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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, Committee 
on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, July 29, 2010: 

State Department: 

Undercover Tests Show Passport Issuance Process Remains Vulnerable to 
Fraud: 

Statement of Gregory Kutz, Managing Director: 
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations: 

GAO-10-922T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-922T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Terrorism and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. 
Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

A U.S. passport is one of the most sought after travel documents in 
the world, allowing its holder entrance into the United States and 
many other countries. People attempting to obtain a U.S. passport 
illegally often seek to use the guise of a U.S. citizen to conceal 
their involvement with more serious crimes, such as terrorism, drug 
trafficking, money laundering, or murder. 

In March 2009, GAO reported on weaknesses in State’s passport issuance 
process that could allow a terrorist or criminal to fraudulently 
acquire a genuine U.S. passport. Specifically, GAO easily obtained 
four genuine passports from State using counterfeit documents. In 
April 2009, GAO suggested that State take 5 corrective actions based 
on these undercover tests and State acknowledged those corrective 
actions. GAO was asked to perform additional proactive testing of 
State’s passport issuance process to determine if it continues to be 
vulnerable to fraud. 

To do this work, GAO applied for seven U.S. passports using 
counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents, such as driver’s 
licenses and birth certificates, to simulate scenarios based on 
identity theft. GAO created documents for seven fictitious or deceased 
individuals using off-the-shelf, commercially available hardware, 
software, and materials. Undercover investigators applied for 
passports at six U.S. Postal Service locations and one State-run 
passport office. 

What GAO Found: 

State’s passport issuance process continues to be vulnerable to fraud, 
as the agency issued five of the seven passports GAO attempted to 
fraudulently obtain. While there were multiple indicators of fraud and 
identity theft in each application, State identified only two as 
fraudulent during its adjudication process and mailed five genuine 
U.S. passports to undercover GAO mailboxes. GAO successfully obtained 
three of these passports, but State had the remaining two recovered 
from the mail before they were delivered. According to State 
officials, the agency discovered—after its adjudication process—that 
the two passports were part of GAO testing when they were linked to 
one of the passport applications it initially denied. State officials 
told GAO that they used facial recognition technology—which they could 
have also used during the adjudication process—to identify the two 
remaining applications. 

Figure: Results of GAO Testing of State’s Passport Issuance Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

3 passports received; 
2 passports issued but recovered before delivery; 2 passports denied. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

GAO’s tests show that State does not consistently use data 
verification and counterfeit detection techniques in its passport 
issuance process. Of the five passports it issued, State did not 
recognize discrepancies and suspicious indicators within each 
application. Some examples include: passport photos of the same 
investigator on multiple applications; a 62 year-old applicant using a 
Social Security number issued in 2009; passport and driver’s license 
photos showing about a 10 year age difference; and the use of a 
California mailing address, a West Virginia permanent address and 
driver’s license address, and a Washington, D.C. phone number in the 
same application. These were fraud indicators that should have been 
identified and questioned by State. State also failed to crosscheck 
the bogus citizenship and identity documents in the applications 
against the same databases that it later used to detect GAO’s other 
fraudulent applications. State used facial recognition technology to 
identify the photos of GAO undercover investigators and to stop the 
subsequent delivery of two passports but not to detect fraud in the 
three applications that GAO received, which all contained a passport 
photo of the same investigator. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-922T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Gregory Kutz at (202) 512-
6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the results of our 
investigation of the State Department's (State) passport issuance 
process. My testimony today highlights the results of our most recent 
tests of this process, which we have previously shown to be vulnerable 
to fraud.[Footnote 1] According to State, over 13 million U.S. 
passports were issued in fiscal year 2009. U.S. passports are one of 
the most sought after travel documents in the world, allowing its 
holders entrance into the United States and visa-free passage into 
many other countries. People attempting to obtain a U.S. passport 
illegally are often seeking to use the guise of a U.S. citizen to 
conceal their involvement with more serious crimes, such as terrorism, 
narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and murder. For example, in 
December 2009, an alleged leader of a white supremacist gang was 
sentenced to 3 years in federal prison for making a false statement on 
a passport application in order to flee a double-murder investigation. 

In March 2009, we reported on weaknesses in State's passport issuance 
process that could allow a terrorist or criminal to fraudulently 
acquire a genuine U.S. passport. Specifically, we easily obtained four 
genuine passports from State using counterfeit and fraudulently 
obtained documents. Over the years State has taken steps to protect 
against the fraudulent use of U.S. passports by, for example, issuing 
only electronic passports.[Footnote 2] However, terrorists and other 
criminals could still circumvent these security measures by using 
stolen identities and fraudulent breeder documents,[Footnote 3] such 
as birth certificates and drivers' licenses, to obtain genuine 
passports. For example, in late 2006, State's Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security initiated a multiyear investigation, uncovering a criminal 
enterprise through which Jamaican and West African nationals bought 
counterfeit New York City birth certificates to fraudulently obtain 
U.S. passports. As a result, agents confiscated 17 fraudulently 
obtained U.S. passports and intercepted 10 fraudulent passport 
applications. Further, the fraudulent use of Puerto Rican birth 
certificates to obtain U.S. passports was so widespread that in 
December 2009, the Puerto Rican government enacted a law that 
invalidates all birth certificates issued before July 1, 2010. 
[Footnote 4] 

This testimony responds to your request that we perform additional 
proactive testing of State's passport issuance process to determine 
whether it continues to be vulnerable to fraud. To perform this work, 
we designed three test scenarios--similar to those we used in our 
previous testing--that would simulate the actions of a malicious 
individual who had access to another person's identity information, a 
practice commonly known as identity theft.[Footnote 5] We then applied 
for seven genuine U.S. passports and supported our applications with 
counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents, such as birth 
certificates and drivers' licenses, and the Social Security numbers 
(SSN) and identities of fictitious or deceased individuals. We 
fabricated these documents using publicly available software, 
hardware, and materials. 

Our seven tests simulate an individual stealing another person's 
identity and using it to obtain a passport. Five of our tests were 
based on information and SSNs we had previously obtained from the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) for the purpose of conducting 
undercover tests. One of these included the identity and SSN of a five 
year old child to simulate a malicious individual stealing the 
identity of a real child to get a passport. Finally, in two other 
tests, we used the identities of individuals who died in 1966 and 
1969. For six tests, we submitted our passport applications and 
supporting materials at United States Postal Services (USPS) locations 
that accept passport applications. For the other test, we submitted 
our application and materials at State's regional Washington, D.C., 
passport-issuing office. We also briefed State officials on the 
results of our investigation and discussed their actions on our tests. 

We conducted our work from January 2010 through July 2010 in 
accordance with quality standards for investigations as set forth by 
the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. 

Background: 

A U.S. passport is not only a travel document but also an official 
verification of the bearer's origin, identity, and nationality. Each 
day, Americans submit them as identification to board international 
flights, obtain drivers' licenses, cross the border from the United 
States into Canada and Mexico, apply for loans, and verify their 
employability. To acquire a U.S. passport for the first time, an 
applicant must provide evidence of citizenship, or non-citizen 
nationality,[Footnote 6] such as a certificate of birth in the United 
States or a naturalization certificate, and a valid government-issued 
identification document that includes a photograph or physical 
description of the holder (most commonly a state-issued driver's 
license or identity card).[Footnote 7] 

Most passport applications are submitted by mail or in-person at one 
of almost 9,400 passport application acceptance facilities nationwide. 
The passport acceptance agents at these facilities are responsible 
for, among other things, verifying whether an applicant's 
identification document matches the applicant. Then, through 
adjudication, passport examiners determine whether State should issue 
each applicant a passport. Adjudication requires the examiner to 
scrutinize identification and citizenship documents presented by 
applicants to verify their identity and U.S. citizenship or non-
citizen nationality. 

Since 2005, we have issued several reports on fraud vulnerabilities 
within the passport issuance process and the subsequent actions taken 
by State to prevent individuals from fraudulently securing passports. 
[Footnote 8] For example, we reported that identity theft was among 
the most common means used to commit passport fraud. In March 2009, we 
reported that our covert testing of State's passport issuance process 
demonstrated how malicious individuals might use identity theft to 
obtain genuine U.S. passports. Through our work, we have identified 
two major areas of vulnerability in State's passport issuance process. 

* Passport acceptance agents and passport examiners have accepted 
counterfeit or fraudulently acquired genuine documents as proof of 
identification and citizenship. We reported in March 2009 that State 
issued four genuine U.S. passports to GAO investigators, even though 
the applications that we submitted contained bogus information and 
were supported by counterfeit drivers' licenses and birth 
certificates.[Footnote 9] The sheer variety of documents that are 
eligible to prove citizenship and identity also complicate State's 
verification efforts. 

* State's limited access to information from other federal and state 
agencies hampers its ability to ensure that supporting documents 
belong to the bearer. In 2005 we reported that the information State 
used from SSA to corroborate SSNs was limited and outdated.[Footnote 
10] Although State and SSA had signed a memorandum in April 2004 
giving State access to SSA's main database, the memorandum had not 
been implemented. Moreover, the memorandum did not include access to 
SSA's death records, though State officials said they were exploring 
the possibility of obtaining these records. Yet, in one case from our 
covert testing in 2009, we obtained a U.S. passport using the SSN of a 
man who died in 1965. In response to our prior findings, State 
officials said that the lack of an automated check against SSA death 
records was a long-standing vulnerability, but noted that Passport 
Services had recently purchased a subscription to the Death Master 
File, which included weekly updates of deaths recorded by SSA. State 
also indicated that federal agencies limit its access to records due 
to privacy concerns and the fact that State is not a law enforcement 
agency. For example, it could not conduct real-time authentication of 
the birth certificates presented by passport applicants. The agency 
added that these documents present an exceptional challenge to fraud 
detection efforts, due to the thousands of different acceptable 
formats that the documents can be presented in. It further indicated 
that there are also difficulties with verifying the authenticity of 
drivers' licenses. 

Covert Testing of State's Passport Issuance Process Shows That 
Vulnerabilities Remain: 

State's passport issuance process continues to be vulnerable to fraud, 
as the agency issued five of the seven passports GAO attempted to 
fraudulently obtain. Despite multiple indicators of fraud and identity 
theft in each application, State identified only two as fraudulent 
during its adjudication process and mailed five genuine U.S. passports 
to undercover GAO mailboxes. GAO successfully obtained three of these 
passports, but State had two others recovered from the mail before 
they were delivered. According to State officials, the agency 
discovered--after its adjudication process--that the two passports 
were part of GAO testing when they were linked to one of the passport 
applications it initially denied. State officials told us that they 
used facial recognition technology [Footnote 11]--which it could have 
also used during the adjudication process--to identify our two 
remaining applications. 

According to State, one of our applications was denied in April 2010 
during processing at the National Processing Center in New Hampshire 
by an examiner who was suspicious that the application in totality was 
likely an "imposter." The examiner sent the file to a fraud manager in 
Florida who subsequently determined that the Florida birth certificate 
was counterfeit. State detected the second fraudulent application 
after the SSN used was flagged as recently issued by SSA. This 
application was then sent to the same fraud manager in Florida who 
processed the first application, since they both contained Florida 
birth certificates. State officials indicated that they then uncovered 
GAO's undercover tests by crosschecking the fraudulent Florida birth 
certificate with the state's Bureau of Vital Statistics. 

After State discovered our undercover test, the agency used methods 
and resources not typically utilized to detect fraud during the normal 
passport adjudication process to identify our remaining tests. For 
example, according to State officials, they subsequently identified 
the two remaining GAO applications by using facial recognition 
technology to search for the photos of the applicants, who were our 
undercover investigators. State could have used the very same 
technology to detect fraud in the three applications for passports 
that we received, because all three passports contained the photo of 
the same GAO investigator. One of the passports that were recovered 
after issuance also included the photo of the same investigator. 

Our most recent tests show that State does not consistently use data 
verification and counterfeit detection techniques in its passport 
issuance process. Of the five passports issued, State failed to 
crosscheck the bogus citizenship and identity documents in the 
applications against the same databases that it later used to detect 
our other fraudulent applications. In addition, despite using facial 
recognition technology to identify the photos of our undercover 
investigators and to stop the subsequent delivery of two passports, 
State did not use the technology to detect fraud in the three 
applications for passports that we received, which all contained a 
passport photo of the same investigator. Table 1 and the text that 
follows provide more detail about each of our tests. 

Table 1: Results of GAO Undercover Testing of State's Passport 
Issuance Process: 

Test number: 1; 
Date of Application: 3/10/10; 
State Where Application Filed: Washington; 
Fraud Indicators: 
* Identity of a 62-year-old applicant using recently issued SSN; 
* Counterfeit FL birth certificate; 
* Counterfeit WV driver's license; 
* Various states used for license, mailing and permanent addresses; 
* Same photo used in multiple passports; 
Date of Disposition: 3/24/10; 
Final Disposition: Passport Issued. 

Test number: 2; 
Date of Application: 3/31/10; 
State Where Application Filed: California; 
Fraud Indicators: 
* Identity of a 62-year-old applicant using recently issued SSN; 
* Counterfeit FL birth certificate; 
* Counterfeit WV driver's license; 
* Various states used for license, mailing and permanent addresses; 
* Same photo used in multiple passports; 
Date of Disposition: 5/31/10; 
Final Disposition: Detected, No Passport Issued. 

Test number: 3; 
Date of Application: 4/19/10; 
State Where Application Filed: Washington, D.C.; 
Fraud Indicators: 
* Identity of a 65 year-old applicant using recently issued SSN; 
* Counterfeit FL birth certificate; 
* Counterfeit D.C. driver's license; 
* Various states used for license, mailing and permanent addresses; 
* Same photo used in multiple passports; 
Date of Disposition: 4/20/10; 
Final Disposition: Passport Issued. 

Test number: 4; 
Date of Application: 4/22/10; 
State Where Application Filed: California; 
Fraud Indicators: 
* Identity of a 62-year-old applicant using recently issued SSN; 
* Counterfeit FL birth certificate; 
* Counterfeit WV driver's license; 
* Various states used for license, mailing and permanent addresses; 
* Same photo used in multiple passports; 
Date of Disposition: 5/10/10; 
Final Disposition: Passport Issued. 

Test number: 5; 
Date of Application: 5/4/10; 
State Where Application Filed: Illinois; 
Fraud Indicators: 
* SSN of a child being used by a 55-year-old applicant; 
* Counterfeit FL birth certificate; 
* Counterfeit WV driver's license; 
* Different height on application and license; 
* Same photo used in multiple passports; 
Date of Disposition: Unknown; 
Final Disposition: Detected, No Passport Issued--Linked to GAO Covert 
Testing. 

Test number: 6; 
Date of Application: 5/25/10; 
State Where Application Filed: Georgia; 
Fraud Indicators: 
* Identity of a deceased individual; 
* Counterfeit FL birth certificate; 
* Counterfeit WV driver's license; 
* Various states used for license, mailing and permanent addresses; 
* Same photo used in multiple passports; 
Date of Disposition: 6/15/10; 
Final Disposition: Recovered After Issuance and Determination That GAO 
was Conducting a Covert Test. 

Test number: 7; 
Date of Application: 5/26/10; 
State Where Application Filed: New York; 
Fraud Indicators: 
* Identity of a deceased individual; 
* Counterfeit FL birth certificate; 
* Counterfeit WV driver's license; 
* Various states used for license, mailing and permanent addresses; 
* Same photo used in multiple passports; 
Date of Disposition: 6/11/10; 
Final Disposition: Recovered After Issuance and Determination That GAO 
was Conducting a Covert Test. 

[End of table] 

Test One (Washington): GAO Obtained a Genuine Passport Using the 
Identity of a Fictitious Individual: 

State issued a genuine passport even though the application contained 
multiple indicators that should have raised suspicion of fraud, either 
independently or in aggregate. First, this application included both a 
counterfeit Florida birth certificate and West Virginia driver's 
license, both using the same fictitious name that was on the 
application. If State had confirmed the legitimacy of these documents, 
it would have easily discovered that they were bogus and thus, not 
representative of the true identity of the bearer. Second, we utilized 
an SSN that was recently issued to us by the SSA. If State had 
authenticated the SSN, it would have detected the fact that its issue 
date did not closely coincide with the date of birth and age of the 
U.S. citizen represented in the application. Specifically, the 
applicant listed was a 62-year-old man born in 1948 while the SSN was 
issued by SSA in 2009. Finally, State did not question discrepancies 
between our addresses which included a permanent home address located 
in West Virginia and a mailing address in Seattle, Washington. 
According to State, these were fraud indicators that should have been 
questioned prior to the issuance of the passport. 

Test Two (California): State Detected Our Fraudulent Application 
Before Issuance: 

State denied this passport after identifying certain discrepancies and 
indicators of identity theft and fraud that we included in the 
application. According to State, this fraudulent application was first 
detected when the applicant's identity information did not match SSA's 
records. The application was then submitted to an examiner, who 
determined that our Florida birth certificate was fraudulent after 
checking it against Florida Bureau of Vital Statistics records. State 
also identified physical properties of the document that were 
inconsistent with an original. In addition, State checked our bogus 
West Virginia driver's license against the National Law Enforcement 
Telecommunications System (NLETS), which showed that the license did 
not belong to the bearer. 

Test Three (District of Columbia): GAO Obtained a Genuine Passport 
Using the Identity of a Fictitious Individual: 

State issued a genuine passport even though the application contained 
multiple indicators and discrepancies that should have raised red 
flags for identity theft and fraud. Our investigator went to the U.S. 
Department of State Passport Office in Washington, D.C., which 
provides expedited passport services to applicants scheduled to travel 
out of the country within 14 days from the date of application. The 
State employee made a line-by-line examination of the application to 
make sure that the information coincided with what was provided to 
him, on the bogus Florida birth certificate and District of Columbia 
driver's license. Both documents contained the same fictitious name 
that was used on the application. However, if State had crosschecked 
the information from these two bogus documents against the same 
records that it did in the previous case, it could have discovered 
that neither were representative of the bearer. Further, if State 
officials had checked the SSN in the application, State would have 
concluded that it was recently issued and did not coincide with the 
date of birth represented in the application. In addition, our 
application indicated that our applicant's height was 5' 10" while his 
bogus driver's license showed a height of 6'. According to State, 
these were fraud indicators that should have been questioned prior to 
the issuance of the passport. The following day, our investigator 
returned to the same location and was issued a genuine U.S. passport. 

Test Four (California): GAO Obtained a Genuine Passport Using the 
Identity of a Fictitious Individual: 

State again issued a genuine passport even though the application 
contained multiple indicators and discrepancies that should have 
raised red flags for identity theft and fraud. This application also 
included a counterfeit Florida birth certificate and West Virginia 
driver's license, both in the same fictitious name that was used on 
the application. If State had adequately corroborated the information 
from these two bogus documents against the same records that it did in 
case number two, it could have discovered that the documents were 
counterfeit and not representative of the bearer. In addition, if 
State had adequately verified the SSN in the application, it would 
have found that the recent issue date did not coincide with the age or 
date of birth represented in the application. State also did not 
identify about a 10 year age difference between the applicant's 
passport photo and the photo in his driver's license. Finally, the 
application included suspicious addresses and contact information--a 
California mailing address, a permanent and driver's license address 
from West Virginia and telephone number from the District of Columbia. 
According to State, these were fraud indicators that should have been 
questioned prior to the issuance of the passport. 

Test Five (Illinois): State Detected Our Fraudulent Application Before 
Issuance: 

State identified the fraud indicators and discrepancies that we 
included in this test and did not issue a passport. In addition, the 
agency identified this application as a GAO undercover test. First, 
State identified a major discrepancy with the SSN in our application. 
When our investigator spoke with a State employee about the status of 
his application, he was told that the birth year in his application 
did not match SSA records. In our investigator's fabricated 
explanation, he explained that he was recently a victim of identity 
theft and had a new SSN issued. Second, the agency determined that our 
Florida birth certificate was fraudulent after its check against 
Florida Bureau of Vital Statistics records indicated that the document 
was counterfeit. State also identified physical properties of the 
document that were inconsistent with an original. Finally, State 
questioned why the application was filed in Illinois yet listed a 
mailing, permanent, and driver's license address from West Virginia. 

Test Six (Georgia): State Issued Passport Using the Identity of a 
Deceased Individual But Prevented Its Delivery: 

State issued a passport for this application even though it contained 
multiple indicators of fraud. However, after discovering our testing 
through our fifth application, it subjected this application to 
further review and recovered the passport from the USPS before it was 
delivered. Before the application was discovered as a part of a GAO 
test, State never identified any of the fraud indicators that we 
included in the application. Officials stated that facial recognition 
technology allowed them to discover that the photograph in this 
application was the same used in previous applications. State then 
checked our bogus West Virginia driver's license against NLETS, which 
showed that the license belonged to a person other than the bearer. 
State officials never questioned why the application was filed in 
Georgia yet listed a mailing, permanent, and driver's license address 
from West Virginia and phone number from the District of Columbia. 
State also failed to identify the misspelling of the city in our West 
Virginia license and discrepancies with the zip code information on 
our passport application. According to State, these were fraud 
indicators that should have been questioned prior to the issuance of 
the passport. 

Test Seven (New York): State Issued Passport Using the Identity of a 
Deceased Individual But Prevented Its Delivery: 

As with our sixth test, State issued a passport for this application 
but prevented its delivery after using facial recognition technology 
to link the photo to one used in previous applications--again, after 
discovering our undercover testing. Only after discovering our testing 
did State check our bogus West Virginia driver's license against 
NLETS, which showed that the license belonged to a person other than 
the bearer. If State had checked this license prior to issuing a 
passport, it would have discovered discrepancies regarding information 
on the license including the misspelling of the city. Further, State 
never questioned why the application was filed in New York yet listed 
a Maryland mailing address and a permanent and driver's license 
address from West Virginia, prior to issuing the passport that it 
later revoked. According to State, these were fraud indicators that 
should have been questioned prior to the issuance of the passport. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the integrity of the U.S. passport is an 
essential component of State's efforts to help protect U.S. citizens 
from those who would harm the United States. Over the past several 
years, we have reported that State has failed to effectively address 
the vulnerabilities in the passport issuance process. Our recent tests 
show that there was improvement in State's adjudication process 
because State was able to identify 2 of our 7 passport applications as 
fraudulent and halted the issuance of those passports. However, our 
testing also confirmed that State continues to have significant 
vulnerabilities and systemic issues in its passport issuance process. 
We look forward to continuing to work with this Subcommittee and State 
to improve passport fraud prevention controls. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 
statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may 
have at this time. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Greg 
Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. In addition, contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key 
contributions to this testimony are Andy O'Connell, Assistant 
Director; John Cooney, Assistant Director; Matthew Valenta, Assistant 
Director; Lerone Reid, Analyst-In-Charge; Jason Kelly; Robert Heilman; 
James Murphy; and Timothy Walker. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Department of State: Undercover Tests Reveal Significant 
Vulnerabilities in State's Passport Issuance Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-447] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 
2009). GAO, Addressing Significant Vulnerabilities in the Department 
of State's Passport Issuance Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-583R], (Washington, D.C.: April, 
13, 2009). GAO, State Department: Significant Vulnerabilities in the 
Passport Issuance Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-681T] (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 
2009). 

[2] The electronic passport, or e-passport, is like the traditional 
passport booklet with the addition of a radio frequency identification 
(RFID) chip embedded in the back cover, which provides for electronic 
storage of biographical and biometric data. This addition allows for a 
comparison of the photo in the passport with the photo in the chip, 
and can provide greater assurance that the photo, as well as the 
biographic data, has not been altered or counterfeited. 

[3] A breeder document is an ID document issued to support a person's 
identity and obtain another document of privilege or of greater 
perceived value. 

[4] The law was based on collaboration with State and the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) to address the fraudulent use of Puerto 
Rico-issued birth certificates to unlawfully obtain U.S. passports, 
Social Security benefits, and other federal services. A June 2010 
amendment to the law extends the validity of these birth certificates 
through September 30, 2010, to provide a transition for those applying 
for new documents. 

[5] Identity theft occurs when an individual steals another 
individual's personal identifying information and uses it fraudulently. 

[6] Non-citizen nationals, such as individuals born in American Samoa, 
comprise only a small portion of eligible passport recipients. 

[7] Valid government-issued documents include, for example, state 
drivers' licenses, state identification cards, or military 
identification. 

[8] GAO, State Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. 
Passport Fraud Detection Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-477] (Washington, D.C.: May 20, 
2005); GAO, State Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. 
Passport Fraud Detection Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-853T], (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 
2005); GAO, Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas 
Enhanced, but More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1006] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 31, 2007); and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-447]. 

[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-447]. 

[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-477]. 

[11] Facial recognition technology is used to compare an individual's 
face or photo against multiple "galleries" of images. According to 
State, staff trained in facial comparison techniques use this 
technology to help prevent the issuance of U.S. passports to 
individuals using false identities and individuals who should be 
denied passports for other legal reasons. 

[End of section] 

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