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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, June 4, 2009: 

Military And Dual-Use Technology: 

Covert Testing Shows Continuing Vulnerabilities of Domestic Sales for 
Illegal Export: 

Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director: 
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations: 

GAO-09-725T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-725T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House 
of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Terrorists and foreign governments regularly attempt to obtain 
sensitive dual-use and military technology from manufacturers and 
distributors within the United States. Although the Department of State 
(State) or Department of Commerce (Commerce), or both, must grant 
approval to export sensitive military and dual-use items, publicly 
reported criminal cases show that individuals can bypass this 
requirement and illegally export restricted items such as night-vision 
goggles. In the wrong hands, this technology poses a risk to U.S. 
security, including the threat that it will be reverse engineered or 
used directly against U.S. soldiers. 

Given the threat, the subcommittee asked GAO to conduct undercover 
tests to attempt to (1) purchase sensitive dual-use and military items 
from manufacturers and distributors in the United States; and (2) 
export purchased items without detection by domestic law-enforcement 
officials. 

To perform this work, GAO used fictitious individuals, a bogus front 
company, and domestic mailboxes to pose as a buyer for sensitive items. 
GAO, in coordination with foreign law-enforcement officials, also 
covertly attempted to export dummy versions of items. GAO interviewed 
relevant agencies to gain an understanding of which items were in 
demand by terrorists and foreign governments. GAO actions were not 
designed to test controls of other countries. Relevant agencies were 
also briefed on the results of this work. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO found that sensitive dual-use and military technology can be easily 
and legally purchased from manufacturers and distributors within the 
United States and illegally exported without detection. Using a bogus 
front company and fictitious identities, GAO purchased sensitive items 
including night-vision scopes currently used by U.S. soldiers in Iraq 
and Afghanistan to identify targets, triggered spark gaps used to 
detonate nuclear weapons, electronic sensors used in improvised 
explosive devices, and gyro chips used in guided missiles and military 
aircraft. Interviews with cognizant officials at State and Commerce and 
a review of laws governing the sale of the types of items GAO purchased 
showed there are few restrictions on domestic sales of these items. 

GAO was also able to export a number of dummy versions of these items 
using the mail to a country that is a known transshipment point for 
terrorist organizations and foreign governments attempting to acquire 
sensitive technology. Due to the large volume of packages being shipped 
overseas, and large volume of people traveling overseas, enforcement 
officials within the United States said it is impossible to search 
every package and person leaving the United States to ensure sensitive 
technologies are not being exported illegally. As a result, terrorists 
and foreign governments that are able to complete domestic purchases of 
sensitive military and dual-use technologies face few obstacles and 
risks when exporting these items. The table below provides details on 
several of the items GAO was able to purchase and, in two cases, 
illegally export without detection. 

Table: Sensitive Items Purchased by GAO Using Fictitious Identities: 

Item: Gyro chip; 
Use: Dual-use – Used in advanced aircraft, missile, space and 
commercial systems for stabilization, control, guidance, and 
navigation; 
Notes: 
* In 2006, company paid a $15 million civil penalty for the export of 
civil aircraft containing a gyro chip to China; 
* The gyro chip is fully self contained, lightweight, and has a 
virtually unlimited life; 
* GAO exported without detection. 

Item: Night-vision monocular; 
Use: Military – Used by U.S. troops to identify targets in nighttime 
operations; 
Notes: 
* In 2006, criminal convictions for two people involved in export of 
night-vision devices to the terrorist group Hezbollah; 
* GAO’s bogus company became a certified distributor for the item, 
gaining access to an unrestricted quantity; & Contains an image 
intensifier tube made to military specifications. 

Item: Accelerometer; 
Use: Dual use – Accelerometers are suitable for use in “smart” bombs 
and for measuring motions generated by nuclear and chemical explosives; 
Notes: 
* Item is in high demand by foreign countries and was the subject of a 
2007 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement investigation; 
* In 2007, an individual was sentenced for conspiracy to smuggle 
military-grade accelerometers from the United States to China; 
* GAO exported without detection. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-725T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Gregory Kutz at (202) 512-
6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Terrorists and foreign governments regularly attempt to obtain 
sensitive dual-use[Footnote 1] and military technology from 
manufacturers and distributors within the United States. Recently the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that, on a daily basis, foreign 
states as well as criminal and terrorist groups seek arms, technology, 
and other material to advance their technological capacity. With the 
United States producing advanced technology, it has become a primary 
target of these illegal technology-attainment efforts. For fiscal year 
2008, DOJ publicly reported more than 145 defendants faced criminal 
charges for violations of export-control laws. Roughly 43 percent of 
the defendants charged in these cases were attempting to illegally 
transfer items to Iran or China. For example, a 2007 undercover 
investigation by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
agency revealed that an individual in Connecticut attempted to purchase 
and illegally export an accelerometer to China. According to the 
indictment, this accelerometer is suitable for use in smart bombs and 
for measuring motions generated by nuclear and chemical explosives. In 
another example, in 2008, various individuals and companies were 
indicted on federal charges for purchasing items capable of being used 
to construct Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), including 
inclinometers, and exporting these items to multiple transshipment 
points, with Iran being the final destination. These types of items 
have been, and may continue to be, used against U.S. soldiers in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. In addition, we have identified weaknesses in the 
effectiveness and efficiency of government programs designed to protect 
critical technologies while advancing U.S. interests. Since 2007, we 
have included ensuring the effective protection of technologies 
critical to U.S. national security interest as a high-risk area. 
[Footnote 2] 

While the U.S. State Department (State) and Commerce Department 
(Commerce) each have jurisdiction over the export of certain items to 
countries outside the United States, many of these same items can be 
purchased legally within the United States. In a testimony before 
another congressional committee in 2008, we described how our 
undercover agents were able to purchase sensitive items such as F-14 
Tomcat aircraft parts, night-vision goggles currently being used by 
U.S. forces, and current-issue military body armor on commercial 
internet sites such as eBay and Craigslist.[Footnote 3] Given the ease 
at which we were able to buy those items, and the continued attempts by 
foreign governments and terrorist groups to obtain sensitive 
technologies from within the United States, the committee asked us to 
conduct proactive testing to attempt to (1) purchase sensitive dual-use 
and military items from manufacturers and distributors in the United 
States; and (2) export purchased items without detection by domestic 
law-enforcement officials. 

To perform this investigation, we spoke with relevant agencies to gain 
an understanding of which dual-use and military items were in demand by 
terrorists and foreign governments. Furthermore, we identified publicly 
disclosed enforcement cases regarding the sale and illegal export of 
sensitive dual-use and military items. We searched for dual-use and 
military technology being sold on manufacturers' and distributors' Web 
sites. We then made domestic purchases of dual-use and military items 
either through e-mail or the seller's Web site. We did not purchase 
items from individual persons or commercial auction sites such as eBay 
or craigslist. We used a bogus front company and fictitious identities 
when purchasing these items, meaning that we conducted our work with 
fictitious names and contact information that could not be traced back 
to GAO. We also established a Web site related to our bogus company and 
rented domestic commercial mailboxes used to receive purchased items. 
In some cases, no information other than a name and credit card were 
used when purchasing a sensitive item. When possible, we obtained 
written price quotes from manufacturers and distributors for purchases 
of additional quantities of items we successfully purchased. After 
purchasing these items in an undercover capacity, we contacted the 
distributors and manufacturers of the items and informed them of our 
operation. We then interviewed company officials and performed 
additional follow-up investigative work. In addition, we coordinated 
with foreign government officials to covertly export a number of dummy 
versions of the items we purchased. We discussed the results of our 
work with officials at State and Commerce, as well as law-enforcement 
officials within the Department of Defense, DOJ, and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). 

We conducted our investigation from May 2008 through June 2009 in 
accordance with quality standards for investigations as set forth by 
the Council for Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). 

Background: 

Commerce and State are principally responsible for regulating the 
export of sensitive dual-use and military items, respectively. Under 
the authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979,[Footnote 4] 
Commerce is responsible for regulating the export of dual-use items 
that are included in the Commerce Control List (CCL).[Footnote 5] 
Specifically, Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is 
responsible for regulating the export and reexport of most commercial 
items. The commercial items BIS regulates are referred to as dual-use 
items that have both commercial and military or proliferation 
applications. BIS's export enforcement activities target the most 
significant threats facing the United States such as the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, terrorism 
and state sponsors of terror, and diversions of dual-use goods to 
unauthorized military end uses. 

Under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976,[Footnote 6] 
State regulates the export of military items, which are included in the 
U.S. Munitions List.[Footnote 7] Generally, items regulated by State 
require an export license, while items regulated by Commerce do not 
necessarily require an export license. Whether an export license is 
required depends on multiple factors including the item being exported, 
country of ultimate destination, individual parties involved in the 
export, parties' involvement in proliferation activities, and the 
technical characteristics and planned end use of the item. Any person 
or company in the United States that engages in manufacturing, 
exporting, or importing U.S. Munitions List items must register with 
State.[Footnote 8] 

Commerce and State require exporters to identify items that are on the 
CCL and U.S. Munitions list and, if required, obtain license 
authorization from the appropriate department to export these items 
unless an exemption applies. Exporters are responsible for complying 
with export-controls laws and regulations. When shipping a sensitive 
dual-use or military item that requires a license, exporters are 
required to electronically notify DHS's Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) officials at the port where the item will be exported, including 
information on the quantity and value of the shipment, the issued 
export license number, or an indication that the item is exempt from 
licensing requirements. Export enforcement agencies including CBP, ICE, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Commerce's Office of Export 
Enforcement (OEE), U.S. Attorney's Office and the Defense Criminal 
Investigative Service, are involved with inspecting items to be 
shipped, investigating potential violations of export-control laws, and 
punishing export-control violators. 

U.S. regulations are designed to keep specific military and dual-use 
items from being diverted to improper end users. However, current 
regulations focus on the export of these items and do not address the 
domestic sales of these items. The seller of a U.S. Munitions List item 
or a CCL item may legally sell the item within the United States, and 
is under no legal duty to perform any type of due diligence on a buyer. 
However, if the seller of an item knows or has reason to know that the 
buyer is representing a foreign government or intends to export the 
item, then the seller may be liable.[Footnote 9] 

Sensitive Dual-Use and Military Items Can Be Easily Purchased within 
the United States Using a Bogus Front Company and Fictitious 
Identities: 

We found that sensitive dual-use and military technology can be easily 
purchased from manufacturers and distributors within the United States. 
Using a bogus front company and fictitious identities, we purchased 
[Footnote 10] sensitive dual-use and military items from the sellers of 
the items. Based on our legal analysis of the applicable laws and 
regulations over the domestic sale of sensitive dual-use and military 
technology, we determined that companies are allowed to make domestic 
sales of sensitive items with little or no restrictions. Some of the 
manufacturers and distributors of items we purchased stated that they 
independently instituted procedures to document the sales of sensitive 
items, such as requiring buyers to fill out end-user agreements. 
[Footnote 11] However, the sellers were not legally required to conduct 
any research to validate the authenticity of the identification used or 
the final use of the item. In addition, many of the distributors and 
manufacturers have received warning letters from Commerce for exporting 
sensitive items without the required export license. 

Items obtained by our fictitious individuals included a night-vision 
monocular, electronic components used in IEDs, and secure military- 
grade radios used by U.S. Special Operations personnel. Items we 
obtained were not only sensitive in nature, but were also in demand by 
foreign governments and terrorist organizations. Specifically, seven of 
the sensitive dual-use and military items we obtained during our 
investigation have been the center of criminal indictments and 
convictions for violations of export control laws. All items, except 
the F-16 engine computer, were new and unused. The F-16 engine computer 
was purchased from a distributor who had obtained the item from the 
Department of Defense. Table 1 below summarizes the sensitive items we 
obtained during our investigation, followed by detailed case-study 
narratives.[Footnote 12] 

Table 1: Sensitive Dual-Use and Military Items: 

Dual-use items: 

Case: 1; 
Item: Triggered spark gap; 
Dual-use: [Check]; 
Military: [Empty];
Nuclear: [Check]; 
IED: [Empty]. 

Case: 2; 
Item: Oscilloscope; 
Dual-use: [Check]; 
Military: [Empty]; 
Nuclear: [Check]; 
IED: [Empty]. 

Case: 3; 
Item: Accelerometer; 
Dual-use: [Check]; 
Military: [Check]; 
Nuclear: [Check]; 
IED: [Empty]. 

Case: 4; 
Item: Quadruple differential line receiver; 
Dual-use: [Check]; 
Military: [Check]; 
Nuclear: [Empty]; 
IED: [Check]. 

Case: 5; 
Item: Inclinometer; 
Dual-use: [Check]; 
Military: [Check]; 
Nuclear: [Empty]; 
IED: [Check]. 

Case: 6; 
Item: Gyro chip; 
Dual-use: [Check]; 
Military: [Check]; 
Nuclear: [Empty]; 
IED: [Empty]. 

Case: 7; 
Item: Ka-band power amplifier; 
Dual-use: [Check]; 
Military: [Check]; 
Nuclear: [Empty]; 
IED: [Empty]. 

Military items: 

Case: 8; 
Item: Infra-red flag; 
Dual-use: [Empty]; 
Military: [Check]; 
Nuclear: [Empty]; 
IED: [Empty]. 

Case: 9; 
Item: Modular tactical vest (MTV)/enhanced small arms protective 
inserts (ESAPI); 
Dual-use: [Empty]; 
Military: [Check]; 
Nuclear: [Empty]; 
IED: [Empty]. 

Case: 10; 
Item: Night-vision monocular/Night-vision goggles (NVG); 
Dual-use: [Empty]; 
Military: [Check]; 
Nuclear: [Empty]; 
IED: [Empty]. 

Case: 11; 
Item: Secure personal radio; 
Dual-use: [Empty]; 
Military: [Check]; 
Nuclear: [Empty]; 
IED: [Empty]. 

Case: 12; 
Item: F-16 engine computer; 
Dual-use: [Empty]; 
Military: [Check]; 
Nuclear: [Empty]; 
IED: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Sensitive Dual-Use Items: 

Using a bogus front company, fictitious identities, and a domestic 
mailbox we rented, we were able to purchase sensitive dual-use items 
from distributors and manufacturers. Items that we purchased have 
commercial applications, but can also be used for other purposes such 
as in the development of nuclear weapons, guided missiles, and IEDs. 
The items listed below are subject to export restrictions under either 
the CCL or State's U.S. Munitions List. Many of the items we purchased 
have also been the center of previously identified unlawful exports to 
foreign nations. 

Sensitive Dual-Use Items with Nuclear Applications: 

* Case 1: Triggered Spark Gap. Triggered spark gaps are versatile high- 
voltage switches used for medical applications that can also be used as 
nuclear weapons detonators. Triggered spark gaps have been the center 
of unlawful exports to Pakistan and India. However, they are completely 
legal to buy and sell within the United States. 

Figure 1: Triggered Spark Gap: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph of Triggered Spark Gap] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In January 2009, using a bogus company and a domestic mailbox as a 
business address, we purchased, via e-mail, a triggered spark gap for 
the amount[Footnote 13] of $735 from a manufacturer that is registered 
in the federal Central Contractor Registration (CCR) database, an 
approved government supplier via the General Services Administration 
(GSA) schedule, and a previous target for attempted purchases by 
foreign nationals. After obtaining the triggered spark gap, we notified 
the manufacturer of our undercover purchase. During our interview with 
the manufacturer, company personnel stated they believed that they had 
sufficient protocols in place to document the sale of their items. The 
manufacturer requires new customers to complete a certification form 
where the customer provides their name and the end use of the product 
they are purchasing. However, because sales of this item are legal 
domestically, we were able to purchase it with a fictitious name and 
bogus company, and by providing a valid credit card. With no 
requirement to do so, the manufacturer did not question our fictitious 
identity or bogus company and did not inquire further about the end use 
for our product. While purchasing the triggered spark gap, we also 
obtained a price quote for up to 100 additional triggered spark gaps. 
In addition, in 2005, an individual was sentenced to 3 years in prison 
for conspiring to violate and violating U.S. export restrictions after 
exporting, using an air freight company, items including triggered 
spark gaps. Another individual was indicted for conspiring to violate 
and violating U.S. export restrictions. The two individuals arranged to 
purchase, and export to Pakistan, several U.S.-origin triggered spark 
gaps. In order to obtain the triggered spark gaps the individuals 
falsely indicated that the items were intended for medical use. 

* Case 2: Oscilloscope. Oscilloscopes are used for displaying the 
timing, voltages, frequency, and other attributes of electrical 
signals. In addition, certain oscilloscope versions are capable of 
being utilized in weapon of mass destruction development and are also 
export-controlled for antiterrorism reasons. However, oscilloscopes are 
legal to buy and sell within the United States. During our 
investigation, we determined that CCL versions of oscilloscopes can be 
purchased on the Internet from a distributor that is registered in CCR 
through an online purchase with a credit card. Because this item cost 
over $7,500, we chose not to purchase it. However, we confirmed with 
the distributor that we would have been able to purchase an 
oscilloscope domestically without any verification. In addition, a 
model of oscilloscope similar to the version we could have purchased 
was also illegally shipped overseas by the same seller in 2005. 
Specifically, this seller pled guilty to one felony count of violating 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act by exporting an 
oscilloscope to Israel without a license. This distributor was 
sentenced to pay a criminal fine in the amount of $50,000, placed on 3 
years' probation and ordered to serve 250 hours of community service. 
In recent years, the oscilloscope manufacturer has received several 
warning letters from Commerce for exporting oscilloscopes to Pakistan 
and India without the required license. 

* Case 3: Accelerometer. Accelerometers are sensors and instruments 
used for measuring, displaying, and analyzing acceleration and 
vibration. They can be used on a stand-alone basis, or in conjunction 
with a data-acquisition system. The version of the accelerometer we 
purchased is suitable for use in "smart" bombs and for measuring 
motions generated by nuclear and chemical explosives and, although 
legal for domestic sale, is export-controlled under CCL restrictions. 
In January 2009, we purchased an accelerometer from a manufacturer for 
the amount of $2,766. The manufacturer is registered in CCR and is an 
approved government supplier through the GSA Schedule. We accomplished 
the purchase using a fictitious name, bogus company, and domestic 
mailbox as a business address. We also provided an end-user 
certification stating that we would use the item for research and 
development purposes and would not export the item. We met with the 
manufacturer after our purchase to discuss what we had done and to 
discuss whether the company implemented any voluntary restrictions over 
the domestic sales of sensitive items. The manufacturer of the item did 
not implement controls that are not required by law, and believed that 
documentation of the sale was appropriate. This type of item is in high 
demand by foreign countries. For example, a 2007 undercover 
investigation by ICE revealed that an individual attempted to purchase 
and illegally export the same type of accelerometer we purchased to 
China. Specifically, ICE used an undercover company to capture the 
individual. The individual was sentenced 12 months in prison for his 
role in conspiring to export the accelerometer. 

Dual-Use Items with IED applications: 

* Case 4: Quadruple Differential Line Receiver. The quadruple 
differential line receiver is used for balanced or unbalanced digital 
data transmission. The product supports defense, aerospace, and medical 
applications. In addition, certain versions of quadruple differential 
receivers have military applications. This item may be legally bought 
and sold within the United States. In April 2009, we purchased 10 
military-grade quadruple differential line receivers from a distributor 
for the amount of $248. The transaction was accomplished through the 
company's Internet Web site using a bogus company, fictitious identity, 
and domestic mailbox as a business address. Because the law did not 
mandate it, no verification of our identity or description of the use 
of the product was required. After the purchase we notified the 
distributor of our undercover purchase. As a result of our undercover 
purchase, the distributor stated it will consider implementing 
voluntary controls for the online transactions, but did not provide 
details on what additional controls it would implement. In addition to 
our purchase, other individuals have attempted to export a similar item 
to Iran. Specifically, in 2008, various individuals and companies were 
indicted on federal charges for purchasing items for IEDs including 
items similar to a quadruple differential line receiver. The 
individuals allegedly arranged to export items to multiple 
transshipment points, with Iran being the final destination. In 
addition, we spoke with a Department of Defense official who confirmed 
similar U.S.-made technology is being found in IEDs. The official 
stated that terrorist groups are using more advanced IEDs with easy 
access to this type of technology. 

* Case 5: Inclinometer. An inclinometer is an instrument used for 
measuring angles of slope and inclination of an object with respect to 
its center of gravity. Inclinometers, which are export-controlled but 
legal to buy and sell within the United States, are suitable for use in 
the military, medical, optical, range-finder, and robotics fields, and 
have applications in IEDs. In February 2009, we purchased an 
inclinometer from a manufacturer for the amount of $548. The 
manufacturer is registered in CCR and has recently been the target for 
purchases by individuals shipping inclinometers to Iran. Because it was 
a domestic purchase, the manufacturer was not required to request an 
end-user agreement, or question our identity, company, or that our 
business address was a mailbox. While purchasing the inclinometer, we 
also obtained a price quote for up to 40 additional inclinometers. In 
addition, after the purchase we notified the manufacturer of our 
undercover purchase. When interviewed, the manufacturer correctly 
stated that he did not identify any Commerce-identified red flags from 
the undercover transaction.[Footnote 14] In addition, in 2008, various 
individuals and companies were indicted on federal charges for 
purchasing items for IEDs and exporting inclinometers to Iran. 
Specifically, in 2007, the individuals allegedly purchased 
inclinometers from the same manufacturer we purchased inclinometers 
from, and shipped them to multiple transshipment points, with Iran 
being the final destination. 

Other Dual-Use Items: 

* Case 6: Gyro Chip. Gyro chips are sensitive dual-use items used in 
advanced aircraft, missile, space, and commercial systems for 
stabilization, control, guidance, and navigation. The gyro chip's 
original intent was for commercial use; however, this same item is also 
used to stabilize and steer guided missiles. For this reason, the item 
is export-controlled, but may be legally bought and sold within the 
United States without restriction. The device is fully self-contained, 
extremely small, lightweight, and has virtually unlimited life. 

Figure 2: Gyro Chip: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph of Gyro Chip] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In February 2009, we purchased a gyro chip from a manufacturer that is 
registered in CCR for the amount of $3,146. During the purchase process 
the manufacturer made it clear that the item is subject to ITAR, and if 
exported would be subject to export restrictions. During the undercover 
purchase we provided our bogus company's Web site address, listed a 
domestic mailbox as a business address, and completed a falsified end- 
user agreement. While purchasing the gyro chip, we also obtained a 
price quote for an additional 10 gyro chips. In addition, after the 
purchase we notified the manufacturer of our undercover purchase. We 
then interviewed the manufacturer, which stated that it conducts 
extensive training of its personnel on export regulations of items it 
sells, attends export-regulation conferences, hires export consultants, 
and conducts internal training to sales representatives on specific 
procedures to follow while quoting or selling products. However, no 
validation procedures are required when a domestic sale is made, and 
therefore the manufacturer did not identify our fictitious identity and 
company. In addition, in a previous case, State charged a different 
company with shipping 85 commercial jets overseas many of which went to 
countries including China with a gyro chip embedded in the flight 
control systems. In April 2006, the company agreed to pay $15 million 
to settle the allegations.[Footnote 15] 

* Case 7: Ka-Band Power Amplifier. Ka-band power amplifiers are suited 
for military radar systems, ground terminals for Ka-band satellite 
communications systems, and point-to-point communication systems. Ka- 
band power amplifiers are export-controlled for national security 
reasons, but legal to buy and sell within the United States. In March 
2009, we purchased two Ka-band power amplifiers from a distributor for 
the amount of $227. The distributor is registered in CCR and was a 
previous target for purchases by individuals shipping amplifiers to 
China. Our purchase was made via e-mail and the Internet using a 
fictitious identity, bogus company, and domestic mailbox as a business 
address, and by providing an end-user agreement. We completed the 
agreement using bogus information and stating we would not export the 
item without obtaining an export license. Because there are no 
restrictions on the domestic sale of this item, no additional 
documentation procedures or validation was performed by the distributor 
prior to our purchase. While purchasing the Ka-band power amplifiers, 
we also obtained a price quote for up to 99 additional amplifiers. In 
addition, after the purchase we notified the distributor of our 
undercover purchase. When we interviewed distributor personnel, they 
stated their documentation procedures require the customer to complete 
an end-user agreement; however, they correctly stated they are not 
required to do this for domestic sales. In 2009, an individual was 
indicted for exporting several controlled items including this Ka-band 
power amplifier to China without an export license. Specifically, on 
three occasions the individual allegedly had someone in the United 
States ship several controlled items to China, and in one occasion the 
individual hand-carried the items when flying from the United States to 
China. In recent years, Commerce issued warning letters to the 
manufacturer for exporting electronics to China, failure to comply with 
a license condition, and exporting amplifiers to Germany for sale to 
China without the required export license. 

Sensitive Military Items: 

Using a bogus front company, fictitious identities, and a domestic 
mailbox as our business address, we were able to purchase or otherwise 
obtain sensitive military items from distributors and manufacturers 
without detection. Some of the items we obtained are subject to State's 
U.S. Munitions List and have been at the center of unlawful export 
plots by foreigners. After purchasing and receiving the sensitive 
military items, we interviewed the sellers regarding the controls they 
have in place for the sales of their respective items. 

* Case 8: Infra-Red (IR) Flag. IR flags[Footnote 16] are currently in 
use by U.S. military forces to help identify friendly soldiers during 
nighttime operations. Several of the IR flags we purchased appear as a 
black material with no identifying markers. However, with the use of 
U.S. military night-vision technology (such as the monocular we 
purchased in case 10 below), the patches reveal a U.S. flag, and are 
the same IR flags used on U.S. military combat uniforms. An enemy 
fighter wearing these IR flags could potentially pass as a friendly 
service member during a night combat situation, putting U.S. troops at 
risk. Nevertheless, these items are completely legal to buy and sell 
within the United States. 

Figure 3: IR Flags: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph of IR Flags] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In September 2008, we purchased various U.S. IR flags from a 
distributor for the amount of $78. The company's Internet storefront 
states it specializes in designing modified battle dress uniforms and 
other military uniform accessories used by modern-day warriors. 
Specifically, the company's Web site states that Special Forces in Iraq 
and Afghanistan currently use many of their products. Although there is 
no legal requirement to do so, the distributor's Internet site stated 
that the company checks for military identification; however, the 
seller failed to request identification from our undercover 
investigator. In the end, our fictitious buyer was only required to 
provide a name, credit card, and domestic address for shipment to 
purchase these items. After purchasing and receiving the IR flags, we 
also obtained a price quote for an additional 400 IR flags. In 
addition, after the purchase we notified the distributor of our 
undercover purchase. When interviewed, the distributor of the IR flags 
stated that it always requests for a copy of a military ID as part of 
his own voluntary policy and has minimal voluntary controls in place 
over the sale of the IR tabs. However, the distributor did not request 
a copy of a military ID as part of our purchase. In addition, we 
interviewed the distributor's supplier (manufacturer); the manufacturer 
stated that the distributor is required by their distributorship 
agreement to ask for a military ID. As a result of this lapse, the 
manufacturer stated that the distributor will no longer be authorized 
to sell the IR flags. 

* Case 9: Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) and Enhanced Small Arms 
Protective Inserts (ESAPI). The MTV we purchased is a type currently 
being used by U.S. military personnel and have been tested to National 
Institute of Justice[Footnote 17] Level IIIA[Footnote 18] 9mm velocity. 
Enemies of the United States could use the vest during attacks against 
American and coalition forces, and they could also be used by criminals 
within the United States and on the United States-Mexico border. 
However, the item is completely legal to sell, buy, or possess within 
the United States, except by certain violent felons. ESAPIs are ceramic 
plates that are thicker than the normal SAPIs and increase the 
protection. These types of ESAPIs are suited for use in the MTV we 
purchased. The combination of these items could give terrorists or 
criminals an advantage and protection in combat situations. In 
September 2008, we purchased an MTV of the type currently in use by the 
U.S. Marine Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan from a distributor for the 
amount of $2,417. The distributor is an approved government supplier 
through the GSA schedule. We purchased the MTV from the distributor's 
Internet Web site. Although legally not required to do so, the 
distributor's Web site states that it requires a military ID and 
completes a verification process before the sale of the equipment. 
However, we were able to bypass their voluntary requirements using a 
fictitious military ID. After purchasing and receiving the MTV, we also 
obtained a price quote for an additional 20 MTVs. In addition, we found 
that we could have purchased new ESAPI plates, from the same 
distributor through the same process, which fit into the MTV we 
purchased. The addition of the e-SAPI plates would have increased the 
effectiveness of our vest. We chose not to purchase the ESAPI plates 
because we had purchased similar plates in our prior work.[Footnote 19] 
After the purchase, we notified the distributor of our undercover 
purchase. The distributor stated that it has several voluntary controls 
in place. Specifically, for our transaction it noticed that the 
shipping address and billing address were different; therefore, it 
called the credit card company to verify that the credit card was 
valid, thinking that would be sufficient to verify that the undercover 
customer was not bogus. In the past, this distributor has received a 
warning letter from Commerce for exporting police equipment without the 
required export license. In addition, the MTV manufacturer was fined 
$65,000 for the export of military items to Kuwait, Chile, Oman, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Saudi Arabia without the required export 
license. 

* Case 10: Night-Vision Monocular and Night-Vision Goggles (NVG). The 
night-vision monocular is a lightweight, self-contained, image- 
intensification system capable of being either hand-held, mounted to a 
small arms weapon mounting rail, or mounted to a head mount or helmet 
mount. Night-vision monoculars are used in nighttime operations by U.S. 
forces to provide a tactical advantage on the battlefield. They are 
legal to buy and sell within the United States. 

Figure 4: Night-Vision Monocular: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph of Night-Vision Monocular] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In November 2008, we purchased a night-vision monocular of a type that 
is currently in use by the U.S. military from a distributor that is 
registered in CCR, for $3,600. The purchase was made using a fictitious 
identity, bogus company, and domestic mailbox as a business address. 
During our undercover purchase, the seller certified our bogus company 
to be a distributor of the item by signing a dealer/reseller agreement. 
This allowed us to circumvent the seller's voluntary restrictions on 
only selling the items to military and law-enforcement agencies. As a 
result, we could have obtained a substantial number of night vision 
monoculars as part of this agreement. In addition, we also found that 
we could have purchased new military-specification NVGs, from the same 
distributor through the same process. We chose not to purchase the NVG 
because we had purchased a similar NVG in our prior work.[Footnote 20] 
After the purchase we notified the distributor of our undercover 
purchase. When we interviewed distributor personnel, they stated that 
they have controls in place that are required for the sale of night- 
vision technology as a part of the distributor agreement. The 
distributor correctly stated that it is the reseller/dealer's 
responsibility, if exporting an item, to request and obtain export 
licenses for the subject items and to ensure that the requirements of 
all applicable export laws and regulations are met. Night-vision 
technology has been in demand by entities in countries like China, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Iran, and Hong Kong. For example, on November 14, 
2006, BIS issued a Section 11(h) Denial Order against two individuals 
in connection with their criminal convictions for conspiring to export 
Commerce-and State-controlled night-vision devices to the terrorist 
group Hezbollah in Lebanon. 

* Case 11: Secure Personal Radio (SPR). According to the SPR 
distributor, the SPR model we obtained, which is being used by U.S. 
Special Forces personnel, is the latest model with enhanced digitally 
encrypted capability that has a low probability of detection without 
the aid of high-tech military radio-interception equipment. The SPR 
provides secure communications between battlefield personnel with an 
encryption feature that makes communicating with the radio virtually 
undetectable. Nevertheless, the item is legal to buy and sell within 
the United States. In November 2008, we obtained two SPRs with headsets 
and accessories along with one microphone headset on a loan from a 
distributor. Specifically, the company loaned, at no cost, our bogus 
company the two radios for demonstration purposes with the possibility 
for the undercover company to become a distributor of the SPR radios. 
The company also offered our undercover investigator a job selling the 
equipment on a commission basis. Because there are no domestic 
restrictions on these radios, the company only asked for a copy of a 
driver's license prior to loaning the radios. After the transaction, we 
made the distributor aware of the fictitious identity. The distributor 
acknowledged that it should have shown more voluntary due diligence 
prior to loaning the radios to our undercover investigator. The 
distributor stated that it requires an end-user agreement and a copy of 
identification for documentation purposes, but it performs no other 
voluntary verification checks. The distributor stated it often receives 
inquiries from foreign individuals and estimated as much as 30 percent 
of individuals that register on its Web site are foreign. The 
distributor told us that it informs these individuals it only sells 
domestically to military and law-enforcement entities. 

* Case 12: F-16 Engine-Monitoring System Computer (EMSC). F-16 EMSC 
processes digital engine-performance signals from the digital 
electronic-control module. This EMSC is used in more than 75 percent of 
the USAF's single-engine F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft. Furthermore, the 
engine that uses this monitoring system is also qualified for use on 
the F-15 Strike Eagle aircraft and was recently chosen by South Korea 
to power its new F-15K fighters. This item is export-controlled under 
ITAR, but is legal to buy and sell within the United States. In April 
2009, using a fictitious identity and bogus company, we purchased, 
through e-mail, a used F-16 EMSC from an online distributor for the 
total amount of $570. The distributor had obtained this item from DOD. 
During the purchase process, we provided a bogus company name, a 
domestic mailbox as a business address, a copy of our fictitious 
person's driver license, and a falsified end-user agreement. After 
obtaining the F-16 EMSC, we notified the seller of our undercover 
purchase. During our interview with the seller, the official correctly 
stated that the seller is not required to have any controls in place 
for the domestic sale of this item; however, for its own voluntary due 
diligence the seller ran a public-records check on our fictitious 
person, but did not identify the purchase as suspicious. In recent 
years, several individuals and companies have been sentenced to 
probation and received fines in connection with illegal exports of 
aircraft components to Iran and Libya. In addition to the United States 
and its allies' fleets of F-16 aircraft, Venezuela's military also has 
a fleet of F-16s and has recently issued public statements suggesting 
the country may want to sell its fleet of F-16s to Iran. 

Sensitive Dual-Use and Military Items Can Be Easily Exported: 

We were able to export, without detection by U.S. enforcement 
officials, a number of dummy versions of sensitive dual-use and 
military items to a country that is a known transshipment point for 
terrorist organizations and foreign governments attempting to acquire 
sensitive technology. Due to the large volume of packages being shipped 
overseas, large volume of people traveling overseas, and various 
agencies[Footnote 21] involved in enforcing export controls, U.S. 
enforcement officials stated it is impossible to search every package 
and person leaving the United States to ensure sensitive dual-use and 
military items are not being exported illegally. The combined effect of 
the lack of restrictions over domestic sales and the ease of illegal 
export of these items is that sensitive dual-use and military items can 
be easily purchased and exported by terrorists or foreign governments 
without detection. 

In order to export our items, we first obtained nonfunctional "dummy" 
versions of the items through cooperation with the manufacturers. Next, 
in cooperation with foreign law-enforcement officials, we shipped the 
items, using commercial mail, in nondescript boxes that did not 
disclose the true contents of the items contained within the package. 
The boxes passed through U.S. customs controls without being inspected. 
The location we shipped the items to was a known transshipment point 
for items being sent to terrorist organizations and other foreign 
governments. After receiving the unopened packages, the foreign law- 
enforcement officials shipped the items back to the United States. 

When we discussed our covert shipments with State, Commerce, and 
various law-enforcement agencies responsible for monitoring packages, 
vehicles, and persons exiting the United States, they were not 
surprised by our success. Officials from several agencies stated that 
there is no practical way to ensure that otherwise unsuspicious people, 
vehicles, or packages leaving the United States that carry or contain 
export-controlled items can be identified and searched consistently. 
Officials from Commerce stated that they were aware of similar schemes 
used by real individuals attempting to illegally export controlled 
items. In addition, officials from State stated they have programs in 
place, working in coordination with other government agencies such as 
ICE, designed to educate manufacturers and distributors about laws and 
common risks associated with sales of sensitive technology. However, 
State agreed that it is difficult to prevent items from leaving the 
country after they are legally sold to an individual within the United 
States. 

Conclusions: 

A comprehensive network of controls and enforcement is necessary to 
ensure sensitive technology does not make it into the hands of 
unauthorized individuals. However, the lack of legal restrictions over 
domestic sales of these items, combined with the difficulties 
associated with inspecting packages and individuals leaving the United 
States, results in a weak control environment that does not effectively 
prevent terrorists and agents of foreign governments from obtaining 
these sensitive items. The key to preventing the illegal export of 
these sensitive items used in nuclear, IED, and military applications 
is to stop the attempts to obtain the items at the source, because once 
sensitive items make it into the hands of terrorists or foreign 
government agents, the shipment and transport out of the United States 
is unlikely to be detected. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 
respond to any questions you or other Members of the subcommittee may 
have at this time. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To perform the undercover test of purchasing sensitive dual-use and 
military items from manufacturers and distributors in the United States 
we spoke with relevant agencies and used publicly disclosed enforcement 
cases regarding the sales and illegal exports of sensitive dual-use and 
military items. GAO used the information obtained from these sources to 
determine which sensitive items were in demand by terrorists and 
foreign governments. We also reviewed the export regulations to 
determine that manufacturers and distributors are not required to have 
controls for the domestic sales of sensitive items. We searched for 
dual-use and military technology being sold on manufacturers' and 
distributors' Web sites. We then made domestic purchases of dual-use 
and military items either through e-mail, personal contact, or the 
seller's Web site. We used a bogus front company, fictitious 
identities, and domestic mailboxes as our business address when 
purchasing these items, meaning that we conducted our work with 
fictitious names and contact information that could not be traced back 
to GAO. We also established a Web site related to our bogus company and 
rented domestic commercial mailboxes used to receive purchased items. 
The bogus company used was incorporated to add more credibility. In 
some cases, during the purchase process, no information other than a 
name and credit card were used to purchase a sensitive item. In other 
cases, we submitted falsified end-user agreements stating the end use 
of the product and agreeing not to export the sensitive item. On one 
occasion, we provided a local military unit as the end use of the item 
and a fictitious military ID we created using commercial computer 
software. After we purchased the sensitive items, when possible, we 
obtained written price quotes from manufacturers and distributors for 
purchases of additional quantities of items we successfully purchased. 
After successfully purchasing these items in an undercover capacity, we 
contacted the distributors and manufacturers of the items and informed 
them of our operation. We did not attempt to purchase items from 
individual persons or commercial auction sites such as eBay or 
craigslist. Of the sensitive items disclosed we did not purchase the 
oscilloscope, enhanced small arms protective inserts, and the night- 
vision goggles. For these items we obtained written price quotes in 
lieu of purchasing the items due to their costs or due to the fact we 
had purchased the item in previous work. After obtaining the prices 
quotes, we confirmed with the seller of the items that our purchases 
would have been successful once we had made payment arrangement for the 
items. 

To attempt to export purchased items without detection by domestic law- 
enforcement officials, we coordinated with foreign government officials 
to covertly export items out of the United States. We shipped the items 
to a destination known to be a transshipment point for terrorist 
organizations and other foreign governments. We were able to export a 
number of items. The export process consisted of mailing the dummy 
versions of items from the United States through commercial package 
shipment. We falsified the shipment documents provided with the 
package. When the foreign government officials received the shipment 
they received specific instructions on how to inspect the shipment to 
verify that the package was sealed and was not opened or inspected by 
any U.S. officials. The foreign government officials also received 
special instructions on how to mail the package to GAO. GAO 
successfully received all items back from foreign law enforcement 
officials. We briefed officials at the Departments of State and 
Commerce, as well as law-enforcement officials within the Departments 
of Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice on the results of our work 
and incorporated their comments concerning controls over exported 
items. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Dual-use items refer to items that have commercial uses as well as 
military or nuclear proliferation uses. 

[2] See GAO, High-Risk: Series an Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: Jan, 22, 
2009). 

[3] See GAO, Internet Sales: Undercover Purchases on eBay and 
Craigslist Reveal a Market for Sensitive and Stolen U.S. Military 
Items, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-644T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2008). 

[4] Pub. L. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§§ 2401-2420. The Act has lapsed and been reauthorized by statute and 
Executive Order several times. Currently, the Act is in force pursuant 
to Executive Order 13,222, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,025 (Aug. 22, 2001), which 
extended the application of the Act under the authority of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. 95-223, 
Title II 91 Stat. 1626, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707. 
IEEPA provisions are renewed yearly through a presidential 
determination, the most recent occurring on July 25, 2008 (73 Fed. Reg. 
43,603). 

[5] The CCL is contained in Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 of the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. § 774.1. 

[6] Pub. L. 94-329, Title II, § 212(a)(1), 90 Stat. 744, codified as 
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2778. 

[7] The U.S. Munitions List is contained in Part 121 of the 
International Traffic In Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.1-
.16. 

[8] Export often involves the actual shipment of goods or technology 
out of the United States. Under ITAR, transfers of Munitions List 
"technical data" to foreign persons within the United States is also 
considered to be an export. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(4). Under EAR, 
release of CCL "technology" to foreign nationals within the United 
States is considered to be an export to the home country of the foreign 
national and thus may require an export license. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b). 

[9] An otherwise legal transaction is prohibited if the seller knows an 
export violation will occur, pursuant to 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(1) for 
CCL items and 22 C.F.R. § 127.1(2) for U.S. Munitions List items. 
Criminal liability may attach under 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410, 50 U.S.C. § 
1705, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c), or general statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 371. 

[10] For several items, we obtained written price quotes in lieu of 
purchasing the items due to their costs. After obtaining the price 
quotes, we confirmed with the sellers of the items that our attempted 
purchases would have been successful once we had made payment 
arrangements for the items. 

[11] End-user agreements refer to documents submitted by the buyer in 
which the buyer self-certifies the proposed use for the item being 
purchased, whether the buyer plans to export the item, and whether the 
buyer plans to resell the item. 

[12] For item 2 (Oscilloscope) we obtained a written price quote in 
lieu of purchasing the item due to its cost. For the NVG in item 10, we 
found we could have purchased this same item from the same seller of 
the Night Vision Monocular. However, since we had purchased this item 
on previous work, we choose not to purchase this same item again. For 
item 9 (ESAPI) we found we could have purchased this item from the same 
seller as the MTV however, since we had purchased this item in previous 
work we choose not to purchase this same item again. After obtaining 
the price quotes, we confirmed with the sellers of the items that our 
attempted purchases would have been successful once we had made payment 
arrangements for the items. 

[13] Total amounts may include taxes, shipping and handling fees, and 
service fees. 

[14] Commerce's BIS publishes a list of "Red Flag Indicators" that may 
indicate a transaction could lead to a violation of the Export 
Administration Regulations. A seller who finds a red flag is encouraged 
to report it to Commerce. Examples of red flags include situations 
where the item purchased does not fit with the buyer's line of 
business, the buyer is willing to pay cash for an expensive item where 
financing is the norm, or the buyer has little or no business 
background. The full list is available at [hyperlink, 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/enforcement/redflags.htm]. 

[15] Specific gyro chips are subject to the export licensing 
jurisdiction of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, unless 
these specific gyro chips are integrated into and included as an 
integral part of a commercial primary or standby instrument system. If 
included as an integral part of a commercial primary or standby 
instrument system, these specific gyro chips are subject to the CCL. 

[16] The IR flags are also known as IFF (identification of friend or 
foe) IR U.S. flags. 

[17] The U.S. Justice Department has created standards of body armor 
known as the N.I.J. (National Institute of Justice) Standard 0101.06. 

[18] Level IIIA is usually the highest threat level in soft body armor. 
It is usually worn as overt-style armor because of the weight and 
thickness of the ballistic panels. 

[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-644T]. 

[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-644T]. 

[21] See GAO, Export Controls: Challenges Exist in Enforcement of an 
Inherently Complex System, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-265] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 
2006). 

[End of section] 

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