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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST: 

Tuesday, February 13, 2007: 

Aviation Security: 

Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, 
but More Work Remains: 

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

GAO-07-448T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-448T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of 
Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), established in 
November 2001, has developed and implemented a variety of programs to 
secure the commercial aviation system. To implement these efforts, TSA 
funding related to aviation security has totaled about $20 billion 
since fiscal year 2004. Other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
components, such as the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and 
the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), also play roles in 
securing commercial aviation. In this testimony, we address the efforts 
TSA has taken or planned to strengthen aviation security, and the 
challenges that remain, in three key areas: airline passenger 
prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening, and air 
cargo screening. My comments are based on issued GAO reports and 
testimonies and our preliminary observations from ongoing work on TSA’s 
passenger checkpoint screening procedures and technologies, and 
staffing standards for Transportation Security Officers (TSO). 

What GAO Found: 

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the 
security of the nation’s aviation system, and should be commended for 
these efforts. However, more work remains. Meeting the congressional 
mandates to screen airline passengers and checked baggage alone was a 
tremendous challenge. Since that time, TSA has turned its attention to, 
among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more 
efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the TSO workforce; 
strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more 
effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic 
air cargo security. Some of the actions taken by TSA in these areas 
were in response to GAO recommendations. For example, consistent with 
GAO’s recommendation to strengthen checked baggage screening, TSA has 
developed a strategic planning framework and identified several funding 
and financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage 
screening systems. 

While TSA has undertaken numerous efforts to strengthen aviation 
security, GAO found that DHS and TSA could strengthen their risk-based 
decision-making efforts and collaboration with stakeholders. For 
example, as TSA moves forward with Secure Flight—TSA’s prospective 
domestic passenger prescreening program—it will need to employ a range 
of program management disciplines, which we previously found missing, 
to control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. TSA 
has put in place a new management team, but it is too early to know how 
this change will affect the program’s development. In addition, while 
TSA has tested some proposed modifications to passenger screening 
procedures at airports to help determine whether to implement the 
changes, GAO identified that TSA’s data collection and analyses could 
be improved. GAO also found that limited progress has been made in 
developing and deploying technologies due to planning and funding 
challenges. For example, limited progress has been made in fielding 
explosives detection technology at passenger screening checkpoints, and 
while TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment 
of checked baggage screening systems and to identify funding and 
financing strategies for installing these systems, the agency has 
identified that under current investment levels, installation of 
optimal checked baggage screening systems will not be completed until 
approximately 2024. Additionally, the federal government and the air 
cargo industry face several challenges that must be overcome to 
effectively implement technologies to inspect air cargo, such as 
ensuring that air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the 
delivery time frames of air carriers. GAO also found that more work is 
needed to fully implement a risk-based approach to securing air cargo, 
including finalizing a methodology and schedule for completing 
assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets. TSA 
stated that the agency intends to perform a vulnerability assessment of 
U.S. air cargo operations and activities, as recommended by GAO, and 
plans to complete this assessment in 2007. 

What GAO Recommends: 

In prior reports, GAO has made numerous recommendations designed to 
strengthen aviation security, including recommendations related to 
passenger prescreening, passenger and checked baggage screening, and 
air cargo security. TSA has generally agreed with our recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-448T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 
512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to 
discuss the security of our nation's aviation system. The 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established in 2001 
with the mission to protect the transportation network while also 
ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. Since its inception, 
TSA has focused much of its efforts on aviation security, and has 
developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to 
secure commercial aviation. To implement these efforts, TSA funding for 
aviation security has totaled about $20 billion since fiscal year 2004. 
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) also plays a role in 
securing commercial aviation. In particular, CBP has responsibility for 
conducting passenger prescreening--or the matching of passenger 
information against terrorist watch lists--for international flights 
operating to or from the United States, as well as inspecting inbound 
air cargo upon its arrival in the United States.[Footnote 1] In 
addition, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and 
Technology Directorate (S&T) is responsible for the research and 
development of aviation security technologies. In carrying out its 
broader homeland security responsibilities, DHS faces the daunting 
challenge of determining how to allocate its finite resources within 
the aviation system and across all sectors to address threats and 
strengthen security. 

My testimony today focuses on three key areas of the aviation security 
system: airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked 
baggage screening, and air cargo security. In particular, I will 
address the numerous efforts TSA has taken or has planned to strengthen 
aviation security in these three key areas, and the challenges that 
remain. 

My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing 
the security of the U.S. commercial aviation system; and our 
preliminary observations from ongoing work on TSA's passenger 
checkpoint screening procedures and technologies, air carriers' 
domestic passenger prescreening systems, and staffing standards for 
Transportation Security Officers (TSO). We plan to report on the 
results of this work later this year. We conducted our work in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A 
list of our related reports on aviation security is included at the end 
of this testimony. 

Summary: 

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the 
security of the nation's aviation system. Meeting the congressional 
mandates to screen airline passengers and 100 percent of checked 
baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. To do this, TSA hired and 
deployed a federal workforce of over 40,000 passenger and checked 
baggage screeners, and installed equipment at most of the nation's more 
than 400 commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all 
checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by 
Congress. TSA has since turned its attention to, among other things, 
strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently allocating, 
deploying, and managing the TSO--formerly known as screener--workforce; 
strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more 
effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic 
air cargo security. More specifically, based on our past work and 
preliminary observations from our ongoing work, DHS and TSA have: 

* Taken numerous steps to strengthen the management and performance of 
the TSO workforce by, for example, developing and implementing a 
Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports 
that reflect current operating conditions; implementing a variety of 
human capital initiatives to help recruit, hire, and retain TSOs (both 
full-time and part-time); and providing TSOs with additional training 
intended to enhance the detection of threat objects, particularly 
improvised explosive devices. 

* Proposed and implemented modifications to passenger checkpoint 
screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability) 
information, and pursued several mitigating actions to reduce the need 
to use alternative screening procedures for screening checked baggage 
that have involved trade-offs in security effectiveness. 

* Explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to enhance 
the detection of explosives and other threats; and developed a 
strategic planning framework and identified several funding and 
financing strategies, in collaboration with key stakeholders, for 
installing optimal checked baggage screening systems. 

* Implemented measures to strengthen air cargo security, such as 
conducting threat assessments that identified general and specific 
threats related to domestic air cargo; enhancing requirements for air 
carriers to randomly inspect air cargo; conducting compliance 
inspections of air carriers to ensure that they are complying with 
existing air cargo security requirements; and working with DHS's 
Science and Technology Directorate to enhance air cargo screening 
technologies. 

While these efforts should be commended, we also found that DHS and TSA 
could strengthen their risk-based decision making efforts, including 
planning and program evaluations, and collaboration with stakeholders. 
For example, for over 4 years, TSA has been unable to develop Secure 
Flight--a government-operated domestic passenger prescreening system-- 
to the point of implementation on the schedule it had established for 
the program due, in part, to not employing a range of management 
disciplines to effectively manage program cost, schedule, performance, 
and privacy risks. While TSA officials stated that they will be able to 
manage these risks--based on putting in place a new management team; 
rebaselining the program's goals, capabilities, costs, and schedule; 
and establishing more structured and controlled processes to guide 
future development--it is too early to know how these changes will 
affect the program's development. Further, TSA and CBP, although now 
coordinating efforts, have not yet aligned their respective domestic 
and international passenger prescreening programs to minimize 
duplication and provide a single, integrated interface to the aviation 
industry, and key decisions about how the international and domestic 
prescreening programs will be integrated have not yet been finalized. 

In addition, our ongoing review of TSA's process for modifying 
passenger checkpoint screening procedures identified that TSA's efforts 
to evaluate the effectiveness of proposed changes to passenger 
screening procedures could be improved. For example, while in some 
cases TSA has tested proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint 
screening procedures at selected airports to help determine whether the 
changes would achieve their intended purposes, our preliminary 
observations indicate that TSA's data collection and analyses could be 
strengthened. In addition, with respect to air cargo, while TSA 
conducted a variety of compliance inspections to determine whether air 
carriers or indirect air carriers[Footnote 2] were complying with TSA 
security requirements, and had begun to analyze the results of these 
inspections, it had not developed measures to assess the adequacy of 
air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements, or 
systematically assessed the results of its compliance inspections to 
target higher-risk air carriers or indirect air carriers for future 
reviews. 

We also found that limited progress has been made in developing and 
deploying technologies due to planning and funding challenges. For 
example, our preliminary work has identified that limited progress has 
been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger 
screening checkpoints in part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in 
coordinating research and development efforts, and TSA does not yet 
have a strategic plan in place to assist in guiding its efforts to 
acquire and deploy screening technologies. The lack of such a plan 
could limit TSA's ability to deploy emerging technologies at those 
airport locations deemed at higher risk. In addition, while TSA has 
begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked 
baggage screening systems--as we recommended in March 2005--and to 
identify funding and financing strategies for installing optimal 
checked baggage screening systems, TSA has identified that under 
current investment levels, installation of optimal checked baggage 
screening systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. 
Moreover, although TSA is working to enhance air cargo screening 
technologies, the federal government and the air cargo industry face 
several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement 
technologies to inspect air cargo. These challenges include ensuring 
that air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the delivery 
time frames of air carriers, and that individuals who inspect cargo are 
properly trained to operate the inspection technology. Another 
challenge is the funding of inspection technologies, which can range in 
the millions of dollars. We also reported that additional work is 
needed to fully implement a risk-based management approach to securing 
air cargo. We recommended that TSA develop a methodology and schedule 
for finalizing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical 
assets that need to be protected. TSA stated that the agency intends to 
perform a vulnerability assessment of U.S. air cargo operations and 
activities, and plans to complete this assessment in 2007. 

Background: 

With the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) 
in November 2001, TSA assumed responsibility for civil aviation 
security from the Federal Aviation Administration and for passenger and 
checked baggage screening from air carriers.[Footnote 3] As part of 
this responsibility, TSA oversees security operations at the nation's 
more than 400 commercial airports, including establishing requirements 
for passenger and checked baggage screening, and ensuring the security 
of air cargo transported to, from, and within the United 
States.[Footnote 4] While TSA has operational responsibility for 
conducting passenger and checked baggage screening, TSA has regulatory, 
or oversight, responsibility for air carriers who conduct air cargo 
screening. While TSA took over responsibility for passenger checkpoint 
and baggage screening, as directed by ATSA, air carriers have continued 
to conduct passenger prescreening, which includes the process of 
checking passenger information against federal watch list data before 
flights depart. In accordance with the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, TSA is developing a program to take 
over this responsibility from air carriers for passengers on domestic 
flights, and CBP has issued a proposed rule that would enable it to 
perform its identity-matching function for passengers on international 
flights traveling to or from the United States prior to flight 
departure.[Footnote 5] 

Airline Passenger Prescreening: 

The prescreening of airline passengers--the process of identifying 
passengers who may pose a security risk before they board an aircraft-
-is one of many important layers of security that is intended to help 
officials focus security efforts on those passengers representing the 
greatest potential threat to civil aviation. Within DHS, TSA is 
responsible for ensuring that passenger prescreening is conducted 
before domestic flights--flights operating entirely within the United 
States--take off, while CBP has responsibility for conducting passenger 
prescreening for international flights operating to or from the United 
States.[Footnote 6] 

TSA is developing a program, in accordance with ATSA and the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, through which 
TSA would assume the watch list matching function currently conducted 
by air carriers prior to domestic flight departures.[Footnote 7] TSA 
has named this prospective prescreening program Secure Flight.[Footnote 
8] In accordance with security directives issued by TSA, air carriers-
-and not the U.S. government--currently match passenger-supplied 
reservation information (referred to as passenger name record (PNR) 
data), against the No Fly and Selectee Lists to prescreen passengers 
before domestic flights depart. According to TSA, the No Fly List 
includes the names of individuals considered to be known or suspected 
threats to civil aviation and are therefore precluded from boarding an 
aircraft traveling to, from, or within the United States, while the 
Selectee List includes the names of individuals who require additional 
security screening--which includes physical inspection of the person 
and a hand search of their luggage--prior to being permitted to board 
an aircraft. These lists are extracted from the Terrorist Screening 
Center's (TSC) consolidated terrorist screening database (TSDB) and are 
exported to the air carriers through TSA. The current domestic 
prescreening process also requires that air carriers operate the 
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), which 
identifies passengers for additional screening based on certain 
behavioral characteristics.[Footnote 9] 

The existing identity-matching component of DHS's international 
aviation passenger prescreening process involves separate matching 
activities conducted by air carriers (prior to a flight's departure and 
pursuant to TSA requirements) and by CBP (generally after a flight's 
departure).[Footnote 10] As with domestic passenger prescreening, air 
carriers conduct an initial match of self-reported PNR data against the 
No Fly and Selectee Lists before international flight departures. CBP's 
process, in effect, supplements the air carrier identity matching for 
international flights by comparing additional passenger information 
collected from passports (this information becomes part of Advanced 
Passenger Information System (APIS) data), against the No Fly and 
Selectee Lists and other government databases.[Footnote 11] Under 
current federal regulations for CBP's prescreening of passengers on 
international flights, air carriers are required to provide the U.S. 
government with PNR data as well as APIS data to allow the government 
to conduct, among other things, identity matching procedures against 
the No Fly and Selectee Lists--which typically occur just after or at 
times just before the departure of international flights traveling to 
or from the United States, respectively.[Footnote 12] To address a 
concern that the federal government's identity matching may not be 
conducted in a timely manner, in 2004, Congress mandated that DHS issue 
a proposed rule requiring that the U.S. government's identity-matching 
process occur before the departure of international flights. CBP 
published this proposed rule in July 2006,[Footnote 13] and, if 
implemented, it will allow the U.S. government to conduct passenger 
prescreening in advance of flight departure, and will eliminate the 
need for air carriers to continue performing an identity-matching 
function for international flights. 

Airline Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening: 

One of the most significant changes mandated by ATSA was the shift from 
the use of private-sector screeners to perform airport screening 
operations to the use of federal screeners (now referred to as TSOs). 
Prior to ATSA, passenger and checked baggage screening had been 
performed by private screening companies under contract to airlines. 
ATSA required TSA to create a federal workforce to assume the job of 
conducting passenger and checked baggage screening at commercial 
airports. The federal screener workforce was put into place, as 
required, by November 2002.[Footnote 14] 

Passenger screening is a process by which personnel authorized by TSA 
inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of 
any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item 
onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area.[Footnote 15] Passenger 
screening personnel must inspect individuals for prohibited items at 
designated screening locations.[Footnote 16] As shown in figure 1, the 
four passenger screening functions are: 

* X-ray screening of property, 

* walk-through metal detector screening of individuals, 

* hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and: 

* physical search of property and trace detection for explosives. 

Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray screening of their 
carry-on items and screening by the walk-through metal detector. 
Passengers whose carry-on baggage alarms the X-ray machine, who alarm 
the walk-through metal detector, or who are designated as selectees-- 
that is, passengers selected by the CAPPS or other TSA-approved 
processes to designate passengers for additional screening--are 
screened by hand-wand or pat-down and have their carry-on items 
screened for explosives traces or physically searched[Footnote 17].  

Figure 1: Passenger Checkpoint Screening Operation: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO and Nova Development Corporation. 

Note: Explosive trace detection (ETD) works by detecting vapors and 
residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing 
swabs along the interior and exterior of an object that TSOs determine 
to be suspicious, and place the swabs in the ETD machine, which then 
chemically analyzes the swabs to identify any traces of explosive 
materials. 

[A] BDOs are TSOs specially trained to detect suspicious behavior in 
individuals approaching the checkpoint. Should the BDO observe such 
behavior, he or she may refer the individual for additional screening 
or to a law enforcement officer. 

[B] The hand-wand or pat-down is conducted if a passenger is identified 
or randomly selected for additional screening because he or she met 
certain criteria or alarmed the walk-through metal detector. 

[C] Manual or ETD searches of accessible property occur if the 
passenger is identified or randomly selected for additional screening 
or if the TSO identified a potential prohibited item on X-ray. 

[End of figure] 

Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security 
screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and 
prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or 
weapon onboard an aircraft. As shown in figure 2, checked baggage 
screening is accomplished through the use of explosive detection 
systems[Footnote 18] or explosive trace detection systems,[Footnote 19] 
and through the use of alternative means, such as manual searches, 
canine teams, and positive passenger bag match,[Footnote 20] when the 
explosive detection or explosive trace detection systems are 
unavailable. 

Figure 2: Checked Baggage Screening Operation: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO and Nova Development Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

The passenger and checked baggage screening systems are composed of 
three elements: the people (TSOs) responsible for conducting the 
screening of airline passengers and their carry-on items and checked 
baggage, the technology used during the screening process, and the 
procedures TSOs are to follow to conduct screening. Collectively, these 
elements help to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of 
passenger and checked baggage screening. 

Air Cargo Security: 

TSA's responsibilities for securing air cargo include, among other 
things, establishing security rules and regulations covering domestic 
and foreign passenger air carriers that transport cargo, domestic and 
foreign all-cargo carriers that transport cargo, and domestic indirect 
air carriers. TSA is also responsible for overseeing the implementation 
of air cargo security requirements by air carriers and indirect air 
carriers through compliance inspections, while air carriers are 
required to inspect air cargo for weapons, explosives, or stowaways. 

Air carriers (passenger and all-cargo) are responsible for implementing 
TSA security requirements, predominantly through a TSA-approved 
security program that describes the security policies, procedures, and 
systems air carriers are required to implement.[Footnote 21] These 
requirements include measures related to the acceptance, handling, and 
inspection of cargo; training of employees in security and cargo 
inspection procedures; testing employee proficiency in cargo 
inspection; and access to cargo areas and aircraft. If threat 
information or events indicate that additional security measures are 
needed to secure the aviation sector, TSA may issue revised or new 
security requirements in the form of security directives or emergency 
amendments applicable to domestic or foreign air carriers. The air 
carriers must implement the requirements set forth in the security 
directives or emergency amendments in addition to those requirements 
already imposed and enforced by TSA. 

Air cargo ranges in size from one pound to several tons, and in type 
from perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic 
equipment, automobile parts, clothing, medical supplies, other dry 
goods, fresh cut flowers, fresh seafood, fresh produce, tropical fish, 
and human remains. Cargo can be shipped in various forms, including 
large containers known as unit loading devices that allow many packages 
to be consolidated into one container that can be loaded on an 
aircraft, wooden crates, assembled pallets, or individually wrapped/ 
boxed pieces, known as break bulk cargo. 

Participants in the international air cargo shipping process include 
shippers, such as individuals and manufacturers; freight forwarders or 
regulated agents, who consolidate shipments and deliver them to air 
carriers; air cargo handling agents, who process and load cargo onto 
aircraft on behalf of air carriers; and passenger and all-cargo 
carriers that store, load, and transport air cargo.[Footnote 22] 
International air cargo may have been transported via ship, train, or 
truck prior to its loading onboard an aircraft. Figure 3 identifies 
cargo being loaded onto an aircraft for transport. 

Figure 3: Air Cargo Being Loaded Onto an Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO and TSA. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Years 2004 Through 2007 Aviation Security Funding and Fiscal 
Year 2008 Budget Request for Aviation Security: 

According to DHS's budget execution reports,[Footnote 23] TSA's 
appropriations for aviation security have totaled about $20 billion 
since fiscal year 2004.[Footnote 24] In fiscal year 2004--the first 
year for which data was available--TSA received about $3.9 billion for 
aviation security programs. In fiscal year 2007, TSA received about 
$5.7 billion. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2008 
includes about $5.7 billion to continue TSA's aviation security 
efforts. This total includes about $5.0 billion specifically designated 
for aviation security and about $0.79 billion for aviation-security 
related programs. Figure 4 identifies reported aviation security 
funding for fiscal years 2004 through 2007. 

Figure 4: DHS's Reported Aviation Security Funding For TSA For Fiscal 
Years 2004 through 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA budget execution reports for fiscal years 
2004 to 2007. 

Note: Figures for fiscal years 2004 to 2007 are those reported by DHS 
in monthly budget execution reports for TSA. We used the September 30th 
budget execution reports for our analysis of TSA funding for fiscal 
years 2004 through 2006. For fiscal year 2007, we used the October 31 
report. According to the reports, figures presented include all 
rescissions and supplemental funding for the fiscal years. 

[A] Fiscal years 2004 and 2005 include approximately $330 million in 
research and development funding for aviation security. For fiscal 
years 2006 and 2007, research and development funding was consolidated 
within the DHS S&T; therefore, this funding, as reflected in TSA's 
budget documentation, is not included as part of TSA's appropriations 
for these two fiscal years. 

[B] Fiscal years 2006 and 2007 include approximately $680 million and 
$710 million, respectively, in funding for Federal Air Marshals, which 
was transferred back to TSA from U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement in October 2005. Federal Air Marshals funding is included 
within totals for related aviation security PPAs for fiscal years 2006 
and 2007. 

[C] Funding for aviation security-related programs, projects, and 
activities, as reported by TSA, which were not included in budget 
documentation subtotals for aviation security funding. 

[End of figure] 

Of the approximately $5.7 billion requested for aviation security in 
the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request, almost $4.4 billion, 
or about 77 percent, is for passenger and checked baggage screening. 
This includes approximately $4 billion to support passenger and checked 
baggage screening operations, such as TSO salaries and training, and 
$176 million for the procurement and $259 million for the installation 
of checked baggage explosive detection systems. Additional information 
on the President's budget request for fiscal year 2008 as it relates to 
airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage 
screening, and air cargo security is provided later in this statement. 

TSA and CBP Are Working to Strengthen Domestic and International 
Passenger Prescreening, but Management and Technical Challenges Remain: 

TSA and CBP have separate efforts under way to strengthen domestic and 
international passenger prescreening, respectively. However, these 
programs are in development and face management and technical 
challenges. Further, while TSA and CBP have been developing their 
respective identity-matching programs separately, the two agencies are 
now taking steps to align their prescreening programs to minimize 
duplication and provide a single set of requirements for air carrier 
participation. However, key policy and technical decisions have not yet 
been made to clarify how these two programs will be aligned. 

TSA Has Reported Addressing Challenges That Have Hindered Secure 
Flight's Implementation, but It Is Not Yet Known Whether These Efforts 
Will Address Past Problems: 

For over 4 years, TSA has faced significant challenges in developing 
and implementing its advanced passenger prescreening program, now known 
as Secure Flight, and has not yet taken the identity-matching function 
over from air carriers as mandated by Congress. According to TSA, the 
Secure Flight program--which is to perform the functions associated 
with determining whether passengers on domestic flights are on the No 
Fly and Selectee Lists--is intended to (1) decrease the chance of 
compromising watch list data by centralizing its use within the federal 
government; (2) provide earlier identification of potential threats, 
allowing for the expedited notification of law enforcement and other 
organizations responsible for threat management; (3) provide a fair, 
equitable, and consistent matching process across all air carriers; and 
(4) offer consistent application of an expedited and integrated redress 
process for passengers misidentified as a threat. However, during the 
past 3 years, we reported on multiple occasions that the Secure Flight 
program (and its predecessor, CAPPS II) had not met key milestones or 
finalized its goals, objectives, and requirements. Further, in February 
2006, we reported that, taken as a whole, the development of Secure 
Flight had not been effectively managed and the program was at risk of 
failure. We found that TSA had not conducted critical activities in 
accordance with best practices for large-scale information technology 
programs, and had not followed its own systems development life cycle 
guidance in managing the program's development. Former program 
officials stated that TSA had instead used a rapid development method 
that was intended to enable it to develop the program more quickly. 
However, as a result of this approach, the development process had been 
ad hoc, with project activities conducted out of sequence. For example, 
program officials declared the design phase complete before 
requirements needed to guide the design of Secure Flight had been 
detailed. In addition, TSA had not maintained up-to-date program 
schedules or developed cost estimates for the program. In March 2005, 
we recommended that TSA take numerous steps to strengthen the program's 
development, such as finalizing system requirements and developing 
detailed test plans to help ensure that all Secure Flight system 
functionality is properly tested and evaluated. We also recommended 
that TSA develop a plan for establishing connectivity among the air 
carriers and other stakeholders to help ensure the secure, effective, 
and timely transmission of data for use in Secure Flight 
operations.[Footnote 25] 

In early 2006, acknowledging the challenges it faced with the program, 
TSA suspended the development of Secure Flight and initiated a 
reassessment, or rebaselining, of the program, to be completed before 
moving forward. In January 2007, TSA announced that it had completed 
its rebaselining efforts, which included reassessing program goals and 
capabilities, and developing a new schedule and cost estimates--actions 
that we recommended in March 2005.[Footnote 26] The Assistant Secretary 
of Homeland Security for TSA stated that TSA had made significant 
progress in upgrading the design and development of the Secure Flight 
program, and that program documentation had been revised to reflect 
TSA's plans for reliably delivering Secure Flight capabilities. In 
December 2006, the DHS Investment Review Board--a group of DHS senior 
executives charged with reviewing certain programs at key phases of 
development to help ensure they meet mission needs at expected levels 
of costs and risks--completed its review of Secure Flight and approved 
the program to proceed into capability development and demonstration 
phases. According to the Investment Review Board, this approval was 
based on rescoping Secure Flight using a new business model better 
focused on mission; putting a new team in place with appropriate 
technical and management skills; and improving its management approach 
to privacy, security, and quality assurance. However, the board also 
noted that this important screening capability was needed sooner than 
its planned mid-2009 implementation time frame, and requested that TSA 
determine the feasibility of accelerating the program schedule to 
deliver initial capability by mid-2008. As we have reported, earlier 
attempts to accelerate the Secure Flight program have led to 
developmental problems and program delays. Accordingly, as TSA moves 
forward, it will need to employ a range of program management 
disciplines, which we previously found missing, to control program 
cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. As part of our ongoing 
work assessing the Secure Flight program, we will be reviewing DHS's 
and TSA's efforts to develop and implement the program, including 
progress made during its rebaselining efforts.[Footnote 27] 

Regarding TSA's communications with air carriers about Secure Flight 
system requirements, we reported in March 2005 that air carriers had 
expressed concerns regarding the uncertainty of Secure Flight system 
and data requirements, and the impact that these requirements may have 
on the airline industry and traveling public. Further, based on 
preliminary results for our ongoing work, officials from 9 of the 15 
air carriers we interviewed from February 2006 to January 
2007,[Footnote 28] reported that they were enhancing their respective 
identity-matching systems or planned to do so. While these efforts may 
improve the accuracy of each air carrier's individual identity-matching 
system, the improvements will only apply to their respective systems 
and could further exacerbate differences that currently exist among the 
air carriers' various identity-matching systems. These differences may 
result in varying levels of effectiveness in the matching of passenger 
information against the No Fly and Selectee Lists, which was a key 
factor that led to the government's effort to take over the identity- 
matching function through Secure Flight. Also, officials from 7 of 15 
air carriers stated that TSA had not communicated with them about 
Secure Flight requirements within the past 6 months while the program 
was being rebaselined. TSA officials stated that in October 2006 they 
had resumed discussions with air carriers regarding Secure Flight 
requirements, and as of January 2007, had discussed plans for Secure 
Flight with officials from 8 air carriers and the Air Transport 
Association. TSA officials stated that they also plan to take into 
account current air carrier capabilities and programs as they proceed 
with Secure Flight development, and to update guidance previously 
provided to air carriers to reflect the current concept of operations 
for the rebaselined Secure Flight program. 

In February 2006, we also reported that TSA was in the early stages of 
coordinating with TSC and CBP on broader issues of integration and 
interoperability related to other people-screening programs used by the 
government to combat terrorism. However, TSA needed to provide these 
stakeholders with detailed information about its concept of operations 
for Secure Flight to enable them to plan for and provide the support 
necessary for the program. For example, a TSC official stated that 
without specific information on Secure Flight requirements, TSC could 
not make decisions about needed resources, such as personnel needed to 
operate its call center that would be used to help resolve potential 
matches against the No Fly and Selectee Lists. In January 2007, TSC 
officials stated that while they had been participating in meetings 
with Secure Flight officials, they had not yet received the specific 
operational and technical information needed to plan for supporting 
Secure Flight operations. During Secure Flight rebaselining efforts, 
TSA officials also stated that they were coordinating with CBP to more 
closely align their respective identity-matching programs. However, 
this collaboration is ongoing and key policy and technical decisions 
regarding how the programs will be coordinated have not been announced. 
We discuss TSA and CBP's coordination of their domestic and 
international prescreening programs later in this statement. 

We have also previously reported that TSA, as part of its requirements 
development process, had not clearly identified the privacy impacts of 
the envisioned system or the full actions it planned to take to 
mitigate them. Specifically, because TSA had not made final 
determinations about its requirements for passenger data, and Secure 
Flight's system development documentation did not fully address how 
passenger privacy protections were to be met, it was not possible to 
assess potential system impacts on individual privacy protections at 
that time. We have also previously reported that TSA violated 
provisions of the Privacy Act[Footnote 29] by not fully disclosing its 
use of personal information during systems testing.[Footnote 30] In 
March 2005, we recommended that TSA specify how Secure Flight will 
protect personal privacy.[Footnote 31] TSA officials stated that they 
are aware of, and plan to address, the potential for Secure Flight to 
adversely affect passenger privacy protections, and the need to provide 
a redress process whereby aviation passengers adversely affected by the 
identity matching process may express their concerns, seek correction 
of any inaccurate data, and request other actions to reduce or 
eliminate future inconveniences. Concurrent with its rebaselining 
efforts, TSA reported that it has developed a Secure Flight privacy 
program that is rooted in the Fair Information Practices--a set of 
internationally recognized privacy principles that underlie the Privacy 
Act. TSA officials further stated that the rebaselined Secure Flight 
program will result in a more transparent and privacy-enhanced program 
by addressing concerns identified by us and others in the following 
areas: program oversight, program scope, data collection activities, 
redress requirements, relationships with other TSA credentialing 
programs, and technical requirements. TSA officials also stated that 
they have embedded privacy contractor experts in the program teams to 
address privacy issues as they arise. In addition, in January 2007, 
officials from Secure Flight and TSA's Office of Transportation 
Security Redress stated that Secure Flight will use the TSA redress 
process that is currently available for individuals affected by the air 
carrier identity-matching processes, but the details of how this 
process will be integrated with other Secure Flight requirements have 
not yet been completed. We will continue to assess TSA's efforts to 
manage system privacy protections and establish a redress process for 
resolving misidentified passengers as part of our ongoing review of the 
program. 

We believe that TSA's efforts to reassess Secure Flight's development 
and progress was an appropriate step given the problems that faced the 
program in early 2006. However, since TSA only recently announced that 
it has completed its rebaselining efforts, and just recently provided 
more details of its rebaselined program, it is too early to determine 
the extent to which TSA has addressed the long-standing issues that 
have affected the program. According to DHS's budget execution reports, 
TSA received about $126 million for fiscal years 2004 through 2006-- 
including funds spent on the CAPPS II predecessor program--and $15 
million for fiscal year 2007 for Secure Flight. For fiscal year 2008, 
the President's budget request includes $53 million for TSA to continue 
this program. According to the TSA's budget justification, the increase 
of $38 million is requested to provide for the development and the 
authority to operate the Secure Flight system. Additionally, the 
funding request would provide for procuring hardware, starting 
operations and training, and developing a network interface between 
Secure Flight and CBP. We will continue to monitor Secure Flight's 
development as part of our ongoing review of the program. 

DHS Intends to Align Domestic and International Prescreening Programs, 
but Key Policy and Technical Decisions Have Not Yet Been Made: 

As originally envisioned, once Secure Flight became operational, TSA 
would be operating a domestic passenger prescreening system, while CBP 
would be operating an international passenger prescreening system. 
However, air carriers raised concerns regarding having to support 
different data requirements for two separate government prescreening 
programs. Further, we reported that both programs could result in 
potentially different results for passengers flying on domestic and 
international flights, results that could cause additional costs to air 
carriers, and confusion and inconvenience to passengers. For example, 
if the programs are not aligned, air carriers might have to implement 
different information connections, communications, and programming for 
each prescreening program, resulting in added costs and inefficiencies. 
Also, if the two separate programs use different passenger data 
elements or identity-matching technologies, air carriers may receive 
conflicting notifications to handle a passenger differently for an 
international than for a domestic flight. Passengers may also be 
inconvenienced since a passenger may be delayed on one leg of a 
multileg trip, which includes both a domestic and an international 
flight segment, and possibly miss a flight. 

The air carrier community has asked CBP and TSA to coordinate their 
efforts to ensure that the programs are compatible and are developed as 
a single approach to avoid the need for air carriers to implement two 
separate screening systems to meet CBP and TSA requirements. In a joint 
letter to the Secretary of DHS dated October 27, 2005, the Air 
Transport Association of America and the Association of European 
Airlines urged DHS to coordinate international and domestic airline 
passenger prescreening programs so that air carriers are not unduly 
burdened by the costs and inefficiencies posed by working with two 
different prescreening programs. The letter also stated that the Air 
Transport Association of America and the Association of European 
Airlines believed that there had been a lack of coordination between 
CBP and TSA in aligning their respective passenger prescreening 
programs. Air carrier industry groups reiterated this concern in 
comments they provided in response to CBP's proposed rule for 
conducting passenger prescreening on international flights. We have 
also previously reported that since both agencies are developing and 
implementing passenger prescreening programs, CBP and TSA could 
mutually benefit from the sharing of technical testing results and the 
coordination of other developmental efforts.[Footnote 32] Coordination 
and planning in the development of these two programs would also 
enhance program integration and interoperability, potentially limit 
redundancies, and increase program effectiveness. We have recently 
recommended that DHS take additional steps and make key policy and 
technical decisions that are necessary to more fully coordinate these 
programs.[Footnote 33] 

Recognizing these concerns, DHS has directed TSA and CBP to coordinate 
their prescreening activities so that they provide "One DHS Solution" 
to the commercial aviation industry consistent with applicable 
authorities and statutes. CBP and TSA officials stated that they are 
taking steps to coordinate their prescreening efforts, including 
meeting routinely with DHS's Office of Screening Coordination and with 
aviation and travel industry stakeholders to develop joint data 
requirements, processes, and methods for disseminating information to 
other government and law enforcement organizations in the event of a 
positive identity match against the No Fly and Selectee Lists. DHS 
officials told us that they envision a joint approach that will allow 
for standardization between the two programs to the extent possible, 
reduce unnecessary programming by aircraft operators, and provide 
consistent treatment for passengers across all aircraft operators. 
However, despite this coordination, key policy and technical decisions 
have not yet been made regarding how these programs will be aligned, 
including determining how differences in the data used to conduct 
identity matching and the identity matching techniques used will be 
resolved. Further, it is unclear how the different implementation 
schedules for the two programs--CBP has already issued a proposed rule 
to implement a new passenger prescreening program for passengers on 
international flights, while TSA's schedule shows that Secure Flight 
will not begin operations until 2009--will affect coordination efforts. 
Given DHS's commitment to align the two prescreening programs, and the 
security and efficiency benefits of doing so, it will be important for 
CBP and TSA to take the steps necessary to successfully coordinate 
these programs. Until international and domestic prescreening efforts 
are more fully aligned, the extent to which potential problems of 
duplication and conflicting results in international and domestic 
passenger prescreening will be addressed remains unclear. 

TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance Security at Passenger Screening 
Checkpoints and Checked Baggage Screening Stations, but Continues to 
Face Challenges: 

TSA has taken steps to strengthen the three key elements of the 
passenger and checked baggage screening systems--people (TSOs), 
screening procedures, and technology--but continues to face management, 
planning, and funding challenges. For example, TSA developed a Staffing 
Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports that 
reflect current operating conditions, and provided TSOs with additional 
training intended to enhance the detection of threat objects, 
particularly improvised explosives. TSA also proposed modifications to 
passenger checkpoint screening procedures based on risk (threat and 
vulnerability information), among other factors, but could do more 
evaluation of proposed procedures before they are implemented to ensure 
they achieve their intended results. Additionally, TSA is exploring new 
technologies to enhance the detection of explosives and other threats, 
but continues to face management and funding challenges. For example, 
in May 2006, TSA reported that under current investment levels, the 
installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems would not be 
completed until approximately 2024. TSA, in collaboration with key 
stakeholders, has identified several funding and financing strategies 
for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems, such as 
continued appropriations for the procurement and installation of EDS 
machines. 

TSA Has Efforts Under Way to Strengthen the Management and Performance 
of Its TSO Workforce: 

TSA has implemented several efforts intended to strengthen the 
management and performance of its TSO workforce, which TSA has 
identified as its most important asset in accomplishing its mission. We 
reported in February 2004 that staffing shortages and TSA's hiring 
process had hindered the ability of some Federal Security Directors 
(FSD)--the ranking authority responsible for leading and coordinating 
security activities at airports--to provide sufficient resources to 
staff screening checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their 
checkpoints without using additional measures such as 
overtime.[Footnote 34] Since that time, TSA has developed a Staffing 
Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports. In 
determining staffing allocations, the model takes into account the 
workload demands unique to each airport based on an estimate of each 
airport's peak passenger volume. This input is then processed against 
certain TSA assumptions about screening passengers and checked baggage-
-including expected processing rates, required staffing for passenger 
lanes and baggage equipment based on standard operating procedures, and 
historical equipment alarm rates. In August 2005, TSA determined that 
the staffing model contained complete and accurate information on each 
airport from which to estimate staffing needs, and the agency used the 
model to identify TSO allocations for each airport. At that time, the 
staffing model identified a total TSO full-time equivalent allocation 
need of 42,303--a level within the congressionally mandated limit of 
45,000 full-time equivalent TSOs. According to TSA, when TSA runs the 
model, it does so without imposing a limitation on the maximum number 
of full-time equivalent TSOs, either the 45,000 congressional limit or 
any budgetary limits that affect the number of TSOs that can be hired. 

In addition to the levels identified by the staffing model, TSA sets 
aside TSO full-time equivalents for needs outside of those considered 
by the staffing model in the annual allocation run for airports. For 
example, in order to handle short-term extraordinary needs at airports, 
TSA established a National Screening Force of 615 TSOs who can be sent 
to airports to augment local TSO staff during periods of unusually high 
passenger volume, such as the Super Bowl. Additionally, certain 
airports may, during the course of the year, experience significant 
changes to their screening operations, such as the arrival of a new 
airline or opening of a new terminal. TSA established a reserve of 329 
TSO full-time equivalents during fiscal year 2006 that can be used to 
augment the existing force. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget 
request includes $35 million for operational expenses for a National 
Deployment Office--an office that would be responsible for deploying 
the National Screening Force and other TSOs to those airports 
experiencing significant staffing shortfalls. 

According to TSA, TSA's approach to allocating TSOs has allowed the 
agency to stay within the 43,000 full-time equivalent TSO budgetary 
limit for fiscal year 2006--a staffing level that TSA's Assistant 
Secretary stated is sufficient to provide passenger and checked baggage 
screening services.[Footnote 35] According to the President's fiscal 
year 2008 budget request, the $2.6 billion requested for the federal 
TSO workforce represents an increase of about $131 million over fiscal 
year 2007 for cost of living adjustments and a travel document checker 
initiative. Under this initiative, about 1,330 full-time equivalent 
TSOs would be placed at the 40 highest risk category X and I airports 
to conduct document checking for passengers approaching the passenger 
screening checkpoint.[Footnote 36] According to the budget request, the 
$2.6 billion is to fund the personnel, compensation, and benefits of 
approximately 43,688 full-time equivalent TSOs and about 1,045 full- 
time equivalent Screening Managers. Table 1 shows the total TSO and 
Screening Manager full-time equivalents and the funding levels for 
fiscal years 2004 through 2007, as reported by TSA. 

Table 1: Passenger and Checked Baggage TSO and Screening Manager Full- 
time Equivalents and Actual Spending for TSO Personnel, Compensation, & 
Benefits, by Fiscal Year: 

Total TSOs and Screening Managers at airports nationwide; 
FY 2004: 45,252; 
FY 2005: 45,690; 
FY 2006: 42,187; 
FY 2007[A]: 43,779. 

Actual spending (dollars in thousands); 
FY 2004: $2,191,551; 
FY 2005: 2,291,572; 
FY 2006: 2,251,503; 
FY 2007[A]: 2,418,329. 

Source: TSA: 

[A] Fiscal year 2007 figures are projected. 

[End of table] 

FSDs we interviewed in 2006[Footnote 37] as part of our ongoing review 
of TSA's staffing model generally reported that the model is a more 
accurate predictor of staffing needs than TSA's prior staffing model, 
which took into account fewer factors that affect screening 
operations.[Footnote 38] However, FSDs identified that some assumptions 
used in the fiscal year 2006 staffing model did not reflect actual 
operating conditions. For example, FSDs noted that the staffing model's 
assumption of a 20 percent part-time workforce--measured in terms of 
full-time equivalents--had been difficult to achieve, particularly at 
larger (category X and I) airports, because of, among other things, 
economic conditions leading to competition for part-time workers, 
remote airport locations coupled with a lack of mass transit, TSO base 
pay that has not changed since fiscal year 2002, and part-time workers' 
desire to convert to full-time status. TSA data show that for fiscal 
years 2005 and 2006, the nation's category X airports had a TSO 
workforce composed of about 8 percent part-time equivalents, and the 
part-time TSO attrition rate nationwide remains considerably higher 
than the rate for full-time personnel (approximately 46 percent versus 
16 percent for full-time TSOs for fiscal year 2006). FSDs also 
expressed concern that the model did not specifically account for the 
recurrent training requirement for TSOs of 3 hours per week averaged 
over a fiscal year quarter. Further, FSDs identified that the model for 
fiscal year 2006 did not account for time away from screening to 
perform operational support duties. FSDs we interviewed stated that 
because they are not authorized to hire a sufficient number of mission 
support staff, TSOs are being routinely used to perform certain 
operational support functions, such as payroll processing, scheduling, 
distribution and maintenance of uniforms, data entry, and workman's 
compensation processing. Similarly, in September 2006, the Department 
of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General reported that TSA 
had not determined the precise number of FSD administrative positions 
it needed and was using TSOs to perform administrative work. 

In response to FSDs' input and the various mechanisms TSA has 
implemented to monitor the sufficiency of the model's allocation 
outputs, TSA made changes to some assumptions in the model for fiscal 
year 2007. Our preliminary observations indicate that these revisions 
should help address the concerns identified by FSDs. For example, TSA 
recognized that some airports cannot likely achieve a 20 percent part- 
time full-time equivalent level and others (most likely smaller 
airports) may operate more effectively with other levels of part-time 
TSO staff. As a result, for fiscal year 2007, TSA modified this 
assumption to include a variable part-time goal based on each airport's 
historic part-time to full-time TSO ratio. TSA also included an 
allowance in the fiscal 2007 Staffing Allocation Model for training to 
provide additional assurance that TSOs complete the required training 
on detecting improvised explosive devices--which TSA has identified as 
the most significant threat to commercial aviation. Additionally, TSA 
included an allowance for operational support duties in the 2007 
Staffing Allocation Model to account for the current need for TSOs to 
perform these duties. 

Factors outside of the staffing model's determination of overall TSO 
staffing levels also affect FSDs' ability to effectively deploy their 
TSO workforce. Specifically, FSDs we interviewed as part of our ongoing 
review of TSA's staffing model cited difficulties in recruiting and 
retaining sufficient TSOs (both full-time and part-time) to reach their 
full allocations as determined by the model; staffing checkpoints 
appropriately given that some TSOs are unavailable due to absenteeism 
and injuries; and managing around physical infrastructure limitations 
at some airports, such as lack of room for additional lanes or baggage 
check areas despite demand levels that would justify such added 
capacity. TSA has made progress in addressing these challenges through 
a variety of human capital initiatives. For example, to allow FSDs to 
more efficiently address staffing needs, TSA has shifted responsibility 
for hiring TSOs from TSA headquarters to FSDs at individual airports 
and, according to TSA officials, provided contractor support to assist 
in this effort. TSA data show that since local hiring began in March 
2006, TSA has increased the number of new hire TSOs from approximately 
180 per pay period in February 2006 to nearly 450 each pay period under 
the local hiring initiative. 

In addition to having an adequate number of TSOs, effective screening 
involves TSOs being properly trained to do their job. Since we first 
reported on TSO training in September 2003,[Footnote 39] TSA has taken 
a number of actions designed to strengthen training available to the 
TSO workforce beyond the basic training requirement. For example, TSA 
has expanded training available to the TSO workforce, such as 
introducing an Online Learning Center that makes self-guided courses 
available over TSA's intranet and the Internet, and enhanced training 
on explosives detection. This training included both classroom and 
hands-on experience, and focused particularly on identifying X-ray 
images of improvised explosives device component parts, not just a 
completely assembled bomb. According to TSA, as of February 6, 2007, 
about 98 percent of the 48,236 TSOs on board had received classroom, 
checkpoint, or computer-based improvised explosive device recognition 
training. TSA has also developed new training curriculums to support 
new screening approaches. For example, TSA recently developed a 
training curriculum for TSOs in behavior observation and analysis at 
the checkpoint to identify passengers exhibiting behaviors indicative 
of stress, fear, or deception. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget 
request includes $89.7 million to fully implement TSO training programs 
and related TSO workforce development programs. 

TSA has also made progress in addressing challenges that made it 
difficult for TSOs to access training. We reported in May 2005 that 
insufficient TSO staffing and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet 
connectivity to access the Online Learning Center made it difficult for 
all TSOs at many airports to receive required training, and had limited 
TSO access to TSA training tools.[Footnote 40] We stated that without 
addressing the challenges to delivering ongoing training, including 
installing high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities, TSA 
may have difficulty maintaining a screening workforce that possesses 
the critical skills needed to perform at a desired level. As previously 
discussed, our preliminary observations from our ongoing review of 
TSA's staffing model indicate that TSA has taken steps to address the 
TSO staffing challenges, including providing an allowance for TSO 
training in the Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal year 2007. 
However, it is too soon to determine whether TSA's efforts will address 
TSA's ability to provide required training while maintaining adequate 
coverage for screening operations. TSA established its Online Learning 
Center to provide passenger and baggage TSOs with online, high-speed 
access to training courses. However, effective use of the Online 
Learning Center requires high-speed Internet/intranet access, which TSA 
has not been able to provide to all airports. We reported that as of 
October 2004, about 45 percent of the TSO workforce did not have high- 
speed Internet/intranet access to the Online Learning Center. Given the 
importance of the Online Learning Center in both delivering training 
and serving as the means by which the completion of TSO training is 
documented, we recommended that TSA develop a plan that prioritizes and 
schedules the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity 
to all TSA's airport training facilities to help facilitate the 
delivery of TSO training and the documentation of training completion. 
Since that time, TSA has made progress in deploying high-speed 
connectivity to airports. According to the President's fiscal year 2008 
budget request, 95 percent of the nation's airports now have high-speed 
connectivity. According to the budget request, TSA expects to meet the 
goal of all airports having high-speed connectivity during fiscal year 
2007. 

TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Passenger and Checked Baggage 
Screening Procedures, but Could Improve Its Evaluation and Monitoring 
of the Procedures: 

In addition to TSA's efforts to train and deploy a federal TSO 
workforce, steps have also been taken to strengthen passenger and 
checked baggage screening procedures to enhance detection capabilities. 
However, TSA could improve its evaluation and oversight of these 
procedures. With regard to passenger checkpoint screening procedures, 
between April and December 2005, proposed modifications were made in 
various ways and for a variety of reasons, and a majority of the 
proposed modifications--48 of 92--were ultimately implemented at 
airports. As part of our ongoing review of TSA's process for 
determining whether and how screening procedures should be modified, we 
found that TSA officials proposed standard operating procedure (SOP) 
modifications based on risk information (threat and vulnerability 
information), daily experiences of staff working at airports, and 
complaints and concerns raised by the traveling public.[Footnote 41] In 
addition to these factors, our preliminary observations indicate that 
consistent with its mission, TSA senior leadership made efforts to 
balance the impact that proposed SOP modifications would have on 
security, efficiency, and customer service when deciding whether 
proposed SOP modifications should be implemented. For example, in 
August 2006, TSA sought to increase security by banning liquids and 
gels from being carried onboard aircraft in response to the alleged 
terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple aircraft 
en route from the United Kingdom to the United States. In September 
2006, after obtaining more information about the alleged terrorist 
plot--to include information from the United Kingdom and U.S. 
intelligence communities, discussions with explosives experts, and 
testing of explosives--TSA officials decided to lift the total ban on 
liquids and gels to allow passengers to carry small amounts of liquids 
and gels onboard aircraft. TSA officials also lifted the total ban 
because banning liquids and gels as carry-on items was shown to affect 
both efficiency and customer service. Specifically, following the 
implementation of the total ban in August 2006, the number of bags 
checked per passenger increased by approximately 27 percent--thus 
placing a strain on the efficiency of the checked-baggage screening 
system. In addition, TSA recognized that passengers have legitimate 
needs that may require them to carry some liquids and gels onboard 
aircraft. Moreover, in an effort to harmonize its liquid screening 
procedures with other countries, in November 2006, TSA revised its 
procedures to allow 3.4 fluid ounces of liquids, gels, and aerosols 
onboard aircraft, which is equivalent to 100 milliliters--the amount 
permitted by the 27 countries in the European Union, as well as 
Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland. According to TSA, this 
means that approximately half of the world's travelers will be governed 
by similar measures with regard to this area of security. 

In some cases, TSA first tested proposed modifications to screening 
procedures at selected airports to help determine whether the changes 
would achieve their intended purpose, such as to enhance detection of 
prohibited items or free up TSO resources to perform screening 
activities focused on threats considered to pose a high risk, such as 
explosives. TSA's efforts to collect quantitative data through testing 
proposed procedures prior to deciding whether to implement or reject 
them is consistent with our past work that has shown the importance of 
data collection and analyses to support agency decision making. 
However, as part of our ongoing work, we identified that TSA's data 
collection and analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether 
proposed procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their 
intended purpose. Specifically, we found that for the tests of proposed 
screening procedures TSA conducted during the period April 2005 through 
December 2005, including the removal of small scissors and small tools 
from the prohibited items list,[Footnote 42] although TSA collected 
some data on the efficiency of and customer response to the procedures 
at selected airports, the agency generally did not collect the type of 
data or conduct the necessary analysis that would yield information on 
whether proposed procedures would achieve their intended 
purpose.[Footnote 43] We will report on the results of our analysis of 
TSA's efforts to test proposed modifications to screening procedures 
later this year. 

Once proposed SOP changes have been implemented, it is important that 
TSA have a mechanism in place to ensure that TSOs are complying with 
established procedures. As part of our ongoing review of TSA's process 
for revising passenger screening procedures, we identified that TSA 
monitors TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening SOPs 
through its performance accountability and standards system and through 
local and national covert testing.[Footnote 44] According to TSA 
officials, the performance accountability and standards system was 
developed in response to a 2003 report by us that recommended that TSA 
establish a performance management system that makes meaningful 
distinctions in employee performance,[Footnote 45] and in response to 
input from TSA airport staff on how to improve passenger and checked 
baggage screening measures. This system will be used by TSA to assess 
agency personnel at all levels on various competencies, including, 
among other things, technical proficiency. The technical proficiency 
component of the performance accountability and standards system will 
be used to measure TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening 
procedures. In addition to implementing the performance accountability 
and standards system, TSA conducts local and national covert tests to 
evaluate, in part, the extent to which TSOs' noncompliance with the 
SOPs affects their ability to detect simulated threat items hidden in 
accessible property or concealed on a person. Our preliminary 
observations indicate that TSA airport officials have experienced 
resource challenges in implementing these compliance monitoring 
methods. TSA headquarters officials stated that they are taking steps 
to address these challenges. For example, officials said that they have 
automated many of the data entry functions of the performance 
accountability and standards system to relieve the field of the burden 
of manually entering this information into the online system. 

TSA has also taken steps to strengthen checked baggage screening 
through reducing the need to use alternative screening procedures. In 
addition to screening with standard procedures using EDS and ETD, which 
TSA had determined to provide the most effective detection of 
explosives, TSA also allows alternative screening procedures to be used 
when volumes of baggage awaiting screening pose security 
vulnerabilities or when TSA officials determine that there is a 
security risk associated with large concentrations of passengers in an 
area. These alternative screening procedures include the use of EDS and 
ETD machines in nonstandard ways,[Footnote 46] and also include three 
procedures that do not use EDS or ETD--screening with explosives 
detection canines, physical bag searches, and matching baggage to 
passenger manifests to confirm that the passenger and his or her 
baggage are on the same plane. TSA's use of alternative screening 
procedures has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness.[Footnote 
47] However, the extent of the security trade-offs is not fully known 
because TSA has not tested the effectiveness of alternative screening 
procedures in an operational environment. In our July 2006 report on 
TSA's use of alternative screening procedures, we recommended that TSA 
conduct local testing of alternative screening procedures to determine 
whether checked baggage TSOs can detect simulated improvised explosives 
when using these procedures.[Footnote 48] Since then, TSA has conducted 
covert testing of alternative screening procedures at some airports. 

TSA is pursuing several mitigating actions to reduce the need to use 
alternative screening procedures. These actions include deploying more 
efficient checked baggage screening systems, strengthening its 
coordination with groups such as tour operators to better plan for 
increases in baggage screening needs, deploying "optimization teams" to 
airports that were frequently using alternative screening procedures to 
determine why the procedures were being used so often and to suggest 
remedies, and deploying additional EDS machines. However, although TSA 
has taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening 
procedures at airports, TSA's oversight of FSDs' use of alternative 
screening procedures could be strengthened. For example, in July 2006, 
we reported that FSDs and their staff did not always accurately report 
the occurrences when a particular alternative baggage screening 
procedure was used, impeding TSA's ability to reliably determine how 
often and for how long the alternative screening procedures were used. 
In addition, FSDs and their staff did not always report the use of 
alternative screening procedures as required. TSA officials stated that 
they were working with FSDs to correct these reporting problems and had 
issued guidance clarifying requirements for reporting alternative 
screening procedures. 

Additionally, while TSA is working to minimize the need to use 
alternative screening procedures at airports, TSA has not created 
performance measures or targets related to the use of these procedures. 
By creating a performance measure for the use of alternative screening 
procedures as part of the checked baggage screening index or as a stand-
alone measure, TSA could gauge whether it is making progress towards 
minimizing the need to use these procedures at airports and have more 
complete information on how well the overall checked baggage screening 
system is performing. Furthermore, performance targets for the use of 
alternative screening procedures would provide an indicator of how much 
risk TSA is willing to accept in using these procedures, and TSA's 
monitoring of this indicator would identify when it has exceeded the 
level of risk that it has determined acceptable. We recommended that 
TSA develop performance measures and performance targets for the use of 
alternative screening procedures. Additionally, in September 2006, 
Congress directed TSA to take a variety of actions-
-most of which we recommended in our July 2006 report--to monitor and 
assess the use of alternative screening procedures, including (1) 
develop performance measures and performance targets for the use of 
alternative screening procedures; (2) track the use of alternative 
screening procedures at airports; (3) assess the effectiveness of these 
measures; (4) conduct covert testing at airports that use alternative 
screening procedures; (5) develop a plan to stop alternative screening 
procedures at airports as soon as practicable; and (6) report to the 
Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House Committee on 
Homeland Security by January 23, 2007, on implementation of these 
requirements.[Footnote 49] According to TSA officials, the agency is 
continuing to monitor and track the use of alternative screening 
procedures, which has allowed it to identify areas for improvement 
nationwide and address local issues to minimize the need for 
alternative screening procedures. 

TSA is Exploring New Technologies to Enhance Detection of Explosives 
and Other Threats, but Faces Management and Funding Challenges in 
Fielding Technologies to Airports: 

TSA is supporting the development and deployment of technologies to 
strengthen commercial aviation security but faces management and 
funding challenges. For example, TSA and DHS's S&T are exploring new 
passenger checkpoint screening technologies to enhance the detection of 
explosives and other threats. However, limited progress has been made 
in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger screening 
checkpoints, in part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in 
coordinating research and development efforts. In addition, TSA has 
begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked 
baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made available 
to fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large-scale 
basis. 

Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies: 

To enhance passenger checkpoint screening, TSA is currently working 
with DHS S&T's Transportation Security Laboratory to develop new 
passenger checkpoint screening technologies.[Footnote 50] TSA 
designated about $80.5 million in fiscal year 2007 to acquire and 
deploy emerging screening technologies, and has requested $81.6 million 
for similar purposes in fiscal year 2008. Our preliminary work has 
found that of the various research and development projects funded by 
TSA and DHS S&T, six checkpoint screening projects are currently in the 
applied research or advanced development phases.[Footnote 51] Projects 
in the applied research phase include liquid bottle screening devices, 
explosives trace portals that will reduce the size of the current 
explosives trace portals at checkpoints, and shoe scanners. Three other 
projects in the advanced development phase include whole body imagers, 
cast and prosthesis scanners, and checkpoint explosives detection 
systems. TSA plans to place whole body imagers and checkpoint 
explosives detection systems at certain airport locations to collect 
initial operational data, and plans to continue to conduct similar 
tests of the cast and prosthesis scanners during fiscal year 2007. 
Table 2 provides a description and status of the passenger checkpoint 
screening technologies TSA and DHS S&T are currently researching and 
developing. 

Table 2: Description of Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies in 
the Research and Development Phase, as of January 2007: 

Technology: Liquid bottle screening devices; 
Description: Screens for liquid explosives; 
Status: In the applied research phase. DHS S&T is currently testing 
various devices. 

Technology: Explosives trace portals II; 
Description: Detects trace amounts of explosives on persons (will 
reduce the size of the current explosives trace portals at 
checkpoints); 
Status: In the applied research phase. 

Technology: Shoe scanners; 
Description: Scans passengers shoes with explosives detection 
capability; 
Status: In the applied research phase. Private industry developed this 
device to be used in combination with other technologies to screen 
registered travelers. Vendors requested that TSA assess this technology 
for effectiveness. 

Technology: Whole body imagers; 
Description: Provides two-dimensional, full-body images of all items on 
a passenger's body, including plastic explosives and concealed 
metallic, non-metallic, and ceramic or plastic objects; 
Status: In the advanced development phase. TSA plans to place some 
units at collect initial operational data during operational tests 
using the whole body imager at one U.S. airport in early 2007. 

Technology: Cast and prosthesis scanners; 
Description: Provides a 2- dimensional image of the area beneath a cast 
or inside a prosthetic device; 
Status: In the advanced development phase. TSA placed this equipment at 
an airport in September 2006 and collected operational data. TSA is 
considering deploying this technology in 2007. 

Technology: Checkpoint explosives detection systems; 
Description: Creates a three dimensional image of bags to detect 
explosives and other nonmetallic items; 
Status: In the advanced development phase. TSA plans to place this 
equipment at airports and collect operational data in fiscal year 2007. 

Source: TSA. 

[End of table] 

Despite TSA's efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening 
technologies, preliminary results from our ongoing work suggests that 
limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection 
technology at checkpoints. For example, TSA's fiscal year 2007 budget 
justification requested $80.5 million in budget authority to acquire 
and deploy screening technologies emerging from research and 
development programs, including the acquisition of 92 additional 
explosives trace portal machines and funds to operate and service 
approximately 434 portals. TSA had anticipated that the portals would 
be in operation throughout the country during fiscal year 2007. 
However, due to performance and maintenance issues, TSA halted the 
acquisition and deployment of the portals in June 2006, and the 
acquisition of additional portals is contingent on resolution of these 
issues. As a result, TSA has fielded less than 25 percent of the 434 
portals it projected it would deploy by fiscal year 2007. In addition 
to the portals, TSA has fallen behind in its projected acquisition of 
other emerging screening technologies. For example, the acquisition of 
91 Whole Body Imagers has been delayed in part because TSA needed to 
develop a means to protect the privacy of passengers screened by this 
technology. For fiscal year 2008, TSA has requested an additional $81.6 
million to evaluate, acquire, and install emerging technologies. We 
will continue to assess DHS S&T and TSA's deployment of checkpoint 
screening technologies during our on-going review. 

While TSA and DHS have taken steps to coordinate the research, 
development, and deployment of checkpoint technologies, our ongoing 
work has identified that challenges remain. For example, TSA and DHS 
S&T officials stated that they encountered difficulties in coordinating 
research and development efforts due to reorganizations of TSA and S&T. 
A senior TSA official also stated that while TSA and the DHS S&T have 
executed a memorandum of understanding to establish the services that 
the Transportation Security Laboratory is to provide to TSA, 
coordination with S&T remains a challenge because the organizations 
have not fully implemented the terms of the memorandum of 
understanding. In addition to challenges in coordinating with each 
other, our preliminary observations suggest that TSA and DHS S&T also 
face challenges in coordinating with external stakeholders. 
Specifically, while TSA and DHS S&T have taken steps to coordinate 
efforts with external stakeholders, some airport managers we 
interviewed in October 2006 stated that TSA did not adequately 
communicate with them about when new technologies were to be deployed 
in their airports. TSA officials stated that they do not have a master 
schedule that establishes milestones for conducting operational tests 
and evaluations of emerging technologies or for deploying these 
technologies. Lack of such a schedule could limit TSA's ability to 
coordinate operational tests and deployments with stakeholders. 

Additionally, TSA does not yet have a strategic plan to guide its 
efforts to acquire and deploy screening technologies. As part of our 
ongoing work, we will assess further TSA's efforts to develop an 
overall strategic approach to guide the deployment of checkpoint 
technologies. A lack of a strategic plan or approach could limit TSA's 
ability to deploy emerging technologies at those airport locations 
deemed at highest risk. TSA officials stated that the agency is in the 
process of developing a strategic plan for the checkpoint that is 
scheduled to be completed in early 2007. TSA officials stated that the 
completion of the plan was delayed due to competing priorities, 
including ensuring the screening of checked baggage using explosives 
detection systems and responding to new and emerging threats, such as 
homemade explosives. TSA officials also said that reorganizations at 
TSA and DHS S&T have contributed to the delay. 

It is important that TSA continue to invest in and develop technologies 
for detecting explosives, as demonstrated by the alleged August 2006 
terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on board multiple 
commercial aircraft bound for the United States from the United 
Kingdom. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request notes that 
emerging checkpoint technology will enhance the detection of prohibited 
items, especially firearms and explosives, on passengers. We are 
currently evaluating DHS's and TSA's progress in planning for, 
managing, and deploying research and development programs in support of 
airport checkpoint screening operations and will report on the results 
of our work later this year. 

Checked Baggage Screening Technologies: 

At checked baggage screening stations, TSA has been effective in 
deploying EDS machines and ETD machines. However, initial deployment of 
EDS machines in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--and ETD 
machines resulted in operational inefficiencies and security risks as 
compared with using EDS machines integrated in-line with airport 
baggage conveyor systems. As we reported in March 2005,[Footnote 52] to 
initially deploy EDS and ETD equipment to screen 100 percent of checked 
baggage for explosives, TSA implemented interim airport lobby solutions 
rather than in-line EDS baggage screening systems.[Footnote 53] TSA 
officials stated that they used EDS machines in stand-alone mode and 
ETD machines as an interim solution in order to meet the congressional 
deadline for screening all checked baggage for explosives. Officials 
stated that they employed these interim solutions because of the 
significant costs required to install in-line systems and the need to 
reconfigure many airports' baggage conveyor systems to accommodate the 
equipment. TSA's use of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines has required a 
greater number of TSOs and resulted in screening fewer bags for 
explosives each hour. Additionally, because in-line EDS checked baggage 
screening systems can significantly reduce the need for TSOs to handle 
baggage, installing them may also reduce the number of TSO on-the-job 
injuries. Moreover, screening with in-line EDS systems could also 
result in security benefits by reducing congestion in airport lobbies 
and reducing the need for TSA to use alternative screening 
procedures.[Footnote 54] 

In March 2005, we reported that at nine airports where TSA had agreed 
to help fund the installation of in-line EDS systems, TSA estimated 
that screening with in-line EDS machines could save the federal 
government about $1.3 billion over 7 years. In February 2006, TSA 
reported that a savings of approximately $4.7 billion could be realized 
over a period of 20 years by installing optimal checked baggage 
screening systems, including in-line EDS machines, at the airports with 
the highest checked baggage volumes. However, TSA also reported in 
February 2006 that many of the initial in-line EDS systems had not 
achieved the degree of anticipated savings initially estimated. TSA has 
since determined that recent improvements to the design of the in-line 
EDS systems and EDS screening technology now offer the opportunity for 
higher-performance and lower-cost screening systems. In June 2006, TSA 
issued guidance to airports to provide options, ideas, and suggestions 
for airports to choose from when considering security requirements in 
the planning and design of new or renovated airport 
facilities.[Footnote 55] This guidance also provides recommendations 
for airports in constructing in-line systems. 

TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of 
checked baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made 
available to fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large- 
scale basis. In March 2005, we reported that while TSA had made 
progress in deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a 
systematic, prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these 
machines to achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and 
security. We recommended that TSA systematically evaluate baggage 
screening needs at airports. In February 2006, TSA released its 
strategic planning framework for checked baggage screening aimed at 
increasing security through deploying more EDS machines, lowering 
program life-cycle costs, minimizing impacts to TSA and airport and 
airline operations, and providing a flexible security infrastructure. 
According to TSA, the framework will be used to establish a 
comprehensive strategic plan for TSA's checked baggage screening 
program. As part of this planning effort, TSA identified, among other 
things, the top 25 airports that should first receive federal funding 
for projects related to the installation of in-line EDS systems, and 
the optimal checked baggage screening solutions for the 250 airports 
with the highest checked baggage volumes.[Footnote 56] DHS's budget 
execution reports for TSA for fiscal year 2007 show that TSA received 
$524.4 million for the purchase, installation, maintenance, and 
operations integration of EDS and ETD machines. The President's fiscal 
year 2008 budget request includes $692 million for these activities--an 
increase of $167.6 million over the previous year's appropriations. 
Most (about 72 percent) of this increase is for installation of EDS and 
ETD machines.[Footnote 57] 

In February 2006, TSA officials reported that if some of the top 25 
airports do not receive in-line checked baggage screening systems, they 
will require additional screening equipment to be placed in airport 
lobbies and additional TSO staffing in order to remain in compliance 
with the mandate for screening all checked baggage using explosive 
detection systems. Additionally, in May 2006, TSA reported that under 
current investment levels, the installation of optimal checked baggage 
screening systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. 
According to TSA, as of September 30, 2006, 36 airports had operational 
in-line systems--18 airports had airport-wide systems, while the 
remaining 18 airports had systems at a particular terminal or 
terminals. Over the next 2 years, TSA expects full and partial in-line 
systems to become operational at 25 additional airports. This level of 
effort, according to TSA, balances resources with other risks to 
transportation security. 

In March 2005, we reported that TSA and airport operators were relying 
on several sources of funding to construct in-line checked baggage 
screening systems. One source of funding airport operators initially 
used was the Federal Aviation Administration's Airport Improvement 
Program, which traditionally funds grants to maintain safe and 
efficient airports. With Airport Improvement Program funds no longer 
available after fiscal year 2003 for this purpose, airports turned to 
other sources of federal funding to construct in-line systems.[Footnote 
58] The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution 
approved the use of letter of intent agreements as a vehicle to 
leverage federal government and industry funding to support facility 
modification costs for installing in-line EDS baggage screening 
systems.[Footnote 59] TSA also uses other transaction agreements as an 
administrative vehicle to directly fund, with no long-term commitments, 
airport operators for smaller in-line airport modification 
projects.[Footnote 60] Under these agreements, as implemented by TSA, 
the airport operator provides a portion of the funding required for the 
modification. To fund the procurement and installation of explosive 
detection systems in-line, TSA uses annual appropriations and the $250 
million mandatory appropriation of the Aviation Security Capital 
Fund.[Footnote 61] For example, in fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007, 
TSA received appropriations of $175 million, $180 million, and $141.4 
million, respectively, for the procurement of explosive detection 
systems. It received appropriations of $45 million in fiscal years 2005 
and 2006, and $138 million in fiscal year 2007 for the installation of 
explosive detection systems, in addition to the $250 million made 
available through the capital fund.[Footnote 62] Congress also 
authorized an additional appropriation of $400 million per year through 
fiscal year 2007 for airport security improvement projects, including 
the installation of in-line EDS systems. However, appropriations have 
not been made under this authorization.[Footnote 63] Figure 5 shows TSA 
obligated funding levels for EDS installation and integration. 

Figure 5: TSA Obligated Funding Levels for EDS Installation and 
Integration: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Aviation Security Advisory Committee analysis of TSA data. 

[A] This is an estimate as of August 2006. 

[End of figure] 

TSA is collaborating with key stakeholders to identify funding and 
financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening 
systems. In August 2006, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee 
baggage screening investment study working group, of which TSA is a 
member, released a study outlining an investment strategy for funding 
TSA's checked baggage screening program.[Footnote 64] According to TSA, 
this study, which has been provided to the Office of Management and 
Budget for review, is the final component of TSA's strategic plan for 
checked baggage screening. The investment study recommended four 
investment options, including (1) tax credit bonds,[Footnote 65] (2) 
continued appropriations for the procurement and installation of EDS 
machines, (3) combined line items for the purchase and installation of 
EDS machines in order to provide TSA increased flexibility in directing 
the funding where it is most needed, and (4) enhanced eligibility for 
the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC).[Footnote 66] The working group 
estimated that under its recommended approach, the present value cost 
of the checked baggage screening program is $23.3 billion over the next 
20 years. Of these costs, the aviation industry is projected to bear 
$3.6 billion and the federal government is projected to bear $19.7 
billion. According to the working group, the net effect of investing in 
optimal systems would be to reduce overall life-cycle costs by $1.2 
billion relative to the current rate of investment, primarily through 
TSO staff cost savings and avoidance of increased TSO staff costs in 
the future. In addition, in its August 2006 study, the working group 
identified that in order to achieve these cost savings, a formal cost 
management process is needed given evolving technology and design 
practices, the various parties involved in design and operation, and 
the amount of capital investment to be made over the next several 
years. The working group identified a variety of actions that should be 
taken by Congress, TSA, and the aviation industry, including 
implementing a structured process for ongoing government and industry 
collaboration and increasing program management resources to provide 
for more substantial TSA involvement throughout the planning, design, 
and construction process. (App. I includes a complete list of the 
specific actions the working group identified for Congress, TSA, and 
the aviation industry.) 

Federal Action Is Needed to Strengthen Air Cargo Security: 

In October 2005, we reported that TSA had taken a number of actions 
intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but, as we 
reported, factors existed that may have limited their effectiveness. 
Since our report was released, TSA has issued an air cargo security 
rule that revised some of the requirements air carriers are required to 
follow to ensure air cargo security, and has drafted new and revised 
security programs for domestic and foreign passenger and all-cargo 
carriers that contain more specific security requirements. However, 
more work remains to ensure that TSA has a comprehensive strategy to 
secure air cargo that fully incorporates risk management principles. 

TSA Has Taken Steps to Incorporate Risk Management Principles into Its 
Decision Making to Secure Domestic Air Cargo, but Most Efforts Are in 
the Early Stages: 

TSA has taken steps towards applying a risk-based management approach 
to addressing domestic air cargo security, including conducting threat 
assessments. However, opportunities exist to strengthen these efforts. 
Applying a risk management framework to decision making is one tool to 
help provide assurance that programs designed to combat terrorism are 
properly prioritized and focused. TSA has underscored the importance of 
implementing a risk-based approach that protects against known threats, 
but that is also sufficiently flexible to direct resources to mitigate 
new and emerging threats. According to TSA, the ideal risk model would 
be one that could be used throughout the transportation sector and 
applicable to different threat scenarios. As part of TSA's risk-based 
approach, TSA issued an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that 
focused on securing the domestic air cargo supply chain.[Footnote 67] 
TSA coordinated with air cargo industry stakeholders representing 
passenger and all-cargo carriers to develop this plan. TSA officials 
stated that they are revising their existing domestic air cargo 
strategic plan, but as of February 5, 2007, agency officials had not 
set a timeframe for when TSA will complete this revision. TSA's Air 
Cargo Strategic Plan describes, among other things, an approach for 
screening or reviewing information on all domestic air cargo shipments 
to determine their level of relative risk, ensuring that 100 percent of 
cargo identified as posing an elevated risk is physically inspected, 
and pursuing technological solutions to physically inspect air cargo. 
TSA officials anticipate that the agency's system for targeting 
domestic air cargo, referred to as Freight Assessment, will minimize 
the reliance on the random physical inspections currently conducted by 
air carriers. According to agency plans, air carriers would receive 
targeting information from TSA on specific cargo items identified as 
posing an elevated risk. Upon notification by TSA's Freight Assessment 
System, air carrier personnel would be responsible for conducting the 
inspection of cargo identified as elevated risk. In October 2005, we 
reported that although TSA had identified data elements that could be 
used in its Freight Assessment System, the agency had not yet ensured 
that these data are complete, accurate, and current. We recommended 
that TSA take steps to do so; however, as of February 2007, TSA has not 
yet addressed this recommendation. Further, while TSA planned to phase 
in implementation and deployment of the targeting system for cargo 
transported on passenger carriers during calendar years 2006 and 2007, 
as of February 2007, TSA's system for targeting domestic cargo is still 
under development. 

In addition to developing a strategic plan, a risk management framework 
in the homeland security context should include risk assessments, which 
typically involve three key elements--threats, vulnerabilities, and 
criticality or consequence. Information from these three assessments 
provides input for setting priorities, evaluating alternatives, 
allocating resources, and monitoring security initiatives. In September 
2005, TSA's Office of Intelligence (formerly known as the 
Transportation Security Intelligence Service) completed an overall 
threat assessment for air cargo, which identified general and specific 
threats to domestic air cargo.[Footnote 68] However, we reported that 
TSA had not conducted a vulnerability assessment to identify the range 
of security weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists.[Footnote 
69] TSA plans to conduct this assessment of domestic air cargo 
vulnerabilities--as we recommended--and expects it to be completed in 
late 2007. 

TSA Has Implemented Measures Intended to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo 
Security, but More Work Remains: 

In October 2005, we reported that TSA had taken a number of actions 
intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but that factors 
existed that may limit the effectiveness of these actions. For example, 
we reported that TSA had established a centralized Known Shipper 
database to streamline the process by which shippers (individuals and 
businesses) are made known to carriers with whom they conduct 
business.[Footnote 70] However, at that time, the information in this 
database on the universe of shippers was incomplete, because 
participation in this database was voluntary. Moreover, we identified 
problems with the reliability of the information in the database. TSA 
estimated that the agency's centralized database contained information 
on about 400,000 known shippers, or less than one-third of the total 
population of known shippers, which is estimated to be about 1.5 
million. In May 2006, TSA issued an air cargo security rule that 
included a number of provisions aimed at enhancing the security of air 
cargo.[Footnote 71] For example, TSA made participation in the Known 
Shipper database mandatory, requiring air carriers and indirect air 
carriers to submit information on their known shippers to TSA's Known 
Shipper database. However, the May 2006 security rule did not modify 
TSA's current process for validating known shippers, which remains the 
responsibility of indirect air carriers and air carriers. Accordingly, 
passenger, all cargo, and indirect air carriers will continue to be 
responsible for determining the integrity of the shipper, which may 
allow for potential conflicts of interest because air carriers who 
conduct business with shippers will also continue to have the authority 
to validate these same shipping customers. 

In October 2005, we also reported that TSA had established requirements 
for air carriers to randomly inspect air cargo, but had exempted some 
cargo from inspection, potentially creating security 
weaknesses.[Footnote 72] We recommended that TSA examine the rationale 
for existing air cargo inspection exemptions, determine whether such 
exemptions leave the air cargo system unacceptably vulnerable to 
terrorist attack, and make any needed adjustments to the exemptions. 
TSA established a working group to examine the rationale for existing 
air cargo inspection exemptions, and in October 2006, issued a security 
directive and emergency amendment to domestic and foreign passenger air 
carriers operating within and from the United States that limited the 
inspection exemptions. According to TSA officials, the agency is still 
considering revisions to the inspection exemptions for cargo being 
transported into the United States. 

In October 2005, we also reported that TSA conducted compliance 
inspections of air carriers to ensure that they were complying with 
existing air cargo security requirements. These compliance inspections 
ranged from a comprehensive review of the implementation of all air 
cargo security requirements by an air carrier or indirect air carrier 
to a review of just one or several security requirements.[Footnote 73] 
However, TSA had not developed measures to assess the adequacy of air 
carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements, or assessed 
the results of its compliance inspections to target higher-risk air 
carriers or indirect air carriers for future reviews. More recently, 
TSA reported that the agency has increased the number of inspectors 
dedicated to conducting air cargo inspections, and has begun analyzing 
the results of the compliance inspections to help focus their 
inspections on those entities that have the highest rates of 
noncompliance. For fiscal year 2008, the President's budget includes a 
request of about $56 million for TSA's air cargo security program, 
which includes funding for, among other things, 300 air cargo security 
inspectors, TSA-certified canines for air cargo related activities, and 
the development and deployment of a Freight Assessment System to target 
elevated-risk cargo. 

In addition to taking steps to strengthen inspections of air cargo, TSA 
is working to enhance air cargo screening technologies. Specifically, 
TSA, together with DHS's S&T, is currently developing and pilot testing 
a number of technologies to assess their applicability to inspecting 
and securing air cargo. These efforts include: 

* an air cargo explosives detection pilot program implemented at three 
airports, testing the use of explosive detection systems, explosive 
trace detectors, standard X-ray machines, canine teams, technologies 
that can locate a stowaway through detection of a heartbeat or 
increased carbon dioxide levels in cargo, and manual inspections of air 
cargo;[Footnote 74] 

* an EDS pilot program, which is testing the use of computer-aided 
tomography to measure the densities of objects in order to identify 
potential explosives in air cargo;[Footnote 75] 

* an air cargo security seals pilot, which is exploring the viability 
of potential security countermeasures, such as tamper-evident security 
seals, for use with certain classifications of exempt cargo; 

* the use of hardened unit-loading devices, which are containers made 
of blast-resistant materials that could withstand an explosion onboard 
the aircraft; and: 

* the use of pulsed fast neutron analysis, which allows for the 
identification of the material signatures of contraband, explosives, 
and other threat objects. 

According to TSA officials, the agency will determine whether it will 
require the use of any of these technologies once it has completed its 
assessments and analyzed the results. However, TSA has not established 
a timeframe for completing these assessments. According to TSA 
officials, the federal government and the air cargo industry face 
several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement any 
of these technologies to inspect or secure air cargo. These challenges 
include factors such as the nature, type, and size of the cargo; 
environmental and climatic conditions; inspection throughput rates; 
staffing and training issues for individuals who inspect air cargo; the 
location of air cargo facilities (centralized versus decentralized); 
cost and availability; and employee health and safety concerns. To 
effectively inspect domestic air cargo that TSA deems to pose an 
elevated risk, the agency will need to make decisions regarding which 
technologies will be used to inspect such cargo. According to TSA 
officials, there is no single technology capable of efficiently and 
effectively inspecting all types of air cargo for the full range of 
potential terrorist threats, including explosives and weapons of mass 
destruction. 

We will soon report on the second phase of our review of air cargo 
security, which focuses on DHS's efforts to secure air cargo that is 
transported into the United States from abroad, referred to as inbound 
air cargo. This report will address (1) the actions TSA and CBP have 
taken to secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all these efforts 
could be strengthened; and (2) the practices the air cargo industry and 
select foreign governments have adopted that could be used to enhance 
TSA's efforts to strengthen inbound air cargo security, and the extent 
to which TSA and CBP have worked with foreign governments to enhance 
their air cargo security efforts. 

Concluding Observations: 

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the 
security of the nation's aviation system, and should be commended for 
these efforts. Meeting the congressional mandates to screen airline 
passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. Since 
that time, TSA has turned its attention to strengthening passenger 
prescreening, more efficiently allocating and deploying TSOs, 
strengthening screening procedures, developing and deploying more 
effective and efficient screening technologies, and improving domestic 
air cargo security, among other efforts. TSA has made progress in all 
of these areas, but opportunities exist to further strengthen their 
efforts, in particular in the areas of risk-based decision making, 
program planning and monitoring, and stakeholder collaboration. Our 
work has shown--in homeland security and in other areas--that a 
comprehensive risk management approach can help inform decision makers 
in the allocation of finite resources to the areas of greatest need. We 
are encouraged that risk management has been a cornerstone of DHS and 
TSA policy, and that TSA has implemented risk-based decision making 
into a number of its efforts. Despite this commitment, however, TSA 
will continue to face difficult decisions and trade-offs--particularly 
as threats to commercial aviation evolve--regarding acceptable levels 
of risk and the need to balance security with efficiency and customer 
service. We recognize that doing so will not be easy. In implementing a 
risk-based approach, DHS and TSA must also address the challenges we 
identified in our work related to program planning, risk assessments, 
and implementation and monitoring of aviation security programs. 
Without rigorous planning and prioritization, and knowledge of the 
effectiveness of aviation security programs, DHS and TSA cannot be sure 
that they are focusing their finite resources on the areas of greatest 
need. Risk-based decision making will be particularly important as TSA 
begins to place more focus on the security of non-aviation modes of 
transportation, including passenger rail, and resource decisions and 
related trade-offs will have to be made not only within aviation, but 
across all transportation modes. 

TSA must also continue its work to strengthen partnerships with other 
federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and 
international partners to improve the security of the commercial 
aviation system. Securing all aspects of commercial aviation is shared 
a responsibility among these parties. Accordingly, it is important that 
all stakeholders be involved, as appropriate, in coordinating security- 
related priorities and activities, and reviewing and sharing best 
practices and developing common security frameworks. Such efforts are 
particularly important with international partners due to our 
interdependence with foreign nations in securing the aviation system-- 
as evidenced by the recent alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid 
explosives onboard multiple aircraft departing the United Kingdom for 
the United States. TSA has strengthened its coordination efforts with 
domestic and international partners, which has aided its security 
efforts and helped to avoid duplication of effort. Existing risk-based 
decision making, program planning and monitoring, and coordination 
efforts will need to continue and be strengthened as TSA works to 
address continuing challenges and threats facing commercial aviation. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 
any questions that you or other members of the committee may have at 
this time. 

Contact Information: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A. 
Berrick, (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this statement. 

In addition to the contact named above, Mike Bollinger, Kristy Brown, 
Carissa Bryant, Tony Cheesebrough, Kevin Copping, Christine Fossett, 
Samantha Goodman, John Hansen, Mike Harmond, Dawn Hoff, Suzanne 
Heimbach, Adam Hoffman, Anne Laffoon, Thomas Lombardi, Steve Morris, 
Katrina Moss, Mona Nichols-Blake, Leslie Sarapu, Brian Sklar, Edith 
Sohna, Maria Strudwick, Meg Ullengren, and Candice Wright made 
contributions to this testimony. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Key Actions for Congress, TSA, and the Aviation Industry, 
as Recommended by the Baggage Screening Investment Study Working Group: 

In August 2006, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee baggage 
screening investment study working group, of which TSA is a member, 
released a study outlining an investment strategy for the funding of 
TSA's checked baggage screening program.[Footnote 76] The working 
group's investment study identified five key actions that should be 
taken by Congress, TSA, and the aviation industry, respectively, with 
regard to funding these systems. Table 3 provides a summary of the key 
actions identified by the working group. 

Table 3: Summary of key actions for Congress, TSA, and the aviation 
industry, as recommended by the baggage screening investment study 
working group: 

Congress: Authorize a voluntary tax credit bond program of $3 billion 
for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, which airports could access to fund 
the infrastructure necessary for automated EDS baggage screening 
systems; 
TSA: Finalize and publish the draft baggage screening investment study 
guidelines developed by the baggage screening investment study 
technical team. Include a detailed explanation of the upgraded design 
review and approval process in the baggage screening investment study 
guidelines. Update the baggage screening investment study guidelines at 
least yearly to reflect ongoing lessons learned; 
Aviation industry: Use upcoming industry conferences to communicate the 
key findings and recommendations of the baggage screening investment 
study. 

Congress: Permit use of tax credit bonds for refunding by airports or 
airlines that have or will self-fund their in-line screening systems 
through the tax credit bond authorization period (with the airport 
facilitating conduit financing on behalf of airlines as needed, as tax 
credit bonds require the issuer to be a public entity); 
TSA: Issue detailed funding guidance to the aviation industry 
explaining the alternatives available for funding baggage screening 
systems and communicate the process and business rules to access 
facility modification grants for airports and airlines not wishing or 
not able to use the tax credit bond program; 
Aviation industry: For those airports and airlines that have already 
developed designs for in-line systems but not yet initiated 
construction, prepare refined designs consistent with the baggage 
screening investment study guidelines. 

Congress: Continue or increase the existing rate of annual 
appropriations for purchase and installation of EDS equipment ($435 
million per year, escalating annually). TSA would be responsible for 
prioritizing the use of these funds, which could include provision of 
(a) equipment to airports that use the voluntary tax credit bond 
program, (b) grants and equipment to airports and airlines that do not 
use the voluntary tax credit bond program, (c) grants to airports and 
airlines requiring reimbursement for self-funded optimal screening 
systems that do not use the tax credit bond program, (d) ongoing 
support for expansion of optimal screening systems to accommodate 
future traffic growth, and (e) life-cycle replacement and refurbishment 
of previously installed equipment; 
TSA: Provide Congress with requested information regarding an estimated 
deployment timeline on an airport-by-airport basis; 
Aviation industry: Create integrated local design teams for individual 
design efforts to facilitate stakeholder coordination at the local 
level. 

Congress: Eliminate any restrictions associated with combining purchase 
and installation funds to provide TSA with increased flexibility to 
manage the impact of the voluntary tax credit bond program; 
TSA: Work with DHS and equipment manufacturers to actively manage the 
timely development and deployment of new screening technologies 
critical to the costs and performance assumptions in the baggage 
screening investment study; 
Aviation industry: Develop contracts with baggage handling systems 
designers, suppliers, and other associated contractors that require 
compliance with the baggage screening investment study guidelines and 
the performance standards specified therein. 

Congress: Enhance passenger facility charge program flexibility to 
include (a) tax credit bond sinking fund payments and (b) modification 
or construction of exclusive-use outbound baggage systems to 
accommodate EDS screening systems; 
TSA: Establish an integrated national deployment team composed of 
representatives from TSA, airport, airline, and key industry trade 
associations to actively and collaboratively manage the cost and 
quality of automated EDS baggage screening systems at a national level; 
Aviation industry: Actively participate in the integrated national 
deployment team, including providing dedicated representatives to work 
with TSA during the initial deployment of optimal screening systems to 
all categories X, I, II, and III airports. 

Source: Aviation Security Advisory Committee: 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Airline Passenger Prescreening: 

Transportation Security Administration's Office of Intelligence: 
Responses to Post Hearing Questions on Secure Flight. GAO-06-1051R. 
Washington D.C.: August 4, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation 
Security Administration's Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-864T. 
Washington D.C.: June 14, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely 
Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's 
Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully 
Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight Program 
Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More 
Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but 
Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-356. 
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial 
Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 
23, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- 
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 17, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 
Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004. 

Airline Passenger Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening: 

Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening 
Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.: July 
28, 2006. 

Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal 
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding 
Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage 
Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington, D.C.: April 
4, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made 
Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security 
at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T. Washington, D.C.: 
April 4, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of 
Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: July 
13, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement 
Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: May 
2, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the 
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365. 
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing 
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004. 

Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made 
and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 
2003. 

Air Cargo: 

Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air 
Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005. 

Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT's 
Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 
Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002. 

In-Flight Security: 

Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better 
Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying 
Less-than-Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from 
Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 
2005. 

Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. GAO-05- 
781. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges 
of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed. 
GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial 
Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002. 

Perimeter Security, Access Controls, and General Aviation: 

Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted 
Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed. GAO-05-928T. 
Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005. 

General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but 
Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term 
Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of 
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728. 
Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-04- 
785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004. 

Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to 
Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519. 
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the 
Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial 
Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004. 

The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge- 
based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development Program. GAO-04-341R. 
Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004. 

Other Aviation Security: 

Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the 
Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed 
to Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 
24, 2007. 

Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects 
on the Public. GAO-06-1031. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006. 

Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority 
of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 23, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation 
Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen 
Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address 
Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the 
Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003. 

Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover 
Airports' Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 25, 2003. 

Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has 
Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 
15, 2002. 

Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect 
Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces 
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: July 
25, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 
Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 
25, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 21, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 
Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001. 

Note: GAO Products that are not available to the public because they 
are considered Security Sensitive Information, Law Enforcement 
Sensitive, or National Security Secret are not included in this list of 
related products. 

[End of section] 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] TSA also requires that both U.S. and foreign air carriers utilize 
the No Fly and Selectee Lists to prescreen passengers prior to 
conducting operations to, from, or within the United States, in 
accordance with TSA security directives. 

[2] Indirect air carriers are entities that consolidate air cargo from 
multiple shippers and deliver it to air carriers to be transported. 

[3] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

[4] Other federal entities involved in securing or safeguarding air 
cargo include the Department of Homeland Security-U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, the United States Postal Service, the Department of 
Commerce, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of the 
Treasury. 

[5] See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4012(a)(1)-(2), 118 Stat. 3638, 3714-19 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 44903(j)(2)(C), 44909(a)(6)). 

[6] Currently, TSA requires that both U.S. and foreign air carriers 
utilize the No Fly and Selectee lists to prescreen passengers prior to 
conducting operations to, from, or within the United States, in 
accordance with TSA security directives. 

[7] GAO, Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May 
Adversely Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security 
Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 9, 2006). GAO, Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and 
Testing Under Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further 
Developed, GAO-05-356 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005). 

[8] Following the events of September 11, and in accordance with ATSA, 
TSA began an effort in March 2003 to develop a new computer-assisted 
passenger prescreening system known as CAPPS II. See 49 U.S.C. § 
44903(j)(2)(A). Because of a variety of delays and challenges, in 
August 2004, DHS cancelled the development of CAPPS II. In its place, 
TSA announced that it would develop a new prescreening program called 
Secure Flight. 

[9] Although the air carriers currently conduct the watch list matching 
and CAPPS prescreening functions, these processes are required and 
overseen by TSA. 

[10] In addition to name matching prescreening activities, CBP also 
prescreens travelers by evaluating the authenticity and completeness of 
passengers' passports and other travel documents as part of its travel 
document review procedures. CBP also attempts to identify high-risk 
travelers on international flights through its Automated Targeting 
System--Passenger (ATS-P). Under this risk assessment program, CBP 
conducts a risk-targeting process by evaluating passenger information 
(for both passengers departing from and for the United States) against 
risk assessment rules and algorithms within the ATS-P. The ATS-P 
compares passenger information against data from numerous national 
intelligence and law enforcement databases to identify those travelers 
who are likely to present a higher risk, so that CBP can interdict and 
further screen these travelers. 

[11] As passengers are not required to present a passport to board 
domestic flights, the name matching process for domestic flights 
primarily uses only PNR data, not APIS data. 

[12] See 19 C.F.R. §§ 122.49a, 122.75a (establishing the electronic 
manifest transmission requirements for passengers onboard commercial 
aircraft arriving in or departing from the United States). 

[13] 71 Fed. Reg. 40,035 (July 14, 2006). A notice of proposed 
rulemaking provides notice to interested or affected parties of an 
agency's anticipated regulatory action and an opportunity for such 
parties to comment on this action before implementation. 

[14] TSA also allows airports to apply to opt-out of federal screening 
and to use private screeners under contract with TSA. See 49 U.S.C. § 
44920. Six airports currently have screening operations conducted by 
private screening contractors under TSA's Screening Partnership 
Program. 

[15] Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers are 
provided access to boarding aircraft. Access to these areas is 
controlled by TSOs (or by non-federal screeners at airports 
participating in the Screener Partnership Program) at checkpoints where 
they conduct physical screening of individuals and their carry-on 
baggage for weapons and explosives. 

[16] TSOs must deny passage beyond the screening location to any 
individual or property that has not been screened or inspected in 
accordance with passenger screening standard operating procedures. If 
an individual refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item must 
not be allowed into the sterile area or onboard an aircraft. 

[17] At some airports, some passengers may also be screened by walking 
through an explosives trace portal--a machine that detects trace 
amounts of explosives on persons. 

[18] Explosive detection systems use computer-aided tomography X-rays 
to examine objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic 
signatures of threat explosives. This equipment operates in an 
automated mode. 

[19] Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues 
of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with 
swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of 
explosive materials. 

[20] Positive passenger bag match requires that passengers be on the 
same aircraft as their checked baggage. According to TSA officials, 
this procedure is rarely used. 

[21] As of January 2007, TSA security programs include (1) Aircraft 
Operators Standard Security Program, which applies to domestic 
passenger air carriers; (2) Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security 
Program, which applies to domestic indirect air carriers; (3) Domestic 
Security Integration Program, a voluntary program that applies to 
domestic all-cargo carriers; (4) the Twelve-Five Program, which applies 
to certain operators of aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds in 
scheduled or charter service that carry passengers, cargo, or both; (5) 
Model Security Program, which applies to foreign passenger air 
carriers; and (6) All-Cargo International Security Procedures, which 
applies to each foreign air carrier engaged in the transportation of 
cargo to, from, within, or overflying the United States in all-cargo 
aircraft with a maximum certified takeoff weight of more than 12,500 
pounds. TSA drafted new security programs for foreign and domestic all- 
cargo carriers with operations to, from, and within the United States. 
TSA expects to finalize these programs in early 2007. 

[22] The International Civil Aviation Organization defines a regulated 
agent as an agent, freight forwarder, or any other entity that conducts 
business with an aircraft operator and provides security controls that 
are accepted or required by the appropriate government authority with 
respect to cargo or mail. 

[23] DHS's budget execution reports are monthly statements that reflect 
the Department's financial activity. 

[24] In our analysis of DHS's budget execution reports and the 
President's fiscal year 2008 budget request for TSA, we included 
funding specifically designated for aviation security and funding for 
other programs, projects, and activities related to aviation security, 
to the extent they were identifiable. In addition, these aviation 
security totals do not reflect funding for activities that may support 
TSA's aviation security programs and projects, such as intelligence and 
administration, because TSA's documentation does not identify the 
proportion of funding dedicated to support aviation security. Also, 
during this time period, a number of aviation security related 
activities were transferred in or out of TSA's jurisdiction, which 
impact TSA funding levels for the affected fiscal years. 

[25] GAO-05-356. 

[26] GAO-05-356. 

[27] The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, 
mandates that GAO review and confirm, upon the department's 
certification, that the Secure Flight Program meets the 10 conditions 
listed in section 522(a) of Public Law 108-334. See Pub. L. No. 109- 
295, § 514, 120 Stat 1355, 1379 (2006). See also Pub. L. No. 108-334, § 
522, 118 Stat. 1298, 1319-20 (2004). We are also conducting our ongoing 
review in response to requests from the United States Senate: the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and its 
Subcommittee on Aviation; Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security; Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs; Committee on Judiciary; also the House of Representatives: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Committee on Homeland 
Security; and the Chairman of the Committee on Government Reform. 

[28] We have ongoing work that includes collecting information about 
the identity-matching systems currently used by air carriers to match 
information for passengers on domestic flights against information on 
the No Fly and Selectee Lists derived from the TSDB. Air carriers will 
continue to conduct this name matching until Secure Flight becomes 
fully operational. Our interviews with officials from the 15 air 
carriers is part of this ongoing review of the air carriers' domestic 
identity matching efforts. In that we did not use probability sampling 
methods to select these 15 air carriers, information provided by 
officials from these air carriers cannot be generalized to other air 
carriers. 

[29] Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a). 

[30] GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did 
Not Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight 
Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps 
to More Fully Inform the Public, GAO-05-864R (Washington, D.C.: July 
22, 2005). 

[31] GAO-05-356. 

[32] GAO-06-374T and GAO-05-356. 

[33] GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International 
Passenger Prescreening are Under Way, But Planning and Implementation 
Issues Remain, GAO-07-55SU (Washington, D.C.: November 2006). This 
report contains information considered to be Security Sensitive 
Information. 

[34] GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and 
Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004). 

[35] As part of TSA's Screening Partnership Program, six airports used 
private contract screeners in lieu of federal TSOs during fiscal year 
2006. Despite the fact that these airports do not use federal 
screeners, TSA still used the Staffing Allocation Model to determine 
the full-time equivalent screening staff at each of these airports for 
fiscal year 2006. These staffing levels, as determined by the model, 
were to serve as a limit on the number of private screeners that the 
private screening contractors could employ. According to TSA, the 1,702 
total full-time equivalent staffing allocation at these airports does 
not count against TSA's nationwide ceiling of 45,000 full-time 
equivalents for TSO staff. In addition, according to the President's 
fiscal year 2008 budget request for TSA, TSA is accepting two 
additional airports--Key West and Marathon Florida--with a combined 
total of 30 full-time equivalent TSOs, into the Screening Partnership 
Program. 

[36] According to the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request, 
under previous passenger checkpoint screening procedures (prior to 
August 10, 2006), airport contract employees conducted all document 
checking for passengers approaching the checkpoint. TSA has determined 
that a security gap exists in verifying the documentation of the 
traveling public, and is seeking to close this gap to better meet its 
security responsibilities through more rigorous document checking 
procedures than those being done by private industry. 

[37] We visited 14 airports as part of this ongoing review. We did not 
use probability sampling methods to select the airports at which the 
FSDs were located; therefore, information provided by these FSDs cannot 
be generalized to other airports. 

[38] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
enacted in December 2004, required TSA to, among other things, develop 
and submit to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, and the House of Representatives Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, standards for determining the 
aviation security staffing for all airports at which TSA provides or 
oversees screening services by March 2005. These standards are to 
provide the necessary levels of aviation security and ensure that the 
average aviation security related delay experienced by passengers is 
minimized. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also 
mandated that we conduct an analysis of TSA's staffing standards. Pub. 
L. No. 108-458, § 4023, 118 Stat. 3638, 3723-24 (2004). 

[39] GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on 
Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 24, 2003). 

[40] GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance 
Measurement Strengthened but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington, 
D.C.: May 2, 2005). 

[41] We will report on the results of this work later this year. 

[42] In December 2005, TSA revised the prohibited and permitted items 
list by removing (1) metal scissors with pointed tips and a blade 4 
inches or less in length as measured from the fulcrum and (2) tools-- 
such as pliers, screwdrivers, and wrenches--7 inches or less in length 
(excluding crowbars, drills, hammers, and saws) from the list. Pursuant 
to the change, passengers are able to bring these items onboard 
commercial aircraft on domestic flights and international flights 
departing the United States. See 70 Fed. Reg. 79,930 (Dec. 8, 2005). In 
addition to assessing the December 2005 prohibited items list change as 
part of our ongoing review of TSA's process for modifying passenger 
checkpoint screening procedures, we recently initiated a mandated 
review of the public safety impacts and risks, if any, of TSA's 
decision to allow small and tools onboard aircraft, and will report on 
the results of this work later this year. 

[43] TSA conducted tests of several proposed procedures that officials 
believed would have a significant impact on how TSOs perform daily 
screening functions, TSO training, and customer acceptance. 

[44] Covert testing involves TSA headquarters officials (national 
testing) or TSA field staff and other federal employees (local testing) 
attempting to carry simulated threat objects through the checkpoint 
without the objects being detected by TSOs. The results of the local 
covert tests are sensitive security information and the results of 
national covert tests are classified, and therefore are not included in 
this testimony. 

[45] GAO, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to 
Build a Results Oriented Culture, GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: January 
2003). 

[46] The nonstandard ways that the machines are used is sensitive 
security information. 

[47] Certain information we obtained and analyzed regarding explosives 
detection technologies and their effectiveness in TSA's checked baggage 
screening operations is classified or is considered by TSA to be 
sensitive security information. Accordingly, the results of our review 
of this information have been removed from this testimony. 

[48] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening 
Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 
28, 2006). 

[49] See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-699, at 113 (2006) (accompanying H.R. 
5441, enacted into law as the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No.109-295, 120 Stat. 1362 (2006)). 

[50] DHS's S&T is responsible for research and development of 
checkpoint technologies related to aviation security, managing the 
activities conducted at the Transportation Security Laboratory, and 
coordinating these efforts with TSA. TSA's Passenger Screening Program 
is responsible for evaluating and deploying systems to detect 
explosives and weapons concealed on persons or in carry-on items, while 
strengthening access control, improving screener performance, and 
reducing staffing requirements. 

[51] Research and development projects generally fall within the 
following phases: (1) basic research includes all scientific efforts 
and experimentation directed to increase knowledge and understanding in 
the fields of science related to long-term national needs; (2) applied 
research includes efforts directed toward solving specific problems 
with a focus on developing and evaluating the feasibility of proposed 
solutions; (3) advanced development includes efforts directed toward 
the development of hardware for field experiments; and (4) operational 
testing includes evaluation of technologies in a realistic operating 
environment to assess the performance or cost reduction potential of 
advanced technology. 

[52] GAO-05-365. 

[53] TSA was required to provide for the screening of all checked 
baggage for explosives using explosive detection systems by December 
31, 2003. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(d). 

[54] TSA has projected that the number of originating domestic and 
international passengers will rise by about 127 million passengers over 
current levels by 2010. If TSA's current estimate of an average of 0.76 
checked bags per passenger were to remain constant through 2010, TSA 
would be screening about 96 million more bags than it now screens. This 
could increase airports' need to rely on alternative screening 
procedures in the future in the absence of additional or more efficient 
checked baggage screening systems. 

[55] TSA, Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design 
and Construction, Revised June 15, 2006. 

[56] According to TSA, these 250 airports process 99 percent of all 
checked baggage transported. 

[57] The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request acknowledges that 
it does not take into account amounts from the Aviation Security 
Capital Fund because the Fund was only authorized through fiscal year 
2007. As such, although the amount requested for installation reflects 
an increase of $121 million from the amount specifically appropriated 
in fiscal year 2007, it also reflects an overall decrease of $129 
million in total funding from fiscal year 2007 absent the $250 million 
previously available from the Fund. 

[58] The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, prohibited the use of 
Airport Improvement Program funds for activities related to the 
installation of in-line explosive detection systems. See Pub. L. No. 
108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 283. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 
and the Department of Transportation Appropriations Act, 2006, 
continued this prohibition. See Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 
3203 (2004); Pub. L. No. 109-115, 119 Stat. 2396, 2400-01 (2005). 

[59] Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 
367, 117 Stat. 423-24. The letter of intent agreements entered into 
between TSA and the airport authorities, though not a binding 
commitment of federal funding, represent TSA's intent to reimburse the 
airport authority for costs incurred in executing the security 
improvement project--in future years and up to the agreed upon amount-
-contingent upon the receipt and availability of sufficient 
appropriations to fulfill the agreement. 

[60] Other transaction agreements are administrative vehicles used by 
TSA to directly fund airport operators for smaller airport modification 
projects without undertaking a long-term commitment. These transactions 
take many forms and are generally not required to comply with federal 
laws and regulations that apply to contracts, grants, or cooperative 
agreements; and enable the federal government and others entering into 
these agreements to freely negotiate provisions that are mutually 
agreeable. 

[61] The Aviation Security Capital Fund provides TSA with a mandatory 
appropriation of $250 million for each of fiscal years 2004 through 
2007 in support of airport improvement projects related to the 
installation of explosive detection systems. See 49 U.S.C. § 44923. A 
provision of the DHS Appropriations Act, 2004, precluded the use of 
passenger security fees to establish the capital fund in fiscal year 
2004, but the capital fund has been made available to TSA in each of 
fiscal years 2005 through 2007. Congress must reauthorize the capital 
fund for it to continue beyond fiscal year 2007. 

[62] Of the $250 million available through the Aviation Security 
Capital Fund, $125 million is designated as priority funding to fulfill 
letters of intent, with the remaining $125 million available for 
allocation in accordance with a formula based on the size of the 
airport and risks to aviation security. See 49 U.S.C. § 44923(h). 

[63] Funds appropriated pursuant to this authorization must follow the 
same 50 percent split as mandated under the Aviation Security Capital 
Fund. See 49 U.S.C. § 44923(i). 

[64] Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group Report, Baggage 
Screening Investment Study Prepared for the Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee, August 9, 2006. 

[65] Tax credit bonds are bonds where bondholders receive credit 
against their federal income tax liabilities instead of cash interest. 

[66] The Passenger Facility Charge Program allows the collection of PFC 
fees up to $4.50 for every enplaned passenger at commercial airports 
controlled by public agencies. Airports use these fees to fund FAA- 
approved projects that enhance safety, security, or capacity; reduce 
noise; or increase air carrier competition. 

[67] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, TSA's Air Cargo Strategic 
Plan, November 2003. 

[68] TSA's Office of Intelligence (formerly know as the Transportation 
Security Intelligence Service) does not independently gather 
intelligence information but rather produces threat assessments using 
available intelligence from sources such as DHS's Directorate of 
Information Analysis, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
Central Intelligence Agency. The details of TSA's threat assessment are 
classified. 

[69] At the departmental level, DHS does not have any efforts under way 
specifically aimed at assessing the vulnerabilities of inbound air 
cargo. However, agency officials stated that the Office of 
Infrastructure Protection, an office within DHS charged with 
coordinating national critical infrastructure protection efforts, is 
coordinating with TSA on conducting risk assessments associated with 
U.S. airports. 

[70] A known shipper is an individual or business with an established 
history of shipping cargo on passenger carriers. 

[71] 71 Fed. Reg. 30,478 (May 26, 2006). 

[72] GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen 
Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: October 
2005). 

[73] TSA compliance inspections are fundamentally different from air 
carriers' inspections of air cargo. TSA inspections are designed to 
ensure air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements, 
while air carrier inspections focus on ensuring that air cargo does not 
contain an improvised explosive device or human stowaway. 

[74] The Conference Report accompanying the Department of Homeland 
Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub L. No. 109-90, directed $30 
million to the Science and Technology Directorate to conduct three 
cargo screening pilot programs testing different concepts of operation. 
See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-241, at 53 (2005). 

[75] Computer-aided tomography is a method of producing a three- 
dimensional image of the internal structures of an object from a large 
series of two-dimensional X-ray images taken around a single axis of 
rotation. 

[76] Aviation Security Advisory Committee, Working Group Report, 
Baggage Screening Investment Study Prepared for the Aviation Security 
Advisory Committee, August 9, 2006. 

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