreover, 
although DOD's plan stated that the department would set performance 
measures in 2010 and monitor progress by the fourth quarter of fiscal 
years 2010, at the time of our review, DOD had not provided 
information concerning any additional performance measures. 

DOD Addressed Some Requirements for Its Senior Leader Workforce, but 
Not Those Related to Assessing the Critical Skills of the Existing and 
Future Workforces: 

Our review of DOD's 2009 senior leader workforce plan found that the 
department included (1) an assessment of the projected trends in the 
senior leader workforce based on expected losses through retirement 
and other attrition and (2) a plan of action to address the gaps in 
critical skills and competencies that included changes in the number 
of personnel authorized in categories of the senior leader workforce. 
More specifically, DOD's 2009 senior leader workforce plan included, 
among other things, trend projections for the Senior Executive 
Service, Senior Leader, Science and Professional, and intelligence 
community segments of the senior leader workforce. 

Additionally, DOD's plan included a plan of action to address the gaps 
in critical skills and competencies that identified changes needed in 
the number of personnel authorized and stated, at the time of GAO's 
review, that DOD expected executive requirements to increase by more 
than 400 positions by fiscal year 2015. In particular, that plan 
identified the need for 240 additional senior leader allocations for 
fiscal year 2010 to satisfy emerging mission needs--including 
allocations for increased medical requirements and to backfill 
positions previously held by general flag officers who have been or 
will be deployed. The plan also identified a need for 25 senior leader 
allocations to address shortfalls in the acquisition workforce. 
However, in our November 2010 report[Footnote 15] that focused 
specifically on requirements for DOD's senior leader workforce, we 
found that while DOD had conducted a baseline review to assess and 
validate its civilian senior leader workforce requirements, it did not 
document its analysis or summarize the results of its review. Further, 
while DOD reported to Congress that this was a rigorous analysis of 
its senior leader workforce, we found that some of the components' 
information was incomplete and DOD was unable to provide documentation 
of an analysis summarizing its results. Similarly, DOD's intelligence 
community, in 2007, issued guidance for assessing its senior workforce 
needs but also did not summarize its analysis. As a result, we 
recommended in our November 2010 report that in future reviews of 
DOD's civilian senior leader workforce, the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness to document the analysis conducted. DOD generally concurred 
with this recommendation stating that it will document analyses 
conducted in future reviews of its civilian senior leaders. We also 
recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Intelligence to finalize and issue common criteria for 
the military service intelligence elements and the defense 
intelligence agencies to use in their assessments of Defense 
Intelligence Senior Executive Service requirements. DOD concurred with 
our recommendation. We will be evaluating DOD's progress in 
implementing the recommendations, especially in light of the impact of 
the Secretary of Defense's efficiency initiatives,[Footnote 16] which 
call for a reduction in the number of senior leaders. 

Finally, key legislative requirements that the department did not 
address in its senior leader workforce plan included (1) an assessment 
of critical skills that will be needed in the future within the senior 
leader workforce and (2) an assessment of the critical skills of the 
existing senior leader workforce. Specifically, DOD's plan did not 
identify critical skills related to Senior Leader and Scientific and 
Professional positions and did not address the requirement to conduct 
an assessment of critical skills of the existing and future senior 
leader workforce. While the plan notes the need for skills in areas 
such as leadership and management, it does not provide details for 
these skills and does not identify skills related to senior leader or 
scientific and professional positions. 

DOD Addressed Some Requirements for Its Acquisition Workforce, but 
Partially Addressed Those Related to Competency Gaps, Appropriate 
Workforce Mix, and Funding Needs: 

In our February 2011 high-risk report, we noted that among the actions 
DOD needed to take to improve outcomes on the billions of dollars 
spent annually on goods and services was to ensure that its 
acquisition workforce was adequately sized, trained, and equipped to 
meet the department's needs. With regard to DOD's acquisition 
workforce plan, we found that DOD identified the need to increase the 
size of its acquisition workforce (totaling about 118,000 civilians as 
of September 2009) by 20,000 personnel by fiscal year 2015. To do so, 
DOD outlined its strategies for growing the acquisition workforce 
through retention, new hiring, and in-sourcing, which involves the 
conversion of functions currently performed by contractor personnel to 
performance by government personnel. DOD, however, had not yet (1) 
completed assessments of the skills and competencies of its 
acquisition workforce; (2) included in its plan an assessment of what 
the appropriate mix of its total acquisition workforce should be; and 
(3) at the time of our report, included information on the funding 
needed to achieve DOD's human capital initiatives for the acquisition 
workforce. 

In our September 2010 report, we found that DOD's plan partially 
addressed the legislative requirements to assess the critical skills 
and competencies of its acquisition workforce. A DOD official 
responsible for the acquisition workforce plan indicated that DOD did 
not differentiate skills and competencies, but rather considered 
skills to be an integral part of the competencies. As such, conducting 
competency assessments would embody an assessment of the requisite 
skills. In that regard, DOD reported that it had completed the 
competency assessment of its contracting career field, but not the 
assessments of the remaining 12 career fields, which were in various 
stages of progress. 

Similarly, we noted in our September 2010 report that the plan only 
partially addressed the need to assess the appropriate mix of 
civilian, military, and contractor personnel. The plan provided 
detailed information about the civilian workforce, information on 
military personnel currently serving in the acquisition workforce, 
identified specific guidance that was in place for determining the 
appropriate workforce mix, and indicated that initiatives had begun 
that were aimed at inventorying the use of contractors across all 13 
career fields. The plan, however, did not identify specific growth 
targets for military personnel or provide data on the current or 
future contractor personnel in DOD's total acquisition workforce. 

This leads us to a related point about DOD's use of the inventory of 
contractor services as a workforce planning tool. Congress has passed 
legislation in recent years to improve the department's ability to 
manage its services acquisitions; to make more strategic decisions 
about the right workforce mix of military, civilian, and contractor 
personnel; and to better align resource needs through the budget 
process to achieve that mix. For example, section 807 of the NDAA for 
Fiscal Year 2008 required DOD to annually compile and review an 
inventory of activities performed pursuant to contracts for services 
to help provide better insights into, among other things, the number 
of contractors providing services to the department and the functions 
they are performing.[Footnote 17] Additionally, DOD is to review the 
inventories and, among other things, identify activities that should 
be considered for conversion to performance by DOD civilian employees. 
As such, the inventories and the associated review processes are to 
help support development of DOD's annual strategic workforce plan. 

In January 2011, we reported on the approach DOD used to compile its 
fiscal year 2009 inventories and how the inventories had been reviewed 
and used to inform workforce decisions.[Footnote 18] We found that DOD 
had implemented a more uniform approach to compile its fiscal year 
2009 inventories to reduce inconsistencies in how components compiled 
their fiscal year 2008 inventories. To do so, in May 2010 the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (AT&L) issued guidance to the Navy, Air Force, and other 
components that specified the categories of services to be included in 
the inventories; instructed them to use the Federal Procurement Data 
System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG)[Footnote 19] as the basis for most of 
the inventory data requirements; and provided a formula to estimate 
the number of contractor full-time equivalent personnel working under 
those contracts. This guidance also authorized the Army to continue to 
use its existing process, which incorporates data reported by 
contractors through the Army's Contractor Manpower Reporting 
Application (CMRA) system, as the basis for its inventory. The CMRA is 
a system that is designed to collect information on labor hour 
expenditures by function, funding source, and mission supported on 
contracted efforts. DOD officials identified continuing limitations 
associated with the fiscal year 2009 inventories, including the 
inability of FPDS-NG, which was to be used by DOD components other 
than the Army, to provide information for all of the required data 
elements. DOD was also concerned about AT&L's estimating approach. 
Additionally, we found that the military departments differed both in 
their approaches to reviewing the activities performed by contractors 
and the extent to which they have used the inventories to inform 
workforce decisions. Overall, the Army had used the inventories to a 
greater degree than the other military departments. 

AT&L's May 2010 guidance stated that the Department recognized the 
need and benefit of collecting actual contractor manpower data and was 
committed to do so. Further, AT&L stated it would work with the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and 
other organizations to issue preliminary guidance and a proposed plan 
of action by August 2010. However, at the time of our review of the 
fiscal year 2009 inventories, DOD had not yet done so. In response, we 
recommended that DOD develop and issue a plan of action to collect 
manpower data and, in the interim, improve its estimating approach. 
Developing such a plan would provide an important tangible step in 
meeting the inventory requirements, especially since the absence of a 
way forward hinders DOD's ability to use the inventories as a tool to 
inform decision making. Earlier this year, Congress appropriated $2 
million to the Air Force and the Navy to leverage the Army's 
Contractor Manpower Reporting Application, modified as appropriate for 
service-specific requirements, for documenting the number of full-time 
contractor employees.[Footnote 20] DOD was also to report to the 
defense committees on its plans for documenting the number of full-
time contractor employees, but a DOD official indicated that they have 
not yet done so. 

Finally, with respect to DOD's acquisition workforce plan, we found 
that DOD, at the time of our September 2010 report, did not include 
information on the funding needed to achieve DOD's human capital 
initiatives for the acquisition workforce. We have previously included 
in our recommendations to DOD that the department align activities 
with resources to guide its efforts to implement its strategic 
workforce plan. Without a funding plan, DOD may not be able to fund 
its best strategies that address legislative requirements and meet its 
workforce needs, and given today's fiscal climate, there is increased 
pressure to ensure that funds are allocated to the best strategies. 
DOD released a separate report on September 14, 2010, after we had 
concluded our audit work. 

DOD officials indicate that they expect to issue their next 
acquisition workforce report in September 2011. As part of our planned 
review of the overall civilian workforce, we intend to determine DOD's 
progress in assessing (1) the critical skills and competencies of the 
civilian workforce; (2) gaps in that workforce; (3) the appropriate 
mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel capabilities; and 
(4) implementation, using results-oriented performance measures. As 
part of our planned review of the senior leader workforce, we intend 
to determine DOD's progress in assessing (1) changes in the number of 
personnel authorized in the senior leader workforce--to include 
changes identified in DOD's baseline reviews, as well as senior leader 
position reductions identified in DOD's efficiency initiatives; (2) 
the critical skills and competencies of the senior leader workforce; 
and (3) gaps in that workforce. As part of our planned review of the 
acquisition workforce plan, we intend to assess DOD's progress toward 
achieving the planned workforce growth, its progress in completing the 
remaining competency assessments, and whether the funds currently 
budgeted for these efforts will be sufficient to achieve DOD's targets. 

Concluding Observations: 

In conclusion Mr. Chairman, in each of its 2009 workforce plans, DOD 
has taken some positive steps, such as identifying mission-critical 
occupations and projecting workforce trends. DOD has made limited 
progress, however, in identifying the skills and competency gaps of 
its workforce. Until DOD identifies the critical skills and 
competencies and the actual gaps in these, it will be difficult, for 
example, for the department to develop effective recruitment, 
retention, and investment strategies. Furthermore, without using 
results-oriented performance measures, DOD will be unable to assess 
the progress of its planning efforts. Thoughtful decision making and 
sound strategic planning are essential given the current budget 
environment. Ensuring that DOD is able to achieve its mission within 
available resources requires it has a workforce with the right skills 
and capabilities. 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, this concludes our prepared 
statement. We would be happy to respond to any questions that you or 
other Members of the Committee may have at this time. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

For future questions about this statement, please contact Brenda S. 
Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, on (202) 512- 
3604 or farrellb@gao.gov or John P. Hutton, Director, Acquisition and 
Sourcing Management, on (202) 512-7773 or huttonj@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made 
key contributions to this statement include Marion A. Gatling, 
Assistant Director; Timothy J. DiNapoli, Assistant Director; Mae F. 
Jones; Lonnie J. McAllister; Brian D. Pegram; Terry L. Richardson; 
John Van Schaik; Jennifer L. Weber; and Rebecca A. Wilson. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 
Requirements Applicable to DOD Civilian Workforces: 

Over the years, Congress has passed legislation requiring the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct human capital planning efforts 
for the department's overall civilian workforce, its senior leader 
workforce, and its acquisition workforce. Most recently, in October 
2009, section 1108 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
for Fiscal Year 2010 required DOD to develop and submit a strategic 
plan to shape and improve the department's civilian workforce, and to 
include separate chapters for the senior leader workforce and the 
defense acquisition workforce.[Footnote 21] Table 1 provides a summary 
of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requirements and how they apply to 
the overall, senior leader, and acquisition workforces. 

Table 1: Summary of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010 Requirements Applicable to Overall Civilian, Senior Leader, and 
Acquisition Workforces: 

An assessment of: Critical skills and competencies that will be needed 
in the future within the civilian workforce by DOD to support national 
security requirements and effectively manage the department during the 
7-year period following the year in which the plan is submitted; 
Overall civilian workforce: Applicable; 
Senior leader workforce: Applicable; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

An assessment of: The appropriate mix of military, civilian, and 
contractor personnel capabilities; 
Overall civilian workforce: Applicable; 
Senior leader workforce: Applicable; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

An assessment of: The critical skills and competencies of the existing 
workforce of the department and projected trends in that workforce 
based on expected losses through retirement and other attrition; 
Overall civilian workforce: Applicable; 
Senior leader workforce: Applicable; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

An assessment of: Gaps in the existing or projected workforce of the 
department that should be addressed to ensure that the department has 
continued access to the critical skills and competencies it needs; 
Overall civilian workforce: Applicable; 
Senior leader workforce: Applicable; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

An assessment of: Use of results-oriented performance measures, of the 
progress of the department in implementing the strategic workforce 
plan under this section during the previous year; 
Overall civilian workforce: Applicable; 
Senior leader workforce: [Empty]; 
Acquisition workforce: [Empty]. 

A plan of action that includes: Specific recruiting and retention 
goals, especially in areas identified as critical skills and 
competencies, including the program objectives of the department to be 
achieved through such goals and the funding needed to achieve such 
goals; 
Overall civilian workforce: Applicable; 
Senior leader workforce: Applicable; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

A plan of action that includes: Specific strategies for developing, 
training, deploying, compensating, and motivating the civilian 
workforce of the department, including the program objectives of the 
department to be achieved through such strategies and the funding 
needed to implement such strategies; 
Overall civilian workforce: Applicable; 
Senior leader workforce: Applicable; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

A plan of action that includes: Any incentives necessary to attract or 
retain any civilian personnel possessing the skills and competencies 
identified; 
Overall civilian workforce: Applicable; 
Senior leader workforce: Applicable; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

A plan of action that includes: Any changes in the number of personnel 
authorized in any category of personnel in the senior leader workforce 
or in the acquisition workforce that may be needed to address such 
gaps and effectively meet the needs of the department; 
Overall civilian workforce: [Empty]; 
Senior leader workforce: Applicable; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

A plan of action that includes: Any changes in resources or in the 
rates or methods of pay for any category of personnel in the senior 
leader workforce or in the acquisition workforce that may be needed to 
address inequities and ensure that the department has full access to 
appropriately qualified personnel to address such gaps and meet the 
needs of the department; 
Overall civilian workforce: [Empty]; 
Senior leader workforce: Applicable; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

A plan of action that includes: Any legislative changes that may be 
necessary to achieve the goals; 
Overall civilian workforce: Applicable; 
Senior leader workforce: Applicable; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

Specific strategies for: Developing, training, deploying, 
compensating, motivating, and designing career paths and career 
opportunities; 
Overall civilian workforce: [Empty]; 
Senior leader workforce: Applicable; 
Acquisition workforce: [Empty]. 

Specific steps that the department has taken or plans to take to: 
Ensure that such workforce is managed in compliance with the 
requirements of section 129 of this title; 
Overall civilian workforce: [Empty]; 
Senior leader workforce: Applicable; 
Acquisition workforce: [Empty]. 

Specific steps that the department has taken or plans to take to: 
Develop appropriate career paths for civilian employees in the 
acquisition field; 
Overall civilian workforce: [Empty]; 
Senior leader workforce: [Empty]; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

Specific steps that the department has taken or plans to take to: 
Implement the requirements of section 1722a with regard to members of 
the armed forces in the acquisition field; 
Overall civilian workforce: [Empty]; 
Senior leader workforce: [Empty]; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

A plan for funding: Needed improvements in the acquisition workforce 
of the department through the period of the future-years defense 
program, including a specific identification of funding provided in 
the DOD Acquisition Workforce Fund, along with a description of how 
such funding is being implemented and whether it is being fully used 
and a description of any continuing shortfalls in funding available 
for the acquisition workforce; 
Overall civilian workforce: [Empty]; 
Senior leader workforce: [Empty]; 
Acquisition workforce: Applicable. 

Any additional matter: The Secretary of Defense considers necessary to 
address; 
Overall civilian workforce: Applicable; 
Senior leader workforce: [Empty]; 
Acquisition workforce: [Empty]. 

Submittals: From secretaries of the military services and heads of the 
defense agencies regarding each of the above legislative requirements; 
Overall civilian workforce: Applicable; 
Senior leader workforce: [Empty]; 
Acquisition workforce: [Empty]. 

Total requirements; 
Overall civilian workforce: 11; 
Senior leader workforce: 12; 
Acquisition workforce: 13. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Critical skills and competencies of the existing and future 
workforces--lines 1 and 3 above--were divided into five items: (1) 
critical skills for the future workforce, (2) critical competencies 
for the future workforce, (3) critical skills for the existing 
workforce, (4) critical competencies for the existing workforce, and 
(5) projected trends. Thus, total requirements were 14 for the overall 
workforce, 15 for the senior leader workforce, and 16 for the 
acquisition workforce. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A 
Governmentwide Perspective, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-241] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2001). 

[2] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278] (Washington, D.C.: February 
2011). 

[3] For the purposes of this testimony, senior management, functional, 
and technical personnel will be referred to as the senior leader 
workforce. In addition, DOD has identified 13 acquisition functional 
career fields as constituting the acquisition workforce, consistent 
with the authority provided under the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act. Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 1202(a) (1990) (codified, as 
amended, at 10 U.S.C. § 1721 (a),(b) 2011). 

[4] Pub.L. No. 109-163,§ 1122 (2006); Pub. L. No. 109-364,§ 1102 
(2006); Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 851 (2008); Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1108 
(2009). 

[5] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1108(a) (2009). This act incorporated 
reporting requirements from the fiscal year 2006, fiscal year 2007, 
and fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Acts, established 
some new requirements, and repealed the previous legislation. 

[6] See GAO, Human Capital: Further Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's 
Civilian Strategic Workforce Plan, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-814R] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 
2010); Human Capital: Opportunities Exist to Build on Recent Progress 
to Strengthen DOD's Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-235] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 
2009); and The Department of Defense's Civilian Human Capital 
Strategic Plan Does Not Meet Most Statutory Requirements, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-439R] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 
2008). 

[7] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1108(a) (2009). 

[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-814R]. 

[9] The Acquisition Workforce Improvement Strategy plan provided 
summary information on DOD's acquisition human capital management 
efforts, as well as information by military department, selected 
defense agencies, and 8 of the 13 functional career fields that 
constitute 90 percent of the defense acquisition workforce. We 
assessed key sections of the plan, which covered defense acquisition 
workforce strategies, analytics, and initiatives, and appendixes that 
covered the contracting and production quality and manufacturing 
career fields; the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Contract 
Management Agency workforces; and acquisition career paths, critical 
acquisition functions, and defense acquisition workforce awards. We 
reviewed the appendixes related to the other career fields included in 
the strategy--such as business (cost estimating and financial 
management), information technology, and life cycle logistics--but did 
not assess them for the purposes of this report. 

[10] Specifically, we relied on previous data reliability assessments 
from GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce 
Plans Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-753] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004), and DOD Personnel: Documentation of 
the Army's Civilian Workforce-Planning Model Needed to Enhance 
Credibility, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-1046] 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 2003). We also conducted interviews with 
responsible agency officials concerning the completeness and 
reliability of data presented in the strategic workforce plan. 

[11] In our 2010 review, we treated mission-critical occupations as 
the department's critical skills and evaluated critical competencies 
separately. 

[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-235]. 

[13] Our body of work has consistently defined a workforce gap 
analysis as referring to gaps in critical skills and competencies 
needed now and in the future workplace. Competency gap analyses enable 
an agency to develop specific strategies to address workforce needs, 
and measuring progress demonstrates the contribution of workforce 
planning in achieving program goals. See [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-235] and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-753] and GAO, Human Capital: A 
Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the 
Federal Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 
2004), and A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP] (Washington, D.C: Mar. 15, 
2002). 

[14] Specifically, that report stated that the success indicator for 
measuring annual progress toward a mission-ready workforce will be 
achieved when 85 percent of the staffing projections are met within 
certain targeted mission-critical occupations--a measure that 
according to DOD was met by eight mission-critical occupations. 
Further, that report stated that DOD hopes to assess all mission- 
critical occupations against this measure in future years. 

[15] GAO, Human Capital: Opportunities Exist for DOD to Enhance Its 
Approach for Determining Civilian Senior Leader Workforce Needs, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-136] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 4, 2010). 

[16] DOD, Department of Defense (DOD) Efficiency Initiatives Memo 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2010). 

[17] Pub. L. No. 110-181. 

[18] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Further Action Needed to Better 
Implement Requirements for Conducting Inventory of Service Contract 
Activities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-192] 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2011). 

[19] FPDS-NG is the federal government's primary data system for 
tracking information on contracting actions. 

[20] Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations 
Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 8108 (2011). 

[21] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1108(a) (2009). The act incorporated 
reporting requirements from the fiscal year 2006, fiscal year 2007, 
and fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Acts, established 
some new requirements, and repealed the previous legislation. 

[End of section] 

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