This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-07-499T
entitled 'Homeland Security: US-VISIT Has Not Fully Met Expectations
and Longstanding Program Management Challenges Need to Be Addressed'
which was released on February 16, 2007.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST Friday, February 16, 2007:
Homeland Security:
US-VISIT Has Not Fully Met Expectations and Longstanding Program
Management Challenges Need to Be Addressed:
Statement of:
Randolph C. Hite, Director:
Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues:
Richard M. Stana, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-07-499T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-499T, a report to the Subcommittee on Homeland
Security, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is investing billions of
dollars in its U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US VISIT) program to collect, maintain, and share information on
selected foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States. The
program uses biometric identifiers (digital fingerscans and
photographs) to screen people against watch lists and to verify that a
visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document.
The program is also to biometrically confirm the individual’s
departure. For over 3 years, GAO has reported on US-VISIT capability
deployments and shortfalls, as well as fundamental limitations in DHS’s
efforts to define and justify US VISIT’s future direction and to cost-
effectively manage the delivery of program capabilities on time and
within budget.
GAO was asked to testify on (1) the status of the program’s
implementation and (2) the program’s progress in addressing
longstanding management weaknesses. Given where US-VISIT is today and
the challenges and uncertainties associated with where it is going, GAO
believes that DHS is long overdue in demonstrating that it is pursuing
the right US-VISIT solution and that it is managing US-VISIT the right
way.
What GAO Found:
After spending almost 4 years and more than $1 billion, DHS has
implemented entry capabilities at most ports of entry; however, it has
not implemented a biometric exit capability or a suitable alternative.
As of December 2006, US VISIT had deployed and was operating entry
capability at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 of 170 land ports of
entry. However, the implementation of a biometric land exit capability
is currently not feasible, according to program officials, because the
only proven technology available would require additional staffing and
infrastructure demands, and cause delays with potential impacts on
trade and commerce. Also, testing and analysis of a non biometric
solution identified numerous performance and reliability problems, and
such an alternative technology does not meet legislative requirements.
DHS believes that advances over the next 5 to 10 years will allow
solutions that do not require major infrastructure changes, but the
prospects for such technology are uncertain.
DHS continues to face longstanding US-VISIT management challenges and
future uncertainties.
* For almost 4 years, DHS has continued to pursue US-VISIT without
producing the program’s operational and technological context.
According to program officials, an immigration and border management
strategic plan was drafted in March 2005 to show how US-VISIT is
aligned with DHS’s organizational mission and to define an overall
immigration and border management vision. After almost 2 years, this
plan has not yet been approved, but the Acting Director said that it is
currently with OMB for approval. At the same time, DHS has launched
other major security programs without defining the relationship between
US-VISIT and these programs.
* DHS has yet to economically justify its investment in US-VISIT
increments or assess their operational impacts. For over 3 years, we
reported that the program did not adequately assess the increment’s
costs and benefits because the assessments were unclear and
insufficient, and the cost estimates upon which they were based did not
meet key criteria for reliable cost estimating. GAO further reported
that the program had not assessed the impact of the entry and exit
capabilities on operations and facilities, in part, because the scope
of the evaluations performed were too limited.
* DHS has not implemented key acquisition and financial management
controls. For example, GAO reported that the program had not
effectively overseen contract work performed on its behalf by other DHS
and non-DHS agencies, and these agencies did not always establish and
implement effective contract oversight activities.
Without these management controls, there is greater risk that US-VISIT
will not produce the right solution, and be managed the right way.
Accordingly, GAO has made numerous recommendations to address these
management challenges.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-499T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Randy Hite at (202) 512-
3439 or hiter@gao.gov, or Rich Stana at (202) 512-8777 or
stanar@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in the Subcommittee's
hearing on the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology (US-VISIT). US-VISIT is multibillion-dollar program of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that is intended to achieve a
daunting set of goals: to enhance the security of our citizens and
visitors and ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system while
facilitating legitimate trade and travel and protecting individuals'
privacy. To achieve these goals, US-VISIT is to record selected
travelers'[Footnote 1] entry and exit to and from the United States at
over 300 ports of entry (POEs) around the country, verify their
identity, and determine their compliance with the terms of their
admission and stay.
Since fiscal year 2002, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees
have provided valuable oversight and direction for US-VISIT as the
Congress directed DHS to submit annual expenditure plans that had to
meet certain conditions, and directed GAO to review these plans. Our
reviews have produced five reports, including the latest on the fiscal
year 2006 expenditure plan,[Footnote 2] which we issued earlier this
week. These reports and our recent reports to the House Committee on
Homeland Security on US-VISIT contract and financial
management[Footnote 3] and US-VISIT operations at land POEs[Footnote 4]
have identified fundamental challenges that the DHS continues to face
in meeting program expectations (i.e., delivering program capabilities
and benefits on time and within cost). In light of these challenges, we
continue to believe that the program carries an appreciable level of
risk and must be managed effectively if it is to be successful.
Our testimony today draws on this body of completed work to provide a
snapshot of what US-VISIT capabilities have and have not been
delivered, what work has recently begun to enhance already delivered
capabilities, and the range of longstanding challenges that hamper DHS
efforts to establish and live up to program expectations and
commitments. All the work on which this testimony is based was
performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
In summary, after spending almost 4 years and more than $1 billion, DHS
is operating US-VISIT entry capabilities at most POEs, has conducted
various exit demonstration projects at a small number of POEs, and has
begun to work to move from 2 to10 fingerprint biometric capabilities
and expand electronic information sharing with stakeholders. Of
particular note is the fact that a US-VISIT biometric-based entry
screening capability is operating at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154
land POEs. However, a biometric exit capability is not. According to
program officials, this is due to a number of factors. For example, at
this time the only proven technology available for biometric land exit
verification would necessitate mirroring the processes currently in use
for entry at these POEs, which would create costly staffing demands and
infrastructure requirements, and introduce potential trade, commerce,
and environmental impacts. Further, a pilot project to examine an
alternative technology at land POEs did not produce a viable solution.
Where US-VISIT stands today owes largely to the manner in which it has
been managed. In this regard, we have reported a range of program
management weaknesses related to ensuring that the program, as defined,
is the right thing to do and that it is done the right way. To be the
right thing to do, the program needs to fit properly within DHS's
strategic plans and related operational and technology blueprints, and
it needs to produce benefits in excess of costs over its useful life.
Relatedly, program impacts and options need to be considered and
addressed. To be done the right way, critical acquisition management
processes need to be established and followed to ensure that program
capabilities and expected mission outcomes are delivered on time and
within budget. These processes include effective project planning,
requirements management, contract tracking and oversight, test
management, and financial management. As we have reported for several
years, DHS has yet to adequately do these things. While program
officials have stated that all the areas are being addressed, progress
has been slow. Given that significant enhancements to existing program
capabilities are envisioned and underway, it is critical for the
department to expeditiously address the management challenges and
weaknesses that we have identified. Until it does, the risk of US-VISIT
continuing to fall short of expectations is increased.
Background:
US-VISIT is a governmentwide program intended to enhance the security
of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade,
ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect the
privacy of our visitors. To achieve its goals, US-VISIT is to collect,
maintain, and share information on certain foreign nationals who enter
and exit the United States; detect fraudulent travel documents, verify
traveler identity, and determine traveler admissibility through the use
of biometrics; facilitate information sharing and coordination within
the immigration and border management community; and identify foreign
nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of their
admission; (2) may be eligible to receive, extend, or adjust their
immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law
enforcement officials. The scope of the program includes the pre-entry,
entry, status, and exit of hundreds of millions of foreign national
travelers who enter and leave the United States at over 300 air, sea,
and land POEs, as well as analytical capabilities spanning this overall
process.
Management and Implementation of US-VISIT:
The US-VISIT program office has responsibility for managing the
acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of US-VISIT. Until
recently, the US-VISIT Director (currently Acting Director) reported
directly to the Deputy Secretary for Homeland Security. However, as of
March 31, 2007, the program office will report to the newly established
Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate.
Since 2003, DHS has planned to deliver US-VISIT capability in four
increments: Increment 1 (air and sea entry and exit), Increment 2 (air,
sea, and land entry and exit), Increment 3 (land entry), and Increment
4, which is to define, design, build, and implement more strategic
program capability, and which program officials stated will consist of
a series of incremental releases or mission capability enhancements
that will support business outcomes. In Increments 1 through 3, the
program has built interfaces among existing ("legacy") systems,
enhanced the capabilities of these systems, and deployed these
capabilities to air, sea, and land POEs. These first three increments
have been largely acquired and implemented through existing system
contracts and task orders.
Through fiscal year 2007, about $1.7 billion has been appropriated for
the US-VISIT program. About $162 million of the $362 million
appropriated in fiscal year 2007 funds has been released to the
program. The remaining $200 million is pending the submission of an
expenditure plan to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. The
department has requested $462 million in fiscal year 2008 for the
program.
According to program officials, as of January 31, 2007, almost $1.3
billion has been obligated to acquire, develop, deploy, enhance,
operate, and maintain US-VISIT entry capabilities, and to test and
evaluate exit capability options.[Footnote 5]
Overview of Ports of Entry:
The United States shares over 7,500 miles of land border with Canada
and Mexico. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operates 170 land POEs
on the northern border with Canada and the southwest border with
Mexico.[Footnote 6] These POEs are diverse in nature, with some
operating in urban areas, such as Detroit, Michigan, and others
operating in remote areas such as the northern plains in Montana or
along the southwest border. Taken together, land POEs process the
largest number of visitors to the United States each year (about 79
percent of about 425 million total border crossings during fiscal year
2004) and process fewer visitors subject to US-VISIT than other POEs
(about 11 percent of about 42 million border crossings processed via US-
VISIT during fiscal year 2004). The volume of visitor traffic at land
POEs in fiscal year 2005 varies widely, with the busiest four land POEs
identified by CBP being San Ysidro, Calexico, and Otay Mesa,
California, and Bridge of the Americas in El Paso, Texas.
US-VISIT Operations and Processing at Ports of Entry:
In many cases, the US-VISIT process begins overseas at U.S. consular
offices where biometric information is collected from visa applicants
and checked against a database of known criminals and suspected
terrorists. When a visitor arrives at a U.S. POE, the biometric
information is used to verify that the visitor is the person who was
issued the visa or other travel documents. Ultimately, visitors are to
confirm their departure from the United States by having their visas or
passports scanned and undergoing fingerscanning. (Currently, at a few
pilot sites, departing visitors are asked to undergo these exit
procedures.) The exit confirmation is added to the visitor's travel
records to demonstrate compliance with the terms of admission to the
United States.
However, most land border crossers--including U.S. citizens, lawful
permanent residents, and most Canadian and Mexican citizens--are, by
statute or implementing regulation, not required to enroll into US-
VISIT.[Footnote 7] In fiscal year 2004, for example, U.S. citizens and
lawful permanent residents comprised about 57 percent of land border
crossers; Canadian and Mexican citizens comprised about 41 percent; and
less than 2 percent were US-VISIT enrollees. Figure 1 shows the number
and percent of persons processed under US-VISIT as a percentage of all
border crossings at land, air, and sea POEs in fiscal year 2004.
Figure 1: Persons Processed Under US-VISIT as a Percentage of All
Border Crossings at Land, Air, and Sea Ports of Entry, Fiscal Year
2004:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Note: Persons processed by US-VISIT may include foreign nationals who
were also issued an I-94 valid for multiple entries and who have re-
entered multiple times. I-94s are used to record a foreign national's
entry into the United States. Total entering the U.S. includes U.S.
citizens who may have re-entered the country multiple times and foreign
nationals, including those not issued I-94s, such as Canadian citizens
and Mexicans with BCCs, and those issued multiple entry I-94s who also
may have re-entered multiple times. U.S. citizens do not fall within
the statutory scope of US-VISIT and therefore are exempt from US-VISIT
screening.
[End of figure]
Foreign nationals subject to US-VISIT who intend to enter the country
encounter different inspection processes depending on their mode of
travel. Those entering the United States at an air or sea POE are to be
processed in the primary inspection area upon arrival. Before they
arrive, these visitors generally are subject to prescreening via
passenger manifests that are forwarded to CBP by commercial air or sea
carriers.[Footnote 8] By contrast, foreign nationals entering the
United States at land POEs are generally not subject to prescreening
because they arrive in private vehicles or on foot and there is no
manifest to record their pending arrival. Thus, when foreign nationals
subject to US-VISIT arrive at a land POE in vehicles, they enter the
primary inspection area where CBP officers--often located in booths--
are to visually inspect travel documents and query the visitors about
such matters as their place of birth and proposed destination. Visitors
arriving as pedestrians enter an equivalent primary inspection area,
generally inside a CBP building. If the CBP officer believes a more
detailed inspection is needed or if the visitors are required to be
processed under US-VISIT for the first time,[Footnote 9] the visitors
are to be referred to the secondary inspection area that is generally
inside a facility away from the primary inspection area. The secondary
inspection area generally contains office space, waiting areas, and
space to process visitors, including US-VISIT enrollees. Equipment used
for processing includes a computer, printer, digital camera, and a two-
fingerprint scanner.
DHS Has Delivered Some, But Not All, US-VISIT Capabilities:
Under law, DHS was to create an electronic entry and exit system to
screen and monitor the stay of foreign nationals who enter and leave
the United States and implement the system at (1) air and sea POEs by
December 31, 2003, (2) the 50 highest-volume land POEs by December 31,
2004, and (3) the remaining POEs by December 31, 2005.[Footnote 10] In
developing the system, DHS was to focus particularly on the use of
biometric technology[Footnote 11] and was also to collect biometric
data upon entry and exit for all individuals, who are required to be
processed through US-VISIT.[Footnote 12] However, after almost 4 years
and more than $1 billion, DHS has implemented entry capabilities at
most POEs but has not implemented exit capabilities. According to
program officials, several factors have affected the program's ability
to develop, implement, and deploy a biometric exit capability.
US-VISIT Entry Capabilities Are Operating at Most Ports of Entry and
Have Prevented Some from Entering Illegally:
The program office has largely met its expectations relative to a
biometric entry capability. For example, on January 5, 2004, it
deployed and began operating most aspects of its planned biometric
entry capability at 115 airports and 14 seaports for selected foreign
nationals, including those from visa waiver countries;[Footnote 13] as
of December 2006, the program office had deployed and began operating
this entry capability in the secondary inspection areas of 154 of 170
land POEs. According to program officials, 14 of the remaining 16 POEs
have no operational need to deploy US-VISIT because visitors who are
required to be processed through US-VISIT are, by regulation, not
authorized to enter into the United States at these locations.[Footnote
14] The other two POEs do not have entry capability deployed because
they do not have the necessary transmission lines to operate US-VISIT;
CBP officers at those sites have continued to process visitors
manually.
To the department's credit, the development and deployment of this
entry capability was largely in accordance with legislative time lines
and has occurred during a period of considerable organizational change,
starting with the creation of DHS from 23 separate agencies in early
2003, followed by the birth of a US-VISIT program office shortly
thereafter--which was only about 5 months before the program had to
meet its first legislative milestone. Compounding these program
challenges was the fact that the systems that were to be used in
building and deploying a biometric entry capability were managed and
operated by a number of the separate agencies that had been merged to
form the new department, each of which was governed by different
policies, procedures, and standards.
Moreover, DHS reports that US-VISIT entry capabilities have produced
results. According to US-VISIT's Consolidated Weekly Summary Report, as
of December 28, 2006, there have been more than 5,400 biometric hits in
primary entry, resulting in more than 1,300 people having adverse
actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. According to the
report, about 4,100 of these hits occurred at air and sea ports of
entry and over 1,300 at land ports of entry. Further, the report
indicates that more than 1,800 biometric hits have been referred to
DHS's immigration enforcement unit, resulting in 293 arrests. We did
not verify the information in the consolidated report.
Another potential consequence, although difficult to demonstrate, is
the deterrent effect of having an operational entry capability.
Although deterrence is not an expressly stated goal of the program,
officials have cited it as a potential byproduct of having a publicized
capability at the border to screen entry on the basis of identity
verification and matching against watch lists of known and suspected
terrorists. Accordingly, the deterrent potential of the knowledge that
unwanted entry may be thwarted and the perpetrators caught is arguably
a layer of security that should not be overlooked.
Despite these results, US-VISIT's entry capability at land POEs has not
been without operational and system performance problems. During recent
visits to land POEs, we identified some space constraints and other
capacity issues. For example, at the Nogales-Morley Gate POE in
Arizona, where up to 6,000 visitors are processed daily (and up to
10,000 on holidays), equipment was installed[Footnote 15] but not used
because of CBP concerns about its ability to carry out the US-VISIT
process in a constrained space while thousands of other people not
subject to US-VISIT are processed through the facility daily.[Footnote
16] Thus, visitors that are to be processed into US-VISIT from Morley
Gate are directed to return to Mexico (a few feet away) and to walk
approximately 100 yards to the Nogales-DeConcini POE facility, which
has the capability to handle secondary inspections of this kind. In
addition, we found that POEs had experienced system downtime associated
with US-VISIT. In particular, 12 of the 21 land POEs that we visited
stated that they had experienced computer-processing problems that had
an impact on processing times and traveler delays. In June 2006, a CBP
data center official confirmed that POEs had experienced slowdowns
associated with certain US-VISIT data queries.[Footnote 17] The CBP
official also told us that these computer processing problems have
since been identified and resolved, and that performance had greatly
improved. We did not verify whether the actions taken fully resolved
these problems.
US-VISIT Is Unable to Implement a Biometric Exit Capability at Land
Ports of Entry Due to Several Constraints and Testing of Non-biometric
Exit Solution Has Identified Performance Problems:
Several logistical, infrastructure, cost, and technological constraints
have precluded DHS from implementing a biometric exit capability at
land POEs. According to program officials, the major constraint at this
time is that the only proven technology available to biometrically
verify individuals upon exit at land POEs would necessitate mirroring
the processes currently in use for entry. Such a process would require
CBP officers to perform the same processes as for entry, including
examining the travel documents of those leaving the country, taking
fingerprints, comparing visitors' facial features to photographs, and,
if questions about identity arise, directing the departing visitor to
secondary inspection for additional questioning. The program office
concluded in January 2005 that a mirror image solution was "an
infeasible alternative for numerous reasons, including but not limited
to, the additional staffing demands, new infrastructure requirements,
and potential trade and commerce impacts."[Footnote 18]
More specifically, program officials told us that implementing such a
solution could result in delays at land POEs with a heavy daily volume
of visitors, and would require both additional lanes for exiting
vehicles and additional inspection booths and staff (though they had
not determined precisely how many). It is unclear how new vehicle lanes
and new facilities could be built at land POEs where space constraints
already exist, such as those in congested urban areas. For example, San
Ysidro, California, currently has 24 entry lanes, each with its own
staffed booth, and 6 unstaffed exit lanes. Thus, if full biometric exit
capability were implemented using a mirror image approach, San Ysidro's
current capacity of 6 exit lanes would have to be expanded to 24 exit
lanes. As shown in the following photo and confirmed during our site
visit to the San Ysidro POE, the facility is surrounded by dense urban
infrastructure, leaving little, if any, room to expand in place. Some
of the 24 entry lanes for vehicle traffic heading north from Mexico
into the United States appear in the bottom left portion of the
photograph, where vehicles are shown waiting to approach primary
inspection at the facility; the six exit lanes (traffic towards
Mexico), which do not have fixed inspection facilities, are at the
upper left.
Figure 2: Aerial View of San Ysidro, California, POE:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Other POE facilities are similarly spatially constrained. For example,
the Nogales-DeConcini, Arizona facility is bordered by railroad tracks,
a parking lot, and industrial or commercial buildings. Further, CBP has
identified space constraints at selected rural POEs, such as the
Thousand Islands Bridge POE at Alexandria Bay, New York, which is
situated in what POE officials described as a "geological bowl," with
tall rock outcroppings potentially hindering the ability to expand
facilities at the current location. Officials told us that in order to
accommodate existing and anticipated traffic volume upon entry, they
are in the early stages of planning to build an entirely new POE on a
hill about a half-mile south of the present facility.
DHS also identified the cost of implementing a biometric exit
capability as a constraint. In 2003, the program office estimated that
it would cost approximately $3 billion to implement US-VISIT entry and
exit capability at land POEs where US-VISIT was likely to be installed,
and that such an effort would have a major impact on facility
infrastructure at land POEs. We did not assess the reliability of the
2003 estimate, but would note that while the estimate did not
separately break out costs for entry and exit construction, it did
factor in the cost for building additional exit vehicle lanes and
booths as well as buildings and other infrastructure that would be
required to accommodate a mirror image of entry capabilities. Program
officials told us that they did not move ahead with this option. No
subsequent cost estimate updates had been prepared, and DHS's annual
budget requests have not included funds to build the infrastructure
that would be associated with the required facilities.
In light of these various constraints, the program office has tested
nonbiometric technology to record travelers' departure, but testing
showed numerous performance and reliability problems. Because there is
at present no biometric technology that can be used to verify a
traveler's exit from the country at land POEs without also making major
and costly changes to POE infrastructure and facilities, the program
office tested radio frequency identification (RFID) technology as a
nonbiometric means of recording visitors as they exit. RFID technology
can be used to electronically identify and gather information contained
on a tag--in this case, a unique identifying number embedded in a tag
on a visitor's arrival/departure form--which an electronic reader at
the POE is to detect.
While RFID technology required few facility and infrastructure changes,
testing and analysis at five land POEs at the northern and southern
borders identified numerous performance and reliability problems, such
as the failure of RFID readers to detect a majority of travelers' tags
during testing. For example, the program office reported that of 166
vehicles tested during a one-week period at the Blaine-Pacific Highway,
readers correctly identified 14 percent--a sizable departure from the
target read rate of 70 percent.[Footnote 19]
Another problem that arose were "cross-reads," in which multiple RFID
readers installed on poles or structures over roads, called gantries,
picked up information from the same visitor, regardless of whether the
individual was entering or exiting in a vehicle or on foot. Thus, cross-
reads resulted in inaccurate record-keeping. According to a January
2006 corrective-action report, remedying cross-reads would require
changes to equipment and infrastructure on a case-by-case basis at each
POE, because each has a different physical configuration of buildings,
roadways, roofs, gantries, poles, and other surfaces against which the
signals can bounce and cause cross-reads. Each would therefore require
a different physical solution to avoid the signal interference that
triggers cross-reads. Although cost estimates or time lines for such
alterations to facilities and equipment have not been developed, it is
possible that having to alter each POE's physical configuration in some
regard and then test each separately to ensure that cross-reads had
been eliminated would be both time consuming and potentially costly.
Moreover, even if RFID deficiencies were to be fully addressed and
deadlines set, the RFID solution does not meet the legislative
requirement for a biometric exit capability. By design, an RFID tag
embedded in an I-94 arrival/departure form cannot provide the biometric
identity-matching capability that is envisioned as part of a
comprehensive entry/exit border security system that uses biometric
identifiers for tracking overstays and others entering, exiting, and re-
entering the country. That is, the RFID tag in the I-94 form cannot be
physically tied to an individual. This situation means that while a
document may be detected as leaving the country, the person to whom it
was issued at time of entry may be somewhere else. Thus, the technology
that had been tested cannot meet a key program goal--ensuring that
visitors who enter the country are the same ones who leave.
According to program officials, technological advances over the next 5
to 10 years will make it possible to utilize alternative technologies
that provide biometric verification of persons exiting the country
without major changes to facility infrastructure and without requiring
those exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles, thereby mitigating
traffic backup, congestion, and resulting delays. Further, the program
reports that although limitations in technology currently preclude the
use of biometric identification because visitors would have to be
stopped, the prospect of the as-yet-undeveloped biometric verification
technology supports the long-term US-VISIT vision.[Footnote 20]
However, according to program officials, no such technology or device
currently exists that would not have a major impact on facilities. The
prospects for its development, manufacture, deployment and reliable
utilization are thus uncertain, although a prototype device that would
permit a fingerprint to be read remotely without requiring the visitor
to come to a full stop is under development.
By law, DHS was to have reported to Congress by June 2005 on how the
agency intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program.
According to statute, this plan is to include, among other things, a
description of the manner in which the program meets the goals of a
comprehensive entry and exit screening system--including both biometric
entry and exit--and fulfills statutory obligations imposed on the
program by several laws enacted between 1996 and 2002.[Footnote 21]
According to program officials, as of February 2007, this plan has been
forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review.
Until such a plan is finalized and issued, DHS is not able to
articulate how entry/exit concepts--including any interim nonbiometric
solutions--will fit together, and is not positioned to identify,
prioritize, and allocate resources for an exit capability or
effectively plan for the program's future. Further, given the absence
of a comprehensive entry and exit system, questions remain about what
meaningful data may be available to other DHS components, such as
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to ensure that DHS can, from an
interior enforcement perspective, identify and remove foreign nationals
covered by US-VISIT who may have overstayed their visas. We discuss
this point further in the following section.
DHS Continues to Face Longstanding US-VISIT Management Challenges and
Future Uncertainties:
Our work and other best practice research have shown that applying
disciplined and rigorous management practices improves the likelihood
of delivering expected capabilities on time and within budget. Such
practices and processes include determining how the program fits within
the larger context of an agency's strategic plans and related
operational and technology environments, whether the program will
produce benefits in excess of costs over its useful life, and whether
program impacts and options are being fully identified, considered, and
addressed. To further ensure that programs are managed effectively, it
is important that they be executed in accordance with acquisition and
financial management requirements and best practices, and that progress
against program commitments is defined and measured so that program
officials can be held accountable for results.
For almost 4 years, we have reported on fundamental limitations in
DHS's efforts to define and justify the program's future direction and
to cost-effectively manage the delivery of promised capabilities on
time and within budget. To a large degree, what is operating and what
is not operating today, and what future program changes are underway
and yet to be defined, are affected by these limitations. DHS needs to
address these challenges going forward, and the recommendations that we
made over the last 3 years are aimed at encouraging this. Until these
recommendations are fully implemented, the program will be at greater
risk of not optimally meeting mission needs and falling short of
meeting expectations.
DHS Has Not Defined and Developed US-VISIT Within a DHS-wide
Operational and Technological Context:
As we previously reported, agency programs need to properly fit within
a common strategic context or frame of reference governing key aspects
of program operations (such as who is to perform what functions, when
and where they are to be performed, what information is to be used to
perform them, and what rules and standards will govern the use of
technology to support them).[Footnote 22] Without a clear operational
context to guide and constrain both US-VISIT and other border security
and immigration enforcement initiatives, DHS risks investing in
programs and systems that are duplicative, are not interoperable, and
do not optimize enterprisewide mission operations and produce intended
outcomes.
For almost 4 years, DHS has continued to pursue US-VISIT (both in terms
of deploying interfaces between and enhancements to existing systems
and in defining a longer-term, strategic US-VISIT solution) without
producing the program's operational context. In September 2003, we
reported that DHS had not defined key aspects of the larger homeland
security environment in which US-VISIT would need to operate. In the
absence of a DHS-wide operational and technological context, program
officials were making assumptions about certain policy and standards
decisions that had not been made, such as whether official travel
documents would be required for all persons who enter and exit the
country--including U.S. and Canadian citizens--and how many
fingerprints would be collected for biometric comparisons. We further
reported that if the program office's assumptions and decisions turned
out to be inconsistent with subsequent policy or standards decisions,
it would require US-VISIT rework.
According to the program's Chief Strategist, an immigration and border
management strategic plan was drafted in March 2005 to show how US-
VISIT is aligned with DHS's organizational mission and to define an
overall vision for immigration and border management. According to this
official, the vision provides for an immigration and border management
enterprise that unifies multiple departmental and external stakeholders
around common objectives, strategies, processes, and infrastructures.
As of February 2007, about 2 years later, we were told that this
strategic plan has not yet been approved, although the program's Acting
Director stated that the plan is currently with OMB and should be
provided to the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on
Homeland Security by March 2007.
However, at the same time, US-VISIT has not taken steps to ensure that
the direction that it is taking is both operationally and
technologically aligned with DHS's enterprise architecture (EA). As the
report that we issued this week states, the DHS Enterprise Architecture
Board, which is the DHS entity that determines EA compliance, has not
reviewed the US-VISIT architecture compliance for more than 2 years.
However, since August 2004, both US-VISIT and the EA have changed. For
example, additional functionality, such as the interoperability of US-
VISIT's Automated Biometric Information System (IDENT) and the
Department of Justice's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System (IAFIS), and the expansion of IDENT to collect ten rather than
two fingerprints, has been added. Also, two versions of the DHS EA have
been issued since August 2004.
While the strategic plan has not been approved or disseminated, the
program office has developed a strategic vision and blueprint and begun
to implement it. According to program officials, this future vision is
to be delivered through a number of planned mission capability
enhancements. Of these, the first enhancement is underway and is to
provide several new capabilities, including what the program refers to
as "Unique Identity," which is to include the migration from the 2-
fingerprint to 10-fingerprint collection at program enrollment. It is
also to interoperate US-VISIT's IDENT system and the Department of
Justice's IAFIS system. Currently, the US-VISIT officials plan to
complete Unique Identity in several phases and have it fully
operational by December 2009, although these plans have not yet
approved by DHS.
At this same time, DHS has launched other major border security
programs without adequately defining the relationships to US-VISIT and
each other. For example, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 directs DHS and the Department of State to
develop and implement a plan, no later than June 2009, that requires
U.S. citizens and foreign nationals of Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico to
present a passport or other document or combination of documents deemed
sufficient to show identity and citizenship to enter the United States
(this is currently not a requirement for these individuals entering the
United States via sea and land POEs from most countries within the
western hemisphere).[Footnote 23] This effort, known as the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative, was first announced in 2005. In May 2006,
we reported that DHS and the Department of State had taken some steps
to carry out the initiative, but they had a long way to go to implement
their proposed plans.[Footnote 24] Among other things, key decisions
had yet to be made about what documents other than a passport would be
acceptable when U.S. citizens and citizens of Canada enter or return to
the United States. Further, while DHS and Department of State had
proposed an alternative form of passport, called a PASS card, that
would rely on RFID technology to help DHS process U.S. citizens re-
entering the country, DHS had not made decisions involving a broad set
of considerations that include (1) utilizing security features to
protect personal information, (2) ensuring that proper equipment and
facilities are in place to facilitate crossings at land borders, and
(3) enhancing compatibility with other border crossing technology
already in use.
DHS has also initiated another border security program, known as the
Secure Border Initiative (SBI)--a multi-year program to secure the
borders and reduce illegal immigration by installing state-of-the-art
surveillance technologies along the border, increasing border security
personnel, and ensuring information access to DHS personnel at and
between POEs. Under SBI and its component, called SBInet, DHS plans to
integrate personnel, infrastructures, technologies, and rapid response
capability into a comprehensive border protection capability. DHS
reports that, among other things, SBInet is to encompass both the
northern and southern land borders, including the Great Lakes, under a
unified border control strategy whereby CBP is to focus on the
interdiction of cross-border violations between and at the land POEs,
funneling traffic to the land POEs. As part of SBI, DHS also plans to
focus on interior enforcement--disrupting and dismantling cross-border
crime into the interior of the United States while locating and
removing aliens who are present in the United States in violation of
law. However, it is unclear how SBInet will be linked, if at all, to US-
VISIT so that the two can share technology, infrastructure, and data.
Clearly defining the dependencies among US-VISIT and programs like the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and SBI is important because there
is commonality among their strategic goals and operational
environments. For example, both US-VISIT and SBI share the goal of
securing the POEs. Moreover, there is overlap in the data that each is
to produce and use. For example, both US-VISIT and the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative will require identification data for
travelers at POEs.
Despite these dependencies, DHS has yet to define these relationships
or how they will be managed. Further, according to a March 6, 2006 memo
from the DHS Joint Requirements Council, the US-VISIT strategic plan
did not provide evidence of sufficient coordination between the program
and the other entities involved in border security and immigration
efforts. The council's recommendation was that the strategic plan not
be approved until greater coordination between US-VISIT and other
components was addressed.
According to the Acting Program Director, a number of efforts are
underway to coordinate with other entities, such as with CBP on RFID,
with the Coast Guard on development of a mobile biometric reader, and
with State on standards for document readers. Without a clear,
complete, transparent, and understood definition of how related
programs and initiatives are to interact, US-VISIT and other border
security and immigration enforcement programs run the risk of being
defined and implemented in a way that does not optimize DHS-wide
performance and results.
DHS Has Not Economically Justified US-VISIT Increments or Assessed
Their Operational Impacts:
The decision to invest in any system or capability should be based on
reliable analyses of return on investment. That is, an agency should
have reasonable assurance that a proposed program will produce mission
value commensurate with expected costs and risks. According to OMB
guidance, individual increments of major systems should be individually
supported by analyses of benefits, cost, and risk. Thus far, DHS has
yet to develop an adequate basis for knowing whether its incrementally
deployed US-VISIT capabilities represent a good return on investment,
particularly in light of shortfalls in DHS's assessments of the
program's operational impacts, including costs of proposed
capabilities. Without this knowledge, DHS will not know until after the
fact whether it is investing wisely or pursuing cost-effective and
affordable solutions.
DHS Did Not Economically Justify Its Proposed Incremental Investments:
US-VISIT had not assessed the cost and benefits of its early
increments. For example, we reported in September 2003 that it had not
assessed the costs and benefits of Increment 1. Again, in February
2005, we reported that although the program office developed a cost-
benefit analysis for its land entry capability, it had not justified
the investment because the treatment of both benefits and costs were
unclear and insufficient. Further, we reported that the cost estimates
on which the cost-benefit analysis was based were of questionable
reliability because effective cost-estimating practices were not
followed. Most recently, in February 2006, we reported again that the
program office had not justified its investment in its air and sea exit
capability. For example, we reported that while the cost-benefit
analysis explained why the investment was needed, and considered at
least two alternatives to the status quo, which is consistent with OMB
guidance for cost-benefit analyses, it did not include a complete
uncertainty analysis for the three exit alternatives evaluated.
Specifically, it did not include a sensitivity analysis[Footnote 25]
for the three alternatives, which is a major part of an uncertainty
analysis. A complete analysis of uncertainty is important because it
provides decision makers with a perspective on the potential
variability of the cost and benefit estimates should the facts,
circumstances, and assumptions change. Further, the cost estimate upon
which the analysis was based did not meet key criteria for reliable
cost estimating. For example, it did not include a detailed work
breakdown structure, which serves to organize and define the work to be
performed so that associated costs can be identified and estimated.
Further, as we state in the report that we issued earlier this week,
DHS has devoted considerable time and resources toward establishing an
operational exit capability at land, air, and sea POEs. For example,
over the last 4 years, DHS has committed over $160 million to evaluate
and operate exit pilots at selected air, sea, and land POEs.
Notwithstanding this considerable investment of time and resources, the
US-VISIT program still does not have either an operational exit
capability or a viable exit solution to deploy to all air, sea, and
land POEs.
Moreover, US-VISIT exit pilot reports have raised concerns and
limitations. For example, as we previously stated, land exit pilot
experienced several performance problems, such as the failure of RFID
readers to detect a majority of travelers' tags during testing and
cross-reads, in which multiple RFID readers installed on poles or
structures over roads, called gantries, picked up information from the
same visitor.
Notwithstanding these results, we reported earlier this week that the
program office planned to invest another $33.5 million to continue its
air and sea exit pilots. However, neither the fiscal year 2006
expenditure plan nor other exit-related program documentation
adequately defined what these efforts entail or what they will
accomplish. In particular, the plan and other exit-related
documentation merely state that $33.5 million will be used to continue
air and sea exit pilots while a comprehensive exit solution is
developed. They do not adequately describe measurable outcomes
(benefits and results) from the pilot efforts, or related cost,
schedule, and capability commitments that will be met. Further, the
plan does not recognize the challenges revealed from the prior exit
efforts, nor does it show how proposed exit investments address these
challenges. In addition, the plan allocates more funding for continuing
the air and sea exit pilots ($33.5 million) than the prior year's plan
said would be needed to fully deploy an operational air and sea exit
solution ($32 million). According to program officials, the air and sea
exit pilots are being continued to maintain a presence intended to
provide a deterrent effect at exit locations, and to gather additional
data that could help support planning for a comprehensive exit
solution.
Moreover, US-VISIT reported in August 2006 that it planned to spend an
additional $21.5 million to continue its land exit demonstration
project without adequate justification. However, we reported earlier
this week that these plans lacked adequate justification in light of
the problems we discussed earlier in this statement. Accordingly,
program officials told us that they intend to terminate the land exit
project until a comprehensive exit strategy can be developed. They have
also stated that a small portion of the $21.5 million is to be used to
close out the demonstration project and have requested that the
remainder of the money be reprogrammed to support Unique Identity.
DHS Did Not Adequately Assess the Impact of Entry Capabilities on Land
Ports of Entry Operations and Planned Capability Enhancements Carry
Potential Cost Implications:
Knowing how planned US-VISIT capabilities will impact POE operations is
critical to US-VISIT investment decision makers. In May 2004, we
reported that the program had not assessed how deploying entry
capabilities at land POEs would impact the workforce and facilities. We
questioned the validity of the program's assumptions and plans
concerning workforce and facilities, since the program lacked a basis
for determining whether its assumptions were correct and thus whether
its plans were adequate. Subsequently, the program office evaluated the
operational performance of the land entry capability with the stated
purpose of determining the effectiveness of its performance at the 50
busiest land POEs. For this evaluation, the program office established
a baseline for comparing the average time it takes to issue and process
entry/exit forms at 3 of these 50 POEs, and then conducted two
evaluations of the processing times at the three POEs, one after the
entry capability was deployed as a pilot, and another one 3 months
later, after the entry capability was deployed to all 50 POEs. The
evaluation results showed that the average processing times decreased
for all three sites. Program officials concluded that these results
supported their workforce and facility investment assumptions that no
additional staff was required to support deployment of the entry
capability and that minimal modifications were required at the
facilities.[Footnote 26]
However, the scope of the evaluations was not sufficient to satisfy the
evaluations' stated purpose for assessing the full impact of the entry
capability. For example, the selection of the three sites, according to
program officials, was based on a number of factors, including whether
the sites already had sufficient staff to support the pilot. Selecting
sites based on this factor is problematic because it presupposes that
all not POEs have the staff needed to support the land entry
capability. In addition, evaluation conditions were not always held
constant: specifically, fewer workstations were used to process
travelers in establishing the baseline processing times at two of the
POEs than were used during the pilot evaluations.
Moreover, CBP officials from a land port of entry that was not an
evaluation site (San Ysidro) told us that US-VISIT deployment had not
reduced but actually lengthened processing times. (San Ysidro processes
the highest volume of travelers of all land POEs.) Although these
officials did not provide specific data to support their statement,
their perception nevertheless raises questions about the potential
impact of land entry capabilities on the 47 sites that were not
evaluated.
Exacerbating this situation is the fact that DHS plans to introduce
changes and enhancements to US-VISIT at land POEs to verify the
identity of individuals entering the country, including a transition
from digitally scanning 2 fingerprints to 10. While such changes are
intended to further enhance border security, deploying them may have an
impact on aging and spatially-constrained land POEs facilities because
they could increase inspection times and adversely affect POEs
operations. Moreover, the increase from 2 to 10 fingerprints can affect
the capacity of the systems and communications networks processing
because of the larger data sets being processed and transmitted (10 vs
2 fingerprints). This need for increased capacity will in turn affect
program costs.
US-VISIT Did Not Adequately Evaluate Exit Capability Impacts on
Operations at Air and Sea Ports of Entry:
The impact of planned exit capabilities at air and sea POEs has also
not been adequately analyzed, and is thus not available to inform
investment decisions. In February 2005, we reported that the program
office had not adequately planned for evaluating its exit pilot at air
and sea POEs because the pilot's evaluation scope and timeline were
compressed. As a result, the US-VISIT program office extended the pilot
from 5 to 11 POEs (nine airports and two seaports). Notwithstanding the
expanded scope of the pilot, the exit alternatives were not
sufficiently evaluated. Specifically, the program office evaluated
these alternatives against three criteria,[Footnote 27] including
compliance with the exit process. According to the exit evaluation plan
report, the average compliance rate across all three alternatives was
only 24 percent.[Footnote 28] The evaluation report cited several
reasons for the low compliance rate, including that compliance during
the pilot was voluntary. As a result, the evaluation report concluded
that national deployment of the exit solution will not meet the desired
compliance rate unless the scope of the exit process is expanded to
incorporate an enforcement mechanism, such as not allowing persons to
reenter the United States if they do not comply with the exit process
or not allowing persons to board a carrier until they are processed by
an airline or the Transportation Security Administration. As of
February 2006, program officials had not conducted any formal
evaluation of enforcement mechanisms or their possible effect on
compliance and cost, and according to the Acting Program Director, they
do not plan to do so.
DHS Has Not Adequately Justified Increases in, and Disclosed the Scope
and Nature of, Program Management-Related Fiscal Year 2006
Expenditures:
Program management is an important and integral aspect of any system
acquisition program. The importance of program management, however,
does not by itself justify any level of investment in such activities.
Rather, investments in program management capabilities should be viewed
the same as investments in any program capability, meaning the scope,
nature, size, and value of the investment should be disclosed and
justified in relation to the size and significance of the acquisition
activities being performed.
As the report that we issued earlier this week states, US-VISIT's
planned investment in program management-related activities has risen
steadily over the last 4 years, while planned investment in development
of new program capabilities has declined. Figure 3 shows the breakdown
of planned expenditures for US-VISIT fiscal year 2002 through 2006
expenditure plans.
Figure 3: US-VISIT Breakdown of Planned Expenditures as a Dollar Amount
for FY2002 Through FY2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO Analysis Based On US-VISIT Data.
Note: According to US-VISIT program officials, actual cost information
for program management and operations cannot be readily provided due to
limitations in their financial management system.
[End of figure]
Specifically, The Fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan provided $30
million for program management and operations and about $325 million
for new development efforts, whereas the fiscal year 2006 plan provided
$126 million for program management-related functions--an increase of
$96 million--and $93 million for new development. This means that the
fiscal year 2006 plan proposed expending $33 million more for program
management and operations than it is for new development.
The increase in planned program management-related expenditures is more
pronounced if it is viewed as a percentage of planned development
expenditures. Figure 4 shows planned US-VISIT expenditures for program
management and operations as a percentage of development for fiscal
years 2002 thru 2006.
Figure 4: US-VISIT Planned Expenditures for Program Management and
Operations as a Percentage of Development for FY2002 through FY2006:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO analysis based on US-VISIT data.
Note: According to US-VISIT program officials, actual cost information
for program management and operations cannot be readily provided due to
limitations in their financial management system.
Specifically, planned program management-related expenditures
represented about 9 percent of planned development in fiscal year 2003,
but represented about 135 percent of fiscal year 2006 development,
meaning that the fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan proposed spending
about $1.35 on program management-related activities for each dollar
spent on developing new US-VISIT capability.
Moreover, the fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan did not explain the
reasons for this recent growth or otherwise justify the sizeable
proposed investment in program management and operations on the basis
of measurable and expected value. Further, the plan did not adequately
describe the range of planned program management and operations
activities.
Program officials told us that the DHS Acting Undersecretary for
Management raised similar concerns about the large amount of program
management and operations funding in the expenditure plan. In January
2007, DHS submitted a revised expenditure plan to the House and Senate
Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security, at the committee's
direction, to address their concerns. The revised plan allocates some
program management funds to individual increments and to two new
categories--program services and data integrity and biometric support,
and program and project support contractor services. However, the
revised plan still shows a relatively sizeable portion of proposed
funding going toward program management-related activities.
DHS Has Not Fully Implemented Key US-VISIT Acquisition and Financial
Management Controls:
Managing major programs like US-VISIT requires applying discipline and
rigor when acquiring and accounting for systems and services. Our work
and other best practice research have shown that applying such rigorous
management practices improves the likelihood of delivering expected
capabilities on time and within budget. In other words, the quality of
IT systems and services is largely governed by the quality of the
management processes involved in acquiring and managing them. Some of
these processes and practices are embodied in the Software Engineering
Institute's (SEI) Capability Maturity Models®, which define, among
other things acquisition process management controls that, if
implemented effectively, can greatly increase the chances of acquiring
systems that provide promised capabilities on time and within budget.
Other practices are captured in OMB guidance, which establishes
policies for planning, budgeting, acquisition, and management of
federal capital assets.
Over the last several years, we have made numerous recommendations
aimed at strengthening US-VISIT program management controls relative to
acquisition management, including for example configuration management,
security and privacy management, earned value management (EVM), and
contract tracking and oversight.
The program office has taken steps to lay the foundation for
establishing several of these controls. For example, the program
adopted the SEI Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI®)[Footnote
29] to guide its efforts to employ effective acquisition management
practices, and approved an acquisition management process improvement
plan dated May 16, 2005. The goal, as stated in the plan, was to
conduct an independent CMMI assessment in October 2006 to affirm that
requisite process controls were in place and operating.
In September 2005, the program office completed an initial assessment
of 13 key acquisition process areas that revealed a number of
weaknesses. To begin addressing these weaknesses, the program office
narrowed the scope of the process improvement activities from 13 to 6
(project planning, project monitoring and control, requirements
development and management, configuration management, product and
process quality assurance, and risk management) of the CMMI process
areas and revised its process improvement plan in April 2006 to reflect
these changes. In May 2006, the program conducted a second internal
assessment of the six key process areas, and according to the results
of this assessment, improvements were made, but weaknesses remained in
all six process areas. For example,
* a number of key acquisition management documents were not adequately
prepared and processes were not sufficiently defined, including those
related to systems development, budget and finance, facilities, and
strategic planning (e.g., product work flow among organizational units
was unclear and not documented); and:
* roles, responsibilities, work products, expectations, resources, and
accountability of external stakeholder organizations were not well-
defined.
Notwithstanding these weaknesses, program officials told us that their
self-assessments show that they have made incremental progress in
implementing the 113 practices associated with the six key processes.
(See figure 5 for US-VISIT's progress in implementing these practices.)
However, they also recently decided to postpone indefinitely the
planned October 2006 independent appraisal. Instead, the program
intends to perform quarterly internal assessments until the results
show that they can pass an independent appraisal. Further, the program
has not committed to a revised target date for having an external
appraisal.
Figure 5: US-VISIT Progress in Implementing Key Acquisition Practices
from August 2005 to November 2006:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO analysis based on US-VISIT data.
[End of figure]
The acquisition management weaknesses in the six key process areas are
exacerbated by weaknesses in other areas. For example, we recently
reported[Footnote 30] that the US-VISIT contract tracking and oversight
process suffers from a number of weaknesses. Specifically, we reported
that the program had not effectively overseen US-VISIT-related contract
work performed on its behalf by other DHS and non-DHS agencies, and
these agencies did not always establish and implement the full range of
controls associated with effective management of contractor activities.
Further, the program office and other agencies did not implement
effective financial controls.[Footnote 31] In particular, the program
office and other agencies managing US-VISIT-related work were unable to
reliably report the scope of contracting expenditures. In addition,
some agencies improperly paid and accounted for related invoices,
including making a duplicate payment and making payments for non-US-
VISIT services from funds designated for US-VISIT.
Fully and effectively implementing the above discussed key acquisition
management and related controls takes considerable time. However,
considerable time has elapsed since we first recommended establishment
of these controls and they are not yet operational and it is unclear
when they will be. Therefore, it is important that these improvement
efforts stay on track. Until these capabilities are in place, the
program risks not meeting its stated goals and commitments.
US-VISIT has not yet implemented other key management practices, such
as developing and implementing a security plan and employing an EVM
system to help manage and control program cost and schedule. As we
previously reported, the program's 2004 security plan generally
satisfied OMB and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
security guidance. Further, the fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan
states that all of the US-VISIT component systems have been certified
and accredited and given full authority to operate. However, the 2004
security plan preceded the US-VISIT risk assessment, which was not
completed until December 2005, and the security plan was not updated to
reflect this risk assessment. According to program officials, they
intend to develop a security strategy by the end of 2006 that reflects
the risk assessment. We have ongoing work for the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs to review the information
security controls associated with computer systems and networks
supporting the US-VISIT program.
Regarding EVM,[Footnote 32] the program is currently relying on the
prime contractor's EVM system to manage the prime contractor's progress
against cost and schedule goals. According to the fiscal year 2006
expenditure plan, the program office has assessed the prime
contractor's EVM system against relevant standards. However, in
reality, this EVM system was self-certified by the prime contractor in
December 2003 as meeting established standards. OMB requires that
agencies verify contractor self-certifications. The program office has
yet to do this, although program officials told us that they plan to
retain the services of another contractor to perform this validation.
This needs to be done quickly. Our review of the integrated baseline
review, which agencies are required by OMB to complete to ensure that
the EVM program baseline is accurate, showed that it did not address
key baseline considerations, such as cost and schedule risks. Moreover,
other US-VISIT contractors have not been required to use EVM, although
program officials told us that this was to change effective October 1,
2006.
DHS Has Yet to Establish Effective Program Accountability Mechanisms:
To ensure that programs manage their performance effectively, it is
important that they define and measure progress against program
commitments and hold themselves accountable for results. Measurements
of the operational performance, progress, and results are important to
reasonably ensure that problems and shortfalls can be addressed and
resolved in a timely fashion and so that responsible parties can be
held accountable.
Thus far, effective performance and accountability mechanisms have yet
to be fully established for US-VISIT. As we reported,[Footnote 33] CBP
officials at 12 of 21 land POE sites that we visited told us about US-
VISIT-related computer slowdowns and freezes that adversely affected
visitor processing and inspection times at 9 of the 12 sites, but noted
that these problems were not always reported to CBP's computer help
desk, as required by CBP guidelines. Although various controls are in
place to alert US-VISIT and CBP officials to problems as they occur,
these controls did not alert officials to all problems (they had been
unaware of the problems we identified before we brought them to their
attention). These computer processing problems have the potential to
not only inconvenience travelers because of the increased time needed
to complete the inspection process, but to compromise security,
particularly if CBP officers are unable to perform biometric checks--
one of the critical reasons US-VISIT was installed at POEs.
In addition, to permit meaningful program oversight, it is important
that expenditure plans describe how well DHS is progressing against the
commitments made in prior expenditure plans. However, US-VISIT's
expenditure plan for fiscal year 2006 (the fifth expenditure plan)
continued a longstanding pattern of not describing progress against
commitments made in previous plans. For example, according to the
fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan, the prime contractor was to begin
integrating the long-term Increment 4 strategy into the interim US-
VISIT system's environment and the overall DHS enterprise architecture,
and that US-VISIT and the prime contractor would work with the
stakeholder community to identify opportunities for delivery of long-
term capabilities under Increment 4. However, the fiscal year 2006 plan
does not discuss progress or accomplishments relative to these
commitments.
Additionally, the expenditure plan committed to begin deploying the
most effective exit alternative for capturing biometrics at air and sea
POEs during fiscal year 2005. In contrast, the 2006 expenditure plan
states that the exit pilots will continue throughout fiscal year 2006
and does not address whether the fiscal year 2005 schedule deployment
commitment was met. Also, the fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan did not
address all performance measures cited in the fiscal year 2005 plan.
Specifically, the 2005 plan included 11 measures. In contrast, the 2006
plan listed 7 measures, 4 of which are similar, but not identical to,
some of the 11 measures in the 2005 plan. This means that several of
the 2005 plan's measures are not addressed in the 2006 plan. Moreover,
even in cases of similar performance measures, the fiscal year 2006
plan does not adequately describe progress in meeting commitments. For
example, the fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan cited a performance
measurement of "Pre-entry watch list hits on biometrically enabled visa
applications." The fiscal year 2006 plan cites the performance measure
of "Number of biometric watch list hits for visa applicants processed
at consular offices." According to the latter plan, in fiscal year 2005
there were 897 such hits; however, neither plan cites a performance
target against which to gauge progress, assuming that the two
performance measures mean the same thing. Without such measurements,
program performance and accountability can suffer.
In closing, we would emphasize that after a considerable investment of
time and resources, US-VISIT has met some fairly demanding legislative
requirements for deployment of entry capabilities at most POEs, and
that this achievement owes largely to the hard work and dedication of
individuals in the US-VISIT program office and the close oversight of
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Nevertheless, core
capabilities, such as exit, have not been implemented, and fundamental
questions about the program's future direction and fit within the
larger homeland security context as well as its return on investment
remain unanswered. Moreover, the program is overdue in establishing the
means to ensure that it is pursuing the right US-VISIT solution, and
that it is managing it the right way. The longer the program proceeds
without these, the greater the risk that the program will not optimally
support mission operations and will fall short of commitments.
Measuring and disclosing the extent to which these commitments are
being met are also essential to holding the department accountable. We
look forward to continuing to work constructively with the US-VISIT
program to better ensure the program's success.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We would be happy to answer
any questions that you or members of the committee may have at this
time.
Contact and Acknowledgement:
If you should have any questions about this testimony, please contact
Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov, or Richard M.
Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Other major contributors to
this testimony included Deborah Davis, David Hinchman, James Houtz,
Sandra Kerr, John Mortin, Freda Paintsil, and Sushmita Srikanth:
FOOTNOTES
[1] US-VISIT applies to foreign travelers that enter the United States
under a nonimmigrant visa or are traveling from a country that has a
visa waiver agreement with the United States under the Visa Waiver
Program. The Visa Waiver Program enables foreign nationals of certain
countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for
stays of 90 days or less without obtaining a visa.
[2] GAO, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve
Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning, GAO-03-563 (Washington, D.C.:
June 9, 2003); GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and
Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003); GAO, Homeland Security: First Phase
of Visitor and Immigration Status Program Operating, but Improvements
Needed, GAO-04-586 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2004); GAO, Homeland
Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program, GAO-05-202
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2005); and GAO, Homeland Security: Planned
Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be
Adequately Defined and Justified, GAO-07-278 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
14, 2007)
[3] GAO, Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for
Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened, GAO-06-
404 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006).
[4] GAO, Border Security, US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic,
Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-
07-248 (Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006).
[5] This includes, for example, computers, printers, digital cameras,
fingerprint scanners, telecommunications upgrades, existing system
enhancements, and facilities modifications.
[6] CBP is responsible for, among other things, enforcing U.S.
immigration laws governing the admissibility of foreign nationals
entering the United States by air, sea, and land.
[7] Since the statute governing US-VISIT applies to foreign national
arrival and departure data only, U.S. citizens do not fall within the
scope of the program and therefore are exempt from US-VISIT screening.
Also, in general, regardless of whether they are to be processed into
US-VISIT, Mexican citizens must present either a passport and visa or a
border crossing card (BCC) when seeking admission to the United States,
while Canadian citizens generally do not need such documents. According
to US-VISIT, when Mexicans receive a BCC, the data on the individual
entered into U.S. databases at the time of their visa application are
accessible by US-VISIT--if they are to be processed into it for any
reason.
[8] Under the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002, 8 U.S.C. § 1221, commercial air and sea carriers are to transmit
crew and passenger manifests to appropriate immigration officials
before arrival of an aircraft or vessel in the United States. These
manifests are transmitted to CBP through the Advanced Passenger
Information System (APIS), which helps officers identify (1) those
arrivals for which biometric data are available and (2) foreign
nationals who need to be scrutinized more closely.
[9] At land border POEs, the Form I-94 issued to foreign nationals
covered by US-VISIT who are deemed admissible is considered issued for
multiple entries, unless specifically annotated otherwise. A multiple
entry I-94 permits them to reenter the country, generally for up to 6
months, without additional US-VISIT processing during the period
covered by the I-94.
[10] 8 U.S.C. §1365a; 6 U.S.C.§ 251 (transferred Immigration and
Naturalization Service functions to DHS).
[11] Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 414(b), (Oct. 26, 2001).
[12] Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 8 U.S.C.
§1365b.
[13] On September 30, 2004, US-VISIT expanded biometric entry
procedures to include individuals from visa waiver countries applying
for admission.
[14] According to CBP, these POEs are classified as Class B ports.
Under 8 C.F.R. §100.4 (c) (2), only citizens of the United States,
Canada, and Bermuda, and Lawful Permanent Residents of the United
States and certain holders of border crossing cards may enter through
Class B ports.
[15] Such equipment includes a computer, printer, digital camera, and
fingerprint scanners.
[16] CBP based this decision on the high volume of pedestrians entering
the United States through the Morley Gate POE; the fact that, before
deployment, I-94s had not been previously issued at the Morley Gate
POE; and the close proximity of the Morley Gate POE facility to the
nearby DeConcini POE facility, about 100 yards away.
[17] CBP officials also dealt with sporadic network outages. In one
case, on December 2, 2005, the entire network went down for 3 hours
because of an accident. According to port officials, visitors seeking
entry into the country at the San Ysidro, California, POE were
initially asked to wait until the systems came back up or return at
another time. About an hour after the outage began, CBP officers began
to manually process I-94s for US-VISIT, in accordance with CBP standard
operating procedures, but without the benefit of a biometric
verification of their identity under US-VISIT.
[18] US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment--FINAL
(Rosslyn, Va.: Jan. 31, 2005).
[19] A US-VISIT program official explained that for vehicles exiting
during RFID testing, one could "reasonably expect" a read rate of 70
percent because vehicles are not required to stop upon exit. The
official also cited vehicle speed, safety, and awareness (of optimal
positioning of the arrival/departure form; for example, holding the
form up to the window of the vehicle) as factors that affected RFID
read rates.
[20] US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment--FINAL
(Rosslyn, Va: Jan. 31, 2005).
[21] 8 U.S.C. §1365b(c)(2)(E).
[22] GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Border and Transportation
Security Program Need to be Addressed, GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 19, 2003).
[23] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7209 (Dec. 17, 2004), as amended, Pub. L.
No. 109-295, § 546 (Oct. 4, 2006). In November 2006, DHS and the
Department of State issued a final rule announcing that, beginning on
January 23, 2007, citizens of the United States, Canada, Mexico, and
Bermuda are required to present a passport to enter the United States
when arriving by air from any part of the Western Hemisphere (8 C.F.R.
Parts 212 and 235 and 22 C.F.R. Parts 41 and 53). According to DHS, a
separate proposed rule addressing land and sea travel will be published
at a later date with specific requirements for travelers entering the
United States through land and sea border crossings.
[24] GAO, Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative on the U.S. Canadian Border, GAO-06-741R (Washington,
D.C.: May 25, 2006).
[25] A sensitivity analysis is a quantitative assessment of the effect
that a change in a given assumption, such as unit labor cost, will have
on net present value.
[26] Specifically, they said minimal modifications to interior
workspace were required to accommodate biometric capture devices and
printers and to install electrical circuits. These officials stated
that modifications to existing officer training and interior space were
the only changes needed.
[27] The other two evaluation criteria were conduciveness to travel and
cost.
[28] Compliance rates were 23 percent for the kiosk, 36 percent for the
mobile device, and 26 percent for the validator.
[29] The CMMI® ranks organizational maturity according to five levels.
Maturity levels 2 through 5 require verifiable existence and use of
certain key process areas.
[30] GAO, Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for
Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened, GAO-06-
404 (Washington, D.D.: June 9, 2006).
[31] Financial controls are practices to provide accurate, reliable,
and timely accounting for billings and expenditures.
[32] EVM is a management tool to help ensure that work performed for a
program or project is consistent with cost and schedule goals.
[33] GAO, Border Security, US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic,
Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-
07-248 (Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006).
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site.
To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon,
go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548: