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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related 
Programs, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST:
Thursday, March 3, 2011: 

Foreign Operations: 

Key Issues for Congressional Oversight: 

Statement of Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

GAO-11-419T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-419T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) implement a broad range of U.S. government 
activities and programs overseas, including the conduct of diplomacy, 
development and security assistance, and efforts to combat terrorism 
and narcotics trafficking, among others. The President has requested 
approximately $55.7 billion for State and USAID in fiscal year 2012, 
an increase of nearly 8 percent over fiscal year 2010 funding levels. 

This testimony discusses four cross-cutting areas of U.S. foreign 
policy as implemented by State and USAID: (1) investments in key 
partner nations, (2) building the capacity of U.S. agencies to advance 
foreign policy priorities, (3) contractor oversight and 
accountability, and (4) strategic planning and performance 
measurement. This statement is based on GAO’s extensive body of work 
on foreign operations issues, including fieldwork in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, and numerous other locations. 

What GAO Found: 

Since 2002, the United States has invested over $130 billion in 
security, economic, and governance assistance to Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan. Although the administration has requested additional 
funding in fiscal year 2012 to assist Iraq’s security forces, 
opportunities exist for cost-sharing given the Iraqi government’s 
continuing budget surpluses and unexpended security budgets. Regarding 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States has placed an increased 
focus on providing funding directly to the Afghan government and 
Pakistani organizations. This course of action involves considerable 
risk given the limited capacity of some prospective recipients—-
particularly the Afghan government--to manage and implement U.S.-
funded programs, thereby highlighting the need for agency controls and 
safeguards over these funds. 

According to the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, 
State and USAID are engaged in efforts to build and support a 
workforce that is well-matched to the foreign affairs challenges of 
the twenty-first century. Accomplishing this objective is critical 
given that GAO’s work has consistently found limitations in the 
ability of State and USAID to ensure that they are deploying the right 
people to the right places at the right time. For example, State has 
faced persistent staffing and foreign language gaps that put the 
department’s diplomatic readiness at risk. Similarly, GAO found that 
State has experienced difficulties hiring and training staff to 
operate and maintain its new, more sophisticated embassy compounds. 
State has taken some actions in response to GAO’s findings. For 
example, in 2010, the department introduced a new pilot program to 
expand its cadre of Chinese speakers. State also noted in 2010 that it 
planned to hire additional facilities managers at embassies and 
consulates. 

State and USAID rely extensively on contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to support their direct-hire personnel, implement 
reconstruction efforts, and address workforce shortfalls such as 
insufficient numbers of trained agency personnel and the frequent 
rotations of staff posted to these countries. Robust management and 
oversight of contractor operations are essential in these challenging 
environments. However, GAO has found oversight to be inadequate at 
times, thus raising questions about the agencies’ ability to ensure 
accountability for multibillion-dollar investments. 

GAO’s reviews of international affairs programs have repeatedly found 
weaknesses in agencies’ strategic planning and performance measurement 
efforts. For example, GAO reported that State significantly expanded 
its Bureau of Diplomatic Security without the benefit of strategic 
planning to ensure that the bureau’s missions and activities address 
the department’s priority needs. Such a review is vital given that the 
bureau will assume full responsibility for securing all diplomatic 
personnel and facilities in Iraq starting in October 2011 as the U.S. 
military completes its drawdown. GAO also reported that State 
generally lacked outcome-based measures for the Mérida Initiative-—a 
$1.5 billion effort to provide law enforcement support to Mexico—-
thereby making it difficult to determine the initiative’s 
effectiveness. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO has made a variety of recommendations to State and USAID to help 
improve their foreign operations programs. In particular, GAO has 
recommended that agencies improve planning and performance measurement 
of their programs and take steps to enhance accountability of U.S. 
aid. State and USAID have efforts under way to implement some of these 
recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-419T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers 
at (202) 512-3101 or williamsbridgersj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to share with you the results of our 
reviews of U.S. foreign policy implementation by the Department of 
State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID). The President's fiscal year 2012 budget for State and USAID 
requests approximately $55.7 billion--an increase of nearly 8 percent 
over the agencies' fiscal year 2010 funding level of just over $51.6 
billion as enacted.[Footnote 1] Today, I will discuss the findings 
from some of our most recent work on State and USAID and the 
recommendations we have made.[Footnote 2] My testimony will focus on 
our reviews of State and USAID in four cross-cutting areas. 
Specifically, I will discuss (1) U.S. investments in key partner 
nations, (2) building the capacity of U.S. agencies to advance foreign 
policy interests, (3) contractor oversight and accountability, and (4) 
strategic planning and performance measurement. I will also raise a 
number of issues to potentially inform the Subcommittee's oversight 
agenda and, more immediately, its examination of the President's 
fiscal year 2012 budget request within the context of today's fiscal 
environment. 

GAO Reviews of Investments in Key Partner Nations Have Identified Cost-
Sharing Opportunities and the Need for Agency Controls over U.S. Funds: 

Since 2002, the United States has invested over $130 billion in 
security, economic, and governance assistance to Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan. Although the administration has requested additional 
funding in fiscal year 2012 to assist Iraq's security forces, 
opportunities exist for cost-sharing given the Iraqi government's 
continuing budget surpluses and unexpended security budgets. Regarding 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States has placed an increased 
focus on providing funding directly to the Afghan government and 
Pakistani organizations. This course of action involves considerable 
risk given the limited capacity of some prospective recipients--
particularly the Afghan government--to manage and implement U.S.-
funded programs, thereby highlighting the need for agency controls and 
safeguards over these funds. 

Iraq: 

Since 2003, the United States has provided about $58 billion for 
reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq. Over 40 percent of 
this amount (about $24 billion) has funded Department of Defense (DOD) 
programs to train and equip Iraq's security forces. This substantial 
investment has enabled the United States to develop a force of over 
650,000 Iraqi personnel. In the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2011, Congress authorized an additional $1.5 billion in 
operation and maintenance funds for fiscal year 2011 for the Iraq 
Security Forces Fund, which has been used in the past to train and 
equip Iraqi security forces. However, Congress generally required at 
least a 20 percent Iraqi cost share for the purchase of any item or 
service for the Iraqi security forces if purchased with funds made 
available to DOD for the fiscal year 2011 Iraq Security Forces Fund. 
Congress also stated that not more than $1 billion of the funds for 
the Iraqi security forces could be obligated until the Secretary of 
Defense certifies that the Iraqi government had demonstrated a 
commitment to adequately build the logistics and maintenance capacity 
of its security forces, to develop the institutional capacity to 
manage such forces independently, and to develop a culture of 
sustainment for equipment provided by the United States or acquired 
with U.S. assistance. For fiscal year 2012, the administration has 
requested another $2 billion for State programs to assist the Iraqi 
security forces, including $1 billion for a new civilian-led police 
development program and $1 billion in Foreign Military Financing for 
Iraq's military. 

However, our September 2010 report on Iraq's budget surplus emphasizes 
the need to ensure that Iraq shares in the cost for its own security. 
[Footnote 3] Specifically, we found that, through the end of 2009, 
Iraq had generated an estimated cumulative budget surplus of $52.1 
billion, of which at least $11.8 billion was available after adjusting 
for outstanding advances. In addition, we found that, between 2005 and 
2009, Iraq's security ministries budgeted but did not use between $2.5 
billion and $5.2 billion in funds that could have been devoted to the 
country's security needs. Furthermore, while the Iraqi government 
recently announced a 2011 budget that projects a $13.4 billion 
deficit, our 2010 report noted that Iraq's budgets serve as imperfect 
predictors of the country's year-end fiscal balance. For example, from 
2005 through 2009, Iraq's budgets predicted deficits but ended each 
year with budget surpluses, on a cash accounting basis. Accordingly, 
we recommended that Congress consider Iraq's available financial 
resources when reviewing the administration's fiscal year 2011 budget 
request and any future funding requests to support the Iraqi security 
forces. 

In addition, we continue to follow the transition in Iraq from a 
military to a civilian-led presence. The administration has requested 
just over $3.2 billion[Footnote 4] in fiscal year 2012 contingency 
funding for State and USAID operations in Iraq. These funds will 
support the operations and protection of a large U.S. civilian 
presence in the country, including personnel at the U.S. Embassy in 
Baghdad; two consulates in Basrah and Erbil; two branch offices in 
Mosul and Kirkuk; and three aviation facilities in Basrah, Erbil, and 
Baghdad. In July 2010, we issued a report on State transition efforts 
in Iraq, copies of which we provided to the Subcommittee.[Footnote 5] 

Finally, we are also assessing the Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq. This 
campaign plan provides a comprehensive, government-wide plan to guide 
U.S. efforts in Iraq, including the transition from a DOD-led to a 
State-led operation. The current plan identifies four lines of 
operation--political, economic and energy, rule of law, and security-- 
and articulates the strategic priorities and risks in achieving goals 
and objectives. Our review--the most recent in a series of classified 
assessments we have conducted of joint campaign plans for Iraq--will 
examine the extent to which the campaign plan adheres to military 
doctrine and addresses the risks to the campaign. 

Related issues for oversight include: 

* the extent to which the Iraqi government has adequately built the 
logistics and maintenance capacity of its security forces, developed 
the institutional capacity to manage such forces independently, and 
developed a culture of sustainment for equipment provided by the 
United States or acquired with U.S. assistance; and: 

* the intended goals and expected outcomes for State's programs to 
assist the Iraqi security forces. 

Afghanistan and Pakistan: 

Since 2002, the United States has provided more than $55 billion for 
Afghan security, governance, and development, and over $18 billion to 
assist Pakistan in its security, economic, and development matters and 
to provide reimbursements for its efforts to combat terrorism along 
its border with Afghanistan. Our reviews of this assistance have 
focused on U.S. efforts to develop capable Afghan National Security 
Forces; the U.S. civilian-military campaign plan for Afghanistan; and 
programs to develop Afghanistan's agriculture, roads, and water sector 
and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. We have also 
highlighted obstacles that have impeded the progress of U.S. programs 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the unstable security situation 
and the government of Afghanistan's lack of capacity to sustain many 
of the programs put in place by donors. 

In recent years, the United States has placed increased emphasis on 
providing funding directly to the Afghan government and Pakistani 
government and nongovernmental organizations instead of through large 
international contractors and U.S.-based partners. For example, in 
January 2010, the United States and the international community agreed 
to deliver half of their development aid to Afghanistan over the next 
2 years directly through the Afghan government. Our preliminary 
observations indicate that USAID disbursed about $204 million in 
direct assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2010, mostly through 
the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. 
Similarly, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, 
[Footnote 6] which authorizes up to $1.5 billion a year for 
development, economic, and democratic assistance to Pakistan for 
fiscal years 2010 through 2014, encourages, as appropriate, the 
provision of this assistance through Pakistani organizations. As of 
December 2010, the United States had disbursed about $120 million in 
direct assistance to Pakistani organizations. However, the 
vulnerability of U.S.-funded programs to waste, mismanagement, and 
corruption is likely to increase under these circumstances, given the 
limited capacity and weak internal controls of some of the Afghan and 
Pakistani entities involved in implementing them. In February 2011, we 
reported that USAID had undertaken or intends to take a number of risk 
mitigation strategies and steps to identify weaknesses in Pakistani 
organizations and improve the capacity of those that do not meet 
minimum standards for managing U.S. funds.[Footnote 7] For example, 
Pakistani organizations receiving U.S. funding for the first time 
would undergo a preaward assessment of their internal controls and 
financial management systems conducted by Pakistani Certified Public 
Accounting firms. However, we also found that USAID's oversight of 
assistance awarded to Pakistani organizations could be further 
enhanced to prevent the misuse of U.S. funds. We recommended that 
USAID, among other things, provide U.S. assistance to Pakistani 
organizations identified in preaward assessments as high-or medium-
risk through contracts, grants, or agreements that would require these 
organizations to address weaknesses that could endanger the 
accountability of U.S. funds. USAID agreed with our recommendation, 
stating that all contracts, grants, and agreements awarded to high-or 
medium-risk recipients take into consideration weaknesses identified 
in the preaward assessments. However, USAID did not specifically state 
that it would make addressing such weaknesses a requirement in all of 
its contracts, grants, and agreements awarded to high-or medium-risk 
recipients. 

In response to the Subcommittee's interest, we have also initiated 
work on U.S. efforts to ensure accountability of direct assistance to 
Afghanistan and to build the financial management capacity of the 
Afghan government. Our preliminary observations on these programs 
suggest that USAID has not consistently completed risk assessments of 
Afghan ministries prior to providing them with direct assistance, but 
that U.S. agencies have increased their focus on developing Afghan 
financial management capacity. We currently have a team in Afghanistan 
reviewing these programs and another team heading to Pakistan this 
week to examine U.S. security assistance in Pakistan's western 
frontier region. 

Related issues for oversight include: 

* the extent of State and USAID efforts to develop the Afghan 
government's capacity to sustain donor-funded programs, the progress 
made through such efforts, and the challenges faced, if any; and: 

* the extent to which USAID has taken steps to obtain reasonable 
assurance of the qualifications and independence of Pakistani 
Certified Public Accounting firms that are conducting preaward 
assessments of Pakistani organizations. 

U.S. Agencies Need to Improve Their Capacity to Advance Foreign Policy 
Interests: 

According to the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, 
State and USAID are engaged in efforts to build and support a 
workforce that is well-matched to the foreign affairs challenges of 
the twenty-first century. Accomplishing this objective is critical 
given that our work has consistently found limitations in the ability 
of State and USAID to ensure that they are deploying the right people 
to the right places at the right time. For instance, the February 2011 
update to GAO's "High-Risk Series" states that current and emerging 
critical skills gaps undermine agencies' abilities to meet their vital 
missions.[Footnote 8] With regard to State, the report cites 
insufficient foreign language capabilities. We reported in 2009 that 
the department has had persistent shortages of staff with critical 
language skills, such as Arabic and Chinese, and some foreign language 
shortfalls in areas of geographic strategic interest, such as the Near 
East and South and Central Asia--all gaps that jeopardize diplomatic 
readiness and could hinder U.S. overseas operations.[Footnote 9] We 
reported in 2009 that State's diplomatic readiness was also at risk 
due to continuing staffing and experience gaps at key hardship posts, 
such as Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Lagos, Nigeria; and Shenyang, China. 
[Footnote 10] Additionally, in our 2010 review of State's efforts to 
construct new embassy compounds, we found that the department has 
experienced difficulties hiring and training staff to operate and 
maintain these more sophisticated facilities.[Footnote 11] State has 
taken some actions in response to our findings. For example, in 2010, 
the department introduced a new pilot program to expand its cadre of 
Chinese speakers. State also noted in 2010 that it planned to hire 
additional facilities managers at embassies and consulates. 
Nonetheless, the widespread difficulties that State has faced in 
aligning its workforce with its needs raise serious questions about 
its readiness to manage the upcoming transition to a civilian-led 
presence in Iraq--a presence that is slated to more than double in 
size from nearly 8,000 civilian personnel to about 17,000. In 
particular, the ability of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security to 
assume full security responsibility for all diplomatic personnel and 
facilities starting in October 2011 is uncertain. 

USAID faces similar workforce challenges. Of particular note, USAID's 
workforce plan does not include a comprehensive analysis of the 
agency's gaps in critical skills and competencies or the specific 
actions the agency intends to take to address such gaps. As we 
reported in 2010, until USAID improves its workforce planning, the 
agency will remain at risk of not deploying the workforce it needs to 
meet current and future foreign assistance goals.[Footnote 12] USAID 
subsequently agreed with our recommendation to develop a comprehensive 
workforce plan that analyzes its workforce gaps and specific steps to 
address such gaps. 

Related issues for oversight include: 

* additional actions State has taken or plans to take to address 
longstanding staffing and foreign language gaps, and: 

* the extent to which State, USAID, and DOD have planned for an 
estimated doubling in civilian presence and an expanded diplomatic 
"footprint" in Iraq, given the forthcoming transition from a military 
to a civilian mission. 

Agencies Can Do More to Ensure Oversight of Contractors and 
Accountability of U.S. Investments: 

During fiscal year 2009 and the first half of 2010, State and USAID 
collectively reported obligations of nearly $6 billion on contracts, 
grants, and cooperative agreements to support their direct-hire 
personnel and implement development efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
This reliance is due in part to agency workforce shortfalls, including 
insufficient numbers of trained agency personnel and the frequent 
rotations of staff posted to these countries. However, we have found 
State and USAID's oversight of their contracts, grants, and 
cooperative agreements to be inadequate at times, thus raising 
questions about the agencies' ability to ensure accountability for 
multibillion-dollar investments. For example, as we reported in 2010, 
State and USAID continue to lack complete data on the number of 
personnel working under their contracts, grants, and cooperative 
agreements in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 13] We also found that 
State and USAID did not consider the need to provide greater scrutiny 
and an enhanced degree of management oversight when contractors 
performed contract and grant administration functions, such as 
evaluating other contractors' performance and recommending grant 
awards--both of which closely support inherently governmental 
functions.[Footnote 14] As a result, there is potential for loss of 
government control and accountability for mission-related policy and 
program decisions that can lead to decisions that are not in the best 
interest of the government and increase vulnerability to waste, fraud, 
and abuse.[Footnote 15] 

Our work has also highlighted other challenges in ensuring 
accountability of U.S. investments. For example, we previously 
reported that USAID's efforts to manage and oversee development 
assistance being carried out by contractors and grantees in 
Afghanistan have been hampered by factors such as the high-threat 
working environment and difficulties in preserving institutional 
knowledge due to high staff turnover.[Footnote 16] Additionally, the 
use of Afghan and Pakistani firms is expected to grow in accordance 
with U.S. Embassy Kabul's Afghan First Policy and the Enhanced 
Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009,[Footnote 17] which encourage, 
respectively, the utilization of Afghan and Pakistani firms, including 
through host country contracts. This expected increase heightens 
existing concerns about the risk of U.S. contracting and assistance 
funds being diverted to finance terrorist or insurgent groups. GAO is 
currently conducting a review of DOD, State, and USAID's processes for 
vetting prospective Afghan contractors to determine whether they are 
affiliated with insurgent or criminal groups or appear to pose a 
significant risk of diverting funds or security information to 
terrorists, criminal, and other corrupt organizations. 

Related issues for oversight include: 

* actions State and USAID have taken to improve their ability to 
account for personnel working under contracts, grants, and cooperative 
agreements in Iraq and Afghanistan; and: 

* the sufficiency of U.S. efforts to minimize the risk of Afghan and 
Pakistani firms diverting contract and assistance funds to terrorist 
and insurgent groups. 

Sustained Agency Attention to Strategic Planning and Performance 
Measurement Is Needed: 

Sound strategic planning and performance measurement are critical for 
managing U.S. government funds responsibly. In particular, agencies 
should define the results they seek to accomplish, identify the 
strategies for achieving the desired results, and determine how well 
they succeed in achieving those results. However, our reviews of 
international affairs programs have repeatedly found weaknesses in 
agencies' strategic planning and performance measurement efforts. For 
example, we reported that State significantly expanded its Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security--from fewer than 1,000 direct-hire security 
specialists in 1998 to over 2,000 in 2009--without the benefit of 
strategic planning to ensure that the bureau's missions and activities 
address the department's priority needs.[Footnote 18] Accordingly, we 
recommended that State conduct a strategic review of the bureau that 
addresses its key human capital and operational challenges. State 
agreed with our recommendation. 

We also found weaknesses in State's performance measurement of the 
Mérida Initiative, a $1.5 billion effort launched in 2007 to provide 
law enforcement support to Mexico in response to rising crime and 
violence related to drug trafficking, particularly along the United 
States-Mexico border.[Footnote 19] Last summer, we reported that U.S. 
agencies had provided various types of equipment and training through 
this initiative, including five Bell helicopters, several X-ray 
inspection devices, and training for over 4,000 police officers. 
[Footnote 20] However, we found that State generally lacked outcome-
based measures for Mérida, making it difficult to determine the 
program's effectiveness and leaving unclear when its goals will be 
met. Consequently, we recommended that State develop performance 
measures that indicate progress toward Mérida's strategic goals. 
[Footnote 21] State estimated in February 2011 that it would take 
another 4 months before performance measures were completed for 
Mérida. We similarly recommended that USAID take steps to enhance 
monitoring and evaluation of its agricultural development programs in 
Afghanistan, such as by consistently analyzing and interpreting 
program data to determine the extent to which annual targets are met. 
[Footnote 22] USAID concurred and described several ongoing 
initiatives that addressed elements of our recommendation. 

Related issues for oversight include: 

* the extent to which State has strategically reviewed the capacity of 
its Bureau of Diplomatic Security and developed contingency plans as 
the bureau prepares to assume full responsibility from DOD starting in 
October 2011 for the security of all diplomatic personnel and 
facilities in Iraq, and: 

* the extent to which State has made progress in developing 
performance measures for the Mérida Initiative to aid in determining 
the program's effectiveness. 

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may 
have. 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For questions regarding this statement, please contact Jacquelyn 
Williams-Bridgers at (202) 512-3101 or williamsbridgersj@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals 
making key contributions to this statement include Johana Ayers, 
Vincent Balloon, Kathryn Bolduc, Burns Chamberlain, Joseph Christoff, 
Aniruddha Dasgupta, Martin De Alteriis, Timothy DiNapoli, Jess Ford, 
John Hutton, Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Hynek Kalkus, Bruce 
Kutnick, Richard Lindsey, Grace Lui, Judith McCloskey, James Michels, 
Erin O'Brien, Esther Toledo, and Adam Vogt. Joyce Evans, Elizabeth 
Repko, and Cynthia Taylor provided technical assistance. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The fiscal year 2012 request for State and USAID includes a core 
budget of $47 billion, as well as an additional $8.7 billion for State 
and USAID operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq as part of the 
fiscal year 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations request. We are 
currently examining the fiscal year 2012 request for State and USAID 
as part of our annual review of the international affairs budget for 
possible realignments and reductions. 

[2] This statement is based on our wide-ranging body of work examining 
U.S. implementation of security, economic development, and governance 
programs overseas as well as State and USAID operational issues. We 
have conducted on-the-ground work in numerous locations, including 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Mexico, and our reports incorporate 
information we obtained and analyzed from foreign government officials 
and international partners in these countries, as well as from State, 
USAID, and other U.S. officials posted both overseas and in 
Washington, D.C. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence we obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[3] GAO, Iraqi-U.S. Cost-Sharing: Iraq Has a Cumulative Budget 
Surplus, Offering the Potential for Further Cost-Sharing, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-304] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 
2010). 

[4] This figure does not include $2 billion requested for State 
programs to assist the Iraqi security forces. 

[5] Because our July 2010 report on transition efforts in Iraq 
contains sensitive information, it is not available on GAO's Web site. 

[6] Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (Oct. 15, 2009). 

[7] GAO, Department of State's Report to Congress and U.S. Oversight 
of Civilian Assistance to Pakistan Can Be Further Enhanced, GAO-11-
310R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 17, 2011). 

[8] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 
2011). 

[9] GAO, Department of State: Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address 
Persistent Foreign Language Shortfalls, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-955] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 
2009). 

[10] GAO, Department of State: Additional Steps Needed to Address 
Continuing Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-874] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 
2009). 

[11] GAO, New Embassy Compounds: State Faces Challenges in Sizing 
Facilities and Providing for Operations and Maintenance Requirements, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-689] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 20, 2010). 

[12] GAO, Foreign Assistance: USAID Needs to Improve Its Strategic 
Planning to Address Current and Future Workforce Needs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-496] (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
2010). 

[13] GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued 
Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and 
Associated Personnel, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-1] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2010). 

[14] Inherently governmental functions related to the public interest 
require performance by government employees. Other functions, while 
not inherently governmental, may approach the category because of the 
nature of the function, the manner in which a contractor performs the 
contract, or the manner in which the government administers 
performance under a contract. Functions closely supporting the 
performance of inherently governmental functions generally include 
professional and management support activities, such as those that 
involve or relate to supporting budget preparation, evaluation of 
another contractor's performance, acquisition planning, or technical 
evaluation of contract proposals. 

[15] GAO, Contingency Contracting: Improvements Needed in Management 
of Contractors Supporting Contract and Grant Administration in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-357] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2010). 

[16] GAO, Afghanistan Development: USAID Continues to Face Challenges 
in Managing and Overseeing U.S. Development Assistance Programs, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-932T] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 15, 2010). 

[17] Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (Oct. 15, 2009). 

[18] GAO, State Department: Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth 
Warrants Strategic Review, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-156] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 
2009). 

[19] The United States also provides law enforcement support to 
Central American countries through the Mérida Initiative. 

[20] GAO, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance 
Measures, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-837] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010). State data as of February 2011 show 
that, while most Mérida funds have been obligated, nearly 80 percent 
have not yet been expended. 

[21] The Mérida Initiative's four strategic goals are to (1) Disrupt 
Organized Criminal Groups, (2) Institutionalize Reforms to Sustain 
Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights, (3) Create a 21ST Century 
Border, and (4) Build Strong and Resilient Communities. 

[22] GAO, Afghanistan Development: Enhancements to Performance 
Management and Evaluation Efforts Could Improve USAID's Agricultural 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-368] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2010). 

[End of section] 

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