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entitled 'Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Differences in 
Health Care Prices Across Metropolitan Areas Linked to Competition and 
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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Ways and Means, House 
of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 11:30 a.m. CST: 

Friday, December 2, 2005: 

Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: 

Differences in Health Care Prices Across Metropolitan Areas Linked to 
Competition and Other Factors: 

Statement of A. Bruce Steinwald: 

Director, Health Care: 

GAO-06-281T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-281T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Health, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Differences in utilization of health care services across the country 
have been well documented, but less has been reported on geographic 
variation in price. As health care spending is the product of 
utilization and price, information on health care prices and factors 
contributing to price differences provides an additional perspective on 
drivers of health care spending. In an August 2005 report, GAO examined 
claims data on enrollees of preferred provider organizations (PPO) 
participating in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) 
and found substantial price variation across metropolitan areas, after 
adjusting prices to account for area differences in the cost of 
providing services and in the types of services provided. 

This statement is based on GAO’s August 2005 report entitled Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Program: Competition and Other Factors Linked 
to Wide Variation in Health Care Prices (GAO-05-856). It focuses on (1) 
factors that underlie area differences in price and (2) the 
contribution of price to geographic differences in spending on health 
care. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO found that market characteristics were closely associated with 
price differences across metropolitan areas for the FEHBP PPOs we 
reviewed. Areas with the least competitive markets—that is, areas with 
a higher percentage of hospital beds concentrated in the two largest 
hospitals or hospital networks—had prices of hospital stays and 
physician services that were higher than areas with the most 
competitive markets. The percentage of primary care physicians’ 
reimbursement that was paid on a capitation basis in health maintenance 
organizations (HMO)—a proxy for a payer’s power to bargain with 
providers on price—was also associated with geographic price variation. 
We found that in areas where either market share was concentrated among 
few providers or HMO bargaining power was weak (as measured by lower 
levels of HMO capitation), hospital and physician prices paid by the 
PPOs in our study were higher than average. When we controlled for 
other factors that might be associated with geographic price variation, 
hospital competition and payer bargaining power remained associated 
with lower prices, but the effect was reduced, and much variation 
remained unexplained. 

Price contributed to geographic differences in spending per enrollee, 
but less than utilization. For both hospital and physician services, 
price contributed to about one-third and utilization to about two-
thirds of the variation in spending between metropolitan areas in the 
highest and lowest spending quartiles. Price was positively associated 
with spending, as was utilization, for both hospital and physician 
services. Therefore, areas with either high prices or high utilization 
tended to also have high spending. In the case of physician services, 
price and utilization were modestly but negatively associated, such 
that areas with high physician prices tended to have somewhat lower 
utilization of physician services and areas with low physician prices 
tended to have somewhat higher utilization of physician services. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-281T. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact A. Bruce Steinwald at 
(202) 512-7101 or steinwalda@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Madam Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the findings from our August 2005 
report entitled Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Competition 
and Other Factors Linked to Wide Variation in Health Care 
Prices.[Footnote 1] In this report, we examined differences in prices 
paid for hospital stays and physician services across selected 
metropolitan areas in 2001,[Footnote 2] the most recent year for which 
data were available when the study began. Differences in utilization of 
health care services across the country have been well documented, but 
less has been reported on geographic variation in price. As health care 
spending is the product of utilization and price, more information on 
health care prices and factors contributing to price differences 
provides an additional perspective on drivers of health care spending. 

Our study examined claims data on behalf of more than 2 million 
enrollees of preferred provider organizations (PPO) participating in 
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). The prices these 
PPOs negotiated with physicians and hospitals were the same for the 
enrollees in FEHBP as for PPO enrollees insured through other 
employers. Our study found that prices for FEHBP PPO hospital stays 
varied by more than 250 percent and prices for physician services 
varied by about 100 percent across metropolitan areas. We adjusted 
prices to account for area differences in the cost of providing 
services and in the types of services provided using Medicare's methods 
of adjusting hospital and physician payments for these area 
differences, with some modifications. 

A detailed account of our findings and methodology is included in our 
August 2005 report. My remarks today will focus on (1) factors that 
underlie area differences in price and (2) the contribution of price to 
geographic differences in spending on health care. These remarks are 
based on the information contained in the report. The work done for the 
report was performed from September 2002 through July 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary, market characteristics were closely associated with price 
differences across metropolitan areas. Areas with the least competitive 
markets--that is, areas with a higher percentage of hospital beds 
concentrated in the two largest hospitals or hospital networks--had 
prices of hospital stays and physician services that were higher than 
areas with the most competitive markets. The percentage of primary care 
physicians' reimbursement that was paid on a capitation basis in health 
maintenance organizations (HMO)--a proxy for a payer's power to bargain 
with providers on price[Footnote 3] --was also associated with 
geographic price variation.[Footnote 4] We found that in areas where 
either market share was concentrated among few providers or HMO 
bargaining power was weak (as measured by lower levels of HMO 
capitation), hospital and physician prices paid by the PPOs in our 
study were higher than average. When we controlled for other factors 
that might be associated with geographic price variation, hospital 
competition and payer bargaining power remained associated with lower 
prices, but the effect was reduced, and much variation remained 
unexplained. 

Price contributed to geographic differences in spending per enrollee, 
but less than utilization. For both hospital and physician services, 
price contributed to about one-third and utilization to about two- 
thirds of the variation in spending between metropolitan areas in the 
highest and lowest spending quartiles. Price was positively associated 
with spending, as was utilization, for both hospital and physician 
services. Therefore, areas with either high prices or high utilization 
tended to also have high spending. 

Background: 

In public programs, such as Medicare, prices are administratively set, 
whereas in the private sector, prices are generally negotiated between 
providers and health insurers, or payers. Payers may negotiate 
discounted rates with providers, for example, in exchange for an 
anticipated share of patient volume. Some payers, especially HMOs, may 
negotiate capitation arrangements with providers, under which the fixed 
payment per patient puts providers at risk of losing financially if the 
costs of treating a patient exceed the payment. In contrast to this 
arrangement, which fixes the provider's payment regardless of the 
number of services provided, the traditional fee-for-service 
arrangement affords providers the opportunity to increase payments by 
increasing the volume of services provided. Payers that can negotiate a 
capitated rather than fee-for-service payment arrangement with 
providers likely have more negotiating power relative to providers, 
which in turn can affect prices. In our study, we measured payer 
negotiating power in a metropolitan area as the percentage of 
compensation that was capitated for primary care physicians. 

The extent of competition among providers in an area may also affect 
prices. In general, economic theory holds that areas with more 
competition among providers are likely to have lower prices. 
Consolidation of providers, such as hospital mergers, reduces the 
number of competitors in the market, giving the consolidated 
competitors a larger market share. Recent trends of provider 
consolidation suggest that some markets are becoming less competitive. 

Competition, Payer Bargaining Power, Associated with Area Price 
Differences: 

We found that in metropolitan areas where market share was concentrated 
among few providers or HMO bargaining power was weak (as measured by 
lower levels of HMO capitation), hospital and physician prices paid by 
the PPOs (in FEHBP) were higher than average. Many of the metropolitan 
areas in our study had few providers in competition; about one in four 
areas had only one or two hospitals or hospital networks serving the 
entire market. In these areas, prices for hospital stays and physician 
services--after adjusting for differences in these areas' cost of doing 
business and mix of services--were substantially higher than prices in 
the most competitive metropolitan areas. For example, in Rapid City, 
South Dakota, one of the least competitive markets in our study, 
hospital and physician prices were higher than average by 25 percent 
and 10 percent, respectively. In contrast, the hospital and physician 
prices in Pittsburgh, one of the most competitive markets in our study, 
were lower than average by 14 percent and 16 percent, 
respectively.[Footnote 5] 

FEHBP PPO hospital and physician prices were also higher, on average, 
in metropolitan areas with low levels of HMO capitation, suggesting 
little power on the part of payers to negotiate with providers on 
price. Across all metropolitan areas in our study, the average 
percentage of primary care physicians' compensation that was capitated 
was about 8 percent. More than a third of the areas in our study had 
almost no HMO capitation; in these areas, less than 1 percent, on 
average, of the payments to primary care physicians were paid on a 
capitated basis. In the quartile of metropolitan areas with the highest 
levels of HMO capitation, the average proportion of primary care 
physicians' compensation that was capitated was 23 percent. 

Price Contributed to Geographic Differences in Spending, but Less than 
Utilization: 

Our study showed that prices contributed substantially to geographic 
differences in spending for hospital and physician care, but to a 
lesser extent than utilization. When we compared price differences and 
utilization differences in the metropolitan areas with the highest and 
lowest quartile of spending per enrollee, we found that the price of 
hospital stays contributed to about one-third of area differences in 
spending on hospital care while utilization--that is, the number of 
hospital stays--contributed to the remaining two-thirds. We found a 
similar relationship between the price of physician services and an 
area's spending on physician care--namely, one-third of spending 
differences was attributable to price differences and two-thirds was 
attributable to service use differences. We also found positive 
associations between price and spending and between utilization and 
spending. That is, areas with higher prices or higher utilization also 
tended to have higher spending. In the case of physician services, 
price and utilization were modestly but negatively associated, such 
that areas with high physician prices tended to have somewhat lower 
utilization of physician services and areas with low physician prices 
tended to have somewhat higher utilization of physician services. 

Concluding Observations: 

In conclusion, our study results underscore the importance of examining 
an area's market structure--including interactions between payers and 
providers--to fully understand private sector spending differences from 
one area to another. We found that, in addition to utilization of 
services, prices played a significant role in an area's total health 
care spending. Therefore, it is important for participants and policy 
makers in geographic markets to understand the effect of prices as well 
as utilization on health care spending to make informed decisions about 
the actions needed to moderate spending in their local area. 

Madame Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy 
to answer any questions you or the other Subcommittee Members may have. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact A. 
Bruce Steinwald at (202) 512-7101 or steinwalda@gao.gov. Christine 
Brudevold, Assistant Director; Hannah Fein; and Michael Kendix 
contributed to this statement. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO-05-856 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2005). 

[2] We excluded some of the 331 metropolitan areas in the 50 states and 
the District of Columbia for lack of adequate claims information or 
sufficient number of hospital stays to support our analyses. We had a 
sufficient volume of hospital stays and physician services to analyze 
hospital prices in 232 metropolitan areas and physician prices in 319 
metropolitan areas. 

[3] We use the term providers to refer to hospitals, physicians, and 
other providers of health care services unless otherwise specified. 

[4] Capitation is a payment method used by managed care organizations 
where physicians are paid a fixed, predetermined payment for caring for 
an enrollee for a specified period of time, regardless of the number or 
type of services ultimately provided 

[5] Rapid City, South Dakota was in the quartile with the least 
competition, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania was in the quartile with the 
most competition.