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United States Government Accountability Office: 


Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 3:15 p.m. EST:
Tuesday, March 1, 2011: 

Warfighter Support: 

DOD Should Have a More Comprehensive Approach for Addressing Urgent 
Warfighter Needs: 

Statement of William M. Solis, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 


Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

[End of section] 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the challenges that the 
Department of Defense (DOD) faces in fulfilling urgent operational 
needs identified by our warfighters. Over the course of the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have encountered changing 
adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures, which challenged DOD 
to quickly develop and provide new equipment and new capabilities to 
address evolving threats. Further, U.S. troops faced shortages of 
critical items, including body armor, tires, and batteries. DOD's goal 
is to provide solutions as quickly as possible to meet urgent 
warfighter needs to prevent mission failure or loss of life. To meet 
its urgent needs, DOD had to look beyond traditional acquisition 
procedures, expand the use of existing processes, and develop new 
processes and entities designed to be as responsive as possible to 
urgent warfighter requests. In addition to requests for equipment from 
DOD's existing stocks, warfighters have requested new capabilities, 
such as: technology to counter improvised explosive devices (IED); 
technology related to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) to provide increased situational awareness; and equipment 
related to command and control to enhance operations on the 
battlefield. In meeting urgent needs, it is important for DOD to 
efficiently use the department's financial resources. DOD has spent 
billions of dollars over the past several years to address urgent 
warfighter needs. Our past work on weapons acquisition has shown that 
the department has often pursued more programs than its resources can 
support.[Footnote 1] Additionally, our past work also has shown that 
DOD has had difficulty translating needs into programs, which often 
has led to cost growth and delayed delivery of needed capabilities to 
the warfighter. 

Today, we are publicly releasing a report that addresses (1) what 
entities exist within DOD for responding to urgent operational needs, 
and the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or 
duplication; (2) the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive approach 
for managing and overseeing its urgent needs activities; and (3) the 
extent to which DOD has evaluated the potential for consolidations of 
its various activities and entities.[Footnote 2] My statement will 
first briefly discuss challenges we reported in April 2010[Footnote 3] 
that affected the overall responsiveness of DOD's urgent needs 
processes and then highlight the key findings and recommendations of 
today's report. Today's report contributed to our findings in another 
report being released today that addresses opportunities to reduce 
potential duplication in government programs.[Footnote 4] In 
conducting our work, we analyzed DOD policies, guidance, studies, and 
other documents, interviewed DOD and military service officials, and 
executed a 46-question data-collection instrument to collect 
information from numerous DOD and military service entities having a 
role in the fulfillment of urgent needs. We conducted our work for the 
related report from February 2010 to March 2011 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 


As DOD's urgent needs processes have evolved, there have been several 
reviews of DOD's abilities to rapidly respond to and field needed 
capabilities. For example, according to senior DOD officials, the 
department has conducted a study to determine lessons learned from 
several independent urgent needs processes that might be integrated 
into the department's main acquisition process. However, two studies 
by the Defense Science Board in 2009 found that DOD had done little to 
adopt urgent needs as a critical, ongoing DOD institutional capability 
essential to addressing future threats.[Footnote 5] Most recently, the 
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 
requires DOD to review its processes for the fielding capabilities in 
response to urgent operational needs and consider such improvements as 
providing a streamlined and expedited approach, clearly defining the 
roles and responsibilities for carrying out all phases of the process, 
and establishing a formal feedback mechanism.[Footnote 6] 

We reported in April 2010 on several challenges that affected DOD's 
responsiveness to urgent needs.[Footnote 7] Through our field work in 
Iraq and analysis of 23 case studies, we found that with the exception 
of one system all the solutions to our case studies were fielded 
within 2 years of being endorsed by a theater command--which was 
within DOD's informally established timeline for satisfying joint 
urgent operational needs. However, we found that challenges with 
training, funding, and technical maturity and complexity hindered 
DOD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent warfighter needs. The 
following summarizes these key findings and our recommendations. 
Additional information is provided in our April 2010 report.[Footnote 

* Training--We found challenges in training personnel that process 
urgent needs requests. For example, we found that while the Army 
required selected officers to attend training on how to address 
requirements and identify resources for Army forces, officers at the 
brigade level responsible for drafting and submitting Army and joint 
urgent needs requests--and those at the division level responsible for 
reviewing the requests prior to submission for headquarters approval--
were not likely to receive such training. As a result, once in 
theater, Army officers often faced difficulties drafting, submitting, 
and reviewing the volume of urgent needs requests, which, according to 
Army officials, could be over 200 per month. To address this 
challenge, we recommended that the Army update its training regimen 
for officers who initiate and review urgent needs requests. DOD 
partially concurred, stating that these training issues are applicable 
across the department and that it would develop additional policy. 

* Funding--We found that funding was not always available when needed 
to acquire and field solutions to joint urgent needs. This result 
occurred in part because the Office of the Secretary of Defense had 
not given any one organization primary responsibility for determining 
when to implement the department's statutory rapid acquisition 
authority or to execute timely funding decisions. We recommended that 
the Secretary of Defense designate an entity with primary 
responsibility for recommending use of rapid acquisition authority. 
The department partially concurred, and stated it would develop 
additional DOD policy for using rapid acquisition authority. In 
addition, we found that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had the 
authority, within certain dollar thresholds, to reprogram funds for 
purposes other than those specified by Congress at the time of the 
appropriation. However, in the absence of a high-level authority with 
primary responsibility for executing such reprogramming or transfer 
decisions, DOD faced challenges in consistently securing timely 
cooperation from the services or other components. We recommended DOD 
establish an executive council to make timely funding decisions on 
urgent need requests. DOD partially concurred, stating it would 
develop additional DOD policy and rely on existing councils to address 
our recommendation. 

* Technical maturity and complexity--We found that attempts to meet 
urgent needs with immature technologies or with solutions that are 
technologically complex could lead to longer time frames for fielding 
solutions to urgent needs. Also, we found that DOD guidance was 
unclear about who is responsible for determining whether 
technologically complex solutions fall within the scope of DOD's 
urgent needs processes. We recommended that DOD issue guidance to 
clearly define roles and responsibilities for implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation of all phases of the urgent needs process--
including applying technological-maturity criteria. DOD concurred, 
stating that it would develop new policy and update existing policy. 

We also reported in April 2010 that DOD had not established an 
effective management framework for its urgent needs processes. 
[Footnote 9] Specifically, we reported that DOD's guidance for its 
urgent needs processes (1) was dispersed and outdated; (2) did not 
clearly define roles and responsibilities for implementing, 
monitoring, and evaluating all phases of those processes; and (3) did 
not incorporate all of the expedited acquisition authorities available 
to acquire joint urgent needs solutions. Further, we found that data 
systems for the urgent needs processes did not have comprehensive, 
reliable data for tracking overall results and did not have standards 
for collecting and managing data. In addition, we reported that the 
joint process did not include a formal method for feedback to inform 
joint leadership on the performance of solutions. Finally, we noted 
that in the absence of a management framework for its urgent needs 
processes, DOD did not have tools to fully assess how well its 
processes work, manage their performance, ensure efficient use of 
resources, and make decisions regarding the long-term sustainment of 
fielded capabilities. We made several recommendations to DOD to 
address these findings and DOD generally concurred with our 
recommendations. In June 2010, the Senate Armed Services Committee 
urged DOD to address these shortcomings that we identified "as quickly 
as possible."[Footnote 10] 

DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and 
Evaluation for Potential Consolidation: 

In our report being released today, we identified cases of 
fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication of efforts of DOD's 
urgent needs processes and entities. However, the department is 
hindered in its ability to identify key improvements to its urgent 
needs processes because it does not have a comprehensive approach to 
manage and oversee the breadth of its efforts. Further, DOD has not 
comprehensively evaluated opportunities for consolidation of urgent 
needs entities and processes across the department. In this new 
report, we made several recommendations to DOD for improving its 
management and oversight of urgent needs, and DOD fully concurred with 
those recommendations. The following summarizes our key findings and 
recommendations, which are provided in more detail in the report we 
publicly release today.[Footnote 11] 

Fulfillment of Urgent Needs Involves a Number of Entities and 
Processes, Resulting in Fragmentation, Overlap, and Potential 
Duplication of Efforts: 

Over the past two decades, the department has established many 
entities that develop, equip, and field solutions and critical 
capabilities in response to the large number of urgent needs requests 
submitted by the combatant commands and military services. Many of 
these entities were created, in part, because the department had not 
anticipated the accelerated pace of change in enemy tactics and 
techniques that ultimately heightened the need for a rapid response to 
the large number of urgent needs requests submitted by the combatant 
commands and military services. While many entities started as ad hoc 
organizations, several have been permanently established. On the basis 
of DOD's and our analysis, we identified at least 31 entities that 
play a significant role in the various urgent needs processes. Table 1 
below shows the 31 entities we identified. 

Table 1: DOD Entities Involved in the Fulfillment of Urgent Needs: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense or Joint Staff: 
* Joint Staff, J8; 
* Rapid Fielding Directorate; 
* Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Task Force; 
* Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) Task Force; 
* Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization; 
* Rapid Reaction Technology Office; 
* Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations; 
* Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. 

* Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Current and Future Warfighting 
Capabilities Division; 
* Biometrics Identity Management Agency; 
* Asymmetric Warfare Group; 
* Rapid Fielding Initiative; 
* Rapid Equipping Force; 
* Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training & Doctrine 
* Project Manager (PM) or Program Executive Offices (PEO),[A] such as 
Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 
(including Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Sensors-
Combined) or the Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar Program Directorate. 

* Chief of Naval Operations N81D; 
* U.S. Fleet Forces Command; 
* U.S. Pacific Fleet; 
* Rapid Action Teams, led by a Chief of Naval Operations Sponsor; 
* Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expeditionary Warfare; 
* Rapid Development and Deployment Office; 
* PM or PEO,[A] such as PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare. 

Marine Corps: 
* Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, 
Capabilities Development Directorate; 
* PM or PEO,[A] such as PM Light Armored Vehicles. 

Air Force: 
* Air Force Air Combat Command A8XM; 
* Air Force Air Mobility Command A5QX; 
* Requirements Policy & Process Division, Directorate of Operational 
Capability Requirements; 
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; 
* PM or PEO,[A] such as Aeronautical Systems Center. 

Special Operations Command: 
* Special Operations Command J8; 
* Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] Each military service has program offices responsible for specific 
programs or portfolios of similar programs that may include solutions 
to validated urgent need requirements. However, we have not identified 
the universe of PMs/PEOs that are or have been involved in the 
fulfillment of urgent needs. 

[End of table] 

We found that fragmentation and overlap exist among urgent needs 
entities and processes. For example, there are at least eight 
processes and related points of entry for the warfighter to submit a 
request for an urgently needed capability, including through the Joint 
Staff and each military service. Entities within these processes then 
validate the submitted urgent need request and thus allow it to 
proceed through their specific process. Moreover, our analysis showed 
that overlap exists among urgent needs entities in the roles they play 
as well as the capabilities for which they are responsible. For 
example, at the joint level we found six entities involved in 
facilitating urgent needs requests and five entities involved in 
providing sourcing support for urgent needs requests.[Footnote 12] 
Additionally, several entities have focused on developing solutions 
for the same subject areas, such as counter-IED and ISR capabilities, 
potentially resulting in duplication of efforts. For example, both the 
Army and the Marine Corps had their own separate efforts to develop 
counter-IED mine rollers. 

DOD Does Not Have Comprehensive Guidance and Full Visibility to 
Effectively Manage and Oversee Its Urgent Needs: 

DOD has taken some steps to improve its fulfillment of urgent needs. 
These steps include developing policy to guide joint urgent need 
efforts, establishing a Rapid Fielding Directorate to rapidly 
transition innovative concepts into critical capabilities, and working 
to establish a senior oversight council to help synchronize DOD's 
efforts. Despite these actions, the department does not have a 
comprehensive approach to manage and oversee the breadth of its 
activities to address capability gaps identified by warfighters in- 
theater. Federal internal control standards require detailed policies, 
procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve desired 
results through effective stewardship of public resources.[Footnote 
13] However, DOD does not have a comprehensive, DOD-wide policy that 
establishes a baseline and provides a common approach for how all 
joint and military service urgent needs are to be addressed--including 
key activities of the process such as validation, execution, or 
tracking. Additionally, we found that DOD has a fragmented approach in 
managing all of its urgent needs submissions and validated 
requirements. For example, the Joint Staff, the Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the military services, 
and the Special Operations Command have issued their own guidance, 
which varied, outlining activities involved in processing and meeting 
their specific urgent needs.[Footnote 14] 

DOD also lacks visibility over the full range of urgent needs efforts--
from funding to measuring results. Specifically, we found that DOD 
does not have (1) visibility over the total costs of its urgent needs 
efforts, (2) a comprehensive tracking system, (3) a universal set of 
metrics, and (4) a senior-level focal point. The following summarizes 
these key findings. 

* DOD does not have visibility over total costs. DOD cannot readily 
identify the cost of its departmentwide urgent needs efforts. Based on 
the information submitted to us in response to our data request, the 
total funding for the fulfillment of urgent needs is at least $76.9 
billion from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 15] 
Because DOD does not have visibility over all urgent needs efforts and 
costs, it is not fully able to identify the need for key process 
improvements and adjust program and budgetary priorities accordingly. 

* DOD does not have a comprehensive tracking system. DOD cannot 
readily identify the totality of its urgent needs efforts as well as 
the cost of such efforts because it has limited visibility over all 
urgent needs submitted by warfighters--both from joint and service-
specific sources. Specifically, DOD and the services have disparate 
ways of tracking urgent needs; some have formal databases to input 
information while others use more informal methods such as e-mailing 
to solicit feedback. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and each 
of the military services utilize electronic databases to track 
capability solutions as they move through the urgent needs process. 
However, more than a third of the entities involved in the process did 
not collect or provide the necessary information for the joint or 
service-based systems to track those solutions. Moreover, there was 
confusion over whose role it was to collect and input data into these 
tracking systems. 

* DOD does not have a universal set of metrics. Our analysis found 
that the feedback mechanisms across DOD, the Joint Staff, the military 
services, JIEDDO, and the Special Operations Command are varied and 
fragmented. In April 2010, we recommended that DOD develop an 
established, formal feedback mechanism or channel for the military 
services to provide feedback to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint 
Rapid Acquisition Cell on how well fielded solutions met urgent needs. 
The department concurred with the recommendation and stated that it 
would develop new DOD policy and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would 
update the Chairman's instruction to establish requirements for 
oversight and management of the fulfillment of urgent needs. However, 
the majority of DOD urgent needs entities we surveyed for our March 
2011 report said that they do not collect all the data needed to 
determine how well these solutions are performing. Additionally, in 
April 2010, we also recommended that DOD develop and implement 
standards for accurately tracking and documenting key process 
milestones such as funding, acquisition, fielding, and assessment, and 
for updating data-management systems to create activity reports to 
facilitate management review and external oversight of the process. 
DOD agreed with these recommendations and noted actions it planned to 
take to address them. However, our current analysis found that the 
department lacked a method or metric to track the status of a 
validated urgent requirement across the services and DOD components, 
such as whether a requirement currently in development could be 
applicable to another service. 

* DOD does not have a senior-level focal point. DOD's lack of 
visibility over all urgent needs requests is due in part to the lack 
of a senior-level focal point (i.e., gatekeeper) that has the 
responsibility to manage, oversee, and have full visibility to track 
and monitor all emerging capability gaps being identified by 
warfighters in-theater. At present, the department has not established 
a senior-level focal point to (1) lead the department's efforts to 
fulfill validated urgent needs requirements, (2) develop and implement 
DOD-wide policy on the processing of urgent needs or rapid 
acquisition, or (3) maintain full visibility over its urgent needs 
efforts and the costs of those efforts. We have previously testified 
and reported on the benefits of establishing a single point of focus 
at a sufficiently senior level to coordinate and integrate various DOD 
efforts to address concerns, such as with counterterrorism and the 
transformation of military capabilities.[Footnote 16] 

Opportunities Exist for Consolidating Urgent Needs Processes and 

In addition to not having a comprehensive approach for managing and 
overseeing its urgent needs efforts, DOD has not conducted a 
comprehensive evaluation of its urgent needs processes and entities to 
identify opportunities for consolidation. Given the overlap and 
potential for duplication we identified, coupled with similar concerns 
raised by other studies, there may be opportunities for DOD to further 
improve its urgent needs processes through consolidation. GAO's 
Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide establishes that such 
a comprehensive analysis of alternative processes should be performed 
to include a performance-based, risk-adjusted analysis of benefits and 
costs for each alternative.[Footnote 17] In our current report, we 
identified and analyzed several options, aimed at potential 
consolidations and increased efficiencies, in an effort to provide 
ideas for the department to consider in streamlining its urgent needs 
entities and processes. These options include the following: 

* Consolidate into one Office of the Secretary of Defense-level entity 
all the urgent needs processes of the services and DOD, while allowing 
the services' program offices to maintain responsibility for 
developing solutions. 

* Consolidate entities that have overlapping mission or capability 
portfolios related to urgent needs, such as entities involved in the 
development of solutions for biometrics. 

* Establish a gatekeeper within each service to oversee all key 
activities to fulfill a validated urgent need requirement. 

* Consolidate within each service any overlapping activities in the 
urgent needs process, such as the multiple entry and validation points 
that exist in the Army. 

The options we identified were not meant to be exhaustive or mutually 
exclusive. DOD would need to perform its own analysis, carefully 
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of options it identifies to 
determine the optimal course of action. Additionally, it must be 
recognized that many entities involved in the fulfillment of urgent 
needs have other roles as well. However, until DOD performs such an 
evaluation, it will remain unaware of opportunities for consolidation 
and increased efficiencies in the fulfillment of urgent needs. 

GAO Recommends That DOD Establish Comprehensive Guidance and Evaluate 
Potential Options for Consolidation: 

In the report we publicly release today, we make several 
recommendations to promote a more comprehensive approach to planning, 
management, and oversight of DOD's fulfillment of urgent needs. In 
summary, we are recommending that: 

* DOD develop and promulgate DOD-wide guidance across all urgent needs 
processes that establishes baseline policy for the fulfillment of 
urgent needs, clearly defines common terms, roles, responsibilities, 
and authorities, designates a focal point to lead DOD's urgent needs 
efforts, and directs the DOD components to establish minimum urgent 
needs processes and requirements; and: 

* DOD's Chief Management Officer evaluate potential options for 
consolidation to reduce overlap, duplication, and fragmentation, and 
take appropriate action. 

DOD concurred with all of our recommendations and stated that specific 
actions it will take to address these recommendations will be 
identified in a report on its urgent needs processes that is required 
by the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2011 and due to Congress in January 2012.[Footnote 18] DOD also stated 
that the Deputy Chief Management Officer, supported by the military 
services' Chief Management Officers, will participate in this end-to- 
end review and provide oversight and assistance in utilizing process 
improvement techniques and tools. 

Concluding Remarks: 

Over the past several years we have identified significant challenges 
affecting DOD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs of the 
warfighter and effectively manage and oversee the breadth of its 
urgent needs processes. It is noteworthy that DOD has recognized these 
challenges and continues to take steps towards improving its programs. 
However, until the department holistically examines the entirety of 
its various urgent needs processes and entities, including evaluating 
the need for consolidation, and establishes clear and comprehensive 
policy, it will not be in a position to ensure the warfighter, 
Congress, or the public that its processes are addressing the critical 
needs of U.S. forces in the most timely, efficient, and effective 
manner. Given the magnitude of the financial resources at stake, 
coupled with the need to field urgent need solutions as rapidly as 
possible to prevent loss of life or mission failure, it is imperative 
that DOD's senior leadership make it a top priority to reform its 
urgent needs process. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer 
any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have at 
this time. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact 
William Solis at (202) 512-8365 or In addition, 
contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals 
who made key contributions to this testimony are Cary Russell, 
Assistant Director; Usman Ahmad, Laura Czohara, Lonnie McAllister, 
John Ortiz, Richard Powelson, Steve Pruitt, Ryan Stott, Elizabeth 
Wood, Delia Zee, and Karen Zuckerstein. 

[End of section] 


[1] GAO, Defense Acquisition: DOD's Requirements Determination Process 
Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 

[2] GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More 
Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation, 
[hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 1, 2011). 

[3] GAO, Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD's Urgent Needs 
Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet 
Critical Warfighter Needs, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 

[4] GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government 
Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 

[5] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment 
of Urgent Operational Needs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, July 
2009); Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on 
Capability Surprise, vol. I: Main Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, September 2009). 

[6] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 804 (2011). 

[7] [hyperlink,]. 

[8] [hyperlink,]. 

[9] [hyperlink,]. 

[10] S. Rep. No. 111-201, at 160 (2010). 

[11] [hyperlink,]. 

[12] Through our analysis, we identified several broad activities 
involved in the processing of urgent needs. Facilitation refers to the 
development and coordination of requirements, costs, potential 
solution, funding, and other factors related to the course of action 
to be taken for the fulfillment of an urgent need. Sourcing is the 
approval of the proposed course of action and assignment of a sponsor 
who will carry out that course of action. 

[13] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
(Washington, DC: November 1999). 

[14] Joint Staff: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
3470.01 (July 15, 2005); Army: Army Regulation 71-9 (Dec. 28, 2009); 
Navy: Joint Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Research Development and Acquisition) (July 19, 2007) and Secretary 
of the Navy Notice 5000 (Mar.12, 2009); Marine Corps: Marine Corps 
Order 3900.17 (Oct. 17, 2008); Air Force: Air Force Instruction 63-114 
(June 12, 2008); Air Force Instruction 10-601 (July 12, 2010); JIEDDO: 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instruction 
5000.01 (Nov. 6, 2009); Special Operations Command: Special Operations 
Command Directive 71-4 (June 9, 2009) and Special Operations Command 
Directive 70-1 (Mar. 19, 2010). 

[15] Our estimate includes funding for processing of urgent needs as 
well as development of solutions and some acquisition costs. As our 
data request was not exhaustive, the numbers reported are a lower 
bound to the total amount spent on urgent needs rather than an upper 
bound. Additionally, our funding data have been converted to base year 
2010 dollars. 

[16] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership 
and National Strategy, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 
2001) and Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, 
and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform 
Military Capabilities, [hyperlink,
70] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004). 

[17] GAO, Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide, ver. 3, 
[hyperlink,] (Washington, 
D.C.: May 1997). 

[18] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 804 (2011). 

[End of section] 

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