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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and National 
Archives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 1:00 p.m. PDT:
Friday, April 30, 2010: 

2010 Census: 

Cooperation with Enumerators Is Critical to a Successful Headcount: 

Statement of Robert Goldenkoff: 
Director: 
Strategic Issues: 

GAO-10-665T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-665T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Information Policy, Census, and National Archives, Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

On May 1, 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) will launch its 
massive follow-up effort with the roughly 48 million households that 
did not mail back their census forms (130 million forms were 
delivered). As part of this nonresponse follow-up effort, over 600,000 
enumerators will fan out across the country, personally contacting 
nonresponding housing units as many as six times in an effort to 
ensure everyone is counted. 

As requested, GAO’s testimony in Los Angeles (L.A.) focuses on the 
importance of census participation, paying particular attention to (1) 
the Bureau’s preparedness for nonresponse follow-up in terms of 
workload and staffing levels, (2) why it will be critical for 
Angelenos and others across the country to cooperate with enumerators 
during nonresponse follow-up, and (3) key steps the Bureau needs to 
take moving forward to ensure nonresponse follow-up is timely and 
accurate. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO 
work. 

What GAO Found: 

Nationally, based on workload and staffing levels, the Bureau appears 
to be well positioned to implement nonresponse follow-up. On both 
counts, the Bureau’s performance is meeting its expected goals. With 
respect to the mail-back response rate, the Bureau expected a level of 
between 59 percent and 65 percent. The actual mail-back response rate 
when the Bureau determined the universe of houses to visit for 
nonresponse follow-up on April 19, was 63.2 percent, well within its 
estimates. The mail-back response rate for L.A. City was 61.4 percent, 
and L.A. County was 64.7 percent. In terms of staffing, the Bureau met 
its goals both nationally as well as for L.A. Still, the Bureau could 
encounter pockets of challenges at the local level where mail-back 
response rates are less than expected. Further, the reliability of a 
computer system needed to administer nonresponse follow-up is an open 
question. 

Participation in the census has decade-long implications for 
individuals, communities, and states. For example, census data are 
used to apportion House seats, redraw the boundaries of congressional 
and local election districts, and help ensure compliance with civil 
rights and other laws protecting our citizens. A complete count also 
helps ensure that L.A. and other areas obtain their fair share of 
federal assistance. Indeed, a number of formula grants allocate money 
based at least in part on census and related population data. GAO’s 
recent analysis found that the 10 largest federal assistance programs 
obligated an estimated $478 billion in fiscal year 2009 based, to some 
extent, on census and related population data. The grants included 
Medicaid, Highway Planning and Construction, Head Start, and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program. Local governments as well as 
businesses use census data for planning and investment decisions, and 
to better tailor the services they provide. 

Nationally, following up on nonresponding households is a daunting 
task, and L.A. presents its own challenges and opportunities. For 
example, data from a planning database the Bureau developed placed 
L.A. County first on a list of the top 50 U.S. counties with the 
highest number of people living in hard-to-count areas, based on data 
from the 2000 Census. Factors contributing to the area’s hard-to-count 
challenges include poverty, unemployment, and language barriers. 
Moving forward, among other activities, it will be important for the 
Bureau to track various production, quality, and other indicators as 
planned to help ensure nonresponse follow-up stays on track. 

In summary, participation in the census is a quick, easy, and 
confidential civic act that has a lasting impact on states, cities, 
neighborhoods, and even individuals. But the benefits that can accrue 
from a complete and accurate population tally can only occur if 
Angelenos cooperate with enumerators when they knock on nonrespondents’
doors in the weeks ahead. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony, but past 
reports recommended that the Bureau could build on lessons learned 
from 2000 to improve its 2010 nonresponse follow-up operation. The 
Bureau concurred with these recommendations and has taken steps to 
implement them. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-665T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Robert Goldenkoff at (202) 
512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today at the Center for Healthy Communities in 
Los Angeles (L.A.), to discuss the importance of participating in the 
2010 Census. As you know, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) goes to 
great lengths to secure a complete and accurate enumeration of the 
more than 300 million people that live in our country. In fact, the 
decennial census is an enterprise that few, if any, peacetime 
endeavors can match in terms of its size, scope, complexity, and fixed 
deadlines. 

For the 2010 Census, the Bureau needed to successfully print 360 
million questionnaires, hire a million temporary employees, partner 
with over 200,000 public and private sector entities across the 
country, and align thousands of disparate activities. The Bureau needs 
to do all of this and more, do it right, and do it under an extremely 
tight schedule. Perhaps most importantly, however, the Bureau cannot 
do it alone. To the contrary, participation in the census, just like 
voting and jury duty, is a civic responsibility that helps sustain a 
democratic society. What does this mean, exactly? After all, the 
census is fundamentally a head count. Does the participation of any 
one person really make a difference? 

For Angelenos, as with people across the country, a complete count has 
implications for political representation and getting their fair share 
of federal assistance. This is because data from the census--a 
constitutionally mandated effort--are used to apportion seats in 
Congress, redraw congressional districts, help allocate more than $400 
billion in federal aid to state and local governments each year, and 
remake local political boundaries. Census data are also used for 
planning purposes by the public and private sectors. The bottom line 
is that everything from House seats, to housing assistance, to 
investment decisions by L.A. businesses are determined, in whole or in 
part, by census data. 

This afternoon's hearing is particularly timely as tomorrow the Bureau 
will launch its massive follow-up effort with the roughly 48 million 
households that did not mail back their census forms. As you know, the 
Bureau mailed out census questionnaires to around 120 million 
households in mid-March and hand delivered an additional 12 million 
questionnaires, mainly in rural areas, as well as in areas along the 
Gulf Coast affected by recent hurricanes. Both types of forms were to 
be returned by mail. On May 1, the Bureau's nonresponse follow-up 
operation begins. As part of the operation, over 600,000 enumerators 
will fan out across the country, personally contacting each 
nonresponding housing unit as many as six times in an effort to ensure 
everyone is counted. 

Cooperation with census enumerators during this next phase of data 
collection will be especially important. The city of L.A.'s mail-back 
response rate as of April 19, 2010, when the Bureau determined the 
nonresponse follow-up workload, was 61.4 percent[Footnote 1] 
(nationally, the mail-back response rate was just over 63 percent). 
During the 2000 Census, the city's mail-back response rate when it 
determined its nonresponse follow-up workload was 62.8 percent (the 
national mail-back response rate for the short form, at that time, was 
66.4 percent).[Footnote 2] For those who did not mail back their 
census forms, nonresponse follow-up will be the last opportunity to be 
directly counted in the census. 

As requested, my remarks today will focus on the importance of census 
participation, paying particular attention to (1) the Bureau's 
preparedness for nonresponse follow-up in terms of workload and 
staffing levels, (2) why it will be critical for Angelenos and others 
across the country to cooperate with enumerators during nonresponse 
follow-up, and (3) key steps the Bureau needs to take moving forward 
to ensure nonresponse follow-up is timely and accurate. 

My testimony today is based on our ongoing and completed reviews of 
key census-taking operations (see "Related GAO Products" at the end of 
this statement). In these reviews we analyzed key documents--including 
plans, procedures, and guidance for the selected activities--and 
interviewed cognizant Bureau officials at headquarters and local 
census offices. In addition, we made on-site observations of certain 
census activities across the country. These observations included the 
Bureau's nonresponse follow-up efforts during the 2000 Census in 
various locations across the country, among them three sections of 
L.A.: Hollywood/Mid-Wilshire, L.A. Downtown, and Santa Monica. For the 
2010 Census, we observed key census-taking activities in L.A., as well 
as in Fresno and San Bernardino, California; plus Atlanta, Georgia; 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Washington, D.C., among other 
locations. We selected these cities because of their geographic and 
demographic diversity, among other factors. Further, to gain greater 
insight into the local census operations, we surveyed the Bureau's 494 
local census office managers using a series of online questionnaires 
about their experience in managing local census office activities. 

On April 19, 2010, we provided the Bureau with a statement of facts 
for our audit work, and on April 22, 2010, the Bureau provided 
technical comments, which we included as appropriate. We conducted our 
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The Bureau takes extraordinary measures to produce a complete and 
accurate census. To date, for example, the Bureau has sent 
questionnaires to 120 million housing units for occupants to complete 
and mail back. The Bureau also hand-delivered around 12 million 
questionnaires--mostly in rural areas as well as in areas along the 
Gulf Coast affected by recent hurricanes--for residents to fill out 
and return via mail. In March and April, the Bureau simultaneously 
launched operations aimed at counting people in migrant worker 
housing, boats, tent cities, homeless shelters, nursing homes, 
dormitories, prisons, and other diverse dwellings, all in an effort to 
secure a complete count. 

For those individuals who do not mail back their census forms, the 
Bureau attempts to include them through its nonresponse follow-up 
operation, which is scheduled to run from May 1 through July 10. 
During this operation, over 600,000 enumerators are to go door-to-door 
collecting census information from each address from which a 
questionnaire was not received. Nonresponse follow-up is the most 
costly and labor-intensive of all census-taking operations. The Bureau 
expects nonresponse follow-up will cost around $2.3 billion, or around 
16 percent of the decennial's total estimated lifecycle cost of around 
$14.7 billion. By comparison, according to Bureau data on the 2000 
nonresponse follow-up operation, labor, mileage, and certain 
administrative costs alone amounted to around $1.76 billion (in 2010 
dollars), or about 22 percent of the total $8.15 billion (in 2010 
dollars) lifecycle cost of the 2000 Census. 

Importantly, nonresponse follow-up is the last opportunity for people 
to be directly counted in the census. Those individuals who are missed 
by, or who do not respond to, census enumerators, are included through 
methods that are indirect and not as accurate. In cases of refusal, 
enumerators may be instructed to try to find a proxy respondent who 
might know something about the occupants of a household. If this is 
infeasible, data on the household are statistically imputed based on 
the demographic characteristics of surrounding housing units. 

This is significant for Angelenos for two reasons. First, for 2010, 
the mail-back response rate, used for determining the nonresponse 
follow-up workload, of 61.4 percent for the city of L.A. is lagging 
the national rate of 63.2 percent. Second, in 2000, minority groups, 
which comprise a large share of L.A.'s population, tended to return 
their questionnaires at a lower rate compared to other groups, and 
were more likely to be missed by the census. For example, as shown in 
figure 1, nationally in 2000, whites had a higher mail return rate 
(77.5 percent) than the rate for all groups (74.1 percent), while 
nearly every other race/ethnic group had lower return rates than the 
total mail return rate.[Footnote 3] The lowest mail return rates were 
those of Pacific Islander (54.6 percent) and multi-racial (57.7 
percent) households. Participating in nonresponse follow-up represents 
an important opportunity to improve the quality of census data. 

Figure 1: Mail Return Rates by Race/Ethnic Groups during the 2000 
Census: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Race/Ethnicity: White; 
Percent return rate: 77.5%. 

Race/Ethnicity: Black: 
Percent return rate: 59.7%. 

Race/Ethnicity: American Indian; 
Percent return rate: 64.5%. 

Race/Ethnicity: Asian; 
Percent return rate: 69.8%. 

Race/Ethnicity: Pacific Islander; 
Percent return rate: 54.6%. 

Race/Ethnicity: Other race; 
Percent return rate: 58.7%. 

Race/Ethnicity: Two or more races; 
Percent return rate: 57.5%. 

Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic; 
Percent return rate: 64.5%. 

Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic; 
Percent return rate: 75%. 

Return rate for all groups: 
Percent return rate: 74.1%. 

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 

[End of figure] 

Despite these elaborate efforts to obtain a complete count, some 
amount of error is unavoidable. However, what makes these errors 
particularly problematic is their differential impact on various 
subgroups. Minorities, renters, and children, for example, are more 
likely to be missed by the census while more affluent groups, such as 
people with vacation homes, are more likely to be included more than 
once. 

The Bureau Is Positioned to Conduct Nonresponse Follow-up but Could 
Encounter Local and Other Challenges: 

Nationally, in terms of workload (as measured by the mail-back 
response rate) and staffing levels, the Bureau appears to be well 
positioned to implement nonresponse follow-up. On both counts, the 
Bureau's performance is meeting its expected goals. Nevertheless, 
national-level data can mask challenges occurring at the local level, 
and there are areas throughout the country where either the mail-back 
response rate or staffing levels are lagging. 

With respect to the mail-back response rate, the Bureau expected a 
level of between 59 percent and 65 percent.The actual mail-back 
response rate when the Bureau determined the universe of houses to 
visit for nonresponse follow-up on April 19, was just over 63 percent, 
well within its estimates.[Footnote 4] This translates into a workload 
of around 48 million housing units. Achieving this mail-back response 
rate is an important accomplishment as the nation's population is 
growing steadily larger, more diverse, and according to the Bureau, 
increasingly difficult to find and reluctant to participate in the 
census. 

High mail-back response rates are important because they save taxpayer 
dollars. According to the Bureau, for every one-percentage point 
increase in mail response in 2010, the Bureau saves $85 million that 
would otherwise have been spent on nonresponse follow-up. According to 
the Bureau, it costs 42 cents to mail back each census form in a 
postage-paid envelope, compared with $57 for census takers to visit 
each home. Moreover, mail returns tend to have better quality data. 

Key factors aimed at improving the mail-back response rate included 
the mailing of a reminder postcard; sending a second or "replacement" 
questionnaire to around 30 million households in census tracts that 
had the lowest response rates in the 2000 Census, and 12-million 
replacement questionnaires to nonresponding households in other census 
tracts that had low-to-moderate response rates in 2000; and an 
aggressive marketing and outreach program. 

The Bureau also appears to be in good shape nationally from the 
perspective of enumerator staffing. In terms of recruiting, the 
Bureau's goal was to recruit 3.7 million applicants to fill over 
600,000 enumerator and other positions by April 25. As of April 11, 
the Bureau had recruited 3,717,757 applicants, or 101 percent of its 
target. 

While the Bureau appears to be well-positioned from a national 
perspective to carry out nonresponse follow-up, the decennial is 
essentially a local endeavor, where the operational environment and 
challenges the Bureau faces vary markedly from one locale to another. 
In this regard, several locations stand out. For example, the mail-
back response rates in some large cities trail the 2010 national 
response rate of 63.2 percent, and/or the response rate they achieved 
during the 2000 Census. They include Detroit, New Orleans, San 
Antonio, and San Diego (see table 1). 

Table 1: Selected Cities with Mail-Back Response Rates for 2010 That 
Are Lower Than 2000: 

City: Detroit; 
City Mail-Back Response Rates: 2000 Census: 61.4%; 
City Mail-Back Response Rates: 2010 Census: (as of April 19, 2010): 
45.9%; 
City Mail-Back Response Rates: Difference: 15.5%. 

City: New Orleans; 
City Mail-Back Response Rates: 2000 Census: 50.1%; 
City Mail-Back Response Rates: 2010 Census: (as of April 19, 2010): 
42.5%; 
City Mail-Back Response Rates: Difference: 7.6%. 

City: San Antonio; 
City Mail-Back Response Rates: 2000 Census: 66.9%; 
City Mail-Back Response Rates: 2010 Census: (as of April 19, 2010): 
61.0%; 
City Mail-Back Response Rates: Difference: 5.9%. 

City: San Diego; 
City Mail-Back Response Rates: 2000 Census: 71.5%; 
City Mail-Back Response Rates: 2010 Census: (as of April 19, 2010): 
64.5%; 
City Mail-Back Response Rates: Difference: 7%. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data. 

[End of table] 

Likewise, there are three local census offices that have less than two 
qualified applicants per field position--the Bureau's recruitment 
target. These offices continue their recruiting efforts, and the 
Bureau has plans to staff operations with recruits from neighboring 
local census offices, if necessary. 

With respect to L.A., as shown in table 2, L.A. City is trailing the 
state and national mail-back response rates as of April 19, 2010, as 
well as comparable benchmarks from the 2000 Census. 

Table 2: 2010 Census Mail-Back Response Rates Compared to 2000: 

Level of Geography: National; 
Census Mail-Back Response Rates: 2000 Census: 66.4%; 
Census Mail-Back Response Rates: 2010 Census (as of April 19, 2010): 
63.2%. 

Level of Geography: California; 
Census Mail-Back Response Rates: 2000 Census: 68.9%; 
Census Mail-Back Response Rates: 2010 Census (as of April 19, 2010): 
64.6%. 

Level of Geography: L.A. County; 
Census Mail-Back Response Rates: 2000 Census: 68.3%; 
Census Mail-Back Response Rates: 2010 Census (as of April 19, 2010): 
64.7%. 

Level of Geography: L.A. City; 
Census Mail-Back Response Rates: 2000 Census: 62.8%; 
Census Mail-Back Response Rates: 2010 Census (as of April 19, 2010): 
61.4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data. 

[End of table] 

In terms of recruiting, the L.A. region has met its recruiting goals. 
For example, the Bureau's recruiting goal for the L.A. region was 
266,370, and as of April 18, 2010, the Bureau had recruited 350,187 or 
131 percent of its goal. Starting pay for enumerators, which is based 
on local labor markets, is $17 per hour in the L.A. area. 

Aside from workload and staffing, the reliability of the Bureau's 
automated systems, and in particular an information technology (IT) 
system used for managing the Bureau's field operations, is an open 
question. In earlier tests and prior activities, the operational 
control system did not function reliably, and the Bureau had to 
restrict the number of users in local census offices because of 
capacity limitations. The Bureau has taken steps to mitigate the risks 
posed by the unreliable IT systems, including upgrading hardware and 
software, but time will tell whether they will be able to perform as 
needed under full operational loads. 

Cooperation with Enumerators Will Help California Count in the 2010 
Census: 

Census Data Are Critical for Representative Democracy: 

The Constitution requires a census every 10 years in order to 
apportion seats in the House of Representatives. Moreover, while not 
required by the Constitution, states use census data to redraw the 
boundaries of congressional districts. Although a few missed 
households might not seem particularly problematic, especially in a 
nation of more than 300 million people, a complete count is necessary 
because, in some cases, small differences in population totals could 
potentially impact apportionment or redistricting decisions, or both. 
Indeed, during the 2000 Census, the last House seat could have gone to 
Utah rather than North Carolina if Utah's population had around 850 
more people. 

More broadly, census data are used to help protect our democratic 
system of government. For example, block-by-block census data were 
used in reapportioning state legislatures in the 1960s, as discussed 
in the Supreme Court's "one person, one vote" landmark case of 
Reynolds v. Simms.[Footnote 5] Further, census data are used to help 
ensure compliance with federal civil rights and other laws protecting 
our citizens. 

Census Data Are Used to Allocate Federal Aid to States and Localities: 

Many federal assistance programs are funded by formula grants that 
have historically relied, at least in part, on census and related 
population data to allocate funds. In our recent analysis, we found 
that the 10 largest federal assistance programs obligated an estimated 
$478 billion in fiscal year 2009 based, to some extent, on census and 
related population data.[Footnote 6] This amount represents about 84 
percent of total federal assistance. The grants included Medicaid, 
Highway Planning and Construction, Head Start, and the Children's 
Health Insurance Program. 

A recent study by the Brookings Institution calculated that in fiscal 
year 2008, federal assistance programs distributed a total of $19.8 
billion in total program expenditures, or $1,988 for each person in 
L.A. County.[Footnote 7] Medicaid, a joint federal-state program that 
finances health care for certain low-income individuals, was by far 
the single largest program, accounting for $14.7 billion, or around 75 
percent of total expenditures. Other assistance went to programs that 
included transportation, education, training, employment, social 
services, and income security. 

Beyond these specific numbers, this much is clear: While population is 
one of several factors that can affect the distribution of federal 
assistance, boosting the participation rate, especially for hard-to- 
count groups, helps ensure that Angelenos obtain their fair share of 
federal assistance. This is a particularly important goal given the 
fiscal challenges that L.A. and the state of California are facing. 

Local Governments Use Census Data to Plan for and Provide Services: 

The decennial census yields data that states use not only to determine 
boundaries for congressional districts, but also to establish 
boundaries for smaller jurisdictions such as local election and school 
districts. The census is also a rich source of data to help county and 
city governments plan for and provide a variety of services. For 
Angelenos, this could mean help in answering such questions as: 

* Will the population of preschoolers in various neighborhoods warrant 
building additional elementary schools? 

* Are the mass transit systems reaching the people likely to use 
public transport? 

* Where and when should the next senior citizen facility be built? 

Without federal census data, state and local governments would have to 
undertake their own headcounts, a costly alternative given the Census 
Bureau's experience and economies of scale. Further, a less-than- 
complete count could result in the inefficient allocation of taxpayer 
dollars. 

Census Data Help Businesses Make Investment and Planning Decisions: 

Businesses use the aggregated census data to plan for and provide 
their services and goods. Census data about population trends help 
businesses succeed--and provide jobs in the process--by alerting them 
of opportunities to provide new services and products and to tailor 
existing ones to reflect demographic changes. Census data also help 
businesses efficiently target their advertising dollars and better 
meet the needs of their clients and customers. For example, a free 
issue of a magazine focused on the interests of Hispanic readers can 
be distributed based on information at the census block level. 
Likewise, retail chains can use census data to inform decisions on 
what mix of multicultural products--from cosmetics to music--they 
should carry. Companies also use population data to locate where to 
place new stores, as well as where to place production facilities 
where they can expect to find a suitable labor force. 

Census Participation Is Safe: 

While the Bureau does a lot with the information people report, there 
are a number of things the Bureau will not do with it. For example, 
the answers that are provided cannot be shared with anyone, including 
law enforcement or tax collection agencies. The answers cannot be used 
in court, and they cannot be obtained with a Freedom of Information 
Act request. Federal law protects respondents' privacy and keeps the 
information confidential. 

Further, in March 2010, the U.S. Justice Department confirmed that 
provisions of the Patriot Act[Footnote 8] that pertain to the 
gathering and sharing of information do not override legal provisions 
that protect the confidentiality of census data. In short, everyone 
who lives in the country should feel safe about participating in the 
census, regardless of their immigration status. 

Key Steps Could Help Ensure Timely and Accurate Follow-up Operations: 

Nationally, following up on nonresponding households is a daunting 
task, and L.A. presents its own challenges and opportunities. For 
example, data from a planning database the Bureau developed placed 
L.A. County first on a list of the top 50 U.S. counties with the 
highest number of people living in hard-to-count areas, based on data 
from the 2000 Census. Specifically, 4.4 million people of L.A. 
County's total population of more than 9 million people (46 percent) 
lived in hard-to-count census tracts in 2000. Factors contributing to 
the area's hard-to-count challenges include poverty, unemployment, and 
language barriers. 

In our review of nonresponse follow-up during the 2000 Census, we 
noted that the Bureau has historically faced the combined challenge of 
(1) collecting quality data directly from household members, while (2) 
completing the operation on schedule, before error rates can increase 
as people move or have trouble remembering who was living at their 
homes on Census Day (April 1, 2010), as well as for keeping subsequent 
operations on track. For methodological reasons, the Bureau needs to 
complete its field data collection workload before a subsequent 
accuracy check can begin.[Footnote 9] 

During the 2000 Census, finding the optimal balance between these two 
objectives was sometimes a challenge for the Bureau. Indeed, to help 
ensure that local census offices completed nonresponse follow-up on 
schedule, the Bureau developed ambitious interim "stretch" goals that 
called on local census offices to complete 80 percent of their 
nonresponse follow-up workload within the first 4 weeks of the 
operation and be completely finished by the end of the 8th week of the 
10-week long effort. We found that these production goals generated 
mixed results. 

Specifically, 17 percent of the sample of local census office managers 
we surveyed during the 2000 Census believed that the pressure had a 
positive or significantly positive impact; 41 percent believed that 
scheduling pressure had little or no impact on the quality of the 
operation; and 40 percent of the respondents believed that the 
pressure during nonresponse follow-up had a negative or significantly 
negative impact on the quality of the enumeration. Of those managers 
in the latter group, a common perception appeared to be that 
production was emphasized more than accuracy and that the schedule 
required local census offices to curtail procedures that could have 
improved data quality. Further, a small number of local census offices 
improperly collected less complete data and took other shortcuts 
(which the Bureau took steps to rectify). 

Nationally, however, our analysis of Bureau data showed that those 
local census offices that completed their 2000 Census nonresponse 
follow-up workloads faster than the others did not collect larger 
quantities of less-than-complete data, such as partial interviews. 

For the 2010 Census, the Bureau will conduct a quality assurance 
procedure it refers to as "outlier reinterviews," where the Bureau is 
to revisit or "reinterview" those households where characteristics of 
an enumerator's work differ from other enumerators collecting data in 
the same vicinity. In such cases, enumerators could be fabricating 
data. Outlier reinterviews are one of several types of reinterviews 
the Bureau plans to use for 2010. 

Although the Bureau had procedures for various types of reinterviews, 
including a form of outlier reinterviews, for the 2000 Census, local 
census office managers often decided against conducting them. Indeed, 
52 local census offices--about 10 percent of all local offices--did 
not conduct any reinterviews after a random check of enumerators' 
initial work. For the 2010 Census, the outlier interview cases will be 
automatically selected as opposed to being controlled by clerks in the 
local census offices. This could help ensure that outlier cases are 
investigated per the Bureau's reinterview procedures. 

More generally, as the Bureau completes its nonresponse follow-up 
workload, it will be important for it to closely track various 
indicators of the pace, production levels, and quality of the 
operation as planned, and quickly investigate and appropriately 
address any peculiarities that could be indicative of falsification or 
other data quality issues. At the same time, it will be important for 
the Bureau to fully leverage its partnership program--an effort where 
specially trained Bureau employees engage key government and community 
organizations to support the census--to help pave the way for 
nonresponse follow-up and improve cooperation with enumerators. For 
example, based on our review of the 2000 Census, partnership staff 
could, among other activities, reach out to building managers and 
community leaders to gain access to secure apartment buildings and 
gated communities, and take other steps to deal with enumeration 
challenges. 

However, the initial results of our 2010 survey on local census office 
managers suggest that there is room for improvement, in many cases, in 
the relationships between the local census offices and partnership 
staff. For example, of the 395 of 494 local census office managers who 
responded to our question about their satisfaction with the 
communication between the local census office and with partnership 
staff, 39 percent indicated they were generally or very satisfied, 46 
percent were generally or very dissatisfied, and 14 percent were 
neither satisfied or dissatisfied. 

Likewise, when asked about the partnership staff's assistance with 
local challenges, 39 percent of responding local census office 
managers were generally or very satisfied, 43 percent were generally 
or very dissatisfied, while 18 percent were neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied. 

The 26 local census office managers in the Bureau's L.A. region--an 
area extending from L.A. proper south to the Mexican border--held 
views similar to managers nationwide. Moving forward, it will be 
important for the Bureau to take appropriate steps to ensure that the 
efforts of the partnership staff are aligned with and fully supportive 
of the activities carried out by local census offices. For example, 
one partnership specialist we met with noted that having weekly, in-
person meetings with local census office managers helped coordinate 
the work they were doing. 

Concluding Observations: 

As measured by workload and staffing levels, the Bureau is generally 
well-positioned to launch nonresponse follow-up. The operation starts 
tomorrow and will have more than 600,000 enumerators fan out across 
the country, collecting census information from those households that 
did not mail back their forms. 

That said, the success of the enumeration is determined as much by 
what happens at the local level, as by national trends. With that in 
mind, the level of cooperation that occurs in the coming weeks on 
doorsteps across the country--as well as right here in downtown and 
South L.A.; Echo Park and Westlake; Wilshire and East Hollywood; and 
in neighborhoods all across L.A. City and County--will determine, to a 
large degree, the ultimate cost and quality of the decennial census. 

Mr. Chairman and members of this Subcommittee, this concludes my 
statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you might 
have at this time. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this statement, 
please contact Robert Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or by e-mail at 
goldenkoffr@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include 
David Bobruff, Sara Daleski, Dewi Djunaidy, Ronald Fecso, Richard 
Hung, Kirsten Lauber, Andrea Levine, Kathleen Padulchick, Lisa 
Pearson, and Timothy Wexler. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

2010 Census: Data Collection Is Under Way, but Reliability of Key 
Information Technology Systems Remains a Risk. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-567T]. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 
2010. 

2010 Census: Operational Changes Made for 2010 Position the U.S. 
Census Bureau to More Accurately Classify and Identify Group Quarters. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-452T]. Washington, 
D.C.: February 22, 2010. 

2010 Census: Census Bureau Has Made Progress on Schedule and 
Operational Control Tools, but Needs to Prioritize Remaining System 
Requirements. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-59]. 
Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009. 

2010 Census: Efforts to Build an Accurate Address List Are Making 
Progress, but Face Software and Other Challenges. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-140T]. Washington, D.C.: October 
21, 2009. 

2010 Census: Census Bureau Continues to Make Progress in Mitigating 
Risks to a Successful Enumeration, but Still Faces Various Challenges. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-132T]. Washington, 
D.C.: October 7, 2009. 

2010 Census: Communications Campaign Has Potential to Boost 
Participation. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-525T]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2009. 

2010 Census: Fundamental Building Blocks of a Successful Enumeration 
Face Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-430T]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2009. 

Information Technology: Census Bureau Testing of 2010 Decennial 
Systems Can Be Strengthened. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-262]. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 
2009. 

2010 Census: The Bureau's Plans for Reducing the Undercount Show 
Promise, but Key Uncertainties Remain. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1167T]. Washington, D.C.: September 
23, 2008. 

2010 Census: Census Bureau's Decision to Continue with Handheld 
Computers for Address Canvassing Makes Planning and Testing Critical. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-936]. Washington, D.C.: 
July 31, 2008. 

2010 Census: Census Bureau Should Take Action to Improve the 
Credibility and Accuracy of Its Cost Estimate for the Decennial 
Census. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-554]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2008. 

2010 Census: Census at Critical Juncture for Implementing Risk 
Reduction Strategies. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-659T]. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 
2008. 

Information Technology: Census Bureau Needs to Improve Its Risk 
Management of Decennial Systems. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-79]. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 
2007. 

2010 Census: Basic Design Has Potential, but Remaining Challenges Need 
Prompt Resolution. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-9]. 
Washington, D.C.: January 12, 2005. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The boundaries of the census tracts used to generate these 
estimates are not identical to the actual political boundaries of the 
city so the actual value for the city may differ slightly. 

[2] In the 2000 Census, the Bureau mailed out both long-and short-form 
questionnaires. The short-form questionnaire had a higher response 
rate because it had fewer questions. For the 2010 Census, the Bureau 
used only a short-form questionnaire. For this testimony we use the 
2000 Census short-form mail response rate when comparing 2000 and 2010 
mail-back response rates. 

[3] The mail return rate differs from the mail response rate in that 
the mail response rate is calculated as a percentage of all the 
housing units in the mail-back universe, including those that are 
later discovered to be nonexistent or unoccupied. The Bureau uses this 
mail-back response percentage as an indicator of its nonresponse 
follow-up workload. 

[4] As discussed in the previous footnote, the mail-back response rate 
is calculated as a percentage of all forms in the mail-back universe 
from which the Bureau received a questionnaire. Although it includes 
households whose forms were returned by the U.S. Postal Service as 
"undeliverable" and thus might be vacant or nonexistent, the Bureau 
still sends enumerators to follow-up on them to ensure a complete 
count. We report the mail-back response rate because it is a measure 
of the nonresponse follow-up workload; the workload, in turn, has 
implications for the final cost of the census. On its Web site, the 
Bureau reports what it refers to as the "participation rate." This 
number differs from the mail-back response rate in that it excludes 
undeliverable questionnaires. The Bureau reports this figure because 
it is a better indicator of the public's cooperation with the census. 

[5] 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 

[6] GAO, Formula Grants: Funding for the Largest Federal Assistance 
Programs Is Based on Census-Related Data and Other Factors, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-263] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 15, 2009). 

[7] Andrew Reamer, Counting for Dollars: The Role of the Decennial 
Census in the Distribution of Federal Funds, Brookings (Washington, 
D.C.: March 2010). 

[8] Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. The Patriot Act was enacted 
following the September 11, 2001, attacks in order to assist in the 
prevention of future terrorist incidents. 

[9] GAO, 2000 Census: Best Practices and Lessons Learned for More Cost-
Effective Nonresponse Follow-up, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-196] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 
2002). 

[End of section] 

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