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Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 

Expected at 9:00 a.m. EDT: 

Thursday, May 10, 2007: 

Homeland Security: 

Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of 
Homeland Security: 

Statement of David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

GAO-07-833T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-833T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the 
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Government al 
Affairs, U.S. Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a key role in leading 
and coordinating—with stakeholders in the federal, state, local, and 
private sectors—the nation’s homeland security efforts. GAO has 
conducted numerous reviews of DHS management functions as well as 
programs including transportation and border security, immigration 
enforcement and service delivery, and disaster preparation and 
response. This testimony addresses: 

* why GAO designated DHS’s implementation and transformation as a high-
risk area,
* specific management challenges that DHS continues to face,
* examples of the program challenges that DHS faces, and
* actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and 
transformation efforts. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk in 2003 
because DHS had to transform and integrate 22 agencies—several with 
existing program and management challenges—into one department, and 
failure to effectively address its challenges could have serious 
consequences for our homeland security. Despite some progress, this 
transformation remains high risk. 

Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and 
complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning and integration of 
key management functions that will likely span a number of years. DHS 
has made some progress in these areas, but much additional work is 
required to help ensure sustainable success. DHS has also issued 
guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by 
function basis, but lacks a comprehensive integration strategy with 
overall goals, a timeline, appropriate responsibility and 
accountability determinations, and a dedicated team to support its 
efforts. The latest independent audit of DHS’s financial statements 
showed that its financial management systems still do not conform to 
federal requirements. DHS has also not institutionalized an effective 
strategic framework for information management, and its human capital 
and acquisition systems require further attention to ensure that DHS 
allocates resources economically, effectively, ethically, and 
equitably. 

Since GAO’s 2007 high-risk update, DHS has continued to strengthen 
program activities but still faces a range of programmatic and 
partnering challenges. To help ensure its missions are achieved, DHS 
must overcome continued challenges related to such issues as cargo, 
transportation, and border security; systematic visitor tracking; 
efforts to combat the employment of illegal aliens; and outdated Coast 
Guard asset capabilities. Further, DHS and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency need to continue to develop clearly defined 
leadership roles and responsibilities; necessary disaster response 
capabilities; accountability systems to provide effective services 
while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse; and the ability to 
conduct advance contracting for emergency response goods, supplies, and 
services. 

DHS has not produced a final corrective action plan specifying how it 
will address its many management challenges. Such a plan should define 
the root causes of known problems, identify effective solutions, have 
management support, and provide for substantially completing corrective 
measures in the near term. It should also include performance metrics 
and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. It will also 
be important for DHS to become more transparent and minimize recurring 
delays in providing access to information on its programs and 
operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess 
its efforts. DHS may require a chief management official, with 
sufficient authority, dedicated to the overall transformation process 
to help ensure sustainable success over time. 

What GAO Recommends: 

While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO has made 
numerous prior recommendations to DHS in reports addressing the issues 
identified in this statement. DHS generally concurred with these 
recommendations; however it is not clear to what extent these 
recommendations are being implemented. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-833T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Norman Rabkin at (202) 
512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov or Bernice Steinhardt, at 202-512-6806 or 
steinhardtb@gao.gov 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to 
address management and programmatic challenges facing the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). I have spoken extensively about the fiscal 
crisis our nation faces with the coming retirement of the baby boom 
generation and the related growth in entitlement spending. The current 
financial condition in the United States is worse than is widely 
understood and is not sustainable. Meeting the long-term fiscal 
challenge will require (1) significant entitlement reform to change the 
path of those programs; (2) reprioritizing, restructuring and 
constraining other spending programs; and (3) additional revenues--such 
as through a reformed tax system. These efforts will require bipartisan 
cooperation and compromise. 

Irrespective of our fiscal situation, it is important for federal 
departments--including DHS--to operate as efficiently and effectively 
as possible in carrying out their missions. At the same time, we also 
face new and uncertain threats to our security, both overseas and at 
home, that require continued attention. Without this focus, the 
consequences can be catastrophic. We designated the implementation and 
transformation of DHS as a high-risk area in 2003 and continued that 
designation in our 2005 update. In my testimony today, I will explain 
why we decided to maintain this area on our 2007 high risk list, 
focusing on four areas: 

* why we originally designated DHS's implementation and transformation 
as a high-risk area, 

* specific management challenges that DHS continues to face, 

* examples of the program challenges that DHS faces, and: 

* actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and 
transformation efforts. 

My comments today are based on our wide-ranging work on DHS since the 
2005 high-risk update, as well as our institutional knowledge of 
homeland security and various government organizational and management 
issues. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. A listing of GAO reports related to the 
transformation, management, and program challenges discussed in this 
statement are contained in Appendix 1. 

Summary: 

We first designated DHS's implementation and transformation as high 
risk in 2003 because 22 disparate agencies had to transform and 
integrate into one department. Many of these individual agencies were 
facing their own management and mission challenges. But most 
importantly, the failure to effectively address DHS's management 
challenges and program risks could have serious consequences for our 
homeland security as well as our economy. We kept the DHS 
implementation and transformation on the high-risk list in 2005 because 
serious transformation challenges continued to hinder DHS's success. 
Since then, our and the DHS Inspector General's (IG) reports have 
documented DHS's progress and remaining challenges in transforming into 
an effective, integrated organization. For example, in the management 
area, DHS has developed a strategic plan, is working to integrate some 
management functions, and has continued to form necessary partnerships 
to achieve mission success. Despite these efforts, however, DHS 
implementation and transformation remain on the 2007 high-risk list 
because numerous management challenges continue to exist. For example, 

* Although DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist management 
integration on a function by function basis, DHS lacks a comprehensive 
management integration strategy with overall goals, timelines, and a 
team dedicated to support its integration efforts. 

* The DHS strategic plan addresses five of six Government Performance 
and Results Act required elements and takes into account its non- 
homeland security missions, such as responding to natural disasters. 
However, it had only limited consultation with key stakeholders, thus 
missing an opportunity to create a shared understanding of goals and 
priorities. 

* Several DHS programs have not developed outcome-based measures to 
assess performance. 

* While the Secretary of DHS has expressed a commitment to risk 
management, DHS has not performed comprehensive risk assessments in 
transportation, trade, critical infrastructure, or the immigration and 
customs systems to guide resource allocation decisions. 

* Since its creation, DHS has been unable to obtain an unqualified or 
"clean" audit opinion on its financial statements. The auditors 
continue to report material internal control weaknesses and that DHS's 
financial systems do not substantially comply with federal 
requirements. These weaknesses highlight the concern that DHS may not 
be able to account for all of its funding and resources or have 
reliable financial information for management and budget purposes. 

* DHS has not institutionalized an effective strategic framework for 
information management to, among other things, guide technology 
investments, and despite some progress, DHS's human capital--the 
centerpiece of its transformation efforts--and acquisition systems will 
require continued attention to help prevent waste and to ensure that 
DHS can allocate its resources economically, efficiently, effectively, 
ethically, and equitably. 

DHS has taken some actions to strengthen program activities in areas 
such as cargo, transportation, and border security; Coast Guard 
acquisition management; advance contracting for goods and services for 
disaster preparedness; and immigration services. However, DHS continues 
to face a range of programmatic and partnering challenges. To help 
ensure its missions are achieved, DHS must overcome continued 
challenges related to: 

* strengthening cargo and passenger screening, visitor tracking, 
efforts to combat the employment of illegal aliens, and outdated Coast 
Guard asset capabilities; 

* balancing its homeland security and other missions, such as disaster 
preparedness; and: 

* clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing 
necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing 
accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting 
against waste, fraud, and abuse at the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA). 

To be removed from GAO's high-risk list,[Footnote 1] agencies must do 
three things. First, they have to produce a corrective action plan that 
defines the root causes of identified problems, identifies effective 
solutions to those problems, and provides for substantially completing 
corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan should include 
performance metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor 
progress. In the spring of 2006, DHS provided us with a draft 
corrective action plan that did not contain key elements we have 
identified as necessary for an effective corrective action plan, 
including specific actions to address identified objectives. As of May 
2007, DHS has not submitted a corrective action plan to OMB. According 
to OMB, this is one of the few high-risk areas that has not produced a 
final corrective action plan. 

Second, agencies must demonstrate significant progress in addressing 
the problems identified in their corrective action plan. To date, DHS 
has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its management 
areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive work needs to 
be guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been receptive towards 
oversight and its delays in providing Congress and us with access to 
various documents and officials have impeded the timeliness of our 
work. We have recently worked with DHS management, including the 
Secretary and the Undersecretary for Management, to establish a more 
cooperative and efficient process--for example, reviewing sensitive 
documents at a particular agency location--in an effort to not only to 
maintain a productive working relationship with the department, but 
also to meet the needs of our congressional requesters in a timely 
manner. Finally, agencies, in particular top leadership, must 
demonstrate a commitment to achieve any remaining key objectives and 
sustain various improvements in their performance over the long term. 
Although DHS leaders have expressed their intent to integrate legacy 
agencies into the new department, they have not dedicated the resources 
needed to oversee this effort and have not been responsive to many 
directions from Congress and recommendations from study groups and 
accountability organizations like the IGs and GAO. 

While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO has made 
numerous prior recommendations to DHS in reports addressing the issues 
identified in this statement. DHS generally concurred with these 
recommendations; however it is not clear to what extent these 
recommendations are being implemented. 

Background: 

In an effort to strengthen homeland security following the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush issued 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002 and signed 
legislation creating DHS in November 2002.[Footnote 2] The strategy set 
forth the overall objectives, mission areas, and initiatives to prevent 
terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's 
vulnerability to terrorism; and minimize the damage and assist in the 
recovery from attacks that may occur. 

DHS, which began operations in March 2003, represented a fusion of 22 
federal agencies to coordinate and centralize the leadership of many 
homeland security activities under a single department. Although the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security identified that many other 
federal departments (and other nonfederal stakeholders) are involved in 
homeland security activities, DHS has the dominant role in implementing 
the strategy. The strategy identified 6 mission areas and 43 
initiatives. DHS was designated as the lead federal agency for 37of the 
43 initiatives, and has activities under way in 40 of the 43 
initiatives. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created DHS, represented a 
historic moment of almost unprecedented action by the federal 
government to fundamentally transform how the nation thinks of homeland 
security, including how it protects itself from terrorism. Also 
significant was the fact that many of the 22 departments brought 
together under DHS were not focused on homeland security missions prior 
to September 11, 2001. Rarely in the country's past had such a large 
and complex reorganization of government occurred or been developed 
with such a singular and urgent purpose. The creation of DHS 
represented a unique opportunity to transform a disparate group of 
agencies with multiple missions, values, and cultures into a strong and 
effective cabinet department whose goals are to, among other things, 
protect U.S. borders and infrastructure, improve intelligence and 
information sharing, and prevent and respond to potential terrorist 
attacks. Together with this unique opportunity, however, came a 
significant risk to the nation that could occur if the department's 
implementation and transformation efforts were not successful. 

Mission areas designated as high risk have national significance, while 
other areas designated as high risk represent management functions that 
are important for agency performance and accountability. The identified 
areas can have a qualitative risk that may be detrimental to public 
health or safety, national security, and economic growth, or a fiscal 
risk due to the size of the program in question. Examples of high-risk 
areas include federal governmentwide problems, like human capital 
management; large programs, like Social Security, Medicaid, and 
Medicare; and more narrow issues, such as contracting at a specific 
agency. The DHS transformation is unique in that it involves 
reorganization, management, and program challenges simultaneously. 

DHS's Transformation: 

We first designated DHS's transformation as high risk in January 2003 
based on three factors. First, DHS faced enormous challenges in 
implementing an effective transformation process, developing 
partnerships, and building needed management capacity because it had to 
effectively combine 22 agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees 
into one department. Second, DHS faced a broad array of operational and 
management challenges that it inherited from its component legacy 
agencies. For example, many of the major components that were merged 
into the department, including the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, the Transportation Security Administration, the Customs 
Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast Guard, 
brought with them existing challenges in areas such as strategic human 
capital, information technology, and financial management. Finally, 
DHS's national security mission was of such importance that the failure 
to effectively address its management challenges and program risks 
could have serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, the 
health and safety of our citizens, and our economy. 

Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the 
creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large 
organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations 
than DHS, can take years to achieve.[Footnote 3] On the basis of the 
need for more progress in its transformation efforts, DHS's 
implementation and transformation stayed on our high-risk update for 
2005, and remained on the high-risk list in 2007. Further, in November 
of 2006, we provided the congressional leadership a listing of 
government programs, functions, and activities that warrant further 
congressional oversight.[Footnote 4] Among the issues included were DHS 
integration and transformation efforts. 

DHS Must Address Key Management Challenges: 

Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and 
complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning, integration of key 
management functions across the department, and partnering with 
stakeholders across the public and private sectors. DHS has made some 
progress in each of these areas, but much additional work is required 
to help ensure sustainable success. Apart from these integration 
efforts, however, a successful transformation will also require DHS to 
follow through on its initial actions of building capacity to improve 
the management of its financial and information technology systems, as 
well as its human capital and acquisition efforts. 

DHS Transformation and Integration: 

Thorough planning is important for DHS to successfully transform and 
integrate the management functions of 22 disparate agencies into a 
common framework that supports the organization as a whole. Our past 
work has identified progress DHS has made in its planning 
efforts.[Footnote 5] For example, the DHS strategic plan addresses five 
of six Government Performance and Results Act required elements and 
takes into account its non-homeland security missions, such as 
responding to natural disasters. Furthermore, several DHS components 
have developed their own strategic plans or strategic plans for 
missions within their areas of responsibility. For example, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has produced an interim 
strategic plan that identifies its goals and objectives, and U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed a border patrol strategy 
and an anti-terrorism trade strategic plan. However, deficiencies in 
DHS's planning efforts remain. A DHS-wide transformation strategy 
should include a strategic plan that identifies specific budgetary, 
human capital, and other resources needed to achieve stated goals. The 
strategy should also involve key stakeholders to create a shared 
understanding of goals and priorities. DHS's existing strategic plan 
lacks these linkages, and DHS has not effectively involved stakeholders 
in the development of the plan. DHS has also not completed other 
important planning-related activities. For example, some of DHS's 
components have not developed adequate outcome-based performance 
measures or comprehensive plans to monitor, assess, and independently 
evaluate the effectiveness of their plans and performance. 

Integrating core management functions like financial, information 
technology, human capital, and procurement is also important if DHS is 
to transform itself into a cohesive, high-performing organization. 
However, DHS lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with 
overall goals, a timeline, appropriate responsibility and 
accountability determinations, and a dedicated team to support its 
management integration efforts. In 2005, we recommended that DHS 
establish implementation goals and a timeline for its management 
integration efforts as part of a comprehensive integration strategy, a 
key practice to help ensure success for a merger or transformation. 
Although DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist management 
integration on a function by function basis, it has not developed a 
plan that clearly identifies the critical links that should occur 
across these functions, the necessary timing to make these links occur, 
how these interrelationships will occur, and who will drive and manage 
them. In March 2007 testimony before the House Homeland Security 
Committee, DHS's Undersecretary for Management supported our 
recommendation on the need for a comprehensive management integration 
strategy for the department. The Undersecretary stated that he was 
reviewing DHS's progress against its individual plans and guidance for 
its management functions that would be part of such a comprehensive 
strategy. In addition, although DHS had established a Business 
Transformation Office that reported to the Under Secretary for 
Management to help monitor and look for interdependencies among the 
individual functional management integration efforts, that office was 
not responsible for leading and managing the coordination and 
integration itself. We understand that the Business Transformation 
Office has been recently eliminated due to a lack of funding. 

In addition to the Business Transformation Office, we have recommended 
that Congress continue to monitor whether it needs to provide 
additional leadership authorities to the DHS Under Secretary for 
Management or create a Chief Operating Officer/Chief Management Officer 
(COO/CMO) position that could help elevate, integrate, and 
institutionalize DHS's management initiatives. Legislation was 
introduced in this session and passed by the Senate to create a Deputy 
Secretary of Homeland Security for Management, a CMO position.[Footnote 
6] On April 24, 2007, I sponsored a forum on implementing COO/CMO 
positions in select federal departments and agencies, as part of a 
broader study examining issues associated with implementing these 
positions in response to a bipartisan request from this subcommittee. 
Forum participants included former and current government executives, 
and officials from private businesses and nonprofit organizations. The 
forum discussion focused on criteria for determining the type of COO/ 
CMO position that should be established in selected entities and how to 
implement the position, including qualifications, appointment 
processes, roles and responsibilities, and reporting relationships. In 
addition to the forum, we have also learned about the experiences of 
organizations that have positions similar to a COO/CMO through several 
case study reviews. We expect to issue our full report to the 
subcommittee in early September 2007. 

Finally, DHS cannot successfully achieve its homeland security mission 
without working with other entities that share responsibility for 
securing the homeland. Partnering for progress with other governmental 
agencies and private sector entities is central to achieving its 
missions. Since 2005, DHS has continued to form necessary partnerships 
and has undertaken a number of coordination efforts with private sector 
entities. These include, for example, partnering with (1) airlines to 
improve aviation passenger and cargo screening, (2) the maritime 
shipping industry to facilitate containerized cargo inspection, (3) 
financial institutions to follow the money trail in immigration and 
customs investigations, and (4) the chemical industry to enhance 
critical infrastructure protection at such facilities.[Footnote 7] In 
addition, FEMA has worked with other federal, state, and local entities 
to improve planning for disaster response and recovery. However, 
partnering challenges continue as DHS seeks to form more effective 
partnerships to leverage resources and more effectively carry out its 
homeland security responsibilities. For example, because DHS has only 
limited authority to address security at chemical facilities, it must 
continue to work with the chemical industry to ensure that it is 
assessing vulnerabilities and implementing security measures. Also, 
while TSA has taken steps to collaborate with federal and private 
sector stakeholders in the implementation of its Secure Flight program, 
these stakeholders stated that TSA has not provided them with the 
information they would need to support TSA's efforts as they move 
forward with the program. 

Financial Management and Internal Controls: 

DHS has made modest progress in addressing financial management and 
internal control weaknesses and continues to face significant 
challenges in these areas. For example, since its creation, DHS has 
been unable to obtain an unqualified or "clean" audit opinion on its 
financial statements. The independent auditor's report cited 10 
material weaknesses--i.e., significant deficiencies in DHS's internal 
controls--showing no decrease from fiscal year 2005. These weaknesses 
included financial management oversight, financial reporting, financial 
systems security, and budgetary accounting. Furthermore, the report 
found two other reportable conditions and instances of non- compliance 
with eight laws and regulations, including the Federal Managers' 
Financial Integrity Act of 1982, the Federal Financial Management 
Improvement Act of 1996, and the Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002.[Footnote 8] While there continue to be material 
weaknesses in its financial management systems, DHS has made some 
progress in this area. For example, the independent auditor's fiscal 
year 2006 report noted that DHS had made improvements at the component 
level to improve financial reporting during fiscal year 2006, although 
many challenges were remaining. Also, DHS and its components have 
reported developing corrective action plans to address the specific 
material internal control weaknesses identified. 

In addition to the independent audits, we have done work to assess 
DHS's financial management and internal controls. For example, in 2004, 
we reviewed DHS's progress in addressing financial management 
weaknesses and integrating its financial systems.[Footnote 9] 
Specifically, we identified weaknesses in the financial management 
systems DHS inherited from the 22 component agencies, assessed DHS's 
progress in addressing these weaknesses, identified plans DHS had to 
integrate with its financial management systems, and reviewed whether 
the planned systems DHS was developing would meet the requirements of 
relevant financial management improvement legislation. On the basis of 
our work, we recommended that DHS (1) give sustained attention to 
addressing previously reported material weaknesses, reportable 
conditions, and observations and recommendations; (2) complete 
development of corrective action plans for all material weaknesses, 
reportable conditions, and observations and recommendations; (3) ensure 
that internal control weaknesses are addressed at the component level 
if they were combined or reclassified at the departmentwide level; and 
(4) maintain a tracking system of all auditor-identified and management-
identified control weaknesses. These recommendations are still relevant 
today. 

Information Technology: 

A departmentwide information technology (IT) governance framework-- 
including controls (disciplines) aimed at effectively managing IT- 
related people, processes, and tools--is vital to DHS's transformation 
efforts. These controls and disciplines include: 

* having and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, 
as an authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain IT 
investments; 

* defining and following a corporate process for informed decision 
making by senior leadership about competing IT investment options; 

* applying system and software development and acquisition discipline 
and rigor when defining, designing, developing, testing, deploying, and 
maintaining systems; 

* establishing a comprehensive information security program to protect 
its information and systems; 

* having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and 
abilities to execute each of these areas now and in the future; and: 

* centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout 
the organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer.[Footnote 
10] 

DHS has made progress in each of these areas, but additional work is 
needed to further enhance its IT governance framework and implement our 
related recommendations. For example, the June 2006 version of DHS's 
enterprise architecture, while an improvement over prior versions, 
still lacks important architecture content and limits DHS's ability to 
guide and constrain IT investments, among other things.[Footnote 11] 
With respect to IT investment management, DHS has established 
management structures but has not, for example, fully implemented key 
practices needed to effectively oversee and control department 
investments--putting the department at increased risk of its programs 
not delivering promised mission capabilities and benefits. DHS stated 
it is working on improving its investment management process.[Footnote 
12] DHS has taken other measures to enhance IT governance as well, such 
as completing a comprehensive inventory of its major information 
systems (though a comprehensive information security program is still 
needed), organizing IT leadership roles and responsibilities under the 
CIO, and initiating strategic planning for IT human capital (an area 
where we have ongoing work to assess related strategic planning efforts 
and progress made). 

In addition to efforts undertaken in these areas, our reviews of key 
nonfinancial systems show that DHS has not consistently employed a 
range of system acquisition management disciplines, such as reliable 
cost-estimating practices and meaningful performance measurements. We 
have made a number of recommendations in this and other areas, 
including work related to deploying and operating IT system and 
infrastructure in support of DHS's core mission and operations. 
Implementation of many of our recommendations has been slow. Until DHS 
fully establishes and consistently implements the full range of IT 
management disciplines embodied in its framework and related to federal 
guidance and best practices, it will be challenged in its ability to 
effectively manage and deliver programs. 

Human Capital Systems: 

DHS has made some progress in transforming its human capital systems, 
but more work remains.[Footnote 13] Some of the most pressing human 
capital challenges at DHS include (1) successfully completing its 
ongoing transformation; (2) forging a unified results-oriented culture 
across the department (line of sight); (3) linking daily operations to 
strategic outcomes; (4) rewarding individuals based on individual, 
team, unit, and organizational results; (5) obtaining, developing, 
providing incentives to, and retaining needed talent; and most 
importantly, (6) leadership at the top, to include a chief operating 
officer or chief management officer. Moreover, employee morale is low, 
as measured by recent results in the 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey, 
which can have an impact on the progress of DHS's transformation and 
integration. DHS scored at the bottom or near the bottom of all federal 
agencies in the four areas which provide the standards of success for 
agencies to measure their progress and achievements in managing their 
workforces. These four areas include (1) leadership and knowledge 
management, (2) results-oriented performance culture, (3) talent 
management, and (4) job satisfaction. As we have reported, people are 
at the center of any serious change management initiative, and 
addressing the "people" element and employee morale issues is the key 
to a successful merger and transformation. 

Strategic human capital management is the centerpiece of any 
transformation effort. In 2005, we reported that DHS had initiated 
strategic human capital planning efforts and published proposed 
regulations for a modern human capital management system.[Footnote 14] 
We also reported that DHS's leadership was committed to the human 
capital system design process and had formed teams to implement the 
resulting regulations. Since our report, DHS has finalized its human 
capital regulations and it is vital that DHS implement its human 
capital system effectively.[Footnote 15] In April 2007, DHS issued its 
fiscal year 2007 and 2008 Human Capital Operational Plan, which 
identifies five department priorities: hiring and retaining a talented 
and diverse workforce, creating a DHS-wide culture of performance, 
creating high-quality learning and development programs for DHS 
employees, implementing a DHS-wide integrated leadership system, and 
being a model of human capital service excellence. DHS officials 
explained that the Human Capital Operating Plan encompasses the 
initiatives of the previous human capital management system, MAXHR, but 
also outlines a more comprehensive human resources program. GAO has not 
yet reviewed DHS's new Human Capital Operational Plan to see if it 
addresses our prior recommendations. However, we expect to examine this 
plan. 

Further, since our 2005 update, DHS has taken some actions to integrate 
the legacy agency workforces that make up its components. For example, 
it standardized pay grades for criminal investigators at ICE and 
developed promotion criteria for investigators and CBP officers that 
equally recognize the value of the experience brought to ICE and CBP by 
employees of each legacy agency. DHS also made progress in establishing 
human capital capabilities for the US-VISIT program, which should help 
ensure that it has sufficient staff with the necessary skills and 
abilities to implement the program effectively. CBP also developed 
training plans that link its officer training to CBP strategic goals. 

Despite these efforts, however, DHS must still (1) create a clearer 
crosswalk between departmental training goals and objectives and DHS's 
broader organizational and human capital goals, and (2) develop 
appropriate training performance measures and targets for goals and 
strategies identified in its departmentwide strategic training plan. We 
have also made recommendations to specific program offices and 
organizational entities to help ensure that human capital resources are 
provided to improve the effectiveness of management capabilities, and 
that human capital plans are developed that clearly describe how these 
components will recruit, train, and retain staff to meet their growing 
demands as they expand and implement new program elements. We are 
completing a review of selected human capital issues and plan to report 
on our results soon. This report will discuss information on: attrition 
rates at DHS; senior-level vacancies at DHS; DHS's use of human capital 
flexibilities, including the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, and 
personal services contracts; and DHS's compliance with the Federal 
Vacancies Reform Act of 1998. 

Acquisition Management: 

DHS has made some progress but continues to face challenges in creating 
an effective, integrated acquisition organization. Since its inception 
in March 2003, DHS made early progress in implementing a strategic 
sourcing program to increase the effectiveness of its buying power and 
in creating a small business program. These programs have promoted an 
environment in which there is a collaborative effort toward the common 
goal of an efficient, unified organization. Strategic sourcing allows 
DHS components to formulate purchasing strategies to leverage buying 
power and increase savings for a variety of products like office 
supplies, boats, energy, and weapons, while its small business program 
works to ensure small businesses can compete effectively for the 
agency's contract dollars. However, DHS's progress toward creating a 
unified acquisition organization has been hampered by policy decisions. 
In March 2005, we reported that an October 2004 management directive, 
Acquisition Line of Business Integration and Management, while 
emphasizing the need for a unified, integrated acquisition 
organization, relies on a system of dual accountability between the 
chief procurement officer and the heads of the departments to make this 
happen.[Footnote 16] This situation has created ambiguity about who is 
accountable for acquisition decisions. We also found that the various 
acquisition organizations within DHS are still operating in a disparate 
manner, with oversight of acquisition activities left primarily up to 
each individual component. Specifically, we reported that (1) there 
were components exempted from the unified acquisition organization, (2) 
the chief procurement officer had insufficient staff for departmentwide 
oversight, and (3) staffing shortages led the office of procurement 
operations to rely extensively on outside agencies for contracting 
support.[Footnote 17] In December 2005, DHS established an acquisition 
oversight program to provide comprehensive insight into each 
component's acquisition programs. This oversight program involves a 
series of reviews which are currently being implemented. However, 
accountability concerns remain. In March 2005, we recommended that, 
among other things, the Secretary of Homeland Security provide the 
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer with sufficient resources and 
enforcement authority to enable effective departmentwide oversight of 
acquisition policies and procedures, and to revise the October 2004 
management directive to eliminate reference to the Coast Guard and 
Secret Service as being exempt from complying with the directive. In 
September 2006, DHS reported on planned increases in staffing for the 
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, but we expressed concern that 
the authority of the Chief Procurement Officer had not been 
addressed.[Footnote 18] Unless DHS addresses these challenges, it is at 
risk of continuing to exist as a fragmented acquisition organization. 
Because some of DHS's components have major, complex acquisition 
programs--for example, the Coast Guard's Deepwater program (designed to 
replace or upgrade its cutters and aircraft) and CBP's Secure Border 
Initiative--DHS needs to improve the oversight of contractors and 
should adhere to a rigorous management review process. 

Programmatic Challenges Facing DHS: 

DHS continues to face challenges, many of which were inherited from its 
component legacy agencies, in carrying out its programmatic activities. 
These challenges include enhancing transportation security, 
strengthening the management of U.S. Coast Guard acquisitions and 
meeting the Coast Guard's new homeland security missions, improving the 
regulation of commercial trade while ensuring protection against the 
entry of illegal goods and dangerous visitors at U.S. borders and ports 
of entry, and improving enforcement of immigration laws, including 
worksite immigration laws, and the provision of immigration services. 
DHS must also effectively coordinate the mitigation and response to all 
hazards, including natural disaster planning, response, and recovery. 
DHS has taken actions to address these challenges, for example, by 
strengthening passenger and baggage screening, increasing the oversight 
of Coast Guard acquisitions, more thoroughly screening visitors and 
cargo, dedicating more resources to immigration enforcement, becoming 
more efficient in the delivery of immigration services, and conducting 
better planning for disaster preparation. However, challenges remain in 
each of these major mission areas. 

Transportation Security: 

Despite progress in this area, DHS continues to face challenges in 
effectively executing transportation security efforts. We have 
recommended that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) more 
fully integrate a risk management approach--including assessments of 
threat, vulnerability, and criticality--in prioritizing security 
efforts within and across all transportation modes; strengthen 
stakeholder coordination; and implement needed technological upgrades 
to secure commercial airports.[Footnote 19] DHS has made progress in 
all of these areas, particularly in aviation, but must expand its 
security focus more towards surface modes of transportation and 
continue to seek best practices and coordinated security efforts with 
the international community. DHS and TSA have taken numerous actions to 
strengthen commercial aviation security, including strengthening 
passenger and baggage screening, improving aspects of air cargo 
security, and strengthening the security of international flights and 
passengers bound for the United States.[Footnote 20] For example, TSA 
increased efforts to measure the effectiveness of airport screening 
systems through covert testing and other means and has worked to 
enhance passenger and baggage screener training. TSA also improved its 
processes for identifying and responding to threats onboard commercial 
aircraft and has modified airport screening procedures based on risk. 
Despite this progress, however, TSA continues to face challenges in 
implementing a program to match domestic airline passenger information 
against terrorist watch lists, fielding needed technologies to screen 
airline passengers for explosives, and strengthening aspects of 
passenger rail security.[Footnote 21] In addition, TSA has not 
developed a strategy, as required, for securing the various modes of 
transportation. As a result, rail and other surface transportation 
stakeholders are unclear regarding what TSA's role will ultimately be 
in establishing and enforcing security requirements within their 
transportation modes. We have recommended that TSA more fully integrate 
risk-based decision making within aviation and across all 
transportation modes, strengthen passenger prescreening, and enhance 
rail security efforts. We have also recommended that TSA work to 
develop sustained and effective partnerships with other government 
agencies, the private sector, and international partners to coordinate 
security efforts and seek potential best practices, among other 
efforts. While DHS has made significant strides in strengthening 
aviation security, it still is in the early stages of developing a 
comprehensive approach to ensuring inbound air cargo security. 

Coast Guard Acquisitions and Non-Homeland Security Missions: 

The Coast Guard needs to improve the management of its acquisitions and 
continue to enhance its security mission while meeting other mission 
responsibilities. In 2004, we recommended that the Coast Guard improve 
its management of the Deepwater program by strengthening key management 
and oversight activities, implementing procedures to better ensure 
contractor accountability, and controlling future costs by promoting 
competition.[Footnote 22] In April 2006, we reported the Coast Guard 
had made some progress in addressing these recommendations. For 
example, the Coast Guard has addressed our recommendation to ensure 
better contractor accountability by providing for better input from 
U.S. Coast Guard performance monitors.[Footnote 23] However, even with 
these improvements, acquisition and contract management issues that we 
reported on previously continue to be challenges to the Coast Guard. 
For example, within the Deepwater program, an updated class of patrol 
boats has been removed from service and its replacement, a new cutter 
class, has been delayed due to design concerns. While the Coast Guard 
recently announced that it will be taking a more active role in 
Deepwater acquisitions and noted that many of the issues that led to 
these acquisition problems are being addressed, it is too soon to tell 
how effective these changes will be. Further, the Coast Guard has 
acquisition challenges other than just the Deepwater program. For 
example, the Coast Guard's timeline for achieving full operating 
capability for its search and rescue communications system, Rescue 21, 
was delayed from 2006 to 2011, and the estimated total acquisition cost 
increased. 

The Coast Guard has made progress in balancing its homeland security 
and traditional missions. The Coast Guard is unlike many other DHS 
components because it has substantial missions not related to homeland 
security. These missions include maritime navigation, icebreaking, 
protecting the marine environment, marine safety, and search and rescue 
for mariners in distress. Furthermore, unpredictable natural disasters, 
such as Hurricane Katrina, can place intense demands on all Coast Guard 
resources. The Coast Guard must continue executing these traditional 
missions and balance those responsibilities with its homeland security 
obligations, which have increased significantly since September 11. 

Border Security and the Regulation of Trade: 

DHS has made some progress but still faces an array of challenges in 
securing the border while improving the regulation of commercial 
trade.[Footnote 24] Since 2005, DHS agencies have made some progress in 
implementing our recommendations to refine the screening of foreign 
visitors to the United States, target potentially dangerous cargo, and 
provide the personnel necessary to effectively fulfill border security 
and trade agency missions. As of January 2006, DHS had a pre-entry 
screening capability in place in overseas visa issuance offices, and an 
entry identification capability at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 
land ports of entry. Furthermore, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
has made risk management at ports and all critical infrastructure 
facilities a key priority for DHS. In addition, DHS developed 
performance goals and measures for its trade processing system and 
implemented a testing and certification process for its officers to 
provide better assurance of effective cargo examination targeting 
practices. However, efforts to assess and mitigate risks of DHS's and 
the Department of State's implementation of the Visa Waiver Program 
remain incomplete, increasing the risk that the program could be 
exploited by someone who intends harm to the United States. Further, 
many of DHS's border-related performance goals and measures are not 
fully defined or adequately aligned with one another, and some 
performance targets are not realistic. CBP is not systematically 
incorporating inspection results into its cargo screening system 
because it has not yet fully implemented a system that will report 
details on its security inspections nationwide to allow management to 
analyze those inspections. Other trade and visitor screening systems 
have weaknesses that must be overcome to better ensure border and trade 
security. For example, deficiencies in the identification of 
counterfeit documentation at land border crossings into the United 
States create vulnerabilities that terrorists or others involved in 
criminal activity could exploit. We also reported that DHS's Container 
Security Initiative to target and inspect high-risk cargo containers at 
foreign ports before they leave for the United States has been 
challenged by staffing imbalances, the lack of minimum technical 
requirements for inspection equipment used at foreign ports, and 
insufficient performance measures to assess the effectiveness of 
targeting and inspection activities. We are currently reviewing this 
program to ascertain what progress CBP has made in addressing these 
challenges. 

Enforcement of Immigration Laws: 

DHS has taken some actions to improve enforcement of immigration laws, 
including worksite immigration laws, but the number of resources 
devoted to enforcing immigration laws is limited given that there are 
an estimated 12 million illegal aliens residing in the United States. 
DHS has strengthened some aspects of immigration enforcement, including 
allocating more investigative work years to immigration functions than 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service did prior to the creation of 
DHS. Nevertheless, effective enforcement will require more attention to 
efficient resource use and updating outmoded management 
systems.[Footnote 25] In April 2006, ICE announced an interior 
enforcement strategy to bring criminal charges against employers who 
knowingly hire unauthorized workers. ICE has also reported increases in 
the number of criminal arrests and indictments for these violations 
since fiscal year 2004. In addition, ICE has plans to shift 
responsibility for identifying incarcerated criminal aliens eligible 
for removal from the United States from the Office of Investigations to 
its Office of Detention and Removal, freeing those investigative 
resources for other immigration and customs investigations. ICE has 
also begun to introduce principles of risk management into the 
allocation of its investigative resources. However, enforcement of 
immigration enforcement laws needs to be strengthened and significant 
management challenges remain. DHS's ability to locate and remove 
millions of aliens who entered the country illegally or overstayed the 
terms of their visas is questionable, and implementing an effective 
worksite enforcement program remains an elusive goal. ICE's Office of 
Investigations has not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the 
customs and immigration systems to determine the greatest risks for 
exploitation by criminals and terrorists. This office also lacks 
outcome-based performance goals that relate to its objective of 
preventing the exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities in customs and 
immigration systems, and it does not have sufficient systems in place 
to help ensure systematic monitoring and communication of 
vulnerabilities discovered during its investigations. Moreover, the 
current employment verification process used to identify workers 
ineligible for employment in the United States has not fundamentally 
changed since its establishment in 1986, and ongoing weaknesses have 
undermined its effectiveness. We have recommended that DHS take actions 
to help address these weaknesses and to strengthen the current process 
by issuing final regulations on changes to the employment verification 
process which will reduce the number of documents suitable for proving 
eligibility to work in the United States. Some other countries require 
foreign workers to present work authorization documents at the time of 
hire and require employers to review these documents and report 
workers' information to government agencies for collecting taxes and 
social insurance contributions, and conducting worksite enforcement 
actions. 

Provision of Immigration Services: 

Although DHS has made progress in reducing its backlog of immigration 
benefit applications, improvements are still needed in the provision of 
immigration services, particularly by strengthening internal controls 
to prevent fraud and inaccuracy.[Footnote 26] Since 2005, DHS has 
enhanced the efficiency of certain immigration services. For example, 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) estimated that it had 
reduced its backlog of immigration benefits applications from a peak of 
3.8 million cases to 1.2 million cases from January 2004 to June 2005. 
USCIS has also established a focal point for immigration fraud, 
outlined a fraud control strategy that relies on the use of automation 
to detect fraud, and is performing fraud assessments to identify the 
extent and nature of fraud for certain benefits. However, DHS still 
faces significant challenges in its ability to effectively provide 
immigration services while at the same time protecting the immigration 
system from fraud and mismanagement. USCIS may have adjudicated tens of 
thousands of naturalization applications without alien files, and 
adjudicators were not required to record whether the alien file was 
available when they adjudicated the application. Without these files, 
DHS may not be able to take enforcement action against an applicant and 
could also approve an application for an ineligible applicant. In 
response to our report, USCIS recently enacted a policy that requires 
the adjudicator to record whether the alien file was available when 
they adjudicated the application. In addition, USCIS has not 
implemented important aspects of our internal control standards or 
fraud control best practices identified by leading audit organizations. 
Such best practices would include (1) a comprehensive risk management 
approach, (2) mechanisms for ongoing monitoring during the course of 
normal activities, (3) clear communication agencywide regarding how to 
balance production-related goals with fraud-prevention activities, and 
(4) performance goals for fraud prevention. 

Disaster Preparedness and Response: 

We have reported that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate disaster 
preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.[Footnote 27] Between the 
time that FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003 and Hurricane Katrina 
hit in late August 2005, its responsibilities had been dispersed and 
its role within DHS continued to evolve. Hurricane Katrina severely 
tested disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and 
revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding 
to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. Our analysis showed 
the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and 
responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster 
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance 
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent 
waste, fraud, and abuse. In September 2006, we recommended that 
Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to 
prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. 
We also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously re-test, train, and 
exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and 
lines of authority for all levels of leadership, implementing changes 
needed to remedy identified coordination problems; (2) direct that the 
National Response Plan (NRP) base plan and its supporting Catastrophic 
Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational 
implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and direction for federal, 
state, and local planning, training, and exercises to ensure such 
activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery 
responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a 
lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to prepare to meet their 
responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness 
Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and 
how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a 
catastrophic disaster. 

DHS has made revisions to the NRP and released its Supplement to the 
Catastrophic Incident Annex--both designed to further clarify federal 
roles and responsibilities and relationships among federal, state and 
local governments and responders. However, these revisions have not 
been rigorously tested. DHS is working on additional revisions to the 
NRP and the National Incident Management System and recently informed 
Congress the revisions to the NRP may not be complete by the scheduled 
June 1, 2007 target date. Thus, it is unlikely that any changes will be 
clearly communicated, understood, and effectively tested prior to the 
2007 Hurricane Season, which begins in June. DHS has also announced a 
number of actions intended to improve readiness and response based on 
our work and the work of congressional committees and the 
Administration. For example, DHS is currently reorganizing FEMA as 
required by the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act.[Footnote 28] 
One major objective of this reorganization is to integrate 
responsibility and accountability for disaster preparedness and 
response within DHS by placing the responsibility for both within FEMA. 
DHS has also announced a number of other actions to improve readiness 
and response, such as mass care and shelter, in which FEMA rather than 
the Red Cross, will now have the lead. However, there is little 
information available on the extent to which these changes are tested 
and operational. 

Finally, in its desire to provide assistance quickly following 
Hurricane Katrina, DHS was unable to keep up with the magnitude of 
needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster assistance, or 
ensure that there were provisions in contracts for response and 
recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in all cases. We 
recommended that DHS create accountability systems that effectively 
balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to 
prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. We also recommended that DHS provide 
guidance on advance procurement practices (pre-contracting) and 
procedures for those federal agencies with roles and responsibilities 
under the NRP so that these agencies can better manage disaster-related 
procurement, and establish an assessment process to monitor agencies' 
continuous planning efforts for their disaster-related procurement 
needs and the maintenance of capabilities.[Footnote 29] For example, we 
identified a number of emergency response practices in the public and 
private sectors that provide insight into how the federal government 
can better manage its disaster-related procurements. These include both 
developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices and 
establishing vendor relationships prior to the disaster and 
establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of capacity 
to match the response with the need. FEMA had taken some action on 
these recommendations by entering into advance contracts for various 
goods, supplies, and services, such as debris removal. However, DHS has 
not implemented our recommendation to develop guidance on advance 
procurement practices and procedures for those federal agencies and 
other partners, such as the Red Cross, with roles and responsibilities 
under the NRP. 

Actions Needed to Strengthen DHS's Transformation and Integration 
Efforts: 

To be removed from our high-risk list, agencies need to develop a 
corrective action plan that defines the root causes of identified 
problems, identifies effective solutions to those problems, and 
provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near 
term. Such a plan should include performance measures, metrics and 
milestones to measure their progress. Agencies should also demonstrate 
significant progress in addressing the problems identified in their 
corrective action plan. This should include a program to monitor and 
independently validate progress. Finally, agencies, in particular top 
leadership, must demonstrate a commitment to sustain initial 
improvements. This would include a strong commitment to address the 
risk(s) that put the program or function on the high-risk list and 
provide for the allocation of sufficient people and resources 
(capacity) to resolve the risk(s) and ensure that improvements are 
sustainable over the long term. 

In the spring of 2006, DHS provided us a draft corrective action plan 
for addressing its transformation challenges. This plan addressed major 
management areas we had previously identified as key to DHS's 
transformation--management integration through the DHS management 
directorate and financial, information, acquisition, and human capital 
management. The plan identified an overall goal to develop and 
implement key department wide processes and systems to support DHS's 
transformation into a department capable of planning, operating, and 
managing as one effective department. 

In the short term, the plan sought to produce significant improvements 
over the next 7 years that further DHS's ability to operate as one 
department. Although the plan listed accomplishments and general goals 
for the management functions, it did not contain (1) objectives linked 
to those goals that are clear, concise, and measurable; (2) specific 
actions to implement those objectives; (3) information linking 
sufficient people and resources to implement the plan; or (4) an 
evaluation program to monitor and independently validate progress 
toward meeting the goals and measuring the effectiveness of the plan. 
As of May 2007, DHS has not submitted a corrective action plan to OMB. 
According to an official at OMB, this is one of the few high-risk areas 
that have not produced a final corrective action plan. 

In addition to developing an effective corrective action plan, agencies 
must show that significant progress has taken place in improving 
performance in the areas identified in its corrective action plan. 
While our work has noted progress at DHS, for us to remove the DHS 
implementation and transformation from our high-risk list, we need to 
be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that DHS has 
implemented many of our past recommendations, or has taken other 
corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, 
DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent 
enough so that Congress can be sure it is economically, efficiently, 
effectively, ethically, and equitably using the billions of dollars in 
funding it receives annually, and is providing the levels of security 
called for in numerous legislative requirements and presidential 
directives. Our work for Congress assessing DHS's operations has been 
significantly hampered by long delays in granting us access to program 
documents and officials, or by questioning our access to information 
needed to conduct our reviews. 

We have processes for obtaining information from departments and 
agencies across the federal government that work well. DHS's process-- 
involving multiple layers of review by department-and component-level 
liaisons and attorneys regarding whether to provide us the requested 
information--does not work as smoothly. DHS's processes have impeded 
our efforts to carry out our mission by delaying access to documents 
that we require to assess the department's operations. We have 
occasionally worked with DHS management to establish a cooperative 
process--for example, reviewing sensitive documents at a particular 
agency location--in an effort to not only to maintain a productive 
working relationship with the department but also to meet the needs of 
our congressional requesters in a timely manner. I have spoken to 
Secretary Chertoff who pledged to make access a higher priority and 
have met with Undersecretary Schneider who also assured us of his 
cooperation. We are encouraged by these statements and look forward to 
better relations with the department. 

We recognize that the department has legitimate interests in protecting 
certain types of sensitive information from public disclosure. We share 
that interest as well and follow strict security guidelines in handling 
such information. We similarly recognize that agency officials will 
need to make judgments with respect to the manner and the processes 
they use in response to our information requests. However, to date, 
because of the processes adopted to make these judgments, GAO has often 
not been able to do its work in a timely manner. We have been able to 
eventually obtain information and to answer audit questions, but the 
delays we have experienced at DHS have impeded our ability to conduct 
audit work efficiently and to provide timely information to 
congressional clients. 

Finally, to be removed from our high-risk list, any progress that 
occurs must be sustainable over the long term. DHS's leaders need to 
make and demonstrate a commitment to implementing a transformed 
organization. The Secretary has stated such a commitment, most 
prominently as part of his "second stage review" in the summer of 2005, 
and more recently in remarks made at George Washington University's 
Homeland Security Policy Institute. However, appropriate follow-up is 
required to assure that transformation plans are effectively 
implemented and sustained, to include the allocation of adequate 
resources to support transformation efforts. In this regard, we were 
pleased when DHS established a Business Transformation Office, but we 
believe that the office's effectiveness was limited because the 
department did not give it the authority and responsibility needed to 
be successful. We understand that this office has recently been 
eliminated. Further, department leaders can show their commitment to 
transforming DHS by acting on recommendations made by the Congress, 
study groups, and accountability organizations such as its Office of 
the IG and GAO. Although we have also seen some progress in this area, 
it is not enough for us to conclude that DHS is committed to and 
capable of quickly incorporating corrective actions into its 
operations. Therefore, until DHS produces an acceptable corrective 
action plan, demonstrates progress reforming its key management 
functions, and dedicates the resources necessary to sustain this 
progress, it will likely remain on our high-risk list. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this completes my 
prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that 
you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time. 

Contacts and Acknowledgements: 

For information about this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin, 
Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512- 
8777, or rabkinn@gao.gov or Bernice Steinhardt, Director, Strategic 
Issues at 202-512-6806 or steinhardtb@gao.gov. Other individuals making 
key contributions to this testimony include Christopher Conrad, Anthony 
DeFrank, and Sarah Veale. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products: 

Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security: 

Implementation and Transformation: 

High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 
2007). 

Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress, GAO-07-235R 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006). 

Homeland Security: DHS Is Addressing Security at Chemical Facilities, 
but Additional Authority Is Needed, GAO-06-899T (Washington, D.C.: June 
21, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring the 
Effectiveness of Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts, GAO-06-612 
(Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006). 

Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management 
Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate, GAO-06-206 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2005). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security 
Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities, GAO-05- 
434 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005). 

Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security 
Management Challenges, GAO-05-573T (Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005). 

Results-Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS's Planning Process 
Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability, GAO-05-300 (Washington, 
D.C.: March 31, 2005). 

Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and Sustained Approach 
Needed to Achieve Management Integration, GAO-05-139 (Washington, D.C.: 
March 16, 2005). 

Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal 
Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices, GAO- 
05-49 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2004). 

Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned 
for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO- 
03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks, 
GAO-01-159SP (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2000). 

Financial Management and Internal Controls: 

Financial Management Systems: DHS Has an Opportunity to Incorporate 
Best Practices in Modernization Efforts, GAO-06-553T (Washington, D.C.: 
March 29, 2006). 

Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces Significant 
Financial Management Challenges, GAO-04-774. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 
2004). 

Information Technology: 

Homeland Security: DHS Enterprise Architecture Continues to Evolve but 
Improvements Needed, GAO-07-564 (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007). 

Information Technology: DHS Needs to Fully Define and Implement 
Policies and Procedures for Effectively Managing Investments, GAO-07- 
424 (Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007). 

Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated 
Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing Management 
Challenges and New Risks, GAO-06-580 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006). 

Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More Widespread 
Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure 
Information, GAO-06-383 (Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain on 
Department's Management of Information Technology, GAO-06-598T 
(Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006). 

Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement's Infrastructure Modernization Program, GAO- 05-
805 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005.) 

Information Security: Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully 
Implement Its Security Program. GAO-05-700 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 
2005). 

Information Technology: Federal Agencies Face Challenges in 
Implementing Initiatives to Improve Public Health Infrastructure, GAO- 
05-308 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005). 

Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial Environment 
Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements Continues. 
GAO-05-267 (Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005). 

Department of Homeland Security: Formidable Information and Technology 
Management Challenge Requires Institutional Approach, GAO-04-702 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 27, 2004). 

Human Capital Systems: 

Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to 
Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007). 

Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks 
of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 
2006). 

Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in 
the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R (Washington, 
D.C.: June 13, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating, but 
Management Improvements Are Still Needed, GAO-06-318T (Washington, 
D.C.: Jan. 25, 2006). 

Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training 
Important for Successful Transformation, GAO-05-888 (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 23, 2005). 

Acquisition Management: 

Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and Oversight 
Would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to Address Risks, GAO- 
06-996 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition 
Organization, GAO-06-1012T (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Create 
an Effective Acquisition Organization, GAO-05-179 (Washington, D.C.: 
March 29, 2005). 

Homeland Security: Further Action Needed to Promote Successful Use of 
Special DHS Acquisition Authority, GAO-05-136 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 
15, 2004). 

Transportation Security: 

Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are 
in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, 
D.C.: April 30, 2007). 

Aviation Security: TSA's Change to its Prohibited Items List Has Not 
Resulted in Any Reported Public Safety Incidents, but the Impact of the 
Change on Screening Operations is Inconclusive, GAO-07-623R. 
(Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2007). 

Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Service Drive Changes 
to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and 
Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-634 
(Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007). 

Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for 
Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be 
Systematically Reassessed, GAO-07-299 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 
2007). 

Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key 
Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T, (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 13, 2007). 

Transportation Security Administration: Oversight of Explosive 
Detection Systems Maintenance Contracts Can Be Strengthened, GAO-06-795 
(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006). 

Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening 
Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: July 
28, 2006). 

Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State 
Safety Oversight Program, GAO-06-821 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006). 

Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation 
Security Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-864T 
(Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006). 

Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage 
Screening, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T (Washington, D.C.: April 
4, 2006). 

Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private-Sector 
Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains, GAO-06-166 (Washington, D.C.: 
March 31, 2006). 

Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely 
Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's 
Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006). 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from 
Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-06-203 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 
2005). 

Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air 
Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005.) 

Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to 
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851 (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 9, 2005). 

Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed, GAO-05- 
781 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6. 2005). 

Aviation Safety: Oversight of Foreign Code-Share Safety Program Should 
Be Strengthened, GAO-05-930 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2005). 

Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted 
Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed, GAO-05-928T 
(Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005). 

Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but 
Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed, GAO-05-356 
(Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005). 

Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the 
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-365 
(Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005). 

Coast Guard Acquisitions and Non-Homeland Security Missions: 

Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, Performance, 
Reorganization, and Related Challenges: GAO-07-489T (Washington, D.C.: 
April 18, 2007). 

Coast Guard: Status of Efforts to Improve Deepwater Program Management 
and Address Operational Challenges, GAO-07-575T (Washington, D.C.: 
March 8, 2007). 

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on Deepwater Program Assets and 
Management Challenges, GAO-07-446T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2007). 

Coast Guard: Efforts to Improve Management and Address Operational 
Challenges in the Deepwater Program, GAO-07-460T (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 14, 2007). 

Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland 
Security's Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard's Deepwater 
Program, GAO-07-453T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2007). 

United States Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in Management and 
Oversight of Rescue System Acquisition, GAO-06-623 (Washington, D.C.: 
May 31, 2006). 

Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program 
Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted, GAO-06- 
546 (Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006). 

Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and 
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical 
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005.) 

Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and 
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, GAO-05-448T (Washington, D.C.: 
May 17, 2005). 

Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny 
with Limited Assurance of Improved Security, GA0-05-404 (Washington, 
D.C.: March 11, 2005). 

Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and 
Management Concerns Remain, GAO-05-161 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 
2005). 

Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs Increased 
Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-04-380 
(Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004). 

Border Security and the Regulation of Trade: 

Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and 
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-248 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2006). 

Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks 
of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 
2006). 

Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated 
Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing Management 
Challenges and New Risks, GAO-06-580 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006). 

Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border 
Surveillance Technology Program, GAO-06-295 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 
2006). 

Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border 
Security Program Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296 (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 14, 2006). 

Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from 
Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing, GAO-05-859 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2005). 

Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and 
Marine Assets, GAO-05-543 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 12, 2005). 

Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department 
of Homeland Security's Visa Security Program, GAO-05-801 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 29, 2005). 

Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest 
Differences in Sector Performance, GAO-05-435 (Washington, D.C.: July 
22, 2005). 

Enforcement of Immigration Laws: 

Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and 
Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-06-895T (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 
2006). 

Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in 
the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R (Washington, 
D.C.: June 13, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened, GAO-06-404 
(Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS's 
Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources, GAO-06-462T (Washington, 
D.C.: March 28, 2006). 

Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and 
Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-05-813 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 
2005). 

Provision of Immigration Services: 

Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien 
Files Are Located when Needed, GAO-07-85 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 
2006). 

Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy 
Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud, GAO-06-259 
(Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2006). 

Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and 
Ensure Quality of Adjudications, GAO-06-20 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 
2005). 

Immigration Services: Better Contracting Practices Needed at Call 
Centers, GAO-05-526 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.) 

Disaster Preparedness and Response: 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and 
Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for 
the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes, GAO-06-834 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 
2006). 

Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance for 
Health Facilities Should be Addressed, GAO-06-826 (Washington, D.C.: 
July 20, 2006). 

Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA's 
Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and 
Abuse, GAO-06-655 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). 

Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed to 
Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International 
Assistance, GAO-06-460 (Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006). 

Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better 
Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies, GAO-05- 
577 (Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005). 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High 
Risks, GAO-01-159SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 2000). 

[2] Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 
(Nov. 25, 2002). 

[3] GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons 
Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal 
Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

[4] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress, GAO-07-
235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006). 

[5] GAO, Results Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS's Planning 
Process Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability, GAO-05-300 
(Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005); Homeland Security: Better 
Management Practices Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Allocate 
Investigative Resources, GAO-06-462T (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 
2006); Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest 
Differences in Sector Performance, GAO-05-435 (Washington, D.C.: July 
22, 2005). 

[6] Improving America's Security Act of 2007, S. 4, 110th Cong. § 1601 
(2007). 

[7] GAO, Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May 
Adversely Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security 
Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 9, 2006); Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation 
and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, GAO-05-448T (Washington, 
D.C.: May 17, 2005); Homeland Security: Better Management Practices 
Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources, GAO-06-
462T (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006); and Homeland Security: DHS Is 
Addressing Security at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is 
Needed, GAO-06-899T (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006). 

[8] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. 
Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2006 Financial Statements. OIG- 
07-10. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2006). 

[9] GAO, Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces 
Significant Financial Management Challenges, GAO-04-774 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 19, 2004). 

[10] GAO, Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain 
on Department's Management of Information Technology, GAO-06-598T 
(Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006). 

[11] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Enterprise Architecture Continues to 
Evolve but Improvements Needed, GAO-07-564 (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 
2007). 

[12] GAO, Information Technology: DHS Needs to Fully Implement Policies 
and Procedures for Effectively Managing Investments, GAO-07-424 
(Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007). 

[13] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of 
Training Important for Successful Transformation, GAO-05-888 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2005); Information on Immigration 
Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in the Department of Homeland 
Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border 
Protection, GAO-06-751R (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006); Homeland 
Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating, but 
Management Improvements Are Still Needed, GAO-06-318T (Washington, 
D.C.: Jan. 25, 2006); and Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to 
Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 
(Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006). 

[14] GAO, Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland 
Security Management Challenges, GAO-05-573T (Washington, D.C.: April 
20, 2005). 

[15] The Homeland Security Act gave DHS authorization to design a human 
capital management system to meet its unique missions. In January 2005, 
DHS announced its final human capital management system regulations. 
DHS intended to implement a new personnel system in 2005. According to 
DHS OIG, these delays will impact the cost of implementation, the 
current development and implementation contract, and the ability to 
properly manage the workforce. Department of Homeland Security, Office 
of Inspector General. Major Management Challenges Facing the Department 
of Homeland Security, OIG-06-14 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2005). 

[16] GAO, Homeland Security: Success and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to 
Create an Effective Acquisition Organization, GAO-05-179 (Washington, 
D.C.: March 29, 2005). 

[17] GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective 
Acquisition Organization, GAO-06-1012T (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 
2006). 

[18] Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and 
Oversight Would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to Address 
Risks, GAO-06-996 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2006). 

[19] GAO, Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security 
Training Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls 
Needed, GAO-05-781 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005); Aviation 
Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo 
Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005); Rail Transit: 
Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety 
Oversight Program, GAO-06-821 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006); and 
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening 
Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: July 
28, 2006). 

[20] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening 
Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: July 
28, 2006); Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen 
Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 
2005); and Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and 
Checked Baggage, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T (Washington, D.C.: 
April 4, 2006); Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound 
Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07- 
660 (Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2007). 

[21] GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the 
Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-
864T (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006). 

[22] GAO, Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs 
Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-04-380 
(Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004). 

[23] GAO, Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and 
Program Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted, 
GAO-06-546 (Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006). 

[24] GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, 
Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-
07-248 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2006); Border Security: Stronger 
Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program, 
GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006); Border Security: Key 
Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border Surveillance 
Technology Program, GAO-06-295 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2006); 
Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated 
Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing Management 
Challenges and New Risks, GAO-06-580 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006); 
and Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key 
Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296 (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 14, 2006). 

[25] GAO, Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory 
Promotions in the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R 
(Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006); Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses 
Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-06-
895T (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2006); and Homeland Security: Better 
Management Practices Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Allocate 
Investigative Resources, GAO-06-462T (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 
2006). 

[26] GAO, Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help 
Ensure Alien Files Are Located when Needed, GAO-07-85 (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 27, 2006); Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a 
Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit 
Fraud, GAO-06-259 (Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2006); and Immigration 
Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and Ensure Quality of 
Adjudications, GAO-06-20 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2005). 

[27] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, 
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the 
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

[28] Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (Oct. 4, 2006). 

[29] See GAO-06-618.

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