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entitled 'Auto Industry: A Framework for Considering Federal Financial 
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Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST:
Friday, December 5, 2008: 

Auto Industry: 

A Framework for Considering Federal Financial Assistance: 

Statement of Gene L. Dodaro: 
Acting Comptroller General of the United States: 

GAO-09-247T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-247T, a testimony before the Committee on 
Financial Services, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Prepared This Statement: 

The current economic downturn has brought significant financial stress 
to the auto manufacturing industry. Recent deteriorating financial, 
real estate, and labor markets have reduced consumer confidence and 
available credit, and automobile purchases have declined. While auto 
manufacturers broadly have experienced declining sales in 2008 as the 
economy has worsened, sales of the “Big 3” (General Motors, Chrysler, 
and Ford) have also declined relative to those of some other auto 
manufacturers in recent years because higher gasoline prices have 
particularly hurt sales of sport utility vehicles. 

In addition to causing potential job losses at auto manufacturers, 
failure of the domestic auto industry would likely adversely affect 
other sectors. Officials from the Big 3 have requested, and Congress is 
considering, immediate federal financial assistance. 

This testimony discusses principles that can serve as a framework for 
considering the desirability, nature, scope, and conditions of federal 
financial assistance. Should Congress decide to provide financial 
assistance, we also discuss how these principles could be applied in 
these circumstances. The testimony is based on GAO’s extensive body of 
work on previous federal rescue efforts that dates back to the 1970s. 

What GAO Found: 

From our previous work on federal financial assistance to large firms 
and municipalities, we have identified three fundamental principles 
that can serve as a framework for considering future assistance. These 
principles are (1) identifying and defining the problem, (2) 
determining the national interests and setting clear goals and 
objectives that address the problem, and (3) protecting the 
government’s interests. First, problems confronting the industry must 
be clearly defined—separating out those that require an immediate 
response from those structural challenges that will take more time to 
resolve. Second, Congress should determine whether the national 
interest will be best served through a legislative solution, or whether 
market forces and established legal procedures, such as bankruptcy, 
should be allowed to take their course. Should Congress decide that 
federal financial assistance is warranted, it is important that 
Congress establish clear objectives and goals for this assistance. 
Third, given the significant financial risk the federal government may 
assume, the structure Congress sets up to administer any assistance 
should provide for appropriate mechanisms, such as concessions by all 
parties, controls over management, compensation for risk, and a strong 
independent board, to protect taxpayers from excessive or unnecessary 
risks. 

These principles could help the Congress in deciding whether to offer 
financial assistance to the domestic auto manufacturers. If Congress 
determines that a legislative solution is in the national interest, a 
two-pronged approach could be appropriate in these circumstances. 
Specifically, Congress could 1) authorize immediate, but temporary, 
financial assistance to the auto manufacturing industry and 2) 
concurrently establish a board to approve, disburse, and oversee the 
use of these initial funds and provide any additional federal funds and 
continued oversight. This board could also oversee any structural 
reforms of the companies. Among other responsibilities, Congress could 
give the board authority to establish and implement eligibility 
criteria for potential borrowers and to implement procedures and 
controls in order to protect the government’s interests. 
 
Figure: Number of Vehicles Sold By the Big 3, 2004 to 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure is a line graph depicting the number of vehicles sold by 
the Big 3, 2004 to 2008. The vertical axis of the graph represents 
vehicles sold, in hundreds of thousands. The horizontal axis of the 
graph represents months from 2004 through 2008. The following data is depicted: 

Date: January, 2004; 
Vehicles sold: 663,791. 

Date: July, 2004: 
Vehicles sold: 919,910. 

Date: January 2005; 
Vehicles sold: 618,520. 

Date: July, 2005; 
Vehicles sold: 1,119,540. 

Date: January 2006; 
Vehicles sold: 647,902. 

Date: July, 2006; 
Vehicles sold: 790,971. 

Date: January, 2007; 
Vehicles sold: 561,714. 

Date: July, 2007; 
Vehicles sold: 642,365. 

Date: January, 2008; 
Vehicles sold: 543,964. 

Date: July, 2008; 
Vehicles sold: 492,434. 

Date: October, 2008; 
Vehicles sold: 395,497. 

Source: IHS Global Insight. 

[End of figure] 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-247T]. For more 
information, contact Katherine Siggerud at (202) 512-2834, J. 
Christopher Mihm at (202) 512-3236, or Gary L. Kepplinger at (202)-512-
5400. 

[End of section] 

Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and Members of the Committee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to testify on possible federal assistance 
to the domestic auto industry. The current economic downturn has added 
to the significant financial stress facing that industry. Deteriorating 
financial, real estate, and labor markets have reduced consumer 
confidence and available credit, and automobile purchases have 
declined. After reaching a recent high of about 1.8 million in July 
2005, the number of vehicles sold in the United States dropped to about 
800,000 in October 2008, approximately a 54 percent decline. While most 
auto manufacturers have experienced declining sales in 2008, recent 
economic conditions have particularly hurt sales of the "Big 3" 
domestic auto manufacturers (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler), in 
part because these companies have historically derived most of their 
sales from vehicles such as sport utility vehicles, which are less fuel 
efficient, but more profitable than small cars. Higher gasoline prices 
over the past several years, which rose to over $4 per gallon in the 
summer of 2008 before falling steeply this fall, have contributed to a 
sharp decline in consumer demand for these vehicles. The tightening of 
the credit markets has also affected the Big 3 and their suppliers, 
which together employ about 730,000 people. In addition to potential 
job losses at auto manufacturers, the collapse or partial collapse of 
the domestic auto industry would adversely affect auto dealers, 
suppliers, and other sectors. 

Officials from the Big 3 have requested immediate federal financial 
assistance, reporting that their companies are experiencing significant 
financial stress.[Footnote 1] Less than three days ago, the Big 3 
submitted business plans to Congress that describe their requests for 
federal assistance and restructuring plans. Congress has asked us to 
review these plans. In deciding whether to provide financial 
assistance, Congress must consider and balance the perceived need for 
expedience with the need to put a structure in place to ensure that the 
interests of taxpayers are safeguarded and the specific problems that 
have put the industry in its current financial crisis are addressed. 

In my statement today, I will discuss principles that could serve as a 
framework for considering the desirability, nature, scope, and 
conditions of possible federal financial assistance and, should 
Congress decide to provide financial assistance, how these principles 
could be applied in these circumstances. My remarks are based on our 
extensive body of work on previous federal financial assistance efforts 
that dates back to the 1970s, including those efforts directed to 
individual large corporations, such as the Chrysler Corporation and 
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, as well as municipalities and commercial 
aviation.[Footnote 2] 

Summary: 

From our previous work on federal financial assistance to large firms 
and municipalities, we have identified three fundamental principles 
that can serve as a framework for considering future assistance. First, 
the problems confronting the industry need to be clearly defined-- 
distinguishing between those that require an immediate financial 
response from those that are likely to require more time to resolve. 
Second, Congress must determine whether the national interest will be 
served best through a legislative solution, or whether market forces 
and established legal procedures, such as bankruptcy reorganization, 
should be allowed to take their course. Should Congress decide that 
federal financial assistance is warranted, it is important that 
Congress establish clear objectives and goals for this assistance. 
Third, given the significant financial risk the federal government may 
assume on behalf of taxpayers, the structure Congress sets up to 
administer any assistance should provide for appropriate mechanisms, 
such as concessions by all parties, controls over management, 
compensation for risk, and a strong independent board, to protect 
taxpayers from excessive or unnecessary risks. 

Congress could apply these principles when deciding whether to offer 
any financial assistance to the domestic auto manufacturers. If 
Congress determines that a legislative solution is in the national 
interest, a two-pronged approach in applying the principles could be 
appropriate in these circumstances. Specifically, Congress could 1) 
authorize immediate, but temporary, financial assistance to the auto 
manufacturing industry and 2) concurrently establish a board to 
approve, disburse, and oversee the use of these initial funds and 
provide any additional federal funds and continued oversight. This 
board could also oversee any structural reforms of the companies. Among 
other responsibilities, Congress could give the board authority to 
establish and implement eligibility criteria for potential borrowers 
and to implement procedures and controls in order to protect the 
government's interests. 

Principles for Large-Scale Federal Financial Assistance Efforts Could 
Guide Congressional Consideration of Auto Manufacturers' Requests: 

We have identified three fundamental principles that can serve as a 
framework for considering large-scale federal assistance efforts. These 
principles are (1) identifying and defining the problem, (2) 
determining the national interests and setting clear goals and 
objectives that address the problem, and (3) protecting the 
government's interests. 

* Identify and define the problem: The government should clearly 
identify and define the specific problems confronting the industry-- 
separating out those that require an immediate response from those 
structural challenges that will take more time to resolve. According to 
the auto manufacturers, the most immediate threat to the industry comes 
from inadequate cash reserves and negative projected cash flows 
combined with a tightening or denial of credit by commercial lending 
institutions. General Motors and Ford have not been profitable since at 
least 2006, and sales have decreased substantially for the Big 3 in 
2008.[Footnote 3] In this regard, deteriorating financial and real 
estate markets, weakening labor markets, and high fuel prices have 
contributed to reductions in consumers' demand for new vehicles, 
particularly less fuel-efficient vehicles. In addition, tightening 
consumer credit has made it difficult for some consumers to obtain auto 
loans. The industry, however, also faces structural challenges that 
will need to be dealt with, including higher labor and pension costs 
than competitors, dealership relationships and structure, and fleet 
characteristics--especially in the area of fuel efficiency. 

* Determine national interests and set clear goals and objectives that 
address the problem: After defining the problem, Congress must 
determine whether a legislative solution best serves the national 
interest. If Congress determines that the benefits of federal 
intervention exceed those of bankruptcy reorganization for one or more 
of the domestic manufacturers, Congress could draft legislation to 
guide the availability and use of federal assistance. It is important 
that the legislation include a clear and concise statement of the 
objectives and goals of the assistance program. A statement of the 
objectives and goals of the program would help Congress and program 
administrators determine which financial tools are needed and most 
appropriate for the industry and for company-specific circumstances; 
provide criteria for program decisions; and serve as a basis for 
monitoring progress. Finally, although Congress may decide that there 
is a compelling national interest in providing financial assistance to 
help ensure the long-term viability of the Big 3, companies receiving 
assistance should not remain under federal protection indefinitely. 
Identifying the conditions that will signal an end to that protection 
would serve as congressional guidance on when the industry should 
emerge from the assistance program. 

* Protecting the government's interest: Because these assistance 
programs pose significant financial risk to the federal government, 
appropriate mechanisms should be included to protect taxpayers from 
excessive or unnecessary risks. Mechanisms, structures, and protections 
should be implemented to ensure prudent use of taxpayer resources and 
manage the government's risk consistent with a good faith attempt to 
achieve the congressional goals and objectives of any federal financial 
assistance program.[Footnote 4] This can be achieved through the 
following four actions--all of which have been used in the past. 
[Footnote 5] 

1. Concessions from others: Congress should require concessions from 
others with a stake in the outcome--including management, labor, 
suppliers, dealers, and creditors. The concessions are not meant to 
extract penalties for past actions, but to ensure cooperation and 
flexibility in securing a successful future outcome. 

2. Controls over management: The government must have the authority to 
approve an aid recipient's financial and operating plans and new major 
contracts. The authority is meant to ensure a restructuring plan with 
realistic objectives and to hold management accountable for achieving 
results. 

3. Collateral: To the extent feasible, the government should require 
that the recipient provide adequate collateral, and that the government 
be in a first lien position. 

4. Compensation for risk: The government should receive compensation 
through fees and/or equity participation in return for providing 
federal aid. The government's participation in any upside gains is 
particularly important if the program succeeds in restoring the 
recipient's financial operational health.[Footnote 6] 

Using the Principles As A Framework for Considering Financial 
Assistance for the Auto Manufacturing Industry: 

Congress could apply these principles if it decides to offer financial 
assistance to the domestic auto manufacturers. If Congress determines 
that the systemic, economic consequences of risking the immediate 
failure of any or all of these companies are too great, a two-pronged 
approach in applying the principles could be appropriate. Specifically, 
Congress could 1) authorize immediate, but temporary, financial 
assistance to the auto manufacturing industry and 2) concurrently 
establish a board to approve, disburse, and oversee the use of these 
initial funds and provide any additional federal funds and continued 
oversight. This board could also oversee any structural reforms of the 
companies. Among other responsibilities, Congress could give the board 
authority to establish and implement eligibility criteria for potential 
borrowers and to implement procedures and controls in order to protect 
the government's interests. 

The federal government has a range of tools it could use to provide 
such bridge assistance, including loans and loan guarantees.[Footnote 
7] Historically, the federal government has used loans and loan 
guarantees in its financial assistance to specific companies. In 
providing such credit assistance, the government has assumed that the 
federal role is to help the industry overcome a cyclical or event- 
specific crisis by gaining access to cash in the short term that it 
otherwise cannot obtain through the markets. Credit assistance assumes 
that the aided companies will eventually return to financial health and 
have the capacity to pay back the loans. The government has offered 
such assistance in return for companies providing various forms of 
collateral and/or equity to protect taxpayer interests, as well as for 
various concessions by interested parties to share the risk and promote 
shared responsibility. For example, any federal assistance to an auto 
manufacturer might seek to ensure that all parties, including labor and 
management, share responsibility for bringing the company back to 
profitability, and that no party makes excessive concessions relative 
to the other parties. Finally, accountability should be built in so 
that Congress and the public can have confidence that the assistance 
was prudent and consistent with the identified objectives. For example, 
as a condition for receiving federal assistance, the auto manufacturers 
should be required to provide program administrators and appropriate 
oversight bodies with access to their financial records and submit 
detailed operating and financial plans indicating how the funds and 
other sources of financing will be used to successfully return the 
companies to profitability. Such information would allow program 
administrators to oversee the use of funds and to hold the companies 
accountable for results. 

Congress should concurrently establish a board to approve, disburse, 
and oversee the use of these initial funds and provide any additional 
federal funds and continued oversight. This board could also oversee 
any structural reforms of the companies. The federal government has 
established boards to implement past financial assistance efforts, 
including when providing assistance to Lockheed in 1971 and Chrysler in 
1980. More recently, in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks on 
the United States, Congress created the Air Transportation 
Stabilization Board (ATSB) to provide loan guarantees to the airline 
industry. The voting members of ATSB included a member of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and representatives from the 
Departments of the Treasury and Transportation. While the exact 
membership of a board to provide financial assistance to the Big 3 auto 
manufacturers could differ, past federal financial assistance efforts 
suggest that it would be prudent to include representatives from 
agencies knowledgeable about the auto manufacturing industry as well as 
from those agencies skilled in financial and economic analysis and 
assistance. In creating such a board, it will be crucial for Congress 
to ensure that the board, similar to boards created to implement past 
federal financial assistance efforts, has access to all financial or 
operational records for any recipients of federal assistance so that 
informed judgments and reviews can occur.[Footnote 8] It would also be 
important to ensure that the board has the authority and resources to 
hire or contract for necessary legal, financial, and other expertise. 
[Footnote 9] For example, ATSB hired an executive director, financial 
analyst, and legal counsel to help the board carry out its duties. 

Beyond access to records and expertise, however, to succeed in 
achieving the goal of a restructured industry, the board is likely to 
need the authority to implement procedures and controls to protect the 
government's interests. This would include bringing the parties with a 
stake in a successful outcome to the table. Our review of past large- 
scale financial assistance efforts leads us to conclude that all of 
these parties must make concessions--not as penalties for past actions 
but rather to ensure cooperation in securing a successful future. The 
board would also need authority to approve the borrower's operating and 
financial plans and major new contracts to ensure the plans are 
realistic and to assess management's efforts in achieving results. In 
addition, the federal government should be the first creditor to be 
repaid in the event of a bankruptcy or when the company returns to 
profitability. In 1980, when providing assistance to Chrysler, Congress 
mandated that Chrysler meet additional policy-oriented requirements 
such as achieving certain energy efficiency goals and placed limits on 
executive compensation. More recently, as a condition of receiving 
federal assistance in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act required 
that airlines limit executive compensation.[Footnote 10] 

In addition, the board, consistent with congressional direction, could 
require that manufacturers, with the cooperation of labor unions, take 
steps to help control costs. Such steps could include reducing excess 
capacity by closing or downsizing manufacturing facilities, reducing 
work-rule restrictions that limit flexibility in terms of which workers 
can do what types of jobs, and ending contracts with dealerships that 
require the manufacturer to pay a large buyout to a dealer if a product 
line is eliminated. Some of these steps should be specifically 
addressed in the legislation. It will be important to keep in mind, 
however, that the affected parties will cooperate only if the 
assistance program offers a better alternative than bankruptcy. The 
government should not expect creditors, for example, to make 
concessions that will cost them more than they would expect to lose in 
a bankruptcy proceeding.[Footnote 11] Finally, Congress should provide 
the board with enough flexibility to balance requirements in each 
recipient's business plan to achieve and maintain profitability. 

The board could be the logical entity to establish and implement 
clearly defined eligibility criteria for potential borrowers, 
consistent with statutory direction provided by Congress, and establish 
other safeguards to help protect the government's interests and limit 
the government's exposure to loss. The safeguards could vary, depending 
on the nature of the financial assistance tools used. Examples of 
safeguards over loans and loan guarantees that have been used in the 
past include the following: 

* Potential borrowers have been required to demonstrate that they meet 
specific eligibility criteria, consistent with congressional direction 
as to the problems to be addressed and the objectives and goals of the 
assistance. 

* Potential borrowers have been required to demonstrate that their 
prospective earning power, together with the character and value of any 
security pledged, provided reasonable assurance of repayment of the 
loan in accordance with its terms. 

* Potential borrowers have been required to clearly indicate the 
planned use of the loans so that the board could make appropriate 
decisions about the borrower's financial plan and terms and conditions, 
as well as collateral. 

* The government has charged fees to help offset the risks it assumed 
in providing such assistance. 

* For loan guarantees, the level of guarantee has been limited to a 
given percentage of the total amount of the loan outstanding. 

To further enhance accountability and promote transparency, the board 
should monitor the status of federal assistance on a regular basis and 
require regular reporting from companies receiving assistance. This 
reporting should, at a minimum, include information on cash flow, 
financial position, and results of independent audits. In addition, the 
board should be required to provide periodic reports to Congress. This 
reporting should include status reports on the amount and types of 
assistance provided to the auto manufacturing industry, periodic 
assessments of the effectiveness of the assistance, and status of any 
repayments of loans that the federal government has provided to the 
industry. 

In addition to providing oversight and accountability of the federal 
funds, the board could be charged with overseeing efforts of the 
assisted companies to implement required changes and reform. The board 
would likely need to consider industry-specific issues in implementing 
financial assistance and industry reform. Employee compensation would 
be one of those issues, and a very complex one. Benefits for auto 
industry workers represent a significant long-term financial commitment 
of the companies seeking assistance, much of it to retirees and their 
families. Although success in a company's future will depend in part on 
sacrifice from all stakeholders, most of the changes in this area will 
necessarily take effect over the long term. The complexities of these 
arrangements and their interface with active workers and with existing 
government programs will make implementing federal assistance 
particularly challenging. For example, the board would need to consider 
the impact that a possible bankruptcy filing by an auto manufacturer 
would have on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the federal 
agency that insures private employers' defined benefit pensions, and 
whose cumulative balance is already negative. 

Concluding Observations: 

In conclusion, Congress is faced with a complex and consequential 
decision regarding the auto manufacturers' request for financial 
assistance. The collapse or partial collapse of the domestic auto 
manufacturing industry would have a significant ripple effect 
throughout other sectors of the economy and serve as a drag on an 
already weakened economy. However, providing federal financial 
assistance to the auto manufacturing industry raises concerns about 
protecting the government's interests and the precedent such assistance 
could set for other industries seeking relief from the current economic 
downturn. 

My remarks today have focused on principles Congress may wish to 
consider as it contemplates possible financial assistance for the auto 
manufacturing industry. These principles are drawn directly from GAO's 
support of congressional efforts over several decades to assist 
segments of industries, firms, the savings and loan industry, and 
municipalities. Although the principles do not provide operational 
rules outlining exactly what should be done, they do provide a 
framework for considering federal financial assistance. By defining the 
problem, determining whether a legislative solution to that problem 
best serves the national interest, and--assuming that such a solution 
is appropriate--establishing an appropriate governance structure, 
Congress might better assure itself and the American people that the 
federal assistance will achieve its intended purpose. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bachus, and members of the 
committee for having me here today. We at GAO, of course, stand ready 
to assist you and your colleagues as you tackle these important 
challenges. 

Contacts: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Katherine A. 
Siggerud on (202) 512-2834 (auto industry issues), J. Christopher Mihm 
on (202) 512-3236 (GAO's principles), and Gary L. Kepplinger on (202) 
512-5400 (legal issues). 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] For example, as of September 30, 2008 General Motors reported total 
liabilities of over $169.4 billion with total assets of about $110.4 
billion, resulting in negative equity of nearly $59 billion. General 
Motors has requested total financial assistance of $18 billion. As of 
September 30, 2008 Ford reported total liabilities of debt of about 
$242.6 billion with total assets of about $242.1 billion, resulting in 
negative equity of approximately $0.5 billion. Officials from Ford have 
requested a "stand-by" line of credit up to $9 billion, to be used if 
conditions worsen. Because Chrysler is privately owned, data on its 
financial condition is not currently available to the public. 
Nevertheless, officials from Chrysler have stated that without 
immediate assistance, its liquidity could fall below the level 
necessary to sustain operations. Chrysler has requested $7 billion of 
financial assistance. 

[2] GAO, Troubled Financial Institutions: Solutions to the Thrift 
Industry Problem [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-89-47], Feb. 21, 1989, Resolving 
the Savings and Loan Crisis [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-GGD-89-3], Jan. 26, 1989, Guidelines 
for Rescuing Large Failing Firms and Municipalities [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-84-34], Mar. 29, 1984, and 
Commercial Aviation: A Framework for Considering Federal Financial 
Assistance [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1163T], Sept. 
20, 2001. 

[3] Chrysler is a private company and does not report its profits or 
losses publicly. 

[4] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1163T]. 

[5] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-84-34]. 

[6] In a previous financial assistance package for Chrysler, the 
government obtained equity participation in the form of warrants that 
allow the government to purchase shares of a recipient's stock at a 
specified price. A decision on whether equity participation should be 
included as well as its form and amount should be made on a case-by- 
case basis. 

[7] Loan guarantees help borrowers obtain access to credit with more 
favorable terms than they may otherwise obtain in private lending 
markets because the federal government guarantees to pay lenders if the 
borrowers default, which makes extending credit more attractive to 
lenders. Loan guarantees have the advantage of encouraging private- 
sector participation and potential expertise, with higher levels of 
federal guarantees likely generating the most participation. The Office 
of Management and Budget's Circular A-129, Policies for Federal Credit 
Programs and Non-Tax Receivables prescribes policies and procedures for 
justifying, designing, and managing federal credit programs. This 
guidance states that lenders should have a substantial stake in full 
repayment, generally 20 percent. Limiting the federal guarantee to 80 
percent ensures that lenders share in the risks associated with the 
loan. However, given the current problems in the credit sector, lenders 
may be unable to provide large loans and unwilling to accept such 
risks. 

[8] In addition, prior federal assistance programs for failing firms 
and municipalities gave GAO the authority to audit the accounts of the 
recipients and the right of access to the records needed to do so. This 
authority enabled GAO to support congressional oversight of the 
assistance program. 

[9] Staff could also be detailed from federal agencies represented on 
the board to support the board's review and oversight function. 

[10] P.L. No. 107-42. 

[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-84-34]. 

[End of section] 

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