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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Management, Investigations and 
Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Wednesday, April 25, 2007: 

Department Of Homeland Security: 

Observations on GAO Access to Information on Programs and Activities: 

Statement of Norman Rabkin, Managing Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

GAO--07-700T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-700T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Management, Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Homeland 
Security, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In testimony before this committee and the House Committee on 
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security in February 2007, GAO 
stated that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has not made its 
management or operational decisions transparent enough to allow 
Congress to be sure that the Department is effectively, efficiently, 
and economically using its billions of dollars of annual funding. GAO 
also noted that its work for Congress to assess DHS’s operations has, 
at times, been significantly hampered by long delays in obtaining 
access to program documents. Following the aforementioned testimonies, 
GAO was asked to testify about its access issues. 

This testimony provides information on (1) the scope of GAO’s work, (2) 
GAO protocols for accessing agency information, (3) DHS processes for 
working with GAO, (4) access issues GAO has encountered, and (5) steps 
GAO has taken to address these issues. 

This testimony identifies issues that Congress and DHS may wish to give 
attention so that DHS may provided GAO timely access to information 
needed to carry out its statutory responsibilities. 

What GAO Found: 

To carry out its audit and evaluation authorities, GAO has a broad 
statutory right of access to agency records. Auditing standards require 
that analysts and financial auditors promptly obtain sufficient, 
competent, and relevant evidence to provide a reasonable basis for any 
related findings and conclusions. Therefore, prompt access to all 
records and other information associated with these activities is 
needed for the effective and efficient performance of GAO’s work. This 
is also necessary in order for the Congress to be able to conduct its 
constitutional responsibilities in a timely and effective manner. 

Since DHS began operations in 2003, GAO has provided major analyses of 
the department’s plans and programs for transportation security, 
immigration, Coast Guard, and emergency management. GAO has also 
reported on DHS’s management functions such as human capital, financial 
management, and information technology. 

GAO has processes it applies in working with departmental agencies 
across the federal government that work well. DHS’s adopted processes 
have frequently impeded GAO’s efforts to carry out its mission by 
delaying access to documents required to assess the department’s 
operations. This process involves multiple layers of review by 
department- and component-level liaisons and attorneys and results in 
frequent and sometimes lengthy delays in obtaining information. 

GAO recognizes that the department has legitimate interests in 
protecting certain types of sensitive information from public 
disclosure. GAO shares that interest as well and follows strict 
security guidelines in handling such information. GAO similarly 
recognizes that agency officials will need to make judgments with 
respect to the manner and the processes they use in response to GAO’s 
information requests. However, to date, because of the processes 
adopted to make these judgments, GAO has often not been able to do its 
work in a timely manner. GAO has been able to eventually obtain 
information and answer audit questions, but the delays experienced at 
DHS impede GAO’s ability to conduct audit work efficiently and to 
provide timely information to congressional clients. 

Figure: DHS process for working with GAO: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS Directive #820. 

[End of figure] 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-700T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Norman J. Rabkin, at 
(202) 512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the subject of access by the 
Government Accountability Office to information at the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). My statement will provide information on the 
scope of our work, our protocols regarding how we normally get access 
to agency information, DHS processes for responding to our requests, 
access issues we have encountered at DHS, and, finally, steps we have 
taken to address these issues. 

Summary: 

GAO's mission is to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the 
accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the 
American people. Since DHS began operations in 2003, we have provided 
major analyses of the department's plans and programs for 
transportation security, immigration, Coast Guard, and emergency 
management. We have also reported on DHS's management functions such as 
human capital, financial management, and information technology. 

We have processes for obtaining information from departments and 
agencies across the federal government that work well. DHS's adopted 
processes do not work as smoothly. DHS's processes have impeded our 
efforts to carry out our mission by delaying access to documents that 
we require to assess the department's operations. This process involves 
multiple layers of review by department-and component-level liaisons 
and attorneys regarding whether to provide us the requested 
information. 

We have occasionally worked with DHS management to establish a 
cooperative process--for example, reviewing sensitive documents at a 
particular agency location. We have agreed to these types of 
accommodations for accessing information under certain circumstances 
because we believe that doing so allows us not only to maintain a 
productive working relationship with the department but also to meet 
the needs of our congressional requesters in a timely manner. Further, 
such a relationship enables us to present the progress and challenges 
of the department in a clear and impartial manner, so that we can meet 
our shared objectives of improving our nation's security preparedness. 

We recognize that the department has legitimate interests in protecting 
certain types of sensitive information from public disclosure. We share 
that interest as well and follow strict security guidelines in handling 
such information. We similarly recognize that agency officials will 
need to make judgments with respect to the manner and the processes 
they use in response to our information requests. However, to date, 
because of the processes adopted to make these judgments, GAO has often 
not been able to do its work in a timely manner. We have been able to 
eventually obtain information and to answer audit questions, but the 
delays we have experienced at DHS have impeded our ability to conduct 
audit work efficiently and to provide timely information to 
congressional clients. 

GAO Performs a Broad Range of Work for Congress: 

GAO has broad statutory authority under title 31 of the United States 
Code to audit and evaluate agency financial transactions, programs, and 
activities.[Footnote 1] To carry out these audit and evaluation 
authorities, GAO has a broad statutory right of access to agency 
records. Using the authority granted under title 31, we perform a range 
of work to support Congress that, among other things, includes the 
following: 

* Evaluations of federal programs, policies, operations, and 
performance: 

- For example, evaluations of transportation security programs related 
to passenger-screening operations at airports, our work to assess 
enforcement of immigration laws, and our work on the U.S. Coast Guard's 
Deepwater acquisition to replace its aging fleet. 

* Management and financial audits to determine whether public funds are 
being spent efficiently, effectively, and in accordance with applicable 
laws: 

- For example, DHS's appropriations acts for fiscal years 2002 through 
2006 have mandated that we review expenditure plans for the U.S. 
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (U.S.VISIT) program. 

* Investigations to assess whether illegal or improper activities may 
have occurred: 

- For example, we investigated the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency's (FEMA) Individuals and Households Program to determine the 
vulnerability of the program to fraud and abuse in the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

* Constructive engagements in which we work proactively with agencies, 
when appropriate, to help guide their efforts toward transformation and 
achieving positive results: 

- For example, we have worked to establish such an arrangement with the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on its design and 
implementation of the Secure Flight Program for passenger pre-screening 
for domestic flights whereby we could review documents on system 
development as they were being formulated and provide TSA with our 
preliminary observations for its consideration. Congress mandated TSA 
certify that the design and implementation of the program would meet 10 
specific criteria. Congress also mandated that we review and comment on 
TSA's certification. TSA's certification has not yet occurred. 

Auditing Standards and Our Protocols Address Accessing Information: 

We carry out most of our work in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards.[Footnote 2] Our analysts and financial 
auditors are responsible for planning, conducting, and reporting their 
work in a timely manner without internal or external impairments. These 
standards require that analysts and financial auditors promptly obtain 
sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for any related findings and conclusions. Therefore, prompt 
access to all records and other information associated with these 
activities is needed for the effective and efficient performance of our 
work. 

Our work involves different collection approaches to meet the evidence 
requirements of generally accepted government auditing standards. Such 
evidence falls into four categories: 

* physical (the results of direct inspection or observation); 

* documentary (information created by and for an agency, such as 
letters, memorandums, contracts, management and accounting records, and 
other documents in various formats, including electronic databases); 

* testimonial (the results of face-to-face, telephone, or written 
inquiries, interviews, and questionnaires); and: 

* analytical (developed by or for GAO through computations, data 
comparisons, and other analyses). 

We have promulgated protocols describing how we will interact with the 
agencies we audit.[Footnote 3] We expect that agencies will promptly 
comply with our requests for all categories of needed information. We 
also expect that we will receive full and timely access to agency 
officials who have stewardship over the requested records; to agency 
employees responsible for the programs, issues, events, operations, and 
other factors covered by such records; and to contractor personnel 
supporting such programs, issues, events, and operations. In addition, 
we expect that we will have timely access to an agency's facilities and 
other relevant locations while trying to minimize interruptions to an 
agency's operations when conducting work related to requests for 
information. 

We provide an appropriate level of security to information obtained 
during the course of our work. We are statutorily required to maintain 
the same level of confidentiality of information as is required of the 
agency from which it is received, and we take very seriously our 
obligation to safeguard the wide range of sensitive information we 
routinely receive. For example, we ensure that GAO employees have 
appropriate security clearances to access information. We also have 
well-established security policies and procedures. 

Timely access to information, facilities, and other relevant locations 
is in the best interests of both GAO and the agencies. We need to 
efficiently use the time available to complete our work to minimize the 
impact on the agency being reviewed and to meet the time frames of our 
congressional clients. Therefore, we expect that an agency's leadership 
and internal procedures will recognize the importance of and support 
prompt responses to our requests for information. When we believe that 
delays in obtaining requested access significantly impede our work, we 
contact the agency's leadership for resolution and notify our 
congressional clients, as appropriate. 

DHS Has Implemented Burdensome Processes for Working with GAO: 

Unlike those of many other executive agencies, DHS's processes for 
working with us includes extensive coordination among program 
officials, liaisons, and attorneys at the departmental and component 
levels and centralized control for all incoming GAO requests for 
information and outgoing documents. In an April 2004 directive on GAO 
relations, DHS established a department liaison to manage its 
relationship with us. In addition, DHS has a GAO coordinator within all 
of its components and, within the DHS General Counsel Office, an 
Assistant General Counsel for General Law who provides advice on GAO 
relations. According to the directive, the department liaison (1) 
receives and coordinates all GAO notifications of new work, (2) 
participates in all entrance conferences, and (3) notifies the 
Assistant General Counsel of new work to obtain participation of 
counsel. The directive requires the Assistant General Counsel to 
participate in all entrance meetings to ensure that the scope of any 
request is clear and finite, and that mutual obligations between DHS 
and GAO are met. The component coordinator handles all matters 
involving GAO for the component, generally participates in GAO entrance 
meetings, and seeks advice of component's counsel, as appropriate. 

The following figure illustrates the coordination of information among 
DHS officials described above when we make a request for information. 
Typically when we begin an engagement, we send a letter to the 
department liaison to notify DHS that we are starting a new engagement 
and we request an entrance meeting to discuss the work. During the 
course of our review, we provide written requests for meetings and 
documents to component coordinators using a DHS-prescribed form. The 
component coordinators then forward our requests to program officials 
and consult with component counsel, who may consult with the Assistant 
General Counsel. 

Figure 1. DHS Process for Working with GAO. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS Directive #820. 

[End of figure] 

In a memo that transmitted the above directive to senior managers in 
DHS components, the then-Under Secretary for Management emphasized the 
importance of a positive working relationship between the two agencies. 
The memo stated that failure to meet or brief GAO staffs in a timely 
manner, as well as being viewed as nonresponsive to GAO document 
requests, could result in tense and acrimonious interactions. The Under 
Secretary also reminded senior officials that prompt and professional 
discharge of their responsibilities to GAO requests could affect both 
DHS's funding and restrictions attached to that funding. 

GAO Has Experienced Difficulties Accessing DHS Information: 

In testimony before this committee and the House Committee on 
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security in February 2007, we 
stated that DHS has not made its management or operational decisions 
transparent enough to allow Congress to be sure that the department is 
effectively, efficiently, and economically using its billions of 
dollars of annual funding.[Footnote 4] We also noted that our work for 
Congress to assess DHS's operations has been significantly hampered by 
long delays in obtaining access to program documents and officials. We 
emphasized that for Congress, GAO, and others to independently assess 
the department's efforts, DHS would need to become more transparent and 
minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its 
programs and operations. 

At most federal agencies and in some cases within DHS, we obtain the 
information we need directly from program officials, often on the spot 
or very soon after making the request. For example, our work on the 
Secure Border Initiative (SBI) has so far met with a very welcome 
degree of access to both DHS officials and documents. SBI is a 
comprehensive multiyear program established in November 2005 to secure 
U.S. borders and reduce illegal immigration. One element of SBI is 
SBInet, the program within the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system of 
tactical infrastructure, rapid response capability, and technology. The 
fiscal year 2007 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 
required that, before DHS could obligate $950 million of the $1.2 
billion appropriated for SBInet, it had to prepare a plan for expending 
these funds, have it reviewed by GAO, and then submit it to Congress 
for approval.[Footnote 5] The plan was to be submitted within 60 days 
of the act's passage. 

CBP officials provided us office space at CBP headquarters, gave us 
access to all levels of SBInet management, and promptly provided us 
with all the documentation we requested, much of which was still in 
draft form and predecisional. DHS met the 60-day requirement when it 
submitted its plan to the Appropriations Committees on December 4, 
2006. We met our responsibilities by being able to review the plan as 
it developed over the 60-day period, and to provide the results of our 
review to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on December 7 
and 13, 2006, respectively. 

In contrast to the access we were afforded in the above example, the 
process used in most of our interactions with DHS is layered and time- 
consuming. As discussed earlier, we are asked to submit each request 
for documents to the component coordinator rather than directly to 
program officials even if we have already met with these officials. 
Also as mentioned earlier, the component coordinator often refers our 
request to component counsel. And the Assistant General Counsel for 
General Law in DHS's General Counsel's office may become involved. The 
result is that we often wait for months for information that in many 
cases could be provided immediately. In some cases, DHS does not 
furnish information until our review is nearly finished, greatly 
impeding our ability to provide a full and timely perspective on the 
program under review. 

Each access issue with DHS requires that we make numerous and 
repetitive follow-up inquiries. Sometimes, despite GAO's right of 
access to information, DHS delays providing information as it vets 
concerns internally, such as whether the information is considered 
deliberative or predecisional. At other times, we experience delays 
without DHS expressing either a concern or a cause for the delays. On 
other occasions, DHS is unable to tell us when we might obtain 
requested information or even if we will obtain it. 

We have encountered access issues in numerous engagements, and the 
lengths of delay are both varied and significant and have affected our 
ability to do our work in a timely manner. We have experienced delays 
with DHS components that include CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), FEMA, and TSA on different types of work such as 
information sharing, immigration, emergency preparedness in primary and 
secondary schools, and accounting systems. I have examples of two 
engagements to share with you today that illustrate the types of delays 
we experience and how they have affected the timing of our work. 

My first example is of an engagement related to detention standards for 
aliens in custody, where the team working on this engagement 
experienced delays of up to 5 months in obtaining various documents. 
The objective of this work, which is still under way and is being done 
for the House Committee on Homeland Security, is to assess ICE efforts 
to review facilities that house alien detainees, determine whether the 
facilities have complied with DHS standards, and determine the extent 
that complaints have been filed about conditions in the facilities. 
Some of the facilities are owned and operated by DHS; others are 
operated under contract with DHS. In order to determine the extent to 
which facilities are complying with DHS standards, we requested that 
ICE provide copies of the reports of inspections it conducted in 2006 
at 23 detention facilities. We requested those reports in December 2006 
and did not receive the final four of the inspection reports until just 
last week, after DHS departmental intervention. We had several meetings 
and discussions with DHS officials including program officials, 
liaisons, and attorneys, and we were never provided a satisfactory 
answer about the reason for this 5-month delay. We also experienced 
delays on this engagement obtaining a copy of the contract for detainee 
phone services between ICE and the phone service contractor. DHS took 1 
month to provide the contract and redacted almost the entire document 
because a DHS attorney contended the information was "privileged." We 
followed up with DHS officials to communicate that our authority 
provided for access to this type of information and then waited another 
2 weeks before we were able to get an unredacted copy of the contract. 

In another engagement being done at the request of the then-Chairman of 
the House Committee on Government Reform, we are reviewing an emergency 
preparedness exercise that DHS conducted in June 2006 called Forward 
Challenge 06. The purpose of the exercise was to allow agencies to 
activate their continuity of operations plans, deploy essential 
personnel to an alternate site, and perform essential functions as a 
means of assessing their mission readiness. Our objective is to 
determine the extent to which participating agencies were testing the 
procedures, personnel, and resources necessary to perform essential 
functions in their continuity-of-operations plans during the exercise. 
We began our work a few months before the exercise and had arranged 
with DHS to observe the actual exercise. However, 2 days before its 
start, DHS officials told us we would not be permitted to observe the 
exercise and stated that after completion, they would instead brief us 
on the exercise and the lessons they had learned from it. They provided 
that briefing in August 2006, at which time we requested relevant 
documentation to support the claims the DHS officials made to us. 

Subsequently, in November 2006, DHS provided us with one-third of the 
agency after-action reports we requested but redacted key information, 
including the identity of the participating agencies. DHS, however, was 
reluctant to provide us with the balance of the documents requested, 
stating that it considered these to be "deliberative materials" and 
expressing concern that sharing these with us would have a significant 
and negative impact on participants' level of openness in future 
exercises. Despite GAO's right of access to the information, the 
involvement of GAO and DHS officials at the highest level, and a letter 
of support from the former and current chairman of the committee, we 
did not receive access to the requested documentation until March 2007. 
Our report for this engagement was to be issued in November 2006; 
because we did not receive the needed information until March 2007, we 
will not be able to issue our analysis until later this year. 

GAO Has Taken and Suggested Steps to Resolve Access Issues with DHS: 

We have made good faith efforts to resolve access issues. Specifically, 
we have undertaken many steps to work with DHS to resolve delays as 
expeditiously as possible and gain access to information needed for our 
work. At our audit team level we have asked staff to set reasonable 
time frames for requesting DHS to provide information and arrange for 
meeting and when we encounter resistance, to ensure that the 
information we request is critical to satisfying the audit objectives. 
When delays occur, our approach is to involve various management levels 
at both GAO and DHS, beginning with lower-level managers and working up 
to the Comptroller General and the Secretary. At each level, our 
managers and legal staff contact their counterpart liaisons and 
counsel, component heads, or DHS senior managers, as appropriate, 
either by telephone, e-mail, or letter, to communicate our access 
authority and need for the information to satisfy audit objectives. Our 
communication efforts have generally resulted in obtaining the 
requested or alternative information, or making other accommodations. 

We have proposed to DHS that the department take several steps that 
would enhance the efficiency of its process. First, our staff should be 
able to deal directly with program officials after we have held our 
initial entrance conference. If these officials have concerns about 
providing us requested information, they can involve DHS liaison or 
coordinators. Second, to the extent that DHS counsel finds it necessary 
to screen certain sensitive documents, it should do so on an exception 
basis. Other documents should be provided directly to us without prior 
review or approval by counsel. We provide DHS several opportunities to 
learn how we are using the information its officials provide us--we 
provide routine updates on our work to program officials; we provide 
program officials, liaisons, and counsel a "statement of facts" that 
basically describes what we learned during the engagement; and we 
formally provide DHS a copy of our draft report that contains our 
evidence, conclusions, and recommendations for its comment. There is no 
reason to hold information back from us when it has been made available 
to contractors, other federal agencies, state and local governments, or 
the public, or when its only sensitivity is that DHS considers it 
confidential or classified. The Secretary of DHS and the Under 
Secretary for Management have stated their desire to work with us to 
resolve access issues. We are willing to work with DHS to resolve any 
access-related concerns. Nevertheless, we remain troubled that the 
design and implementation of the current DHS process is routinely 
causing unnecessary delays. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 
respond to any questions your or other members of the subcommittee may 
have at this time. 

Contact Information: 

For further information about this statement, please contact Norman J. 
Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on 
(202) 512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov. 

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Linda 
Watson, John Vocino, Jan Montgomery, Geoff Hamilton and Richard 
Ascarate. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Key GAO Audit and Access Authorities: 

GAO's Audit and Evaluation Authority: 

GAO has broad statutory authority under title 31 of the United States 
Code to audit and evaluate agency financial transactions, programs, and 
activities. Under 31 U.S.C. § 712, GAO has authority to investigate all 
matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public money. 
Section 717 of title 31, U.S.C., authorizes GAO to evaluate the results 
of programs and activities of federal agencies, on GAO's own initiative 
or when requested by either house of Congress or a committee of 
jurisdiction. Section 3523(a) of title 31 authorizes GAO to audit the 
financial transactions of each agency, except as specifically provided 
by law. 

GAO's Access-to-Records Authority: 

To carry out these audit and evaluation authorities, GAO has a broad 
statutory right of access to agency records. Under 31 U.S.C. § 716(a), 
federal agencies are required to provide GAO with information about 
their duties, powers, activities, organization, and financial 
transactions. When an agency does not make a record available to GAO 
within a reasonable period of time, GAO may issue a written request to 
the agency head specifying the record needed and the authority for 
accessing the record. Should the agency fail to release the record to 
GAO, GAO has the authority to enforce its requests for records by 
filing a civil action to compel production of records in federal 
district court. 

A limitation in section 716, while not restricting GAO's basic 
statutory right of access, acts to limit GAO's ability to compel 
production of particular records through a court action. For example, 
GAO may not bring such an action to enforce its statutory right of 
access to a record where the President or the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget certifies to the Comptroller General and Congress 
(1) that a record could be withheld under one of two specified 
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)[Footnote 6] and (2) 
disclosure to GAO reasonably could be expected to impair substantially 
the operations of the government. 

The first prong of this certification provision requires that such 
record could be withheld under FOIA pursuant to either 5 U.S.C. § 
552(b)(5), relating to inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or 
letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an 
agency in litigation with the agency, or 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7), relating 
to certain records or information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes.[Footnote 7] 

The second prong of the certification provision, regarding impairment 
of government operations, presents a very high standard for the agency 
to meet. The Senate report on this section 716 limitation stated: 

"As the presence of this additional test [the second prong] makes 
clear, the mere fact that materials sought are subject to 5 U.S.C. 
552(b)(5) or (7) and therefore exempt from public disclosure does not 
justify withholding them from the Comptroller General. Currently GAO is 
routinely granted access to highly sensitive information, including 
internal memoranda and law enforcement files, and has established a 
fine record in protecting such information from improper use or 
disclosure. Thus, in order for the certification to be valid, there 
must be some unique or highly special circumstances to justify a 
conclusion that possession by the Comptroller General of the 
information could reasonably be expected to substantially impair 
Government operations."[Footnote 8] 

The committee report also points out that the Comptroller General's 
statutory right of access to agency records is not diminished by the 
certification provisions of the legislation. The certification simply 
allows the President or Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) to preclude the Comptroller General from seeking a judicial 
remedy in certain limited situations.[Footnote 9] 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] See appendix I for more information on key GAO audit and access 
authorities. 

[2] GAO, Government Auditing Standards, 2003 Revision, GAO-03-673G 
(Washington, D.C; June 2003). 

[3] GAO, GAO Agency Protocols, GAO-05-35G (Washington, D.C; Oct. 21, 
2004). 

[4] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges 
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-398T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 6, 2007); and GAO, Homeland Security: Management and 
Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-
07-452T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007). 

[5] Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006). 

[6] The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, 
generally requires agencies to disclose documents to the public, 
subject to certain specified exemptions. 

[7] More specifically, this exemption category relates to records or 
information compiled for law enforcement purpose, but only to the 
extent that the production of such law enforcement records or 
information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with 
enforcement proceedings; (B) would deprive a person of a right to a 
fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (C) could reasonably be 
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) 
could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential 
source, including a state, local, or foreign agency or authority or any 
private institution which furnished information on a confidential 
basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal 
law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or 
by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence 
investigation, information furnished by a confidential source; (E) 
would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement 
investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines for law 
enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could 
reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or (F) could 
reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any 
individual. 

[8] S. Rep. No. 96-570, at 7-8 (1980). 

[9] Id. at 7.

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