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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on 
Science and Technology, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 
Tuesday, June 29, 2010: 

Environmental Satellites: 

Planning Required to Mitigate Near-term Risks and Ensure Long-term 
Continuity: 

Statement of David A. Powner: 
Director: 
Information Technology Management Issues: 

GAO-10-858T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-858T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, 
House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Environmental satellites provide data used for weather forecasting, 
measuring variations in climate over time, and predicting space 
weather. Due to the continuing cost, schedule, and tri-agency 
management challenges of the National Polar-orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)—a key satellite acquisition 
managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA), 
the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA)—the White House's Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) decided in February 2010 to disband NPOESS 
and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD undertake separate acquisitions. 

GAO was asked to summarize its report being released today on plans 
for NOAA's and DOD's separate acquisitions and the key risks of the 
transition, as well as its recent work on federal efforts to establish 
long-term strategies for satellite-provided climate and space weather 
data. 

What GAO Found: 

OSTP's decision to disband NPOESS came at a time when the program's 
cost estimate had more than doubled—to over $15 billion, the launch 
date for a demonstration satellite had been delayed by over 5 years, 
and the tri-agency management structure had repeatedly proven to be 
ineffective. To implement the decision, NOAA and DOD have begun 
planning for separate acquisitions to replace NPOESS. NOAA has 
developed preliminary plans for its new program—called the Joint Polar 
Satellite System—to meet the requirements of the afternoon NPOESS 
orbit. DOD expects to make final decisions on the spacecraft and 
sensors in August 2010. However, because neither agency has completed 
its plans, the impact of the decision to disband the program on the 
expected costs, schedules, and capabilities has not yet been 
determined. Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in 
transitioning from NPOESS to their separate programs, including the 
loss of key staff and capabilities, delays in negotiating contract 
changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for 
the other agency's requirements, insufficient oversight of new program 
management, and cost growth resulting from contract and program 
changes. While NOAA and DOD are establishing plans for their new 
programs, the development of key NPOESS components is continuing. 
However, the launch date of the demonstration satellite—to be used 
operationally to ensure climate and weather data continuity—has been 
delayed by 9 months, and the program has slowed down work on all 
development activities. Until the transition risks are effectively 
mitigated, and unless components are able to continue scheduled 
development, it is likely that launch dates will continue to be 
delayed. Further delays are likely to jeopardize the availability and 
continuity of critical weather and climate data. 

For over a decade, the climate community has clamored for a national 
interagency strategy that coordinates agency priorities, budgets, and 
schedules for environmental satellites over the long-term—and the 
governance structure to implement that strategy. While the federal 
government has taken several steps to ensure the provision of 
environmental data from satellites for both climate and space weather 
in the short term, federal efforts to ensure the long-term provision 
of these environmental measurements are still lacking. Specifically, 
although both the climate and space weather communities have recently 
drafted reports for OSTP containing recommendations for climate and 
space weather satellites, respectively, the climate report focuses 
only on short-term needs and does not include longer term priorities, 
nor does it include budgets or schedules. Further, OSTP does not have 
plans for finalizing or releasing either the climate or space weather 
reports. Until an interagency strategy for environmental observation 
is established, and a clear process for implementing it is in place, 
federal agencies will continue to procure their immediate priorities 
on an ad hoc basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to 
investments in earth observation may be lost, and our nation's ability 
to understand long-term climate changes may be limited. 

What GAO Recommends: 

In its reports, GAO recommended that NOAA and DOD address key 
transition risks, and that the President's Assistant for Science and 
Technology implement interagency strategies for the long-term 
provision of environmental observations. NOAA and DOD agreed, while 
the Assistant's office neither agreed nor disagreed, but noted its 
plan to develop a strategy for earth observations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-858T] or key 
components. For more information, contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-
9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on 
efforts to disband the National Polar-orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and federal planning to ensure 
long-term environmental monitoring from satellites. NPOESS was planned 
to be a state-of-the-art, environment-monitoring satellite system that 
would replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental satellite 
systems. Managed jointly by the Department of Commerce's National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of 
Defense (DOD)/U.S. Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), the program was considered critical to the 
nation's needs through the year 2026. However, to address continuing 
cost, schedule, management, and technical challenges, the White 
House's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) decided in 
February 2010 to disband the NPOESS acquisition and, instead, to have 
NOAA and DOD undertake separate acquisitions. As requested, this 
statement summarizes our report being released today on plans for 
NOAA's and DOD's separate acquisitions and the key risks of 
transitioning from NPOESS to these new programs, as well as our recent 
work on federal efforts to establish long-term strategies for 
satellite-provided climate and space weather data. [Footnote 1] 

In preparing this testimony, we relied on the work supporting the 
corresponding reports. Those reports contain detailed overviews of our 
scope and methodology. All of our work for the reports was performed 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Since the 1960s, the United States has used satellites to observe the 
earth and its land, oceans, atmosphere, and space environments. 
Satellites provide a global perspective of the environment and allow 
observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable or unsuitable 
for measurements. Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne 
observing systems, satellites have become an indispensable part of 
measuring and forecasting weather and climate. For example, satellites 
provide the graphical images used to identify current weather 
patterns, as well as the data that go into numerical weather 
prediction models. These models are used to forecast weather 1 to 2 
weeks in advance and to issue warnings about severe weather, including 
the path and intensity of hurricanes. Satellite data are also used to 
warn infrastructure owners when increased solar activity is expected 
to affect key assets, including communication satellites or the 
electric power grid. When collected over time, satellite data can also 
be used to observe climate change—the trends and changes in the 
earth's climate. For example, these data are used to monitor and 
project seasonal, annual, and decadal changes in the earth's 
temperature, vegetation coverage, and ozone coverage. 

Satellite-provided Environmental Data for Climate and Space Weather: 
 One key subset of satellite-provided data is climate data. These data 
are used in combination with ground and ocean observing systems to 
understand seasonal, annual, and decadal variations in the climate. 
Satellites provide land observations such as measurements of soil 
moisture, changes in how land is used, and vegetation growth; ocean 
observations such as sea levels, sea surface temperature, and ocean 
color; and atmospheric observations such as greenhouse gas levels 
(e.g., carbon dioxide), aerosol and dust particles, and moisture 
concentration. When these data are obtained over long periods of time, 
scientists are able to use them to determine short- and long-term 
trends in how the earth's systems work and how they work together. For 
example, climate measurements have allowed scientists to better 
understand the effect of deforestation on how the earth absorbs heat, 
retains rainwater, and absorbs greenhouse gases. Scientists also use 
climate data to help predict climate cycles that affect the weather, 
such as El Nino, and to develop global estimates of food crop 
production for a particular year or season. 

Another subset of satellite-provided environmental information is 
space weather data. Satellite-provided observations of space weather 
generally describe changes in solar activity in the space environment. 
Just as scientists use observations of weather that occurs on the 
earth's surface and in its atmosphere to develop forecasts, scientists 
and researchers use space weather observations to detect and forecast 
solar storms that may be potentially harmful to society. 

Coordination and Oversight of Satellite-Provided Environmental 
Observations: 

NASA, NOAA, and DOD all have responsibilities for acquiring, 
processing, and disseminating environmental data and information from 
research or operational satellites. In addition to these agencies, 
there are two interagency organizations—the U.S. Group on Earth 
Observations (USGEO) and the U.S. Global Change Research Program 
(USGCRP)—that are primarily responsible for coordinating federal 
efforts with respect to observations of the earth's environment. The 
National Space Weather Program serves as the coordinating body for 
space weather. USGEO and USGCRP report to the Executive Office of the 
President through the National Science and Technology Council's 
Committee on Environment and Natural Resources, while the National 
Space Weather Program coordinates its activities through NOAA's Office 
of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology. 

The Executive Office of the President provides oversight for federal 
space-based environmental observation. Within the Executive Office of 
the President, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Council on 
Environmental Quality carry out these governance responsibilities. In 
addition, the National Science and Technology Council and its 
Committee on Environment and Natural Resources provide the Executive 
Office of the President with executive-level coordination and advice. 
[Footnote 2] 

The NPOESS Program: Inception, Challenges, and Divergence: 

Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate 
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is 
managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
(DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force.[Footnote 3] Currently, 
there is one operational POES satellite and two operational DMSP 
satellites that are positioned so that they cross the equator in the 
early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon. In addition, the 
government is also relying on a European satellite, called the 
Meteorological Operational (MetOp) satellite.[Footnote 4] Together, 
they ensure that, for any region of the earth, the data provided to 
users are generally no more than 6 hours old. 

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would 
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the 
two satellite programs into a single satellite program—NPOESS—capable 
of satisfying both civilian and military requirements.[Footnote 5] To 
manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency 
Integrated Program Office, with NOAA responsible for overall program 
management for the converged system and for satellite operations; the 
Air Force responsible for acquisition; and NASA responsible for 
facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies 
into the converged system. 

Since the program's inception, NPOESS costs have grown by over $8 
billion, and launch schedules have been delayed by over 5 years. In 
addition, as a result of a 2006 restructuring of the program, the 
agencies reduced the program's functionality by decreasing the number 
of originally planned satellites, orbits, and instruments. The 
restructuring also led agency executives to mitigate potential data 
gaps by deciding to use a planned demonstration satellite, called the 
NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite, as an operational 
satellite providing climate and weather data. Even after this 
restructuring, however, the program continued to encounter technical 
issues, management challenges, schedule delays, and further cost 
increases. To address these issues, in recent years we have made a 
series of recommendations to, among other things, improve executive-
level oversight and develop realistic time frames for revising cost 
and schedule baselines.[Footnote 6] 

In August 2009, the Executive Office of the President formed a task 
force, led by OSTP, to investigate the management and acquisition 
options that would improve the NPOESS program. As a result of this 
review, the Director of OSTP announced in February 2010 that NOAA and 
DOD will no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite system; 
instead, each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite system. 
Specifically, NOAA is to be responsible for the afternoon orbit and 
the observations planned for the first and third NPOESS satellites. 
DOD is to be responsible for the early-morning orbit and the 
observations planned for the second and fourth NPOESS satellites. The 
partnership with the European satellite agencies for the midmorning 
orbit is to continue as planned. 

Agencies Have Started Planning Separate Acquisitions, but the Impact 
of This Approach Is Not Known and Key Risks and Challenges Remain: 

NOAA has developed preliminary plans for its new satellite acquisition 
program—called the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS)—to meet the 
requirements of the afternoon NPOESS orbit. Specifically, NOAA plans 
to acquire two satellites; the plans call for the first JPSS satellite 
to be available for launch in 2014, and the second JPSS satellite to 
be available for launch in 2018.[Footnote 7] NOAA will also provide 
the ground systems for both the JPSS and DOD programs. NOAA is also 
planning technical changes to the satellites, including using a 
smaller spacecraft than the one planned for NPOESS and removing 
sensors that were planned for the NPOESS satellites in the afternoon 
orbit.[Footnote 8] In addition, NOAA plans to transfer the management 
of acquisition from the NPOESS program office to NASA's Goddard Space 
Flight Center, so that it can be co-located at a space system 
acquisition center as advocated by an independent review team. NOAA 
has developed a team to lead the transition from NPOESS to JPSS, and 
plans to begin transitioning in July and complete the transition plan—
including cost and schedule estimates—by the end of September. 

DOD is at an earlier stage in its planning process, in part because it 
has more time before the first satellite in the morning orbit is 
needed. DOD officials are currently developing plans—including costs, 
schedules, and risks—for their new program, called the Defense Weather 
Satellite System. DOD expects to make final decisions on the 
spacecraft, sensors, procurement strategy, and staffing in August 
2010, and begin the program immediately.[Footnote 9] 

Because neither agency has finalized plans for its acquisition, the 
full impact of OSTP's decision on the expected cost, schedule, and 
capabilities is unknown. 

* Cost: NOAA anticipates that the JPSS program will cost approximately 
$11.9 billion to complete through 2024.[Footnote 10] Although this 
estimated cost is less than the current baseline and recent estimates 
for the NPOESS program, DOD will still need to fund and develop 
satellites to meet the requirements for the early morning orbit. 
[Footnote 11] DOD's initial estimates are for its new program to cost 
almost $5 billion through fiscal year 2015.[Footnote 12] Thus, the 
cost of the two acquisitions will likely exceed the baselined life-
cycle cost of the NPOESS program. 

* Schedule: Neither NOAA nor DOD has finalized plans that show the 
full impact of the restructuring on the schedule for satellite 
development. We have previously reported that restructuring a program 
like NPOESS could take significant time to accomplish, due in part to 
the time taken revising, renegotiating, or developing important 
acquisition documents, including contracts and interagency agreements. 
[Footnote 13] With important decisions and negotiations still pending, 
it is likely that the expected launch date of the first JPSS satellite 
will be delayed. 

* Capabilities: Neither agency has made final decisions on the full 
set of sensors—or which satellites will accommodate them—for their 
respective satellite programs. Until those decisions are made, it will 
not be possible to determine the capabilities that these satellites 
will provide and their associated costs. 

Timely decisions on cost, schedule, and capabilities would allow both 
acquisitions to move forward and satellite data users to start 
planning for any data shortfalls they may experience. Until DOD and 
NOAA finalize their plans, it is not clear whether the new 
acquisitions will meet the requirements of both civilian and military 
users. 

Key Transition Risks and Continuing Development Challenges Threaten 
Satellite Data Continuity: 

Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from 
NPOESS to their new programs, including loss of key staff and 
capabilities, delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing 
new program offices, failure to support the other agency's 
requirements, insufficient oversight of new program management, and 
potential cost growth from contract terminations and other program 
changes. 

* Loss of key staff and capabilities: The NPOESS program office is 
composed of NOAA, NASA, Air Force, and contractor staff with knowledge 
and experience in the status, risks, and lessons learned from the 
NPOESS program. This knowledge will be critical to moving the program 
forward both during and after the transition period. However, within 
the past year, the program office has lost its Program Executive 
Officer, Deputy Program Executive Officer, and System Program Director—
the top three individuals who oversee day-to-day operations. Thus, 
final critical decisions on work slow downs and priorities will be 
made by a new Program Executive Officer, who has only overseen the 
program for a few weeks. In addition, program office staff have 
already begun leaving—or looking for other employment—due to the 
uncertainties about the future of the program office. Unless NOAA and 
DOD are proactive in retaining these staff, the new program may waste 
valuable time if staff must relearn program details and may repeat 
mistakes made and lose lessons learned by prior program staff. 

* Delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new 
programs: According to NOAA officials, the plan for JPSS may require 
negotiations with contractors and between contractors and their 
subcontractors. In addition, both NOAA and DOD will need to establish 
and fully staff program offices to facilitate and manage the 
transition and new programs. Until decisions are made on how the 
program is to proceed with contract changes and terminations, the 
contractors and program office cannot implement the chosen solution, 
and some decisions, such as how to hold schedule slips to a minimum, 
could become much more difficult. 

* Failure to support the other agency's requirements: As a joint 
program, NPOESS was expected to fulfill many military, civilian, and 
research requirements for environmental data. However, because the 
requirements of NOAA and DOD are different, the agencies may develop 
programs that meet their own needs but not the other's. If the 
agencies cannot find a way to build a partnership that facilitates 
both efficient and effective decision-making on data continuity needs, 
the needs of both agencies may not be adequately incorporated into the 
new programs. 

* Insufficient oversight of new program management: Under its new JPSS 
program, NOAA plans to transfer parts of the NPOESS program to NASA, 
but it has not yet defined how it will oversee NASA's efforts. We have 
reported that NASA has consistently underestimated time and cost and 
has not adequately managed risk factors such as contractor 
performance. Because of these issues, we listed NASA's acquisition 
management as a high-risk area in 1990, and it remains a high-risk 
area today.[Footnote 14] NOAA officials reported that they are 
developing a management control plan with NASA and intend to perform 
an independent review of this plan when it is completed. They could 
not provide a time frame for its completion. Without strong NOAA 
oversight of NASA's management of program components, JPSS may 
continue to face the same cost, schedule, and contract management 
challenges as the NPOESS program. 

* Cost growth resulting from contract and program changes: Because 
neither acquisition has fully developed plans for their respective 
programs, it is unclear whether contracts will need to be fully or 
partially terminated, and what the terminations and other program 
changes could ultimately cost. We have previously reported that if the 
government decides to terminate a contract for convenience, it must 
compensate the contractor—in the form of a termination settlement—for 
the work it has performed.[Footnote 15] However, a settlement only 
addresses the government's obligation under a terminated contract, and 
there may be additional costs. For example, additional costs could 
result from awarding a new contract to replace a terminated contract. 
Until NOAA and DOD make decisions and plans for their programs, the 
full cost of contract and program changes will be unknown. 

NOAA, NASA, and DOD acknowledge that there are risks associated with 
the transition to new programs, but they have not yet established 
plans to mitigate these risks. 

While NOAA and DOD are developing plans for their new programs, the 
development of key NPOESS components is continuing. In recent months, 
the program completed the development of the critical imaging sensor, 
called the Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), and 
delivered it to NASA for integration onto the NPP satellite. Four of 
the five sensors intended for NPP are now on the spacecraft. In 
addition, the program continues to work on components of the first and 
second NPOESS satellites, which are to be transferred to NOAA and DOD 
to become part of their respective follow-on programs. However, the 
expected launch date of the NPP satellite has been delayed by 9 months 
(moving the launch date to September 2011 or later), due to technical 
issues in the development of the NPP sensor that has not yet been 
integrated. In addition, the development of the VIIRS sensor for the 
first NPOESS or JPSS satellite is experiencing significant cost 
overruns. Further, the program is slowing down and may need to stop 
work on key components because of potential contract liabilities and 
funding constraints, but it has not developed a prioritized list on 
what to stop first. 

Until the transition risks are effectively mitigated, and unless 
selected components are able to continue scheduled development, the 
launches of NPP and the first NOAA and DOD satellites could be further 
delayed. Further launch delays are likely to jeopardize the 
availability and continuity of weather and climate data. For example, 
the POES satellite currently in the afternoon orbit is expected to 
reach the end of its lifespan at the end of 2012. If NPP is delayed, 
there could be a gap in polar satellite observations in the afternoon 
orbit. Similarly, a delay in the launch of the first JPSS satellite 
may lead to a gap in satellite data after NPP reaches the end of its 
lifespan. 

Federal Efforts to Ensure the Long-term Provision of Environmental 
Data from Satellites Are Lacking: 

For over a decade, the climate community has clamored for an 
interagency strategy to coordinate agency priorities, budgets, and 
schedules for environmental satellites over the long term—and the 
governance structure to implement that strategy. Specifically, in 
1999, the National Research Council reported on the need for a 
comprehensive long-term earth observation strategy and, in 2000, for 
an effective governance structure that would balance interagency 
issues and provide authority and accountability for implementing the 
strategy.[Footnote 16] The National Research Council and others have 
repeated these concerns in multiple reports since then, including 
after the agencies responsible for NPOESS canceled key climate and 
space weather sensors from the program in 2006.[Footnote 17] 
Similarly, in 1999, the Administrators of NOAA and NASA wrote letters 
to OSTP noting the need for an interagency strategy and the means to 
implement it. 

While progress has been made in developing near-term interagency 
plans, this initiative is languishing without a firm completion date, 
and federal efforts to establish and implement a strategy for the long-
term provision of satellite data are insufficient. Specifically, in 
2005, the National Science and Technology Council's Committee on 
Environment and Natural Resources established USGEO to develop an 
earth observation strategy and coordinate its implementation. Since 
that time, USGEO assessed current and evolving requirements, evaluated 
them to determine investment priorities, and drafted the Strategic 
Assessment Report—a report delineating near-term opportunities and 
priorities for earth observation from both space and ground. According 
to agency officials, this report is the first in a planned series, and 
it was approved by OSTP and multiple federal agencies in May 2009. 
However, OSTP has not yet forwarded the draft to the Committee on 
Environment and Natural Resources and the President's National Science 
and Technology Council because it is reconsidering whether to revise 
or move forward with the plan. USGEO officials could not provide a 
schedule for completing this near-term interagency plan. 

This draft report is an important first step in developing a national 
strategy for earth observations, but it is not sufficient to ensure 
the long-term provision of data vital to understanding the climate. 
The draft report integrates different agencies' requirements and 
proposes continuing or improving earth observations in 17 separate 
areas, using both satellite and land-based measuring systems. However, 
the report does not include costs, schedules, or plans for the long-
term provision of satellite data. While the report does note the 
importance of continuing certain near-term plans for sensors, it does 
not make recommendations for what to do over the long term. 

In addition, the federal government lacks a clear process for 
implementing an interagency strategy. Key offices within the Executive 
Office of the President with responsibilities for environmental 
observations, including OSTP and the Council for Environmental 
Quality, have not established processes or time frames for 
implementing an interagency strategy—including steps for working with 
OMB to ensure that agencies' annual budgets are aligned with the 
interagency strategy. As a result, even if an interagency strategy was 
finalized, it is not clear how OSTP and OMB would ensure that the 
responsibilities identified in the interagency strategy are consistent 
with agency plans and are funded within agency budgets. 

Until an interagency strategy for earth observation is established, 
and a clear process for implementing it is in place, federal agencies 
will continue to procure their immediate priorities on an ad hoc 
basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to investments 
in earth observation may be lost, and the continuity of key 
measurements may be jeopardized. This will hinder our nation's ability 
to understand long-term climate changes. 

Federal Agencies Lack a Strategy for the Long-term Provision of Space 
Weather Data: 

While key federal agencies have taken steps to plan for continued 
space weather observations in the near term, they lack a strategy for 
the long-term provision of space weather data. Similar to maintaining 
satellite-provided climate observations, maintaining space weather 
observations over the long term is important. The National Space 
Weather Program, the interagency coordinating body for the United 
States space weather community, has repeatedly recommended taking 
action to sustain the space weather observation infrastructure on a 
long-term basis. 

Agencies participating in the National Space Weather Program have 
taken short-term actions that may help alleviate near-term gaps in 
space weather observations, but OSTP has not approved or released two 
reports that are expected to establish plans for obtaining space 
weather observations over the long term. Specifically, NOAA and DOD 
are seeking to replace key experimental space-observing satellites. 
[Footnote 18] Further, the National Space Weather Program recently 
developed two reports at the request of OSTP documenting specific 
recommendations for the future of space weather, one on what to do 
about a critical NASA space weather satellite, called the Advanced 
Composition Explorer, and the other on the replacement of the space 
weather capabilities removed from the NPOESS program. The program 
submitted the reports in October and November of 2009, respectively. 
However, OSTP officials do not have a schedule for approving or 
releasing the reports. 

While the agencies' short-term actions and the pending reports hold 
promise, federal agencies do not currently have a comprehensive 
interagency strategy for the long-term provision of space weather 
data. Until OSTP releases the reports, it will not be clear whether 
they provide a clear strategy to ensure the long-term provision of 
space weather data—or whether the current efforts are simply ad hoc 
attempts to ensure short-term data continuity. Without a comprehensive 
long-term strategy for the provision of space weather data, agencies 
may make ad hoc decisions to ensure continuity in the near term and 
risk making inefficient decisions on key investments. 

Implementation of Recommendations Could Help Ensure Near- and Long-
Term Satellite Continuity: 

In the report being released today, we are making recommendations to 
ensure that the transition from NPOESS to its successor programs is 
efficiently and effectively managed.[Footnote 19] Among other things, 
we are recommending that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce 
direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to expedite 
decisions on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of their 
planned programs; direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to 
develop plans to address key transition risks, including the loss of 
skilled staff, delays in contract negotiations and setting up new 
program offices, loss of support for the other agency's requirements, 
and oversight of new program management; and direct the NPOESS program 
office to develop priorities for work slowdown and stoppage to allow 
the activities that are most important to maintaining launch schedules 
to continue. 

In written comments on the NPOESS report, both NOAA and DOD agreed 
with our recommendations and identified plans to implement them. In 
addition, NASA made comments on two of our findings. For example, NASA 
commented on our finding that NOAA would need to provide enhanced 
oversight of NASA's management of the JPSS program. NASA officials 
asserted that the proper basis for comparison should not be their 
leading-edge research missions, but, instead, should be their 
operational environmental satellite programs. However, the JPSS 
program does include leading-edge sensor technologies, and the 
complexity of these sensor technologies has been a key reason for the 
cost growth and schedule delays experienced to date on the NPOESS 
program. Thus, it will be important for both NOAA and NASA to ensure 
that the subcontractors are adequately managed so that technical, 
cost, and schedule issues are minimized or mitigated. The full text of 
the three agencies' comments and our evaluation of those comments are 
provided in the accompanying report. 

In the report issued in April, we made recommendations to improve long-
term planning for environmental satellites.[Footnote 20] Specifically, 
we recommended that the Assistant to the President for Science and 
Technology, in collaboration with key Executive Office of the 
President entities (including the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy, the Office of Management and Budget, the Council on 
Environmental Quality, and the National Science and Technology 
Council) establish a deadline to complete and release three key 
reports on environmental observations. We also recommended that the 
Assistant to the President direct USGEO to establish an interagency 
strategy to address the long-term provision of environmental 
observations from satellites that includes costs and schedules for the 
satellites, as well as a plan for the relevant agencies' future 
budgets, and establish an ongoing process, with timelines, for 
obtaining approval of the interagency strategy and aligning it with 
agency plans and annual budgets. 

When asked to comment on our report, the Executive Office of the 
President did not agree or disagree with our recommendations; however, 
officials noted that OSTP is currently revising USGEO's Strategic 
Assessment Report to update information on launch schedules and on the 
availability of certain measurements that have changed since 
completion of the report a year ago. In crafting this strategy, it 
will be important for OSTP to address long-term interagency needs and 
to work with OMB to ensure that the long-term plans are aligned with 
individual agencies' plans and budgets. If the plan does not include 
these elements, individual agencies will continue to address only 
their most pressing priorities, other agencies' needs may be ignored, 
and the government may lose the ability to effectively and efficiently 
address its earth observation needs. 

In summary, at the end of this fiscal year, the federal government 
will have spent 16 years and almost $6 billion to combine two legacy 
satellite programs into one, yet will not have launched a single 
satellite. Faced with expected cost growth exceeding $8 billion, 
schedule delays of over 5 years, and continuing tri-agency management 
challenges, a task force led by the President's Office of Science and 
Technology Policy decided to disband NPOESS so that NOAA and DOD could 
pursue separate satellite acquisitions. While the two agencies are 
scrambling to develop plans for their respective programs, it is not 
yet clear what the programs will deliver, when, and at what cost, but 
it is very likely that they will cost more than the existing NPOESS 
baseline and recent program office estimates. Timely decisions on 
cost, schedule, and capabilities are needed to allow both acquisitions 
to move forward. In addition, the agencies face a number of transition 
risks, but neither agency has developed plans to mitigate these risks. 
Meanwhile, the NPOESS program is continuing to develop components of 
the NPP satellite and components of the first two satellites. However, 
program officials reported that they have slowed all development work, 
and may need to stop work on these deliverables. Slowing or stopping 
work could further delay the satellites' launches, but the program has 
not developed a prioritized list of what to stop first to mitigate 
impacts on satellite launches. Until it does so, there may be an 
increased risk of gaps in satellite data. 

Although initial steps have been taken to ensure the short-term 
continuity of key climate and space weather measurements from 
satellites, the federal government has not taken the necessary steps 
to ensure the long-term sustainment of these critical measurements. 
For example, NOAA recently removed sensors from JPSS that were 
originally planned for the NPOESS satellites in the afternoon orbit, 
but it is unclear how this will affect other agencies and programs. 
Until an interagency strategy for earth observation is established, 
and a clear process for implementing it is in place, federal agencies 
will continue to procure their immediate priorities on an ad hoc 
basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to investments 
in earth observation may be lost, and the continuity of key 
measurements may be lost. This will hinder our nation's ability to 
understand long-term climate changes and risk our ability to measure, 
predict, and mitigate the effects of space weather. 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, 
please contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or at 
pownerd@gao.gov. Other key contributors include Colleen Phillips, 
Assistant Director, Kate Agatone; Franklin Jackson; Kathleen S. 
Lovett; Lee McCracken; and John Ockay. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act 
Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and 
Climate Data, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-558] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010), and Environmental Satellites: 
Strategy Needed to Sustain Critical Climate and Space Weather 
Measurements, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-456] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2010). 

[2] The Council on Environmental Quality coordinates federal 
environmental efforts; the National Science and Technology Council 
coordinates science and technological policies and sets national goals 
for investments in those areas, and the Committee on Environment and 
Natural Resources provides advice on federal research and development 
efforts in the area of environment and natural resources. 

[3] NOAA provides command and control for both the POES and DMSP 
satellites after they are in orbit. 

[4] The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological 
Satellites' MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting 
satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp satellites are 
planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years. The first of these 
satellites was launched in 2006 and is currently operational. 

[5] Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994. 

[6] GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs 
Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-
agency Decision Making, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-564] (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 
2009); Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition 
Faces Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate 
Data Continuity, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-518] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2008); and Polar-orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical 
Challenges and Risks Remain, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-498] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 
2007). 

[7] NOAA officials noted that these dates could change as transition 
plans are developed. 

[8] NOAA officials are currently revisiting plans for the Space 
Environment Monitor, which collects data to predict the effects of 
space weather on technological systems, and the Microwave 
Imager/Sounder, which collects microwave images and data needed for 
measurements such as rain rate and soil moisture. Although they plan 
to launch the Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Suite, NOAA 
officials have not yet made a decision on which satellite will host 
the sensor. 

[9] DOD had originally planned to make decisions on the spacecraft and 
sensors in June and October 2010, respectively, but revised the dates 
for these decisions in late June 2010. 

[10] This estimate includes approximately $2.9 billion in NOAA funds 
spent on NPOESS through fiscal year 2010, but does not include 
approximately $2.9 billion that DOD has spent through fiscal year 2010 
on NPOESS. NOAA officials also reported that the JPSS cost estimate is 
at a higher confidence level than the previous NPOESS life-cycle cost 
estimates. 

[11] Although the program baseline is currently $13.95 billion, we 
estimated in June 2009 that this cost could grow by about $1 billion. 
In addition, officials from the Executive Office of the President 
stated that they reviewed life-cycle cost estimates from DOD and the 
NPOESS program office of $15.1 billion and $16.45 billion, 
respectively. 

[12] This estimate includes approximately $2.9 billion in DOD funds 
spent on NPOESS through fiscal year 2010. It is not a life-cycle cost 
estimate and could change as DOD completes its requirements review and 
analysis of alternatives for its new program. DOD has not yet 
developed a life-cycle cost estimate. 

[13] GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost 
Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006). 

[14] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2009). 

[15] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Termination Costs Are Generally Not a 
Compelling Reason to Continue Programs or Contracts That Otherwise 
Warrant Ending, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-379] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2008). 

[16] National Research Council, Climate Research Committee, Adequacy 
of Climate Observing Systems (Washington, D.C.: 1999); National 
Research Council, Space Studies Board: Committee on Earth Studies, 
Issues in the Integration of Research and Operational Satellite 
Systems for Climate Research: Part I. Science and Design (Washington, 
D.C.: 2000). 

[17] For example, see: National Research Council, Committee on a 
Strategy to Mitigate the Impact of Sensor Descopes and Demanifests on 
the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft, Ensuring the Climate Record from the 
NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft: Elements of a Strategy to Recover 
Measurement Capabilities Lost in Program Restructuring, (Washington, 
D.C.: 2008); National Research Council, Committee on Earth Science and 
Applications from Space: A Community Assessment and Strategy for the 
Future, Earth Science and Applications from Space: National 
Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: 2007); 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Wigbels, Lyn et.al.), 
Earth Observations and Global Change: Why? Where Are We? What Next?: A 
Report of CSIS Space Initiatives (Washington, D.C.: July 2008). 

[18] NOAA has requested funding in fiscal year 2011 to refurbish 
NASA's Deep Space Climate Observatory spacecraft to replace the 
experimental Advanced Composition Explorer spacecraft and has 
requested funding to replace its Constellation Observing System for 
Meteorology, Ionosphere, and Climate. DOD has begun efforts to develop 
a replacement for its experimental Communication/Navigation Outage 
Forecasting System satellite, which is designed to sense space weather 
that affects how the Global Positioning System, high frequency radio, 
and other communications devices work in low latitude areas. 

[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-558]. 

[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-456]. 

[End of section] 

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