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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Tuesday, November 17, 2009: 

International Trade: 

Options for Congressional Consideration to Improve U.S. Trade 
Preference Programs: 

Statement of Loren Yager:
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

GAO-10-262T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-262T, a testimony before the Subcommittee for 
Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

U.S. trade preference programs promote economic development in poorer 
nations by providing duty-free export opportunities in the United 
States. The Generalized System of Preferences, Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, Andean Trade Preference Act, and African Growth and 
Opportunity Act unilaterally reduce U.S. tariffs for many products from 
over 130 countries. However, two of these programs expire partially or 
in full this year, and Congress is exploring options as it considers 
renewal. This testimony describes the growth in preference program 
imports, identifies policy trade-offs, and summarizes GAO 
recommendations and options suggested by a panel of experts on the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The testimony is based on 
studies issued in September 2007, March 2008, and August 2009. For 
those studies, GAO analyzed trade data, reviewed trade literature and 
program documents, interviewed U.S. officials, did fieldwork in nine 
countries, and convened a panel of experts. 

What GAO Found: 

Total U.S. preference imports grew from $20 billion in 1992 to $110 
billion in 2008, with most of this growth taking place since 2000. The 
increases from preference program countries primarily reflect the 
addition of new eligible products, increased petroleum imports from 
some African countries, and the rapid growth of exports from countries 
such as India, Thailand, and Brazil. 

Preference programs give rise to three critical policy trade-offs. 
First, opportunities for beneficiary countries to export products duty 
free must be balanced against U.S. industry interests. Some products of 
importance to developing countries, notably agriculture and apparel, 
are ineligible by statute as a result. Second, some developing 
countries, such as Bangladesh and Cambodia, are not included in U.S. 
regional preference programs; however, there is concern that they are 
already competitive in marketing apparel to the United States and that 
giving them greater duty-free access could harm the apparel industry in 
Africa and elsewhere. Third, Congress faces a trade-off between longer 
preference program renewals, which may encourage investment, and 
shorter renewals, which may provide leverage to encourage countries to 
act in accordance with U.S. interests such as trade liberalization. 

GAO reported in March 2008 that preference programs have proliferated 
and become increasingly complex, which has contributed to a lack of 
systematic review. Moreover, we found that there was little to no 
reporting on the impact of these programs. In addition, GAO solicited 
options from a panel of experts in June 2009 for improving the 
competitiveness of the textile and apparel sector in AGOA countries. 
Options they suggested included aligning trade capacity building with 
trade preference programs, modifying rules of origin to facilitate 
joint production among trade preference program beneficiaries and free 
trade partners, and creating non-punitive and voluntary incentives to 
encourage the use of inputs from the United States or its trade 
preference partners to stimulate investment in beneficiary countries. 

Figure: Growth of Trade Programs over Time: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

1975: GSP; 
1983: CBI; 
1996: LDC; ATPA; 
2000: AGOA; CBTPA; 
2002: ATPDEA; 
2006: HOPE. 

AGOA: African Growth and Opportunity Act; 
ATPA: Andean Trade Preference Act; 
ATPDEA: Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act; 
CBI: Caribbean Basin Initiative; 
CBTPA: Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act; 
GSP: Generalized System of Preferences; 
HOPE: Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement 
Act; 
LDC: Expanded GSP for Least-developed Country. 

Source: GAO analysis of USTR documents on Generalized System of 
Preferences, African Growth and Opportunity Act,Andean Trade Preference 
Act, and Caribbean Basin Initiative. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

In the March 2008 report, GAO recommended that the U.S. Trade 
Representative review beneficiary countries that have not been 
considered under the regional programs, and periodically consider 
preference programs jointly. In response, USTR officials told us that 
the relevant agencies will meet at least annually. USTR also changed 
its annual report to discuss the preference programs in one place. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-262T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Loren Yager at (202) 512-4347 
or yagerl@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on U.S. trade 
preference programs. Over the last 2 years, GAO has completed three in- 
depth studies on U.S. preference programs for this Committee and the 
Senate Committee on Finance.[Footnote 1] We believe this hearing 
provides an opportunity for Congress and the administration to review 
the progress and performance of these programs as a group and consider 
potential opportunities to improve them. As a number of the preference 
programs are scheduled to expire by the end of the current calendar 
year, this discussion will allow for consideration of some of the 
difficult questions that have been posed in the past by members of this 
Committee. 

In order to contribute to that discussion, I will address three topics. 
First, I will provide some background on the programs and on recent 
import trends. Second, I will outline some of the key trade-offs 
between various domestic and foreign interests that are inevitable in 
the design of preference programs. Finally, I will summarize some of 
the recommendations we have provided regarding preferences programs as 
well as some of the options that experts suggested to GAO that we 
included in our most recent report to Congress on the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act. 

My remarks are based on the three studies noted above, and informed by 
our on-going work in fulfillment of a congressional mandate on the 
Haiti Earned Import Allowance Program.[Footnote 2] We conducted our 
work on the cited studies from March 2007 to July 2009 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards and GAO's quality 
assurance framework, as applicable. Those standards require that we 
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence 
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

Background: 

In an effort to promote and achieve various U.S. foreign policy 
objectives, Congress has expanded trade preference programs in number 
and scope over the past 3 decades. The purpose of these programs is to 
foster economic development through increased trade with qualified 
beneficiary countries while not harming U.S. domestic producers. Trade 
preference programs extend unilateral tariff reductions to over 130 
developing countries. Currently, the United States offers the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) [Footnote 3] and three regional 
programs, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI),[Footnote 4] the Andean 
Trade Preference Act (ATPA),[Footnote 5] and the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA). Special preferences for Haiti became part of 
CBI with enactment of the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through 
Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act in December 2006. The regional 
programs cover additional products but have more extensive criteria for 
participation than the GSP program. Eight agencies have key roles in 
administering U.S. trade preference programs. Led by the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR), they include the Departments of 
Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Labor, State, and Treasury, 
as well as the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). 

U.S. imports from countries benefiting from U.S. preference programs 
have increased significantly over the past decade. Total U.S. 
preference imports grew from $20 billion in 1992 to $110 billion in 
2008. Most of this growth in U.S. imports from preference countries has 
taken place since 2000. This accelerated growth suggests an 
expansionary effect of increased product coverage and liberalized rules 
of origin for least-developed countries (LDC) under GSP in 1996 and for 
African countries under AGOA in 2000. In particular, much of the growth 
since 2000 is due to imports of petroleum from certain oil producing 
nations in Africa, accounting for 79.5 percent of total imports from 
Sub-Saharan Africa in 2008. For example, in that same year, U.S. 
imports from the oil producing: 

countries of Nigeria grew by 16.2 percent, Angola by 51.2 percent, and 
the Republic of Congo by 65.2 percent. 

Figure 1: Trends in U.S Preference Import Levels (1992-2008): 

[Refer PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Year: 1992; 
GSP: $16.77 billion; 
AGOA: $0 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $0.97 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $1.53 billion. 

Year: 1993; 
GSP: $19.59 billion; 
AGOA: $0 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $0.4 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $1.9 billion. 

Year: 1994; 
GSP: $18.39 billion; 
AGOA: $0 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $0.98 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $2.05 billion. 

Year: 1995; 
GSP: $18.46 billion; 
AGOA: $0 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $0.93 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $2.61 billion. 

Year: 1996; 
GSP: $16.92 billion; 
AGOA: $0 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $1.27 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $2.79 billion. 

Year: 1997; 
GSP: $15.78 billion; 
AGOA: $0 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $1.35 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $3.2 billion. 

Year: 1998; 
GSP: $16.34 billion; 
AGOA: $0v
ATPA/ATPDEA: $1.64 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $3.22 billion. 

Year: 1999; 
GSP: $13.68 billion; 
AGOA: $0v
ATPA/ATPDEA: $1.75 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $2.64 billion. 

Year: 2000; 
GSP: $16.44 billion; 
AGOA: $0 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $1.98 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $2.79 billion. 

Year: 2001; 
GSP: $15.73 billion; 
AGOA: $7.58 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $1.67 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $8.3 billion. 

Year: 2002; 
GSP: $17.66 billion; 
AGOA: $8.36 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $1 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $9.99 billion. 

Year: 2003; 
GSP: $21.28 billion; 
AGOA: $13.19v
ATPA/ATPDEA: $5.83 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $10.42 billion. 

Year: 2004; 
GSP: $22.71 billion; 
AGOA: $21.99 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $8.35 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $10.81 billion. 

Year: 2005; 
GSP: $26.75 billion; 
AGOA: $32.65 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $11.4 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $12.1 billion. 

Year: 2006; 
GSP: $32.6 billion; 
AGOA: $36.13 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $13.48 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $9.915 billion. 

Year: 2007; 
GSP: $30.85 billion; 
AGOA: $42.26 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $12.39 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $5.5 billion. 

Year: 2008; 
GSP: $31.66 billion; 
AGOA: $56.37 billion; 
ATPA/ATPDEA: $17.24 billion; 
CBI/CBTPA: $4.72 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. official trade statistics, based on 
preferences claimed upon entry. 

Note: Values of imports are expressed in nominal dollars, not adjusted 
for inflation. 

[End of figure] 

There is also evidence that leading suppliers under U.S. preference 
programs have "arrived" as global exporters. For example, based on a 
World Trade Organization (WTO) study in 2007,[Footnote 6] the three 
leading non-fuel suppliers of U.S. preference imports--India, Thailand, 
and Brazil--were among the top 20 exporters in the world, and were also 
major suppliers to the U.S. market. Exports from these three countries 
also grew faster than world exports as a whole. However, these 
countries have not reached World Bank "high income" level criteria, as 
they range from "low" to "upper middle" levels of income. 

GSP--the longest standing U.S. preference program--expires December 31, 
2009, as do ATPA benefits. At the same time, legislative proposals to 
provide additional, targeted benefits for the poorest countries are 
pending. 

Critical Policy Trade-offs among U.S. Consumers, Producers, and Foreign 
Beneficiaries Are Inherent in Preference Programs: 

Preference programs entail a number of difficult policy trade-offs. For 
example, the programs are designed to offer duty-free access to the 
U.S. market to increase beneficiary trade, but only to the extent that 
access does not harm U.S. industries. U.S. preference programs provide 
duty-free treatment for over half of the 10,500 U.S. tariff lines, in 
addition to those that are already duty-free on a most favored nation 
basis. But they also exclude many other products from duty-free status, 
including some that developing countries are capable of producing and 
exporting. GAO's analysis showed that notable gaps in preference 
program coverage remain, particularly in agricultural and apparel 
products. For 48 GSP-eligible countries, more than three-fourths of the 
value of U.S. imports that are subject to duties (i.e., are dutiable) 
are not included in the programs. For example, just 1 percent of 
Bangladesh's dutiable exports to the United States and 4 percent of 
Pakistan's are eligible for GSP. Although regional preference programs 
tend to have more generous coverage, they sometimes feature "caps" on 
the amount of imports that can enter duty-free, which may significantly 
limit market access. Imports subject to caps under AGOA include certain 
meat products, a large number of dairy products, many sugar products, 
chocolate, a range of prepared food products, certain tobacco products, 
and groundnuts (peanuts), the latter being of particular importance to 
some African countries. 

A second, related, trade-off involves deciding which developing 
countries can enjoy particular preferential benefits. A few LDCs in 
Asia are not included in the U.S. regional preference programs, 
although they are eligible for GSP-LDC benefits. Two of these 
countries--Bangladesh and Cambodia--have become major exporters of 
apparel to the United States and have complained about the lack of duty-
free access for their goods. African private-sector representatives 
have raised concerns that giving preferential access to Bangladesh and 
Cambodia for apparel might endanger the nascent African apparel export 
industry that has grown up under AGOA. Certain U.S. industries have 
joined African nations in opposing the idea of extending duty-free 
access for apparel from these countries, arguing these nations are 
already so competitive in exporting to the United States that in 
combination they surpass U.S. free trade agreement partners Mexico and 
those in CAFTA, as well as those in the Andean/AGOA regions. 

This trade-off concerning what countries to include also involves 
decisions regarding the graduation of countries or products from the 
programs. The original intention of preference programs was to provide 
temporary trade advantages to particular developing countries, which 
would eventually become unnecessary as countries became more 
competitive. Specifically, the GSP program has mechanisms to limit duty-
free benefits by "graduating" countries that are no longer considered 
to need preferential treatment, based on income and competitiveness 
criteria. Since 1989, at least 28 countries have been graduated from 
GSP, mainly as a result of "mandatory" graduation criteria such as high 
income status or joining the European Union. Five countries in the 
Central American and Caribbean region were recently removed from GSP 
and CBI/CBTPA when they entered into free trade agreements with the 
United States. In addition to country graduation, the United States GSP 
program also includes a process for ending duty-free access for 
individual products from a given country by means of import ceilings--
Competitive Needs Limitations (CNL). These ceilings are reached when 
eligible products from GSP beneficiaries exceed specified value and 
import market share thresholds (LDCs and AGOA beneficiaries are 
exempt). Amendments to the GSP in 1984 gave the President the power to 
issue (or revoke) waivers for CNL thresholds under certain 
circumstances, for example through a petition from an interested party, 
or when total U.S. imports from all countries of a product are small or 
"de minimis." In 2006 Congress passed legislation affecting when the 
President should revoke certain CNL waivers for so called "super 
competitive" products. In 2007, the President revoked eight CNL 
waivers. 

Policymakers face a third trade-off in setting the duration of 
preferential benefits in authorizing legislation. Preference 
beneficiaries and U.S. businesses that import from them agree that 
longer and more predictable renewal periods for program benefits are 
desirable. Private-sector and foreign government representatives have 
stated that short program renewal periods discourage longer-term 
productive investments that might be made to take advantage of 
preferences, such as factories or agribusiness ventures. Members of 
Congress have recognized this argument with respect to Africa and, in 
December 2006, Congress renewed AGOA's third-country fabric provisions 
until 2012 and AGOA's general provisions until 2015. However, some U.S. 
officials believe that periodic program expirations can be useful as 
leverage to encourage countries to act in accordance with U.S. 
interests such as global and bilateral trade liberalization. 
Furthermore, making preferences permanent may deepen resistance to U.S. 
calls for developing country recipients to lower barriers to trade in 
their own markets. Global and bilateral trade liberalization is a 
primary U.S. trade policy objective, based on the premise that 
increased trade flows will support economic growth for the United 
States and other countries. Spokesmen for countries that benefit from 
trade preferences have told us that any agreement reached under the 
Doha round of global trade talks at the WTO must, at a minimum, provide 
a significant transition period to allow beneficiary countries to 
adjust to the loss of preferences.[Footnote 7] 

Potential Areas of Improvement for U.S. Trade Preference Programs: 

Proliferation of Preference Programs Has Led to a Need for a More 
Integrated Approach: 

GAO found that preference programs have proliferated over time and have 
become increasingly complex, which has contributed to a lack of 
systematic review. In response to differing statutory requirements, 
agencies involved in implementing trade preferences pursue different 
approaches to monitoring the various criteria set for these programs. 
We observed advantages to each approach but individual program reviews 
appeared disconnected and resulted in gaps. For example, some countries 
that passed review under regional preference programs were later 
subject to GSP complaints. Moreover, we found that there was little to 
no reporting on the impact of these programs. To address these issues, 
GAO recommended that USTR periodically review beneficiary countries, in 
particular those that have not been considered under GSP or regional 
programs. Additionally, we recommended that USTR should periodically 
convene relevant agencies to discuss the programs jointly. 

In our March 2008 report, we also noted that even though there is 
overlap in various aspects of trade preference programs, Congress 
generally considers these programs separately, partly because they have 
disparate termination dates. As a result, we suggested that Congress 
should consider whether trade preference programs' review and reporting 
requirements may be better integrated to facilitate evaluating progress 
in meeting shared economic development goals. 

In response to the recommendations discussed above, USTR officials told 
us that the relevant agencies will meet at least annually to consider 
ways to improve program administration, to evaluate the programs' 
effectiveness jointly, and to identify any lessons learned. USTR has 
also changed the format of its annual report to discuss the preference 
programs in one place. In addition, we believe that Congressional 
hearings in 2007 and 2008 and again today are responsive to the need to 
consider these programs in an integrated fashion. 

Experts Provided a Range of Options for Improving AGOA: 

In addition to the recommendations based on GAO analysis, we also 
solicited options from a panel of experts convened by GAO in June 2009 
to discuss ways to improve the competitiveness of the textile and 
apparel sector in AGOA beneficiary countries. While the options were 
developed in the context of AGOA, many of these may be applicable to 
trade preferences programs in general. 

* Align Trade Capacity Building with Trade Preferences Programs: Many 
developing countries have expressed concern about their inability to 
take advantage of trade preferences because they lack the capacity to 
participate in international trade. AGOA is the only preference program 
for which authorizing legislation refers to trade capacity building 
assistance; however, funding for this type of assistance is not 
provided under the Act.[Footnote 8] In the course of our research on 
the textile and apparel inputs industry in Sub-Saharan African 
countries, many experts we consulted considered trade capacity building 
a key component for improving the competitiveness of this sector. 

* Modify Rules of Origin among Trade Preference Program Beneficiaries 
and Free Trade Partners: Some African governments and industry 
representatives of the textile and apparel inputs industry in Sub- 
Saharan African countries suggested modifying rules of origin 
provisions under other U.S. trade preference programs or free trade 
agreements to provide duty-free access for products that use AGOA 
textile and apparel inputs. Similarly, they suggested simplifying AGOA 
rules of origin to allow duty-free access for certain partially 
assembled apparel products with components originating outside the 
region. 

* Create Non-Punitive and Voluntary Incentives: Some of the experts we 
consulted believe that the creation of non-punitive[Footnote 9] and 
voluntary incentives to encourage the use of inputs from the United 
States or its trade preference partners could stimulate investment in 
beneficiary countries. One example of the incentives discussed was the 
earned import allowance programs currently in use for Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic. Such an incentive program allows producers to 
export certain amounts of apparel to the U.S., duty free, made from 
third-country fabric, provided they import specified volumes of U.S. 
fabric.[Footnote 10] Another proposal put forth by industry 
representatives was for a similar "duty credit" program for AGOA 
beneficiaries. A simplified duty credit program would create a non- 
punitive incentive for use of African regional fabric. For example, a 
U.S. firm that imports jeans made with African origin denim would earn 
a credit to import a certain amount of jeans from Bangladesh, duty 
free. However, some experts indicated that the application of these 
types of incentives should be considered in the context of each trade 
preference program, as they have specific differences that may not make 
them applicable across preference programs. 

While these options were suggested by experts in the context of a 
discussion on the African Growth and Opportunity Act, many of these 
options may be helpful in considering ways to further improve the full 
range of preference programs as many GSP LDCs face many of the same 
challenges as the poorer African nations. Some of the options presented 
would require legislative action while others could be implemented 
administratively. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to summarize the work GAO 
has done on the subject of preference programs. I would be happy to 
answer any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may 
have. 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Loren Yager 
at (202) 512-4347, or by e-mail at yagerl@gao.gov. Juan Gobel, 
Assistant Director; Gezahegne Bekele; Ken Bombara; Karen Deans; 
Francisco Enriquez; R. Gifford Howland; Ernie Jackson; and Brian 
Tremblay made key contributions to this statement. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, U.S.-Africa Trade: Options for Congressional Consideration to 
Improve Textile and Apparel Sector Competitiveness under the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-916] (Washington, D.C. : August 12, 
2009); GAO, International Trade: U.S. Trade Preference Programs Provide 
Important Benefits, but a More Integrated Approach Would Better Ensure 
Programs Meet Shared Goals, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-443] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 
2008); and GAO, International Trade: An Overview of Use of U.S. Trade 
Preference Programs by Beneficiaries and U.S. Administrative Reviews, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1209] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 27, 2007). 

[2] In response to the statutory mandate in the Haitian Hemispheric 
Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008 (HOPE II), 
Title XV of P.L. 110-234, GAO is conducting a review of the Earned 
Import Allowance Program for Haiti. 

[3] In 1996, the number of duty-free tariff lines offered under GSP was 
expanded to provide additional benefits to beneficiary least-developed 
countries (LDC). 

[4] In 2000, CBI was expanded by the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership 
Act (CBTPA). 

[5] In 2002, ATPA was expanded by the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug 
Eradication Act (ATPDEA). 

[6] For additional information, see WTO, World Trade 2007, Prospects 
for 2008: Developing, Transition Economies Cushion Trade Slowdown, 
Press Release No. 520, Apr. 17, 2008, p. 19. 

[7] For additional information on these issues see [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-443] and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1209]. 

[8] For additional information on trade capacity building see GAO-09-
916. 

[9] The non-punitive focus of this suggestion is a direct response to 
the negative results of the previously implemented "abundant supply" 
provision in AGOA. (See GAO-09-916 for more detail.) 

[10] The earned import allowance programs for Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic vary in some aspects, for example a 3 for 1 ratio of qualified 
inputs to earned credits is used for Haiti, while a 2 for 1 ratio is 
used for the Dominican Republic. 

[End of section] 

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