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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10 a.m. EDT: 

Thursday, March 22, 2007: 

Federal Aviation Administration: 

Key Issues in Ensuring the Efficient Development and Safe Operation of 
the Next Generation Air Transportation System: 

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

GAO-07-636T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-636T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 
Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operates one of the safest 
air transportation systems in the world. It is, however, a system under 
strain. The skies are becoming more crowded every day, with an 
estimated 1 billion passengers per year expected by 2015. The current 
aviation system cannot be expanded to meet this growth. The 
reauthorization of FAA is an opportunity to examine how the agency is 
managing the operation and safety of the air transportation system as 
it leads the transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System (NextGen)—a major redesign of the current system. GAO’s 
testimony focuses on key issues related to FAA’s reauthorization, 
including (1) FAA’s progress in implementing initiatives that could 
provide a solid foundation for NextGen, (2) issues that need to be 
addressed to help ensure a successful transition to NextGen, and (3) 
safety areas that are important for the continued safe operation of the 
current and future system. This statement is based on recent GAO 
reports and ongoing work on some management and safety initiatives. 

What GAO Found: 

FAA has made significant progress in moving to more businesslike and 
cost-effective operations and modernizing the air traffic control 
system. This progress should better position the agency for the complex 
implementation of NextGen. However, further work remains to fully 
address past problems in the modernization effort while at the same 
time finding new leadership—due to losses of key leaders at FAA and its 
Air Traffic Organization—that can continue an agencywide commitment to 
transformation. While FAA has improved its financial management 
capability, including implementing a new cost accounting system and 
developing a cost allocation methodology, it is not yet clear if that 
methodology provides a sound basis from which to derive the 
administration’s proposed new cost-based funding structure for FAA. In 
addition, improved acquisition processes, such as establishing guidance 
on using Earned Value Management, are positive steps, but they need to 
be fully implemented across all critical acquisitions. As FAA works 
toward acquiring and deploying NextGen technology, it will also be 
important to phase out existing air traffic control equipment using a 
risk-based approach and continue to maintain existing systems. 

Key issues that FAA needs to address as it begins implementing NextGen 
include continued focus on coordination with the Joint Planning and 
Development Office (JPDO). FAA, in coordination with JPDO, is 
developing an implementation plan for NextGen that is expected to 
include details of the required technologies, procedures, and 
resources. This is a step in the right direction. While FAA estimates 
that its cost for NextGen programs may range between $15 billion and 
$22 billion, it will be important to determine which entities will fund 
and conduct the necessary developmental research. Also, GAO has 
recommended that FAA assess its capacity to handle the technical and 
contract management expertise to determine if it has the capabilities 
required to oversee the implementation of NextGen. FAA is considering 
action that would respond to this recommendation. 

To deal with current safety issues and the transition to NextGen, it 
will be important for FAA to address safety in the airport environment, 
where forecasted traffic growth could lead to increased ground 
congestion and safety hazards. FAA also needs to establish the 
appropriate regulatory approach for certain current airspace users, 
such as air ambulances, and new users, such as the emerging space 
tourism industry. In addition, to maintain and expand the margin of 
safety, especially if substantial growth in air traffic materializes, 
FAA will need to rely more on data than on labor-intensive inspections. 
GAO has recommended that FAA improve its safety data. FAA has taken 
some action to improve its data, but more work remains. FAA’s ability 
to ensure a safe system will also be affected by its ability to hire, 
train, and deploy its workforce of air traffic controllers, inspectors, 
and technicians. 

What GAO Recommends: 

This testimony does not contain recommendations. However, GAO reports 
containing relevant recommendations are listed among the Related GAO 
Products, some of which FAA is in the process of responding to. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-636T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham, 
Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today as you 
consider the reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA). FAA operates one of the safest air transportation systems in the 
world. It is, however, a system under strain. The skies over America 
are becoming more crowded every day. Demand for air travel has 
increased in recent years, with over 740 million passengers flying in 
fiscal year 2006, climbing toward an estimated 1 billion passengers per 
year in 2015, according to FAA estimates. Already, with the increasing 
demand for air travel, flight arrival delays have increased; such 
delays are nearing the record levels of 2000, a year in which one in 
four flights reached its destination behind schedule. The system is 
also expected to absorb a variety of different types of aircraft in the 
near future, ranging from the jumbo Airbus A380--which can hold more 
than 500 passengers--to very light jets--which may greatly increase the 
number of aircraft in the sky while transporting six or fewer 
passengers on any given flight. The consensus is that the current 
aviation system cannot be expanded to meet this projected growth. 

In 2003, recognizing the need for system transformation, Congress 
authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office 
(JPDO), housed within FAA but involving several federal partner 
agencies,[Footnote 1] to conceptualize and plan for the Next Generation 
Air Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen is envisioned as a major 
redesign of the air transportation system that will move from largely 
ground-based radars to precision satellite-based navigation and 
includes digital, networked communications; an integrated weather 
system; layered, adaptive security; and more. The reauthorization of 
FAA and the Airport and Airway Trust Fund provides a unique opportunity 
to examine how the agency is managing the operation and safety of the 
current air traffic control system as it prepares to implement NextGen. 
My testimony today focuses on these questions: (1) What progress is FAA 
making in implementing initiatives that could provide a solid 
foundation for NextGen? (2) What are the key issues that need to be 
addressed to help ensure a successful transition to NextGen? and (3) 
What key safety areas need to be addressed for the continued safe 
operation of the current and future air transportation system? My 
statement is based on our recent reports as well as ongoing work for 
this subcommittee assessing FAA's performance metrics for its 
acquisitions, runway safety, and safety issues concerning the operation 
of unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace. We conducted 
this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

In summary: 

* Over the past few years, FAA has made significant progress in moving 
to more businesslike and cost effective operations and modernizing the 
air traffic control system, which should better position the agency for 
the complex implementation of NextGen. However, further work remains to 
fully address past problems in the modernization program. FAA has 
improved its financial management, including implementing a new cost 
accounting system and developing a cost allocation methodology; 
however, it is not yet clear if the cost allocation methodology is 
sufficiently valid and reliable to derive the administration's proposed 
new cost-based funding for FAA. FAA has also sought to improve its 
financial management with efforts to control and reduce costs. For 
example, FAA plans to produce cost savings through outsourcing such as 
with its planned contracting out of new surveillance technology, and 
through facility consolidations. In addition to improvements in 
financial management, FAA has improved its acquisition management, 
which will be critical to a successful transition to NextGen. For 
example, FAA has begun reviewing its major systems acquisitions and has 
established guidance for using a project management technique known as 
Earned Value Management[Footnote 2] in its acquisition management 
system, although institutionalizing these improvements will continue to 
be a challenge for FAA. FAA has also established performance measures 
and targets for its critical acquisitions. While the acquisition and 
deployment of NextGen technology are key issues facing the agency, it 
will be critical that FAA continue to maintain existing systems and 
phase out existing systems using a risk-based approach. And, although 
FAA has initiated numerous financial, management, and acquisition 
process improvements, the agency must work to institutionalize these 
changes while at the same time finding new leadership--due to losses of 
key leaders at FAA and its Air Traffic Organization (ATO)--that can 
continue to enforce an agencywide commitment to change and continuous 
improvement. 

* As FAA begins implementing NextGen, key issues remain that will need 
to be addressed, such as coordinating with JPDO, funding for NextGen- 
related programs, and ensuring that FAA has both the technical and 
contract management expertise that will be required to oversee this 
complex undertaking. FAA has become steadily more focused on NextGen 
over the past few years and is expanding and revamping its Operational 
Evolution Plan--renamed the Operational Evolution Partnership--to 
integrate with JPDO activities and become its implementation plan for 
NextGen, including details of required technologies, procedures, and 
resources. This is a step in the right direction. JPDO recently 
reported that the total cost for NextGen infrastructure may range 
between $15 billion and $22 billion. The agency also noted that it 
expects a corresponding cost to system users, who will have to equip 
themselves with the advanced avionics necessary to realize the full 
benefits of some NextGen technologies, in the range of $14 billion to 
$20 billion. Another transition challenge for FAA and JPDO is to 
address questions about which entities will fund and conduct some of 
the necessary research, development, and demonstration projects that 
will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities and keeping the 
development of new systems on schedule. We have also recommended that 
FAA examine its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the technical 
and contract management expertise that will be needed for NextGen 
implementation. In response to our recommendation, FAA is considering 
convening a blue ribbon panel to study the issue and make 
recommendations to the agency. We believe that such a panel could help 
FAA begin to address this challenge. 

* To deal with current and future safety issues, it will be important 
for FAA to also address several issues as it works to ensure that its 
safety programs are aligned to meet future demand. First, ground safety 
is an area of increasing concern because air traffic is forecast to 
grow substantially during the coming decades, which will result in more 
aircraft and increased congestion and safety hazards in the complex 
airport environment. FAA needs to keep on schedule to deploy NextGen 
technology that warns controllers of imminent ground collisions and 
implement recommendations by the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) (which continues to place runway incursions on its Most Wanted 
Transportation Safety Improvements list). Second, FAA needs to 
establish an appropriate regulatory approach for some current airspace 
users, such as air ambulances, and new users such as the emerging space 
tourism industry. For example, we suggested that Congress should 
consider revisiting FAA's dual role for ensuring safety and promoting 
the emerging space tourism industry and decide whether the elimination 
of FAA's promotional role is necessary to alleviate a potential 
conflict of interest. Third, to maintain and expand the margin of 
safety--especially if substantial growth in air traffic materializes-- 
FAA cannot rely on its current oversight approach, which focuses on 
labor-intensive inspections. Accurate, complete safety data would 
provide FAA with an early warning of hazards that can lead to 
accidents. We have recommended that FAA improve the accuracy and 
completeness of its safety data and its analysis of that data. FAA is 
in the early planning stages of addressing our recommendations, but 
more work remains. Fourth, FAA's ability to ensure safety in NextGen 
will be affected by its ability to manage its human capital, including 
safety inspectors, engineers, technicians, and air traffic controllers. 
FAA faces challenges in improving its staffing processes, addressing 
human factors issues associated with significant increases in the 
automation of air traffic management, replacing the large percentage of 
staff expected to retire, and addressing the contentious relations with 
its employee unions, which have the potential to hinder the agency's 
ability to retain and recruit skilled staff. 

Improved, Businesslike Operations Should Better Position FAA to 
Implement and Manage NextGen, but Further Work Remains: 

Although the NextGen effort involves multiple government agencies and 
the private sector, FAA will be the entity largely responsible for 
implementing the policies and systems necessary for NextGen while 
safely operating the current air traffic control system 24 hours a day, 
7 days a week. This means that FAA will be responsible for keeping a 
number of large NextGen systems acquisitions on budget and on schedule 
as it manages and sustains the current system. Historically, FAA has 
had serious weaknesses in its financial management as well as chronic 
cost and schedule difficulties with air traffic control system 
acquisitions. During the past few years, FAA has made significant 
progress in implementing businesslike processes and procedures for 
financial management, acquisitions, and organization structures. The 
implementation of these types of initiatives has improved FAA's 
management of the current system and should better position the agency 
to manage the enormously complex transition to NextGen. However, 
further work remains to fully address past problems and 
institutionalize these changes throughout the agency, especially given 
the changing leadership within both FAA and its ATO. 

FAA Has Improved Its Financial Management, although the Soundness of 
Its Cost Allocation Methodology is Uncertain: 

Sound financial management, including sound cost accounting and cost 
allocation systems, is important for the current operation of FAA and 
lays the foundation for the transformation to NextGen and proposed 
changes to the agency's funding system laid out in the administration's 
reauthorization proposal. In 1999, we placed FAA on our high-risk list 
for its financial management practices, noting weaknesses that rendered 
the agency vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse by undermining its 
ability to manage operations and limiting the reliability of financial 
information provided to Congress. In 2005, we removed FAA's financial 
management from our high-risk list because the agency had made 
significant progress, including implementing a new financial management 
system called Delphi[Footnote 3] and receiving unqualified opinions 
from auditors on its annual financial statements for fiscal years 2001 
through 2005. Nonetheless, external auditors issued a qualified opinion 
on FAA's fiscal year 2006 financial statement and repeated a material 
internal control weakness that was reported in 2005. The concerns that 
led to the qualified opinion stemmed from FAA's inability to support 
the accuracy and completeness of its construction-in-progress account, 
reported in the financial statement as $4.7 billion. FAA is working to 
address the problem. 

As part of its improved financial management, FAA has developed a cost 
accounting system and a cost allocation methodology, which are critical 
to the successful implementation of the new cost-based funding system 
included in the administration's reauthorization proposal.[Footnote 4] 
The proposal would change FAA's financing system from one based mainly 
on excise taxes to one that provides a better link between revenues and 
the costs that users of the national airspace system impose on the 
system, according to the agency. FAA also says the proposal would 
improve revenue adequacy, equity, and efficiency.[Footnote 5] While the 
reauthorization proposal may address some of the equity and efficiency 
concerns that FAA has raised with the current funding structure, we 
have reported that it is not yet clear if FAA has developed a sound 
cost allocation methodology from which to derive the new cost-based 
funding.[Footnote 6] We are reviewing FAA's cost allocation methodology 
and expect to issue a report later this year. 

FAA has also improved its financial management through increased 
efforts to achieve cost savings and cost avoidance throughout the 
agency. For example, FAA is outsourcing flight service stations and 
estimates a $2.2 billion savings over 12 years. Similarly, FAA is 
seeking savings through outsourcing its planned nationwide deployment 
of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), a critical 
element of NextGen. FAA is planning to implement ADS-B through a 
performance-based contract in which FAA will pay "subscription" charges 
for the ADS-B services and the vendor will be responsible for building 
and maintaining the infrastructure. (FAA also reports that the ADS-B 
rollout will allow the agency to remove 50 percent of its current 
secondary radars, saving money in the program's baseline. The remaining 
radars will serve as a back-up system to ADS-B.) As for consolidating 
facilities, FAA is currently restructuring ATO's administrative service 
areas from nine offices to three offices, which FAA estimates will save 
up to $460 million over 10 years. 

We previously reported that FAA should pursue further cost control 
options, such as exploring additional opportunities for contracting out 
services and consolidating facilities. However, we recognize that FAA 
faces challenges with consolidating facilities, an action that can be 
politically sensitive. In recognition of this sensitivity, the 
administration's reauthorization proposal presents a "BRAC-like" 
initiative in which the Secretary of Transportation would be authorized 
to establish an independent, five-member commission, known as the 
Realignment and Consolidation of Aviation Facilities and Services 
Commission, to independently analyze FAA's recommendations to realign 
facilities or services. The commission would then send its own 
recommendations to the President and Congress. In the past, we noted 
the importance of potential cost savings through facility 
consolidations; however, it must also be noted that any such 
consolidations must be handled through a process that solicits and 
considers stakeholder input throughout and fully considers the safety 
implications of both proposed facility closures and consolidations. 

Progress Has Been Made but Further Work Remains to Institutionalize 
Recent Improvements in Management and Acquisition Processes: 

A successful transition to NextGen will depend, to a great extent, on 
FAA's ability to manage the acquisition and integration of multiple 
NextGen systems. Since 1995, we have designated FAA's air traffic 
control modernization program as high risk because of systemic 
management and acquisition problems. However, in recent years, FAA has 
made significant progress toward improving its acquisition management. 
Realization of NextGen goals could be severely compromised if FAA's 
improved processes are not institutionalized and carried over into the 
implementation of NextGen, which is an even more complex and ambitious 
undertaking than past modernization efforts. 

To its credit, FAA has taken a number of actions to improve its 
acquisition management. By creating ATO in 2003 and appointing a chief 
operating officer (COO) to head ATO, FAA established a new management 
structure and adopted more leading practices of private sector 
businesses to address the cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls 
that have plagued air traffic control acquisitions. ATO has worked to 
create a flatter organization, with fewer management layers, and has 
reported reducing executive staffing by 20 percent and total management 
by 16 percent. In addition, FAA uses a performance management system to 
hold managers responsible for the success of ATO. More specifically, to 
better manage its acquisitions and address problems we have 
identified,[Footnote 7] FAA has: 

* undertaken human capital initiatives to improve its acquisition 
workforce culture and build towards a results-oriented, high-performing 
organization; 

* developed and applied a process improvement model to assess the 
maturity of its software and systems acquisitions capabilities 
resulting in, among other things, enhanced productivity and greater 
ability to predict schedules and resources; and: 

* reported that it has established a policy and guidance on using 
Earned Value Management (EVM) in its acquisition management system and 
that 19 of its major programs are currently using EVM.[Footnote 8] 

Institutionalizing these improvements throughout the agency will 
continue to be a challenge for FAA. For example, the agency has yet to 
implement its cost-estimating methodology, although, according to the 
agency, it has provided training on the methodology to employees. 
Furthermore, FAA has not established a policy to require use of its 
process improvement model on all major acquisitions for the national 
airspace system. Until the agency fully addresses these residual 
issues, it will continue to risk program management problems affecting 
cost, schedule, and performance. With a multibillion dollar acquisition 
budget, addressing these issues is as important as ever. 

FAA's Methodology for Tracking and Reporting Performance on Critical 
Acquisitions is Subject of Ongoing Work for this Subcommittee: 

In another effort to improve agency processes, FAA expanded its use of 
performance measures to track its performance. In its fiscal year 2007 
portfolio of goals, FAA lists 30 performance measures. As part of our 
ongoing work,[Footnote 9] we are currently reviewing how FAA selects 
and measures two of these goals in particular: critical acquisitions on 
budget and critical acquisitions on schedule.[Footnote 10] FAA has 
reported exceeding targets for both of these measures for the past 3 
fiscal years. FAA's targets for fiscal year 2006 were to have 85 
percent of critical acquisition programs within 10 percent of budget, 
as reflected in its capital investment plan, and to have 85 percent of 
critical acquisition programs on schedule. For fiscal year 2006, FAA 
reported that its critical acquisitions were 100 percent on budget and 
over 97 percent on schedule. This represents a major turnaround in a 
program that remains on our high-risk list. 

It will be important, as FAA begins to implement NextGen systems, to 
maintain critical acquisitions on schedule and on budget in order to 
meet the goal of transitioning to NextGen by 2025 and to prevent 
escalation of the costs of NextGen. Our ongoing work is examining FAA's 
performance and reporting on its critical acquisitions, including 
applicable performance measures. We are also exploring FAA's use of the 
most recently approved cost and schedule baselines, which may have 
changed significantly since the start of an acquisition, to measure 
program performance. Rebaselining acquisitions is an accepted practice 
and there are valid reasons for doing so, such as when changes in a 
program's requirements fundamentally alter the acquisition and make the 
originally approved schedule unrealistic. Because rebaselining resets 
the cost and schedule variances to zero, we want to verify that FAA's 
practice is not masking acquisition performance problems. We expect to 
issue a report on these issues later this year. 

Although FAA Is Now Focusing on NextGen, It Must Continue to Manage and 
Sustain the Current System: 

While the acquisition and deployment of NextGen technology are key 
issues facing the agency, it will be critical for FAA to continue to 
maintain existing systems and phase out existing systems using a risk- 
based approach. The adequacy of FAA's maintenance of existing systems 
was raised following a power outage and equipment failures in Southern 
California that caused hundreds of flight delays during the summer of 
2006. Investigations by FAA and the Department of Transportation 
Inspector General into these incidents identified a number of 
underlying issues, including the age and condition of equipment. 
Nationwide, the number of scheduled[Footnote 11] and unscheduled 
outages of air traffic control equipment and ancillary support systems 
has been increasing (see fig. 1). Increases in the number of 
unscheduled outages indicate that systems are failing more frequently. 

Figure 1: Number of Scheduled and Unscheduled Equipment Outages, 
Calendar Years 2001-2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of FAA's NASPAS data. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, the duration of unscheduled equipment outages has also 
been increasing in recent years from an average of about 21 hours in 
2001 to about 40 hours in 2006 (see fig. 2), which may indicate, in 
part, that maintenance and troubleshooting activities are requiring 
more effort and longer periods of time. However, according to FAA, it 
considers user impact and resource efficiency when planning and 
responding to equipment outages. As a result, according to the agency, 
although some outages will have longer restoration times, the agency 
believes they do not adversely affect air traffic control operations. 
It will be critical for FAA to monitor and address equipment outages to 
ensure the safety and efficiency of the legacy systems, since they will 
be the core of the national airspace system for a number of years and, 
in some cases, will become part of NextGen. 

Figure 2: Average Duration of Scheduled and Unscheduled Equipment 
Outages, Calendar Years 2001-2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO's analysis of FAA's NASPAS data. 

[End of figure] 

Institutionalizing Change Within FAA Will Require Continued Strong 
Leadership: 

While FAA has implemented many positive changes to its management and 
business processes in recent years, it currently faces the loss of key 
leaders. We reported that the experiences of successful transformations 
and change management initiatives in large public and private 
organizations suggest that it can take 5 to 7 years or more until such 
initiatives are fully implemented and cultures are transformed in a 
sustainable manner. Such changes require focused, full-time attention 
from senior leadership and a dedicated team.[Footnote 12] However, the 
agency will have lost two of its significant agents for change--the FAA 
administrator and the COO, who heads ATO--by the end of September 2007. 
The administrator's term ends in September 2007; the COO left in 
February 2007, after serving 3 years. This situation is exacerbated by 
the fact that the current director of JPDO is new, having assumed that 
position in August 2006. For the financial, management, and acquisition 
improvements to further permeate the agency, and thus provide a firm 
foundation upon which to implement NextGen, FAA's new leaders will need 
to demonstrate the same commitment to improvement as the outgoing 
leaders. This continued commitment to change is critical over the next 
few years, as foundational NextGen systems begin to be implemented. 
Because this is a critical time for FAA, the agency needs to move 
expeditiously to find a new COO for ATO. It could be useful to have a 
COO whose tenure lasted the length of the current statutory 5-year 
term. This would allow for stable leadership at ATO during this 
critical transition from planning to early implementation of NextGen. 

Key Issues Remain in the Transition From Planning to Implementing 
NextGen: 

Several key issues will need to be addressed to help ensure a 
successful transition to NextGen as FAA moves from the 
conceptualization and planning of NextGen, handled largely through the 
interagency collaborative efforts of FAA's JPDO, to the implementation 
of NextGen technologies and systems. Those issues include (1) 
continuing to focus on the coordination between ATO and JPDO and 
stakeholder involvement; (2) determining which entities will fund the 
necessary research, development, and demonstration projects for 
NextGen; and (3) determining whether FAA has the technical and contract 
management expertise necessary to oversee the complex implementation of 
NextGen. 

FAA Has Improved Coordination with JPDO, but Some Key Stakeholder 
Involvement is Absent: 

FAA has become steadily more focused on NextGen implementation, but 
some key stakeholders, such as FAA technicians who will maintain 
NextGen systems, are not currently involved. One of the most important 
changes FAA has made with regard to NextGen is the expansion and 
revamping of its Operational Evolution Plan (OEP)--renamed the 
Operational Evolution Partnership--to become FAA's implementation plan 
for NextGen. This is a step in the right direction. The OEP is being 
expanded to apply to all of FAA and is intended to become a 
comprehensive description of how the agency will implement NextGen, 
including the required technologies, procedures, and 
resources.[Footnote 13] (Figure 3 shows the OEP framework.) An ATO 
official told us that the new OEP is expected to be consistent with 
JPDO's key planning documents and partner agency budget 
guidance.[Footnote 14] According to FAA, the OEP will allow it to 
demonstrate appropriate budget control and linkage to NextGen plans and 
will force FAA's research and development to be relevant to NextGen's 
requirements. According to FAA documents, the agency plans to publish 
the new OEP in June 2007. 

Figure 3: New OEP Framework: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: JPDO. 

Note: The concentric rings indicate the nature of initiative 
development from the outer ring (NextGen strategic initiatives), in 
which new programs and concepts are analyzed and demonstrated; to the 
second ring, where decisions are made regarding safety, operating 
policy, performance standards, and certification requirements; to the 
third ring (technical development), where concepts are prototyped and 
investment analysis decisions are made. The progression through the 
rings is not necessarily linear, and a program may be in more than one 
ring at a time. Data communications, for example, is in the technical 
development ring and also in the middle ring as policy and rulemaking 
is considered. The core is divided into three sections, which indicate 
the FAA offices that implement the final NextGen program. 

[End of figure] 

In an effort to further align FAA's efforts with JPDO's plans for 
NextGen, FAA has created a NextGen Review Board to oversee the OEP. 
This review board will be co-chaired by JPDO's director and ATO's vice 
president of operations planning services. Initiatives, such as concept 
demonstrations or research proposed for inclusion in the OEP will now 
need to go through the review board for approval. Initiatives are to be 
assessed for their relation to NextGen requirements, concept maturity, 
and risk. An ATO official told us that the new OEP process should also 
help identify some smaller programs that might be inconsistent with 
NextGen and could be discontinued and will assist in project 
integration. Additionally, as a further step towards integrating ATO 
and JPDO, the administration's reauthorization proposal calls for the 
JPDO director to be a voting member of FAA's Joint Resources Council 
and ATO's Executive Council. 

Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers and 
technicians, will play critical roles in NextGen, and their involvement 
in planning for and deploying the new technology will be important to 
the success of NextGen. In November 2006, we reported that air traffic 
controllers were not involved in the NextGen planning effort.[Footnote 
15] Controllers are beginning to become involved as they are now 
represented on a key planning body. However, the technicians do not 
participate in NextGen efforts. Input from current air traffic 
controllers who have recent experience controlling aircraft and current 
technicians who will maintain the new equipment is important in 
considering human factors and safety issues. Our work on past air 
traffic control modernization projects has shown that a lack of 
stakeholder involvement early and throughout a project can lead to cost 
increases and delays. 

FAA Has Begun Budgeting for NextGen Programs, although Questions Remain 
About the Funding of NextGen Research and Development: 

JPDO recently reported some estimated costs for NextGen, including 
specifics on some early NextGen programs.[Footnote 16] JPDO believes 
the total federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will 
range between $15 billion and $22 billion. JPDO also reported a 
preliminary estimate of the corresponding cost to system users to equip 
themselves with the advanced avionics that are necessary to realize the 
full benefits of some NextGen technologies may range from $14 billion 
to $20 billion. JPDO, in its recently released 2006 Progress Report, 
noted that this range for avionics costs reflects uncertainty about 
equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of very light jets 
that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the amount of out- 
of-service time required for installation. 

In its capital investment plan for fiscal years 2008-2012, FAA includes 
estimated expenditures for 11 line items that are considered NextGen 
capital programs.[Footnote 17] The total 5-year estimated expenditures 
for these programs is $4.3 billion. In fiscal year 2008, only 6 of the 
line items are funded for a total of roughly $174 million; funding for 
the remaining 5 programs would begin with the fiscal year 2009 budget. 
According to FAA, in addition to capital spending for NextGen, the 
agency will spend an estimated $300 million on NextGen-related research 
and development from fiscal years 2008 through 2012. The 
administration's budget for fiscal year 2008 for FAA includes a total 
of $17.8 million to support the activities of JPDO. 

The administration's reauthorization proposal would allow for $5 
billion in Treasury debt financing authority for NextGen-related 
capital needs for fiscal years 2013-2017. Projects that might be 
appropriate for such financing include safety-critical and mission- 
essential software and systems that controllers and traffic flow 
managers will use to support certain aircraft operations in the NextGen 
system, according to the proposal. However, the proposed borrowing 
authority seems unlikely to have a major impact on FAA's ability to pay 
for capital investment associated with moving to NextGen because the 
payback period is relatively short. With a maximum payback period of 5 
years, the advantage of matching the time period for paying for a 
capital investment with the time period in which the benefits of that 
investment are realized is unlikely to be achieved. Therefore, the 
advantage of borrowing versus receiving appropriations for a period of 
up to 5 years is unclear. 

While FAA and JPDO have begun to release estimates for FAA's NextGen 
investment portfolio, questions remain over which entities will fund 
and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and 
demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen 
capabilities and keeping the development of new systems on schedule. In 
the past, a significant portion of aeronautics research and 
development, including intermediate technology development, has been 
performed by NASA. However, NASA's aeronautics research budget and 
proposed funding shows a 30-percent decline, in constant 2005 dollars, 
from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2011. To its credit, NASA plans to 
focus its research on the needs of NextGen. However, NASA is also 
moving toward a focus on fundamental research and away from 
developmental work and demonstration projects. FAA and JPDO face the 
challenge of determining the nature and scope of the research and 
technology development necessary to begin the transition to NextGen. 
They also have to identify the entities that can conduct that research 
and development and the source of funding to support it. 

FAA Needs to Explore whether It Has the Technical and Contract 
Management Expertise Necessary to Implement NextGen: 

In the past, a lack of expertise contributed to weaknesses in FAA's 
management of air traffic control modernization efforts, and industry 
experts with whom we spoke questioned whether FAA will have the 
technical expertise needed to implement NextGen. In addition to 
technical expertise, FAA will need contract management expertise to 
oversee the systems acquisitions and integration involved in NextGen. 
In November 2006, we recommended that FAA examine its strengths and 
weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and contract 
management expertise that will be required to define, implement, and 
integrate the numerous complex programs inherent in the transition to 
NextGen.[Footnote 18] In response to our recommendation, FAA is 
considering convening a blue ribbon panel to study the issue and make 
recommendations to the agency about how best to proceed with its 
management and oversight of the implementation of NextGen. We believe 
that such a panel could help FAA begin to address this challenge. 

Aviation Safety Record Remains High, but Some Areas Need to be 
Addressed for Current and Future Safety as FAA Transitions to NextGen: 

As FAA works to develop the policies and systems to transition to 
NextGen, it will be important for the agency to also ensure that its 
safety programs are aligned with these changes. While recent safety 
trends are generally positive, improving upon those trends will be 
necessary simply to maintain the same level of safety if air traffic 
doubles or triples during the coming decades. Moreover, certain recent 
trends--such as the commercial air carrier fatal accident rate--may 
warrant immediate attention. Although this accident rate has steadily 
declined in recent years, FAA did not meet its performance target in 
this area for fiscal year 2006 due to four accidents, including two 
accidents on runway and ramp areas and one runway overrun. FAA's 
ability to deal with current safety issues and the transition to 
NextGen would be enhanced by (1) acquiring and deploying new safety 
enhancing technologies; (2) establishing appropriate regulatory 
approaches for current airspace users and emerging sectors; (3) 
improving the accuracy and completeness of its safety data; and (4) 
addressing human capital issues associated with hiring, training, and 
deploying its skilled workforce of air traffic controllers, safety 
inspectors, engineers, and technicians. 

FAA Faces Challenges in Implementing Advanced Technology and Other 
Measures to Improve Safety in the Airport Environment: 

Safety in the airport environment is an area of increasing concern 
because air traffic is forecast to grow substantially during the coming 
decades. More aircraft and congestion at the airport will make 
maintaining safety even more critical, as the airport environment 
involves enormously complex interactions between air traffic 
controllers and the people who operate on the airport surface, 
including pilots, mechanics, maintenance technicians, and airport 
employees. FAA's efforts to improve safety in the airport environment 
include deploying NextGen technology, such as the Airport Surface 
Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X),[Footnote 19] evaluating runway 
status lights, and testing a low-cost surface surveillance system. FAA 
pursues new technologies to improve runway safety because the incursion 
rate at U.S. airports was higher in fiscal year 2006 than it was in 
fiscal year 2002.[Footnote 20] (Incursions are potential collisions on 
the ground.) However, the deployment of new technology has faced 
schedule delays. FAA originally planned to deploy ASDE-X at 35 major 
airports by 2007, but the technology is operational at only 8 airports 
to date, and deployment at the remaining 27 airports is not scheduled 
to be complete until 2011 (see fig. 4). At the same time, FAA is 
evaluating the performance of runway status lights, another technology 
aimed at preventing runway incursions by warning pilots when a runway 
is unsafe for crossing or departure. FAA expects to decide this year 
whether to deploy the system at 35 large airports at an estimated cost 
of $300 million. Although the 35 airports that are to receive ASDE-X-- 
and may receive runway status lights--handle about 70 percent of 
enplanements in the United States, they represent only about 6 percent 
of the country's 573 commercial service airports. Therefore, FAA is 
also evaluating a low-cost surface surveillance system that could meet 
the needs of small-to medium-sized airports. The system is designed to 
alert controllers of potential conflicts and hazards and provide direct 
warnings to pilots entering or approaching active runways. 

Figure 4: Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) 
Deployment Sites: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: FAA. 

[End of figure] 

The number of serious incursions--incidents where a collision was 
narrowly avoided--rose from 28 in fiscal year 2004 to 31 in fiscal year 
2006. As a result, NTSB continues to place runway incursions on its 
Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements list. FAA has not yet 
implemented any of the six runway incursion prevention recommendations 
that NTSB made in 2000. The recommendations include such things as 
implementing at commercial airports ground movement safety systems that 
provide a direct warning to flight crews of possible incursions and 
changing air traffic control procedures.[Footnote 21] According to 
NTSB, FAA has not completed its evaluation and implementation of 
technology to address the recommendation on safety systems, and the two 
agencies have not reached agreement on the recommendations to change 
air traffic control procedures. 

FAA is also making efforts to prevent runway overruns, which occur when 
aircraft pass the ends of runways during aborted takeoffs or while 
landing, by the construction of runway safety areas or the installation 
of arresting material at the end of runways. In 2000, FAA established 
its Runway Safety Area program to accelerate the construction of runway 
safety areas--areas surrounding the runways designed to reduce the risk 
of damage to aircraft from overruns. Since 2005, commercial service 
airports have been required[Footnote 22] to bring their runway safety 
areas into compliance with FAA standards by 2015. According to FAA, as 
of January 2007, 70 percent of the 1,020 runways at 573 commercial 
airports in the United States substantially comply with runway safety 
area standards, up from 55 percent in 2000. In fiscal year 2006, the 
Airport Improvement Program (AIP) awarded more than $240 million in 
grants for runway safety area improvement projects. FAA indicates that 
about $1.1 billion in AIP funds will be needed to complete the 
remainder. The administration's budget request for FAA calls for $2.75 
billion in AIP funds in fiscal year 2008, a substantial reduction from 
the $3.5 billion funding levels for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. It will 
be important for FAA to consider these runway safety areas as it 
prioritizes AIP funds. FAA considers the installation of an Engineered 
Materials Arresting System (EMAS), a bed of crushable concrete designed 
to safely decelerate and stop overrunning aircraft, to be an acceptable 
alternative for meeting runway safety area standards. As of December 
2006, EMAS was installed on 21 runways at 16 U.S. airports and had 
successfully stopped three aircraft from overrunning runways. We are 
conducting ongoing work for this subcommittee on runway and ramp safety 
and expect to issue our final report later this year. 

FAA and Congress Should Address Regulatory Approaches to Some Current 
Airspace Users and Emerging Sectors: 

Future air traffic is expected to include not only increases in the 
number of traditional airspace users, but new users as well. It will be 
important for FAA to establish the appropriate regulatory approach for 
current users and new users such as the emerging space tourism industry 
and unmanned aircraft systems. For example, we recently found that 
FAA's current oversight approach for air ambulances was not geared to 
the unique operating characteristics and risks associated with that 
sector.[Footnote 23] Further, in 2006, NTSB recommended, among other 
things, that FAA require that all air ambulance operators comply with 
Part 135 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations during all 
flights with medical personnel on board.[Footnote 24] Under FAA 
regulation, most air ambulances operate under rules specified in Part 
135. However, pilots may operate under different standards, depending 
on whether they are carrying patients. Without patients or passengers 
on board, pilots may operate under rules specified in Part 91 of Title 
14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. With patients on board, pilots 
are required to operate under Part 135 rules. Parts 91 and 135 flight 
rules differ significantly in two key areas--(1) weather and visibility 
minimums and (2) rest requirements--with Part 135 requirements being 
more stringent. 

In many air ambulance trips, part of the trip may involve Part 135 
rules, while another part may involve Part 91 rules. For example, scene 
response missions for air ambulance helicopters frequently have three 
legs--the flight en route to the accident scene, the transport of the 
patient to the hospital, and the reposition of the helicopter back to 
its base (see fig. 5). Only the leg during which patients or other 
passengers (medical crew members are not considered passengers) are on 
board must be flown under Part 135 flight rules. Of the 89 air 
ambulance accidents that we examined from 1998 through 2005, 64 took 
place during Part 91 flight and the remaining 25 took place during Part 
135 flight. However, because air ambulance flights without patients or 
passengers could be flown under Part 91 requirements, there may be more 
than twice as many flights taking place under Part 91 compared with 
Part 135. A better understanding of the trends in the air ambulance 
industry, including accident data, will be important in deciding if the 
current regulatory approach is appropriate or if more fundamental 
changes, such as revising FAA regulations, need to be made. 

Figure 5: Air Ambulance Scene Flight Response Legs: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

As another example, the need for a different regulatory approach for 
all-cargo operations has been raised. According to FAA, from 1998 
through 2005, the accident rate for scheduled air cargo operators 
declined significantly but was still about 2.5 times higher than the 
accident rate for scheduled passenger operators. The Congressional 
Research Service pointed out that the size of aircraft, the range of 
operations flown by all-cargo operators, and the large growth in the 
all-cargo sector introduce unique risks to operators, airports, and the 
public that may call for revisiting the safety standards that apply to 
all-cargo operations.[Footnote 25] 

In recent work, we also raised issues concerning FAA's regulation of 
the emerging space tourism industry.[Footnote 26] Specifically, we 
suggested that Congress should consider revisiting the granting of 
FAA's dual mandate for ensuring safety and promoting space tourism and 
decide whether the elimination of FAA's promotional role is necessary 
to alleviate a potential conflict. FAA licenses the operation of 
commercial space launches and launch sites. Historically, these 
launches carried commercial payloads and were unmanned. The prospect 
for commercial space tourism materialized in 2004, after the successful 
launches of SpaceShipOne raised the possibility of an emerging U.S. 
commercial space tourism industry that would make human space travel 
available to the public. Several companies are planning to start taking 
paying passengers on suborbital flights within the next few years and a 
number of commercial spaceports are being planned. For example, Virgin 
Galactic intends to provide suborbital space flight from a planned 
spaceport in New Mexico starting in 2009. It plans to carry 3,000 
passengers over 5 years, with 100 individuals having already paid the 
full fare of $200,000. Figure 6 shows current and planned spaceports. 
In 1984, the Commercial Space Launch Act gave DOT the authority to 
license and monitor the safety of commercial space launches and to 
promote the industry. It is important that FAA's statutory 
responsibility to promote the commercial space launch industry does not 
interfere with its safety oversight of the industry as the space 
tourism sector develops. We have no evidence that FAA's promotional 
activities, such as sponsoring an annual industry conference and 
publishing economic impact studies, have conflicted thus far with its 
safety regulatory role, but conflicts could occur as the industry 
matures. 

Figure 6: Federal Commercial Launch Sites and Existing and Proposed 
Spaceports in the United States, October 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Sources: FAA and GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, FAA faces the challenge of determining the circumstances 
under which it would regulate the safety of crew and space flight 
participants. In 2004, the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act 
prohibited FAA from regulating crew and passenger safety before 2012, 
except in response to high-risk incidents, serious injuries, or 
fatalities. FAA has interpreted this limited authority as allowing it 
to regulate crew safety in certain circumstances and has been proactive 
in proposing regulations concerning emergency training for crews and 
passengers. However, FAA has not developed safety indicators by which 
it would monitor the developing space tourism sector and determine when 
to step in and regulate human space flight. We have recommended that 
the agency be proactive about safety rather than respond only after a 
fatality or serious incident occurs by identifying and monitoring 
safety indicators that might trigger the need for regulation before 
2012. Actions have not been taken on our recommendations. 

Another emerging sector that poses regulatory issues is unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS)[Footnote 27] (see fig. 7), which are expected to 
be part of the mix of aircraft that will operate in NextGen. A small 
number of UASs are currently used by government agencies for a variety 
of purposes, such as border security, search and rescue, firefighting, 
military training exercises, and other law enforcement and homeland 
security initiatives. Recent projections indicate that over 10,000 UASs 
could be in operation in the United States by 2015, but FAA believes 
that the number may be less. We have work ongoing for this subcommittee 
to assess issues such as the technological and regulatory issues that 
remain in order for UASs to be safely integrated in the national 
airspace system, the timeframes for completing such work, and the 
identification of entities that should take the lead in such work. We 
expect to issue a report later this year. 

Figure 7: U.S. Air Force's Global Hawk UAS: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Department of Defense. 

[End of figure] 

Our preliminary work, indicates that UASs pose unique safety challenges 
and questions. For example, what standards should UASs meet to ensure 
that they detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft? What standards 
should be set for UAS safety and reliability? How should FAA classify 
UASs, which can range in size from very small, hand launched systems to 
those similar in size to a large passenger aircraft? What pilot 
qualifications are needed for UAS operators? FAA has begun to answer 
such questions by reviewing its existing safety regulations developed 
for manned aircraft to determine how or whether they need to be 
modified to enable UASs to be safely integrated into the national 
airspace system. FAA expects this to be a 5-to 10-year effort. In the 
meantime, FAA will continue its existing oversight approach and review 
each request to operate on a case-by-case basis. If FAA determines that 
a UAS can operate safely under specified conditions, the agency issues 
a certificate of authorization and the airspace is restricted during 
the period of operation.[Footnote 28] In fiscal year 2006, FAA 
processed 96 applications for certificates of authorization and issued 
62 certificates. FAA projects that it will receive over 400 
applications in 2010. The agency may have difficulty handling such an 
increase under its existing case-by-case process, which could serve as 
a de facto limit on the number of UASs operating in the next few years. 

FAA Needs Improved Data and Analysis for Current Safety Oversight and 
for the Transition to NextGen: 

FAA cannot rely on its current oversight approach, which focuses on 
labor-intensive inspections to maintain and expand the margin of 
safety, especially if substantial growth in air traffic materializes. 
FAA acknowledges this situation and sees the need to establish a safety 
information system that can provide an early warning of hazards that 
may lead to accidents and help the agency manage risk. However, our 
past work has found problems with the accuracy and completeness of 
FAA's safety data. For example, FAA does not collect actual flight 
activity data for general aviation operators, air taxis, or air 
ambulances. As a result, FAA lacks information to monitor the rate of 
accidents and determine the effectiveness of its oversight. We have 
recommended that FAA improve the accuracy and completeness of its 
safety data and evaluate this information to identify nationwide 
trends. FAA is in the early planning stages of addressing our 
recommendations, but more work remains. 

An important aspect of FAA's safety oversight is the use of over 13,000 
private individuals and organizations, known as designees, to leverage 
inspector resources. Designees act as representatives of the agency to 
conduct many safety certification activities, such as administering 
flight tests to pilots, inspecting repair work by maintenance 
facilities, and approving designs for aircraft parts. In reviewing 
FAA's designee programs, we found that the agency's oversight of 
designees was hampered, in part, by limited data on designees' 
performance.[Footnote 29] FAA is in the early stages of addressing our 
recommendation to improve the consistency and completeness of designee 
information. FAA is also changing and expanding the designee programs 
by replacing certain designee programs with an organization designation 
authorization. By expanding the number and types of organizational 
designees, FAA's role is being further transformed to monitoring the 
performance of organizations rather than overseeing the individuals who 
perform the certification activities. It will be important for FAA to 
have the data, evaluative processes, and a well-trained inspector staff 
to effectively monitor the new program to make sure that safety is not 
adversely affected. 

FAA is in the early stages of addressing some of these data issues as 
it begins planning a new system--Aviation Safety Information Analysis 
and Sharing System--that would provide access to large volumes of 
industry safety data. FAA began planning for the new system in 2006. 
Because this activity is in the early planning stages, our concerns 
about FAA's data remain relevant. The successful completion of this 
planning effort will be critical to FAA's ability to improve safety. In 
fiscal year 2008, FAA proposes budgeting $32 million for safety 
databases and computer systems. As FAA prioritizes the activities that 
it undertakes with these funds, it will be important to continue 
addressing these critical data limitations. 

In addition, FAA is shifting to a data-driven, risk-based approach to 
maintaining the agency's approximately 40,000 pieces of air traffic 
control equipment, but it has not yet determined its new data needs. 
FAA is in the very early planning stages of a 10-year or longer effort 
to switch to this new approach, termed reliability centered maintenance 
(RCM), which private industry and other federal agencies, such as the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and NASA, use to maintain equipment. FAA 
expects the new approach to improve equipment performance. However, we 
reported in November 2006 that FAA had not developed a plan to 
implement RCM, has not determined the data needs for RCM, and has not 
decided what training will be provided to staff.[Footnote 30] As the 
agency moves forward with this approach, it will be important for FAA 
to address the issues we identified as well as work with stakeholders, 
including FAA maintenance technicians, to ensure that decisions are not 
driven entirely by cost savings and that the safety and efficiency of 
national airspace operations are not adversely affected. 

FAA Faces Human Capital Challenges: 

FAA's ability to ensure safety in NextGen will also be affected by its 
ability to manage its human capital, including air traffic controllers, 
safety inspectors, engineers, and technicians. FAA faces a challenge in 
managing human capital due to contentious relations with its labor 
unions. Fourteen unions represent more than 34,000 of FAA's 43,200 full 
time permanent employees. With the exception of two unions--the 
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) and the 
Professional Airway System Specialists (PASS), which represent about 
23,000 FAA employees--12 unions have negotiated a contract or 
memorandum of agreement with FAA, according to agency officials. In 
April 2006, after reaching an impasse in negotiations with NATCA, FAA 
used its authority[Footnote 31] to settle the impasse by imposing a 
contract on its air traffic controllers. After 4 years of contract 
negotiations with PASS, FAA reached an agreement in April 2006. The 
PASS membership, however, according to an FAA official, rejected this 
proposed contract. Subsequently, FAA filed a complaint with the Federal 
Labor Relations Authority claiming an unfair labor practice, according 
to the same FAA official. Until this complaint is adjudicated, the 
previous PASS contract remains in effect, according to the FAA 
official. Improving the contentious relationship between FAA and these 
unions could have positive effects on both the safety of FAA operations 
and the implementation of new air traffic management systems under 
NextGen. For example, delays in union approvals that may be needed to 
implement new systems could lead to delays in their implementation if 
labor management relations are acrimonious. In addition, the current 
contract situations have the potential to hinder FAA's ability to 
retain and recruit skilled technical staff. 

FAA estimates it will lose about 72 percent of its air traffic 
controller workforce over the next 10 years. (See fig. 8.) To replace 
these controllers, FAA plans to hire 15,004 new controllers from fiscal 
years 2006 through 2016, according to the agency's March 2007 
controller workforce plan. This recent hiring target is higher than 
FAA's June 2006 hiring target[Footnote 32] to reflect recent data 
indicating that controllers are retiring at a faster rate than FAA 
anticipated. To meet these higher targets, FAA has expanded its hiring 
sources, which had focused on individuals with prior FAA or DOD air 
traffic control experience and graduates from FAA's collegiate training 
initiative program to include the general public. This strategy is 
needed, according to FAA officials, because DOD has recently become 
less of a hiring source for controllers due to military incentives for 
retaining controllers and DOD's higher salaries than FAA's entry-level 
salary.[Footnote 33] However, those new hires that lack prior air 
traffic control experience will require more training to become 
certified controllers.[Footnote 34] Additionally, since it can take up 
to 3 to 5 years for a controller to become certified, within a few 
years, a large portion of the controller workforce may be trainees and 
not fully certified. Based on FAA's hiring and retirement projections, 
by 2010, about 40 percent of the air traffic controller workforce will 
have 5 or fewer years of experience. This high percentage of newly 
hired controllers will continue for a number of years, making it 
important for FAA to carefully balance the ratio of trainees to 
certified controllers at each air traffic control facility. 

Figure 8: Estimated Controller Losses and Planned Hires, Fiscal Years 
2006-2016: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: FAA. 

Note: Numbers for fiscal year 2006 represent actual losses and hires. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to the challenge of hiring and training new air traffic 
controllers, it will be important to deploy them in an optimal manner 
to reflect changing air traffic demands. FAA's recent controller 
workforce plan includes facility-by-facility staffing standards for 
fiscal year 2007 expressed as ranges.[Footnote 35] The staffing 
standards are intended to take into consideration facility-specific 
information, such as air traffic operations, productivity trends, 
expected retirements, and the number of controllers in training. These 
new standards are an improvement over FAA's historical approach, which 
was to compute the number of controllers needed systemwide and 
negotiate the distribution of these totals to the facility level. 
However, FAA's current staffing does not align with the new standards 
at about one-third of FAA's 314 facilities--93 of which are currently 
overstaffed and 11 understaffed. This situation adds further complexity 
to the controller hiring, training, and staffing issues that FAA must 
carefully manage in the upcoming years. Furthermore, FAA has not 
factored into its staffing standards or its projected hiring targets 
the effect of new NextGen technologies on controller workload. The new 
technologies will result in a more automated system that, over time, is 
expected to change the role of controllers as well as productivity. In 
future updates of the controller workforce plan, it will be important 
to begin to factor in this impact. 

Furthermore, having the right skill mix of safety inspectors and 
technicians and deploying them to make best use of their skills is 
especially important as new and developing sectors emerge. By 2010, 44 
percent of FAA's inspector workforce of about 3,865 will be eligible to 
retire. To begin addressing this situation, FAA has requested funding 
to hire an additional 87 inspectors in fiscal year 2008. In addition to 
maintaining a sufficient number of safety inspectors, it will be 
important to deploy them where they are most needed. However, FAA lacks 
a staffing model to accomplish this. The National Academy of Sciences 
recently completed a study that analyzed FAA's staffing processes for 
safety inspectors and identified a number of issues that the agency 
needed to address. For instance, the study indicated that the current 
staffing process does not focus resources in the areas of greatest need 
and the match between individual inspectors' technical knowledge and 
the facilities and operations they oversee is not always optimal. In 
response to academy recommendations, FAA expects to develop a staffing 
model, but the agency does not have a specific time frame for 
initiating this effort. In addition, FAA lacks staffing standards for 
its approximately 6,100 technicians, who are responsible for 
maintaining the agency's air traffic control equipment. The development 
of staffing models for safety inspectors and technicians is important 
in the changing aviation environment and is critical to FAA's ability 
to ensure that its safety programs and workload are aligned to meet the 
future demands for which NextGen is preparing. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald 
L. Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals 
making key contributions to this testimony include Faye Morrison, 
Teresa Spisak, Nancy Boardman, Anne Dilger, Sharon Dyer, Kevin Egan, 
Colin Fallon, Jim Geibel, Bob Homan, Rosa Leung, Ed Menoche, Taylor 
Reeves, Richard Scott, Jeremy Sebest, Larry Thomas, Pam Vines, and 
Carrie Wilkes. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Federal Aviation Administration: Observations on Selected Changes to 
FAA's Funding and Budget Structure in the Administration's 
Reauthorization Proposal. GAO-07-625T. Washington, D.C.: March 21, 
2007. 

Aviation Safety: Improved Data Collection Needed for Effective 
Oversight of Air Ambulance Industry. GAO-07-353. Washington, D.C.: 
February 21, 2007. 

Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges Facing the Agency in Fiscal 
Year 2008 and Beyond. GAO-07-490T. February 14, 2007. 

Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges 
Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System. GAO-
07-25. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2006. 

FAA's Proposed Plan for Implementing a Reliability Centered Maintenance 
Process for Air Traffic Control Equipment. GAO-07-81R. Washington, 
D.C.: November 9, 2006. 

Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face 
Challenges. GAO-06-1091T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2006. 

Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued Planning and Monitoring 
to Oversee the Safety of the Emerging Space Tourism Industry. GAO-07- 
16. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2006. 

Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Oversight System Is Effective but Could 
Benefit from Better Evaluation of Its Programs' Performance. GAO-06- 
266T. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2005. 

National Airspace System: Transformation will Require Cultural Change, 
Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available Management Tools. 
GAO-06-154. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2005. 

Aviation Safety: System Safety Approach Needs Further Integration into 
FAA's Oversight of Airlines. GAO-05-726. Washington, D.C.: September 
28, 2005. 

Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program Needed 
to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts. GAO-05-266. Washington, D.C.: 
April 29, 2005. 

Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Strengthen the Management of Its 
Designees Programs. GAO-05-40. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2004. 

Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities Improved, but More 
can be Done to Institutionalize Improvements. GAO-04-901. Washington, 
D.C.: August 20, 2004. 

Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management Capabilities 
in Place, but More Oversight of Operational Systems is Needed. GAO-04- 
822. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2004. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] JPDO was authorized by the Vision 100--Century of Aviation 
Reauthorization Act (Pub. L. No. 108-176), which requires the office to 
operate in conjunction with multiple government agencies, including the 
Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland 
Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. 
JPDO also involves industry and other stakeholders through the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System Institute. 

[2] Earned Value Management combines measurements of technical, 
schedule, and cost performance with the intent of providing an early 
warning of problems while there is time for corrective action. 

[3] Delphi is a commercial off-the-shelf financial management system 
that was acquired by the Department of Transportation and fully 
implemented in FAA in 2003. 

[4] The reauthorization proposal includes, among other things, 
introducing direct user charges for commercial aircraft based on the 
cost of the air traffic services they receive, eliminating many current 
taxes, substantially increasing the fuel taxes general aviation 
operators pay, charging both commercial and general aviation a fuel tax 
to pay for airport capital improvements, and linking the contribution 
to FAA's budget from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury to the 
public benefits FAA provides. Under the administration's proposal, 
these changes would begin in fiscal year 2009. 

[5] Revenue adequacy refers to the ability of FAA's funding system to 
produce revenues commensurate with workload changes over time. Equity 
refers to the equitable distribution of costs to aviation users. 
Efficiency refers to incentives that encourage the efficient use of the 
national airspace system. 

[6] GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Observations on Selected 
Changes to FAA's Funding and Budget Structure in the Administration's 
Reauthorization Proposal, GAO-07-625T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 
2007). 

[7] GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program 
Needed to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts, GAO-05-266 (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005); Air Traffic Control: System Management 
Capabilities Improved, but More can be Done to Institutionalize 
Improvements, GAO-04-901 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004); and 
Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management Capabilities 
in Place, but More Oversight of Operational Systems is Needed, GAO-04-
822 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004). 

[8] EVM is a project management technique that combines measurements of 
technical performance, schedule performance, and cost performance with 
the intent of providing an early warning of problems while there is 
time for corrective action. 

[9] This work is in response to a joint request from this subcommittee 
and the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Senate Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation Committee. 

[10] ATO has the lead responsibility for both of these goals. 

[11] Scheduled outages occur for scheduled maintenance. 

[12] GAO, National Airspace System: Transformation will Require 
Cultural Change, Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available 
Management Tools, GAO-06-154 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2005). 

[13] Prior to expansion of the OEP, the document centered on plans for 
increasing capacity and efficiency at 35 major airports. 

[14] The planning documents include the Concept of Operations, 
Enterprise Architecture, and Integrated Work Plan. The Concept of 
Operations describes how the transformational elements of NextGen will 
operate in 2025. It is intended to establish general stakeholder buy-in 
to the NextGen end state, transition path, and business case. The 
Enterprise Architecture follows from the Concept of Operations and 
describes the system in more detail. It will be used to integrate 
planning efforts and drive partner agency guidance. The Integrated Work 
Plan lays out a timeline for deploying and integrating NextGen systems. 

[15] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and 
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace 
System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006). 

[16] JPDO, Making the NextGen Vision a Reality: 2006 Progress Report to 
the Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Plan 
(Washington, D.C.: March 2007). 

[17] FAA has six capital investment programs that it considers 
transformational NextGen programs slated to receive funding in fiscal 
year 2008: ADS-B nationwide implementation, System Wide Information 
Management (SWIM), NextGen Data Communications, NextGen Network Enabled 
Weather, National Airspace System Voice Switch, and NextGen Technology 
Demonstration. In addition, five other programs are slated to begin 
funding in 2009: NextGen System Development, NextGen High Altitude 
Trajectory Based Operations, NextGen High Density Airports, NextGen 
Networked Facilities, and NextGen Cross-Cutting Infrastructure. 

[18] GAO-07-25. 

[19] ASDE-X is the upgraded digitally-based technology that enables air 
traffic controllers to detect potential runway conflicts by providing 
detailed coverage of movement on runways and taxiways. ASDE-X warns 
controllers of potential runway incursions. 

[20] The rate was 5.4 incursions per 1 million tower operations in 
fiscal year 2006 and 5.2 incursions per 1 million tower operations in 
fiscal year 2002. 

[21] Recommended changes to air traffic control procedures include 
clarifying authorized runway crossings, increasing the situational 
awareness of the flight crews for arriving aircraft at night or in poor 
visibility conditions without relying on the controllers, and the use 
of international landing clearance procedures and standard phraseology 
for airport surface operations. 

[22] Public Law 109-115. 

[23] GAO, Aviation Safety: Improved Data Collection Needed for 
Effective Oversight of Air Ambulance Industry, GAO-07-353 (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 21, 2007). 

[24] NTSB, Special Investigative Report on Emergency Medical Services 
Operations (Washington, D.C.: 2006). According to NTSB, as of December 
21, 2006, this recommendation and others made in this report were still 
open. 

[25] Congressional Research Service, Reauthorization of the Federal 
Aviation Administration: Background and Issues for Congress 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2007). 

[26] GAO, Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued Planning and 
Monitoring to Oversee the Safety of the Emerging Space Tourism 
Industry, GAO-07-16 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 2006). 

[27] Unmanned aircraft systems do not carry a human operator; they are 
either programmed for autonomous flight (called a "drone") or are flown 
remotely by a ground operator. 

[28] A certificate of authorization allows an operator to use defined 
airspace for a specified time (up to one year, in some cases) and 
includes special provisions unique to each operation. For instance, a 
certificate may include a requirement to operate only under visual 
flight rules. 

[29] GAO, Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Strengthen the Management of 
Its Designees Programs, GAO-05-40 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004). 

[30] GAO, FAA's Proposed Plan for Implementing a Reliability Centered 
Maintenance Process for Air Traffic Control Equipment, GAO-07-81R 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2006). 

[31] 49 U.S.C. §40122(a)(2). 

[32] In June 2006, FAA planned to hire 11,851 new air traffic 
controllers from 2006 through 2015. FAA's revised plan calls for hiring 
13,641 new controllers for the same time period. 

[33] Under FAA's recently implemented contract with air traffic 
controllers, most current controllers continue to receive their 
existing base salaries and benefits, while new controllers are hired at 
lower wages. 

[34] Only newly hired controllers without any previous experience or 
specialized education are required to complete 5 weeks of initial 
qualification training. 

[35] For example, the staffing range at the Seattle-Tacoma 
International Airport is from 23 to 29 controllers. 

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