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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science 
and Technology, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Thursday, March 29, 2007: 

Joint Planning and Development Office: 

Progress and Key Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System: 

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

GAO-07-693T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-693T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Space 
and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology, House of 
Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The skies over America are becoming more crowded every day. The 
consensus of opinion is that the current system cannot be expanded to 
meet projected growth. In 2003, recognizing the need for system 
transformation, Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning 
and Development Office (JPDO), housed within the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), to lead a collaborative effort of federal and 
nonfederal aviation stakeholders to conceptualize and plan the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)—a fundamental redesign 
and modernization of the national airspace system. JPDO operates in 
conjunction with its partner agencies, which include FAA; the 
Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland 
Security; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and 
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. 

GAO’s testimony focuses on the progress that JPDO has made in planning 
the NextGen initiative and some key issues and challenges that JPDO 
continues to face. This statement is based on GAO’s November 2006 
report to this subcommittee as well as ongoing work. In our November 
2006 report, we recommended that JPDO take actions to institutionalize 
its collaboration and determine if it had the involvement of all key 
stakeholders. JPDO said it would consider our recommendations. 

What GAO Found: 

JPDO has made progress in several areas in its planning of the NextGen 
initiative, but continues to face a number of challenges. JPDO’s 
organizational structure incorporates some of the practices that we 
have found to be effective for federal interagency collaborations, and 
includes an institute that facilitates the participation of nonfederal 
stakeholders. JPDO has faced some organizational challenges, however. 
Leadership turnover at JPDO and the Institute have raised concerns 
about the stability of JPDO and the impact of the turnovers on its 
progress. Additionally, we and JPDO officials have heard concerns from 
stakeholders about the productivity of some integrated product teams 
and the pace of the planning effort. In response, JPDO officials are 
currently proposing several changes to JPDO’s organizational structure 
aimed at improving the organization’s effectiveness. 

JPDO has also made progress toward releasing several key planning 
documents, including a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise 
Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan, although in some cases on a 
revised and extended timeline. JPDO is focusing on the right types of 
key documents for the foundation of NextGen planning, although the 
current draft Concept of Operations still lacks important details. In 
our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a 
planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human 
and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently, 
institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies 
will be critical to JPDO’s ability to facilitate the implementation of 
NextGen. JPDO has identified several tasks including aligning the 
enterprise architectures of its partner agencies, working with OMB to 
establish a cross-agency mechanism for NextGen funding decisions, and 
working with FAA to revamp a key planning document to focus on the 
NextGen effort. 

JPDO has made progress in developing cost estimates for NextGen, 
recently reporting that it estimates the total federal cost for NextGen 
infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 
billion. Questions remain, however, over which entities will fund and 
conduct some of the necessary research, development, and demonstration 
projects that in the past were often conducted by NASA, and which will 
be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. For example, JPDO’s 
investment simulation capability, which relies heavily on a NASA 
modeling platform, may be constrained unless the JPDO or another 
partner agency can assume the modeling work. JPDO also faces a 
challenge in addressing questions concerning how human factors issues, 
such as the changing roles of air traffic controllers in a more 
automated NextGen environment, will be researched and addressed. 
Finally, JPDO has a continuing challenge in ensuring the involvement of 
all key stakeholders, including controllers and technicians. Similarly, 
issues have arisen over whether conflict of interest issues could chill 
the participation of industry stakeholders. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-693T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham, 
Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today to discuss the 
progress of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) in 
conceptualizing, planning, and facilitating a transformation of the 
current national airspace system to the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen). Our nation's current airspace system 
is under growing strain as the demand for air travel is steadily 
increasing, from over 740 million passengers flying in fiscal year 2006 
to an estimated 1 billion passengers by 2015, according to Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates. The system is also expected to 
absorb a growing variety of aircraft, from the jumbo A380 which can 
hold more than 500 passengers to very light jets which will transport 
six or fewer passengers per flight. The consensus is that the current 
system cannot be expanded to meet this projected growth. Without a 
timely transition to NextGen capabilities, JPDO officials estimate a 
future gap between the demand for air transportation and available 
capacity that could cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars annually. 

In 2003, recognizing the need for system transformation, Congress 
authorized the creation of JPDO,[Footnote 1] housed within FAA, to lead 
a collaborative effort of federal and nonfederal aviation stakeholders 
to conceptualize and plan the NextGen system. NextGen is envisioned as 
a major redesign of the air transportation system that will move from 
largely ground-based radars to precision satellite-based navigation and 
includes digital, networked communications; an integrated weather 
system; layered, adaptive security; and more. In addition to FAA, JPDO 
operates in conjunction with multiple federal partner agencies, 
including the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and 
Homeland Security; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. 

My testimony today focuses on the following question: What is the 
status of JPDO's planning and facilitation of NextGen with respect to 
its organizational structure, technical planning, and initial research 
and development? My statement is based on our November 2006 report to 
this subcommittee[Footnote 2] as well as on-going work. We conducted 
this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

In summary: 

JPDO has made progress in several areas in its planning of the NextGen 
initiative, but continues to face a number of challenges. JPDO's 
organizational structure incorporates some of the practices that we 
have found to be effective for federal interagency collaborations, and 
includes an institute that facilitates the participation of nonfederal 
stakeholders. JPDO has faced some organizational challenges, however. 
Leadership turnover at JPDO and the Institute have raised concerns 
about the stability of JPDO and the NextGen initiative. Additionally, 
we and JPDO officials have heard concerns from stakeholders about the 
productivity of some integrated product teams (IPTs) and the pace of 
the planning effort at JPDO. In response, JPDO officials are currently 
proposing several changes to JPDO's organizational structure aimed at 
improving the effectiveness of the organization. We believe that these 
changes could help address stakeholder concerns, but the effectiveness 
of these changes will have to be evaluated. 

JPDO has also made progress toward releasing several key planning 
documents, including a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise 
Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan, although in some cases on a 
revised and extended timeline. JPDO is focusing on the right types of 
key documents for the foundation of NextGen planning, although the 
current draft Concept of Operations still lacks important details. In 
our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a 
planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human 
and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently, 
institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies 
will be critical to JPDO's ability to facilitate the implementation of 
NextGen. JPDO has identified several tasks that will help 
institutionalize collaboration, including aligning the enterprise 
architectures of its partner agencies, working with OMB to establish a 
cross-agency mechanism for NextGen funding decisions, and working with 
FAA to revamp a key planning document to focus on the NextGen effort. 

JPDO has made progress in developing cost estimates for NextGen, 
recently reporting that it estimates the total federal cost for NextGen 
infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 
billion. Questions remain, however, over which organizations will fund 
and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and 
demonstration projects that in the past were often conducted by NASA, 
and which will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. For 
example, JPDO's investment simulation capability relies heavily on a 
NASA modeling platform that NASA does not plan to upgrade for 2 years. 
As a result, JPDO's investment simulation capability might be 
constrained. JPDO also faces a challenge in addressing questions 
concerning how human factors issues, such as the changing roles of air 
traffic controllers in a more automated NextGen environment, will be 
researched and addressed. Finally, JPDO has a continuing challenge in 
ensuring the involvement of all key stakeholders. For example, active 
air traffic controllers and technicians are not currently involved in 
NextGen planning. Similarly, issues have arisen over whether conflict 
of interest issues could chill the participation of industry 
stakeholders. 

In November 2006, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation 
direct JPDO to take actions to institutionalize the partner agencies' 
collaboration in supporting NextGen, including action on a Memorandum 
of Understanding among the partner agencies, actions to finalize 
procedures to leverage partner agency resources, and actions to develop 
procedures for dispute resolution. We also recommended that the 
Secretary direct JPDO to determine whether key stakeholders and 
expertise are not currently represented in JPDO planning efforts. JPDO 
officials neither agreed nor disagree with our recommendations, but 
said they would consider them. 

JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning NextGen, but Continues to Face a 
Number of Challenges: 

JPDO has continued to make progress in facilitating the collaboration 
that is central to its mission and in furthering its key planning 
documents. However, JPDO faces a number of challenges involving its 
organizational structure, institutionalization of its efforts, research 
and development activities, and stakeholder participation. 

JPDO's Organizational Structure Facilitates Collaboration, but 
Continues to Evolve: 

Vision 100 includes requirements for JPDO to coordinate and consult 
with its partner agencies, private sector experts, and the public. 
JPDO's approach has been to establish an organizational structure that 
involves federal and nonfederal stakeholders throughout the 
organization. This structure includes a federal interagency senior 
policy committee, a board of directors, and an institute to facilitate 
the participation of nonfederal stakeholders. JPDO's structure also 
includes eight integrated product teams (IPT), which is where the 
federal and nonfederal experts come together to plan for and coordinate 
the development of technologies for NextGen. The eight IPTs are linked 
to eight key strategies that JPDO developed early on for guiding its 
NextGen planning work (see table 1). 

Table 1: JPDO's Strategies and Related IPT Lead Agencies: 

Strategy: Develop airport infrastructure to meet future demand; 
Related IPT Lead Agency: Federal Aviation Administration. 

Strategy: Establish an effective security system without limiting 
mobility or civil liberties; 
Related IPT Lead Agency: Department of Homeland Security. 

Strategy: Establish an agile air traffic system that quickly responds 
to shifts in demand; 
Related IPT Lead Agency: National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration[A]. 

Strategy: Establish shared situational awareness--where all users share 
the same information; 
Related IPT Lead Agency: Department of Defense. 

Strategy: Establish a comprehensive and proactive approach to safety; 
Related IPT Lead Agency: Federal Aviation Administration. 

Strategy: Develop environmental protection that allows sustained 
aviation growth; Related IPT Lead Agency: Federal Aviation 
Administration. 

Strategy: Develop a systemwide capability to reduce weather impacts; 
Related IPT Lead Agency: Department of Commerce. 

Strategy: Harmonize equipage and operations globally; 
Related IPT Lead Agency: Federal Aviation Administration. 

Sources: GAO and JPDO. 

[A] NASA leads this IPT because it has primary responsibility for 
conducting the necessary research; implementation of the agile air 
traffic system is the responsibility of FAA. 

[End of table] 

JPDO's senior policy committee is headed by the Secretary of 
Transportation (as required in Vision 100) and includes senior-level 
officials from JPDO's partner agencies. The Next Generation Air 
Transportation System Institute (the Institute) was created by an 
agreement between the National Center for Advanced 
Technologies[Footnote 3] and FAA to incorporate the expertise and views 
of stakeholders from private industry, state and local governments, and 
academia. The Institute Management Council (IMC), composed of top 
officials and representatives from the aviation community, oversees the 
policy, recommendations, and products of the Institute and provides a 
means for advancing consensus positions on critical NextGen issues. The 
IPTs are headed by representatives of JPDO's partner agencies and 
include more than 200 nonfederal stakeholders from over 100 
organizations, whose participation was arranged through the Institute. 
Figure 1 illustrates JPDO's position within FAA and the JPDO structures 
that bring together federal and nonfederal stakeholders, including the 
Institute and the IPTs. To meet Vision 100's requirement that JPDO 
coordinate and consult with the public, the Institute held its first 
public meeting in March 2006 and plans to hold another public meeting 
in May 2007. 

Figure 1: Organization of JPDO: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: JPDO. 

[End of figure] 

In November 2006, we reported that JPDO's organizational structure 
incorporated some of the practices that we have found to be effective 
for federal interagency collaborations--an important point given how 
critical such collaboration is to the success of JPDO's mission. For 
example, the JPDO partner agencies have worked together to develop key 
strategies for NextGen and JPDO has leveraged its partner agency 
resources by staffing various levels of its organization with partner 
agency employees. Also, our work has shown that involving stakeholders 
can, among other things, increase their support for a collaborative 
effort, and the Institute provides a method for involving nonfederal 
stakeholders in planning NextGen. 

Recently, JPDO officials told us they have proposed to FAA management 
and the IMC executive board a change in the IPT structure and operation 
to improve the efficiency of the organization. JPDO has proposed 
converting each IPT into a "work group" with the same participants as 
the current IPT, but with each work group led by a joint government and 
industry steering committee. The steering committee would oversee the 
creation of small, ad hoc subgroups that would be tasked with short- 
term projects exploring specific issues and delivering discrete work 
products. Under this arrangement, work group members would be free of 
obligations to the group when not engaged in a specific project. 
According to JPDO officials, if these changes are approved, the work 
groups would be more efficient and output-or product-focused than the 
current IPTs. JPDO officials also noted that they are proposing to 
create a ninth work group to address avionics issues. 

We believe that these changes could help address concerns that we have 
heard from some stakeholders about the productivity of some IPTs and 
the pace of the planning effort at JPDO. Nonetheless, the effectiveness 
of these changes will have to be evaluated over time. Also, JPDO's 
director has pointed out the need for the office to begin transitioning 
from planning NextGen to facilitating the implementation of NextGen. We 
believe that these changes are potentially useful in supporting such a 
transition. However, it will be important to monitor these changes to 
ensure that the participation of stakeholders is neither decreased nor 
adversely affected. Maintaining communications within and among work 
groups could increase in importance if, as work group members focus on 
specific projects, they become less involved in the overall 
collaborative planning effort. 

Finally, while the organizational structure of JPDO and the Institute 
have been in place and largely unchanged for several years now, both of 
these entities have suffered from a lack of stable leadership. As JPDO 
begins its fourth year in operation, it is on its third director and 
operated during most of 2006 under the stewardship of an acting 
director. The Institute pointed out in its recent annual report that 
JPDO's leadership turnover had made it a challenge for JPDO to move out 
more aggressively on many goals and objectives, as the office waited on 
a full-time director. The Institute also stated that JPDO's leadership 
turnover had limited the ability of the IMC executive committee to 
forge a stronger relationship with JPDO leadership and work jointly on 
strategic issues and challenges. However, the Institute has also had 
issues with turnover and is currently functioning under an acting 
director due to the recent departure of its second director, who had 
been in the position less than two years. The leadership turnovers at 
both JPDO and the Institute raise concerns about the stability of JPDO 
and about the impact of these turnovers on the progress of the NextGen 
initiative. 

JPDO Has Made Progress Toward Releasing Key Planning Documents, 
although Further Work Remains: 

JPDO's authorizing legislation requires the office to create a multi- 
agency research and development plan for the transition to NextGen. To 
comply, JPDO is developing several key documents that together form the 
foundation of NextGen planning. These documents include a NextGen 
Concept of Operations, a NextGen Enterprise Architecture, and an 
Integrated Work Plan. 

The Concept of Operations is the most fundamental of JPDO's key 
planning documents, as the other key documents flow from it. Although 
an earlier version was delayed so that stakeholder comments could be 
addressed, Version 1.2 of the Concept of Operations is currently posted 
on JPDO's Website for review and comment by the aviation community. 
This 226-page document provides written descriptions of how the NextGen 
system is envisioned to operate in 2025 and beyond, including 
highlighting key research and policy issues that will need to be 
addressed.[Footnote 4] For example, some key policy issues are 
associated with automating the air traffic control system, including 
the need for a backup plan in case automation fails, the 
responsibilities and liabilities of different stakeholders during an 
automation failure, and the level of monitoring needed by pilots when 
automation is ensuring safe separation between aircraft. Over the next 
few months, JPDO plans to address the public comments it receives and 
issue a revised version of the Concept of Operations. 

In addition to the Concept of Operations, JPDO is working on an 
Enterprise Architecture for NextGen--that is, a technical description 
of the NextGen system, akin to blueprints for a building. The 
Enterprise Architecture is meant to provide a common tool for planning 
and understanding the complex, interrelated systems that will make up 
NextGen. According to JPDO officials, the Enterprise Architecture will 
provide the means for coordinating among the partner agencies and 
private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant research and 
development activities, and integrating equipment. JPDO plans to issue 
an early version of its Enterprise Architecture next month, although it 
was originally scheduled for release in September 2006. 

Finally, JPDO is developing an Integrated Work Plan that will describe 
the capabilities needed to transition to NextGen from the current 
system and provide the research, policy and regulation, and schedules 
necessary to achieve NextGen by 2025. The Integrated Work Plan is akin 
to a project plan and will be critical for fiscal year 2009 partner 
agency budget and program planning. According to a JPDO official, the 
office intends to issue its initial draft of the Integrated Work Plan 
in July 2007. 

Figure 2: Key NextGen Planning Documents: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: JPDO. 

[End of figure] 

We have discussed JPDO's planning documents with JPDO officials and 
examined both an earlier version of JPDO's Concept of 
Operations[Footnote 5] and the current version that is out for public 
comment.[Footnote 6] Based on our analysis, JPDO is focusing on the 
right types of key documents for the foundation of NextGen planning. As 
for the Concept of Operations, the current version is much improved 
from the prior version, with additional details added. Nonetheless, we 
believe that it still does not include key elements such as scenarios 
illustrating NextGen operations, a summary of NextGen's operational 
impact on users and other stakeholders, and an analysis of the 
benefits, alternatives, and trade-offs that were considered for 
NextGen. In addition, it lacks an overall description that ties 
together the eight key areas that the document covers. As noted, JPDO 
does plan to release another version of the Concept of Operations later 
this year. 

In fact, JPDO plans further versions of all of its key planning 
documents. We see the development of all three of JPDO's key documents 
as part of an iterative and evolutionary process. Thus, it is unlikely 
that any of these documents will ever be truly "finalized," but rather 
will continue to evolve throughout the implementation of NextGen to 
reflect, for example, the development of new technologies or problems 
uncovered during research and development of planned technologies. 

Finally, while each of the three key documents has a specific purpose, 
the scope and technical sophistication of these documents makes it 
difficult for some stakeholders to understand the basics of the NextGen 
planning effort. To address this issue, JPDO is currently drafting what 
the office refers to as a "blueprint" for NextGen, meant to be a short, 
high-level, non-technical presentation of NextGen goals and 
capabilities. We believe that such a document could help some 
stakeholders develop a better understanding of NextGen and the planning 
effort to date. 

Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Poses a Continuing 
Challenge for JPDO: 

In our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a 
planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human 
and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently, 
institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies 
will be critical to JPDO's ability to facilitate the implementation of 
NextGen. As we reported in November, JPDO has not established some 
practices significant to institutionalizing its collaborative process. 
For example, one method for establishing collaboration at a fundamental 
level would be for JPDO to have formal, long-term agreements among its 
partner agencies on their roles and responsibilities in creating 
NextGen. Currently, there is no mechanism that assures the partner 
agencies' commitment continuing over the 20-year timeframe of NextGen 
or their accountability to JPDO. According to JPDO officials, they are 
working to establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by the 
Secretary or other high-ranking official from each partner agency, 
which will broadly define the partner agencies' roles and 
responsibilities. JPDO first informed us of the development of this MOU 
in August 2005; in November 2006 we recommended that JPDO finalize the 
MOU and present it to the senior policy committee for its consideration 
and action. However, as of March 28, 2007, the MOU remained unsigned by 
some of the partner agencies. 

Another key method for institutionalizing the collaborative effort is 
incorporating NextGen goals and activities into the partner agencies' 
key planning documents. For example, we noted in November 2006 that 
NASA and FAA had incorporated NextGen goals into their strategic plans. 
These types of efforts will be critical to JPDO's ability to leverage 
its partner agency resources for continued JPDO planning efforts. Even 
more importantly, these efforts will be critical to helping ensure that 
partner agencies--given competing missions and resource demands-- 
dedicate the resources necessary to support the implementation of 
NextGen research efforts or system acquisitions. 

Recognizing that JPDO does not have authority over partner agency 
resources, FAA and JPDO have initiated several efforts to 
institutionalize NextGen. For example, JPDO is working with FAA to 
refocus one of FAA's key planning documents on the implementation of 
NextGen--an effort that also appears to be improving the collaboration 
and coordination between JPDO and FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO), 
which has primary responsibility for modernization of the air traffic 
control system. FAA has expanded and revamped its Operational Evolution 
Plan (OEP)--renamed the Operational Evolution Partnership--to become 
FAA's implementation plan for NextGen.[Footnote 7] The OEP is being 
expanded to apply to all of FAA and is intended to become a 
comprehensive description of how the agency will implement NextGen, 
including the required technologies, procedures, and resources. (Figure 
3 shows the OEP framework.) An ATO official told us that the new OEP is 
to be consistent with JPDO's key planning documents and its budget 
guidance to the partner agencies. According to FAA, the new OEP will 
allow it to demonstrate appropriate budget control and linkage to 
NextGen plans and will force FAA's research and development to be 
relevant to NextGen's requirements. According to FAA documents, the 
agency plans to publish a new OEP in June 2007. 

Figure 3: New OEP Framework: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: JPDO. 

Note: The concentric rings indicate the nature of initiative 
development from the outer ring (NextGen strategic initiatives), in 
which new programs and concepts are analyzed and demonstrated; to the 
second ring, where decisions are made regarding safety, operating 
policy, performance standards, and certification requirements; to the 
third ring (technical development), where concepts are prototyped and 
investment analysis decisions are made. The progression through the 
rings is not necessarily linear, and a program may be in more than one 
ring at a time. Data communications, for example, is in the technical 
development ring and also in the middle ring as policy and rulemaking 
is considered. The core is divided into three sections, which indicate 
the FAA offices that implement the final NextGen program. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, to further align FAA's efforts with JPDO's plans for 
NextGen, FAA is creating a NextGen Review Board to oversee the OEP. 
This Review Board will be co-chaired by JPDO's Director and ATO's Vice 
President of Operations Planning Services. Initiatives, such as concept 
demonstrations or research, proposed for inclusion in the OEP will now 
need to go through the Review Board for approval. Initiatives are to be 
assessed for their relation to NextGen requirements, concept maturity, 
and risk. An ATO official told us that the new OEP process should also 
help identify some smaller programs that might be inconsistent with 
NextGen and which could be discontinued. Additionally, as a further 
step towards integrating ATO and JPDO, the administration's 
reauthorization proposal calls for the JPDO director to be a voting 
member of FAA's Joint Resources Council and ATO's Executive Council. 

While progress is being made in incorporating NextGen initiatives into 
FAA's strategic and planning documents, more remains to be done with 
FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies. For example, one critical 
activity that remains in this area will be synchronizing the NextGen 
enterprise architecture, once JPDO releases and further refines it, 
with the partner agencies' enterprise architectures. Doing so should 
help align agencies' current work with NextGen while simultaneously 
identifying gaps between agency plans and NextGen plans. Also, while 
FAA is making significant progress toward creating an implementation 
plan for NextGen, the other partner agencies are less far along or have 
not begun such efforts. JPDO's lack of authority over partner agency 
resources will be minimized as a challenge if the partner agencies 
commit to NextGen goals and initiatives at a structural level. By 
further incorporation of NextGen efforts into strategic planning 
documents, the partner agencies will better institutionalize their 
commitments to JPDO and the NextGen initiative. 

Finally, another important method for institutionalizing the 
collaborative effort will be for JPDO to establish mechanisms for 
leveraging partner agency resources. JPDO has made progress in this 
area, although further work remains. As we noted in our November 
report, JPDO is working with OMB to develop a process that would allow 
OMB to identify NextGen-related projects across the partner agencies 
and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program. We recently 
met with OMB officials who said that they felt there has been 
significant progress with JPDO over the last year. JPDO is now working 
on an OMB Exhibit 300 form for NextGen.[Footnote 8] This will allow 
JPDO to present OMB a joint business case for the NextGen-related 
efforts within the partner agencies and will be used as input to 
funding decisions for NextGen research and acquisitions across the 
agencies. This Exhibit 300 will be due to OMB in September 2007 to 
inform decisions about the partner agencies' 2009 budget submissions. 

Ultimately, the success of JPDO will have to be measured in the efforts 
of its partner agencies to implement policies and procedures and 
acquire systems that support NextGen. To date, JPDO can point to its 
success in collaborating with FAA to fund and speed its rollout of two 
systems considered cornerstone technologies for NextGen: Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and System Wide Information 
Management (SWIM). ADS-B is a new air traffic surveillance system that 
will replace many existing radars with less costly ground-based 
transceivers. SWIM will provide an initial network centric capability 
to all the users of the air transportation system. This means that the 
FAA and the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense will 
eventually share a common, real-time, secure picture of aviation 
operations across the airspace system. Identifying such NextGen 
programs across the partner agencies and establishing implementation 
plans for them in JPDO's Integrated Work Plan will be critical going 
forward to creating performance metrics for JPDO. 

Although we recommended in our November report that JPDO develop 
written procedures that formalize agreements with OMB regarding the 
leveraging of partner agency resources, this is still a work in 
progress. For example, OMB officials said they had not reviewed JPDO's 
2008 partner agency budget guidance prior to its release to the partner 
agencies, which highlights the need for JPDO to further develop its 
procedures for working with OMB. Going forward, it will be important 
for Congress and other stakeholders to evaluate the success of the 2009 
budgets in supporting NextGen initiatives, especially as 2009 is 
expected to be a critical year in the transition from planning NextGen 
to implementing NextGen. 

FAA and JPDO Have Begun to Release Early Cost Estimates for NextGen, 
but Questions Remain Over Who Will Conduct Necessary Research and 
Development: 

In our November report, we noted that JPDO had not yet developed a 
comprehensive estimate of the costs of NextGen. Since then, in its 
recently released 2006 Progress Report,[Footnote 9] JPDO reported some 
estimated costs for NextGen, including specifics on some early NextGen 
programs. JPDO believes the total federal cost for NextGen 
infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 
billion. JPDO also reported that a preliminary estimate of the 
corresponding cost to system users, who will have to equip with the 
advanced avionics that are necessary to realize the full benefits of 
some NextGen technologies, produced a range of $14 billion to $20 
billion. JPDO noted that this range for avionics costs reflects 
uncertainty about equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of 
very light jets that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the 
amount of out-of-service time required for installation. 

FAA, in its capital investment plan for fiscal years 2008-2012, 
includes estimated expenditures for 11 line items that are considered 
NextGen capital programs.[Footnote 10] The total 5-year estimated 
expenditures for these programs is $4.3 billion. In fiscal year 2008, 
only 6 of the line items are funded for a total of roughly $174 
million; funding for the remaining 5 programs would begin with the 
fiscal year 2009 budget. According to FAA, in addition to capital 
spending for NextGen, the agency will spend an estimated $300 million 
on NextGen-related research and development from fiscal years 2008 
through 2012. The administration's budget for fiscal year 2008 for FAA 
includes a total of $17.8 million to support the activities of JPDO. 

While FAA and JPDO have begun to release estimates for FAA's NextGen 
investment portfolio, questions remain over which entities will fund 
and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and 
demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen 
capabilities. In the past, a significant portion of aeronautics 
research and development, including intermediate technology 
development, has been performed by NASA. However, NASA's aeronautics 
research budget and proposed funding shows a 30-percent decline, in 
constant 2005 dollars, from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2011. To 
its credit, NASA plans to focus its research on the needs of NextGen. 
However, NASA is also moving toward a focus on fundamental research and 
away from developmental work and demonstration projects, which could 
negatively impact NextGen if these efforts are not assumed by others. 
According to its 2006 Progress Report, JPDO is building a research and 
development plan that will document NextGen's research needs and the 
organizations that will perform the work. 

For example, JPDO's investment simulation capability relies heavily on 
NASA's NAS-wide modeling platform, the Airspace Concepts Evaluation 
System (ACES).[Footnote 11] This investment simulation capability 
permits JPDO to, among other things, evaluate alternative research 
ideas and assess the performance of competing vendors. According to a 
JPDO official, this capability, which is critical to NextGen research, 
is eroding as JPDO's investment simulation requirements are expanding. 
As part of its fundamental research mission, NASA intends to upgrade to 
ACES-X (a more sophisticated representation of the national airspace 
system), but not for another two years. Until then, JPDO investment 
modeling capability will be constrained unless the office or another 
partner agency can assume the modeling work. While one option would be 
to contract with private sector vendors to do this type of modeling on 
a per simulation basis, this solution could be expensive for the 
government. Moreover, JPDO might not be able to continue facilitating 
participation by both small and large companies, thus giving both an 
equal opportunity to demonstrate their ideas, because small companies 
would have to pay for access to this proprietary modeling capability. 
This is an issue that needs to be addressed in the short-term. 

JPDO faces the challenge of determining the nature and scope of the 
research and technology development necessary to begin the transition 
to NextGen, as well as identifying the entities that can conduct that 
research and development. According to officials at FAA and JPDO, they 
are currently studying these issues and trying to assess how much 
research and development FAA can assume. An FAA official recently 
testified that the agency proposes to increase its research and 
development funding by $280 million over the next 5 years. However, a 
draft report by an advisory committee to FAA stated that FAA would need 
at least $100 million annually in increased funding to assume NASA's 
research and development work, and establishing the necessary 
infrastructure within FAA could delay the implementation of NextGen by 
5 years.[Footnote 12] More work remains to completely assess the 
research and development needs of NextGen and the ability of FAA and 
the other JPDO partner agencies to budget for and conduct the necessary 
initiatives. This information is critical as the timely completion of 
research and testing of proposed NextGen systems is necessary to 
keeping the NextGen initiative on schedule. 

Some Fundamental NextGen Capabilities Will Require Human Factors 
Research: 

Addressing questions about how human factors issues will affect the 
move to some key NextGen capabilities is another challenge for JPDO. 
For example, the NextGen Concept of Operations envisions an increased 
reliance on automation, which raises questions about the role of the 
air traffic controllers in such an automated environment. Similarly, 
the Concept of Operations envisions that pilots will take on a greater 
share of the responsibility for maintaining safe separation and other 
tasks currently performed by controllers. This raises human factors 
questions about whether pilots can safely perform these additional 
duties. 

Although JPDO has begun to model how shifts in air traffic controllers' 
workloads would affect their performance, it has not yet begun to model 
the effect of how this shift in workload to pilots would affect pilot 
performance. According to a JPDO official, modeling the effect of 
changes in pilot workload has not yet begun because JPDO has not yet 
identified a suitable model for incorporation into its suite of 
modeling tools. According to a JPDO official, the evolving roles of 
pilots and controllers is the NextGen initiative's most important human 
factors issue, but will be difficult to research because data on pilot 
behavior are not readily available for use in creating models. In 
addition to the study of changing roles, JPDO has not yet studied the 
training implications of various systems or solutions proposed for 
NextGen. For example, JPDO officials said they will need to study the 
extent to which new air traffic controllers will have to be trained to 
operate both the old and the new equipment as the Concept of Operations 
and enterprise architecture mature. 

JPDO Faces A Continuing Challenge in Ensuring the Involvement of All 
Key Stakeholders: 

Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers and 
technicians, will play critical roles in NextGen, and their involvement 
in planning for and deploying the new technology will be important to 
the success of NextGen. In November 2006, we reported that active air 
traffic controllers were not involved in the NextGen planning effort 
and recommended that JPDO determine whether any key stakeholders and 
expertise were not represented on its IPTs, divisions, or elsewhere 
within the office. Since then, the head of the controllers' union has 
taken a seat on the Institute Management Council. However, no active 
controllers are yet participating at the IPT planning level. Also, 
aviation technicians do not participate in NextGen efforts. Input from 
current air traffic controllers who have recent experience controlling 
aircraft and current technicians who will maintain NextGen equipment is 
important when considering human factors and safety issues. Our work on 
past air traffic control modernization projects has shown that a lack 
of stakeholder or expert involvement early and throughout a project can 
lead to costly increases and delays. 

In addition, we found that some private sector stakeholders have 
expressed concerns that participation in the Institute might either 
preclude bidding on future NextGen acquisitions or pose organizational 
conflicts of interest. FAA's acquisition process, generally, precludes 
bids from organizations that have participated in, materially 
influenced, or had prior knowledge of the requirements for an 
acquisition. The Institute was aware of this concern and attempted to 
address it through an amendment to its governing document that 
strengthened the language protecting participants from organizational 
conflicts of interest for participation in the NextGen initiative. 
However, while the amendment language currently operates to protect 
stakeholders, the language has never been tested or challenged. Thus, 
it is unclear at this time whether any stakeholder participation is 
being chilled by conflict of interest concerns. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to 
respond to any questions from you or other Members of the Subcommittee. 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L. 
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals making 
key contributions to this statement include Kevin Egan, Colin Fallon, 
Rick Jorgenson, Faye Morrison, and Richard Scott. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] JPDO was authorized by the Vision 100--Century of Aviation 
Reauthorization Act (Pub. L. No. 108-176). The office began operating 
in early 2004. 

[2] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and 
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace 
System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006). 

[3] The National Center for Advanced Technologies is a nonprofit unit 
within the Aerospace Industries Association. 

[4] Following an introductory section, the Concept of Operations has 
eight sections covering air traffic management operations, airport 
operations and infrastructure services, net-centric infrastructure 
services, shared situational awareness services, security services, 
environmental management framework, safety management services, and 
performance management services. 

[5] Concept of Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System, version 0.2, July 24, 2006. 

[6] Our senior level technologist reviewed JPDO's current Concept of 
Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation System, version 
1.2, dated February 28, 2007, by comparing it with the IEEE Standard 
1362-1998 for concept of operations documents. 

[7] Prior to expansion of the OEP, the document centered around plans 
for increasing capacity and efficiency at 35 major airports. 

[8] Section 300 of OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and 
Execution of the Budget (Nov. 2, 2005), sets forth requirements for 
federal agencies for planning, budgeting, acquiring, and managing 
information technology capital assets. 

[9] JPDO, Making the NextGen Vision a Reality: 2006 Progress Report to 
the Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Plan 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2007). 

[10] FAA has six capital investment programs that it considers 
transformational NextGen programs slated to receive funding in fiscal 
year 2008: ADS-B nationwide implementation, System Wide Information 
Management (SWIM), NextGen Data Communications, NextGen Network Enabled 
Weather, National Airspace System Voice Switch, and NextGen Technology 
Demonstration. In addition, five other programs are slated to begin 
funding in 2009: NextGen System Development, NextGen High Altitude 
Trajectory Based Operations, NextGen High Density Airports, NextGen 
Networked Facilities, and NextGen Cross-Cutting Infrastructure. 

[11] ACES provides a detailed flight simulation environment and an open 
framework to integrate the results of other simulations. This allows 
JPDO to test concepts well before they have to be demonstrated with 
real hardware and people. This platform provides a basis for evaluating 
the timing of many agencies' current budget requests and is a method 
for comparing competitive ideas. 

[12] Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee, Draft 
Report on Financing the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(Washington, D.C.: April 2006). 

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