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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 1:30 p.m. EST:
Wednesday, March 9, 2011: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Key Questions Confront the Army's Ground Force Modernization 
Initiatives: 

Statement of Michael J. Sullivan, Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

GAO-11-425T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-425T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

From 2003 through 2009, the Future Combat Systems program was at the 
center of the Army’s efforts to modernize. But in 2009, DOD canceled 
the program and instead laid out plans for development of a ground 
combat vehicle (GCV) program, multiple increments of brigade 
modernization, and a tactical network. 

GCV is intended to modernize the current ground combat vehicle fleet; 
the early infantry brigade combat team (E-IBCT) to continue previous 
Future Combat Systems efforts to stage and spin out emerging 
technologies to current forces; and the tactical information network 
to provide connectivity, communications, and data for the warfighter. 
Each of these is in various stages of implementation: GCV is to begin 
technology development in April 2011; E-IBCT increments have been 
terminated in early production based on test results; and development 
of the tactical network is poised to begin. 

This testimony focuses on the Army’s recent efforts to prepare for a 
new GCV development program, E-IBCT program test results and 
decisions, and emerging plans for the tactical network, as well as 
questions the Army faces as it makes significant decisions in those 
areas. 

DOD reviewed a draft of this testimony and provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

What GAO Found: 

The Army is preparing to start a new GCV acquisition program by 
evaluating contractor proposals for technology development. The Army 
appears to be embarking on a more knowledge-based program than 
previously planned, focusing on costs and technical maturity. Yet, to 
deliver the first production vehicle in 7 years, the program must 
complete technology development in 2 years and engineering and 
manufacturing development in 4 years. Key questions on GCV pertain to 
how urgently it is needed, robustness of the analysis of alternatives, 
its cost and affordability, plausibility of its schedule, and whether 
mature technologies will be used. Addressing such questions is 
essential to getting a good start on demonstrating the match between 
GCV requirements and resources by the end of technology development. 

Figure: Army’s Proposed GCV Schedule: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

DOD acquisition process: 

February 2010: 
Material development. 

CY2010: 
Materiel solution analysis; 
Current GCV status. 

CY2011-CY2012: 
Technology development; 
April 2011: Acquisition milestone (GCV estimates). 

CY2013-CY2017: 
CY2013: Preliminary design review; 
April 2013: Development start; Acquisition milestone (GCV estimates); 
Engineering and manufacturing development: 
CY2013-CY2014: Integrated System Design; 
CY2015-CY2017: System capability and manufacturing process 
demonstration; 

CY2017-CY2018: 
Spring 2017: Production start; Acquisition milestone (GCV estimates); 
Production; 
First production vehicle: mid-2018; 

Sources: GAO analysis of Army data, the DOD acquisition process, and 
GAO best practices. 

[End of figure] 

Most of the systems from the first increment of E-IBCT showed little 
or no military utility in recent tests. Several of the systems have 
since been terminated but two were approved for additional production. 
Several questions remain about the future of the remaining development 
efforts that were once part of the Future Combat Systems program. 
These questions relate to (1) whether additional procurement of the 
network integration kit—which includes a radio, computer system, and 
software—is justified in light of the Army’s determination that it is 
not a viable, affordable, long term solution, and (2) how E-IBCT 
systems could have met many of their requirements, yet have so little 
military utility. The Army has also decided not to pursue Increment 2 
of E-IBCT. Key questions remain on whether the Army will continue 
development or terminate other efforts from Future Combat Systems. 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics recently designated the Army tactical network as a special 
interest portfolio, signaling a commitment to continued investment in 
this area, to meet the need for adaptive, evolutionary network 
approaches. To develop a clear understanding of the network 
requirements, strategies, and management of a number of disparate 
acquisitions, the Under Secretary has directed the Army to develop an 
integrated network architecture and a comprehensive acquisition 
strategy by this month. Key questions remain on whether the Army has 
yet clearly defined its internal roles and responsibilities for 
management of its tactical network, and how it will proceed with 
development of fundamental parts of the network—the advanced radios 
and waveforms. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-425T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Michael J.Sullivan at (202) 
512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and members of the 
subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss some of the Department of the 
Army's recent initiatives to modernize its ground forces and begin the 
development of a new ground combat vehicle (GCV). My statement today 
is based largely on work we have conducted over the last year in 
response to a request from this subcommittee. This statement focuses 
on the Army's recent efforts to initiate a GCV acquisition program, 
recent developments concerning the first two increments of the Brigade 
Combat Team modernization systems, and emerging plans for the Army's 
future tactical network. My statement will include potential issues 
that the Army is facing as it prepares to make other significant 
decisions in these areas. 

Over much of the past year, we have obtained data and held discussions 
with Department of Defense (DOD) and Army officials on plans to 
develop a GCV, make improvements to and test the early infantry 
brigade combat team (E-IBCT) equipment, and formulate a strategy to 
develop and demonstrate an information network. To assess the GCV, we 
reviewed Army and DOD documents, including the Army's draft Analysis 
of Alternatives Executive Summary, the original GCV request for 
proposals and the subsequent revision to this document, as well as 
other documents pertaining to the GCV's development. We also held 
discussions with GCV program officials. We met with independent test 
officials to obtain perspectives on the test process and results for 
the E-IBCT equipment and reviewed the Limited User Test report and the 
Army's plans for a second increment. We also held discussions with 
Army officials and reviewed documents related to its network strategy. 
We also compared all of the Army's plans against best acquisition 
practices and DOD policy. 

This statement is based on work we conducted between June 2010 and 
March 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Since it started development in 2003, the Future Combat System (FCS) 
was at the center of the Army's efforts to modernize into a lighter, 
more agile, and more capable combat force. The Army expected to 
develop this equipment in 10 years, procure it over 13 years, and 
field it to 15 FCS-unique brigades. The Army had also planned to spin 
out selected FCS technologies and systems to current Army forces. In 
June 2009, after 6 years and an estimated $18 billion invested, the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
issued an acquisition decision memorandum that canceled the FCS 
acquisition program, terminated manned ground vehicle development 
efforts, and laid out plans for follow-on Army brigade combat team 
modernization efforts. These initiatives included plans for the 
development of: 

* GCV, 

* multiple increments of brigade modernization, and: 

* an incremental tactical network capability. 

The Army's GCV program is intended to modernize the current ground 
combat vehicle fleet, replacing a portion of the Bradley combat 
vehicles currently in inventory, at a projected cost to develop and 
acquire of up to $40 billion. The GCV features are expected to include 
full spectrum capability, robust survivability, capacity for a nine-
man squad, and room for growth. The current plans call for a 7-year 
schedule from the expected approval of technology development start 
(Milestone A) in April 2011 to a first production vehicle delivered in 
2018.[Footnote 1] In February 2010, the Army issued a request for 
proposals before completing an analysis of alternatives, citing 
schedule urgency. In May 2010, the Army convened a "Red Team" to 
assess the risk of achieving the GCV schedule. The Red Team issued its 
report in August 2010, citing major risk areas including schedule, 
technical maturity, and affordability of the system. 

The E-IBCT Increment 1 was a continuation of previous FCS-related 
efforts to spin out emerging capabilities and technologies to current 
forces and included: 

* Class 1 Unmanned Aerial System, 

* Network Integration Kit, 

* Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,[Footnote 2] 

* Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle, 

* Tactical-Unattended Ground Sensors, and: 

* Urban-Unattended Ground Sensor. 

Significant performance shortfalls, particularly system reliability, 
were revealed during the September 2009 Limited User Test. The 
pervasive reliability problems in equipment during testing made it 
difficult to complete a full assessment of performance and the 
contribution of these systems to military utility. Although never 
clearly defined, E-IBCT Increment 2 was anticipated to include 
upgrades to Increment 1 systems, continued development of other FCS 
systems such as the Common Controller and larger unmanned ground 
vehicles, and further development of elements of the FCS information 
network. Since its termination in 2009, the Army has continued many 
FCS developments. According to Army program data, between March and 
December 2010, the Army paid contractors over $912 million for 
development of Increment 2 systems. 

Additionally, the Army has been defining a strategy to develop and 
field a common tactical information network. Generally, such a system 
is expected to collect, process, and deliver vast amounts of 
information, such as imagery and communication while seamlessly 
linking people and systems. At this time, the Army's strategy is to 
understand current Army networking capabilities, determine 
capabilities needed in the 2017-18 time frame, and chart an 
incremental path to get there. The Army's new network strategy differs 
from the FCS network strategy primarily due to its incremental nature. 
The Army is working to document the architecture of the existing 
communication programs and defining capability gaps. It does not plan 
to have a single network development program but instead, it plans to 
rely on numerous programs of record to provide a variety of network 
capabilities that are expected to be fielded in 2-year incremental 
packages. It has also proposed a common operating environment which 
defines the standards and interfaces whereby new network capabilities 
can be integrated. The Army plans regular demonstrations as the 
network grows and improves in capability. 

Key GCV Questions Must Be Addressed As the Army Approaches the Start 
of the Technology Development Phase in April and the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development Phase in 2 Years: 

The Army is currently evaluating contractor proposals for the GCV 
technology development phase and preparing for a Milestone A review in 
April. In August 2010, the initial request for proposals for GCV was 
rescinded because of concerns that the program was pursuing a high-
risk strategy, with questionable requirements and little concern for 
costs. In response, the Army issued a revised request for proposals in 
November 2010 that shifted the focus to more mature technologies to 
achieve the desired 7-year schedule. This strategy eliminated or 
reduced many of the requirements cited as unstable or not well 
understood. The Army has now prioritized the GCV requirements into 
three groups--a "must have" category, a second group of requirements 
where the Army intends to be flexible in what it accepts, and a third 
group deferrable to later increments. 

Currently, the Army is evaluating proposals from multiple contractor 
teams and plans to award up to three fixed price incentive fee 
contracts for the 24-month GCV technology development phase. During 
this phase, the requirements will be further refined and subsystem 
prototypes will be demonstrated. The Army plans to conduct the 
preliminary design review in advance of the spring 2013 Milestone B 
review, followed by a 4-year engineering and manufacturing development 
phase. An initial production decision is expected in the spring of 
2017, with the first production vehicle delivered sometime the 
following year. Figure 1 below illustrates (1) where the program is in 
the process, (2) the key requirements and acquisition documents needed 
at each milestone, and (3) the knowledge needed at each milestone per 
the best practices acquisition model. 

Figure 1: GCV Events in the DOD Acquisition Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

DOD acquisition process: 

February 2010: 
Material development. 

CY2010: 
Materiel solution analysis; 
Current GCV status. 

CY2011-CY2012: 
Technology development. 

CY2013-CY2017: 
CY2013: Preliminary design review; 
Engineering and manufacturing development: 
CY2013-CY2014: Integrated System Design; 
CY2015-CY2017: System capability and manufacturing process 
demonstration; 

CY2017-CY2018: 
Production; 
First production vehicle: mid-2018; 

Acquisition milestones (GCV estimates): 
A: April 2011; 
B: April 2013: Development start; 
C: Spring 2017: Production start. 

Requirements process documents: 
CY2010: Initial capabilities document; 
CY2013: Capabilities development document; 
CY2017: Capabilities production document. 

Acquisition process documents: 
April 2011: Milestone A: 
* Analysis of Alternatives; 
* Component Cost Estimate; 
* Systems Engineering Plan; 
* Technology Development Strategy; 
* Test and Evaluation Strategy; 
* Milestone Decision Authority Certification; 
April 2013: Milestone B: 
* Acquisition Strategy; 
* Acquisition Program Baseline; 
* Independent Cost Estimate; 
* Technology Readiness Assessment; 
* Preliminary Design Review Report; 
* Test and Evaluation Master Plan; 
* Milestone Decision Authority Certification; 
Spring 2017: Milestone C; 
* Acquisition Strategy; 
* Acquisition Program Baseline; 
* Independent Cost Estimate; 
* Technology Readiness Assessment; 
* Test and Evaluation Master Plan; 
* Operational test results. 

Best practices knowledge-based acquisition model: 
April 2013: Knowledge Point 1: Technologies, time, funding and other 
resources match customer needs. Decision to invest in product 
development; 
Key Steps: 
* Preliminary design review completed; 
* Technologies demonstrated to high levels; 
* Incremental acquisition strategy in place; 
* Knowledge-based cost estimate; 
CY2015: Knowledge Point 2: Design is stable and performs as expected. 
Decision to start building and testing production-representative 
prototypes; 
Key Steps: 
* Subsystems and system-level critical design reviews completed; 
* Ninety percent of engineering drawings released; 
* Early integrated system prototype demonstrated; 
* Critical manufacturing processes identified; 
Spring 2017: 
Knowledge Point 3: Production meets cost, schedule, and quality 
targets. Decision to produce first units for customer; 
Key Steps: 
* Fully integrated, capable prototype demonstrated in intended 
environment; 
* Manufacturing processes in control; 
* Product reliability demonstrated. 

Sources: GAO analysis of Army data, the DOD acquisition process, and 
GAO best practices. 

[End of figure] 

The Army appears to be embarking on a more knowledge-based, 
incremental acquisition program, focusing on costs and technical 
maturity. Key questions remain about the urgency of the need for the 
GCV, the robustness of the analysis of alternatives, the feasibility 
of a 7-year delivery schedule, and whether it will use only mature 
technologies. Resolving these questions could go a long way to 
informing a knowledge-based decision at the Milestone A review. That, 
in turn, would be a good starting point for the Army as it proceeds 
toward the Milestone B decision, now anticipated in spring 2013. At 
that point, knowledge-based acquisition calls for the Army to clearly 
demonstrate the match between GCV requirements and the resources 
available. 

Has the Army demonstrated an urgent need for GCV within 7 years? 

Questions remain about the urgency of the need for the GCV. In its 
August 2010 report, the Red Team that was convened by the Army 
questioned the urgency of the need for the GCV within 7 years. The 
report concluded that the funds that have migrated from the FCS 
program were driving the events and activities of the program, versus 
a true capabilities gap. Further, the team reported that the Army had 
not provided the analysis supporting the need to rapidly replace the 
Bradley vehicle. The Army is currently conducting portfolio reviews 
across many of its missions.[Footnote 3] The results of the combat 
vehicle portfolio review should be available soon and should be able 
to answer questions about urgent need, related questions about the 
capability needs the GCV is intended to fulfill, and establish the 
vehicle's priority relative to other weapons systems being reviewed. 
Decision makers will have to decide if the Army has made a convincing 
case for the GCV before allowing it to proceed into the technology 
development phase. 

Was the Army's final assessment of the reduced GCV requirements during 
its analysis of alternatives sufficiently robust? 

The initial analysis of alternatives for the GCV considered a broad 
set of alternatives and did a robust evaluation of requirements and 
the resources needed to achieve them. The initial GCV design concept 
was found to be more advantageous than the alternatives considered; 
however, the analysis team determined that the manufacturing unit cost 
for a vehicle with these capabilities would be around $18 million--too 
expensive to meet the Army's affordability goals. The Army then did a 
series of analyses, trading off various capabilities to eliminate the 
immediate need for exotic and immature technologies. The analysis of 
alternatives team performed a quick turn-around analysis of the 
potential unit cost reductions resulting from those trade-offs. It 
found that the agreed upon set of trade-offs may reduce the costs 
enough to achieve the Army's manufacturing unit cost target of $9.5 to 
$10.5 million and the corresponding reductions in requirements would 
only modestly degrade vehicle survivability and force protection, 
while offering as good or better mobility. This analysis of the 
reduced GCV requirements does not appear to have been as robust and 
relies on qualitative analysis from subject-matter experts for most of 
the design trade-offs, instead of the more rigorous quantitative 
methods used in the initial analysis of alternatives. The analysis 
also did not compare the capabilities of the new GCV design concept 
with the wider range of alternatives in the original assessment--such 
as the Bradley upgrade and some foreign or current vehicles--but only 
against the current force Bradley vehicles (without upgrades). The 
merits of the GCV design concept versus the other alternatives should 
be addressed as part of the upcoming Milestone A review. 

Can the Army define GCV requirements that can be met within a 7-year 
schedule? 

While it may be possible for the Army to meet its GCV program 
requirements on a 7-year schedule, both the Red Team and the Army's 
analysis of alternatives team found risk with this schedule. The Red 
Team reported that the risk the GCV would not achieve its requirements 
within the 7-year schedule constraint was very high, given the 
available resources, expertise, and recent investments. It reported 
that it would be possible to moderately improve an existing vehicle 
within 7 years that could address the most pressing needs, such as 
survivability and mobility. However, the team estimated that 
developing the next generation combat vehicle--a new and very 
different vehicle from what is currently in the force--would take 10 
to 12 years. The analysis of alternatives also found that there was a 
moderate risk in this schedule, particularly in view of an 
acquisitions environment in which development time has the potential 
to be longer than expected and, historically, time lines for major 
defense acquisition programs are longer than this. However, these 
estimates and predictions were made before the Army both reduced its 
requirements and urged the use of mature technologies at the start of 
technology development. Nevertheless, a 4-year engineering and 
manufacturing phase for an entirely new combat vehicle appears to be 
ambitious. Therefore, in considering the Army's plans for GCV, 
decision makers should be careful to apply knowledge-based acquisition 
principles and not be artificially constrained by the pre-determined 
fixed schedule. 

Will the Army be able to achieve needed capabilities using only mature 
technologies for GCV? 

In response to concerns raised by the Red Team and others, the Army 
revised its GCV strategy to require that contractors use mature 
technologies or demonstrate there is a clear path forward to achieve 
technical maturity. In its analysis of the original request for 
proposals, the Red Team observed many unstable requirements; low 
technology readiness levels (TRL) of the proposed armor; and size, 
weight, and power issues associated with a vehicle that may weigh up 
to 70 tons.[Footnote 4] While the analysis of alternatives reported 
that the combat vehicle technologies were of low or moderate concern, 
in fact the advanced armor was found to be at a very low level of 
maturity (TRL 3) and the Active Protection System, which is intended 
to offer 360-degree protection against rocket-propelled grenades, was 
not expected to be sufficiently mature (at TRL 5) by 2012. In 
response, the Army revised the request for proposals, reducing the 
number of requirements and urging contractors to propose only TRL 6 
technologies for the technology development phase or have a clear path 
forward as to how to achieve this level of maturity. It is not known 
yet what technologies the contractors have included in their proposals 
but the two-year technology development phase will limit the range of 
technologies that will be mature within that period of time. The 
program's success will require the DOD and the Army to remain 
disciplined by maintaining a focus on the achievable and to avoid the 
requirements creep that has been so common in other programs. 

What are the key tasks required for the Army to demonstrate a match 
between GCV requirements and costs at Milestone B? 

By Milestone B, the Army should be able to use the knowledge gained 
during the technology development phase to complete its capability 
development document, which should outline an affordable increment of 
militarily useful, logistically supportable, and technically mature 
capability. Significant systems engineering analysis and knowledge 
will be required to confirm that the technologies are mature enough 
for system integration; that, through a thorough and disciplined 
system-level preliminary design review, the design is sound enough to 
move into integration; and that a cost estimate based on adequate 
systems engineering knowledge is available to show that development 
and production will be affordable and the system will meet the 
requirements. The cost and affordability of the program must be 
confirmed through rigorous, independent cost estimates and an 
assessment made of whether the program is affordable in light of 
budget constraints. An independent technology assessment should 
confirm the maturity of the technology as the capability development 
document confirms the requirements. Finally, the feasibility and risks 
in the acquisition strategy and schedule should be assessed by 
independent specialists. The Army has also stated it will consider all 
contract vehicle types, including fixed price, for the engineering and 
manufacturing development phase. The strategy should also feature a 
timely and thorough critical design review and include plans for 
robust demonstrations of GCV prototypes as early as possible. 
Particular attention should be given to GCV's schedule-driven 
acquisition. 

Most E-IBCT Increment 1 Systems Demonstrated Little Military Utility 
in User Tests and the Army Does Not Plan To Pursue E-IBCT Increment 2: 

Recent limited user tests conducted by the Army and assessed by the 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation that were performed during 
fiscal year 2010 yielded startling results--most Increment 1 systems 
showed little or no military utility. In response, the Army has 
terminated several systems and only two were approved for additional 
procurement--the small unmanned ground vehicle and the network 
integration kit. These events have raised questions about the Army's 
process for establishing requirements. And while the small unmanned 
ground vehicle performed well in tests, the military utility of the 
costly network integration kit remains in doubt, and the Army has 
stated that the kit is not a viable, affordable, long term solution. 
For us, that raises questions about the desirability of continued 
procurement of the kit. Because Increment 1 systems have been deemed 
to provide little military utility, the Army and DOD decided to cancel 
the entire E-IBCT program, which effectively put an end to both 
increments. Nevertheless, the Army continues to assess whether 
additional investments are warranted in the remaining systems and 
capabilities from the FCS program. To avoid unnecessary expenditures, 
the Army needs to expedite this process. As indicated on table 1, the 
user tests provided information on the systems' ability to meet their 
performance and reliability requirements as well as provided 
determinations on military utility. 

Table 1: E-IBCT Increment 1 2010 Limited User Test demonstrated 
performance and reliability requirements, and military utility 
assessments: 

Network Integration Kit: 
Demonstrated performance requirements: Majority but not all; 
Reliability requirements: Met; 
Military utility effectiveness assessment: None or limited; 
Military utility suitability assessment: None; 
Military utility survivability assessment: Limited. 

Urban Unattended Ground Sensor: 
Demonstrated performance requirements: Majority but not all; 
Reliability requirements: Met; 
Military utility effectiveness assessment: None; 
Military utility suitability assessment: None; 
Military utility survivability assessment: None. 

Class 1 Unmanned Aerial System: 
Demonstrated performance requirements: Majority but not all; 
Reliability requirements: Not met; 
Military utility effectiveness assessment: Limited; 
Military utility suitability assessment: None; 
Military utility survivability assessment: Limited. 

Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor: 
Demonstrated performance requirements: Majority but not all; 
Reliability requirements: Met; 
Military utility effectiveness assessment: Limited; 
Military utility suitability assessment: None; 
Military utility survivability assessment: None. 

Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle: 
Demonstrated performance requirements: Majority but not all; 
Reliability requirements: Met; 
Military utility effectiveness assessment: Effective; 
Military utility suitability assessment: Effective; 
Military utility survivability assessment: Limited. 

Source: Army Test and Evaluation Command's Operational Test Agency 
Milestone C Assessment Report. 

[End of table] 

During the Limited User Test, the systems displayed improved 
reliability, relative to previous testing, and demonstrated a majority 
of their performance requirements. However, with the exception of the 
small unmanned ground vehicle, the systems provided little or no 
military utility. Relative to the other systems, the small unmanned 
ground vehicle performed well in these tests--it met most of its 
requirements and was assessed well on military utility. As a result, 
in February 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (1) concurred with an earlier Army decision 
to end development efforts for all of the elements of Increment 1; (2) 
approved production of two sets of small unmanned vehicles and 
directed the Army to consider further vehicle production under a 
separate program; and, (3) responding to the Army's desire to keep 
network demonstration efforts active, approved procurement of one 
additional brigade set of network integration kits despite 
disappointing performance in the user tests. The decision made 
potential fielding of the kits--radios, waveforms, integrated computer 
system, and software--contingent on user testing that successfully 
demonstrates that it can improve current force capabilities.[Footnote 
5] Additionally, the decision recognized the need for addressing a 
number of known kit deficiencies, such as the ability to effectively 
communicate while moving and with current Army radio formats. 

Is additional procurement beyond what is needed for network 
integration kit testing justified? 

The Army now plans to perform additional testing this spring and 
summer to determine whether (1) a brigade would be better equipped 
with a network integration kit than without it, (2) fielding is 
warranted, or (3) further program modifications are needed. The Army 
maintains that the kit is needed to capitalize on waveform, radio, and 
integrated computer system efforts to deliver the networking 
capabilities for company and platoon use. However, for a program 
currently in production, a number of critical technologies key to the 
kit's performance remain immature. The Army and the Director, Defense 
Research and Engineering have both assessed a critical technology key 
to the kit's performance--the Wideband Networking Waveform--at a 
maturity level well below what would be expected of a program in the 
production stage of development.[Footnote 6] The Director also 
indicated that there is a high risk that the technology will not 
mature as expected and also considers the technology to be potentially 
flawed. Additionally, the Director has assessed another key critical 
technology for the kit--the Soldier Radio Waveform--at a technology 
maturity level well below what would be expected of a program in 
production. 

Furthermore, each kit is estimated to cost almost $800,000 with 81 
already in production and with up to 100 more to be produced and 
purchased by the Army. The Army has not yet finalized its plans for 
fielding the additional units if the known deficiencies of the kits 
are corrected and additional testing is successful. While continued 
development and testing of the kit may be appropriate, procurement of 
up to 181 units seems far beyond what may be needed for testing. By 
comparison, about 15 kits were used in the 2010 E-IBCT limited user 
testing. If the kit is not a viable, affordable, long term solution as 
the Army has stated, we question why it is procuring kits for fielding. 

How could E-IBCT Increment 1 systems have met many of their 
performance requirements in testing but be found to lack sufficient 
military utility? 

Army officials have expressed their concerns to us about how the E-
IBCT systems could have met many performance requirements yet be found 
to offer little or no military utility during recent testing. The 
capabilities demonstrated by the E-IBCT systems were often 
overshadowed by the unanticipated burdens, such as the network 
integration kit's extensive start-up procedures or the lengthy and 
extensive emplacement times for the tactical unattended ground sensor. 

The Army is planning to conduct a review of its processes for setting 
requirements and provide its own assessment of this situation. One 
possible explanation may be the supporting rationale for the E-IBCT 
systems. As we have stated previously, the E-IBCT Increment 1 systems 
were a continuation of previous FCS-related efforts to spin out 
emerging capabilities and technologies to current forces. FCS was to 
be a synergistic system-of-systems. The Army conducted a single 
analysis of alternatives for the program and concluded that an FCS-
equipped brigade would be more effective than other Army combat 
brigades. When the FCS program was terminated, the Army restructured 
the program into the E-IBCT Modernization, which aimed to field 
subsets of former FCS systems to the current force. However, this 
decision was not informed by analyses of alternatives for the 
individual systems. Such analyses would have informed decision makers 
about the systems' individual ability to satisfy a mission need 
outside of the earlier FCS fighting construct, which may have provided 
insights into their potential military utility. 

What rationale will the Army use in deciding which of the remaining 
FCS systems or capabilities to terminate or continue in development? 

Despite the decision to cancel the E-IBCT program, the Army has not 
entirely ruled out additional development for some of these systems. 
Prior to its cancellation decision, the Army transferred program 
management responsibility for the systems from its Program Executive 
Office for Integration to other, separate program executive offices. 
According to an Army official, the Army has been working for almost 2 
years to draft analyses of alternatives for each of these systems to 
determine whether to continue investing in their development as 
separate programs. Those analyses should provide insights about the 
potential benefits of the systems. 

The Army is also considering whether to continue development 
activities for other systems or capabilities that were being developed 
within the FCS program. For example, within FCS, the Army was working 
on a larger unmanned ground vehicle being designed to provide 
transport of equipment and/or supplies for the dismounted soldier. The 
Army is now considering system development for what it calls a Squad 
Mission Equipment Transport, which appears similar to what the Army 
was attempting to achieve with the larger FCS unmanned ground vehicle. 
The Army was also developing another FCS unmanned system which would 
provide a remote reconnaissance, sensing, and direct-fire capability. 
The development of this system was previously under the purview of 
Program Executive Office for Integration and was mentioned as a 
potential E-IBCT Increment 2 system. The management responsibility for 
that system has been transitioned to Program Executive Office for 
Ground Combat Systems, which is also responsible for the Squad Mission 
Equipment Transport. It appears the Army is preparing capability 
description documents for these two new systems, but plans for their 
further development are unclear. The Common Controller is another 
system that emerged from the FCS program. It was designed to provide a 
single unit for controlling sensors and multiple unmanned platforms, 
like the Class I unmanned aerial system and the small unmanned ground 
vehicle. The fate of the Common Controller is unclear at this point. 

Finally, the Army still has plans for a common operating environment, 
which is software designed to connect command and control systems to 
the software applications, and the work that was begun under FCS has 
been transitioned to a government laboratory for further development 
and incorporation into its longer-term networking initiatives. Another 
network-related FCS initiative the Army may continue to develop is the 
Warfighter-Machine Interface. This was the primary soldier computer 
system that would display the common operating picture and allow 
soldiers access to most of the software services. 

Army Tactical Information Network Designated As Special Interest 
Portfolio: 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics has recently designated the Army tactical network as a 
special interest portfolio and instructed the Army to develop an 
integrated network architecture and a comprehensive acquisition 
strategy. The Under Secretary stated that lessons learned from recent 
testing highlight the need for adaptive, evolutionary network 
approaches. The first step, in his view, is establishing a clear 
understanding of the network requirements, strategies, and management 
of a number of disparate communications and command and control 
acquisitions. He instructed the Army to develop an integrated network 
architecture and a comprehensive acquisition strategy by March 2011. 
To that end, the Army has developed a network demonstration strategy 
and the Army Chief of Staff has ordered it be expeditiously 
implemented. A key aspect of its implementation will be aligning the 
schedules of the separate programs of record with the Army's plans to 
conduct periodic demonstrations of the overall information network. A 
major network test and evaluation is being planned for June 2011. Two 
issues deserve additional attention: (1) whether the Army has clearly 
defined its internal roles and responsibilities for management of its 
tactical network, and (2) how recent developments have impacted the 
Army's radio and waveform plans. 

Has the Army clearly defined its internal roles and responsibilities 
for management of its tactical network? 

The Army does not plan to have a single network development program, 
but instead will rely on numerous programs to provide a variety of 
network capabilities. This proved to be a challenge under FCS. The 
Army planned to use complementary systems to provide a portion of the 
FCS's anticipated capabilities. These were systems that were managed 
and developed under separate program offices, much like what the Army 
is considering with this proposed networking approach. The Army 
discovered that the programmatic challenges associated with those 
separate developments complicated plans to utilize them in FCS. 
Relying on separate development programs to provide needed 
capabilities for the FCS program proved more challenging than 
expected. To date, Army officials have told us that two separate Army 
groups could be involved but details about the specific role and 
authority of these organizations for coordinating the Army network 
strategy are not yet well defined. As the Army continues to define and 
implement its network strategy, we would expect to see more clarity on 
its internal management roles and responsibilities. 

How have recent developments impacted the Army's radio and waveform 
plans? 

The Network Integration Kit was expected to be a fundamental part of 
the Army's information network. The Army has tentatively decided to 
complete development of the Joint Tactical Radio System ground mobile 
radio but it does not plan to procure large quantities of these 
particular radios for any network integration kits. Army officials say 
that, in the future, they intend to purchase comparable radios, but 
they intend to pursue them in a competitive environment and not be 
restricted to a single vendor. It is not yet clear how and when the 
Army intends to implement this plan. 

According to an Army official, the Army plans for the future tactical 
network will include the wideband networking and soldier radio 
waveforms, which have been under development for use on the Joint 
Tactical Radio System family of radios. However, the Army has had 
trouble maturing these waveforms for several years and they are still 
not at acceptable levels of maturity. For example, a March 2010 
independent DOD assessment indicated that the technologies are more 
akin to low-fidelity prototypes that lack functionality rather than 
high-fidelity prototypes with full functionality. The Army believes it 
has made progress in recent waveform testing. However, the technical 
maturity of these waveforms may still be in question and that needs to 
be considered as the Army proceeds with implementation of its network 
strategy. 

Concluding Remarks: 

The Army has had to make many difficult modernization decisions over 
the last decade, such as the termination of Armed Reconnaissance 
Helicopter, termination of FCS, and truncating E-IBCT Increment 1. E- 
IBCT, the Army's initial post-FCS modernization effort, has not worked 
out very well. The recent cancellation of the E-IBCT Modernization 
program signals another step away from the FCS, but it also presents 
questions the Army must address. When I appeared before this committee 
this time last year, I testified that none of these systems have been 
designated as an urgent need, and that it is not helpful to provide 
early capability to the warfighter if those capabilities are not 
technically mature or reliable. We cautioned that if the Army moved 
forward too fast with immature designs that it could cause additional 
delays as the Army and its contractors concurrently address 
technology, design, and production issues. The Army needs to look 
ahead and base its acquisition decisions on well thought-out 
requirements and knowledge-based acquisition principles. 

After the rough start with the GCV effort, the Army has shown a 
willingness to rethink its original approach that other experts 
believed was flawed. By retracting the original request for proposals 
and addressing some of the concerns raised by independent evaluators, 
the Army was able to introduce improvements. However, as the Army 
continues toward the GCV's technology development phase, it must 
address several questions in order to position the program for 
successful execution. While the Army has done much to put it on a 
better path, the GCV acquisition strategy is still very ambitious, 
with a 2-year technology development phase and a 4-year engineering 
and manufacturing development phase. Now is the time for DOD and the 
Army to determine whether the proposed timeframes are sufficient for 
the program's scope. If the necessary acquisition knowledge cannot be 
developed within those time frames, additional time and resources may 
need to be added. The Army also has to retain both the flexibility and 
resolve to ensure that the right work gets done in the technology 
development phase--robust system engineering, technology development, 
cost estimating, and requirements definition--to make for success in 
the remainder of the program. GCV, if done right, could be a 
breakthrough in Army acquisition. However, if the Army does not adhere 
to acquisition policy and best practices on GCV, it could end up in 
the same failed position that it found itself in with FCS and other 
programs. 

Moreover, DOD and Army decisions on when and how the GCV program 
enters the acquisition process will help to define how recent 
acquisition legislation and policy will actually be implemented. The 
decisions made on the program will be symbolic from that standpoint. 
If GCV does not measure up to the standards in law and in policy, yet 
is approved and wins funding, it will be a setback to acquisition 
reform. The Congress and DOD have enacted acquisition reforms in 
legislation and policy, now is the time to enable and enforce those 
reforms at the service, DOD and congressional levels. 

Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and members of the 
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy 
to answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have. 

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For future questions about this statement, please contact me on (202) 
512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to 
this statement include William R. Graveline, Assistant Director; 
William C. Allbritton; Noah B. Bleicher; Beverly A. Breen; Marcus C. 
Ferguson; and Robert S. Swierczek. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Milestone A is the point at which a program enters the technology 
development phase, Milestone B is entry into the engineering and 
manufacturing development phase, and Milestone C is entry into the 
production and deployment phase. 

[2] The Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System was canceled in May 2010 due 
to redundancy with existing precision fires programs. 

[3] A Capability Portfolio Review is an Army process to holistically 
examine, validate, modify, or make recommendations to terminate 
requirements driving capability development, acquisition, and 
sustainment across a series of portfolios defined by the Army but 
roughly aligned with those defined by DOD. 

[4] Technology readiness levels are measures pioneered by NASA and 
adopted by DOD to determine whether technologies were sufficiently 
mature to be incorporated into a weapon system. Our prior work has 
found TRLs to be a valuable decision-making tool because they can 
presage the likely consequences of incorporating a technology at a 
given level of maturity into a product development. The maturity level 
of a technology can range from paper studies (TRL 1), to prototypes 
that can be tested in a realistic environment (TRL 7), to an actual 
system that has proven itself in mission operations (TRL 9). According 
to DOD acquisition policy, a technology should have been demonstrated 
in a relevant environment (TRL 6) or, preferably, in an operational 
environment (TRL 7) to be considered mature enough to use for product 
development. Best practices of leading commercial firms and successful 
DOD programs have shown that critical technologies should be mature to 
at least a TRL 7 before the start of product development. 

[5] A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the 
frequency, modulation type, message format, and/or transmission system. 

[6] The Director, Defense Research and Engineering is now known as the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. 

[End of section] 

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