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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and 
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT: 

Tuesday, July 25, 2006: 

DOD Excess Property: 

Control Breakdowns Present Significant Security Risk and Continuing 
Waste and Inefficiency: 

Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and 
Special Investigations: 

John P. Ryan, Assistant Director Forensic Audits and Special 
Investigations: 

GAO-06-981T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-981T, testimony before the Subcommittee on 
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In light of GAO’s past three testimonies and two reports on problems 
with controls over excess DOD property, GAO was asked to perform follow-
up investigations to determine if (1) unauthorized parties could obtain 
sensitive excess military equipment that requires demilitarization 
(destruction) when no longer needed by DOD and (2) system and process 
improvements are adequate to prevent sales of new, unused excess items 
that DOD continues to buy or that are in demand by the military 
services. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO investigators posing as private citizens purchased several 
sensitive military equipment items from DOD’s liquidation sales 
contractor, indicating that DOD has not enforced security controls for 
preventing sensitive excess military equipment from release to the 
public. GAO investigators at liquidation sales purchased ceramic body 
armor inserts currently used by deployed troops, a cesium technology 
timing unit with global positioning capabilities, a universal frequency 
counter, two guided missile radar test sets, 12 digital microcircuits 
used in F-14 fighter aircraft, and numerous other items. GAO was able 
to purchase these items because controls broke down at virtually every 
step in the excess property turn-in and disposal process. GAO 
determined that thousands of military items that should have been 
demilitarized (destroyed) were sold to the public. Further, in June 
2006, GAO undercover investigators posing as DOD contractor employees 
entered two excess property warehouses and obtained about $1.1 million 
in sensitive military equipment items, including two launcher mounts 
for shoulder-fired guided missiles, several types of body armor, a 
digital signal converter used in naval surveillance, an all-band 
antenna used to track aircraft, and six circuit cards used in 
computerized Navy systems. At no point during GAO’s warehouse security 
penetration were its investigators challenged on their identity and 
authority to obtain DOD military property. The table below shows 
examples of sensitive military equipment obtained during GAO’s 
undercover operations. 

Figures: Sensitive Military Equipment Obtained during GAO's Undercover 
Tests: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO, Moog Corporation for antenna. 

[End of Figure] 

GAO investigators posing as private citizens also bought several new, 
unused items currently being purchased or in demand by the military 
services from DOD’s excess property liquidation sales contractor. 
Although military units paid full price for these items when they 
ordered them from supply inventory, GAO paid a fraction of this cost to 
purchase the same items, demonstrating continuing waste and 
inefficiency. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO briefed DOD management on the results of its follow-up 
investigation and provided additional perspectives on ways to resolve 
the control breakdowns that resulted in public sales of sensitive 
excess military equipment and new, unused excess items that the 
military services continue to use. In its comments on GAO’s draft 
report, DOD stated that given the time allotted to comment, the 
department was not able to do a detailed review and has no comments at 
this time. DOD also commented that it continues to implement changes to 
procedures based on GAO’s May 2005 report (GAO-05-277). 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-981T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 
512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our recent investigation of 
Department of Defense (DOD) excess property controls. This testimony is 
the fourth in a series of testimonies and reports to this 
Subcommittee,[Footnote 1] detailing serious breakdowns in management 
processes, systems, and controls that have resulted in lost and missing 
property and substantial waste and inefficiency in DOD's excess 
property reutilization program. Our June 2002 testimony and our 
November 2003 report documented instances where DOD sold to the public 
items such as Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology 
(JSLIST)[Footnote 2] and other chemical and biological protective suits 
and related gear that should have been restricted to DOD-use only. Our 
November 2003 report also identified several examples to show that at 
the same time DOD excessed biological equipment items in good or 
excellent condition and sold many of them to the public for pennies on 
the dollar, it was purchasing the same or similar items. Our May 2005 
report stated that DOD reported $466 million in lost, damaged, and 
missing excess property from fiscal years 2002 through 2004, including 
property with demilitarization restrictions,[Footnote 3] such as 
chemical and biological protective suits, body armor, and guided 
missile warheads. Some of the missing restricted items had been 
improperly sold to the public. Further, our May 2005 report noted that 
during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the military services needlessly 
spent at least $400 million to purchase new items instead of reusing 
identical excess items in new and unused condition (A-condition). As a 
result, the new, unused excess items were sold for pennies on the 
dollar while the military services paid the full acquisition price to 
order these items from Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supply depots. 

Our recent investigative tests of controls over sensitive excess 
military equipment and technology items that require demilitarization 
focused on determining whether (1) DOD was improperly selling these 
items to the public[Footnote 4] and (2) excess property warehouse 
facilities had adequate security to prevent unauthorized parties from 
obtaining excess military items with demilitarization restrictions. Our 
investigative tests of controls for preventing liquidation sales of 
new, unused excess items that DOD is continuing to buy or that are in 
demand by the military services focused on whether these items were 
continuing to be sold to the public. We used publicly available 
information to develop undercover identities and techniques used in our 
investigations. We conducted our investigations from November 2005 
through June 2006 in accordance with quality standards for 
investigators as set forth by the President's Council on Integrity and 
Efficiency. 

Today, we will summarize the results of our recent work with respect to 
whether (1) unauthorized parties could obtain sensitive excess military 
equipment that requires demilitarization when no longer needed by DOD 
and (2) systems and process improvements are adequate to prevent 
liquidation sales of A-condition items that DOD is continuing to buy or 
that are in demand by the military services. In addition, we will 
highlight the status of DOD corrective actions on the recommendations 
in our May 2005 report. The details of our work are included in our 
investigative report, which the Subcommittee is releasing 
today.[Footnote 5] 

Summary: 

Posing as private citizens to disguise our identity, our investigators 
identified and purchased numerous sensitive excess DOD military 
technology items that should have been demilitarized instead of being 
sold to the public. Sensitive excess military equipment we purchased at 
DOD excess property liquidation sales auctions included ceramic body 
armor inserts currently used by deployed troops, a time selector unit 
used to ensure the accuracy of computer-based equipment, such as global 
positioning systems and system-level clocks, a universal frequency 
counter used to ensure that the frequency of communication gear is 
running at the expected rate, two guided missile radar test sets, at 
least 12 digital microcircuits used in F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft, 
and numerous other sensitive electronic parts. We were able to purchase 
these items because controls broke down at virtually every step in the 
excess property turn-in and disposal process. Also, in instances where 
DOD required an End-Use Certificate (EUC)[Footnote 6] as a condition of 
sale, our undercover investigator was able to successfully defeat the 
screening process by submitting bogus documentation and providing 
plausible explanations for discrepancies in his documentation. 

In addition, posing as DOD contractor employees[Footnote 7] our 
undercover investigators were able to easily penetrate security at two 
separate locations in June 2006 and obtain at no cost directly from 
excess inventory warehouses, numerous sensitive military equipment 
items valued at about $1.1 million that should not have been released 
outside of DOD. The items we obtained included two launcher mounts for 
shoulder-fired guided missiles, several types of body armor, a digital 
signal converter used in naval electronic surveillance, an all-band 
antenna used to track aircraft, six circuit cards used in computerized 
Navy systems, and several other items in use by the military services. 
The body armor could be used in terrorist or other criminal activity. 
Many of the other military items have weapons applications that also 
would be useful to terrorists. Our undercover investigators were able 
to obtain these items because Defense Reutilization and Marketing 
Office (DRMO)[Footnote 8] personnel did not confirm their identity and 
authorization to requisition excess DOD property items. The DRMO 
personnel even helped our undercover investigators load the items into 
our van. 

We also made several undercover purchases of new, unused A-condition 
excess DOD items, including wet-weather parkas, cold-weather desert 
camouflage parkas, a portable field x-ray processing enclosure, high- 
security locks used to secure the back bay of logistics trucks, a 
gasoline engine, and a refrigerant recovery system used for servicing 
automotive vehicles. The items we purchased at DOD liquidation sales 
were being ordered from supply inventory by military units at or near 
the time of our purchases and for one supply depot stocked item--the 
portable x-ray enclosure--no items were in stock when we made our 
purchase. At the time of our purchase, DOD's liquidation contractor 
sold 40 of these x-ray enclosures with a total reported acquisition 
cost of $289,400 for a liquidation sales price of $2,914--about a penny 
on the dollar. In another example, we purchased a gasoline engine in 
March 2006 for $355. The Marine Corps ordered 4 of these gas engines 
from DLA supply inventory in June 2006 and paid $3,119 each for them. 
At the time of our undercover purchase, 20 identical gasoline engines 
with a reported acquisition cost of $62,380 were sold to the public for 
a total liquidation sales price of $6,221. Our investigation 
demonstrated that the problems we reported on in May 2005 have not been 
fully resolved and there is continuing waste and inefficiency in DOD's 
excess property reutilization program. 

We provided a detailed corrective action briefing to DOD on June 28, 
2006. DOD managers told us they shared our concern about the breakdowns 
in security controls that allowed sensitive military items requiring 
demilitarization to be sold to the public. They asked us for pertinent 
documentation obtained during our investigations to support their 
follow-up inquiries and corrective action plans. We provided this 
information on June 30, 2006, along with documentation to show that the 
military services were still ordering and using the excess A-condition 
items that we purchased. In addition, we provided a draft of our 
investigative report to DOD for comment on July 10, 2006. In commenting 
on our draft report, DOD stated that given the time allotted to 
comment,the department was not able to perform a detailed review and 
has no comments at this time. DOD also stated that it continues to 
implement changes to procedures based on our May 2005 report.[Footnote 
9] 

Undercover Acquisitions of Sensitive Excess Military Items Identifies 
National Security Risk: 

Posing as private citizens, our undercover investigators purchased 
several sensitive excess military equipment items that were improperly 
sold to the public at DOD liquidation sales. These items included three 
ceramic body armor inserts identified as small arms protective inserts 
(SAPI), which are the ceramic inserts currently in demand by soldiers 
in Iraq and Afghanistan; a time selector unit used to ensure the 
accuracy of computer-based equipment, such as global positioning 
systems and system-level clocks; 12 digital microcircuits used in F-14 
Tomcat fighter aircraft; guided missile radar test sets used to check 
the operation of the data link antenna on the Navy's Walleye (AGM-62) 
air-to-ground guided missile; and numerous other electronic items. In 
instances where DOD required an EUC as a condition of sale, our 
undercover investigator was able to successfully defeat the screening 
process by submitting bogus documentation and providing plausible 
explanations for discrepancies in his documentation. In addition, we 
identified at least 79 buyers for 216 sales transactions involving 
2,669 sensitive military items that DOD's liquidation contractor sold 
to the public between November 2005 and June 2006. We are referring 
information on these sales to the appropriate federal law enforcement 
agencies for further investigation. 

Our investigators also posed as DOD contractor employees, entered DRMOs 
in two east coast states, and obtained several other items that are 
currently in use by the military services. DRMO personnel even helped 
us load the items into our van. These items included two launcher 
mounts for shoulder-fired guided missiles, an all-band antenna used to 
track aircraft, 16 body armor vests, body armor throat and groin 
protectors, six circuit card assemblies used in computerized Navy 
systems, and two Palm V personal data assistant (PDA) organizers. 

Sensitive Excess Military Items Purchased at DOD Excess Property 
Liquidation Sales: 

Using a fictitious identity as a private citizen, our undercover 
investigator applied for and received an account with DOD's liquidation 
sales contractor. Our investigator was then able to purchase several 
sensitive excess military items noted above that were being improperly 
sold to the public. During our undercover purchases, our investigator 
engaged in numerous conversations with liquidation sales contractor 
staff during warehouse inspections of items advertised for sale and 
with DRMS and DLA's Criminal Investigative Activity (DCIA) staff during 
the processing of our EUCs. On one occasion our undercover investigator 
was told by a DCIA official that information provided on his EUC 
application had no match to official data and that he had no credit 
history. Our investigator responded with a plausible story and 
submitted a bogus utility bill to confirm his mailing address. 
Following these screening procedures, the EUC was approved by DCIA and 
our undercover investigator was able to purchase our targeted excess 
military items. Once our initial EUC was approved, our subsequent EUC 
applications were approved based on the information on file. Although 
the sensitive military items that we purchased had a reported 
acquisition cost of $461,427, we paid a liquidation sales price of $914 
for them--less than a penny on the dollar. 

We observed numerous sales of additional excess sensitive military 
items that were improperly advertised for sale or sold to the public, 
including fire control components for weapon systems, body armor, and 
weapon system components. The demilitarization codes for these items 
required either key point or total destruction rather than disposal 
through public sale. Although we placed bids to purchase some of these 
items, we lost to higher bidders. We identified at least 79 buyers for 
216 public liquidation sales transactions involving 2,669 sensitive 
military items. On July 13, 2006, we briefed federal law enforcement 
and intelligence officials on the details of our investigation. We are 
referring public sales of sensitive military equipment items to the 
federal law enforcement agencies for further investigation and recovery 
of the sensitive military equipment. 

During our undercover operations, we also noted 13 advertised sales 
events, including 179 items that were subject to demilitarization 
controls, where the items were not sold. In 5 of these sales involving 
113 sensitive military parts, it appears that DOD or its liquidation 
sales contractor caught the error in demilitarization codes and pulled 
the items from sale. One of these instances involved an F-14 fin panel 
assembly that we had targeted for an undercover purchase. During our 
undercover inspection of this item prior to sale, a contractor official 
told our investigator that the government was in the process of 
changing demilitarization codes on all F-14 parts and it was likely 
that the fin panel assembly would be removed from sale. Of the 
remaining 8 sales lots containing 66 sensitive military parts, we could 
not determine whether the items were not sold because DOD or its 
contractor caught the demilitarization coding errors or because minimum 
bids were not received during the respective sales events. 

Sensitive Military Items Obtained through Inside Penetrations of DRMO 
Security: 

Our investigators used publicly available information to develop 
fictitious identities as DOD contractor personnel and enter DRMO 
warehouses (referred to as DRMO A and DRMO B) in two east coast states 
on separate occasions in June 2006, to requisition excess sensitive 
military parts and equipment valued at about $1.1 million. Our 
investigators were able to search for and identify excess items without 
supervision. In addition, DRMO personnel assisted our investigators in 
locating other targeted items in the warehouse and loading these items 
into our van. At no point during either visit, did DRMO personnel 
attempt to verify with the actual contractor that our investigators 
were, in fact, contractor employees. 

During the undercover penetration at DRMO A, our investigators obtained 
numerous sensitive military items that were required to be destroyed 
when no longer needed by DOD to prevent them from falling into the 
wrong hands. These items included two guided missile launcher mounts 
for shoulder-fired missiles, six Kevlar body armor fragmentation vests, 
a digital signal converter used in naval electronic surveillance, and 
an all-band antenna used to track aircraft. 

Posing as employees for the same DOD contractor identity used during 
our June 2006 penetration at DRMO A, our investigators entered DRMO B a 
day later for the purpose of testing security controls at that 
location. DRMO officials appeared to be unaware of our security 
penetration at DRMO A the previous day. During the DRMO B undercover 
penetration, our investigators obtained 10 older technology body armor 
fragmentation vests, throat and groin protection armor, six circuit 
card assemblies used in Navy computerized systems, and two Palm V 
personal digital assistants (PDA) that were certified as having their 
hard drives removed. Because PDAs do not have hard drives, after 
successfully requisitioning them, we asked our Information Technology 
(IT) security expert to test them and our expert confirmed that all 
sensitive information had been properly removed.[Footnote 10] 

Shortly after leaving the second DRMO, our investigators received a 
call from a contractor official whose employees they had impersonated. 
The official had been monitoring his company's requisitions of excess 
DOD property and noticed transactions that did not appear to represent 
activity by his company. He contacted personnel at DRMO A, obtained the 
phone number on our bogus excess property screening letter, and called 
us. Upon receiving the call from the contractor official, our lead 
investigative agent explained that he was with GAO, and we had 
performed a government test. 

Waste Associated with Sales of A-Condition Excess Items that Military 
Services Are Continuing to Use in Operations: 

Because significant numbers of new, unused A-condition excess items 
still being purchased or in use by the military services are being 
disposed of through liquidation sales, it was easy for our undercover 
investigator to pose as a liquidation sales customer and purchase 
several of these items for a fraction of what the military services are 
paying to obtain these same items from DLA supply depots. For example, 
we paid $1,146 for several wet-weather and cold-weather parkas, a 
portable field x-ray enclosure, high-security locks, a gasoline engine 
that can be used as part of a generator system or as a compressor, and 
a refrigerant recovery system used to service air conditioning systems 
on automobiles. The military services would have paid a total 
acquisition cost of $16,300 for these items if ordered from supply 
inventory, plus a charge for processing their order.[Footnote 11] 

Several of the items we purchased at liquidation sales events were 
being ordered from supply inventory by military units at or near the 
time of our purchase, and for one supply depot stocked item--the 
portable field x-ray enclosure--no items were in stock at the time we 
made our undercover purchase. At the time of our purchase, DOD's 
liquidation contractor sold 40 of these x-ray enclosures with a total 
reported acquisition cost of $289,400 for a liquidation sales price of 
$2,914--about a penny on the dollar. We paid a liquidation sales price 
of $87 for the x-ray enclosure which had a reported acquisition cost of 
$7,235. In another example, we purchased a gasoline engine in March 
2006 for $355. The Marine Corps ordered 4 of these gas engines from DLA 
supply inventory in June 2006 and paid $3,119 each for them. At the 
time of our undercover purchase, 20 identical gasoline engines with a 
reported acquisition cost of $62,380 were sold to the public for a 
total liquidation sales price of $6,221, also about a penny on the 
dollar. 

Status of DOD Corrective Actions: 

In response to recommendations in our May 2005 report,[Footnote 12] DOD 
has taken a number of actions to improve systems, processes, and 
controls over excess property. Most of these efforts have focused on 
improving the economy and efficiency of DOD's excess property 
reutilization program. However, as demonstrated by our tests of 
security controls over sensitive excess military equipment, DOD does 
not yet have effective controls in place to prevent unauthorized 
parties from obtaining these items. For example, although DLA and DRMS 
have emphasized policies that prohibit batch lotting[Footnote 13] of 
sensitive military equipment items, we observed many of these items 
being sold in batch lots during our investigation and we were able to 
purchase several of them. In addition, DLA and DRMS have not ensured 
that DRMO personnel and DOD's liquidation sales contractor are 
verifying demilitarization codes on excess property turn-in 
documentation to assure appropriate disposal actions for items 
requiring demilitarization. 

Further, although DLA and DRMS implemented several initiatives to 
improve the overall reutilization rate for excess A-condition items, 
our analysis of DRMS data found that the reported reutilization rate as 
of June 30, 2006, remained the same as we had previously reported-- 
about 12 percent.[Footnote 14] This is primarily because DLA 
reutilization initiatives are limited to using available excess A- 
condition items to fill customer orders and to maintain established 
supply inventory retention levels. As a result, excess A-condition 
items that are not needed to fill existing orders or replenish supply 
inventory are disposed of outside of DOD through transfers, donations, 
and public sales, which made it easy for us to purchase excess new, 
unused DOD items. 

Despite the limited reutilization supply systems approach for 
reutilization of A-condition excess items, DLA and DRMS data show that 
overall system and process improvements since the Subcommittee's June 
2005 hearing have saved $38.1 million through June 2006. According to 
DLA data, interim supply system initiatives using the Automated Asset 
Recoupment Program, which is part of an old DOD legacy system, achieved 
reutilization savings of nearly $2.3 million since July 2005 and 
Business System Modernization supply system initiatives implemented in 
January 2006 as promised at the Subcommittee's June 2005 hearing, have 
resulted in reutilization savings of nearly $1.1 million. In addition, 
DRMS reported that excess property marketing initiatives implemented in 
late March 2006 have resulted in reutilization savings of a little over 
$34.8 million through June 2006. These initiatives include marketing 
techniques using Web photographs of high-dollar items and e-mail 
notices to repeat customers about the availability of A-condition items 
that they had previously selected for reutilization. 

Concluding Remarks: 

Our most recent work shows that sensitive military equipment items are 
still being improperly released by DOD and sold to the public, posing a 
significant national security risk. The sensitive nature of these items 
requires particularly stringent internal security controls. Our tests, 
which were performed over a short duration, were limited to our 
observations, meaning that the problem may likely be more significant 
than what we identified. Although we have referred the sales of items 
identified during our investigation to federal law enforcement agencies 
for follow-up, the solution to this problem is to enforce controls for 
preventing improper release of these items outside DOD. Further, 
liquidation sales of items that military units are continuing to 
purchase at full cost from supply inventory demonstrates continuing 
waste to the taxpayer and inefficiency in DOD's excess property 
reutilization program. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement. 
I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of 
the committee may have at this time. 

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D. 
Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Major contributors to this 
testimony include Mario L. Artesiano, Donald L. Bumgardner, Matthew S. 
Brown, Paul R. Desaulniers, Stephen P. Donahue, Lauren S. Fassler, 
Gayle L. Fischer, Cinnimon Glozer, Jason Kelly, John Ledford, Barbara 
C. Lewis, Richard C. Newbold, John P. Ryan, Lori B. Ryza, Lisa M. 
Warde, and Emily C. Wold. 

Technical expertise was provided by Keith A. Rhodes, Chief 
Technologist, and Harold Lewis, Assistant Director, Information 
Technology Security, Applied Research and Methods. 



FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, DOD Excess Property: Management Control Breakdowns Result in 
Substantial Waste and Inefficiency, GAO-05-277 (Washington, D.C.: May 
13, 2005) and GAO-05-723T (Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2005); DOD Excess 
Property: Risk Assessment Needed on Public Sales of Equipment That 
Could Be Used to Make Biological Agents, GAO-04-81TNI (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 7, 2003) and GAO-04-15NI (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003); 
and DOD Management: Examples of Inefficient and Ineffective Business 
Processes, GAO-02-873T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002). 

[2] JSLIST is a universal, lightweight, two-piece garment (coat and 
trousers) that when combined with footwear, gloves, and a protective 
mask and breathing device, forms the warfighter's protective ensemble. 
The ensemble is to provide maximum protection to the warfighter against 
chemical and biological contaminants without negatively affecting the 
ability to perform mission tasks. JSLIST is the current model 
protective suit used by the military services. 

[3] DOD-4160.21-M-1, Defense Demilitarization Manual (1995), contains 
DOD policy related to controls over items with significant military 
technology application. 

[4] In concert with the federal government's E-government policy to use 
information technology (IT) investments to deliver services and 
information to citizens electronically, DOD's excess property 
liquidation sales are conducted over the Internet. OMB, Implementation 
Guidance for the E-Government Act of 2002, M-03-18, at att. A, ¶ B, 1 
(Aug. 1, 2003). 

[5] GAO, DOD Excess Property: Control Breakdowns Present Significant 
Security Risk and Continuing Waste and Inefficiency, GAO-06-943 
(Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2006). 

[6] An EUC is a form used by DOD to document the intended destination 
and disposition of sensitive, controlled items released from the 
department. 

[7] Under DOD's excess property reutilization program, DOD contractors 
are treated the same as DOD units and are not charged for excess 
property items they requisition for reuse. 

[8] DRMOs are excess property warehouses operated by the Defense 
Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS), which is the agency within 
DLA charged with managing DOD's excess property disposal system. 

[9] GAO-05-277. 

[10] Our IT expert used National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) utilities recommended for forensic analysis to run the tests. 
See NIST Pub. 800-72, Guidelines on PDA Forensics (November 2004). 

[11] As noted in our May 2005 report, the weighted average cost for 
warehousing and shipping all supply items was 20.7 percent in fiscal 
year 2003. 

[12] GAO-05-277. 

[13] Batch lotting refers to combining one or more items, or a mixed 
group of items, on the same turn-in document or sales lot. 

[14] GAO-05-277 and GAO-05-729T. 

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